Journal articles by Attila Havas
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 48: 100754, 2023
This article is a first attempt towards building an integrative analytical framework to study goa... more This article is a first attempt towards building an integrative analytical framework to study goaloriented transformative change (GOTC) processes, defined as system-transforming processes that are guided by the ambition to resolve current or expected future societal challenges. GOTC can only start once a broad range of possible major overarching goals are considered by key stakeholders and major relevant actors are committed to act. Hence, there is a need for widening the scope of the extant, partial conceptual models to consider the co-evolutionary interactions between technology, economy, and society to better understand and effectively guide and/or assess GOTC. This claim is based on our focussed review of Innovation Studies, Social Innovation, and Sustainability Transitions research. We offer four building blocks for an integrative framework to analyse GOTC: its overarching goal and specific objectives; objects, types, and levels of change; mechanisms of change; and a set of criteria to assess change.
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Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2021
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Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2021
We contribute to the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) literature in two ways: (i) we con... more We contribute to the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) literature in two ways: (i) we consider how societal aspects are taken into account in research and innovation (R&I) activities in four fundamentally different scenarios, as opposed to analysing current practices; and (ii) put the emphasis on the political conditions of the interactions among the actors, as opposed to focussing on RRI principles and instruments. In the Kingdom of RRI citizens participate directly in decision-making processes; Fortress Europe depicts a libertarian system; Failed Democracy is a populist regime; while Benevolent Green Eurocrats describes a technocratically coordinated strong state. The scenarios offer novel insights into the nature and repercussions of possible policy problems, that is, efficacy; efficiency; legitimacy of R&I activities; societal involvement; equity; and freedom of research. Meaningful interactions between lay people and professional actors in an innovation system can be safeguarded even in the harshest ideological and political framework.
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Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 2017
Forward-looking activities (FLAs) can influence innovation systems in various ways to a significa... more Forward-looking activities (FLAs) can influence innovation systems in various ways to a significant extent. This paper focuses on changes induced by FLAs in the innovation policy governance sub-system(IPGSs) of a given national innovation system. Our knowledge is surprisingly limited even on this subset of FLA impacts, despite several decades of practice and non-negligible analytical efforts. We identify key features of FLAs and IPGSs in order to explore hypotheses on the likely ‘fit’ between different types of FLAs and various IPGSs. Countries selected to illustrate the relevance of our analytical framework include Germany, Greece, and Hungary. Our intention is to contribute to a more refined conceptual framework concerning the role and likely impacts of FLAs. Further, as a better understanding of impacts supports the design of more appropriate and effective FLAs, as well as more insightful evaluations of FLAs, this approach is of practical relevance, too.
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Foresight and STI Governance, Jul 13, 2016
This article reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation with the aim of drawing ... more This article reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation with the aim of drawing lessons for measuring social innovations, and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicators, in principle, could be useful in settings where the dominant mode of innovation is based on R&D activities. In practice, however, both R&D and non-R&D-based modes of innovation are important. IUS, therefore, only provides a partial picture. Social innovations can also rely on R&D-based technological innovations; their essence, however, tends to be organizational, managerial, and behavioural modifications. The IUS indicators do not capture these types of changes. Second, an assessment of the 81 indicators used to compile the Global Innovation Index reveals that it would not be fruitful to rely on such indicators to capture social innovations. Third, given the diversity among innovation systems, a poor performance signalled by a composite indicator does not automatically identify the area(s) necessitating the most urgent policy actions; only tailored, thorough comparative analyses can do so. Finally, analysts and policy makers need to be aware of the differences between measuring (i) social innovation activities (or efforts); (ii) the framework for social innovations (pre-requisites, available inputs, skills, norms, values, behavioural patterns, etc.); and (iii) the economic, societal, and environmental impacts of social innovations.
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IE HAS Discussion Papers, MT–DP 2014/19, Aug 2014
Business-academia (B-A) collaborations have been analysed by an extensive body of literature, tak... more Business-academia (B-A) collaborations have been analysed by an extensive body of literature, taking many different angles, and using various sources and types of information (patent statistics, the Community Innovation Survey data, evidence from specific surveys, interviews, or case studies), but usually a given paper is relying on a single method, addressing one or two major research questions. In contrast, this paper tackles both R&D and innovation collaborations among businesses and academia relying on information from different statistics and interviews. The latter source also allows exploring motivations for, and major features of, B-A co-operation. The paper argues that mapping B-A collaborations by using multiple methods and multiple sources of information can significantly improve the reliability and richness of our understanding, and can offer insights on dynamics and qualitative features of these co-operation processes. Interviews conducted in Hungary – in line with other research findings – have also confirmed that (i) motivations, incentives for, and norms of, conducting R&D and innovation activities diametrically differ in business and academia; and (ii) different types of firms have different needs. Thus, more refined policy measures are to be devised to promote B-A collaboration more efficiently, better tuned to the needs of the actors, based on a relevant taxonomy of their co-operations. Evaluation criteria for academics should also be revised to remove some major obstacles, currently blocking more effective B-A co-operation. Several findings presented in this paper can be generalised beyond the cases considered, but the research design to analyse B-A collaborations and the concomitant policy recommendations always need to be tailored to the innovation systems in question.
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Közgazdasági Szemle, 2014
A közgazdasági iskolák ma már egyetértenek abban, hogy az innováció meghatározó mértékben járul h... more A közgazdasági iskolák ma már egyetértenek abban, hogy az innováció meghatározó mértékben járul hozzá a versenyképesség javításához és a gazdasági növekedéshez, de különbözőképpen értelmezik az innovációt, és eltérő alapelveket ajánlanak a tudomány-, technológia- és innovációpolitika (TTI-politika) megalapozásához. Az EU TTI-politikáját nagymértékben az innováció tudományvezérelt modellje határozza meg, pedig számos elemzés azt mutatja, hogy a tudás más típusai és formái legalább olyan fontosak az innovációs folyamatok sikeréhez, mint a K+F-eredmények. Az ilyen szemléletű szakpolitika tetemes elmaradt haszonnal járhat. A cikk öt szakpolitikai következtetést fogalmaz meg: 1. a TTI-politika hatásosabb lehet, ha minden tudásintenzív tevékenységet ösztönöz, függetlenül a vállalatok ágazati besorolásától és a felhasznált tudás típusától, formájától és forrásától; 2. a rendszerbeli kudarcok elemzése és a megfelelő szakpolitikai intézkedések kidolgozása jelentős szakmai feladat; 3. az innovációs folyamatokat egyes szakpolitikák a TTI-politikánál erősebben befolyásolhatják, ezért több szakpolitika céljait és eszközeit is össze kell hangolni; 4. a rangsorokból csak nagy körültekintéssel szabad szakpolitikai tanulságokat levonni; 5. az egyes szakpolitikai programok értékelését jelentősen befolyásolhatja, hogy melyik közgazdasági iskolát választják az elemzés elméleti megalapozására.
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Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 80 (3): 379-385, 2013
This paper reflects on the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change an... more This paper reflects on the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change and to support decision-makers and other stakeholders in anticipating and dealing with transformations. It does so by critically reflecting on the selected papers for this special issue as well as on the discussions that took place at the fourth Seville International Conference on Future-oriented Technology Analysis. Considering the potential roles of FTA in enabling a better understanding of complex situations and in defining effective policy responses leads to the understanding that appropriate FTA practices are needed to enable FTA to fulfil such roles. Dealing with disruptive changes – and grand challenges in particular –, therefore, raises several conceptual, methodological and operational issues. Two of them are general, while further two are specific to the so-called grand challenges: i) distinguish known unknowns, unknown knows and unknown unknowns, ii) combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in a relevant and feasible way, iii) understand the complex and systemic nature of grand challenges, and iv) orchestrate joint responses to grand challenges. After a brief explanation of these issues, the paper outlines the main ideas of the papers published in this special issue. These present various methodological aspects of FTA approaches as well as some advances needed in practice to assist FTA practitioners and stakeholders in comprehending transformations and in tackling the so-called grand challenges.
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Research Evaluation, Jun 1, 2010
Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures... more Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures of various S&T fields or socio-economic systems by bringing together the perspectives of various stakeholder groups, and thus assists the decision-making processes at different levels. However, in order to avoid hypes – and subsequent disappointments – about what foresight can deliver, the potential contributions to decision-making processes by foresight should be clearly understood. The paper puts foresight into this broader context of policy-making processes, with a particular emphasis on innovation policy: it describes the evolution of different policy rationales since the 1950s, develops a framework to classify the impacts of various types of prospective analyses, and reviews the evaluation results of several national foresight programmes by using this framework. On that basis, future directions of how foresight might evolve are considered to spur discussions.
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Establishing and upgrading research infrastructures (RIs) have always been relatively expensive p... more Establishing and upgrading research infrastructures (RIs) have always been relatively expensive projects, even in those years when the absolute costs were much lower than nowadays. Further, running large RIs can also be rather costly. Thus, although RIs are usually not in the limelight, they can take up a considerable chunk of regional or national R&D budgets, and in some cases they can only be financed via international co-operation, given the funds required. Yet, RI policies have tended to be devised behind close doors, involving only a handful of experts and policy-makers – when national security or prestige has been at stake, politicians, too. The article first discusses five policy challenges which call for a radical overhaul of these old decision-making practices. Then it argues that foresight is a relevant policy tool to support these changes, by presenting major features of foresight.The core arguments of these two sections can be summarised as follows: Decisions on building...
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Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 2009
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Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2008
Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific knowl... more Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific knowledge, but other actors have also become major research performers. Meanwhile, the notion of research has been extended considerably, and the environment of universities is also undergoing fundamental changes. Thus, it is timely to consider alternative futures for them, to be better prepared for their new roles. A review of recent works on the future of higher education shows that the starting point in these exercises is either an existing or an abstract university. This approach has three major shortcomings: (i) the broader socio-economic systems, in which universities operate, are not addressed in these analyses, and thus neither the potential changes in these broader settings, nor their impacts on higher education can be explored; (ii) the huge diversity of higher education systems and individual universities cannot be reflected; (iii) the role of other research actors, and more importantly, the links among universities and those other research players are often disregarded.This article offers an alternative approach, using the case of EU universities as an example, to rectify these shortcomings. A set of ‘cascading’ visions are devised to demonstrate the close links between three levels. First, alternative futures are developed for the EU by considering (i) the overall rationale of EU policies; and (ii) the standing of the EU vis-à-vis the Triad. Second, the different directions are identified, in which the European Research and Innovation Area can evolve. Third, skipping the national level, futures are built for the universities themselves, focussing on their research activities.The modest intention of the futures presented in this paper is to demonstrate how to use the proposed new approach, and initiate meaningful and lively dialogues among stakeholders. Their diverse accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as distinct viewpoints are indispensable for building policy-relevant visions. The proposed three-level structure of futures – or ‘cascading’ visions – offers several advantages for policy-makers at various levels, the stakeholders of universities, as well as academics interested in prospective analysis of innovation systems.
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Resumo A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um pro... more Resumo A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é relevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras. A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuame...
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Revista Parcerias Estrategicas, 2005 No. 21, pp. 235-271, Dec 2005
Resumo
A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um ... more Resumo
A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é elevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras.
A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuamente refinados. Devido às fundamentais mudanças socioeconômicas ocorridas na Hungria e a ampliação da União Européia, forte ênfase foi dada nas ‘visões’ (futuros) – tanto em nível macro quanto em nível dos painéis de especialistas – e grande quantidade dos enunciados Delphi retrataram uestões
não-tecnológicas. Entretanto, o desenvolvimento de visões ualitativamente diferentes e o alinhamento de macrofuturos e futuros previstos no painel demonstraram ser uma tarefa difícil e desafiadora.
Abstract
Hungary launched his first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organisation, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
The heritage of the former system, the transition process itself and the current level of socioeconomic development all played a decisive role throughout the programme. TEP was set up as a programme controlled by non-governmental experts, and in turn, the Steering Group delegated a great deal of autonomy to the expert panels. Thus, methods were refined continuously. Given the
fundamental socio-economic changes in Hungary and the enlargement of the European Union a strong emphasis was put on ‘visions’ (futures) – both at macro and panel levels –, and a large number of Delphi-statements featured non-technological issues. However, developing qualitatively different visions, and aligning macro and panel futures, proved to be a difficult and challenging task.
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Journal of Forecasting, 2003
Hungary launched its first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic fore... more Hungary launched its first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organization, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
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Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 5, No. 4, Oct 2002
The political and economic transition posed a complex, tremendous challenge in Hungary in the beg... more The political and economic transition posed a complex, tremendous challenge in Hungary in the beginning of the 1990s. Not only macroeconomic stabilisation was required, but fundamental organisational and institutional changes were also needed to transform the country into a stable, middle-income economy, capable of catching up with the more advanced ones in the longer run. Having completed the first round of transition, Hungary has again reached a cross-roads. While the one-party system has been replaced with a multi-party parliamentary democracy and the planned economy with a market economy based on private ownership, the world has significantly changed during this historically short period of time.
Hungary now has to consider what role to play in the globalising learning economy, i.e. what future it envisions for herself. To be more specific: does the country passively accept the fate of a mere surviving economy, drifting without having its own strategy? Or, by implementing a clear strategy, does Hungary intend to be prosperous country, where in 15-20 years most citizens will enjoy high living standards, good health and a clean environment? The paper argues that a sound, coherent innovation policy is one of the cornerstones of an overall development strategy, required if a country is to excel. Yet, in spite of a number of efforts/ trials in the 1990s, no such policy document was approved in Hungary.
The article first provides a brief overview of the transition process, emphasising the simultaneous need for systemic changes and macroeconomic stabilisation in order to improve economic performance. Its core section analyses recent changes in the S&T decision-making system, various efforts to draft S&T and innovation policy documents, as well as the inputs and outputs of R&D and innovation. It concludes that the lack of an explicit innovation policy may hinder long-term development as such a policy is required to signal the main policy directions and commitments of the government, to strengthen the national innovation system – thus anchor FDI – and to align all public and private efforts/ resources for development.
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This article is aimed at shedding some light on the on-going re-structuring process in the Hungar... more This article is aimed at shedding some light on the on-going re-structuring process in the Hungarian car parts industry. The performance of this sector can be regarded as a sort of proxy variable to gauge the success of transition to market economy: Hungarian car parts suppliers have lost their former principal market with the collapse of CMEA but just then major foreign investors have entered the Hungarian market. Thus the new market opportunities are there for the Hungarian companies; it is now their task to seize this chance for re-structuring and survival. A closely related issue is the speed and extent of the diffusion of a new production paradigm, namely, lean production, and that of new products, processes, management and organisational culture and techniques, e.g. just-in-time, total quality control, as required by foreign buyers. Will an archipelago of relatively advanced suppliers emerge, with these new developments being locked into an enclave, or can these new products, processes and management techniques diffuse in a wider circle through second and third tier suppliers? More generally, can this ‘on-the-job training’ accelerate the badly needed market re-orientation and transition? What is, and, should be, the role of the Hungarian government to facilitate this process?
This article, based on an extensive literature survey and interviews with managers, cannot provide comprehensive answers to these questions. Yet, it is hoped that the most significant issues can be addressed despite the lack of statistical data on this sector and the limited number of interviews, and hence informed guesses can also be formed about the most likely developments in the near future.
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Economic Systems, 1994
In the industrialized countries the diffusion of laser technology has been a fairly quick and far... more In the industrialized countries the diffusion of laser technology has been a fairly quick and far-reaching process. Although Hungarian laser R&D has a long history, and has respectable achievements to its credit, the diffusion of laser technology has not been that successful in Hungary. The findings of the paper indicate that under the old economic system both demand and supply factors hindered dissemination. The author concludes with an assessment of the likely impact of ongoing transition on the sector.
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Book chapters by Attila Havas
published in revised form as "Restructuring Precision Industry in Hungary", in: A. Lorentzen, M. Rostgård (eds): The Aftermath of ‘Real Existing Socialism’ in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: People and Technology in the Process of Transition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 210-236, Feb 1993
The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period an... more The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation: far more competitive and powerful foreign competitors can now enter both its former single most important market, i.e. the former Soviet Union, and the domestic market. Thus accumulated knowledge of R&D and production engineers as well as the experience of the highly skilled blue-collar workers, albeit of primary importance in this industry, might become completely worthless and disappear. Combined with fresh capital, access to new markets, recent technologies and up-to-date management methods, however, it can (and should) be regarded as a major asset and the indispensable basis for successful restructuring. This paper suggests that sweeping changes in size, ownership, internal organisation, and product range are also inevitable so as to be able to adjust to the new environment.
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Nicholls A, Ziegler R (eds): Creating Economic Space for Social Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 341-362, 2019
This chapter revisits the Extended Social Grid Model based on empirical work exploring the model.... more This chapter revisits the Extended Social Grid Model based on empirical work exploring the model. It summarizes the main findings around four basic points: first, the need to move beyond economic space as markets if social innovation for the marginalized is to be analysed in its full complexity and the variety of provision appreciated beyond a reductive focus on business. Second, the importance of a reflexive use of power in recognition of the reproduction of marginalization (as well as the multi-level opportunities that emerge once this move is made). Third, the role of considering beneficiaries in social innovation not only as participants but also as patients, and hence the need to consider the role of (justified) paternalism in social innovation. Fourth, a note of caution regarding systemic structural change and in favour of the value of niches.
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Journal articles by Attila Havas
A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é elevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras.
A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuamente refinados. Devido às fundamentais mudanças socioeconômicas ocorridas na Hungria e a ampliação da União Européia, forte ênfase foi dada nas ‘visões’ (futuros) – tanto em nível macro quanto em nível dos painéis de especialistas – e grande quantidade dos enunciados Delphi retrataram uestões
não-tecnológicas. Entretanto, o desenvolvimento de visões ualitativamente diferentes e o alinhamento de macrofuturos e futuros previstos no painel demonstraram ser uma tarefa difícil e desafiadora.
Abstract
Hungary launched his first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organisation, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
The heritage of the former system, the transition process itself and the current level of socioeconomic development all played a decisive role throughout the programme. TEP was set up as a programme controlled by non-governmental experts, and in turn, the Steering Group delegated a great deal of autonomy to the expert panels. Thus, methods were refined continuously. Given the
fundamental socio-economic changes in Hungary and the enlargement of the European Union a strong emphasis was put on ‘visions’ (futures) – both at macro and panel levels –, and a large number of Delphi-statements featured non-technological issues. However, developing qualitatively different visions, and aligning macro and panel futures, proved to be a difficult and challenging task.
Hungary now has to consider what role to play in the globalising learning economy, i.e. what future it envisions for herself. To be more specific: does the country passively accept the fate of a mere surviving economy, drifting without having its own strategy? Or, by implementing a clear strategy, does Hungary intend to be prosperous country, where in 15-20 years most citizens will enjoy high living standards, good health and a clean environment? The paper argues that a sound, coherent innovation policy is one of the cornerstones of an overall development strategy, required if a country is to excel. Yet, in spite of a number of efforts/ trials in the 1990s, no such policy document was approved in Hungary.
The article first provides a brief overview of the transition process, emphasising the simultaneous need for systemic changes and macroeconomic stabilisation in order to improve economic performance. Its core section analyses recent changes in the S&T decision-making system, various efforts to draft S&T and innovation policy documents, as well as the inputs and outputs of R&D and innovation. It concludes that the lack of an explicit innovation policy may hinder long-term development as such a policy is required to signal the main policy directions and commitments of the government, to strengthen the national innovation system – thus anchor FDI – and to align all public and private efforts/ resources for development.
This article, based on an extensive literature survey and interviews with managers, cannot provide comprehensive answers to these questions. Yet, it is hoped that the most significant issues can be addressed despite the lack of statistical data on this sector and the limited number of interviews, and hence informed guesses can also be formed about the most likely developments in the near future.
Book chapters by Attila Havas
A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é elevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras.
A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuamente refinados. Devido às fundamentais mudanças socioeconômicas ocorridas na Hungria e a ampliação da União Européia, forte ênfase foi dada nas ‘visões’ (futuros) – tanto em nível macro quanto em nível dos painéis de especialistas – e grande quantidade dos enunciados Delphi retrataram uestões
não-tecnológicas. Entretanto, o desenvolvimento de visões ualitativamente diferentes e o alinhamento de macrofuturos e futuros previstos no painel demonstraram ser uma tarefa difícil e desafiadora.
Abstract
Hungary launched his first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organisation, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
The heritage of the former system, the transition process itself and the current level of socioeconomic development all played a decisive role throughout the programme. TEP was set up as a programme controlled by non-governmental experts, and in turn, the Steering Group delegated a great deal of autonomy to the expert panels. Thus, methods were refined continuously. Given the
fundamental socio-economic changes in Hungary and the enlargement of the European Union a strong emphasis was put on ‘visions’ (futures) – both at macro and panel levels –, and a large number of Delphi-statements featured non-technological issues. However, developing qualitatively different visions, and aligning macro and panel futures, proved to be a difficult and challenging task.
Hungary now has to consider what role to play in the globalising learning economy, i.e. what future it envisions for herself. To be more specific: does the country passively accept the fate of a mere surviving economy, drifting without having its own strategy? Or, by implementing a clear strategy, does Hungary intend to be prosperous country, where in 15-20 years most citizens will enjoy high living standards, good health and a clean environment? The paper argues that a sound, coherent innovation policy is one of the cornerstones of an overall development strategy, required if a country is to excel. Yet, in spite of a number of efforts/ trials in the 1990s, no such policy document was approved in Hungary.
The article first provides a brief overview of the transition process, emphasising the simultaneous need for systemic changes and macroeconomic stabilisation in order to improve economic performance. Its core section analyses recent changes in the S&T decision-making system, various efforts to draft S&T and innovation policy documents, as well as the inputs and outputs of R&D and innovation. It concludes that the lack of an explicit innovation policy may hinder long-term development as such a policy is required to signal the main policy directions and commitments of the government, to strengthen the national innovation system – thus anchor FDI – and to align all public and private efforts/ resources for development.
This article, based on an extensive literature survey and interviews with managers, cannot provide comprehensive answers to these questions. Yet, it is hoped that the most significant issues can be addressed despite the lack of statistical data on this sector and the limited number of interviews, and hence informed guesses can also be formed about the most likely developments in the near future.
interactions and exchanges between these two ‘tribes’. As a first step, lessons from business innovation studies are highlighted below, indicating opportunities to refine the analytical tools and methods we use, and thus improve our understanding of social innovation processes. These insights
– on the degree of novelty, level of change, the ‘dark side’ of innovation, policy rationales to justify interventions, and policy implications – can be useful for practitioners, social innovation scholars, policy analysts and policy-makers.
In spite of this apparent success, the perspectives for foresight are far from clear. The notion of “hype – disappointment cycles”, originally developed to describe the changing attitudes towards emerging technologies, might be applicable to foresight, too: initial enthusiasm has been replaced by scepticism in several countries, and a more realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various types of prospective analyses is also highly demanded.
To prevent ‘disillusionment’, potential contribution of foresight to decision-making processes should be clearly understood, and inherent tensions should be taken into account when foresight processes are designed and conducted. The chapter first ‘locates’ foresight among different types of prospective analyses, and then develops a framework to classify the impacts of foresight on policy preparation processes. Foresight is often associated with consensus building – real life cases, however, reveal several types of tensions, e.g. among participants, as well as between participants, sponsors, and policy-makers. A tentative typology of these potential tensions is also presented.
It is crucial for Hungary to escape this trap. That requires a wide range of technological and non-technological innovations to raise productivity and enter new markets. Macro-economic pressures also call for a successful, competitive economy. Hungarian decision-makers do not realise the close links between domestic R&D efforts, innovation and economic performance. Given the lack of an explicit, coherent innovation strategy and the low level of R&D expenditures, overall economic policies – especially macroeconomic and investment promotion ones – and strategies of foreign-owned companies operating in Hungary are likely to play a much more decisive role in influencing economic performance than science, technology and innovation policies. This is not to suggest, however, that it would be worthless to devise and implement a sound, explicit innovation strategy. On the contrary, an astute innovation strategy should be one of the cornerstones of a comprehensive socio-economic development strategy, aimed at speeding up the cohesion process.
This chapter analyses institutional changes in Hungary from the point of view of science and technology (S&T) policy by pulling together some recent theoretical developments in the economics of innovation and a fairly descriptive approach. The underlying question is whether it is possible to devise a coherent, feasible S&T policy and implement it in an efficient – or at least a satisfactory – way in a transition economy, or whether S&T policy, together with other major institutions, is also evolving. In other words, is S&T policy an outcome of conscious, well-designed and co-ordinated efforts in this period (can it be?), or should it be seen as a resultant of deliberate and unintended consequences of actions and interactions of a host of actors?
Theories and models of innovation as theoretical foundations for S&T policy are briefly outlined in section 2. Then section 3 describes the legacy of central planning in Hungary. Recent changes in the science and technology system are analysed in section 4, and policy conclusions are presented in the final section.
Given the structural features and the level of socio-economic development in the CE4 countries, as well as the dominant way of thinking since the cold war, Western politicians, business people, analysts and journalists tend to share a ‘block’ view of these countries. Further, there is a noticeable – and certainly understandable – ‘drive’ also from the academic community to produce findings that can be generalised across the new EU member states, but at least for the CE4 countries, that is, to focus on identifying shared or similar features. Yet a closer look at the structure of the national innovation systems in these countries, as well as at their innovation performance, points to a different direction. While the structural composition of the research sub-systems of the CE4 countries showed a great diversity already in 2000, fairly significant changes have occurred since then in all countries, adding more colours to the observed diversity. Neither a similar structural composition of the research sub-system can be observed, nor a move towards a similar structure. Their innovation performance is also diverse.
Given the diversity among innovation systems, one should be very careful when trying to draw policy lessons from the ‘rank’ of a country as ‘measured’ by a composite indicator. The CE4 countries, therefore, need to avoid the trap of paying too much attention to simplifying ranking exercises. Instead, it is of utmost importance to conduct detailed, thorough comparative analyses, identifying the reasons for a reasonable or disappointing performance.
Having considered numerous definitions of SI, first we propose a new one, then adapt the multi-channel interactive learning model to SI. To do so, we identify the major actors in an SI process, their activities, interactions, modes of (co-)producing, disseminating and utilising knowledge. We also consider the micro and macro environment of a given SI.
We illustrate the analytical relevance of the proposed model by considering three real-life cases. The model can assist SI policy-makers, policy analysts, as well as practitioners when devising, implementing or assessing SI.
During the almost ten-year long learning process, from the simple adaptation of the Grameen model the Kiútprogram has arrived to the denial of the most important features of joint liability in group lending, namely the application of the devices of social collateral. Experience has also shown that a loan itself is not sufficient to assist escaping from the poverty trap. Without knowledge transfer and without inter-community connection building – at least in the case of discriminated minorities – the effect of the loan may even be detrimental. In a modern society not only physical, but also social and cultural capital is needed to run a successful business in the formal sector of the economy.
In the Kiútprogram’s model the loan plays a crucial role in escaping from the aspiration trap, and thus helps overcome learned helplessness. Loans without any – financial or social – collateral signal that the lender trusts the client, not only in her honesty, but also in her abilities. This method of lending strongly suggests to the clients the conviction that she is able of achieving a business success. Neither financial aid, nor loan with (social) collateral is suitable to reach this effect.
Foresight processes and advice at European level are not developed in a vacuum but complement and compete with other strategic policy advice mechanisms, including for example informal expert groups, Horizon 2020 Advisory Groups, the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM) and the Research, Innovation and Science Expert Group (RISE). The added value of foresight is to provide analysis in terms of forward-looking framing of key challenges (for example, transition to the bio economy, the migration-climate change nexus, Industry 4.0) through the consideration of trends and weak signals of change, sense-making of these trends and weak signals, the exploration of alternative scenarios and through co-design processes.
The Expert Group worked on four work streams to develop:
- Foresight guidelines for strategic programming of research, in particular in support of the next Framework Programme (cf. bringing foresight closer to the policy-making process).
- An operational plan for a flexible and informal European network of foresight experts for research, science and innovation policy that could address the Commission's need for strategic intelligence and sense-making.
- A 'Rapid Response'-Mechanism (RRM). This included the provision of pilot rapid response sense-making of signals that change in society, economy, and technology is occurring on issues deemed relevant for R&I policy.
- A frame for the better use of foresight in selecting R&I topics and doing R&I policy in a bottom-up, inclusive mode.
- Low level of innovation activities, especially that of the SMEs;
- Low occurrence of co-operation in innovation activities among key actors;
- Insufficient quantity of human resources for R&D and innovation is forecast by 2015;
- Unfavourable framework conditions for innovation, especially unpredictable business environment, high administrative and tax burden, competition not conducive to innovation;
- Shortcomings in STI policy: lack of political commitment; instability; shortfalls in implementation; and slow, insufficiently informed policy learning processes.
Two main reasons of the poor innovation performance have also been identified. One of these points outside the narrowly defined STI policy domain: the framework conditions for innovations influence firms’ behaviour with such a power that STI policy schemes cannot offer strong enough incentives to overrule those unfavourable effects. Thus, major policy efforts are needed to create favourable framework conditions, notably a stable macroeconomic environment; endurable administrative and tax burdens on firms; strong demand for new products; a sufficient supply of skilled people for RTDI projects; appropriate regulations and standards; effective IPR policies; etc. Further, policies affecting these conditions need to be aligned with STI policy efforts to make a difference.
The second set of factors can be grouped together as shortcomings in policy-making, including lack of political commitment. R&D and innovation needs to be perceived by politicians as a major contributor to socio-economic development, as opposed to the current – although implicit – understanding, when it is taken as a burden on the budget, and thus becoming the first ‘victim’ when budget problems must be solved. Frequent changes in the structure of the STI policy governance sub-system has lead to organisational instability, which, in turn, affects negatively policy formation and implementation as it hampers organisational learning and imposes unnecessary burdens on RTDI performers, too. Hence, this sub-system needs to be stabilised.
Combining these explanatory factors, there seems to be no ‘panacea’ or a simple ‘quick fix’ to improve RTDI performance. Conscious co-ordination of major economic and STI policies is needed, guided by an overarching socio-economic development strategy. Foresight processes would be useful to underpin these strategies. These dialogues can also highlight how RTDI processes – advanced by appropriate STI policies – can contribute to overall socio-economic development. Policies affecting RTDI processes and performance need also to be orchestrated. Up-to-date decision-preparatory methods – most notably thorough analyses of innovation performance, combining census, R&D and innovation data; evaluation of individual policy measures, as well as that of the policy mix as a whole; and technology assessment – should be relied upon when devising and implementing STI policy measures, also assisted by recurring consultations with the major actors of the national innovation system.
It seems unlikely that the R&D investment targets (GERD at 1.8% of GDP, while BERD at 0.9% of that by 2013) can be achieved simply by providing more public funding. The impact of STI policies aimed at leveraging R&D investments can only be enhanced if framework conditions are also significantly improved. Notably, the macroeconomic situation, the ‘two-tier’ structure of the economy, the intensity and type of competition, the overall entrepreneurship culture, the quality and directions of projects conducted by the publicly financed R&D units have unfavourable impacts on RTDI activities of firms. The incentives provided by the STI policy schemes cannot counterbalance those effects. Structural reasons, which are difficult to address even by overall economic policies, let alone STI policies, can also be seen as obstacles. The bulk of BERD is performed by foreign-owned firms, and their RTDI activities are largely determined by their parents’ strategies, while domestic STI policies can play a relatively minor role.
The science, technology and innovation (STI) policy governance structure has been reorganised at least once by every government since the 1990s, including the highest level policy-making bodies. Moreover, the latter ones have only worked intermittently: in certain periods had been ‘dormant’ for years. Hence, policies affecting the RTDI processes – notably education, STI, macroeconomic, industrial, investment promotion and regional development policies – could not possibly be designed and implemented in a strategic, coherent and integrated framework. The implementing agencies are also frequently reorganised. These permanent changes in governance structures prevent organisational learning of policy design and implementation bodies, and this lack of stability also hampers the efficient functioning of these bodies.
The 84-page government programme, approved in May 2010, devotes 8 lines to R&D and innovation.
A brief overview of the Hungarian NIS is offered in Section 2, and the major performance indicators are presented in international comparison in Section 3. Then the sample is described and the major interview findings are summarised in Section 4. The concluding section highlights implications for innovation surveys’ methods, further quantitative analyses, as well as innovation policies and policy analyses.
Under these circumstances, demonstration of the impact of the application of FTA and of means to enhance that impact, are paramount. Precise cost-benefit analyses, however, are inappropriate. FTA should be understood as a conceptual framework, an art (practice) and a set of tools. Therefore, a broader set of criteria is required to evaluate its impacts.
The paper first provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks, in which the FTA impacts can be assessed. Then a new, but more simple, pragmatic approach is proposed for analysing the use of FTA, namely a distinction between the arguments used by FTA experts and the expectations of potential ‘clients’. The paper concludes that major efforts are needed to operationalise the existing theoretical frameworks to assist actual impact assessment projects, and thus making impact assessment a widely used practice. In doing so, the FTA community will be in a position to analyse the differences between the promised, expected and actual impacts. That would improve the design of FTA projects, and contribute to a more appropriate and wider use of FTA.