Overcoming divisions
The challenges of collectively responding to
emerging threats in a new theater of operations
1. Introduction
In its 7196th meeting on 11 June 2014, the UN Security Council held an open meeting on “UN
Peacekeeping Operations: New Trends” under the presidency of the Russian Federation. The objective
of this paper is to assess the major trends and challenges discussed in this meeting and to analyze
areas of agreement, points of contention, and remaining challenges.
2. Methodology
Due to the fact that over 50 countries took the floor, the analysis will be conducted with the
help of a sample of states and indicators. The P5, AU, Arab League, troop- and police-contributing
countries (TCC/PCC), as well as the major financial contributors were selected as the sample of states
analyzed. Others, like the EU, are not included in the analysis because, due to multiple identities, they
are already represented in the other samples in some form and they do therefore not add any
significant new perspective to the analysis. Instead, groups like the AU and Arab League are included
in the analysis as they are most affected by today’s conflicts and their proposals challenge the
perspectives of many of the Western states. The speeches delivered during the open meeting will be
analyzed with the help of five indicators: 1) changing theater of operations and emerging threats, 2)
the scope and nature of mandates, 3) resources and training, 4) new technologies and 5) avenues of
cooperation, herein included regional and inter-mission cooperation. Given the scope of the paper, this
list is not intended to be exhaustive. In the following, the overall trends and challenges in
peacekeeping operations will be delineated.
3. Trends and challenges in peacekeeping operations
An overwhelming majority of the states present at the 7196the meeting of the Security Council
affirmed that peacekeeping “continues to be a flagship initiative of the United Nations, driven by a
shared moral commitment to protecting the defenseless from the scourges of war” [USA]. As outlined
in the concept note circulated by the Russian Federation before the meeting, and emphasized by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his opening statement, new phenomena are affecting peacekeeping
missions all around the world. These trends include an increasingly complex theater of operations, in
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which asymmetric and unconventional threats, such as terrorism and non-state armed groups, which
are not willing to negotiate, persist. Oftentimes, peacekeeping operations (PKO) are “mandated to
operate where there is no peace to keep or (...) a lack of a viable political process and of clearly
identifiable parties” [SG Ban Ki-moon]. The search for an adequate and effective response to these
trends presents the international community with a range of challenges: Given the financial
constraints of the UN and its reliance on member states for force generation, innovative means need to
be found to increase TCC/PCC and financial contributions while simultaneously enhancing intermission, triangular and regional cooperation based on the principle of comparative advantage.
Further challenges include the nature, scope and implementation of peacekeeping mandates, which
need to be flexible and adaptable to the respective situation on the ground. Not only the issues of rules
of engagement, robust and multidimensional mandates, but also the increasing role of new
technologies, as well as their legal framework represent contested topics. Deductively derived from
these trends and challenges are the above-mentioned five main indicators, which shall represent the
basis for the following analysis of the areas of agreement and points of contention.
4. Areas of agreement and points of contention
The issue of the changing theater of operations of PKO is one of the areas with the broadest
consensus among the speakers. With the exception of Jordan, which portrays the increasingly complex
environment and intra-state nature of conflicts as a myth, most countries agree with Tanzania that
when the “UN peacekeeping enterprise began more than 60 years ago, [no one] could have foreseen
that contemporary PKO would have to navigate through the waters it must sail today”. However,
differences can be found with regards to the sub-topics emphasis by different states: It is very
remarkable that in particular the P5 and the top financial contributors do not elaborate on the
strategic context of PKO in detail but take it as a given. The exceptions are Russia, which underlines the
“rise of terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons”, and the UK, which emphasizes
the “internal, asymmetric and multilayered nature of conflicts”. In contrast, the TCC/PCC as well as the
African countries provide a detailed account of the changing theater of operations and the implications
of peacekeepers increasingly deploying in “theaters of elevated risk” [Nigeria]. While Rwanda
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postulates that “peacekeepers have no role to play in asymmetric warfare”, other TCC/PCC and African
states use the changing environment as a justification to substantiate their calls for more robust
mandates with a viable deterrence posture. In their argumentation, they underscore the need to
protect civilians and to “neutralize armed groups, which show no interest in any semblance of dialogue
or reconciliation, in particular in the context of weak states” [Tanzania].
With regards to the nature and scope of mandates, which are “at the heart of PKO” [UK], most
states acknowledged that mandates need to be clear, achievable and adaptable to the changing
situation on the ground. One discernable difference existed between the P5 and the financial
contributors on one side and the TCC/PCC on the other side: While the former use a lot of time to
discuss the evolving nature of peacekeeping mandates in depths, the latter are more concerned with
the implementation and the security of the peacekeepers. Concerning the design and review of the
implementation process, the TCC/PCC were highly consistent and adamant in their vocalization of a
need for greater “triangular cooperation” between the Security Council, the Secretariat and
themselves. They substantiated their argumentation by referring to Article 44 of the UN, which states
that non-Council members should be invited “to participate in the decisions of the Security Council
concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces” [India]. However, as this
principle is seldom translated into practice, TCC/PCC continue to have a limited degree of influence in
the design and review process, while continuing to shoulder the implementation of mandates. A
similar argument is made regarding the undemocratic nature of decision-making processes. The calls
of non-permanent members of the Security Council to shift the “task of formulating peacekeeping
concepts and strategies to the GA’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operation” [Ethiopia; India]
are echoed by the Russian Federation. The P5 are therefore not homogeneous on this issue. The debate
on PKO mandates reveals interesting fault lines between the states regarding the credibility of the UN:
While the United States posits that the credibility of the UN entails a “responsibility to act” – wording
reminiscent of the responsibility to protect - TCC/PCC, Arab and African countries, which are
frequently the host countries of PKOs, underline the credibility and legitimacy of these missions can
only be upheld through strict adherence to the “time-tested principles of consent, impartiality and the
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non-use of force” [Tanzania]. Their views are echoed by Russia and China. In contrast, consensus
exists regarding the UN’s residual responsibility with the “primary responsibility remaining with the
host country government” [Tanzania]. Two adamantly debated concepts include robust and
multidimensional mandates: Robust mandates, which permit the use of pre-emptive force and
targeted offensive operations for peace enforcement, sparked a controversy between states which
deem the Force Intervention Brigade for example a “highly effective innovation” [USA] and the
TCC/PCC, supported by Russia and China, which raise the issue of hybrid mandates and warn that
“robust mandates cannot become business as usual due to unresolved political and legal issues, such
as peacekeepers losing their impartiality and becoming a party to the conflict” [Russia]. As a less
controversial topic, multidimensional mandates, which include peace-building, the rule of law, security
sector reform and the implementation of SC resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security were
stressed by numerous countries, including Chile, Thailand and Sweden. While the majority of states
emphasized the benefits of this holistic approach, various countries underscored that, due to the
breadth of multidimensional mandates, prioritization is necessary, “with the utmost priority accorded
to the protection of civilians” [Nigeria].
Concerning the resources and training of PKO, most states affirmed that, resources are not
commensurate with the mandates and that PKO are increasingly asked to do “more with less”.
However, different solutions were presented to the problem: While the top financial contributors
emphasized that “broadening troop contributors and right-sizing is a promising approach to meet such
financial challenges” [Japan], TCC/PCC objected by arguing that “proposals by the Senior Advisory
Group regarding ad hoc or phased increased reimbursements to peacekeepers should be accepted”
[India]. TCC/PCC and African states furthermore underlined that the training and equipment of troops,
in particular in Chapter VII mandates, is “insufficient and inadequate”[Tanzania]. Again, with reference
to Article 44, TCC/PCC stress the need for their increased inclusion in decision-making processes.
An additional re-emerging theme was the use of new technologies, in particular of UAVs, “for
intelligence gathering and situational awareness” [Pakistan]. While a majority of states recognized that
UAVs can play a vital role in early warning systems and in the protection of civilians, fault lines are
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visible regarding the practical implications of new technologies. Whereas the P3 and top financial
contributors underlined the economic advantages of new technologies, TCC/PCC emphasized that
investments in technology cannot replace investments in human resources. In addition, China and
Russia argued that the use of new technologies needs adhere to core peacekeeping principles and
should to be duly placed under a “strict political and legal framework due to control and
confidentiality concerns given the multifunctional nature of UAVs”. This view was contradicted by the
UK, but echoed by a wide range of TCC/PCC, African and Arab countries, including Ethiopia, Rwanda
and Egypt.
New avenues of cooperation, especially inter-mission, triangular and regional cooperation, were
re-occurring topics during the debate. The concept of inter-mission cooperation was controversially
debated with proponents underscoring the “temporarily optimized use of scarce resources and filling
of logistical gaps” [USA; UK; Morocco], while opponents caution against “decision-making control over
cross-border activities” [Russia], the “danger of hybrid missions under different mandates” [India] and
“overlap and friction” [Chad]. In contrast, most countries present highlighted the benefits of
streamlined regional cooperation based on comparative advantages, herein included subsidiarity and
national ownership, capacity sharing with regards to standby forces and a more flexible adaptation to
the situation on the ground [Rwanda; Chad; Ethiopia, Pakistan].
5. Outlook and remaining challenges
In conclusion, the analysis demonstrates that remaining difficult challenges persist and
continue to reduce the efficiency of PKO. One of these challenges is the difference between what states
pledge to do in debates like this and what they contribute to PKO in reality. This lack of political will
and the need to do “more with less” amplifies the division between the TCC, which still shoulder the
heaviest burden, and the financial contributors and P5 on the other hand. Further challenges, which
are likely to continue in the future, are the debate around a codified political framework and more
democratic oversight in times when new technologies and innovations like the Force Intervention
Brigade continue to challenge the core principles of PKO. However, the main challenge is likely to
remain the lack of consensus and the inter- and intra-group divisions in the Council. Intensified by the
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veto power of the P5 and multiple coexisting identities -for example Rwanda in its role as a member of
the AU and as a major TCC - the fault lines between the different groups of states are volatile and can
change according to the issue debated. Overcoming this lack of consensus and re-evaluating the
appropriateness of the veto, as proposed by the Elders Initiative, will be a crucial element to improving
the efficiency of the Security Council in the future.
6. Bibliography
United Nations (2014) Security Council 7196th meeting “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: New Trends”,
Provisional
verbatim
records,
available
online
from:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7196 (last accessed: January 14, 2015).
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7. Appendix
Appendix 1: Simplified table of sample and indicators used
Sample
Changing
theater of
operations
Manda
tes
Indicators
Resources
New
& Training technologies
Regional &
Intermission
Cooperation
P5
USA
France
UK
Russia
China
TCC/PCC
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Ethiopia
Rwanda
Financial contributors
USA
Japan
France
Germany
UK
AU
Rwanda
Chad
DRC
Nigeria
Egypt
Ethiopia
Malawi
Senegal
Tanzania
Arab League
Jordan
Egypt
Morocco
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