Gang Investigators' Perceptions of Military-Trained Gang Members in the Southern U.S. Abstract Communities everywhere have experienced the negative effects of street gangs. The presence of military-trained gang members (MTGMs) in the community increases the threat of violence to citizens. The problem addressed was the apparently growing presence of military-trained gang members in civilian communities in two southern states. The purpose was to determine the perceived presence of military-trained gang members and examine whether there was a relationship between the perceptions of gang investigators regarding the presence and the size of their jurisdictions, the proximity of their jurisdictions to a military installation, and the extent to which investigators participate in anti-gang activities. The Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve were identified as the largest sources of MTGMs and the Bloods, Crips, and Gangster Disciples were the gangs most represented. Military leaders should acknowledge the increase in gang-related crime and address the problems caused for both military and civilian communities without attempting to quantify the threat level. Military leadership should continuously examine activities of all suspected gang members for active gang affiliation for retention purposes while evaluating any gang affiliation for security clearances. Military Law Enforcement liaison for recruiters should develop effective communication with law enforcement agencies to assist with information sharing. Keywords: articles of gangs in the army, military crime, research articles, us military training gangs, gang-related activity in the us armed forces increasing, dod strategic plan for gangs in the military, army definition of gang, army enlistment, gang activity in the us military, street gangs in the military, percent of military personnel have gang association, gangs in the military Introduction “The current generation of gang members are the first in a very long time to grow up during a time of high military activity. As a result, more gang members are now joining military service for a wide variety of reasons and are returning to the (civilian community) jurisdiction with basic military training at the very least. I have seen gang members in the military encourage others in their gang to enlist as well. The percentage of military trained gang members will continue to rise for the foreseeable future.” Tennessee Gang Investigators’ Association member, May 2010. There were roughly 1.4 million gang members in the United States at the end of 2010 (NGIC, 2011). That figure represented an increase of 400,000 over the conservatively estimated 1,000,000 of the prior (2009) NGIC estimate, which represented 212,000 more gang members (26% higher) than the 2007 report.  The 2010 U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command (CID) Gang and Extremist Activity Threat Assessment reported a decrease of 68% though there was little in the way of explanation for the decrease. The 2009 CID Gang Activity Threat Assessment had documented a twofold increase in felonies since the 2006 report and a significant year-to-year increase since 2003. The accurate identification of causes for increases or decreases in numbers was critical because over 10% of gang members in civilian communities have military training (Smith & Doll, 2012). The most common military gang-related crimes involved drug trafficking, aggravated assaults, housebreaking and larceny cases, attempted homicides, and sexual assault investigations (CID, 2005-2011; NGIC, 2009; Sazonov, 2011). Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) display indications that thy received military training either directly or indirectly. Indicators of military training include the use of military tactics, weapons, or equipment to conduct gang activity, and the use of distinctive military skills, particularly if gang members trained in weapons, tactics, and planning pass the instruction on to other gang members (NGIC, 2009). Military tactics include the techniques and strategies taught in a variety of military occupational specialties, ranging from tactical assault to organizational leadership strategies. On September 11, 2001, terrorists reminded our country that we weren’t as secure as we thought we were, and the gang problem in the U.S. military became, understandably, less of a priority (Smith, 2011a). Unfortunately, such a shift in focus without a corresponding decrease in gang activity appears to have led to an increasingly larger gang problem in the military (CID 2005-2010). As a result, the military stopped any recognizable proactive gang intelligence collection effort until two deaths occurred in 2005 – one in Alaska and one in Germany – that were clearly gang-related (Smith, 2011a). In the years since the post-9/11 decline in tracking and investigating non-terrorism related gang activity, there has been an increase in academic and practitioner interest and detected events involving military-trained gang members. The increase in gang presence in the U.S. armed forces in recent years was not surprising. The military had been struggling to meet its recruitment goals since post-9/11 troop increases for operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Sazonov, 2011). As a result the military lowered recruiting standards and granted waivers or simply overlooked many disqualifying factors (Sazonov, 2011). Individuals who would not otherwise have qualified were able to enlist, including felons, gang members and other delinquents (Sazonov, 2011). The Army saw a 65% increase in the use of moral waivers from 4,918 in 2003 to 8,129 in 2006, while the Marine Corps issued a total of 20,750 moral waivers in 2006 alone (Alvarez, 2007). Theories explaining gang crime. Gangs are unique organizations and their members are seen as representing both themselves as individuals and the gang as an organization. The theories from what has been referred to as the Chicago School address both the individual and the organization. This line of theory seemed most applicable to the adult gang members found in the military, and include the following: Sutherland (1940) proposed a social learning theory called differential association in contradiction to the notion that crimes were committed only by those in the lower social classes. The principles of differential association proposed by Sutherland included the premise that criminal behavior was learned in communication with others within intimate personal groups. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all the mechanisms involved in any other learning process (Sutherland, 1940). Social disorganization theory held that social disorganization produced weak institutional controls, which in turn loosened the constraints on individuals’ natural propensity to deviate (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Traditions of delinquency were passed on through the generations in the same way language, roles, and attitudes were transmitted (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Social disorganization was seen as the inability of local government to solve problems and understand the needs of the community, and suggested community empowerment as a solution to the gang problem. A modification to differential association theory resulted in Glaser’s (1956) theory of differential identification, which meant “a person pursues criminal behavior to the extent that he identifies himself with real or imaginary persons from whose perspective his criminal behavior seems acceptable” (p. 440). Prior identification and present circumstances play key roles in the selection of people with whom we identify and associate (Glaser, 1956), affecting our ability to associate with one group (e.g., a criminal street gang), while maintaining employment by or membership in a second group whose institutional values and norms oppose those of the first group (e.g., the military). Differential opportunity theory (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) focused on the intervening variables that accounted for the forms crime and deviance can take. An opportunity deemed illegal or illegitimate was a chance to get away with a criminal or deviant act. Such actions required learning and expressing the beliefs necessary for support from the particular subcultural. Many individuals feel resentment against the push for success they feel but believe that money is the means for that success, and the gap between ability and desire provides an inclination toward criminal involvement (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). The concept of differential integration was based on the commonality of emphasis on group affiliation in both structural and subcultural approaches (Knox, 1981). Knox (1981) observed that exoffenders have limited legitimate opportunities and are, as a result, less integrated into the traditional, law-abiding community while having ready access to many subgroups in the community more inclined toward deviance. Differential integration states that the explanation for why exoffenders return to criminal activity (recidivate) involves both the limited opportunities they face and the attraction of the deviant subculture to which they are exposed. Those theories, as applied to the study of gang members in the military, have provided a platform on which to examine simultaneous membership in organizations with conflicting roles in society. The theories serve to explain the troubles associated with the social integration of gang members into legitimate sectors of opportunity, i.e. the disciplinary structure of the military, while having membership in not only a deviant group but also a possibly violent and criminal lifestyle such as that found accompanying gang membership. If applied to gang members, the theories would explain the difficulties gang members have adapting to jobs, communities, relationships, and lifestyles that favor an absence of criminal activity. Those theories may also explain the inability to leave the gang life and commit totally to the military. The research reported in this paper was based on a survey designed in preparation for the Military Gang Perception Questionnaire (Smith, 2011b), and was administered to two populations. Participants in the first population attended a Tennessee Gang Investigators Association (TNGIA) training session in Millington, Tennessee in 2010. Members of the El Paso Police Department working at the uniform street level were also surveyed. The intent was to determine if the street level officer near the Texas-Mexico border was seeing the type of activity being reported by gang investigators in a more central U.S. location. The survey instrument included general questions involving crime in general, gang crime and crime associated to gang members who were also in the military. Literature Review Since Smith’s (2011c) comprehensive literature review, there has been an increase in academic interest in the topic of military-trained gang members. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Command (2011) and Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) (2012) have recently conducted investigations and assessments of gang activity in the military and reported their findings. The most recent available research by the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations was completed in 2007. The 2010 Army CID gang assessment (2011) noted most subjects of gang-related activity were enlisted, single, males, between the ages of 18-24. That fit the official description of an average Army soldier (CID, 2011). Most (68%) of the subjects of gang-related crimes had prior Army law enforcement contact (CID, 2011). The Army experienced a slight (6%) decrease in all gang-related investigations and a significant (68%) decrease in felony investigations with an Army connection. There was no satisfactory explanation for the decrease, which occurred after five consecutive years of significant increases, though the authors of the report speculated that the decrease might be attributed to the continued awareness of gangs and extremists by commanders or the elimination of identified members from the Army, or it might possibly be correlated to the 14% decrease in all CID felony investigations. The decrease in all crimes was not explained further. Nowhere in the report was there information regarding the number of gangs members that had been prosecuted or otherwise removed from the military nor was any mention made regarding notification of law enforcement in the civilian community that received the discharged gang member. Though the results of the 2011 assessment were not yet available, it was suspected that the drop in gang-related investigations was an anomaly. The states with the highest number of incidents reported were Georgia, Texas, Washington, and Hawaii. Most (82%) of the subjects were Caucasian, while only 9% were African-American and 9% were Hispanic (CID, 2011). The 2009 CID gang assessment showed more (49%) African-Americans were subjects of gang investigations. The next highest race represented was Whites with 30%. There was no explanation for the drastic change, nor was there a year-by year comparison in the 2010 report (CID, 2011). The US Army has conducted gang threat assessments covering the ten years since 9/11, as depicted in Table 1. Table 1 Cumulative tally of CID felony and non-felony investigations 2002-2010. Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 ROI 7 5 5 10 16 17 27 34 11 Other 22 8 4 13 44 62 92 109 102 It was noteworthy that the number of felony reports of investigations (ROIs) showed a general increase in most years following a slight decrease from 2002-2003. Other, non-felony investigations also experienced a steady increase over the previous 8 years after a decrease in 2002. Neither of these phenomena were explained in any of the assessments, and no year-to-year analysis was conducted. The US Navy (2012) conducted a review of NCIS criminal investigations and criminal intelligence reports produced during calendar year 2011. The review found that the number of reports identifying gang activity largely stayed the same from 2010 to 2011and gang activity did not appear to pose a significant threat to the operational readiness of the U.S. Navy (USN) or U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The report addressed the threat to the civilian community post-service only by referencing media reports suggesting gang members purposely entered the military to gain skills they could teach fellow gang members (USN, 2012). In contrast to the U.S. Army, the Navy survey experienced a slight drop in all gang-related investigations but a slight increase in those, presumably felonies, with a Navy connection, as depicted in Table 2. Table 2 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Navy Nexus 12 64 78 79 Other 67 130 120 115 For 2011, there were twenty-one (21) gang-related investigations and fifty-eight (58) gang-related intelligence reports with a Navy connection, or nexus, resulting in seventy-nine (79) total (USN, 2012). This represents 1.1114% of the total NCIS investigations and intelligence reports opened and written in 2011. Of the 322,629 active duty U.S. Navy sailors and 200,255 active duty Marines in 2011, a statistically negligible percentage, 0.0086 percent and 0.0164 percent for the USN and USMC, respectively, were linked to gang activity with a Navy nexus (USN, 2012). The US Air Force’s most recent identifiable gang assessment had similar results. Agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) prepared an unclassified report (2007) to document their efforts at intelligence collection to determine if Air Force personnel or resources were adversely affected by gang activity. The agents reported that gang members joining the military were a problem over the previous decade (AFOSI, 2007). Gang members were becoming increasingly more sophisticated in their recruitment of young people, including military dependents, using popular hip hop culture, websites, and chat rooms. This was seen as problematic because gang members may seek to join the military for weapons training, and use of combat tactics such as evasive skill and cover and concealment (AFOSI, 2007). Legislative efforts to prohibit street gang members from joining the military were recently added to a defense-spending bill (Public Law 110-181, 2008). The legislation included the provision to add active membership in a street gang to the standing prohibition against active group membership by military members in extremist groups. The legislation was intended to extend the prohibitions of Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction (DoDI) 1325.6, which has its history in preventing members of organizations considered subversive and openly anti-government from joining the military in the interests of national security (Executive Order 10450, 1953). The history of this recent legislation demonstrates a lack of understanding of the requirements for limiting the negative impact of gangs on military communities. At the time the instruction was initially published in 1969, the DoD was concerned with the infiltration of anti-war and anti-military organizations. The directive focused on dissident and protest activities within the military, and especially on activities such as underground newspapers, demonstrations involving military service members, and serviceman organizations. In 1986, the Secretary of Defense updated the directive. The directive's language prohibited "active" participation in "extremist organizations." This comes from language in Executive Order (EO) 11,785 issued in 1953, during the height of the Cold War, when the government feared Communist infiltration. It was later changed to forbid designating any groups as "totalitarian, fascist, Communist, or subversive" and forbade any circulation or publication of a list of such groups. Military gang investigators have had problems linking the DoD instruction to gangs because of its history (Smith, 2011a). It should be noted that the most recent CID assessment (2010) included the word Extremist in the title – the first time in recent history that was done. It was clear what actions the original legislation was designed to prohibit – there was no mention of gangs or anything similar to those groups. One need only look to the introductory statement whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. . . not limited to . . . (2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition. * * * (4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. An update to DoDI 1325.6, Change 1, February 22, 2012 to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1325.6 includes this guidance: a. Commanders should remain alert for signs of future prohibited activities. They should intervene early, primarily through counseling, when observing such signs even though the signs may not rise to active advocacy or active participation or may not threaten good order and discipline, but only suggest such potential. The goal of early intervention is to minimize the risk of future prohibited activities. b. Examples of such signs . . . could include mere membership in criminal gangs and other organizations . . . (are) active participation in prohibited groups by fundraising; demonstrating or rallying; recruiting, training, organizing, or leading members; distributing material; knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing; having tattoos or body markings associated with such gangs or organizations; or otherwise engaging in activities in furtherance of the objective of such organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment or are incompatible with military service The reality was that Commanders (and other unit leaders) remained alert for signs of bad morale and things that affect the unit mission. They usually don't see what someone does off-duty as something that falls into those categories. The drafters apparently don't see that adult gang members are smart enough to conceal their gang affiliation, learning trades they can use to help the gang, and using their military experience and exposure to access the logistics pipeline to help drug and weapons trafficking endeavors, etc. The military is not and is not designed to be engaged in anything resembling early intervention or minimizing the risk of future prohibited activities. Those are activities for communities where there are youth gangs who can be deterred from crime. All military members are adults, and those who are gang members and military service members are far past intervention time. The examples of gang behavior in the DoD instruction do not appropriately represent the breadth of gang crimes that should be included in criminal gang offense. They appear more like some of the indicators used by Departments of Correction and local police departments to confirm gang membership for youth gangs, not the adults with advanced skills brought or honed by their military training. Sazonov (2011) examined the attitudes of soldiers towards gang-affiliated members who served with them. The study focused on various methods active gang members used to recruit comrades into a gang. Eighteen interviews of current and former military personnel, male and female, from New York, NY, Chicago, IL and San Diego, CA were used (Sazonov, 2011). While males (83%) significantly outnumbered females (17%), the difference was representative of the overall U.S. Military’s gender composition (Sazonov, 2011). African-Americans constituted 50% of the participants, followed by Caucasians at 39%, followed by Asians and Hispanics at 5.5% each respectively. Most of the participants (67%), were not affiliated with any gang, while 33% claimed gang affiliation. The average age of the participants was 31 (Sazonov, 2011). Gang members engaged in a variety of criminal and delinquent behaviors, including distribution of illegal narcotics, theft, assault, assault battery, intimidation, vandalism, extortion, blackmail and conspiracy (Sazonov, 2011). A few gang and non-gang affiliated participants stated that some of the officers were also involved in the gang activity or belonged to a gang and allowed lower ranking gang members to conduct gang activity. One Gangster Disciple respondent stated he personally engaged in weapons theft and battery for which he was never caught. A Crips -affiliated repondent stated that he did not personally engage in weapons theft but knew of other gang-affiliated personnel who did (Sazonov, 2011). Another Gangster Disciples affiliated respondent admitted to shooting an individual and committing a burglary while in the Army. One respondent, an admitted gang member, engaged in property theft and distribution of marijuana and methamphetamine (Sazonov, 2011). If non-gang affiliated personnel observed or reported a gang member, retaliation in the form of assault battery was likely to follow (Sazonov, 2011). A Gangster Disciples affiliated Sergeant said there were instances of gang related stabbings that took place on and off military installation (Sazonov, 2011). Methodology/Methods The research question addressed was whether street level police officers near the Texas-Mexico border were seeing the type of MTGM activity as gang investigators in a more central U.S. location. Participants for the study were active members of the Tennessee Gang Investigators Association (TNGIA) attending training in Martin, Tennessee in 2010. Members of the TNGIA primarily included male and female adults who worked in or were affiliated with the State of Tennessee in police, courts, corrections, and related fields who joined the association to address the problems seen with the increased presence of street gangs and other organized criminal operations. The number of participants of this survey was 63 and 82.4% were police officers and 17.6% (n=9) were correctional officers. The average age of the respondents was 39.5, their average years as an officer was 10.4, and the average years they were with the department was 8.5. The majority of the respondents were white (72%) and 85% were male officers. About half (49%) of the participants had some college education and 21% had a college degree. About two-thirds (66%) were married. About 68% were assigned in either investigation or patrol. Most participants (84%) were sworn officers. About 70% of participants were working at the local level. From the population of 75 in attendance at the training, a total of 63 responded to the survey, a response rate of 84%. Patrol officers were selected as a target group because they are witnessing first-hand the change in gang dynamics in the community as the first responders to all police calls within the City of El Paso, TX. Patrol officers working field patrol duties provide significant insight on the relationship, if any, between gang related criminal activity, military gang members that are in the military and gang activity involving family members of military personnel. The survey instrument was distributed on-line to patrol officers who primarily work field patrol duty at each regional command. Patrol operations field supervisors from the regional commands distributed the on-line survey instrument to officers willing to participate in the survey on a voluntary basis. The only stipulation established by the research team was for the survey instrument to be distributed to participants that were originally identified as being assigned to field patrol duty. From the population of 509 police officers who work patrol, a total of 54 officers responded to the survey, a response rate of 11%. Results Celaya, De La O, and Zamora (2009) examined perceptions of members of the El Paso, TX police department. They used many of the same questions as Smith (See Appendix A), which are compared and contrasted below. Military personnel affiliated with gangs. Most (85.2%) of the El Paso patrol officers indicated that within the last 12 months, they had seen an increase in the number of military personnel associated with gangs, and 88.9% indicated that there are gang members in their jurisdiction that were currently in the military (Celaya et al, 2009). The gang investigators were asked about the previous 5 years, and 77% reported they had seen an increase in the number of military personnel associated with gangs and 25% indicated that there were gang members in their jurisdiction that were currently in the military. These findings reported the results of questions 4 and 9. Crimes committed by military members affiliated with gangs. Two-thirds (66.6%) of the El Paso patrol officers estimated that up to 25% of crimes committed in their jurisdiction are committed by military personnel (Celaya et al, 2009). Most (42%) of the gang investigators were unsure, but of those that answered, the majority (28%) reported up to 10% of crimes were committed by military personnel. These findings reported the results of question 36. The El Paso Patrol officers who encountered gang members that were in the military, indicated that the majority of subjects were junior enlisted (E-1 – E-4) (Celaya et al, 2009). The patrol officers indicated that 83.3% of the crimes committed by military personnel affiliated with gangs involved drug offenses, 79.6% involved assaults, and 72.2% involved in weapons offenses. The gang investigators reported 36% of their gang members were in the lower-enlisted (E-1 – E-4) ranks, and estimated an additional 12% were non-commissioned officers (E-5 and above). The gang investigators indicated that 42% of the crimes committed by military personnel affiliated with gangs involved drug offenses, 23% involved assaults, and only 10% involved in weapons offenses. These findings reported the results of questions 32 and 35. Law Enforcement Perception. All of the El Paso patrol officers indicated they thought military personnel with gang affiliations already had the affiliations prior to joining the military (Celaya et al, 2009). The majority of the patrol officers stated that they became aware of the military personnel’s gang affiliation from personal interviews, and/or from other law enforcement sources. Most (31%) of the gang investigators indicated they thought military personnel with gang affiliations already had the affiliations prior to joining the military. Half of the gang investigators stated that they became aware of the military personnel’s gang affiliation from personal interviews, and/or from other law enforcement sources. These findings reported the results of questions 34 and 33, respectively. The El Paso Patrol officers were asked regarding their perception on three items: the use of military equipment, downplaying of the military connection and forthcoming of the military on information (Celaya et al, 2009), reflecting questions 12, 13, and 14. 45% strongly agreed or agreed that gang members were using military equipment, 59% strongly disagreed or disagreed that there was pressure to downplay the military connection, It was almost split on the forthcomingness of the military: 43.2% strongly agreed or agreed, while 35% strongly disagreed or disagreed that the military was forthcoming with information regarding gangs. The gang investigators were asked about the same three items. 25% strongly agree or agree that gang members were using military equipment, 28% strongly disagree or disagree that there was pressure to downplay the military connection, Regarding the forthcomingness of the military: only 13% strongly agreed or agreed, while 21% strongly disagreed or disagreed that the military was forthcoming with gang information. Relationships with the military and military’s involvement. The El Paso Patrol officers were asked regarding relationships with military officials and the military’s involvement (Celaya et al, 2009). Most (67.3%) of respondents indicated that their agency had a working relationship with military authorities. Many (37%) of the gang investigators indicated their agency had a working relationship with military authorities. These findings reported the results of questions 30. Discussion Military personnel affiliated with gangs. The most common military gang-related crimes involved drug trafficking, aggravated assaults, housebreaking and larceny cases, attempted homicides, and sexual assault investigations (CID, 2005-2011; NGIC, 2009; Sazonov, 2011). The finding was similar to the representation of subjects in gang-related felony investigations in the Army since 2006 (CID, 2007; CID, 2008; CID, 2009), Sazanov (2012), and Smith and Doll (2012). Crimes committed by military members affiliated with gangs. Drugs, Robberies, and Assaults were the crimes most often committed by MTGMs. The finding was also similar to the data compiled from Army CID investigators (2009), Sazanov (2012), and Smith and Doll (2012). Law Enforcement Perception. Few studies have directly examined percentage of time spent on anti-gang activities as a variable, and one that examined it recently (Smith and Doll, 2012) found no statistically significant positive relationship between perceptions of the presence of MTGMs and level of participation in anti-gang activities. That study was unable to show a relationship between anti-gang efforts and the perception of gang investigators regarding MTGMs in their jurisdictions.  As most MTGMs were adults and thought to be more advanced than many youth gang members, they may not be as easily detected by gang investigators, regardless of the percentage of time the investigators are able to commit to anti-gang activities.  With the experience of concealing their gang affiliation while in the military, MTGMs in civilian communities would be experienced in avoiding detection in the presence of gang investigators.  The indicators and effects of MTGMs may need to be incorporated into gang investigator training programs. Relationships with the military and military’s involvement. Following the shift in investigative focus following 9/11, the military stopped any recognizable proactive gang intelligence collection effort until 2005 (Smith, 2011a). In the years since the post-9/11 decline in tracking and investigating non-terrorism related gang activity, there has been an increase in academic and practitioner interest and detected events involving military-trained gang members. Recommendations Recommendations for government leaders.  Compliance with the instruction by Congress to Robert M. Gates, the Secretary of Defense to prohibit members of the Armed Forces to actively participate in criminal street gangs should be completed using penalties with a foundation in criminal law and not civil law or international political or national security issues.   This and prior research has identified the presence of MTGMs in civilian communities that can be addressed by preventive action by government leaders in the form of military policy. Though an in-depth evaluation of the propriety of the use of the DoD instruction exceeded the scope of the research, it was noted that there may be legal problems linking the instruction, and the directive before it, to active membership in street gangs because of the history of the legislation, which initially prohibited communist groups from infiltrating the military and the United States (Executive Order 10450, 1953).  More effort than simply issuing an order should be invested by government leaders to identify useful methods to address the presence of street gang members in the military, as more than 1 in 10 of the gang members in the respondents jurisdictions were MTGMs. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). The federal government and all branches of the military therein should adopt a uniform definition of gangs.  This was previously proposed without public response (CID, 2009; CID 2011; Smith & Doll, 2012), but the absence of action should not delay the addressing of other recommendations.  The NGIC offered NAGIA’s proposed definition:  A gang is a formal or informal group or association of three or more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or name who individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation (NAGIA, 2005; NGIC, 2009).  This definition roughly parallels criminal conspiracy law, which was more applicable in criminal gang investigations and was likely the criterion used by survey respondents when completing their surveys. This research has identified the presence of MTGMs in civilian communities that can be addressed by preventive action by government leaders by identifying a common definition for military leaders and investigators. Policy makers should consider identifying gangs and related groups as Security Threat Groups (STGs). Most of the gang members identified in previous gang assessments were single, African-American males around age 20 (CID, 2007; CID, 2008; CID, 2009). The racial composition of military gang members in felony investigations previously trended from 65% African-American and 21% Caucasian (2007) to 67% African-American and 14% Caucasian (2008) to 47% African-American and 30% Caucasian (2009). The 2006 CID assessment did not identify the racial breakdown, though other demographics were included. None of the authors commented further on the abnormally disproportionate representation of African-Americans relative to the U.S. population or the demographics of the U.S. military, nor did the authors address the drop in African-American gang members from 2008 to 2009 or the increase in 2010. There appeared to be an aversion to address the data, possibly due to a desire to avoid focusing on the sensitive issue of race. Identifying groups known as gangs as Security Threat Groups, as had been done by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and many state departments of corrections for many years and would limit the potential for the perception of racial bias in what would otherwise be deemed a criminal gang investigation. Investigators would then be able to engage in a multi-jurisdictional cooperative effort using federal, state, and local law enforcement to identify all MTGMs – including street gang members, prison gang members, and members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Recommendations for military commanders.  Military leaders should acknowledge the increase in gang-related crime affecting the military and address the problems caused for both military and civilian communities without attempting to quantify the threat level.  This was especially advised because of the high percentage of felony drug investigations (CID, 2006; CID, 2009; CID, 2011) and the high percentage involvement of MTGMs in drug crime reported in the study. Commanders should consider treating all drug trafficking cases as if gang members were in some way connected, whether in manufacturing or distribution. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Military leadership should continuously examine the activities of all suspected military gang members to determine active gang affiliation for retention purposes while evaluating any gang affiliation for security clearances.  Current guidance, specifically DoD Instruction 1325.6, prohibits active gang membership, yet the primary determination of such activity appears to be the presence of a criminal record.  Not all gang members are caught by law enforcement each time they commit a crime.  As was learned in this study, the proliferation of gang activity in communities adjacent to military installations has made it impossible to totally shield the military community.  For service members requiring a security clearance, past gang affiliation should be prohibited, even passive or associate membership, unless accompanied by a complete, public renunciation of the gang and follow up evaluation by representatives of the appropriate medical authority. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Summary Ultimately, the goal of the study was to assist agencies specializing in countering gang-related activities with developing training for law enforcement agencies across the country to assist them with increasing their awareness and safety when they encounter MTGMs.  The study has added to the foundation for this, and the findings are being disseminated throughout the law enforcement committee using a variety of methods and venues.  Recommended training notes and topics are being made available to gang investigators that may encounter MTGMs. References Alvarez, L. (2007, February 14). Army giving more waivers in recruiting. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14military.html Celaya, C., De La O, E., & Zamora, M. (2009). El Paso Gang Impact Study. Unpublished Masters Capstone Project. University of Texas at El Paso. Cloward, R. & Ohlin, L. (1960). Delinquency and opportunity. New York, NY: Free Press. Executive Order 10450 (1953). Security requirements for government employment. National Archives. Retrieved from http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10450.html Glaser, D. (1956). Theories and behavioral images. The American Journal of Sociology. 61(5) 433-444. doi:10.1086/221802 Knox, G. W. (1981). Differential integration and job retention among exoffenders. Criminology, 18(4), 481-501. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1981.tb01379.x National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2009). National gang threat assessment - 2009. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center. National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2011). National gang threat assessment - 2011. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center. National Youth Gang Center (2009). National youth gang survey analysis. Retrieved from http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis Sazonov, S.A. (2011). American soldier: Gangs in the military, a preliminary look at active gang members in the U.S. Armed Forces. Unpublished Masters Thesis. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York Shaw, C. R. & McKay, H. D. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas. Chicago, IL: University Press. Smith, C. F. (2011a). View from the field: The early days of military gang investigating. Journal of Gang Research, 18(4) 46-52. Smith, C. F. (2011b). Documenting the Pilot: the Military Gang Perception Questionnaire (MGPQ). Journal of Gang Research, 18(4) 1-17. Smith, C.F. (2011c). A Comprehensive Literature Review of Military-Trained Gang Members. Journal of Gang Research, 19(1) 9-20. Smith, C. F. & Doll, Y. (2012). Gang Investigators Perceptions of Military-Trained Gang Members. Critical Issues in Justice and Politics, 5(1), 1-19. Sutherland, E. H. (1940). White-Collar Criminality. American Sociological Review, 5(1) 1. doi:10.2307/2083937 U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (2007). AFOSI criminal analysis assessment: The threat of street gangs on/near USAF installations. Author. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2005). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2004-2005: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. Author. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2006). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2006: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. Retrieved from http://militarytimes.com/static/ projects/pages/ 2006_CID_Report.pdf U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2007). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2007: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2008). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2008: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2009). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2009: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2011). Summary report gang and extremist activity threat assessment fiscal year 2010: A review of gang and extremist activity affecting the Army. Author. U.S. Navy (2012). Gang Threat Assessment 2011- Criminal Intelligence Brief. Naval Criminal Investigative Service Multiple Threat Alert Center.  APPENDIX A: Perceptions of Military-Trained Personnel and Gang Activity DIRECTIONS: Below you will find a series of questions regarding your perceptions and gang related issues. Please choose the ONE best answer for each question. If you change an answer, simply put an “X” over the wrong answer and fill in the circle of the correct response. You may use pen or pencil. Thank you in advance for your participation. The answer key for this section is: SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree, NO = No Opinion, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree Please rate the level to which you agree with the following statements: SA A NO D SD I am knowledgeable about gangs and gang-related activities. I know a lot about the gangs in my jurisdiction. There is a gang problem within my jurisdiction. Over the last five years there has been an increase in gang-related activities in my jurisdiction. The supervisors within my jurisdiction believe there is a gang problem. The supervisors within my jurisdiction are actively involved in reducing gang-related activities in my jurisdiction. My peers believe there is a gang problem in our jurisdiction. The community that I serve believes there is a gang problem. There are gang members in my jurisdiction that are currently in the military There are gang members in my jurisdiction that have served in the military. Gang members in my jurisdiction are increasingly using military weapons. Gang members in my jurisdiction are increasingly using military equipment. There is pressure from supervisors to downplay any connection between gang related activities and the military. When a crime involves an active-duty military gang member, the military is very forthcoming with information and assistance. There are not many gang members in my jurisdiction who have served in the military. Active gang members should NOT be allowed to join the military Please rate your level of concern regarding the possibility that military-trained gang members might: Strongly concerned Not at all concerned Have advanced weapons training Have access to military weapons Have International drug connections Please rate your level of concern regarding the possibility that military-trained gang members might: Strongly concerned Not at all concerned Have International crime connections Have leadership training Have recruiting training Have survival, escape, resistance and evasion training Have interrogation training Have self-defense or offensive tactics training Have improvised explosive device (IED) detection training Does your organization have or participate in a formal anti-gang team, section, or task force? O Yes O No O Unsure Are you personally involved in these anti-gang activities? O Yes If Yes, How long have you been involved? O No To what extent do gangs in your jurisdiction commit crimes against non-gang members?  O 1-10 % O 11-25% O 26-50% O 51-100% O Unsure Does your agency have a working relationship with military authorities (e.g. CID, NCIS, OSI or Military Police)? O Yes O No O Unsure Which of the following branches of the military are represented by the gang members in your jurisdiction? (Choose all that apply) O Army O Marines O Air Force O Coast Guard O Navy O Other (Please specify) If you have encountered active-duty military members in gang-related activities, what pay grade/affiliation were they? (Choose all that apply) O Junior enlisted (E1-E4) O Commissioned Officers O Non-commissioned officer (E5-E6) O Civilian O Senior NCOs O Dependants/Family members How did you become aware of the gang members’ military affiliation? (Choose all that apply) O Personal interview O Other police officer O Non-law enforcement credible source O Non-law enforcement source with unknown credibility O I am not aware of this To the best of your knowledge, were these individuals gang members when they joined the military? O Yes O No O Unsure If you have encountered military gang members, what types of crimes were they suspected of committing? (Choose all that apply) O Drugs O Sexual Assaults O Assaults O Weapon Smuggling O Homicides O Other (Please specify) O Robberies O I have not encountered a military gang member Please estimate what percentage of crime in your jurisdiction is committed by military personnel? O 1-10% O Over 51% O 11-25% O Unsure O 26-50% O None Please estimate what percentage of gang activity in your jurisdiction involves dependents (family members) of active-duty military. O 1-10% O Over 51% O 11-25% O Unsure O 26-50% O None Submitted to American Society of Criminology conference proceedings (November 2012). 15

Gang Investigators' Perceptions of Military-Trained Gang Members in the Southern U.S. Abstract Communities everywhere have experienced the negative effects of street gangs. The presence of military-trained gang members (MTGMs) in the community increases the threat of violence to citizens. The problem addressed was the apparently growing presence of military-trained gang members in civilian communities in two southern states. The purpose was to determine the perceived presence of military-trained gang members and examine whether there was a relationship between the perceptions of gang investigators regarding the presence and the size of their jurisdictions, the proximity of their jurisdictions to a military installation, and the extent to which investigators participate in anti-gang activities. The Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve were identified as the largest sources of MTGMs and the Bloods, Crips, and Gangster Disciples were the gangs most represented. Military leaders should acknowledge the increase in gang-related crime and address the problems caused for both military and civilian communities without attempting to quantify the threat level. Military leadership should continuously examine activities of all suspected gang members for active gang affiliation for retention purposes while evaluating any gang affiliation for security clearances. Military Law Enforcement liaison for recruiters should develop effective communication with law enforcement agencies to assist with information sharing. Keywords: articles of gangs in the army, military crime, research articles, us military training gangs, gang-related activity in the us armed forces increasing, dod strategic plan for gangs in the military, army definition of gang, army enlistment, gang activity in the us military, street gangs in the military, percent of military personnel have gang association, gangs in the military Introduction “The current generation of gang members are the first in a very long time to grow up during a time of high military activity. As a result, more gang members are now joining military service for a wide variety of reasons and are returning to the (civilian community) jurisdiction with basic military training at the very least. I have seen gang members in the military encourage others in their gang to enlist as well. The percentage of military trained gang members will continue to rise for the foreseeable future.” Tennessee Gang Investigators’ Association member, May 2010. There were roughly 1.4 million gang members in the United States at the end of 2010 (NGIC, 2011). That figure represented an increase of 400,000 over the conservatively estimated 1,000,000 of the prior (2009) NGIC estimate, which represented 212,000 more gang members (26% higher) than the 2007 report.  The 2010 U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command (CID) Gang and Extremist Activity Threat Assessment reported a decrease of 68% though there was little in the way of explanation for the decrease. The 2009 CID Gang Activity Threat Assessment had documented a twofold increase in felonies since the 2006 report and a significant year-to-year increase since 2003. The accurate identification of causes for increases or decreases in numbers was critical because over 10% of gang members in civilian communities have military training (Smith & Doll, 2012). The most common military gang-related crimes involved drug trafficking, aggravated assaults, housebreaking and larceny cases, attempted homicides, and sexual assault investigations (CID, 2005-2011; NGIC, 2009; Sazonov, 2011). Military-trained gang members (MTGMs) display indications that thy received military training either directly or indirectly. Indicators of military training include the use of military tactics, weapons, or equipment to conduct gang activity, and the use of distinctive military skills, particularly if gang members trained in weapons, tactics, and planning pass the instruction on to other gang members (NGIC, 2009). Military tactics include the techniques and strategies taught in a variety of military occupational specialties, ranging from tactical assault to organizational leadership strategies. On September 11, 2001, terrorists reminded our country that we weren’t as secure as we thought we were, and the gang problem in the U.S. military became, understandably, less of a priority (Smith, 2011a). Unfortunately, such a shift in focus without a corresponding decrease in gang activity appears to have led to an increasingly larger gang problem in the military (CID 2005-2010). As a result, the military stopped any recognizable proactive gang intelligence collection effort until two deaths occurred in 2005 – one in Alaska and one in Germany – that were clearly gang-related (Smith, 2011a). In the years since the post-9/11 decline in tracking and investigating non-terrorism related gang activity, there has been an increase in academic and practitioner interest and detected events involving military-trained gang members. The increase in gang presence in the U.S. armed forces in recent years was not surprising. The military had been struggling to meet its recruitment goals since post-9/11 troop increases for operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Sazonov, 2011). As a result the military lowered recruiting standards and granted waivers or simply overlooked many disqualifying factors (Sazonov, 2011). Individuals who would not otherwise have qualified were able to enlist, including felons, gang members and other delinquents (Sazonov, 2011). The Army saw a 65% increase in the use of moral waivers from 4,918 in 2003 to 8,129 in 2006, while the Marine Corps issued a total of 20,750 moral waivers in 2006 alone (Alvarez, 2007). Theories explaining gang crime. Gangs are unique organizations and their members are seen as representing both themselves as individuals and the gang as an organization. The theories from what has been referred to as the Chicago School address both the individual and the organization. This line of theory seemed most applicable to the adult gang members found in the military, and include the following: Sutherland (1940) proposed a social learning theory called differential association in contradiction to the notion that crimes were committed only by those in the lower social classes. The principles of differential association proposed by Sutherland included the premise that criminal behavior was learned in communication with others within intimate personal groups. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all the mechanisms involved in any other learning process (Sutherland, 1940). Social disorganization theory held that social disorganization produced weak institutional controls, which in turn loosened the constraints on individuals’ natural propensity to deviate (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Traditions of delinquency were passed on through the generations in the same way language, roles, and attitudes were transmitted (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Social disorganization was seen as the inability of local government to solve problems and understand the needs of the community, and suggested community empowerment as a solution to the gang problem. A modification to differential association theory resulted in Glaser’s (1956) theory of differential identification, which meant “a person pursues criminal behavior to the extent that he identifies himself with real or imaginary persons from whose perspective his criminal behavior seems acceptable” (p. 440). Prior identification and present circumstances play key roles in the selection of people with whom we identify and associate (Glaser, 1956), affecting our ability to associate with one group (e.g., a criminal street gang), while maintaining employment by or membership in a second group whose institutional values and norms oppose those of the first group (e.g., the military). Differential opportunity theory (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) focused on the intervening variables that accounted for the forms crime and deviance can take. An opportunity deemed illegal or illegitimate was a chance to get away with a criminal or deviant act. Such actions required learning and expressing the beliefs necessary for support from the particular subcultural. Many individuals feel resentment against the push for success they feel but believe that money is the means for that success, and the gap between ability and desire provides an inclination toward criminal involvement (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). The concept of differential integration was based on the commonality of emphasis on group affiliation in both structural and subcultural approaches (Knox, 1981). Knox (1981) observed that exoffenders have limited legitimate opportunities and are, as a result, less integrated into the traditional, law-abiding community while having ready access to many subgroups in the community more inclined toward deviance. Differential integration states that the explanation for why exoffenders return to criminal activity (recidivate) involves both the limited opportunities they face and the attraction of the deviant subculture to which they are exposed. Those theories, as applied to the study of gang members in the military, have provided a platform on which to examine simultaneous membership in organizations with conflicting roles in society. The theories serve to explain the troubles associated with the social integration of gang members into legitimate sectors of opportunity, i.e. the disciplinary structure of the military, while having membership in not only a deviant group but also a possibly violent and criminal lifestyle such as that found accompanying gang membership. If applied to gang members, the theories would explain the difficulties gang members have adapting to jobs, communities, relationships, and lifestyles that favor an absence of criminal activity. Those theories may also explain the inability to leave the gang life and commit totally to the military. The research reported in this paper was based on a survey designed in preparation for the Military Gang Perception Questionnaire (Smith, 2011b), and was administered to two populations. Participants in the first population attended a Tennessee Gang Investigators Association (TNGIA) training session in Martin, Tennessee in 2010. Members of the El Paso Police Department working at the uniform street level were also surveyed. The intent was to determine if the street level officer near the Texas-Mexico border was seeing the type of activity being reported by gang investigators in a more central U.S. location. The survey instrument included general questions involving crime in general, gang crime and crime associated to gang members who were also in the military. Literature Review Since Smith’s (2011c) comprehensive literature review, there has been an increase in academic interest in the topic of military-trained gang members. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Command (2011) and Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) (2012) have recently conducted investigations and assessments of gang activity in the military and reported their findings. The most recent available research by the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations was completed in 2007. The 2010 Army CID gang assessment (2011) noted most subjects of gang-related activity were enlisted, single, males, between the ages of 18-24. That fit the official description of an average Army soldier (CID, 2011). Most (68%) of the subjects of gang-related crimes had prior Army law enforcement contact (CID, 2011). The Army experienced a slight (6%) decrease in all gang-related investigations and a significant (68%) decrease in felony investigations with an Army connection. There was no satisfactory explanation for the decrease, which occurred after five consecutive years of significant increases, though the authors of the report speculated that the decrease might be attributed to the continued awareness of gangs and extremists by commanders or the elimination of identified members from the Army, or it might possibly be correlated to the 14% decrease in all CID felony investigations. The decrease in all crimes was not explained further. Nowhere in the report was there information regarding the number of gangs members that had been prosecuted or otherwise removed from the military nor was any mention made regarding notification of law enforcement in the civilian community that received the discharged gang member. Though the results of the 2011 assessment were not yet available, it was suspected that the drop in gang-related investigations was an anomaly. The states with the highest number of incidents reported were Georgia, Texas, Washington, and Hawaii. Most (82%) of the subjects were Caucasian, while only 9% were African-American and 9% were Hispanic (CID, 2011). The 2009 CID gang assessment showed more (49%) African-Americans were subjects of gang investigations. The next highest race represented was Whites with 30%. There was no explanation for the drastic change, nor was there a year-by year comparison in the 2010 report (CID, 2011). The US Army has conducted gang threat assessments covering the ten years since 9/11, as depicted in Table 1. Table 1 Cumulative tally of CID felony and non-felony investigations 2002-2010. Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 ROI 7 5 5 10 16 17 27 34 11 Other 22 8 4 13 44 62 92 109 102 It was noteworthy that the number of felony reports of investigations (ROIs) showed a general increase in most years following a slight decrease from 2002-2003. Other, non-felony investigations also experienced a steady increase over the previous 8 years after a decrease in 2002. Neither of these phenomena were explained in any of the assessments, and no year-to-year analysis was conducted. The US Navy (2012) conducted a review of NCIS criminal investigations and criminal intelligence reports produced during calendar year 2011. The review found that the number of reports identifying gang activity largely stayed the same from 2010 to 2011and gang activity did not appear to pose a significant threat to the operational readiness of the U.S. Navy (USN) or U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). The report addressed the threat to the civilian community post-service only by referencing media reports suggesting gang members purposely entered the military to gain skills they could teach fellow gang members (USN, 2012). In contrast to the U.S. Army, the Navy survey experienced a slight drop in all gang-related investigations but a slight increase in those, presumably felonies, with a Navy connection, as depicted in Table 2. Table 2 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 Navy Nexus 12 64 78 79 Other 67 130 120 115 For 2011, there were twenty-one (21) gang-related investigations and fifty-eight (58) gang-related intelligence reports with a Navy connection, or nexus, resulting in seventy-nine (79) total (USN, 2012). This represents 1.1114% of the total NCIS investigations and intelligence reports opened and written in 2011. Of the 322,629 active duty U.S. Navy sailors and 200,255 active duty Marines in 2011, a statistically negligible percentage, 0.0086 percent and 0.0164 percent for the USN and USMC, respectively, were linked to gang activity with a Navy nexus (USN, 2012). The US Air Force’s most recent identifiable gang assessment had similar results. Agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) prepared an unclassified report (2007) to document their efforts at intelligence collection to determine if Air Force personnel or resources were adversely affected by gang activity. The agents reported that gang members joining the military were a problem over the previous decade (AFOSI, 2007). Gang members were becoming increasingly more sophisticated in their recruitment of young people, including military dependents, using popular hip hop culture, websites, and chat rooms. This was seen as problematic because gang members may seek to join the military for weapons training, and use of combat tactics such as evasive skill and cover and concealment (AFOSI, 2007). Legislative efforts to prohibit street gang members from joining the military were recently added to a defense-spending bill (Public Law 110-181, 2008). The legislation included the provision to add active membership in a street gang to the standing prohibition against active group membership by military members in extremist groups. The legislation was intended to extend the prohibitions of Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction (DoDI) 1325.6, which has its history in preventing members of organizations considered subversive and openly anti-government from joining the military in the interests of national security (Executive Order 10450, 1953). The history of this recent legislation demonstrates a lack of understanding of the requirements for limiting the negative impact of gangs on military communities. At the time the instruction was initially published in 1969, the DoD was concerned with the infiltration of anti-war and anti-military organizations. The directive focused on dissident and protest activities within the military, and especially on activities such as underground newspapers, demonstrations involving military service members, and serviceman organizations. In 1986, the Secretary of Defense updated the directive. The directive's language prohibited "active" participation in "extremist organizations." This comes from language in Executive Order (EO) 11,785 issued in 1953, during the height of the Cold War, when the government feared Communist infiltration. It was later changed to forbid designating any groups as "totalitarian, fascist, Communist, or subversive" and forbade any circulation or publication of a list of such groups. Military gang investigators have had problems linking the DoD instruction to gangs because of its history (Smith, 2011a). It should be noted that the most recent CID assessment (2010) included the word Extremist in the title – the first time in recent history that was done. It was clear what actions the original legislation was designed to prohibit – there was no mention of gangs or anything similar to those groups. One need only look to the introductory statement whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. . . not limited to . . . (2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition. * * * (4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. An update to DoDI 1325.6, Change 1, February 22, 2012 to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1325.6 includes this guidance: a. Commanders should remain alert for signs of future prohibited activities. They should intervene early, primarily through counseling, when observing such signs even though the signs may not rise to active advocacy or active participation or may not threaten good order and discipline, but only suggest such potential. The goal of early intervention is to minimize the risk of future prohibited activities. b. Examples of such signs . . . could include mere membership in criminal gangs and other organizations . . . (are) active participation in prohibited groups by fundraising; demonstrating or rallying; recruiting, training, organizing, or leading members; distributing material; knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing; having tattoos or body markings associated with such gangs or organizations; or otherwise engaging in activities in furtherance of the objective of such organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment or are incompatible with military service The reality was that Commanders (and other unit leaders) remained alert for signs of bad morale and things that affect the unit mission. They usually don't see what someone does off-duty as something that falls into those categories. The drafters apparently don't see that adult gang members are smart enough to conceal their gang affiliation, learning trades they can use to help the gang, and using their military experience and exposure to access the logistics pipeline to help drug and weapons trafficking endeavors, etc. The military is not and is not designed to be engaged in anything resembling early intervention or minimizing the risk of future prohibited activities. Those are activities for communities where there are youth gangs who can be deterred from crime. All military members are adults, and those who are gang members and military service members are far past intervention time. The examples of gang behavior in the DoD instruction do not appropriately represent the breadth of gang crimes that should be included in criminal gang offense. They appear more like some of the indicators used by Departments of Correction and local police departments to confirm gang membership for youth gangs, not the adults with advanced skills brought or honed by their military training. Sazonov (2011) examined the attitudes of soldiers towards gang-affiliated members who served with them. The study focused on various methods active gang members used to recruit comrades into a gang. Eighteen interviews of current and former military personnel, male and female, from New York, NY, Chicago, IL and San Diego, CA were used (Sazonov, 2011). While males (83%) significantly outnumbered females (17%), the difference was representative of the overall U.S. Military’s gender composition (Sazonov, 2011). African-Americans constituted 50% of the participants, followed by Caucasians at 39%, followed by Asians and Hispanics at 5.5% each respectively. Most of the participants (67%), were not affiliated with any gang, while 33% claimed gang affiliation. The average age of the participants was 31 (Sazonov, 2011). Gang members engaged in a variety of criminal and delinquent behaviors, including distribution of illegal narcotics, theft, assault, assault battery, intimidation, vandalism, extortion, blackmail and conspiracy (Sazonov, 2011). A few gang and non-gang affiliated participants stated that some of the officers were also involved in the gang activity or belonged to a gang and allowed lower ranking gang members to conduct gang activity. One Gangster Disciple respondent stated he personally engaged in weapons theft and battery for which he was never caught. A Crips -affiliated repondent stated that he did not personally engage in weapons theft but knew of other gang-affiliated personnel who did (Sazonov, 2011). Another Gangster Disciples affiliated respondent admitted to shooting an individual and committing a burglary while in the Army. One respondent, an admitted gang member, engaged in property theft and distribution of marijuana and methamphetamine (Sazonov, 2011). If non-gang affiliated personnel observed or reported a gang member, retaliation in the form of assault battery was likely to follow (Sazonov, 2011). A Gangster Disciples affiliated Sergeant said there were instances of gang related stabbings that took place on and off military installation (Sazonov, 2011). Methodology/Methods The research question addressed was whether street level police officers near the Texas-Mexico border were seeing the type of MTGM activity as gang investigators in a more central U.S. location. Participants for the study were active members of the Tennessee Gang Investigators Association (TNGIA) attending training in Martin, Tennessee in 2010. Members of the TNGIA primarily included male and female adults who worked in or were affiliated with the State of Tennessee in police, courts, corrections, and related fields who joined the association to address the problems seen with the increased presence of street gangs and other organized criminal operations. The number of participants of this survey was 63 and 82.4% were police officers and 17.6% (n=9) were correctional officers. The average age of the respondents was 39.5, their average years as an officer was 10.4, and the average years they were with the department was 8.5. The majority of the respondents were white (72%) and 85% were male officers. About half (49%) of the participants had some college education and 21% had a college degree. About two-thirds (66%) were married. About 68% were assigned in either investigation or patrol. Most participants (84%) were sworn officers. About 70% of participants were working at the local level. From the population of 75 in attendance at the training, a total of 63 responded to the survey, a response rate of 84%. Patrol officers were selected as a target group because they are witnessing first-hand the change in gang dynamics in the community as the first responders to all police calls within the City of El Paso, TX. Patrol officers working field patrol duties provide significant insight on the relationship, if any, between gang related criminal activity, military gang members that are in the military and gang activity involving family members of military personnel. The survey instrument was distributed on-line to patrol officers who primarily work field patrol duty at each regional command. Patrol operations field supervisors from the regional commands distributed the on-line survey instrument to officers willing to participate in the survey on a voluntary basis. The only stipulation established by the research team was for the survey instrument to be distributed to participants that were originally identified as being assigned to field patrol duty. From the population of 509 police officers who work patrol, a total of 54 officers responded to the survey, a response rate of 11%. Results Celaya, De La O, and Zamora (2009) examined perceptions of members of the El Paso, TX police department. They used many of the same questions as Smith (See Appendix A), which are compared and contrasted below. Military personnel affiliated with gangs. Most (85.2%) of the El Paso patrol officers indicated that within the last 12 months, they had seen an increase in the number of military personnel associated with gangs, and 88.9% indicated that there are gang members in their jurisdiction that were currently in the military (Celaya et al, 2009). The gang investigators were asked about the previous 5 years, and 77% reported they had seen an increase in the number of military personnel associated with gangs and 25% indicated that there were gang members in their jurisdiction that were currently in the military. These findings reported the results of questions 4 and 9. Crimes committed by military members affiliated with gangs. Two-thirds (66.6%) of the El Paso patrol officers estimated that up to 25% of crimes committed in their jurisdiction are committed by military personnel (Celaya et al, 2009). Most (42%) of the gang investigators were unsure, but of those that answered, the majority (28%) reported up to 10% of crimes were committed by military personnel. These findings reported the results of question 36. The El Paso Patrol officers who encountered gang members that were in the military, indicated that the majority of subjects were junior enlisted (E-1 – E-4) (Celaya et al, 2009). The patrol officers indicated that 83.3% of the crimes committed by military personnel affiliated with gangs involved drug offenses, 79.6% involved assaults, and 72.2% involved in weapons offenses. The gang investigators reported 36% of their gang members were in the lower-enlisted (E-1 – E-4) ranks, and estimated an additional 12% were non-commissioned officers (E-5 and above). The gang investigators indicated that 42% of the crimes committed by military personnel affiliated with gangs involved drug offenses, 23% involved assaults, and only 10% involved in weapons offenses. These findings reported the results of questions 32 and 35. Law Enforcement Perception. All of the El Paso patrol officers indicated they thought military personnel with gang affiliations already had the affiliations prior to joining the military (Celaya et al, 2009). The majority of the patrol officers stated that they became aware of the military personnel’s gang affiliation from personal interviews, and/or from other law enforcement sources. Most (31%) of the gang investigators indicated they thought military personnel with gang affiliations already had the affiliations prior to joining the military. Half of the gang investigators stated that they became aware of the military personnel’s gang affiliation from personal interviews, and/or from other law enforcement sources. These findings reported the results of questions 34 and 33, respectively. The El Paso Patrol officers were asked regarding their perception on three items: the use of military equipment, downplaying of the military connection and forthcoming of the military on information (Celaya et al, 2009), reflecting questions 12, 13, and 14. 45% strongly agreed or agreed that gang members were using military equipment, 59% strongly disagreed or disagreed that there was pressure to downplay the military connection, It was almost split on the forthcomingness of the military: 43.2% strongly agreed or agreed, while 35% strongly disagreed or disagreed that the military was forthcoming with information regarding gangs. The gang investigators were asked about the same three items. 25% strongly agree or agree that gang members were using military equipment, 28% strongly disagree or disagree that there was pressure to downplay the military connection, Regarding the forthcomingness of the military: only 13% strongly agreed or agreed, while 21% strongly disagreed or disagreed that the military was forthcoming with gang information. Relationships with the military and military’s involvement. The El Paso Patrol officers were asked regarding relationships with military officials and the military’s involvement (Celaya et al, 2009). Most (67.3%) of respondents indicated that their agency had a working relationship with military authorities. Many (37%) of the gang investigators indicated their agency had a working relationship with military authorities. These findings reported the results of questions 30. Discussion Military personnel affiliated with gangs. The most common military gang-related crimes involved drug trafficking, aggravated assaults, housebreaking and larceny cases, attempted homicides, and sexual assault investigations (CID, 2005-2011; NGIC, 2009; Sazonov, 2011). The finding was similar to the representation of subjects in gang-related felony investigations in the Army since 2006 (CID, 2007; CID, 2008; CID, 2009), Sazanov (2012), and Smith and Doll (2012). Crimes committed by military members affiliated with gangs. Drugs, Robberies, and Assaults were the crimes most often committed by MTGMs. The finding was also similar to the data compiled from Army CID investigators (2009), Sazanov (2012), and Smith and Doll (2012). Law Enforcement Perception. Few studies have directly examined percentage of time spent on anti-gang activities as a variable, and one that examined it recently (Smith and Doll, 2012) found no statistically significant positive relationship between perceptions of the presence of MTGMs and level of participation in anti-gang activities. That study was unable to show a relationship between anti-gang efforts and the perception of gang investigators regarding MTGMs in their jurisdictions.  As most MTGMs were adults and thought to be more advanced than many youth gang members, they may not be as easily detected by gang investigators, regardless of the percentage of time the investigators are able to commit to anti-gang activities.  With the experience of concealing their gang affiliation while in the military, MTGMs in civilian communities would be experienced in avoiding detection in the presence of gang investigators.  The indicators and effects of MTGMs may need to be incorporated into gang investigator training programs. Relationships with the military and military’s involvement. Following the shift in investigative focus following 9/11, the military stopped any recognizable proactive gang intelligence collection effort until 2005 (Smith, 2011a). In the years since the post-9/11 decline in tracking and investigating non-terrorism related gang activity, there has been an increase in academic and practitioner interest and detected events involving military-trained gang members. Recommendations Recommendations for government leaders.  Compliance with the instruction by Congress to Robert M. Gates, the Secretary of Defense to prohibit members of the Armed Forces to actively participate in criminal street gangs should be completed using penalties with a foundation in criminal law and not civil law or international political or national security issues.   This and prior research has identified the presence of MTGMs in civilian communities that can be addressed by preventive action by government leaders in the form of military policy. Though an in-depth evaluation of the propriety of the use of the DoD instruction exceeded the scope of the research, it was noted that there may be legal problems linking the instruction, and the directive before it, to active membership in street gangs because of the history of the legislation, which initially prohibited communist groups from infiltrating the military and the United States (Executive Order 10450, 1953).  More effort than simply issuing an order should be invested by government leaders to identify useful methods to address the presence of street gang members in the military, as more than 1 in 10 of the gang members in the respondents jurisdictions were MTGMs. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). The federal government and all branches of the military therein should adopt a uniform definition of gangs.  This was previously proposed without public response (CID, 2009; CID 2011; Smith & Doll, 2012), but the absence of action should not delay the addressing of other recommendations.  The NGIC offered NAGIA’s proposed definition:  A gang is a formal or informal group or association of three or more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or name who individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation (NAGIA, 2005; NGIC, 2009).  This definition roughly parallels criminal conspiracy law, which was more applicable in criminal gang investigations and was likely the criterion used by survey respondents when completing their surveys. This research has identified the presence of MTGMs in civilian communities that can be addressed by preventive action by government leaders by identifying a common definition for military leaders and investigators. Policy makers should consider identifying gangs and related groups as Security Threat Groups (STGs). Most of the gang members identified in previous gang assessments were single, African-American males around age 20 (CID, 2007; CID, 2008; CID, 2009). The racial composition of military gang members in felony investigations previously trended from 65% African-American and 21% Caucasian (2007) to 67% African-American and 14% Caucasian (2008) to 47% African-American and 30% Caucasian (2009). The 2006 CID assessment did not identify the racial breakdown, though other demographics were included. None of the authors commented further on the abnormally disproportionate representation of African-Americans relative to the U.S. population or the demographics of the U.S. military, nor did the authors address the drop in African-American gang members from 2008 to 2009 or the increase in 2010. There appeared to be an aversion to address the data, possibly due to a desire to avoid focusing on the sensitive issue of race. Identifying groups known as gangs as Security Threat Groups, as had been done by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and many state departments of corrections for many years and would limit the potential for the perception of racial bias in what would otherwise be deemed a criminal gang investigation. Investigators would then be able to engage in a multi-jurisdictional cooperative effort using federal, state, and local law enforcement to identify all MTGMs – including street gang members, prison gang members, and members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Recommendations for military commanders.  Military leaders should acknowledge the increase in gang-related crime affecting the military and address the problems caused for both military and civilian communities without attempting to quantify the threat level.  This was especially advised because of the high percentage of felony drug investigations (CID, 2006; CID, 2009; CID, 2011) and the high percentage involvement of MTGMs in drug crime reported in the study. Commanders should consider treating all drug trafficking cases as if gang members were in some way connected, whether in manufacturing or distribution. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Military leadership should continuously examine the activities of all suspected military gang members to determine active gang affiliation for retention purposes while evaluating any gang affiliation for security clearances.  Current guidance, specifically DoD Instruction 1325.6, prohibits active gang membership, yet the primary determination of such activity appears to be the presence of a criminal record.  Not all gang members are caught by law enforcement each time they commit a crime.  As was learned in this study, the proliferation of gang activity in communities adjacent to military installations has made it impossible to totally shield the military community.  For service members requiring a security clearance, past gang affiliation should be prohibited, even passive or associate membership, unless accompanied by a complete, public renunciation of the gang and follow up evaluation by representatives of the appropriate medical authority. This recommendation was previously identified (Smith & Doll, 2012). Summary Ultimately, the goal of the study was to assist agencies specializing in countering gang-related activities with developing training for law enforcement agencies across the country to assist them with increasing their awareness and safety when they encounter MTGMs.  The study has added to the foundation for this, and the findings are being disseminated throughout the law enforcement committee using a variety of methods and venues.  Recommended training notes and topics are being made available to gang investigators that may encounter MTGMs. References Alvarez, L. (2007, February 14). Army giving more waivers in recruiting. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14military.html Celaya, C., De La O, E., & Zamora, M. (2009). El Paso Gang Impact Study. Unpublished Masters Capstone Project. University of Texas at El Paso. Cloward, R. & Ohlin, L. (1960). Delinquency and opportunity. New York, NY: Free Press. Executive Order 10450 (1953). Security requirements for government employment. National Archives. Retrieved from http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10450.html Glaser, D. (1956). Theories and behavioral images. The American Journal of Sociology. 61(5) 433-444. doi:10.1086/221802 Knox, G. W. (1981). Differential integration and job retention among exoffenders. Criminology, 18(4), 481-501. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1981.tb01379.x National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2009). National gang threat assessment - 2009. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center. National Gang Intelligence Center [NGIC]. (2011). National gang threat assessment - 2011. Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center. National Youth Gang Center (2009). National youth gang survey analysis. Retrieved from http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis Sazonov, S.A. (2011). American soldier: Gangs in the military, a preliminary look at active gang members in the U.S. Armed Forces. Unpublished Masters Thesis. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York Shaw, C. R. & McKay, H. D. (1942). Juvenile delinquency and urban areas. Chicago, IL: University Press. Smith, C. F. (2011a). View from the field: The early days of military gang investigating. Journal of Gang Research, 18(4) 46-52. Smith, C. F. (2011b). Documenting the Pilot: the Military Gang Perception Questionnaire (MGPQ). Journal of Gang Research, 18(4) 1-17. Smith, C.F. (2011c). A Comprehensive Literature Review of Military-Trained Gang Members. Journal of Gang Research, 19(1) 9-20. Smith, C. F. & Doll, Y. (2012). Gang Investigators Perceptions of Military-Trained Gang Members. Critical Issues in Justice and Politics, 5(1), 1-19. Sutherland, E. H. (1940). White-Collar Criminality. American Sociological Review, 5(1) 1. doi:10.2307/2083937 U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (2007). AFOSI criminal analysis assessment: The threat of street gangs on/near USAF installations. Author. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2005). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2004-2005: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. Author. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2006). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2006: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. Retrieved from http://militarytimes.com/static/ projects/pages/ 2006_CID_Report.pdf U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2007). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2007: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2008). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2008: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2009). Summary report gang activity threat assessment fiscal year 2009: A review of gang activity affecting the Army. U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command. (2011). Summary report gang and extremist activity threat assessment fiscal year 2010: A review of gang and extremist activity affecting the Army. Author. U.S. Navy (2012). Gang Threat Assessment 2011- Criminal Intelligence Brief. Naval Criminal Investigative Service Multiple Threat Alert Center.  APPENDIX A: Perceptions of Military-Trained Personnel and Gang Activity DIRECTIONS: Below you will find a series of questions regarding your perceptions and gang related issues. Please choose the ONE best answer for each question. If you change an answer, simply put an “X” over the wrong answer and fill in the circle of the correct response. You may use pen or pencil. Thank you in advance for your participation. The answer key for this section is: SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree, NO = No Opinion, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree Please rate the level to which you agree with the following statements: SA A NO D SD I am knowledgeable about gangs and gang-related activities. I know a lot about the gangs in my jurisdiction. There is a gang problem within my jurisdiction. Over the last five years there has been an increase in gang-related activities in my jurisdiction. The supervisors within my jurisdiction believe there is a gang problem. The supervisors within my jurisdiction are actively involved in reducing gang-related activities in my jurisdiction. My peers believe there is a gang problem in our jurisdiction. The community that I serve believes there is a gang problem. There are gang members in my jurisdiction that are currently in the military There are gang members in my jurisdiction that have served in the military. Gang members in my jurisdiction are increasingly using military weapons. Gang members in my jurisdiction are increasingly using military equipment. There is pressure from supervisors to downplay any connection between gang related activities and the military. When a crime involves an active-duty military gang member, the military is very forthcoming with information and assistance. There are not many gang members in my jurisdiction who have served in the military. Active gang members should NOT be allowed to join the military Please rate your level of concern regarding the possibility that military-trained gang members might: Strongly concerned Not at all concerned Have advanced weapons training Have access to military weapons Have International drug connections Please rate your level of concern regarding the possibility that military-trained gang members might: Strongly concerned Not at all concerned Have International crime connections Have leadership training Have recruiting training Have survival, escape, resistance and evasion training Have interrogation training Have self-defense or offensive tactics training Have improvised explosive device (IED) detection training Does your organization have or participate in a formal anti-gang team, section, or task force? O Yes O No O Unsure Are you personally involved in these anti-gang activities? O Yes If Yes, How long have you been involved? O No To what extent do gangs in your jurisdiction commit crimes against non-gang members?  O 1-10 % O 11-25% O 26-50% O 51-100% O Unsure Does your agency have a working relationship with military authorities (e.g. CID, NCIS, OSI or Military Police)? O Yes O No O Unsure Which of the following branches of the military are represented by the gang members in your jurisdiction? (Choose all that apply) O Army O Marines O Air Force O Coast Guard O Navy O Other (Please specify) If you have encountered active-duty military members in gang-related activities, what pay grade/affiliation were they? (Choose all that apply) O Junior enlisted (E1-E4) O Commissioned Officers O Non-commissioned officer (E5-E6) O Civilian O Senior NCOs O Dependants/Family members How did you become aware of the gang members’ military affiliation? (Choose all that apply) O Personal interview O Other police officer O Non-law enforcement credible source O Non-law enforcement source with unknown credibility O I am not aware of this To the best of your knowledge, were these individuals gang members when they joined the military? O Yes O No O Unsure If you have encountered military gang members, what types of crimes were they suspected of committing? (Choose all that apply) O Drugs O Sexual Assaults O Assaults O Weapon Smuggling O Homicides O Other (Please specify) O Robberies O I have not encountered a military gang member Please estimate what percentage of crime in your jurisdiction is committed by military personnel? O 1-10% O Over 51% O 11-25% O Unsure O 26-50% O None Please estimate what percentage of gang activity in your jurisdiction involves dependents (family members) of active-duty military. O 1-10% O Over 51% O 11-25% O Unsure O 26-50% O None Submitted to American Society of Criminology conference proceedings (November 2012). 15