Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Separation of Civilian and Military Facilities

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Separation of Civilian and Military Facilities Author(s): Ashwin Kumar Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 53 (Dec. 31, 2005 - Jan. 6, 2006), pp. 55305532 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4417599 . Accessed: 12/01/2013 14:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political Weekly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sat, 12 Jan 2013 14:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Indo-US Nuclear Deal Separationof Civilian andMilitaryFacilities If the India-USdeal movesforward, this would give theformer greaterfreedom to pursue cooperation with countries possessing nuclear materials and technology. However, international cooperation would requirethefacilities receiving assistance to be subject to safeguards, and to that extentIndia's priorities for international cooperation must be articulated. Having clear priorities would also help India's negotiators navigate a situation in which offers of cooperationcome with strings attached. ASHWINKUMAR s partof the nucleardeal withthe US, Indiahas agreedto identify andseparateall civilianandmilitarynuclearfacilitiesin a phasedmanner and place all civilian facilities underthe InternationalAtomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)safeguardsregime.l The successful implementationof the deal would dependon how the US views India'splan for separationof facilities as well as its commitmentto compliancewith an addiZ tionalprotocol.In November,the US am;n bassadorto India David Mulfordstated thatIndiamustpresenta planfor civilianmilitaryseparationbeforethe US administration would request congressional action[Baruah2005]. The planwouldbe reviewed by US experts, and if judged credible, the US administrationwould approach the Congress so that the lattercould consideramendmentsto US legislation.2Recently, the Indian prime ministerManmohanSingh made the reassuringstatementthatworkon separating India'scivilianandmilitarynuclearfacilities wasata fairlyadvancedstage[Baruah 2005a]. This articledescribesthe issues that should be considered, and outlines in broadstrokeswhat separationshould look like. A Legal Landscape Since 1978, US law requiresthat US nuclearexports to states that were not NPT-recognisednuclearweapons states (NWS)couldnotbe authorisedunlessthey havefull-scopesafeguardson all peaceful nuclearactivities[Squassoni2005]. India is a non-NWSunderthe NPT and also accordingto US law, and thereforethis conditionappliesto it. WhenIndiarefused 5530 In December, RichardLugar,the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations mentioned to a visiting Indian delegation that the current debate in the US Congress on the nuclear cooperation agreement focuses on the facilities separation aspect of India's obligations.3 According to Lugar, the Foreign Relations Committee and the US Congress is likely to assess the separation plan according to three criteria. Firstly, the safeguards plan should ensure that all materials exported to India and all material used in safeguarded nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA safeguards. Second, the plan should ensure that civilian cooperation does not assist India's nuclear weapons programme. Thirdly, the plan should be transparent, as an opaque plan would raise questions about India's intentions within the US Congress.4 to accept this condition, US fuel supplies to the Tarapurlight water reactors (LWR) ended in 1980 [McGoldrick et al 2005]. Between 1978 and 1980, the US administration under president Carter had ex- Safeguards Constraints ported two shipments df fuel for Tarapur An important aspect of the plan would reactors under executive order. But this became untenableafter 1980. Later,France, be the nature of safeguards being impleChina and Russia exported fuel but this mented between India and the IAEA. The is no longer possible as they too are con- joint statement does not commit to any strainedby theirmembershipin the Nuclear particular form of safeguards. In the Suppliers Group (NSG), which adopted voluntary-offer safeguards agreements the full-scope safeguards requirement in between the NWS and the IAEA, coun1992, and some of them also by domestic tries submit to the IAEA a list of facilities legislation requiringfull-scope safeguards eligible for inspection. Further,countries signing voluntary safeguards agreements [Squassoni op cit]. Whateverthe natureof safeguardsagree- have the right to withdraw any facility ments implemented between India and the from this list for national security reasons IAEA, they would not be full-scope since and the transfer of material out of them. India would continue to retain un-safe- However, as suggested by senior US guarded military facilities [Perkovich governmental officials such as senator 2005]. Therefore, nuclear cooperation on Lugar, such an arrangement are unlikely a continued basis would require changes to be acceptable to the US.5 It is possible to US laws, and two options are available that India would be expected to adopt to the US administration. It could try to safeguards in perpetuity on facilities that amend sections of the US Atomic Energy are declared as civilian, requiring that Act requiring full-scope safeguards. Or these facilities may not be used to process instead, it could introduce stand alone nuclear materials for the military sector. legislation to create an exception for India The exact form that safeguards arrange[Squassoni 2005]. As for the NSG, the US ments take will influence the extent of administrationcould press for an excep- separation. For example, in the Tarapur tion or a set of criteria that would allow reprocessing plant safeguards currently cooperation with India while retaining the apply only while processing safeguarded full-scope safeguards. Alternatively, the spent fuels such as the fuel from the group would decide at the plenary to its Rajasthan reactors.6 So underthe present next meeting whetheror not to allow exports arrangement this plant can be used to to India, on the basis of its history and also process un-safeguarded materials too. In its commitments as described in the joint contrast, a complete separation would be statement (ibid). one in which all material used in a reBoth the US Congress and the NSG will processing plant thatis declared as civilian follow the progreAs India makes in its is safeguarded. It remains to be seen what separationplans and, in addition, are likely form the new arrangements will take and to want to know what form the safeguards whether they will override the existing would take before arriving at a decision. safeguards agreements. Economicand PoliticalWeekly December31, 2005 This content downloaded on Sat, 12 Jan 2013 14:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Choice The Indiannegotiators of the deal would be steering a course between what is desirable, given the requirement of a beneficial outcome for the civilian and military sectors at an affordable cost, and what is acceptable to the US, the NSG members, and the international nonproliferation regime. In any separation arrangement, the civilian sector would benefit if a large number of existing facilities are declaredcivilian for two reasons. First, access to inputs from abroad such as financing, technology and fuel supplies would accrue only to this sector. To illustrate,India'spowerprogrammeis uraniumconstrainedandsome heavy-waterreactors have slowed operations to conserve naturaluranium fuel. The enriched uranium that Russia has supplied for the Tarapurlight water reactors is expected to be exhausted in 2006 [Ramachlandran 2005]. To conserve enriched uranium,fuel containing 10 per cent mixed oxide fuel (MOX) has been used at Tarapur and it is possible to increase this fraction up to 30 per cent without expensive design changes [Chari 2005]. Therefore, India's need for uranium imports would place a lower bound on the number of power reactors in its civilian nuclear complex. Second, to the extent thatsafeguardswould result in the duplication of many facilities to separatelyserve the civilian and military sectors,the cost of duplication would affect the economics of nuclear power. On the other hand, since there is no constrainton transferof materials from the militaryto theciviliansector,itmight appear expedient for India to retain its military option by declaring a large number of facilities to be military. Recently, the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) stated that only facilities that have no national security significance will be civilian [Subramanian 2005]. Most Indian facilities have played a dual role in the past, and this approach would minimise the size of the civilian sector. In addition to being detrimental to the civilian sector, such a strategy is unlikely to be acceptable to the US or the NSG. Plutonium Reserves The main reason why sections of the Indianstrategicandnuclearestablishments would want to keep a. large number of facilities in the military sector is to retain India's options for generating weapons-usableplutonium. Currently, India's weapons-gradeplutoniumis produced in two researchreactors- CIRUS andDhruva,locatedattheBhabhaAtomic Research Centre (BARC) campus [Rajaraman2005]. These reactors are operatedwith a low-bumup,and the fuel rodsareremovedafterbriefirradiation and the resultingplutoniumseparated.Such low bumupsare not efficient for power production.High bumupsused in power productionresult in higher isotopes of plutonium, which are suboptimal for weaponsproduction.However,the inherentlydualnatureof thispartof thenuclear programmelies in thefactthat,despitethe higherisotopesinreactorgradeplutonium, itcanalsobeusedtomakefissionweapons. Theplutonium producedinIndia'spower reactorsis also anintegralpartof its plans for three-stagepower programme- the plutoniumproducedin thefirststageis to be usedin thesecondstagein its proposed Fast BreederReactors(FBR) to produce fissile uranium-233.The rate at which uranium-233fuel is madeavailablefor its thirdstagethatwoulduse India'splentiful suppliesof thorium,thereforedependson thequantitiesof plutoniumproducedin its first stage. In addition,plutoniumseparatedfromits powerreactorscan be used as MOX for its light water reactorsin Tarapur. One implicationof wherethe lines are drawn in separating India's nuclear facilities, therefore, is the partitioning of plutoniumsuppliesfor weaponsproductionon themilitarysideandas fuel for FBRs and MOX fuel for the civilian programme.This calls for reflectionand discussionwithinthenuclearandstrategic establishmentson what India's nuclear posture should be. For example, some analystsestimatethat India alreadyhas a stock of weapons-grade plutonium from CIRUS and Dhruvafor a hundred weapons of 20-kilotonneseach (ibid). If this is sufficient, there is no reason for the power reactors to remain in the militarysector. Uranium Enrichment and Fuel Reprocessing India'smainuraniumenrichmentplant inRattehalli, Karnataka, producesenriched uranium for its nuclear submarine programme.Its enrichmentcapacity is muchlowerthanwhatis neededto power a singlelightwaterpowerreactor[Ramana 2004]. Itis notclearwhethermaterialfrom facilitiescanbe usedto power safeguarded nuclearsubmarinesunderthis agreement, butits statusas a potentialsourceof highly enricheduraniumforIndia'sthermonuclear weaponsprogrammemakesit likely that it wouldbe in themilitarysector.Indiahas a pilot-scale ultracentrifugeenrichment plant in BARC's Trombaycampusthat can produce 2 kg of weapons grade uraniumeachyearandis likelyto become a partof the militarysector.7 Spentfuel reprocessingis whereduplicationof facilitiesis likely to arisein any separationprogramme,becausetheplutoniumextractedfromspentfuel is useable in the weaponsprogrammeon one hand andintheproposedfastbreederprogramme and in MOX fuel on the civilian. The medium-scale reprocessing facility operatedby the AEC in Trombayis not under internationalsafeguardscurrently and processesfuel from the CIRUS and Dhruvareactors.8As the main sourceof plutoniumfor the weaponsprogramme,it is likelytobepartof themilitarysector.The large-scaleplantthatis partof theTarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) complex reprocessesfuelmeantfortheFastBreeder TestReactor(FBTR)andTarapur'sMOX fabricationfacilities.9In the past, it has also processedfuel fromCIRUSandalso from the Kalpakkam and Rajasthan reactors.A third plant, the large-scale KalpakkamAtomicReprocessingPlantis managedby the IndiraGandhiCentrefor AtomicResearchandhasbeenearmarked forIndia'sFBRprogramme, andcurrently reprocessesfuel from the heavy water inKalpakkam reactor andalsofromFBTR.10 Theeventualstatusof thesetworeprocessing plantswould dependon the statusof theupstreamanddownstreamfacilities.If, as senior Departmentof Atomic Energy (DAE) officialshave suggested,FBTRis declaredmilitary(T S Subramanian op cit) then under complete separationthe reprocessingplantthatsuppliesthemcannot remainin the civilian sector. Contours of Separation As part of its plans for separatingits facilities,Indiawill eventuallybegin discussions with the IAEA aboutthe nature of safeguardsit will implement.Current safeguards on Indian facilities do not enforcecompleteseparation. Forexample, to the safeguardsapply reprocessingplant in Tarapuronly while processing safeguardedspentfuels such as the fuel from theRajasthanreactors.India'snegotiators should gauge whether continuing such arrangementson currentlysafeguarded Economicand PoliticalWeekly December31, 2005 This content downloaded on Sat, 12 Jan 2013 14:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 5531 facilities would be acceptable to India's partners in the deal. In the face of uncertaintyabout the exact form the safeguards arrangements would eventually take, Indian planners must be willing to make choices in the context of complete separation. Given the existing plutonium stocks and the potential for further plutonium production using the research reactors Dhruva and CIRUS, the power reactors are not necessary for weapons production and should be open to safeguards. The FBTR is likely to remain unsafeguarded, and it remains to be seen what plans the DAE has for operational FBR's once they come on stream. Keeping these reactorsin the militarysector will complicate access to uranium for the first stage reactors that would supply the second stage of this programme.Therefore the power reactors should be subject to safeguards.Inpartitioningdual-use enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities the following questions should be asked: First, are they useful to the civilian nuclear power programme? Second, are they essential to the military nuclear weapons programme? Because materials, facilities and personnel are involved this is likely to be an extended process in which the DAE experts, in consultation with Indian negotiators of the agreement, work out the details of separating these facilities. If the India-US deal moves forward and is approvedby the US Congress and NSG, this would give the formergreaterfreedom to pursue cooperation with countries possessing nuclear materials and technology. Perhapsits greatest benefit would be the flexibility to cooperate with countries thathave experience with FBRs. Or maybe the emphasis would be on obtaining access to natural and enriched uranium fuel for its first stage reactors. While all these avenues may be simultaneously pursued, it must be remembered that international cooperation would require the facilities receiving assistance to be subject to safeguards,and to that extent India's priorities for internationalcooperation must be articulated. Having clear priorities would also help India's negotiators navigate a situation in which offers of cooperation come with strings attached. A Note of Caution The ancillary costs of nuclear power in India will increase if dedicated facilities haveto beestablishedto separatelyservice thecivilianandmilitarysectors.TheDAE is 5532 clearly sensitive to this fact, and the chairman of the AEC indicated that cost would be a factor in identifying what is civilian (ibid). But if facility-specific safeguards happen, then some of the initial costs of replication will be unavoidable. Efforts must be made to understandthe effects of separation on the costs of nuclear power by studying the costs of the kind of facilities that are being duplicated over their lifetimes. Progress in the deal should not be seen as a referendum in favour of nuclear power. Rather, the choice of generation technology should be based on assessment of costs. To assess the economics of nuclear power in comparison to other sources such as natural gas and coal a complete analysis of its economics, including the costs of fuel fabrication, heavy water, spent fuel reprocessing, and waste storage and disposal is necessary [Gopalakrishnan2002]. The cost estimates published by the DAE omit these factors. More generally, there is a need for establishing methodology for integrated resource planning to identify energy choices and this must be openly subject to discussion. 'ZI Facilities, Last Updated September 2003, (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/ Nuclear/2103_2473.html) 8 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Facilities, Last Updated September 2003, (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/ Nuclear/2103_2497.html) 9 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Facilities, Last Updated September 2003, (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/ Nuclear/2103 2499.html) 10 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Facilities, Last Updated September 2003, (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/ Nuclear/2103_2495.html) References Baruah,Amit (2005): 'IndiaMust SubmitPlan on NuclearFacilities', The Hindu,November 15. - (2005a): 'Work on Separatioh of Nuclear Facilities at Advanced Stage'., The Hindu, December 12. Chari, P R (2005): 'Indo-US N Deal', Margin, Vol 37, No4, July-September,NationalCouncil of Applied Economic Research. A (2002): 'Evolutionof theIndian Gopalakrishnan, Nuclear Power Programme',Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, Vol 27, pp 369-95. McGoldricket al (2005): 'The US-IndiaNuclear Deal: Taking Stock', Arms Control Today, October. Perkovich,George (2005): 'FaultyPromises:The US-IndiaNuclearDeal', CarnegieEndowment Email: ashwin_k@MIT.EDU for InternationalPeace, September. Rajaraman, R (2005): 'Save the Indo-US Agreement', Seminar on Nuclear Energy: India's Challenges and Opportunities,Indian 1 Joint statementbetween presidentGeorge W Pugwash Society, November 25-26. Bush and prime minister ManmohanSingh, Ramachandran,R (2005): 'The Indo-US Nuclear Deal:TheDimensionsof theBargain',Seminar office of the presssecretary,the White House, on Nuclear Energy: India's Challenges and July 18, 2005. 2 'US Clarifieson India's Next Step in N-deal', Opportunities, Indian Pugwash Society, November 25-26. Express News Service, November 15, 2005. 3 'Lugar Addresses US-India Nuclear Co- Ramana,M V (2004): 'India's UraniumEnrichment Programme', INESAP Information operation', UnitedStatesSenate,December6, 2005. Bulletin, No 24, December. 4 Ibid. Sq'uassoni, Sharon (2005): 'US Nuclear 5 Ibid. Cooperationwith India:Issues for Congress', CRS Report for Congress, October 24. 6 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Subramanian,T S (2005): 'Identifyinga Civilian Facilities, Last Updated September 2003, Nuclear Facility Is India's Decision', (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/ Interviewwith Anil Kakodkar, The Hindu, Nuclear/2103_2499.html) 7 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear August 12. Notes CALLFOR PAPERS The Centre for GandhianStudies, Jamia MilliaIslamia,New Delhi invites papers for an all-Indiaconference on "Rethinking the NationalLegacy:Gandhiand the Freedom Movement'on 20th and 21st February2006. The Conference would address the followingthemes: Gandhiand the nation-stateinthe era of globalization;the differential response of the HinduNationalistMovementto Gandhiand Nehru;Gandhiand the marginalized;and Gandhias represented in the media/films. Abstracts may be sent via email to gandhiancentre.jamia@.gmail.comor through telefax: +91-11-2698 5473. The fulltext of the call forpapers is availableon the Jamia,. web site http://jmi.nic.in/Events/Events06/gfm.htm. Thedeadlineforsubmittingabstracts has been extended to 31 January2006. Economicand PoliticalWeekly December31, 2005 This content downloaded on Sat, 12 Jan 2013 14:51:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions