Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis

    
                          
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7=:9 Elections in A Nigeria C ontemporary An alys is Edited by Adeolu Durotoye ii DEDICATION To God almighty, my parents, my wife and my children. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS “Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it”. I am grateful to the almighty God for making it possible for me to undertake this project. He is ever worthy to be praised. I am indebted to Aare Afe Babalola, the founder of Afe Babalola University (ABUAD) for writing the forward to this book in addition to providing a credible platform (ABUAD), which encourages me to undertake this project. Equally worthy of mention are Prof. Israel Orubuloye, and Mr. Olu Sodimu who facilitated my joining ABUAD in the first place. Special thanks go to Mr. Ariyo Aboyade, as well as my assistant, Tosin Adedara, who helped in formatting this work. Mr. Babatunde Braimoh and Mr Sunday Oyetunji deserve a mention for designing the different versions of the cover of this book. I thank my Provost, Prof. Adewale AlawiyeAdams, and all my colleagues in the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti for their support and cooperation. I am also grateful to Mr. Tunde Olofintila, Head of ABUAD’s Corporate Affairs Department for assisting in no small measure in editing a portion of this work. All the contributors to this work deserve a commendation. Last but not least, my lovely, and supportive wife, Jane Itunu Durotoye, and my children, Ayomide, Mayokun, Oreoluwa, Paul, Anuoluwa and Elisha, whose encouragement and support remain invaluable. It is practically impossible to mention everyone who assisted in different ways to make this project a success. I am thankful to all. A.D. 2016. iv FOREWORD Election is to democracy what Oxygen is to man. Without Oxygen, man is dead; and without election, democracy cannot thrive. So, it is safe to say that election is the lifeblood of democracy. It is the only way for the citizenry to renew and exercise their rights in the governance of their nation and get the most benefit out of democracy. The democratic right of Nigerians to elect their leaders every four years is therefore of paramount importance. In Westberry v Sanders, the court testified to the fundamental character of the right to vote when it said: “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Deriving from the above judicial position, it is therefore necessary to ensure that any election conducted is done in a way that would substantially ensure that the main objective of a free and fair election is not only achieved, but globally acclaimed to have been achieved. In his book, Here comes the Commander-in-Chief, the crusading Cleric and Columnist, Gabriel Akinnadewo, said: “Since the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Nigeria has fought many wars. Yes, wars because election in this country is war. We fought in 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003 and 2007. Another one is coming in 2011…”. That was as at when Akinnadewo wrote his piece and he could not have been more pin-point accurate and apt. But the immediate past President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, changed the often rancorous tone and tenor of elections in Nigeria when he immediately congratulated the winner of the March 28, 2015 Presidential Election, General Muhammadu Buhari, shortly after he was declared the winner by the Independent National Election Commission (INEC), thereby demonstrating that he is a “man of honour” who is not desperate to remain in office as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This commendable art of statesmanship went a long way in not allowing the nation to be turned into another theatre of war with the attendant gory v carnage, burning, maiming and killing as well as wanton destruction of both ambulatory and non-ambulatory properties similar to the events of 1983 after the gubernatorial election in the then bigger Ondo State. So, it is safe to say that over the years in Nigeria, our bitter experience is that Nigeria’s political history has been characterised by electoral violence, fraudulent elections, competitive rigging, and politically motivated assassination of persons. Perhaps if our politicians were a little more decorous, perhaps our elections would not become a ‘do or die’ affair, neither would anyone or group of persons be at ease to annul elections with impunity. They should take a cue from the mercurial and evergreen declarations of world class political philosophers and political pundits like George Washington, John F. Kennedy, Mahatma Gandhi, Winston Churchill and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. among others so that our elections are more sedate and not war-like. Election petitions have also inflicted severe injuries and damage on the electorate, the judiciary (which has been brutalised and called all sorts of names) and the political class. The general elections of 1999 (and all that followed it) attracted global interest. This is against the backdrop of the long period of military dictatorship and the interval between the last successful elections and that of 1999. Various people and commentators described the outcome of that election in various terms, depending on the political leaning of the commentators. Descriptions like: ‘monumental fraud’, ‘charade’, ‘unrealistic’ were used by those who refused to accept the outcome of the elections whereas those in support of it saw it as “free and fair”. The general elections of 2003 followed the same pattern with some people who felt aggrieved at the outcome of the elections approaching the Elections Petition Tribunal for relief. For instance, petitions were filed at the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal to challenge Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s election as the President for a second term. The hearing of the petition turned out to be the longest in the history of trials of any case in Nigeria with a galaxy of over 360 witnesses testifying at the trial and covering a period of well over two and half years. As a lawyer, I vi represented several of my clients in some of these petitions. Subsequent elections in Nigeria have not been spared violence and petitions in some cases. The good news however is that the 2015 Presidential Election was spared the usual post- election petition and even violence despite the predictions to that effect by local and international commentators and electoral book-makers. This is not the case with state elections however where the Election Petition Tribunals were inundated with myriads of election petitions. As a way out of the problems facing the Election Petitions Tribunals, I have suggested on many occasions in the past that Election disputes be settled by Arbitration, which in any case is cheaper, less time consuming and less rancorous. Going by the above recital, this book on “Elections in Nigeria: A contemporary Analysis” is not only very topical, it is equally timely. To be sure, the book has identified a viable topic, researched it with appropriate techniques and methodology, and reached results with care and clarity, the hallmark of the Ivory Tower the world over. After reading through the over 200 pages of the manuscript of this excellent academic work, I find it pleasurable to note that the book has broken new grounds in the analysis of elections in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. Besides, it has been a pleasant and pleasurable must read for all and I hereby recommend it as such. With the benefit of his expertise in Political Science and Comparative Studies, the editor, Adeolu Durotoye, Ph.D., has put together a Compendium on Elections in Nigeria raising critical questions and lessons, and formulating a realistic best practice forecast for elections in Nigeria. The determined and unrelenting team has undertaken an in-depth analytical study on the various aspects of elections in Nigeria covering the roles of Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), the judiciary, the political class, the media, electoral violence, and ethnic politics. The book is a compendium of facts and figures on elections in Nigeria, and useful recommendations on how to improve the process have been made by a select group of eminent as well as up and coming scholars in different fields including Law, Political Science, International Relations, and Communications Studies. vii What makes the book a most compelling read is the fact that considering Nigeria’s economic, strategic and political importance within and beyond the African continent, free and fair elections in Nigeria is a sine qua non for stability of the West African sub-region and by extension, the Sub Sahara Africa. The thrust of this Compendium is significant for its futuristic approach in providing policy makers, and the generality of Nigerians with some salient suggestions towards credible elections that will ultimately lead to democratic consolidation in Nigeria and the African continent as a whole. I commend the book to the reading, educational and Research pleasure of all. Aare Afe Babalola, OFR, CON, SAN, LL.D, D. Litt, FNSE Founder & Chancellor, Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State viii PREFACE Since the third wave of democratisation hit Africa in the early 1990s, Elections in Africa have been anything but free and fair. While the magnitude of electoral malpractices differed from one country to the otheer, Nigeria has had a tough time organising credible elections since independence. Except for the 1993 elections, and more recently the 2015 presidential election, elections in Nigeria have been bedevilled with all kinds of malpractices before, during and even after the elections. This book is a review of elections in Nigeria since 1999, with examples drawn from pre-1999 elections in some cases. The chapters contain a mixed bag of robust articles based on qualitative and quantitative approaches. Inherent in this work are critical reviews of selected elections, the role of the electoral umpires, the media as carrier of election stories, and the Judiciary as the arbiter of myriad of election petitions that usually accompany elections in Nigeria. The focus of this compendium is to take an intellectual excursion into the state of elections in Nigeria and see how it has affected democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Elections are vital prerequisites to democracy but they do not guarantee democracy except they are considered free and fair. Democracy becomes a mere charade in a situation where elections become “the highest rigger takes all”. We are particularly concerned about the impact of elections on democratic consolidation in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. The book is organised in ten chapters. Chapter 1 is a review of the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria with the critical question of whether the well-acclaimed election represents “The ‘Irreversibility’ of Democracy” in Nigeria. Chapter 2 is an appraisal of the role of the electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with respect to the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria. Chapter 3 discusses the issues pertaining to the 2014 Ekiti state Governorship Elections in South West Nigeria. Chapter 4 examines the role of the Media in Nigeria’s ix electioneering process digging deep into the pre-1999 period from a participant’s perspective. Chapter 5 researches into how the concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” or ‘politics of the belly’ redefines political communication in Nigeria while Chapter 6 looks at the Judiciary as the arbiter of election petitions in Nigeria. Chapter 7 focuses on Osun State’s 2014 Governorship Election while chapter 8 is an expose on the impact of election crises on democratic consolidation in Nigeria since 1999. Chapter 9 interrogates the primordial sentiments in Nigeria’s electoral democracy followed finally by chapter 10, which is anchored on the unassailable relationship between internal democracy in political parties and the credibility of elections. The ultimate objective of this book is to make valuable recommendations towards formulating a realistic best practice for elections in Nigeria in consonance with global standard that will become a template for other African countries. Adeolu Durotoye, PhD Associate Professor & Head, International Relations and Diplomacy Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti (ABUAD) February 2016 x CONTENTS iii Dedication Acknowledgements Foreword Preface Contents Note on Contributors Chapter 1: Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Chapter 6: Chapter 7: iv v ix xi xiii The “Irreversibility” of Democracy and Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Election Adeolu Durotoye 1 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance: An Appraisal of INEC and the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria Ademola Azeez 23 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election Adeolu Durotoye & Sa’eed Husaini 39 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship Abiodun Adeniyi 57 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria Philip Olubunmi Aborisade 75 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria Gbenga Akingbehin 91 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories Adeolu Durotoye 115 xi Chapter 8: Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 Tolu Lawal 135 Chapter 9: Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy Mike Omilusi 151 Chapter 10: Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Ebenezer Olatunji Olugbenga 183 209 Index xii NOTE ON CONTRIBUTORS Contributors to this edition are from different backgrounds and institutions as follows: Dr. Adeolu Durotoye is an Associate professor and Head of International Relations and Diplomacy at Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti (ABUAD) in Nigeria. He obtained his PhD (Magna cum laude) in International Relations from the University of Leipzig in 2001. Dr. Durotoye has taught Politics and International Relations in Germany, Canada, and Ibadan prior to joining Afe Babalola University. He is a PhD external examiner at the department of Political Science, University of Pretoria, South Africa. The author of Nigerian-German Relations, he has published widely in both national and international journals of repute. Dr. Durotoye has visited more than 20 countries in Europe, North and Central America, the Caribbean and Asia where he has presented papers at international conferences. Dr. Ademola Azeez is a Senior lecturer and coordinator of the Political Science Programme at Afe-Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti (ABUAD), Nigeria. He holds his BSc and MSc and PhD degrees from the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He has taught Political Science at the University of Ilorin, Achievers University, Owo, and University of Ado-Ekiti (now Ekiti State University) before joining ABUAD. Ademola Azeez has published widely in both national and international journals of repute. His values and strengths include dynamism, coordination, team work, leadership and zeal for excellence. Dr. Mike Omilusi is a freelance journalist, development and peace building practitioner, consultant and teacher. He obtained his PhD from the Ekiti State University where he also teaches Political Science. For over one and a half decades, he has been collaborating with civil society organisations and international agencies on governance and development issues. He has attended and presented papers at conferences in Europe, Asia and Africa. xiii Dr. Abiodun Adeniyi won the British Chevening Scholarship in 2003 to study International Communications at the University of Leeds, England where he was awarded a doctorate degree in Communication Studies in 2008. Adeniyi returned to Nigeria in 2009, working as a Communications Consultant on the platform of the World Bank Economic Reform and Governance Project (ERGP) at the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), Presidency, Abuja. On expiration of the project, he became Lead Consultant at Witswords Consults Limited (WCL), Abuja, before joining Baze University as a Senior Lecturer in Mass Communication. His present research interests are in the fields of Public Relations and Advertising Practicum, Strategic Communications and the dynamics of media and governance. Dr. Philip Olubunmi Aborisade, an activist, author, researcher, lecturer and a trained journalist of over a decade experience in print media, is an Associate Professor and the Head of Department of Media and Social Studies at Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti. Before his appointment at Afe Babalola University in July 2012, he taught for eight years at the State University of New York (Empire State College) and the College of New Rochelle, New York. Dr. Emmanuel Olugbenga Akingbehin obtained LL.M and Ph.D degrees in Law at the University of Lagos in 1999 and 2011 respectively. He has been in active legal practice since 1990. He is presently a Senior Lecturer at the University of Lagos. He is the immediate past Sub-Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University and currently serves as the Masters’ Degree Coordinator in the Faculty. He is well published locally and internationally. Dr. Akingbehin is a Notary Public of Nigeria and a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators of Nigeria. Dr. Ebenezer Olatunji Olugbenga (formerly Ebenezer Olugbenga Olaoye) obtained his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from the Ondo State University (now Ekiti State University), Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. His M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science are from the University of Lagos, Akoka-Yaba. Olugbenga has written two books, namely Government and Politics for Nigerian Students (2003) and Topics in Politics of Development xiv and Underdevelopment (2011). He also edited Public Management in Nigeria (2005). He has published widely, both in local and international journals. Sa’eed Husain is a PhD candidate at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He visited Ekiti State in 2015 while on his fieldwork. Tolu Lawal is with the Department of Public Administration, Rufus Giwa Polytechnic, Owo, Ondo state, Nigeria. His contribution to this volume was first presented at an international conference in Freiburg, Germany in December 2015. xv xvi  1 The “Irreversibility” of Democracy and Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Election Adeolu Durotoye Introduction Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election was unique in many ways. First, it marked an unprecedented uninterrupted 5th presidential election since return to democracy in 1999. The first Republic lasted only 6 years from 1960 to 1966; the second Republic lasted only 4 years from 1979 to 1984, while the third Republic was truncated after 4 years of expensive transition programmes between 1989 and 1993. Second, it was unique because for the first time, an incumbent president lost an election. Even though many incumbent governors have lost elections at the state level, the “power of incumbency” has always been potent at the federal level. Third, this marked the first time the loser in a presidential election will call to congratulate the winner even before the official results were finalised. Fourth, it is also the first time there will be no post-election violence despite predictions by different observers and commentators including the US. Fifth, it is also the first time an electronic device called the Card reader and a chip card called the Permanent Voter’s Card (PVC) were introduced by the electoral body (INEC). Has Nigeria come of age politically? Has democracy become irreversible in Nigeria? Is democracy now the ‘only game in town’? Are all these a fluke due only to the overwhelming desire for change or a true test of democratic consolidation? In dealing with the Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis research questions raised above, this chapter is organised under the following subtopics; 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. What is Democratic Consolidation Elections in Nigeria Run-up to the 2015 presidential election Conduct of election Why PDP Jonathan lost Recommendation/Conclusion Democratic Consolidation The concept of democratic consolidation evolves out of concern about whether the former authoritarian regimes will be able to sustain their newly found democracy. The idea is that the task of sustaining democracy is as difficult as the task of establishing it. This has brought the concept of democratic consolidation to the centre of academic discourse. Democratic consolidation is the process by which a new democracy matures, in a way that means it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock. Diamond (1999) describes democratic consolidation as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation such that all significant political actors believe that popular rule is better for their society than any other alternative they can imagine. Hence, it is a state of developed democratic cultures where political actors adhere to the democratic rules of the game. Democratic Consolidation has also been defined as series of continuous actions and changes geared towards the replacement of an existing system of authoritarian and undemocratic rule. (Yagboyaju, 2007). According to Asiwaju (2000), democratic consolidation implies the internalisation of democratic culture and the institutionalisation of democratic best process. Put another way, consolidation suggests there is a democratic foundation being strengthened and built upon. (Tinubu, 2009). Osinakachukwu and Jawan (2011) wrote that democratic consolidation “implies a democracy that can last for the test of time…This is a 2 democracy that will come and stay and which cannot come to an end suddenly or abruptly through unconstitutional acts such as military coups or dictatorships”, (p.130). In my opinion, democratic consolidation is a journey and not a destination. It is a process not an event. It implies that the people of a particular country are imbibing and displaying a democratic culture that propels democracy and makes democracy continuously irreversible. Hence, a research into democratic consolidation in Nigeria should look at those input and output mechanisms that make democracy thrive. Some scholars have argued that that the process by which a democracy becomes consolidated involves the creation and improvement of secondary institutions of the democracy. (Linz & Stepan, 1996). On the other hand, some other scholars like O'Donnell (1996)' have argued that the institutionalization of electoral rules is not the most crucial feature of democratic consolidation. Rather the informal practices of actors are very vital in democratic consolidation. Consolidation therefore occurs when the actors in a system follow the formal rules of the democratic institution. Contradicting this position are Gasiorowski and Power (1998). They asserted that the process-centric literature on democratic consolidation has paid inadequate attention to the effects of structural factors. Focusing on the Third World countries, they used three indicators of consolidation and multivariate statistical techniques. The authors' main finding is that development-related socioeconomic factors, the contagion effect of democratic neighbours, and high inflation each strongly affect the likelihood of consolidation, although the latter was significant only in the early part of the period studied. Several other factors have no apparent effect, including several measures dealing with political culture and the design of democratic institutions. These three factors together strongly predict which Third World democracies achieve consolidation. In another vein, Regilme Jr. (2013) has controversially suggested that the cause of non-democratic consolidation in developing countries is brain drain in which high skilled workers from developing countries migrate to 3 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis high-income and capital-rich countries. This leaves many new democracies in the developing world problems in terms of steering effective governance due to the lack of high-skilled professionals. Focusing on Nigeria, some have argued that it is premature to talk of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. With over 10,000 dead in communal conflicts and an exponential increase in societal violence, many will argue that it is too early to talk of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Indeed, the fact that the public still casts doubt on the state’s capacity to manage domestic crises and to protect the security of life and property underscores primarily the depth of disenchantment with the state of things. As Nigeria drifts down the path of increasing violent conflict, perhaps we should first move away from current disappointment and ask if anything could really have been different from the current situation, given the provenance of civilian rule. (Fayemi, 2012). Fayemi argued further that it is difficult to “have democracy without democrats” because of the dominance of the political party hierarchy by retired military officers and civilians closely connected to the military elite who set the tone for a party formation that pays little attention to ideology. Tinubu’s (2009) Verdict on Nigeria’s democracy is that there is as yet “no true democracy” in Nigeria. He argued that the period between 1999 and 2009 was at best, 10 years of civil rule, even if all the structures of a democratic setting, the Presidency, the National Assembly and the Judiciary (at the federal level); and the Governorship, the State Legislatures and the Judiciary (at the state levels) were all in operation, “those democratic structures are built on the quicksand of a general antidemocratic mindset: faulty elections, dubious mandates and abuse of security forces, by the ruling party, to rig elections”, etc. Analysing Obasanjo’s presidency, Tinubu, himself a state governor between 1999 and 4 2007 argued that Nigeria’s “was a democratic dispensation run on military temper”. …the conduct of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo as elected president left little or no doubt that there was a sort of “Army Arrangement”…His style was gruff and dismissive. He barely disguised his contempt for democratic finesse. He openly and unrepentantly subverted due process. He, without end, blackmailed the National Assembly on some bogus pretence to higher ideals of patriotism. Durotoye’s (2014) verdict having reviewed Nigeria’s democracy was a little more balanced. It was clear however that democracy in Nigeria could not be described as ‘real democracy’ during the period (1999-2007). …in view of the different kinds of anti-democratic practices by the political class. Election rigging and brigandage, violence and election annulment were common practices. The trend is towards a reversal to the old order of despotic political rulership under the guise of civil governance. One cannot but agree that elections in Nigeria in the period under study were a fading shadow of democracy, endangering the fragile democratic project itself. The use of state power and security privilege to harass and intimidate the challenger's machinery was widespread. Harassment of the opposition was the most intransigent legacy that has survived from the locust years of military autocracy, and those who are deeply concerned about the survival of democracy might be tempted to believe that this legacy could abort the survival of democratic values in the nation”. However, he added “considering the fact that the role of the legislature and the judiciary during the period showed that all hope is not yet lost in the match 5 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis towards democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Unlike most African countries, Nigerian democracy had been strengthened by strong political institutions necessary to solidify democratic practices. Democratic contest is alive even though battered. Elections in Nigeria Free and fair election is the benchmark of democracy. In other words, democracy implies that the people have the opportunity to decide who governs them. Regular elections offer the people the opportunity to accept or refuse the men who are to govern them. It is free, fair elections that confirm the legitimacy of a government as well as withdraw legitimacy from one government, and gives it to the other. It is the political right enjoyed by the people to decide who should govern them in a free and fair election that separates democracy from any other kind of political system. Election is also a post mortem that investigates the record of office holders to ascertain whether they have kept faith with their election promises or not. Democracy is all about elections and choosing political leaders. A review of elections in Nigeria since independence reveals that election rigging has been a constant factor in Nigeria’s democratic process. Osinachukwu and Jawan (2011) examined election rigging and its effect on democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Relying on qualitative approach using data gathered from secondary sources as well as historical analysis by looking into the histories of election rigging in Nigeria from 1960 to 2007, they concluded that election rigging has hindered the emergence of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Thereby, elections in Nigeria have not been able to bring about leadership change that will enforce accountability in leadership. “Election riggings in Nigeria were evident in 1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections.” (p.128). Electoral frauds include illegal printing of voters’ cards, illegal possession of ballot boxes, stuffing of ballot boxes, falsification of election results, illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers, infant voting, compilation of 6 fictitious names on voters’ lists, illegal compilation of separate voters’ lists, illegal printing of forms used for collection and declaration of election results, deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas, announcing results in places where no elections were held, switching and unauthorized announcement of results, harassment of candidates, agents and voters, change of list of electoral officials, as well as box- inflation of figures, among others. (P.131). Catalogue of Election Rigging Methods in Nigeria As Enumerated by National Conscience Party 1. Recognition of non-existing polling units by INEC and allocation of voting materials to same. 2. Bribing of INEC officials, the police and security agents with irresistible amounts to perpetrate election rigging. 3. Use by INEC of partisan party supporters as electoral officers to man Polling Stations. 4. Diversion of electoral materials to private offices, residence and palaces of traditional rulers for manipulation and falsification. 5. Concealment or non-release of voters’ register loaded with false names later used as a ghost. 6. Voters register used at polling units not numbered, thus permitting arbitrary addition of names to the register. 7. Unannounced and sudden change of location of polling stations and collation centers. 8. Pre-stuffing of ballot boxes with fake ballot paper before the day of the election. 9. Stuffing of illegal ballot boxes with illegal papers. 10. Sale of pre-stuffed ballot boxes to candidates. 11. Replacement or exchange of official ballot boxes with unofficial ballot boxes containing unofficial thumb-printed ballot papers (throwing ballot boxes into the water in riverine areas and replacing with freshly stuffed ballot boxes from illegal quarters). 7 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis 12. Addition of unofficial ballot boxes to official ballot boxes containing already thumb printed ballot papers. 13. Falsification of results and forgery of figure both at polling units and collation centres. 14. Multiple voting to which INEC officials and the police are indifferent. 15. Use of under-aged children as voters to which INEC officials and the police are indifferent. 16. Use of special ethylated spirit to clean off the so-called indelible ink of fingernails to facilitate multiple voting. 17. Use of Vaseline on the fingernails before the so-called indelible ink is applied by polling officers in order to enable easy cleansing and facilitate multiple voting. 18. Thumb printing of ballot papers by INEC officials. 19. Thumb printing of ballot papers by security agents. 20. Thumb printing of ballot papers by some domestic monitors. 21. Accumulation and use of illegally acquired voting cards to vote on election days. 22. Use of party agents as surveyors of voters’ cards to facilitate impersonation and multiple voting. 23. Dressing up party agents in police uniforms to intimidate opponents at polling and collation centres. 24. Use of armed thugs to harass and intimidate opponents and rival party agents. 25. Use of police and security operatives to terrorize opponents and rival party agents. 26. Use of armed thugs, police and security operatives to intimidate party agents of rival parties to depart from polling centre. 27. Party members of the ruling parties bearing INEC tags on polling days to facilitate moving from polling station to polling station 8 and from one collation centre to another with a view to rigging elections. 28. Printing and use of fake election results sheets with same numbers as authentic result sheets. 29. Forcing some party agents at gunpoint to sign forged election results. 30. Canvassing for votes at polling centres with impunity. 31. Members of the ruling parties claiming falsely to be party agents for rival political parties so as to give cover to the rigging of election results. 32. Intimidating and compelling voters, in some instances at gunpoint to vote for particular parties 33. Ruling parties compromising agents of newly registered parties by offering them bribe. 34. Exposure of voters to the full glare of party agents in the process of voting which denied voters of privacy and negated the legal requirement of secret balloting. 35. Posting of false results by INEC on its website for internet consumption that had borne with results emanating from polling centres. 36. Change of candidates for election few days before election and in some cases after election. 37. Sale of mandate to the highest bidder. 38. Use of different fingers to make imprints on ballot papers in order to prevent easy discovery of multiple voting. 39. Agents of ruling parties forcefully seizing ballot papers from voters known to have voted against the favoured party and deliberate invalidation of same by making additional finger imprints. 40. Use of looted public money to bribe voters. 9 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis 41. Distribution of foodstuffs and soup ingredients such as rice, garri, beans, maize, groundnut oil, maggi and other items like sugar, slippers, roofing sheets, clothing materials, etc. to induce voters. 42. Refusing to count and discarding of ballot papers identified as thumb printed for political parties that are not favoured, Source: Kwasau, M. (2013) “The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, no.8. From the above list, it can be deduced that election rigging has been a threat to democracy in Nigeria. Unfortunately, politicians who carried out this dastardly act have gone scot-free. “In as much as politicians are not nailed in their previous manipulation of elections, the future politicians keep re-strategizing manipulations for subsequent elections, thereby making election rigging inevitable in Nigerian politics”. Osinakachukwu & Jawan (2011:136). Apart from the political class, electoral manipulations in Nigeria were aided and abetted by biased electoral umpires. Since the return to civil rule on 29 May 1999, Nigeria has held three general elections, aside from sundry re-run elections and local government polls. Of the three general elections, none of them met the muster of sane polling, even if to be fair, the 1999 election, under the direction of the late Ephraim Akpata, appeared the cleanest of the three. But a disturbing trend is that as each general election was worse than the preceding one (2003 was worse than 1999; and 2007 was worse than 2003), each succeeding electoral umpire was also worse than his predecessor. (Tinubu 2009). Ranking the different electoral chiefs, Tinubu added, “Chief Akpata did a fair job. However, that cannot be said of Dr. Abel Guobadia who succeeded him. Of course, Prof. Maurice Iwu, the current (as of 2009) Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) chairman appears to 10 have broken all bounds in how not to conduct elections; the latest example being the Ekiti governorship re-run and the drama and controversy that surrounded the final ‘result’. Prof. Iwu, with his perfidy, is surely leading Nigeria into the abyss and our democracy into a dungeon. If immediate action is not taken, Iwu will lead our electoral system into a state where candidates will prepare for war instead of electioneering. That would result in a situation of mutually assured destruction. Nevertheless, even with his extremely bad record, he is unfazed. He supervises the conception, monitoring and execution of mandate robbery – and he does so with reckless abandon! No thanks to Iwu, INEC has BECOME a nest of election riggers. Despite all that, he goes on an ego trip, when reacting to his troubled conscience, claiming that he has a lot to teach both Ghana and the United States in the ABC of clean elections. Yet by universal consensus, he conducted the worst election in Nigerian history in 2007. Since then, he has continued his electoral rascality with phoney re-runs in which he and his collaborators, not the Nigerian electorate, decide who win or lose elections!” What one can glean from the above is that Nigeria has fared very badly at each passing election and electoral manipulation is the greatest single threat to Nigeria’s democratic survival. Apart from electoral fraud perpetrated by politicians and aided by the electoral umpires in some cases, there are many other challenges facing democratic consolidation in Nigeria which include the balkanization of the society along tribal and religious sentiments, the absence of true federalism, abject poverty, disjointed and manipulated (mis)information by the media, corruption, the politics of godfatherism and insecurity among many other factors. (Kwasau, 2013). The perennial problem of lack of credible and democratic electoral process has been linked with the phenomenon of “failed, uncaring and unresponsive governance” in Nigeria. (Inokoba and Kumokor, 2011:139). No wonder, years of civil rule since 1999 has failed to deliver on good roads, functioning health amenities, quality education, uninterrupted power supply, living wages for workers, effective petroleum sector, genuine electoral reform, equitable distribution of wealth and so on. Hence, Nigeria’s democracy has been described as merely formalistic and 11 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis devoid of substance. (Ibid. p.139). If credible elections are the barometer for measuring democratic consolidation, then we can say that Nigeria is maturing democratically if only the 2015 elections can be adjudged freer and fairer than previous elections. To this task we now turn. Run Up to the 2015 Presidential Elections a. Emergence of APC The All Progressive Congress (APC) was formed in February 2013 as an offshoot of a merger of Nigeria's three biggest opposition parties – the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) – and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). For the first time since 1999, a formidable opposition was formed to take on the PDP in the general elections. The new coalition was approved by the nation's electoral umpire, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 31 July 2013 to become a political party. Branding itself as a social welfarist party, APC was admitted as a consultative member into the Socialist International on 12–13 December 2014. The Socialist International (SI) is a worldwide association of political parties most of which seek to establish democratic socialism. It consists mostly of democratic socialist, social-democratic and labour political parties and other organisations. Formed in 1951 it has grown to include more than 160 member parties from more than 100 countries b. Emergence of Buhari as APC’s Candidate On 10 December, 2014, former military ruler and three-time presidential candidate, Major General Muhammadu Buhari, emerged the presidential candidate of the party having scored 57.2 percent of the 5,992 votes cast to defeat Kano State Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, Imo State Governor Rochas Okorocha and newspaper owner Sam Nda Isaiah. On 17 December 2014, APC chose a lawyer and academician, Professor Yemi Osinbajo as the running mate of General Buhari. APC's voter base is in the North and the South West. 12 c. Rumpus in PDP and Mass Defection to APC In November 2013, five serving Governors from the governing PDP defected to the APC, a fallout of the Governors Forum’s (An informal Organisation of the 36 States’ governors) election in which the candidate of the president and governor of Plateau state, Jona Jang, was recognised as the winner of the chairmanship election by the presidency even though he scored fewer votes than Governor Rotimi Amaechi, the incumbent chairman and governor of the oil-rich Rivers state. The fallout of the governors’ forum imbroglio was that five PDP governors decamped to the APC. The governors who defected to the APC were Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State, Abdulfatah Ahmed of Kwara State, Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano State, Murtala Nyako of Adamawa State and Aliyu Wamakko of Sokoto State. 49 PDP federal legislators also decamped to APC. This initially gave the APC a slim majority of 186 legislators in the Lower House out of a total of 360 legislators. After months of intrigues and political bickering, National Chairman of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Bamanga Tukur also resigned his position in January 2014. Bamanga Tukur was not very popular with majority of the PDP governors. Just before Tukur’s resignation, PDP’s former general secretary, himself a former state governor and military general defected to APC on account of the failure of the party to reinstate him despite a court order to the effect. Oyinlola described the APC as the only formidable party in the country, saying that his decision to join the party was as a result of the ideology of the party and the performances of its governors. Probably the most devastating blow to the ruling PDP was the resignation of former President Olusegun Obasanjo tearing his party card describing the PDP as a “useless party” while launching a public attack on President Goodluck Jonathan whom he had helped install as president. He was reported to have said, “I have reason to believe that most or should I say all of you are wondering why I have chosen to defect to the APC and I must say that if I had been told that I would have to switch party some 5 years ago, I myself would have argued it. I believe in transparency and integrity but unfortunately, PDP is an opposite of such attributes.” (See OBJ Defects To APC And Calls Jonathan Administration, “Useless Government”. Retrieved on 15 April 2015 13 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis from http://news.nigeriannation.com/lo-ba-tan-obasanjo-defects-to-apcphotos-of-defection-party-photo-news/s). President Jonathan’s emergence as the PDP’s presidential candidate on 10 December 2014, further led to the defection of some PDP members in the House of Representatives to APC. d. INEC’s Insistence on the use of PVC and Electronic Card Readers for the Elections • Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) produced Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) for the 68,833,476 persons in the biometric Register of Voters ahead of the March 28th and April 11th, 2015 general elections. The PVC replaces the Temporary Voter Card (TVC) issued on the heels of registration of voters in 2011. These cards have many components and specialized features (e.g. base substrate, security printing, personalization, lamination and chip embedding), and it is designed with an average life span of ten (10) years. The PVC also has an embedded chip that contains all the biometrics of a legitimate holder (including fingerprints and facial image). On Election Day, it would be swiped with a Smart Card Reader at the polling unit to ensure 100 per cent authentication and verification of the voter before he/she is allowed to vote. The PVC has security features that are not easily susceptible to counterfeiting. Despite PDP and the Presidency’s opposition to its use for the 2015 elections, INEC insisted that only voters who have their PVC will be allowed to vote in the 2015 general elections. INEC extended the collection of the PVCs beyond the initial 8 March 2015 deadline by two weeks to ensure that all eligible and registered voters collected their PVCs. The elections were postponed by 6 weeks to enable all eligible voters collect their PVCs and allow the security forces sufficiently push back the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria’s North East. • Card Readers Equally, INEC insisted that for the first time in Nigeria’s electoral history, electronic voter authentication system (Smart Card Readers) will be deployed 14 for the 2015 general elections. The card reader uses a highly secure and cryptographic technology that is used commonly in devices that need to perform secure transactions, such as paying terminals. It has ultra-low power consumption, with a single core frequency of 1.2GHz and an Android 4.2.2 operating system. According to INEC, the card reader units have been broadly subjected to Quality Assurance, Integrity and Functionality testing and found reliable in ease of use, battery life and speed of processing. For instance, it takes an average of 10 seconds to authenticate a voter. The electoral umpire further announced that the card readers would also be subjected to Stress testing in the states and FCT ahead of the March 28 and April 11, 2015 elections. INEC promised to make a card reader available at every voting point in the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) during the 2015 elections, with a substantial number of spares available to address contingencies. Election Conduct and Results Fourteen candidates contested the election but it was a straight battle between the PDP’s President Goodluck Jonathan and APC’s Muhammadu Buhari. The breakdown of the result as shown in the table below shows that the APC won 53.96% of the votes as opposed to the PDP’s 44.96%. APC won convincingly in 4 of the 6 geo-political zones namely the North West where its presidential candidate hails from, North East riddled with Boko Haram Insurgency, North Central and the South West where the APC’s Vice presidential candidate hails from while the PDP cleared the votes in the South-south-home base of president Jonathan and the South East. • 2015 President Election Results Buhari ௗ 53.96% Jonathan ௗ 44.96% Margin: 2,571,759 Candidate Muhammadu Buhari Party All Progressives Congress Votes 15,424,921 % 53.96 Goodluck Jonathan People's Democratic Party 12,853,162 44.96 Adebayo Ayeni African Peoples Alliance 53,537 0.19 Ganiyu Galadima Allied Congress Party of Nigeria 40,311 0.14 15 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Sam Eke Citizens Popular Party 36,300 0.13 Rufus Salau Alliance for Democracy 30,673 0.11 Mani Ahmad African Democratic Congress 29,665 0.10 Allagoa Chinedu Peoples Party of Nigeria 24,475 0.09 Martin Onovo National Conscience Party 24,455 0.09 Tunde Anifowose-Kelani Accord Alliance 22,125 0.08 Chekwas Okorie United Progressive Party 18,220 0.06 Comfort Sonaiya KOWA Party 13,076 0.05 Godson Okoye United Democratic Party 9,208 0.03 Ambrose Albert Owuru Hope Party 7,435 0.03 Invalid/blank votes 844,519 – Total 29,432,083 100 Registered voters/turnout 67,422,005 43.65 Source: INEC Muhammadu Buhari was declared the winner of the presidential election having scored the majority of the votes and one quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the state as stipulated by the 1999 constitution. Even though the election was believed to be generally free and fair, there were a few irregularities listed below; • Several polling units across the country opened later than scheduled occasioned by the late arrival of election officials and materials • The polling environment was reasonably secured with minimal disruption as members of the Police Force and other security agencies established a noticeable presence within the polling environment with most operating unarmed • Card readers failed to function properly in some areas including the President’s polling unit and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) directed election officers to manually accredit voters using the voter register in those places. • Electoral irregularities were witnessed in some polling units in Kano and Sokoto states where party supporters were unduly assisting election officials in the polling process 16 • Voting cubicles were not seen in several polling units in Kano, Kaduna and Osun States, which means voters, were unable to cast their votes in secret. • Bomb explosives were detonated in Enugu and there were explosions in Akwa, Anambra states. • There was hijacking of a vehicle conveying election officials and materials in Ebonyi state • Assault on some members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were ad-hoc staff of INEC in Ijiam-Ekpomata ward, Ikwo LGA of the state. • In Rivers state, there were reports of sporadic shootings in Ozuaha community in Ikwerre LGA by thugs who barricaded the road into the town and in the process opened fire on a team of policemen and military police escorting NYSC members to polling units. (See CDD REPORT: Matters arising from Voting Phase of Nigeria 2015 Presidential, National Assembly Elections at https://nigeriaelections.org/newsfeed/37 retrieved on 28 April 2015). Many observers commended the conduct of the elections for being peaceful, free and fair. It was also believed that the election represents a victory for democracy and the right of the people of Nigeria to determine who rules them. The security apparatuses were also believed to have ensured the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections. (Soniyi, 2015). Why Jonathan/PDP Lost Many reasons could be adduced for the defeat of PDP in the presidential election. Some of the reasons have been highlighted above. In addition, this chapter will rely on an online survey by Globalreportersnews.com. The survey question posed was “What could be the major reason Jonathan lost to Buhari?” 17 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The result posted on April 6, 2015 is recalled below: Factor Percentage Corruption 29% Manipulation/betrayal by party members 26% Poor Performance 21% Ethnic/minority background 11% Boko Haram/Chibok girls 9% Religion 3% Source: Globalreportersnews.com. Accessed April 6, 2015 The online poll may have its limitations. Only 903 people participated in the poll, which looks an insignificant number. Besides, their demography, location, ethnic and religious backgrounds were not stated. Hence, likely prejudices could not be ascertained. However, the website guarded against multiple voting as no one could vote twice on a computer unit. Despite the limitations, the survey result appears a true reflection of the mood of the majority of Nigerians before the presidential elections. The Jonathan government was riddled with serious allegations of corruption. A former Central Bank governor, Lamido Sanusi alleged that about $40 billion of oil revenue was unaccounted by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). In 2013, Nigeria ranked 144th of 177 in the “Corruption by Country” rating of Transparency International. As stated earlier, PDP was in turmoil before the elections and it is very likely that some members may have worked against the interest of the party at the polls. The Jonathan presidency was also believed to have performed woefully in the different sectors of the economy like the power, road, aviation and many other sectors. Even though Nigeria was rated the largest economy in Africa during the Jonathan presidency, not many Nigerians could feel the impact. Youth unemployment was put at over 50% (Durotoye, 2014b). Surprisingly, it appeared the Boko Haram insurgency and the kidnap of over 200 school girls in Chibok, Borno state did not play a major role. This may be due to the fact that the government had sufficiently rooted out the insurgents a few weeks before the elections. Another explanation might be that not many people in the North East where Boko Haram holds sway partook in the polls. 18 Conclusion and Recommendation The conduct of the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria recorded mixed outcomes. While fears in some quarters that Election Day would be marred by serious violence were allayed to a large extent, some instances of technical hitches, non-compliance with electoral regulations, vote buying and other forms of electoral manipulations were recorded in some states of the Federation. However, it did not appear that these electoral hitches were sufficient to alter the expected outcome of the election. The electorates were patient and determined to cast their votes. The clamour for change was the driving force for many of them. Nigeria’s democracy has scaled the huddle of one turnover test of political change. It remains to be seen whether or not it will fulfil the second turnover test enunciated by Huntington. Samuel Huntington establishes the bench mark of the ‘two turnover test’ in which if a new democracy survives two turnovers of power, then it has consolidated satisfactorily (Huntington 1993:267). The following recommendations are put forward by this chapter; • Appointment of INEC chairman: As suggested by a panel headed by a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Uwais panel, the position of INEC chairman must be advertised and the short-listing of three after adequate screening by the National Judicial Council (NJC). NJC then passes the short list to the president who picks one and sends his name to the Senate for confirmation. This will deny any sitting president the chance to plant a party sympathiser as electoral chief. • Time limit in electoral adjudication: Every electoral petition should be dispensed with before the swearing-in. The current practice enables someone alleged to have stolen the vote enjoys the plums of office and even spends government money on his petition defence before eventually losing at the court. • Electoral Offences Commission: This is to strengthen the state's capacity to punish electoral criminals. Such a commission should be 19 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis made to dispense justice faster than the conventional courts, without necessarily sacrificing the principles of justice and fair play. Any elected office holder found guilty must not only be barred from future elections, he must go to jail for the offence. So too must colluding electoral and security officials. • Independent candidature: This will enrich our democratic process and curb cases of imposition in the parties and lack of internal democracy, knowing that an alternative platform is open to aggrieved but popular candidates. • The present introduction of the Permanent Voter Card (PVC) is a step in the right direction. The PVC captures the biometrics of the voters on the roll. The use of Electronic Card Reader must be perfected to avoid technical hitches as experienced during the last elections. • Ballot scanning machine should be introduced to scan used ballot papers and record votes in real time. • There must be compulsory Presidential Debate to enhance quality of choice. Political campaigns in the last elections were bereft of ideas and more of character assassination and mundane issues.  • There must be intense war against Poverty to discourage vote selling. 20 References Asiwaju, A. (2000), “Sharing Best Practice Experiences in Democracy Building in Non-French Speaking African States”, draft chapter presented at the 4th International Conference on New and Emerging Democracies, Cotonou, Benin Republic, December 4-6, cited in Yagboyaju, Dhikru (2007): “Nigeria and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation: The Fourth Republic Experience”, African Journal of International Affairs and Development, 12(1 and 2): 345-363. Diamond, L. (1999), “Developing Democracy: Towards consolidation”, Baltimore. Durotoye, A. (2014a), “The Travails of Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: 1991-2007”, Africa Update, Vol. XXI, Issue 1 (Winter 2014). Durotoye, A. (2014b) “The Crisis of Youth Unemployment in the MINT countries: Causes, Consequences and Corrections”. European Journal of Business and Management, Vol.6, No.24, 2014:123-135. Fayemi, K. (2012) “Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Looking Between The Mirage And The Mirror”, Centre for Democracy & Development. Retrieved on 15 April 2015 from http://www. slideshare.net/kayodefayemi/democratic-consolidation-in-nigerialooking-between-the-mirage-and-the-mirror. Gasiorowski, M./ Power, T. (1998) “The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World”, Comparative Political Studies, December 1998 vol. 31 no. 6: 740771. Huntington, S. (1993) “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century, Oklahoma. Inokoba, P./ Kumokor, I.(2011) “Electoral Crisis, Governance and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,” Journal of Social Science, 27(2):139-148. Kwasau, M. (2013) “The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” European Scientific Journal, VOL. 9, NO.8. Linz, J. / Stepan, A. (1996) “Toward Consolidated Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 14-33. 21 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Nigerian Eye Online (2014) “Jonathan, Reason for My Defection to APC”. Retrieved 15 April 2015 from: http://nigerianeyeonline.com/ jonathan-reason-for-my-defection-to-apc-oyinlola/. O'Donnell, G. (1996), “Illusions About Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 34-51. Osinakachukwu, N./Jawan, J. (2011) “The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria”, Journal of Politics and Law, Vol. 4, No.2, September. Osun Defender (2014) “OBJ Defects to APC And Calls Jonathan Administration, “Useless Government”. Retrieved on 15 April 2015 from: http://www.osundefender.org/?p=209744. Regilme Jr, S. (2013) "Is International Labor Migration Good for Democratic Consolidation?" Peace Review 25.1 (2013): 97-103. Soniyi, T. (2015) “Accolades Galore for INEC over Conduct of Presidential Elections.” Retrieved on 15 April 2015 from: http://www.thisdaylive .com/articles/accolades-galore-for-inec-nigerians-over-conduct-ofpresidential-elections/205840/. Tinubu, B. (2009) “Democratic Consolidation In Nigeria: Issues, Challenges And Prospects”, lecture delivered by the former Governor of Lagos State at a National Symposium on 10 years of Democracy (1999-2009), organised by the Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano, Kano State, on 29 May 2009. Retrieved on 15 April 2015 from: http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/313/1/ democratic-consolidation-in-nigeria-issues-challen.html. Yagboyaju, D. (2007) “Nigeria and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation: The Fourth Republic Experience”, African Journal of International Affairs and Development, 12(1 and 2): 345-363. 22  2 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance: An Appraisal of INEC and the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria Ademola Azeez Introduction Elections have proven to be an essential ingredient of a democratic system to the extent that it provides the public with the platform to bring about selection of political leaders into various political positions for the running of states. It is the most visible feature of democracy, it serves to legitimize the political system, and ensure peaceful succession of governments. Though, while elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections remain fundamental, not only for installing democratic governments, but as a necessary requisite for broader democratic consolidation. The regularity, openness and acceptability of elections signal whether basic constitutional behavioural and attitudinal foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic rule (O’Donnell, 1998: 112-126). To Robert Dahl (1971: 2), to qualify as democratic, elections must offer an effective choice of political authorities among a community of free and equal citizens. This democratic ideal, he said, “requires that all citizens enjoy ‘unimpaired opportunities’ to ‘formulate’ their political preferences, to ‘signify’ them to one another, and to have them ‘weighed equally’ in public decision making”. As a result of this Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis significance, certain administrative bodies, called Electoral Commissions (ECs) or Election Management Bodies (EMBs) have thus been established by democracies throughout the world with the responsibility of administering and managing elections. They occupy strategic positions in the electoral process and by implication are decisive for the success of any democratic system of government. However, due to the important roles of these bodies, it is important that the public have a great confidence and a perceived integrity in the electoral process that they organize. Therefore, creation of these commissions alone is not sufficient, but such organization must also adhere to the basic requirement of democratic ethos for the smooth running of government. One of such requirements is the need for them to be independent of both government and the political parties. The independence of the Electoral Management Bodies is said to attract confidence of all the stakeholders in the electoral process and create integrity in the process. Hence, any electoral commission whose independence cannot be sufficiently guaranteed becomes anti-democratic and cannot ensure legitimacy and integrity of governance. The thrust of this chapter therefore is to examine the integrity of the Independent Electoral Commission in Nigeria, INEC, the body organized to provide the electoral service in Nigeria. The focus is that, an independent, impartial, transparent, effective and efficient electoral management body is a prerequisite for the institutionalization of a viable democratic political system. With the 2003 general elections, the searchlight for integrity and legitimacy of electoral process will serve to explain the process towards the attainment of democratic consolidation in the country. Relying on a secondary data source, reports, journals and textbooks are used to gather information for this assessment. Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance By definition, an electoral commission is an umpire, a referee, and a judge and adjudicator in election matters. It is an institution of government delegated to oversee the implementation and actualization of election procedures (Beckett, 2011). Anyaele (1991) describes electoral 24 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance commission as a body charged with the responsibility for organizing and conducting free and fair elections in a country. According to Ayorinde (1994), electoral management body is an electoral umpire, which is created by an Act of Parliament, charged with the task of conducting election in a democratic system of government. The laudable roles and functions performed by electoral commissions in various countries require that they are independent. By their independence, they are required to manage their own budget and be autonomous of government control. In countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and the United Kingdom, the independence of the electoral body is constitutionally guaranteed by the constitution. The Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria, for example, was established by Section 10 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. By this Act, the commission and staff are resolutely committed and dedicated to providing basic electoral service to which all Nigerians are entitled to in a timely, fair, honest, effective and transparent manner. In striving to achieve these objectives, the constitution expects the Commission to be free and independent of whatever controls that is not recognized by the Act that established it. Independence of electoral commission is undoubtedly equated with the reality of freedom, liberty and equity in the society. Unfortunately, Nigeria and most developing nations neither envy nor uphold this most universally cherished essential democratic value. With an independent commission, individual citizen and electorate are placed as equal and free in a level playing field for democratic actions. Nigerians have often made the point that the process by which political office holders attain political power should be transparent. When a politician earns an office through the backdoor, through rigging and employment of violence, he negates democracy and creates avoidable cracks in the society. When votes do not count to determine political leadership, it breeds chaos, conflicts and unnecessary heat on governance. Democratic dividends become elusive and citizens become worse attended to because those who should represent their interests are there not through their votes, but as appendage of the people in power (Adejare, 2007). The country’s experience in democracy highlights some emerging cultural trends; characteristics of an authoritarian state, where strategic individual 25 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis and state interests conflict with democratic values, good governance, citizenship and economic change. Of all factors responsible for this current trend, flawed elections as a result of lack of an independent umpire is prominent as exemplified in the various elections undertaken under the current democratic government since 1999. However, to what extent is the independence of electoral commission a force in the 2003 general elections? The outcomes of this malaise shall be looked at in the next section of this chapter. The 2003 General Elections In April 2003, Nigerians went to the polls for the second time in the 4th Republic which took off in 1999. President Obasanjo was nominated by his party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to serve a second-term. The All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) picked another former military leader, General Muhammadu Buhari, as its presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the former leader of the defunct Biafra, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who led the secessionist region of Biafra during Nigeria’s civil war in the 1960s, was picked as the presidential candidate of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). The National Democratic Party (NDP) picked former foreign minister Ike Nwachukwu as its presidential candidate. Obasanjo and the ruling party – an alliance of oligarchs with close links to the military – consolidated their grip on power. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared that Obasanjo won 61.9% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP, won 32.1% of the votes. In the Senate, the PDP won 72 seats out of 109 seats, while the ANPP won 28 and the AD 5 seats. The PDP won 198 seats in the 360-seat House of Representatives, the ANPP 83 seats, and the AD 30 seats. The elections, however, were marred by serious irregularities and electoral fraud, according to both domestic and international election observers. Among the irregularities noted, much emphasis was placed on “inadequate election administration.” Controversy surrounded the voter registration process, the certification of candidates, and poor logistical 26 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance preparations for the elections. One INEC official allegedly admitted that the voters’ register was “25-30% fiction.” (HRW, 2007). Reports of electoral malfeasance, or rigging, were also noted. Ballot box stuffing, falsification of election result forms, and threats of violence were among the most serious charges. In some states, observers noted “systematic attempts at all stages of the voting process to alter the election results.” (IRI, 2003:65) Although reports of rigging varied widely among states, especially with the ruling party’s bid to dislodge the opposition’s hold on the SouthWestern Nigeria from AD, the extent of irregularities caused some to suggest that they “compromised the integrity of the elections where they occurred.” (NDI, 2003) The European Union delegation noted that in at least six states “the minimum standards for democratic elections were not met.” Several election results were later overturned. Therefore, the 2003 general elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections like the previous ones conducted in the country. It was marred by very poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the process cannot be considered to have been credible. Given the lack of transparency and evidence of fraud, particularly in the result collation process, there can be no confidence in the results of these elections. This is all the more regrettable since they were held in an improved atmosphere in which freedoms of expression and assembly were broadly respected during campaigning, the judiciary played a generally positive and independent role and the people showed remarkable commitment to democracy, eagerly engaging in the electoral process and waiting patiently to vote in often very difficult circumstances. INEC, which was financially dependent on the executive, was responsible for administrative failure on a nationwide scale. It did not prepare well for the elections and experienced widespread lack of confidence among 27 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis election stakeholders in relation to its capacity and impartiality. Deadlines were missed throughout the pre-election period and it lacked transparency in its decisions and conduct. INEC was selective and inconsistent in the application and enforcement of electoral legislation. Training of polling staff started late, was of poor quality and in some areas did not take place at all. Engagement with political parties and civil society was poor. Overall, civic and voter education was very limited and ineffective. The voter registration exercise conducted by INEC was marred by official delays, technical breakdowns and establishment of illegal voter registration centres. The quality of the final voter register was poor and included under age voters, double entries, missing and blurred pictures of voters. The voter register was not displayed at local level as required by the law and was only partly posted prior to Election Day for orientation purposes only. Permanent voter registration cards were not issued due to the late publication of the final voter register. The pre-election period saw a vigorous campaigning throughout the country, particularly in states where there was the prospect of a change in power. However, a lack of transparency and accountability in campaign spending, together with the misuse of state resources gave advantage to incumbent parties at the state and federal level, and meant there was an uneven playing field for candidates and parties. Payment to potential voters was both witnessed and reported by observers. Violence was a major issue of concern and incidents increased as the election days drew nearer. Credible reports (for example, Omotola, 2006: 158-160), indicated that at least 200 people, including candidates and police were killed in election related incidents. This is unacceptable not only with respect to right to life but also to the democratic process. The continuing and widespread use of thugs by a number of political parties created a significant degree of fear and intimidation. Despite repeated messages from security agencies showing a zero tolerance policy towards political violence, the security agencies, INEC and political parties did not appear to take decisive steps to address the situation and hold perpetrators to account. 28 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance Some key politicians were assassinated. These included Bola Ige, who until his assassination was Nigeria’s Minister of Justice and AttorneyGeneral of the Federation. He was shot dead at his home in the Southwestern city of Ibadan on December 23, 2001. It was alleged that Ige’s assassination was to make way for the capture of the South-west by the ruling PDP. Bola Ige was a member of the AD. Whatever was the reason for his assassination, it was clear that the killing had political motives. (Lawal, Guardian, September 14, 2009) Like Ige, Marshall Harry who was until his death the National Vice Chairman of the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (ANPP) (South-south), was assassinated on March 5, 2003. He was formerly the Chairman of Rivers State PDP before his defection to the ANPP. (Okoh, 2005) Several other assassinations of low profile politicians took place across the nation before the 2003 elections. Moreover, the 2003 elections witnessed an unprecedented massive and illegal use of thugs and weapons to influence results of votes. Ajayi (2006:60-65) has argued that “Security agents were out to collaborate with and protect the ruling party. In most of the polling stations they did nothing to prevent hijacking of ballot papers by political thugs … Rigging was peacefully done in the form of ballot box stuffing by mainly PDP party agents collaborating with polling officials”. Ajayi (2006:62-64) summarized the impact of the illegal use of state security apparatus and money in the 2003 elections to include: collusion with politicians to scare opponents from polling centres; receiving of bribes from politicians to stuff ballot boxes; collusion with political party agents and thugs to stuff ballot boxes; failing to act in the face of violence and rigging; personally thumb-printing ballot papers; abandonment and absence from attached polling centres; sporadic shooting into the air to scare away genuine voters, and in the process, ballot boxes already stuffed were substituted for the empty ones; illegal arrest and detention of political opponents at the eve of election and election days; sporadic shooting into the air at the house of opponents before and during election days to prevent them from any effective mobilization of supporters and the electorate; harassing of voters at polling booths including beating and 29 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis jack booting thereby infringing on their human rights; and allowing hijacking of ballot papers and boxes by political thugs. His position aligned with the reports of several international observers that monitored the elections. The 30,000 Justice, Development and Peace Committee (JDPC) local team that monitored the elections reported that “the ruling party in each of the two geo-political zones (South-south and South-east), with the connivance of some INEC officials and the security officers, unleashed fearsome intimidation against its opponents and succeeded in carrying out massive rigging of elections in a manner that was reminiscent of the dark ages”. (JDPC 2003: 20-37). The National Democracy Institute observed that there were ‘ballot stuffing, rigging, voter intimidation, violence and fraud particularly in the South-east and South-south zones’. (Quoted in Omotola, 2006: 159; and Ajayi, 2006: 60-65). The results of the elections indicated landslide victory for the ruling PDP, followed by the ANPP, the AD and APGA. The PDP won the presidential election with 24,456,140 votes to beat other contestants including Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP, who scored 12,710,022 votes, Ojukwu O. Odumegwu of the APGA, who scored 1,297,445 votes to emerge second and third respectively. No other candidates from the remaining political parties scored up to a million votes. (Ajayi 2006:60-65; INEC 2003) Similarly, in the gubernatorial election results, the PDP won twenty-nine (29) states (Abia, Adamawa, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Osun, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba, ); the ANPP won six (6) states (Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara), and the AD won one (1) state (Lagos). (INEC 2003). In the senatorial elections, the PDP won seventy-three (73) seats out of the one hundred and nine senatorial (109) seats in the country; the ANPP won twenty-eight (28) while the AD won six (6). In the House of Representatives elections, the PDP won two 30 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance hundred and thirteen (213), as against the ANPP’s ninety-five (95), the AD’s thirty-one (31) and the APGA’s two (2). The remaining parties recorded no victory. The results were greeted with litigations. Buhari of the ANPP and Dikko Yusufu of the Movement for Democratic Justice (MDJ) challenged the victory of Obasanjo. After more than two years of judicial battles, the court affirmed the victory of Obasanjo. At the state level, the Election Tribunal in Adamawa State nullified the PDP gubernatorial victory and ordered a run-off election in 14 of the 21 local government areas. The tribunal ruled that the governor, Boni Haruna was ‘not validly elected’ and that ‘it was evident that thugs and security officials acted in favour of the PDP to disallow agents of the ANPP from performing their roles during the last general elections in various local government areas’. (Osiki, 2008:67-98) The rerun was won by the PDP. In Anambra State, the victory was awarded to APGA after a legal battle that lasted for about three years. Many of the defeated candidates did not consider the option of winning their mandates through the platform of the various electoral tribunals across the country. Litigations of the election tribunals clearly showed that things were not working according to the expectations of Nigerians who desired transparent process of electoral contests. Several years after the polls, those who fraudulently found their ways to the seat of power were illegally directing the affairs of their states using state funds to prosecute their cases at the tribunals. The highly partisan and dependent electoral umpire, the INEC did not help matters. In several instances, security men, including police, soldiers, customs officers, prison officers, Road Safety officers, State Security Service officers and Civil Defence officers who were deployed to ensure free and fair elections were accused of conniving with politicians to forcefully take away ballot boxes and other electoral materials at gun point (The Nation, May10, 2007, p.5). It is obvious that security is crucial to electoral integrity, but the forces have traditionally done little to prevent rigging or violence during elections and have often been bought by politicians and complicit. An embattled police boss and former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Malam Nuhu 31 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Ribadu agreed that the police contributed to electoral frauds in the April 2003 election, like it did in the 1999 elections, but blamed the development on the ill funding of the police (Olasanmi, May 10, 2007, p.42) Another major impediment to the actualization of a free and fair legitimate election was that vast majority of electorate in Nigeria are ignorant of the essence of their votes. Hence, the power of choice they were expected to exercise was often forced on them. Most often they are coerced, intimidated or blackmailed into merely confirming those candidates for office who had been selected for them; the institutions for the organization of credible elections (Electoral Commission) are deliberately weakened and incapacitated by the state forces; maladministration and corruption from the high places; vote buying, ballot stuffing and rigging. With electoral fraud, the state has not been able to produce men of integrity and good leadership quality (HRW 2007). The electoral process in Nigeria, therefore, does not serve as a peaceful means to bringing about change and neither does it offer to the people the opportunity to exercise their choices in a free manner. The framework or the guiding principles of electoral process has been flagrantly abused, distorted and manipulated to favour a particular interest of the powers that be or their party faithful. The whole scenario reflects a Hobbesian state of affairs where parties were at war with one another and were ready to employ any means to achieve political power. Such a state of affair therefore created obstacles in the smooth functioning of the democratic process. It is something like this that has generated numerous challenges before the political system, which ultimately have led to the collapse of the previous democratic processes, and has facilitated the entry of repressive institutions like the military into the sphere of the country’s political system. Overall, the problems associated with the 2003 general elections were aptly summed up by Omotola (2010: 554): 32 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance ...the 2003 elections generated massive interest domestically and internationally. Despite some protests about INEC’s level of preparation, all the thirty political parties participated at one level of the elections or the other. A number of domestic and international observers also participated. The administration of the elections was generally poor. INEC’s organizational weakness and lack of autonomy from political forces all hampered its effectiveness. For instance, the review of voter’s exercise it conducted was fraught with irregularities, particularly non-registration of eligible voters and withholding and sale of voters’ cards... The actual conduct of the elections left more to be desired. Some of the basic problems included the unnecessary militarization of the elections through the massive deployment of security forces. Admittedly, as mentioned above, there was tension across the country prior to the elections particularly in states such as Kwara, Anambra, and Borno, where the battle lines had been drawn between acclaimed godfathers and their estranged sons (incumbent governors). That was not enough to justify the militarization of voting, which not only undermined voter turnout but also provided cover for the INEC to rig the elections in favour of the ruling party (Emphasis mine) Elections and Democratic Governance in Nigeria The 2003 elections like its predecessors were subjected to social and political nuances of a corrupt society. Except a philosopher king is at the helm of affairs in the state, the running of government has been piloted by bourgeoisie and the professional elites as politicians, whose interest is to self and neither the general well-being of the people, nor the advancement of the democratic project in the country. Therefore, operating independently of these bourgeoisies in a corrupt society make the electoral commission an empirically and theoretically unfounded 33 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis democratic institution (Dukor, 2011). To this extent, the major underpinning factor against the independence of electoral commission is corruption. Others could be poverty, ignorance and social exclusion of the electorate, which are instruments of political alienation and subjugation. Another prominent factor is the politics of mutual exclusion arising from ethnicism and cultural differences that had been a phenomenon in the multi-ethnic, multi-racial African societies. In Nigeria, corruption had been sustained by primitive accumulation of wealth not founded on justice and fair play. The discrepancy between the political elites and the governed has congruously fuelled disorder, lack of mutual confidence and lawlessness in the public institutions such as the electoral commission. The Electoral Act, which was meant to address the anomalies, is a bourgeoisie contraption with the intent to protect the interest of the ruling class. The rights of citizens to choose their candidates had been subverted by defective internal democracies in the political parties, especially at the level of primary elections, where candidates are selected rather than elected. It should be noted that the Electoral Act is only prepared to foist an agenda that would make direct delegates to participate in the election of candidates (Iwara, 2010). By this arrangement, personal aides and political appointees would become delegates for the selection of party candidates. This of course can only lead to an advantage in favour of the ‘Principals’ which questions the credibility of the choice of candidates by the appointing bosses who call the shots. The desperation and effect on democratic governance that goes with this is unquantifiable. Apart from limiting the scope of people’s choice, the candidates that emerge through this process often become willing tools in the hands of those who plotted their ascendancy. Conclusion Election administration in Nigeria suffers from a number of structural shortcomings as evidenced in the 2003 general elections. The legal provisions governing appointment, promotion and removal of INEC officials at both federal and state level, as well as the lack of autonomous sources of funding do not provide adequate guarantees for the 34 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance independence of the electoral commission. INEC’s lack of transparency through key stages of the electoral processes opened it up to accusations of political bias voiced by all stakeholders of the democratic project in the country. For credible electoral process therefore, this study recommend the following: (i) The process of appointment to INEC has to assure that Commission members are competent and non-partisan, and that they enjoy a reputation for neutrality. While there are different ways to accomplish this, the overall modalities for selecting INEC officials should be revised. The President could nominate candidates who would then be confirmed by two-thirds of the Senate. Alternatively, a reputable body such as the Supreme Court could propose candidates directly to the Senate for confirmation. Another possibility is for the Justices (or some other vetting body) to vote directly on members. To secure independence, the Commissioners should have a term that exceeds that of the president by two years or more. Therefore, a 6-7 year term is desirable. (ii) INEC requires a secure source of funding to ensure adequate resources for election administration, and availability of funds as needed. INEC should be able to present its budget directly to the National Assembly (as is the case in Canada, another federal democracy), and its funding should come from consolidated revenue. The level of funding for INEC could be determined by a standard formula that reflects the number of registered voters multiplied by the average cost of conducting an election per voter. (iii) INEC should develop a career professional service, equivalent to the career foreign service. Amending the conditions of service and the standards of professionalism within the Electoral Commission will raise the capacities and the stature of the institution, better positioning the Commission to oversee elections. As a point of comparison, 35 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Mexico made the transition from a weak electoral system to a highly trained and professional institution in less than a decade, and a key element in its success was training. 36 Independence of Electoral Commission and Democratic Governance References Adejare, A. (2007) “The Democratisation Process: Dimension of Free and Fair Elections”. International Journal of Social and Management Sciences, vol. 1 no 1. pp 21-34 Ajayi, K. (2006) “Security Forces, Electoral Conduct and the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria.” Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 13, no. 1, KamlaRaj, pp. 57-66. Anyaele, J. (1991) “Behavioural Act of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria.” Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ayorinde, B.G. (1994) Organisation and Conduct of Elections” The Electoral System Accomplishment Dahl Robert A. (1991) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press. Dowse, R. E. and Hughes, J. A. (1983). Political Sociology, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons. Dukor, Maduabuchi (2011) “Electoral Commission and the Challenges of Democracy in Nigeria.” Daily Sun, Lagos. FGN (2000) “1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,” Daily Times Publication, Lagos. HRW (2007), “Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria,” April 2007. International Republican Institute (IRI), (2003) Election Observation Report. JDPC (2003). Final Report on the Observation of the 2003 General Elections in Nigeria. Lagos: Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria. Lawal, Iyabo (2009). ‘Family, friends remember Bola Ige’. Guardian (Lagos) September 14, 2009. National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2003), “Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April 19 Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections,” April 21. O’Donnell Guillermo (1998), “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”. Journal of Democracy. Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1998, pp. 112 – 126. Okoh, A. O. (2005) “The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and Electoral Management in Nigeria: The April 2003 General Elections in Perspective”. The Constitution, Lagos, Vol. 5, No. 4. 37 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Olasanmi, Kunle (2007), ‘Ribadu indicts Police over polls’, The Nation May 10. Omotola, J. S. (2006). “The Limits of Election Monitoring: The 2003 Nigerian General Elections”, Representation: A Journal of Representative Democracy, Vol. 42 (2). Omotola, J. S. (2010). “Elections and Democratic Transitions in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic,” African Affairs, Vol. 109 (437), pp. 535-553. Osiki, O.M. (2008). “Crisis of Governance and Rigging of Elections in Nigeria: 1965-2007”. In: Emordi, E. C. Edeko, S. E. and Iganiga, B. O. (eds.), Contemporary Essays on Nigerian Society, Economy & Law. Ambrose Alli University Press: Ekpoma. www.inecnigeria.org/2003elections/results 38  3 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election Adeolu Durotoye & Sa’eed Husaini Introduction In the governorship election held on June 21, 2014 in the south-western Nigerian state of Ekiti, the contrast between the front-running candidates could hardly have been more dramatic. Dr. John Kayode Fayemi, the incumbent governor belonged to the regionally dominant All Progressives Congress (APC) party. He was a formerly exiled veteran of the struggle against military rule in Nigeria, came to power in 2011 when the supreme court ruled in his favour after an extraordinary three-year-long legal battle for his stolen electoral mandate; proceeded once in office to convene a formidable team of seasoned technocrats from leading international organizations and academic institutions around the globe; and had garnered myriad domestic and international accolades at the time of the election for his fluency in the language of reform and for his modernizing strides as governor of Ekiti State. His main challenger, Mr Peter Ayodele Fayose of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), could boast of less impressive credentials. Though he had previously served a partial term as governor of Ekiti state, his 3-year stint in office, widely associated with an upsurge in violence and political instability Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis in the state, ran aground with his dramatic impeachment on charges of corruption and abuse of power. Given his incumbency, and faced with the sort of challenge Mr. Fayose appeared to pose, the victory of Governor Fayemi seemed a foregone conclusion. Governor Fayemi’s decisive loss – not only by a 63 percent margin, but also in all 16 Local Government Area (LGA) subunits of the state – therefore came as a surprise to most observers of political developments in Nigeria. This chapter takes a number of important developments surrounding the Ekiti election as a lens through which to examine a unique moment in Nigeria’s democratic transition as it shaped voters’ attitudes and the strategies of the two main parties in the electoral contest. Drawing primarily from media reports and extensive interviews conducted by the authors among key constituencies in Ekiti, it examines the ways in which the candidates’ varying appeals, voters’ attitudes, and the interaction between these factors and the broader political context contributed to unseating incumbent governor Fayemi. In terms of these particular factors, the 2014 Ekiti state election proved revealing in at least three important respects. Firstly it highlighted the trajectory of Nigeria’s electoral commission INEC in both its state of technical development and its lingering weaknesses, but also in the confidence in the electoral process it increasingly inspired in voters and political contestants. Secondly, it brought into sharp focus the ways in which important state-level constituencies – such as the state okada (commercial motorcycle) riders union and organized civil servants groups – may both perceive for themselves and carve out larger roles in state politics in Nigeria as electoral processes are increasingly formalized. Lastly, the Ekiti elections underscored key trends in how various types of appeals by competing candidates – spanning personality, patronage, and policies – may be received by critical sub-segments of the state-level electorate, and, crucially, how these appeals may contribute to the victory of an opposition challenger over an incumbent governor. Crucially, these factors, heavily conditioned by the evolving political and institutional context in Nigeria informed the significant ambiguity, which characterized both the processes and results of the June 21, 2014 governorship election in 40 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election Ekiti. This election thus provided a crucial window into the dynamics of statelevel electoral politics in its institutional, elite, and popular dimensions during a unique moment of both dynamism and continuity in Nigeria’s democratic transition. The following section will consider the underlying trajectory of electoral politics in Nigeria leading up to the Ekiti election, particularly highlighting the recent developments of Nigeria’s electoral commission, INEC. Following this, we consider the immediate context of the Ekiti election itself paying attention to the influence of broader political developments in the country, to the main appeals advanced by the competing candidates, and to the major issues, which animated the campaign period and its immediate aftermath. Following this, we present a range of rationales collected through the authors’ empirical work for electoral choice offered by key constituents of voters in Ekiti state, discussing the interesting directions these point future study of subnational electoral patterns in Nigeria. We then conclude with a reflection of the major highlights of the chapter and an examination of the ways in which the Ekiti election reflects the trajectory of state-level politics and electoral politics in Nigeria more broadly. Electoral Politics in the Lead up to Ekiti Nigeria’s electoral institutions and processes have not typically been celebrated for spectacular probity. A more usual characterization is found in Suberu (2010) who laments the ‘monumental electoral shenanigans’ that have come to be associated with political contests at all levels in Nigeria. Because of their enormous (and inordinate) influence on political dynamics in Nigeria, federal-level presidential elections have more often inspired such dire evaluations by scholars and observers of electoral politics in Nigeria. Statelevel contests in Nigeria, when they have received scholarly attention, have often been considered a reflection if not an intensification of the ills of the federal-level – except this time under conditions of even less scrutiny and increased impunity (Hoffmann 2011). The era coinciding with the tenure of PDP President Olusegun Obasanjo in particular, which began with Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, is remembered for elections which in Obasanjo’s 41 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis own infamous words were generally understood to be a ‘do or die affair’. In fact, so marred with violence and misconduct were the 2007 elections – which saw a term-limited Obasanjo hand over power to a PDP governor Umaru Musa Yar’adua, generally understood to be Obasanjo’s hand-picked successor –that President Umaru Musa Yar’adua after his resumption of office was reported to have himself publicly condemned the elections that brought him to power (Human Rights Watch, 2007). However, more recent federal and state elections have provided citizens, scholars, and observers with slightly more cause for optimistic evaluations of the trajectory of electoral politics in Nigeria. The Presidential election in 2011 which brought Goodluck Jonathan to power featured a significantly lessened degree of outright chicanery and even received the (perhaps exaggerated) commendation from the American Ambassador to Nigeria at the time of having been “arguably the most credible and transparent elections in the country’s history as an independent nation”. (McCulley 2011). Key factors which contributed to the credibility of these polls and have remained a central part of subsequent electoral outings in Nigeria include increased scrutiny by local civil society and international observer groups – particularly employing traditional and online media, the (by and large) helpful presence of military and state-security service officials, and vibrant participation by the general electorate (Akhaine, 2011). But perhaps most crucial to the incremental improvements in electoral landscape in 2011 and beyond have been institutional developments, particularly relating to INECs electoral management, which have reduced some of the more overt—and previously characteristic— instances of misconduct. As Akhaine (2011) rightly emphasizes, the appointment of wellregarded president of the radical Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Professor Attahiru Jega, as head of INEC marked a critical injection of independence and credibility into Nigeria’s most important and previously most disavowed electoral institution. The unilateral vote of confidence Jega received from the National Council of State in 2011 further affirmed his impeccable credentials. 42 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election But beyond the appointment of a reputable INEC chairman, this moment also underscored other critical interventions made to the institutional architecture of Nigeria’s electoral system with former Vice-president Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the Presidency shortly after the death of incumbent President Yar’adua. Such key reforms to which the relative success of the 2011 elections were attributed include INECs overhaul of the existing but highly distrusted national voter register with its national drive to reregister voters collecting biometric data launched in 2011. Equally of note was INEC introduction of a new ‘hybrid collation’ procedure whereby voting returns would first be counted and declared at each polling unit (PU) in order to add a further layer of accountability by decreasing the chance that results from individual PUs would be altered when aggregated at central collation points. Yet another key introduction in this period, which, as we further discuss, bore a notable if overlooked significance in the 2014 Ekiti polls, was INEC’s introduction of what it termed the Re-modified Open Ballot System. This new system – featuring a two-stage process in which voters are first accredited before individual balloting in concealed booths commences – was praised for contributing both to increasing the discretion of the voting process and reduced opportunities for multiple voting in 2011 general elections. Subsequent state-level polls after 2011 presented INEC with the opportunity to both reaffirm the strides it had made and demonstrate key lessons learned from the 2011 elections. Despite recorded hiccups in the area of logistics at several PUs and worryingly low turnouts, off-term governorship elections in Ondo and Edo states held in 2012 were celebrated as indicative of INEC’s generally improved managerial acumen. Yet the Anambra state election in 2013 proved a worrying reminder of existing pitfalls in INEC’s structure and capacity. Usual logistical snags of ballot papers and polling officials arriving several hours behind schedule were widely reported. But even more distressing was the revelation that an INEC official conniving with a political party had deliberately withheld election materials across a significant number of PUs in Idemili North Local Government Area of Anambra. The official was ultimately surrendered to the police, INEC issued a partial apology for its underperformance, and polls were shortly rescheduled in the areas affected by the sabotage, but the incident, the broader logistical shortcomings, and the controversy these issues generated drew into doubt INEC’s apparent 43 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis improvements and set an unsteady tone for INECs subsequent challenge, the 2014 Elections in Ekiti. Beyond issues of electoral management, a number of key developments related to the broader political context in Nigeria, which served as a backdrop for the Ekiti polls are worth highlighting. The APC, which was formed as a national coalition of opposition parties not long before the Ekiti election in anticipation of the approaching 2015 presidential election, drew much of its support base from Nigeria’s northern and south-western regions where opposition parties maintained control over a significant proportion of governorship seats. Its cross-national spread, the combined governorship seats it controlled at the onset and its early success at courting disgruntled PDP powerbrokers cast the APC as the first potentially overpowering challenge the ruling PDP would have faced in its 15 years at the helm. Significantly, all but one of the six governors in the southwest – including Fayemi – belonged to the southwest bloc of the APC coalition, which prior to the merger was known as the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Given this configuration, the Ekiti election represented an opportunity both for the PDP to gain a crucial foothold in the opposition dominant southwest before it was to face its most determined challenge in 2015 and for the APC to demonstrate its credibility and shore up its mandate in the heart of its traditional stronghold. In addition to these dynamics, the fact that this was an off-term election – since the legal ruling that brought Fayemi to power had set the electoral schedule in Ekiti off from the usually coinciding state and federal elections – served to centre the national focus on Ekiti polls, further elevating the stakes for the competing parties. For activists and observers around the country and beyond following on online media, the unique tag #EkitiDecides was created to track events in Ekiti immediately as they unfolded. The stage was set for a hotly contested showdown. Immediate Electoral Context: Candidates/Appeals From the start of their campaigns, the main parties framed the election as a referendum on the policy and style of the Fayemi administration. The Fayemi camp was eager to celebrate its flagship initiatives, most notably its infrastructural projects – which occupied 87 out of 100 pages of one of its 44 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election main promotional material – but also various programs to reinvigorate the state educational sector, its civil service reform agenda, and its urban renewal efforts. These were articulated in the rhetoric of ‘progressive’ governance, evoking the continually resonant educational and infrastructure focused legacy of the Southwest’s foremost independence leader Obafemi Awolowo (Hoffman and Nolte, 2013). But to a larger extent the progressive rhetoric also reflected Fayemi’s desire to be associated with celebrated reform oriented Lagos state governors Tinubu and Fashola, and the newly minted APC which had adopted the ‘progressive tag’ in its name. The campaign’s social media outreach and refined branding strategy, which, as one APC strategist boasted was ‘modeled after the Obama campaign’ also served to convey the administrations sense of itself as forward thinking and up-to-date. Other initiatives which reflected this spirit and took centre stage in the Fayemi campaign’s appeals included the Ekiti State Traffic Management Agency (EKSTMA), billed as both a traffic policing and youth employment scheme. Also frequently mentioned was the Owo Arugbo [money for the elderly] ‘social security’ initiative, which reportedly distributed N5,000 in cash monthly to nearly 20,000 qualified senior citizens in the state (Adeniyi 2015 int.). The rationale for the Fayemi team’s focus on its past policy achievements was twofold. Firstly, as reflected in its campaign slogan “Ó wí béҽҒ. Ó ৢe béҽҒ” (or roughly, “He walks the talk”), the campaign wished to play up Fayemi’s effortful strides and faithfulness to his initial promises, achievements which would easily put him head and shoulders above most state governors in Nigeria, from whom little in terms of performance is typically expected. Secondly, the campaign aimed at appealing to the particular demographics, which had benefited from these programs, such as the elderly and urban youth. As one APC strategist remarked, “we expected those who had benefited to return our votes. Those elderly people and the youths [sic]. We thought these people alone were enough to give us our votes back’ (Adeniyi 2015 int.). The PDP campaign led by Ayo Fayose approached Fayemi’s record and its broader appeal quite differently. Fayose campaign pursued a more innovative tactic. His brashness while in office was actively recast as an expression of the 45 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis exuberance of his youth, perfectly fitting within a ‘prodigal son’ narrative he developed to justify his renewed suitability for office. As he noted in a recorded media interview: ‘I am a better man, more matured, more responsive, more responsible. There are certain things that comes with age. Obama first time is a different Obama now… Life is a changing phase that transforms who you are’.1 Related, and perhaps more original, was his tactic not of denying Fayemi’s achievements in office but of reframing them as elitist, inauthentic, and harmful to key demographics of voters. Fayose’s take on the Fayemi administration’s civil service reform initiatives and infrastructure projects were particularly illustrative of this approach. Fayemi’s Teacher’s Needs Assessment Test (TDNA) intended to evaluate the competencies of state employed teachers through a service wide exam became an easy target for Fayose’s counter-narrative about the administration’s civil service reforms. Capitalizing on the administration’s PR missteps and on nascent fears of retrenchment that have lingered in the civil service since the era of military rule and Structural Adjustment policies, the PDP stoked fears that the TDNA would help the administration identify and sack teachers who failed the test or were more arbitrarily deemed to have fallen out of favour with the administration. Beyond just the state teaching corps, such strategies of stoking fear and courting the aggrieved were replicated by the PDP across the civil service, which is understandable considering that the civil service is thought to be the largest employer in the state. Likewise, many of Fayemi’s infrastructural development initiatives, from renovating schools and tourists sites to building new roads and a new state governor's residence were cast as doubtful by the Fayose campaign. Fayose pursued this aim by popularizing the idea that the contracts for these projects were awarded to Lagos APC partisans rather than ‘indigenes’ of Ekiti, and by encouraging the view that the administration’s focus on infrastructure rather than on ‘more tangible projects’ evinced a bias towards projects that were only beneficial to a narrow elite. He also underscored the relationship between  1 ’FAYOSE, COMM. of ENVIRONMENT & GOV. FAYEMI - 60 Minutes with Angela (June 2014)’. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwE2NFVHLhc. Last accessed July, 2015. 46 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election Fayemi and the Lagos APC stalwarts in order to raise fears that signature reforms that had been carried out in Lagos – such as the ban on okada riding within the city – would also be implemented in Ekiti. Further, statements such as ‘what good is a new road to a hungry man’ or ‘do you need all the education in this world to know that people are hungry?’ often made by Fayose in media interviews illustrated the anti-elitist rhetoric around which much of his critique of Fayemi’s policy was based. In addition to fostering this counter-narrative and advancing his ‘prodigal son’ account, Fayose also pursued a unique style of outreach. Central to his appeals was a desire to demonstrate the many ways in which he represented the very opposite of the particular traits which he had worked to associate with Fayemi’s policies. In direct contrast to his counter-narrative of Fayemi, Fayose sought to cast himself as locally authentic, as a friend of the common man, and as a generous leader. His demonstration of these traits included a pledge that unlike Fayemi, he had no intention of banning okada riding if elected into office. Additionally, he promised to support market women, lower tuition at the Ekiti State University, and reduce the strictures that the Fayemi government had placed on civil servants. Ever adept at courting media attention, he was also often pictured buying local food items and drink from road-side market traders, or personally handing out money and food to supporters. This latter tactic of ‘sharing’ petty goods on the campaign trail became the centre of debate in the days immediately preceding the election and shortly after, when commentators began using the term ‘stomach infrastructure’ to describe Fayose’s style of politics. According to some commenters (e.g. Ibrahim, 2014) the term referred to voters’ more immediate needs for food and cash handouts, which, as the increasingly popular narrative went, were being met not by Fayemi’s infrastructure development initiatives but by Fayose’s provision of stomach infrastructure. By the end of the campaign period, stomach infrastructure had become a caricatured short-hand for the Fayose campaigns broader appeals, though it was one Fayose himself came to embrace. The Election Day came with a measure of apprehension from observers across the country given the heightened energy of the campaign, the stakes of the electoral outcome for the main parties, and INEC’s ambiguous record. For 47 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis INEC, this contest therefore represented a chance to demonstrate its improved capacity, particularly as the 2015 elections approached. To achieve this, the commission implemented a number of concrete steps, which earned it wide commendation for contributing to the credibility of the polls. A key initiative was its decision to customize ballot papers, boxes, and result sheets according to each PU, to prevent an established method of cheating by moving electoral items to more favourable or less scrutinized PUs. INEC also improved in logistics, its traditional Achilles heel, as observers reported that most PUs were open according to schedule and adequately prepared with balloting materials. Thus in terms of its organization of accreditation, voting, and collation, INEC earned the commendation it received from organizations across the board, including the 400 member strong civil society coalition, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), who affirmed after the final results were declared that, ‘voters and contestants can have confidence that the INEC results are a true reflection of the will of the voters of Ekiti state’ (cited in Durotoye 2014). Results: Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election The immediate commendation INEC received only served to further affirm the shocking revelation that incumbent governor Fayemi had lost in every LGA in the state to his main challenger, Fayose. Fayemi’s gracious concession speech televised after the announcement of his loss pointed to his personal stature but also served to further confirm the apparent credibility of the result. Nonetheless, the result and process soon proved to be far from impeccable. A major issue, which sparked early debate, was the dramatic influx into the state of security personnel and equipment in the lead up to the election. Allegations soon surfaced that scores of APC party leaders and the PDP controlled Federal security forces before the election, which had served to both prevent the party from completing its final campaign thrust and scare off weary APC supporters on Election Day, had detained activists. Civil society groups also noted the tragic irony in such a show of force for an election while complaints of an understaffed and under-equipped counter-insurgency effort continued to filter from parts of the northeast under Boko Haram’s siege. The credibility of the entire process came under even more serious challenge after Fayose had assumed office with the release of an incriminating recording (which has earned the name ‘Ekitigate’) of Fayose and a number of highly placed officials in the military and federal security agencies discussing vague plans to ‘settle the matter’ on the eve of the elections (Punch, 02.08.2015). Investigations into this affair had yet to reveal its exact object or impact. However, what these triumphs and challenges revealed more clearly was the extent to which, despite INEC’s improvements, electoral politics in Nigeria remained a game of significant ambiguity at the Ekiti election. The fact that even high-ranking PDP officials in the state confessed shock at the extent of their own candidate’s lead in the final tally illustrated this lingering uncertainty in terms of both credibility and the effectiveness of various forms of mobilization, which continue to define the political terrain. Citizens’s Responses It is difficult to gauge the exact extent to which the congruence of the candidates’ appeals with the priorities of various sub-segments of the 49 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis electorate reflected in the ultimate vote tally. Yet, the authors’ empirical work did reveal interesting rationales for voting and a significant level of confidence among a number of key constituencies regarding the importance of their votes in the final electoral outcome. The authors’ interviews with representatives of civil servants unions and semi-structured questionnaires among fifty informally employed traders and artisans in the state capital, Ado-Ekiti were particularly useful in shedding light on broad voting patterns which likely played a decisive role in the Ekiti election and might provide opportunities for further study in state-level electoral contests elsewhere. Similar to the conclusions of Resnick’s (2014) study of urban populism in Zambia, Senegal, and Kenya, it appeared that candidates’ abilities to both demonstrate congruence between their policies and the priorities of key constituencies and to exhibit differentiation from the other candidates in competition increased their chances of winning electoral support. Crucially, it was evident that among both key constituencies, personality, patronage and broad policy positions were the key axes upon which electoral decisions – largely in favour of Fayose – had turned. Civil servants were a particularly important group to interview, not only because they had been courted by all the major candidates throughout the campaign but, relatedly, because the civil service is generally understood to be the primary employer of labour in the state (Aborisade, int. 2015). Given their demographic importance in states like Ekiti and many others in Nigeria, civil servants can exact a significant effect on electoral outcomes dependent on their relationship with the incumbent governor. As earlier discussed, Fayemi’s reform initiatives in the area of teacher testing – but also in regulating the payroll system to limit opportunities for fraud – were viewed with suspicion within the civil service. This distrust was partially stoked by Fayose and the PDP as an electoral tactic. But, as several civil servants confessed in interviews, the level of distrust also had much to do with a prevailing feeling that Fayemi’s reform efforts were drastic and impersonal. These were often justified both with reference to Fayemi’s perceived personality traits and with reference to personal style. Frequently mentioned were accusations of personal arrogance and his style of refined diction or ‘speaking grammar’. Interestingly, for many civil servants interviewed, the latter trait was paradoxically both a source of pride in an 50 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election erudite ‘son of Ekiti’ – a state with the motto ‘the fountain of knowledge’ which is often referred to as one of the most highly educated states in Nigeria – and a sign of his alienation from the lives of ‘ordinary people’ (Taiwo, int. 2015). Given this distrust, Fayose’s frequent mobilization of local idioms of authenticity and his outright denunciation of many of Fayemi’s reform initiatives allowed him exhibit both differentiation from his key opponent, and congruence with key priorities of this demographic. Likewise, the perspectives of informally employed workers in Ado-Ekiti also provided a useful lens into the relative strengths of the forms of mobilization employed by both candidates. As Resnick (2014) interestingly points out, the urban poor and informally employed in major cities across Africa is an increasingly powerful electoral constituency due to the staggering rates of population growth among this demographic. Though Resnick’s study observes this trend in larger cities such as Dakar and Lusaka, the increasing electoral influence of the urban poor is an even more pertinent dynamic in cities such as Ado-Ekiti where opportunities for formal employment are even less present and where, according to the UN 2014 urbanization report, the next wave of urban population growth will occur in the coming decade. This will therefore be a key demographic to observe as state-level electoral politics evolve in Nigeria. Like the civil servants, key aspects, which appeared to drive electoral choice in this demographic, were issues of policy and personality. Fayose was overwhelmingly the preferred candidate among the 50 traders randomly selected across market sites in Ado-Ekiti (47/50 expressed support for Fayose), and his perceived ‘closeness to ordinary people’ and ‘generosity’ were often the reasons why he was considered the preferred candidate. But rather than the issue of stomach infrastructure which had preoccupied commentators around the election, what, interestingly, seemed to be the more pertinent reason for Fayose’s success among this demographic was his apparent trustworthiness in taking care of civil servants salaries and allowances – which by extension meant taking care of the informally employed who considered civil servants to be their number one customer base. The significant rate of informal workers who considered Fayemi’s reform policies to be an attack on civil servant’s 51 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis allowances and, by extension, an attack on ‘ordinary people’ explained why Fayose’s apparent ‘generosity’ was so salient. The third main candidate Opeyemi Bamidele of the Labor Party who, despite his significantly less proportion of votes in the final tally, was often a familiar name to interviewees in this demographic was also often associated with the policies and programmes of the Fayemi government since Bamidele and Fayemi had initially emerged from the same party. In a sociological and demographic context in which nuanced information on policy issues is less common than political rumour, it is easy to understand how such evaluations of personality can become a central source of information regarding candidate’s policy positions on important issues. Again Fayose’s ability to demonstrate both congruence with the priorities of this constituency, and differentiation from his key opponents was key in his successful mobilization of their political allegiance. Another key point of interest, which emerged from conversations with these constituencies, is that, despite the shortcomings of INEC and later revelations of possible widespread rigging, the electoral outcome was still generally considered to be a fair reflection of the preferences of virtually all the individuals interviewed. This perhaps points to an increasing level of trust for INEC as it records more instances of commendable electoral management, but also potentially evinces a growing sense of political empowerment among critical state-level constituencies eager to effect political change through the ballot. Conclusion Broadly, it has been argued that the strategies to win votes pursued by Fayemi and Fayose, the main candidates in competition, and the ultimate success of Fayose’s approach reflected both particular issues of salience to voters in Ekiti and the increasingly formal yet persistently unsteady electoral institutional context in Nigeria. INEC’s improving management record provided a boost of confidence to both politicians and the electorate regarding the sanctity of votes in the Ekiti election. Civil servant unions and the urban poor, critical constituencies which perceived and asserted a greater influence in the Ekiti polls given this increased political space, 52 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election represent important demographic whose influence in state electoral contests across Nigeria calls for further investigation. Yet lingering ambiguities related to the deployment of federal security forces, the influence of malpractice, and the exact promise of various forms of mobilization accounted for the palpable sense of surprise across the political divide at the final electoral outcome. These responses revealed that the 2014 Ekiti election reflected a moment in the trajectory of state electoral politics in Nigeria that epitomized what may be understood as a politics of ambiguity. 53 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis References Interviews: Name Affiliation Dr. Bunmi Aborisade APC Ado-Ekiti Executive, Professor Communication, Afe Babalola University Otunba Adeniyi APC – Strategy, Senior Special Assistant Mr. Odewale Special Advisor, Governor Fayemi Mr. Taiwo Secretary, National Union of Teachers, Ado-Ekiti Chapter. of Market Respondents: 50 (anonymized on request) Books/Articles: Akhaine, S. O. 2011. Nigeria's 2011 elections: The ‘crippled giant’ learns to walk? African Affairs 110 (441): 649-655. Durotoye, A.A. (2014) “Electoral Behaviour in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election in Nigeria”, Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 15 (2014):58-64 Hoffman, L. Nolte, I. 2013. The Roots of Neopatrimonialism: Opposition Politics and Popular Consent in Southwest Nigeria. In Adebanwi, W. Obadara, E. Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretations. New York: Palgrave McMillan Human Rights Watch, 20007. Criminal Politics: Violence, "godfathers" and Corruption in Nigeria, Volume 19, New York, NY. Resnick, D. (2013). Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Suberu, R. 2010. The Nigerian federal system: Performance, problems and prospects. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Volume 28, Issue 4, 2010 54 Electoral Management and the Politics of Ambiguity in Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election News Sources: Daily Champion. (2006, October 17). Nigeria: End of the Road for 'Mr. Controversy'. Africa News. Retrieved from https://www.nexis. com/cart/cartDocRenderer.do?format=GNBFULL&returnToKey=20_ T22132558721&randomNo=0.19975737565303264&csi=8320&doc No =3 Jibrin I. (2014, June 24). Ekiti Lessons for Democracy. Premium Times. Retrieved from: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/163487ekitis-lessons-democracy-jibrin-ibrahim.html Maja-Pearce, A. (2014, July 17). Thai Rice and Nigerian Politics. NewYork Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/ opinion/adewale-maja-pearce-thai-rice-and-nigerianpolitics.html?_r=0 McCulley, T (2011). ‘Now Comes the Hard Part…” United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria. [Online] June, 23. Available from: http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/ambo_oped06232011.html [Assessed: January 2, 2015] Nomjov, C. (2015, April 19). Defend Fayose With The Last Pint Of Your Blood” – Ekiti State Media Calls On NURTW, Okada Unions To Storm Assembly Complex Tomorrow. NewsWireNGR. Retrieved from: http://newswirengr.com/2015/04/19/defend-fayose-with-thelast-pint-of-your-blood-ekiti-state-media-calls-on-nurtw-okadaunions-to-storm-assembly-complex-tomorrow/# Ogundele, K. (2014, May 13). Fayose accuses Fayemi of deceiving Ekiti teachers. Punch. Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/news/ fayose-accuses-fayemi-of-deceiving-ekiti-teachers/ Okorocha, C. (2014, June 27). In a Reversal, APC to Challenge Ekiti Election Result in Court. ThisDay. Retrieved from: http://www. thisdaylive.com/articles/in-a-reversal-apc-to-challenge-ekiti-electionresult-in-court/182021/ Soriwei, F. (2015, February 8). How Fayose, Obanikoro, others used soldiers to rig Ekiti poll — Army Captain. Punch. Retrieved from: http://www.punchng.com/news/how-fayose-obanikoro-others-usedsoldiers-to-rig-ekiti-poll-army-captain/ 55 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Suleiman, T. (2013, September 17). Fayemi’s Car Gifts to Monarchs Unsettles Ekiti Communities. ThisDay. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fayemi-s-car-gifts-to-monarchsunsettles-ekiti-communities/159216/ 56  4 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship Abiodun Adeniyi Introduction The provisions of section 39 (1) of the Nigerian 1979 constitution, envisages the free flow of information. The government is a trust constituted on behalf of the people, and leaders are trustees, ideally expected to act on behalf of the people. The media serves as bearers of information, between sections that constitute the state. This understanding is an extension of the freedom of opinion and of speech, outlined in the libertarian theory of the press (McQuial, 2000), to the extent that the man, in the proper society should not encounter obstacles in the bid to be self, or collectively expressive. Social discourse, thoughts and ideas are encouraged in an atmosphere of freedom (Sabine and Thorson, 1973), as against one of stifling, caging or intimidation. The esteem of the man is enhanced in a state of freedom, notwithstanding provisions like libel, slander, considerations for decency and sedition that seek to regulate excesses. How therefore has the media faired in its role in electioneering process, a key route for the determination of who controls power at periods in the nations life? How have sections of the media responded to their constitutional calling in covering elections? What inferences can be drawn from media roles in election periods? What lessons can be learned from Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis these processes for the present and against the future? These research questions form the basis of this chapter. Methodology In examining the above questions, this chapter adopts the qualitative method, through participant observation. It proceeds from the fact of the author, not only being a witness to many elections in Nigeria, but as a reporter of the electioneering process for more than a decade as a political journalist for one of Nigeria’s most respected newspapers, The Guardian. The experience, used in consideration for reflexivity (Miller, etal, 2002), exposed the writer to practical observation of events, campaigns, the tempers and temperaments of political campaigners, besides an exposure to the organizational strength of the nation’s electoral commission. To be as detached as possible from this participant observation, the chapter proceeds with the use of a critical approach to discussing issues and perspective, in the bid for insights and understanding to the dissection of media actions and roles in the country’s political election process. How then do we dissect the role of the media in the election process? Media as Weapon for Election Mobilization: A Historical Overview The performance of media roles permeates all sections of the society, from politics to economics, cultural to the religious, environmental to global affairs and from defense to the education sector (Gordon, 2010). These functions are either performed either in specialized, interpretative, or investigative format, in a process or a one-off basis, in so far as they are not in breach of the ethical responsibilities of the media, and in fulfillment of the role envisioned in the constitution. The performance of this function in the political sphere, for which electioneering is included, has been not just intriguing, but have also raised issues around lopsided ownership, location and control pattern, prejudice, objectivity, corruption, sectionalism and ethnicisation of professional responsibility. These concerns have long characterized and still characterizing Nigerian media outings during the many local, state, regional and national elections, from the preindependence period, through to the immediate post-independence period, 58 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship and as the country began to recurrently shake off military interruptions in its body polity. The establishment of the Nigerian Tribune by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1949 was one of the first experiences to impact on media ownership pattern and its influence on elections in Nigeria. Chief Awolowo, a good believer in the Western/Yoruba cause initially pursued pro-independence policy with the newspaper, but it witnessed a mutation to the pursuance of proYoruba, pro-western, pro-Action Group of Nigeria (the party with a predominant western following at Nigeria’s independence), and pro-Unity Party of Nigeria (the group that succeeded the Action Group, as a dominant Yoruba political organization) causes. Awolowo was a byword for political activism, ambition and leadership acumen. He participated in many electioneering processes, from the preindependence to the post-independence and in the military era as well. Through these processes, the Nigeria Tribune was a bat of mobilization, for his vision, mission and that of his political party or affiliation. Constituted by some of the best journalism brains in the land, the newspaper deployed their professional and intellectual arsenal to advance the cause of their founder. Based in Ibadan, Oyo state, the Nigeria Tribune extended the faith in Awolowo to a faith in the Yoruba nation, and their electioneering interests. Elections were seen from the point of view of the Western Nigeria contestant. To the Ibadan practitioners, objectivity was at play, but to the distant readers in other parts of the country, the newspaper was one of the most partisan in the land. In response to the Awolowo media weapon, many other politicians and political interest groups soon began to establish their own newspapers, in their own cities, states or regions. Examples of these were the West African Pilot (established by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe), and the New Nigeria, in Kaduna, though publicly owned, but was unrepentantly protective of the interest of the North, the region where it was based. Point is, these media organs helped in furthering the electioneering and political causes of their founders and followers with little or no regret. 59 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The founder’s election manifestoes, speeches or programs were always published with relish. Campaign adverts, paid or unpaid, were also used with lavish. Some of them could reject commercial advert patronage from the opposition politicians or parties. It was always possible to publish or embellish views of founders or those of their supporters as subject of editorials. News and features’ items essentially hovered around the views of followers of founders. Those of opposition streaming in from other sections were either subdued or utterly unused. The overall drive was the mobilization of electoral votes for the benefit of their owners. The media in this context was, therefore, deployed to satisfy the electoral desires of their financiers, eventually defining a role for it as a tool, as a weapon for the achievement of personal, group or ethnic electioneering cause. In the latter years of elections conducted by military regimes, wealthy businessman, Chief Moshood Kolawole Abiola (now deceased) had flouted a newspaper, National Concord. The newspaper, due to the financial prowess of the owner, soon enjoyed a wide circulation and readership. The creation of other titles from the stable, including Weekend Concord (Every Saturday), Sunday Concord (Every Sunday), Community Concord (Focusing on each state of the federation), and African Concord (A weekly newsmagazine), ensured that the Concord brand had wide readership, acceptability and popularity. This status took it way ahead of its peers, including The Guardian, The Punch, Vanguard, Daily Times, Nigerian Tribune, The Democrat and the New Nigeria, even though they all had their different editorial focus, target audience and affiliations. Abiola was first a member of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the second Republic (1979-1983), before aligning with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the wake of the military President Ibrahim Babangida’s promise to return the country to democracy in the early 1990s. The National Concord was deployed as a weapon of mobilization for the SDP, where the owner belonged, against the interest of the National Republican Convention (NRC), the opposing party. The newspaper articulated and rearticulated the views and promise of its founder who sought to become the president of Nigeria. It was forthright, detailed and patronizing of Abiola’s zeal. Even when they reflected the views of the opposition candidate, 60 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship Alhaji Bashir Tofa, it was loudly subdued, evening up to a greater interest in the success of its proprietor. The opposition thereafter began to see the newspaper as one-sided, partisan and biased, while the newspaper, of course countered with reasons around the preservation of self-interest, first. Many journalists on the newspaper stable, in fact, left to work with the businessman, as political campaign strategists, publicists and spokesmen. When the military annulled the subsequent electoral victory of Abiola, his newspapers went beyond the widespread condemnation of the election: they were angered to no end, and peppered the military, with caustic headlines, provocative editorials and protest news stories and features. The newspapers daily outing was predictable-an outright campaign for the revalidation of the election. The change affected the commercial endeavors of the organization. Their once burgeoning fortune began to nosedive, becoming obvious through few advertising patronage, lower distribution and circulation channels. A former over 40 page newspaper began struggling to publish 15 pages. It was worsened when the military finally descended on the publication and shut it. A once blossoming media empire became history: no thanks to an interest in an electoral cause. The presidential adventure of Abiola and the experience of his media empire in his electioneering concern succeeded that of Gen. Shehu Musa Yar’adua, who also ran for the presidency of the country on the platform of the same SDP, using his Kaduna based newspaper, The Reporter, as a campaign and mobilization tool. Yar’adua’s The Reporter was voluble in the advancement of the general’s ambition, and went far in creating awareness and in the mobilization of sections of the North towards supporting the aspiration of the politician. The partisan bent of the newspaper became palpable, predictable and decreased the objectivity bent promised at inception. The bias reduced their commercial fortune, ultimately leading to its closure. That experience did not deter Abiola and his National Concord Newspaper. Questions would however continue to be asked regarding the successes recorded in the use of a media organization for the pursuit of an electioneering objective. How many voters would have voted for a 61 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis candidate on account of reading his newspaper, or watching the Television (in the case of the largely state owned Television and Radio Stations, usually deployed to support the reigning political party)? Are the elites, and opinion leaders, who mainly have access to these media products, relied on to persuade the multitude of other voters in a two-step flow information dissemination arrangement (McQuial, 2000), against the background of low literacy level in the land? How many of these politicians have, infact, won elections on account of control, or ownership of a media house? How should the media practitioner be seen in these contexts: are they political professionals, campaigners or mobilizers? How easily can intellectual fortitude get weakened in the face of the quest to earn a living? Determining these posers rest in the definition of the age-old tension in the relationship between the employer and the employee: should it be a strictly business and professional relationship, or should it transcend these barriers, into satisfying the personal desires of the owners? These issues may be valid for another discourse on another occasion. But how do we contextualize the role of the media in more recent history? I shall turn to this next. Election Campaigns and the Media: A Contemporary Analysis The build up to elections in Nigeria is usually tense. Politicians and pundits make variegated projections, using the media as a springboard. Destructions, deaths and different shades of crisis are often feared. The last presidential election which held March 28, 2015 is a major case. There were two foremost candidates: The incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and General Mohammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Party (APC). Jonathan is from the South-South geo-political zone, while Buhari hails from the North-West zone. The men represented distinct identities in a multi-ethnic state: South (Jonathan) versus North (Buhari); Christian (Jonathan) versus Muslim (Buhari); relative younger generation candidate being age 58 (Jonathan) versus older generation candidate at age 72 (Buhari); civilian background (Jonathan) versus Military background (Buhari); and continuation in government, having been first elected in 2011 (Jonathan) versus bid to 62 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship return to power after ruling as Military head of state, between 1983 and 1984 (Buhari). There were also the trite arguments around performance versus a potential performer; tempered approach to the problem of corruption versus a determined anti-corruption crusader; a civil temper versus a military temper; the nagging problem of insurgency in the Northeast and an alleged incapacity to deal with it (Jonathan), against an assumed promising ability to root out the insurgency on account of military background (Buhari); and then a receding economy and a flat-footed approach to finding solutions to it (Jonathan), as against a presumed ability to provide solutions to the declining economy (Buhari). These differences plague the build up to the presidential elections, leading to fears of violence from either side of the argument: while the Jonathan immediate ethnic sympathizers threatened resumed violence in the volatile Niger-Delta region, should he lose the election, there were concerns that those from the Northern region could resort to mayhem, if Buhari losses like they did in 2011, when Buhari last lost the last presidential elections. The media was awash with threats, counter threats and counter-counter threats. Political interest groups and opinion leaders gave countless opinions in publications, on television and on the Radio. Online media was not also left out. Actors took advantage of the excessive freedom online, through the plurality of platforms, including websites, twitter handles, Facebook pages, emails postings, and cross postings to send and share views to multiple heterogeneous and anonymous audiences. The tension was made more palpable as supporters sometimes went personal. While Jonathan was regarded as “Clueless” by the opposition, Buhari was said to represent “darkness” by the ruling PDP. The media feasted on these, through opinions (as earlier said), and through paid advertisements in newspapers, through jingles on Radio, and via commercials and documentaries on television. Webpage corners and backgrounds were also bought to provide online versions to the personal attacks. 63 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis In some cases, the focus of attack shifted to strong personalities backing the candidates. Examples: Asiwaju Bola Tinubu became a focus of attack in a television and YouTube documentary entitled the “Lion of Bourdilon” that was aired on the African Independent Television (AIT). A Buhari supporter, Tinubu was not alone. A former Governor of Rivers State and staunch Buhari backer, Rotimi Amaechi was also severally attacked. So was PDP presidential campaign spokesman, Femi Fani-Kayode, and PDP stalwart, Chief Tony Anenih. The media was invariably used for the good and the bad, in the build up to the campaign. A key observation in the process was a minimal focus on issues. There were fewer talks about specifics on how the nation’s ailing economy will be revamped, how the insurgents in the North East will be subdued and how it will be avoided in the future. There were little concerns for the failing educational standards, ethnic strife in sections of the country, like in Plateau and Benue states. The revamping of infrastructures and utilities featured more in the backstage, than it did in the front. Concerns were more on the persons jostling for power: looks, offspring, relations, apparels, and similar mundane matters that count less for performance and productivity. These punches and counter-punches were not limited to the presidential elections alone. Aspirants at state levels like governors, senators, and representatives were also acting scripts in their localities. The brickbats permeated the dimensions of all electioneering levels. That the media veritably provided a platform for this bitterness through adverts raises questions over whether they could have done otherwise in the face of a momentary influx of scarce advert revenue. Many of the media houses are no doubt concerned about legal issues like libel, slander, and obscenity. It thus appears that the degree to which they thought about this was dependent on how buoyant, stable, or how non-partisan they are. While a few like The Guardian, Vanguard, Channels Television, and The Daily Trust were not known to have recorded any major libel suit arising from the 2015 presidential election, despite the increased advert patronage they obviously enjoyed during the build up to the elections (which I have used as one sample) some others were not that lucky. AIT was, for instance, slammed with a two billion naira libel suit by Asiwaju Bola Tinubu. 64 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship The online media could not be readily caught in this legal web. Reason being that there are still issues of jurisdiction regarding online publications. Online publications cut across borders, are planetary and can be riddled with anonymity. Raising issues with them could therefore be cumbersome, nebulous and tiresome. The best reactions some online publications have gotten is abusive retractions, as the New York based www.saharareporters.com, often get to reports considered misrepresenting. These news websites are also multiplying in tens, by the day, and on a weekly and monthly basis. Tracking one negative or unpleasant report could amount to shadow chasing. So are the mushrooming platforms and accounts of individuals on the imprecise social media, with its many outlets, on the desktops, the smartphones, Ipads and many others. From the positive angle, the platforms are now however useful for electioneering campaigns, for the projection of ideas, and images of aspirants, for quick rebuttals of wrong information, for fast paced mobilization of people and supporters, for the changing of perceptions and conceptions and for reaching segmented audiences in locations where the local print, or electronic media would easily not reach. Though issues might be raised around the yet limited level of Internet penetration in the country, given persisting problems of electricity, affordability and literacy (some factors that determine use of the devises), this media genre has come as a force in the Nigerian election process, with its wide embrace by voters seeking to co-opt other voters, by electoral bodies through their growing web activities, by the civil society seeking to campaign for order, and for a free and fair elections, and by government and its many agencies, correctly or incorrectly working for the populace. Media and the Election Campaign Process: The Good, the Bad and the Future A first person, participant observatory experience (Danny, 1989) will be briefly told here to typify a common practice amongst media men and the politicians during political campaign processes. As a reporter with The Guardian Newspaper, this writer was once on the campaign train of the National Republican Convention (NRC), with the then party Chairman, 65 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Chief Tom Ikimi leading the train. We flew in a chartered jet to all the country’s state capitals, navigating the nooks and crannies of each state by road, and then boarding the plane again, when done with one state, for another. It was always an all-expenses paid trip: we were fed, accommodated and given stipends. It was often a pleasure, acceptably or inappropriately, to be on such trips. The average journalist would always look forward to it, and the newspaper management was unlikely to disallow it, because they were not going to be bothered about cost, and yet the stories, good or bad, would come their way. On board the jet, always, were all the party chieftains, while the party spokesman, Dr. Doyin Okupe (as he then was) interacted more with the more than a dozen pressmen on board the plane. Current political story ideas, leads, cues and clues were always sourced from inflight, with the spokesman often trying to give those story ideas! Where he could not do that, he would tell a senior member of the press crew who would in turn brief us of their preference. It was often done in a friendly, convivial atmosphere, and they will expect us to “play ball”. After all, we were on their train at no cost to our organizations. They were paying the bills and the expectations were that we would dance to their tunes. Often, many of us would try to do the stories in manners that comply with our newspaper’s house styles. In writing for The Guardian, ethical and objectivity standards were expected to be kept high. I will always write my stories, and consciously or unconsciously, to the best of my ability in trying to present the fact, always from my perception of the event. My biases would eventually be seen when the story is published, through the way it is edited upon publication. When it is not published, I would be convinced that it was probably too partisan, one sided or a sheer campaign piece. Sometimes, it would be kept and used only when the reporter in charge of the other political party has filed a similar story, so mine can be run aside the other. My obligation was to file the stories anyway, and I hardly could influence whether or not the story will be used, given the high pre-editing and control standards the newspaper then maintained. Some other newspapers could get 66 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship their reporters’ stories published the way the political chieftains had dictated. Some with minor changes, while others would even tell us beforehand the page on which the story will be used, and the stories will make it to those pages! It was all a matter of degree of checks, influence of the reporter on the editors and the editorial policy, or slant of the medium. Looking back now, it hardly can be said to be ethical for journalists to be so catered for by political sources, with profound partisan motives. The practice of embedding reporters in campaign trains is still ongoing. Most times, however, at no cost to the newspapers or media houses. In my experience, we were on the campaign of a political party. In recent times, reporters are often on the trains of individual politicians, doing what at best seems like public relations or campaign pieces. Whether with a political party or individual politician, questions could further be asked on the level of objectivity that can be displayed in the face of these experiences. To what extent can a media man do a story against a financier? How many journalists would write about the negative side of a campaign train experience and risk losing similar opportunities in the future? What level of professionalism would reporters be displaying in those circumstances? Can they be said to be unbiased, balanced and critical about parties and candidates to enable the electorates make up their minds in a dispassionate way? With the dawn of democracy in 1999, journalists have even often related more with politicians and parties, such that they are repeatedly invited to party meetings in venues that could be posh, personal and ultimately compromising. The lowly paid reporter may likely shift grounds in such situations at the expense of objectivity. And it is almost impossible to do stories that would run, in any way, against the interest of the benefactor. Another experience could be illuminating. Again on a political campaign visit to Enugu for a rally, we landed in a jumbo jet filled with members of the first National Assembly in the nation’s fourth Republic. But we had to wait at the Airport for a senior state official who was airborne. Before his plane could land, a fully loaded commercial jet was ahead and obviously cleared to land. As the commercial jet was sighted on approach, an SUV 67 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis loaded with secret policemen was parked close to the runway, within touching distance of the aircraft wing, were it to land with the vehicle still there. There was panic. Quickly, signs, shouts and calls, went the way of the motorist (which had gone to “sweep” the runway in protecting the expected personality), to clear from the runway vicinity. As the vehicle pulled off, the aircraft was sighted doing an unusual, momentary maneuver. It landed safely, and the angry passengers alighted to relieve their shock, while onlookers discussed how state security men can sometimes be overzealous. Quickly, the spokesman for the politician on whose ticket we had travelled assembled all of us journalists, pleading with us not to report the incident in any way. Of course, I briefed my editor who told me to do the story all the same. The story never saw the light of the day, because I needed to get the reaction of the politician, the aviation spokesman, and perhaps to hear the experience of the pilot in command of the commercial jet. Then the implications of publishing the story, even without those sides were probably considered: how will flyers subsequently react to air travels? How possible will follow-ups be? Will it not pitch the writer and the newspaper against the authorities implicated in the report? These and more were probably in consideration. But should that be the case? Should passengers not be told of what travelling in the electioneering campaign period could be like? Would it not have been a warning to security agents to be more careful, and be less overzealous in the future? Important in the matrix is the manner in which campaign trains are populated by journalists and how their expense payers try to control their story lines, at the expense of objectivity. This takes its toll on quality journalism and prevents the electorates from having the real picture as would have been told by the ethical journalist. The bigger picture of the poor economic state of the media organizations, which prevents them from affording the cost of sponsoring the journalist on such trips, might be canvassed as an excuse. But are there no other ways of doing those stories without trailing the campaigners to guarantee objectivity? In these present 68 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship days of pluralisation of media outlets, through new gains in communication, could alternatives not have multiplied? The election period is a witness to the growth of real and knee-jerk public relations experts and publicist. They comb the media houses trying to ‘plant’ stories favorable to their principals. Not a few unethical practices can be suspected during those times as monies and other gratifications could be exchanged. The results are jaundiced analysis, biased stories and the sacrificing of professional integrity. When some of these stories are unusable because of obvious libel or slander, the emergency PR experts opt for advertorials, where the media organizations are indemnified. Then the media pages and bulletins become platforms for broadsides, intemperate abuses and insults, which hurt the psyches of the electorates. They hurt because issues are often confined to the backdoor. Personalities are rather attacked, while name calling takes the order of the day. The pedestals for those actions remain the media. Publication of Election Results, the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election Case and the Nascent Media Opinion Polling Newspapers and broadcast stations are now quicker to releasing election results ahead of official announcements of the outcomes. Often, voters are informed of likely winners beforehand. Headlines like “XYZ ahead in presidential poll” are seen in newspapers, while broadcast stations try to give hourly reports, updates on happenings around elections zones, based on stories filled in by correspondents. The speculations and indications of who is winning and who is losing help voters and the populace to know the direction of victory. Many a times, these stories are correct. Some other times, they are not. At other times, they can be mischievous when media houses choose to speculate victory in favor of a preferred candidate, perhaps on account of ethnic, tribal or religious attachment. The motive is to preempt the trend of result, possibly trigger confusion, and get the result invalidated because the candidate of choice was losing. In the case of the June 12 1993 presidential election, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was open to the announcement of results as they were 69 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis released in the polling stations. This allowed media organizations to calculate results, and make nearly correct forecast on the direction of victory. From preliminary calculations, it was emerging that Candidate Moshood Abiola was coasting home to victory, beating his opponent Bashir Tofa in most wards of the federation, including in his (Tofa) own ward in Kano. When the military regime annulled the election citing malpractices, it had to find another excuse, and another. And yet another, in what looked like a frenetic bid to justify the annulment of what was adjudged the freest and fairest election in the history of the country. Through the media, the populace was convinced of a transparent poll, praised by local and international observers. It thereafter became difficult for the military regime to use the media which heralded the dawn of a credible election to discredit the poll. The military were hard done dismissing it as fraudulent. The condemnation of the military was widespread. It was confusing, and it later saw to the unceremonial exit of the General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. Years afterwards, the media had grown in sophistication. They released results even more quickly and began doing opinion polls on likely winners of elections. Thisday newspaper, published by Nduka Obaigbena, has a headstart in this practice, modeled after the culture in developed democracies, where media houses openly take sides to support one candidate against the other. Thisday often make predications on likely candidates to win governorship elections, in states that are too close to call and then make predictions on who was going to win at the center. It was a novel, but bold practice in the country, where credibility of the newspaper could be lost on account of open partisanship, favoritism or bias, given the many divides along ethnic, tribal and religious lines. Sometimes, they got the predictions right and fail at other times. And somehow, it has not affected the vibrancy or acceptability of the organization. The Media, Electoral Umpires, and the Election Organizing Government 70 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship In doing elections, the electoral body is always in want of credibility. They are always being accused by one political party or the other of supporting the other. This is the case because of past history of compromise by heads of electoral organizations. These heads are themselves revealed as bad, biased, corrupt or incompetent by the media. The perception has therefore been that there can hardly be a good umpire. The case of Professor Humphrey Nwosu who came to lead the national electoral body after an illustrious career in the academia, and who showed promise to deliver credible elections, but succumbed to the military might, to justify the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections worsened the perception of the umpires as easy compromisers. In reaction to this sensitivity, the umpires labor to prove their innocence. They do this through an obviously heavy media spending on image management, public relations, voter education, publication of election guidelines, rules and regulations, and modalities for the announcement of results. Election development partners, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other interested parties are always invited through newspapers and broadcast stations to briefings, presentations and workshops, while they plea for the detailed dissemination of the contents. They do not mince words in assuring the nation that a coming election would be transparent, free, fair and credible. Coincidentally, when they deliver on credibility, sections of the media do not mince words in saying so, while they are never spared in the case of failures. The case of Professor Attahiru Jega who rode on the crest of activism to enjoy some credibility as he ascended the umpire throne is significant. He was challenged by the job and conducted a presidential election that was considered above average by the populace and the international community. The media said as much. When the umpire did some other elections in states, like Anambra, that were not quite impressive, the media was also critical. He was scored high through public opinion molded by the media in subsequent elections in Ekiti and Osun states. 71 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Just as the umpire seeks credibility, so does the government of the day. They are obviously interested in being adjudged as organizing credible elections. It does not matter whether they have direct interest in the process or not. And it also does not matter whether they have actually manipulated the process or not. They are more concerned about building a positive perception of their role through the media. President Goodluck Jonathan praised his victory in 2011, arguing that his promise before the election was to deliver a free and fair elections and it happened. Question of the often stated incumbency factor, huge “war chest”, and control of the state apparatus were downplayed as advantages. In building this perception of credibility, the government of the day is wont to positive representation through the instrumentality of the mass media. Conclusion and Recommendations This chapter has tried to interrogate objectivity and partisanship in Nigerian media in relation to the country’s electioneering process. It locates instances and situations of possible compromise, while identifying situations of strength, in upholding media practice ethics. The delicate balance between patronage and professionalism were evaluated in a fledgling democracy, amidst a parlous economy which rubs off on professional and ethical standards. Though the preponderant position might be unwholesome, it does not undermine the fact that credible cases of objectivity and integrity still exist, either in the reporting of individual election stories, or in the strict adherence to objective editorial policies of some media organizations. It is also in evidence that circumstances of practice have oscillated between the character of electioneering process in the military era and in the period of democratic administration. While one process have been less robust and vibrant, the other have been a little more open and fiercely competitive, with the media remaining key definers of positive or negative public opinion. For the media to truly carry out its constitutional responsibility, it must however be detached from partisan processes like being embedded in campaign trains sponsored by politicians and political parties. If the trains have to be covered, each interested media house should bear the cost. 72 The Media in Nigeria’s Electioneering Process: Issues in Objectivity and Partisanship Otherwise, correspondents in locations being visited should be relied upon for story dispatches. The media should also strife for greater professionalism founded on trainings, retraining and better education. The greatest problem in evidence seems to revolve around poor ethics, which makes inducements, compromises and corruption look right and permissible. Better education would instill in the practitioner, a greater sense of decency and expertise, required for improved playing of the opinion molder’s role. The politician, who is ever desirous of having his way, should as well be reminded of the existence of a greater interest: that of the people. Reminders and word of caution to them ultimately command respect to the practitioner, which eventually works for the greater good of the society. 73 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis References Harcup, T. (2008) Journalism: Principles and Practices. London: Sage Publications. Jorgensen, L. Danny. (1989) Participant Observation: A methodology for Human Studies. London: Sage Publications. Makowsky, R.C. (2010) The Discovery of Society. New York: McGrawHill. McQuial, Dennis. 2000. McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory 4th Edition: London: Sage Publications. Sabine, G and Thorson, T. (1993) A History of Political Theory. Fourth Edition: Oxford and IBH Publishing CO. PVT. LTD. New York. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. Winston, Brian. (1998) Media Technology and Society, A History: From the Telegraph to the Internet. London: Routedge. 74  5 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria Philip Olubunmi Aborisade Introduction David Plouffe, was not just the architect of the campaign that put Barrack Obama in the White House; he also built a grassroots movement that changed the face of politics forever and reenergize the idea of democracy itself (David Plouffe, 2009). Political communication has become a significant tool to learn before any attempt is made at partisan politics. Politicians master the game of political communication to be able to reach the grassroots for electoral support. Modern technology has added yet another dimension to political communication with new media modalities employed to reach wider audience at the grassroots. In advanced democracies like the United States of America, political communication has become a veritable tool during electioneering campaign. Its efficacy has tremendously helped political gladiators Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis communicate their political messages to the grassroots. The “Obama for President” Campaign led and directed by David Axelrod successfully deployed political communication to elect the forty-fourth president of the United States of America (David Plouffe, 2009). It is too big to comprehend right now. We have just elected the president of the United States- an African American man born to a Kenyan father and a Kansan mother, just four years out of the Illinois senate. He had defeated the gold standard in both parties, Hilary Clinton and John MacCain, to win in one of the biggest upset in American political history. (David Plouffe, 2009) That was the beauty of political communication. The American experience demonstrated by the Obama Campaign Organization managed by David Plouffe clearly shows the power of political communication in mobilizing grassroots for electoral victory. Recent developments in Nigeria are beginning to change all that. Political communication is being redefined. Irrespective of the level of political campaign strategy employed, success at polls still depends on variables such as the ability of the politician to cater for the stomach needs of the electorates, speak the language they understand and identify with their daily life. This concept is now known in Nigeria as “Stomach Infrastructure”. This vocabulary “Stomach Infrastructure”, crept into Nigeria’s political lexicon after the June 21, 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State of Nigeria when an incumbent governor, Dr. John Kayode Fayemi was defeated by Mr. Ayodele Fayose (who was impeached for grand larceny from the same office eight years earlier) simply because Mr. Fayose caters for the stomach needs of the electorates and identify with the less privileged while Dr. Fayemi was perceived to be sentimentally attached to physical infrastructures and elitist way of life. The transformation of political communication with the introduction of “Stomach Infrastructure” has in a way altered the citizens’ needs and changed the dynamics of political communication in Nigeria. “It is 76 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria instructive to note that setting political communication within a broadest possible understanding of the ways in which communication affects politics and public life” is very important if political communication must achieve the desired effect as Plouffe did in the Obama Campaign (Bennet and Entman 2001).The study was guided by the following research questions: 1. What are the effects of “Stomach Infrastructure” on the June 21 governorship election in Ekiti State? 2. What informed the choice of the candidate voted for at the June 21 election-“Stomach Infrastructure” or Physical development? 3. Can good political communication without “Stomach infrastructure” persuade electorates to vote for a candidate in an election? 4. Why did the people of Ekiti vote for a candidate with the message of “Stomach Infrastructure” rather than a candidate with the message of Physical development? 5. How did the Ekiti electorates receive political communication without “Stomach Infrastructure”? Literature Review The literature review for “Stomach Infrastructure” in relation to political communication is understandably very scanty being a new concept in political communication. The study depends mostly on newspaper columnists and reports on the concept after the June 21, 2014 election in Ekiti State. These reports and columns in Nigerian national dailies such as The Punch, The Nation, and Guardian, The Leadership and Vanguard expressed surprise about the new sociology of the Ekiti electorates who voted for a candidate who caters for their stomach needs rather than a candidate who caters for the physical development of their state. These columnists adduced a variety of reasons for the twist in the sociology of Ekiti politics-such as corruption in Nigeria as whole, poverty and bad governance. They postulated that this development would spread to other states in Nigeria. 77 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The Nation newspaper of June 3, 2014 reports: “The intriguing concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” is an alien terminology to this part of the world”. The Vanguard of July 8, 2014 wrote on Fayose and Stomach infrastructure describing the concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” as a “new maxim, the new political ideology by Ayodele Fayose, the governor elect of Ekiti State”. The leadership newspaper of July 5, 2014 reports that “government's understanding of the so-called “Stomach Infrastructure” was to make the citizens gainfully employed”. The Guardian of October 30, 2014 reports that Fayose explains “Stomach Infrastructure” policy: “EKITI State Governor, Ayodele Fayose has said that the introduction of the “Stomach Infrastructure” Ministry was in fulfilment of the promise he made during his campaign to cater for the welfare of the people of the state. In a column written in the New York Times after the June 21, 2014, Adewale Maja-Pearse rebuked the Ekiti electorates for voting for “Stomach Infrastructure” instead of physical infrastructure. Mohammed Haruna and Olatunji Dare in their columns after the June 21, 2014 election diagnosed the concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” and could not adduce any tangible reason to the twist in the sociology of Ekiti Politics. Apart from the copious reports in the dailies, the literature review provides insights into proper political communication without “Stomach Infrastructure”. The literature looks at political communication, as a powerful tool employed by politicians to mobilize grassroots electorates for support at polls. Plouffe (2009) provides a copious insight into how political communication was deployed in the United States to put Barrack Obama in the white house as the president of the United States of America. Bennet and Entman (2001) wrote thus on the effect of political communication: “It is instructive to note that setting political communication within a broadest possible understanding of the ways in which communication affects politics and public life is very important” Looking at the physiological need of man and the importance of having food to eat to keep soul and body fit, one can understand while the Ekiti electorates preferred a candidate that will cater for their stomach needs at the June 21 governorship election. With the poverty level in Ekiti and Nigeria as a whole (with the number of people who went to bed daily 78 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria without food), the people’s anger and the rejection of Dr. Fayemi by the people of Ekiti at the June 21 governorship election may be justified. After all, a hungry man, they say is an angry man and a nation that cannot feed itself is not existing. Theoretical Framework Many communication theories have been used to explain the way electorates behave at polls. For example, persuasion theory is being employed to explain attitudinal change in democracy. According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), persuasion is likely to make up part of life in a democracy where attitudinal influence in the form of control that is most relied on. This can be used to explain the sudden change in the attitude of Ekiti electorates who jettisoned Physical development for “Stomach Infrastructure”. This article is however anchored on the User and Gratification (U&G) theory. The U&G theory became prominent in 1940 with communication researchers explaining the popularity of some information over other information through the U&G model (Blumler & Katz, 1974). The theory views communication from the perspective of how it meets social or psychological needs (Aborisade, 2012). Perhaps this explains why the message of “Stomach Infrastructure” resonated in the Ekiti people rather than message of Physical development. The U&G theory has three main Objectives; (a) explanation of individual use of mass communication to satisfy their needs, that is to say, what people do with the media; (b) discovering the motives why individual use media; and (c) identifying the good and the bad consequences of individual’s use of the media. The U&G is premised on the assumption that audience members use the media for individual needs. Considering the three main objectives of the U&G theory, it can be argued that the theory supports the preference for “Stomach Infrastructure” over Physical Infrastructure by the people of Ekiti States of Nigeria. It can also be further argued that political message that caters for the stomach needs of 79 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis the Nigerian electorate will resonate more than the political message of physical infrastructure. Methodology The study is a phenomenological, qualitative research that examines how “Stomach Infrastructure” redefines political communication in Nigeria: Ekiti State as a case study. The purpose of the study is to determine the effectiveness and efficacy of political communication without “Stomach Infrastructure” and more importantly to find out if “Stomach Infrastructure” has come to stay as a component of political communication in Nigeria. The study combines both focus group and random interviews in all the sixteen local government in Ekiti State after the June 21, 2014 election to gather data for the study. Data were also gathered from secondary sources mostly from national dailies on the influence of “Stomach Infrastructure” on political communication. The study participants included ten randomly interviewed electorates from each of the sixteen local governments (160 participants in all) in the state after the June 21 governorship election to determine the influence of “Stomach Infrastructure” on how the electorate voted at the governorship election and what informed the choice of the candidate voted for by the electorates during the election-“Stomach Infrastructure” or Physical development. To complement the interviews, three focus groups (in the three Senatorial Districts in the state- Ekiti Central, South and North Senatorial Districts) made up of members of the three major political parties in the State (People Democratic Party, PDP; All Progressives Party, APC; and Labour Party, LP) were organized to determine whether any inducements were used by politicians at the Ekiti governorship election and how the inducements informed the choice of candidate voted for by the electorates. An Overview of Political Communication in Nigeria Right from 1960 when Nigeria got independence from the British colonial master, political gladiators of the first republic were able to identify the need of the people so as to be able to address them under a democratic 80 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria government. Then, the regional political parties of the time and their political leaders were able to incorporate the needs of their people into their manifestoes to enable them persuade the people for support at polls. During this period, Physical Infrastructure and welfare programmes were very prominent on the agenda of the parties. Electioneering campaigns were issue-based and politicians were more concerned with meaningful programmes that can make life better for the people. Then, political gladiators who were able to articulate their manifestoes usually had the support of the people at polls. As time went on, the people were able to know what the various regional parties and politicians had to offer by assessing their performance in terms of how far they had been able to fulfil their campaign promises. While politicians who fulfilled their campaign promises were rewarded at polls, those who did not were rebuffed as well. In the first republic, Nigerian electorates were more concerned with welfare programmes and physical Infrastructure. That was a period when politicians listened to the electorates and were ready to meet their aspiration. Politicians of this epoch communicate genuine messages to the people during electioneering campaign, robust political communication were employed to solicit support from the Nigerian electorates. Politics was then a serious business and the Nigerian political space was dominated by politicians who wanted to make history by impacting the life of the people and making a change in the society. The level of contentment at the time gave ample room to trust political leaders. Politicians at the period strove hard to meet their electoral promises as to justify the political communication invested in their electioneering campaign. While it is not an exaggeration to say that genuine political messages were communicated to the electorates, it could also be said that messages of the politicians resonated and were taken serious by the electorate. That was the period when politics and political communication were meant for the development of the people and society. With the failure of the Nigeria politicians to fulfil their electoral promises, the Nigerian electorates began to see political communication as a very 81 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis deceptive tool employed by politicians to trick them to get their support at polls. The electorates therefore ask that they be paid up front before they vote for any candidate. That seems to be one of the reasons why the electorates prefer “Stomach Infrastructure” to promises of Physical Infrastructure. This seems to be working because the man who popularized “Stomach Infrastructure”, Mr. Ayodele Fayose, the governor of Ekiti State, Nigeria promised the Ekiti people (during his inauguration) rice and chicken for Christmas and he delivered on his promise as the Ekiti people filed out to receive their Christmas rice and chicken from the governor as their own dividend of democracy. The Concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” It is an incontrovertible fact that politics in Nigeria has been the easiest way to make money and the easiest way to lose money. Matters are not helped by the skyrocketing unemployment in the country which has forced many Nigerians to turn to politics for their meal tickets. So, politicians are forced to bribe the electorate for vote without the electorate considering the manifestoes anymore. The electorates after the election look forward to pecuniary gains instead of the development of the society. The June 21, 2014 governorship election in Ekiti State, Nigeria has demonstrated the efficacy of “Stomach Infrastructure” as a tool that must go cap in hand with political communication during electioneering campaign. The victory of the man who popularizes the concept in Nigeria, Mr. Ayo Fayose (with the atrocities which led to his impeachment during his first term in office as governor of the Ekiti state) over an incumbent governor of Ekiti state, Dr. Kayode Fayemi who turned around the physical development of the state in four years with capital projects that could compare with those in advanced democracies, it is evident that “Stomach Infrastructure” is beginning to have a firm grip on political communication in Nigeria. Apart from being a new metaphor for satisfying electorate, “it refers to the practice of the electorate asking to be paid upfront the dividends of democracy in material term (Daily Independent, Nov 5, 2014). 82 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria Political pundits and political communicators have tried to explain this development without much success. While some have argued effortlessly that a state as educated as Ekiti State with all its many professors would not jettison Physical development for “Stomach infrastructure”, some are of the opinion that the poverty level in the country coupled with the skyrocketing unemployment in Nigeria may have pushed the Ekiti people to prefer their stomach needs to the physical development of their state. After all, the Yoruba people of which Ekiti is a part say “ebi oki wo inun ki oro mi o wo ibe” which literally translates that the stomach does not accommodate any other thing with hunger. Trounced by the victory of “Stomach Infrastructure” over physical development in Ekiti State, analysts and political observers see the strange development as an ‘Act of God’. The gospel of “Stomach Infrastructure” has since the June 21 election in Ekiti State spread to other states of Nigeria. While it led to electoral gains in some states, the same cannot be said of some states. But political communicators and political pundits see the 2015 election as acid test for the concept of “Stomach Infrastructure” in Nigeria as political gladiators continue to use “Stomach Infrastructure” to woo the poor Nigerian electorates for support. Connecting with the Electorates As stated earlier on, David Plouffe, the man who anchored President Obama’s campaign utilized political communication maximally to elect the president of the United States of America. That was without the use of “Stomach Infrastructure”. Obama’s electoral messages of Physical Infrastructural development, health insurance, jobs for the unemployed etc. were well received at the grassroots by the American masses and a huge victory was recorded twice in American history using the same method. With the same method of political communication, Obama continues to connect with the people of America at the grassroots. In the case of Ekiti state, the focus of this chapter, it seems as if ability to communicate to connect with the electorate no longer lies in the use of good political communication strategy without “Stomach Infrastructure”. 83 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Looking at the use of political communication by both Fayemi and Fayose during electioneering campaign for the June 21 election, one cannot but marvel at the sophistry of the Fayemi campaign-it was a master piece. Even when a little “Stomach Infrastructure” was employed, it was detached from the campaign message so as not to look as if the electorates were being bribed for electoral support. Fayemi preferred to showcase his commitment to physical infrastructural development than “Stomach Infrastructure”, new metaphor for motivation in Ekiti politics. Fayemi traversed the nooks and crannies of Ekiti State with his gospel of physical development, held village meetings to ask from the people the capital projects they wanted, danced on the streets of Ekiti pointing to his four years achievement in the area of physical development. “O wi bee, O se bee” (He promised, he delivered!), a newspaper which published a compendium of his administration from 2010 to 2014 was distributed free to the people to remind them of the capital projects delivered to them by the John Kayode Fayemi (JKF) administration. The newspaper contained the pictures of all the capital projects delivered by the JKF administration in each local government in Ekiti State. Yet, the people of Ekiti did not listen to him. Various communication strategies were employed on social media, bill boards, hand bills, radio, newspapers, television, mega rallies and house-tohouse campaign to no avail. Beautiful speeches were delivered by Dr. Fayemi which dazzled the political class on governance during his administration but they all fell on deaf ears at the grassroots in Ekiti and Fayemi lost the June 21 governorship election in all the sixteen local government areas of Ekiti State. The man who popularized “Stomach Infrastructure” in Nigeria today, Mr. Fayose did not go through much hassle like Dr. Fayemi to get the support of the people of Ekiti State at polls. He had just one message for the people. That is “Stomach Infrastructure”. His position is, once the stomach is taken care of, other things will fall in place. He was right. He coasted home electoral victory in all the sixteen local government areas of the state at the June 21 poll. Fayose does not possess the intellectual oratorical finesse to dazzle the elite with robust and fleshy speeches like Fayemi. But he understands the language of the people, their philosophy and needs and he employed just that during electioneering campaign to communicate his 84 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria message of “Stomach Infrastructure” and the message was well received at the grassroots. Fayose communicates very well with the people with his rhetoric and down to earth humour and excellent Ekiti dialects and sayings which Fayemi lacks. To cap it all, Fayose went on the streets with his message of “Stomach Infrastructure”, eating roasted plantain with the masses on the road and employing inter-personal communication to connect with the people one to one. Again, Fayemi lacks these elements of grassroots political communication which Fayose employed to coast home to victory at the June 21 governorship election in Ekiti State. Reference to Fayose’s achievements during his first time in the area of physical infrastructure did not resonate in the electorates like his message of “Stomach Infrastructure”. This goes to show the importance attached to “Stomach Infrastructure” over physical development in Ekiti. Findings and Discussion The ten electorates randomly interviewed in each of the 16 local governments in Ekiti State agreed that no amount of political communication during electioneering campaign will persuade the electorate that a candidate is good without ‘greasing their palms’. They attributed this to the skyrocketing unemployment and poverty in the country. The fact that politics is seen as big business and that Nigerians run for political office to make money was seen as the reason why electorates sell their vote for pecuniary gains. Participants in the focus groups equally agreed that with money, you can do anything in Nigeria. They agreed that any politician with the money to throw around will always win election in Nigeria. Irrespective of how well a manifesto is packaged, they believe the candidate with money to address the immediate need of the people will carry the day. Participants in the focus group share the view that Nigerian politicians are no longer in political communication to deliver their manifestos to the people and organize a political movement for support during election. Rather, politicians prefer to bribe their ways with money rather than package a 85 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis robust political communication to address the needs of the electorate. They believe this is a waste of time since the electorate is not prepared to listen to promises without greasing their palms or addressing their stomach needs. The randomly selected participants and participants in the focus groups strongly believed that “Stomach infrastructure” will always remain an important component of political communication in Nigeria unless unemployment and poverty in the country are addressed. The sixteen local government areas in Ekiti where Fayose defeated Fayemi are: Ado, Efon, Ekiti West, Ijero, Irepodun/Ifelodun, Ido/Osi, Ikole, Ilejemeje, Moba, Oye, Ekiti East, Ekiti South West, Emure, Gbonyin, Ikere and Ise/Orun. The defeat of Fayemi in the sixteen local governments, according to the random interview was due to his inability to connect with the grassroots and identify with their way of life. The participants in the interview see Fayose as a grassroot person who understands the problem of the down-trodden masses and always available to address them. Excerpts from the random interviews: Participant from Moba local government-“Fayoses is for the poor, he eats and drinks with us on the streets, we believe he is the only person who can help the poor people. That was why we voted for him. Participant from Ado Local government“Fayose did a lot for the common man when he was governor; he speaks our dialects and understands we are all hungry. That was why we voted for him”. Participant from Gbonyin local government “Fayemi doesn’t know the problem of Ekiti people like Fayose who knows our problems and he is always ready to address them. Fayemi will soon leave us for Lagos, Ghana or London where he lived before joining politics”. Just like the random interviews, the three focus groups interview held in the three Senatorial Districts in Ekiti (Ekiti Central, Ekiti South and Ekiti North) agreed that Fayemi lost to Fayose because he does not communicate in the language the people understand which Fayose did very well through “Stomach Infrastructure”. From the focus group in Ekiti Central Senatorial District (Ado Local Government Area, Efon Local Government, Ekiti West Local Government, Ijero Local Government, Irepodun/Ifelodun Local Government) the fifteen 86 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria members of the focus group agreed that if politicians want to be listened to, they must address the stomach needs of the people and that the electorates in Ekiti listened to Fayose because of “stomach infrastructure”. From the focus group in Ekiti North Senatorial District (Ido/Osi Local Government, Ikole Local Government, Ilejemeje Local Government, Moba Local Government, Oye Local Government), thirteen members of the focus group agreed that Ekiti electorates voted for Fayose because his message of “Stomach Infrastructure” resonated very well with the people and that any politician who can address the stomach needs of the people will always win election in Ekiti State. The remaining two members of the focus groups believe the electorates are just greedy and want to get what they can get from the politicians. From Ekiti South Senatorial District (Ekiti East Local Government, Ekiti South West Local Government, Emure Local Government, Gbonyin Local Government, Ikere Local Government Area,Ise/Orun Local Government), all the fifteen members of the focus group agreed that the immediate need of the Ekiti people which is food made them to vote for “Stomach Infrastructure” at the governorship election and that aspirants for political offices in the State will have to take a cue from that if they want the Ekiti people to vote for them. Conclusion The experience of the June 21 governorship election in Ekiti State has clearly demonstrated how grassroots political communication is being redefined in Nigerian politics. What remained to be seen however is whether the roles played by “Stomach Infrastructure” in redefining political communication will play out in other states of Nigeria in subsequent elections in Nigeria. But for now, politicians still see “Stomach Infrastructure” as a veritable tool capable of redefining political communication at the grassroots in Nigerian. They anchored this position on the level of poverty in Nigeria and the everskyrocketing unemployment in the country, which made the electorates to 87 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis prefer political messages that address their stomach needs to political messages that address physical developments. With the state of political communication as demonstrated by the June 21 governorship election in Ekiti State, Nigeria, this chapter hypothesizes that grassroots political communication has become synonymous with “Stomach Infrastructure”. It is not just a passing phase in grassroots political communication in Nigeria. The masses will look more carefully from now as to which politicians are really interested in their stomach rather than in grandeur projects. 88 ‘Stomach Infrastructure’ and the Reconceptualization of Political Communication in Nigeria References Aborisade, P.O. (2012). The Citizen Reporters: How technology transforms news gathering, reporting and distribution. Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany. Aldrich, John H. (1980). Before the convention: Strategy and choices in Presidential Nomination campaign. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ansolabere, Stephene, and Shanto Iyengar (1995). Going negative: How Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press. Asher, Herbert B. (1992). Presidential election and American Politics: Voters Candidates and Campaigns Since 1952. Pacific Grove, CA: books/Cole. Bennet W. L. and Entman (2001). Mediated Politics: Communication in the future of democracy. The press syndicate of the University of Cambridge. The Pitt Building, Trumpington, Cambridge, United Kingdon. Bartel, Larry M., et al. (1998). Campaign Reforms: Insights and Evidence. Report of the tax force on Campaign Reform. Princeton University. Bennet, W. Lance (1998). The Uncivic culture: Communication, Identity and the Rise of life Style Politics. Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, delivered at American Political Science Association Annual meeting, Boston. Blumler & Katz 1974). The Uses of mass communications. Berverly Hills, CA: Sage. Capella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1997) Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and Public Good. New York: Oxford University Press. Dahl, Robert A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. O wi bee O se bee! (He promised, he delivered!) A compendium of JKF administration from October 16, 2010-April 30, 2014. Research and documentation Unit, Governor’s office, Ekiti State, Ado Ekiti. Plouffe, D. (2009).The Audacity to win: The inside story and lessons of Barrack Obama’s Historic Victory. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 1004, USA. 89 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Adewale Maja-Pearse (June 27, 2014).“Stomach Infrastructure”. New York Times Newspaper. Vanguard Newspaper (July 7, 2014). Fayose and stomach infrastructure. Retrieved from www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/fayose-stomachinfrastructure/ on December 4, 2014. Nation Newspaper (July 28, August 5, 2014). Opinion Articles on “Stomach Infrastructure”. Lagos, Nigeria. Daily Independent (Nov 5, 2014). This is “Stomach Infrastructure’. An opinion piece on “Stomach Infrastructure”. Lagos, Nigeria. 90  6 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria Gbenga Akingbehin Introduction The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government. This will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections.1 Nigeria has witnessed an avalanche of electoral malpractices through the elections conducted in 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 20112. In the annals of Nigerian electoral history, peaceful rigging methods have progressively degenerated into violent rigging culture3, which is now manifested through incidents of election manipulation, gerrymandering, manipulation of demography, disenfranchisement, intimidation, vote buying, ballot stuffing, mis-recording of votes, hijacking of election materials, compilation of fictitious names on voter’s registers, box-switching and inflation of fingers, illegal printing of voters’ card and massive falsification of election results4. Sequel to the foregoing, there has been a growing lack of confidence by the public in the Nigerian electoral process. Yet, there is a growing realization among members of the Commonwealth of Nations that the holding of free and fair election is the centrepiece of democratization5. This has caused many countries to review their constitutions and electoral laws. Countries Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis like Kenya, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, Seychelles, Singapore, Malta Bahamas, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago recently reviewed their constitutions which provide for basic fundamentals of the legislative framework for attaining a credible elections. Nigeria is not an exception. However, in the event of any perceived dissatisfaction about the conduct of an election due to specific irregularities or any of the malpractices highlighted, the judiciary is at hand for the resolution of such electoral disputes. For the purpose of this chapter, judiciary encompasses both the courts and the election petitions tribunals. In accessing the courts or tribunals for the resolution of electoral dispute, it is a sine qua non that a party must come by way of election petition. Hence, in election petitions, which are sui generis, a proceeding which is not begun by way of a petition is a nullity ab initio6. This is because section 133 (1) of the Electoral Act 2010 is emphatic that: No election and return at an election under the Act shall be questioned in any manner other than by petition….. It is therefore the aim of this chapter to conduct an evaluation of the causes of electoral disputes, resolution of electoral disputes through election petitions and the role of the judiciary in the adjudication on election petitions. The chapter is divided into six parts. The first part is introductory. The second part clarified the key terms used in this chapter. The appraisal of causes of electoral disputes vis a vis election petition constitutes the thrust of the third part whilst the chapter analyses the role of the judiciary in adjudicating over election petitions in the fourth part. The writer reviews the contemporary challenges on election petitions and the judiciary in the fifth part and concludes with recommendations in the 6th part. Clarification of Terms In order to aid the understanding of the discourse being undertaken under this part of the chapter, there is need to clarify terms like election petition and judiciary, which are germane to the understanding of the chapter. 92 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria a) Election Petition Election petitions are the means of reclaiming the people’s will for oneself after an election is held, and to complain of undue election or undue return7. It is also defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as “a petition for enquiry into the validity of a parliament member’s election when the member’s return is alleged to be invalid for bribery or other reasons”8. In ANPP v. INEC & Ors9, the Supreme Court defined election petition as a formal written request presented to a court or tribunal for enquiry into the validity or otherwise of a candidate’s return when such return is alleged to be invalid. It is submitted that this judicial definition is wide, nonrestrictive and elastic, and as such preferred to the other definitions. Also in Awuse v. Omehia10, it was held that for a petition to be competent the basis must be the election or return of the person complained against whose undue return or undue election is being challenged. Election petition has also been defined as a petition of inquiry into the validity of the candidate’s return at any election by any of the various reasons including valid nomination, exclusion on other grounds, disqualification and other electoral malpractices and offences11. Hence, there is no doubt that there may be one complaint or another against a candidate or the conduct of an election at the end of every election and this complaint can only be resolved before a competent court or tribunal set up for that purpose. Thus, for such court or tribunal to adjudicate properly on such matter, it must have the requisite jurisdiction to do so. In resolving this dispute or complaint, brought before the court or tribunal for adjudication, it is expected that the petition must as a matter of fact prove such facts raised in his petition by credible evidence. Giving a legal imprimatur to the proceedings to question an election, Section 133 (1) of the Electoral Act 2010 provides: No election or return at an election under this Act shall be questioned in any manner other than by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (in this Act referred to as “election petition”) presented to the competent tribunal or court in accordance with the provisions of the 93 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis constitution or of this Act, and in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party”. Election petition, therefore, is a special proceeding, guided by a particular electoral law made specifically for the conduct of an election to a certain office. Consequently, Omage J. C. A. stated in Abubakar v. INEC12 thus: Election petition and the rules applicable to it and its procedure are unique. It is the reason why election petitions are described as sui generis. They are different from other proceedings. They are neither allied to civil nor to criminal proceedings. They stand on their own, bound by its own rules made under the law. Defects or irregularities which in other proceedings are not sufficient to affect the validity of the claim are not so in an election petition. Gleaning from the foregoing, it can be seen that election petition for the purpose of this chapter is the prescribed procedure through which a complaint of any irregularity or malpractice in an election can be brought before a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It suffices therefore, to state that election petition filed is adjudication upon by the court or tribunal on the basis of the electoral law under which the election was held. The electoral law will prescribe the court or tribunal where the petition shall be filed, the parties, grounds for presentation and the conduct of the entire proceedings. b) Judiciary The judiciary is the third arm of the realm of the government, which is the only branch not made up of elected representatives but of personnel approved to perform the very fundamental role of adjudication in society which sometimes has a greater effect on the lives of the people much more than the actions of the other two arms of government13. The term “judiciary” has been variously defined by several eminent authors. According to Black’s law Dictionary14, it is “the branch of government 94 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria responsible for interpreting the laws and administering justice; the body of judges; the bench; that branch of government which is intended to interpret, construe and apply the law”. Professor Oloko15 has also defined judiciary as The specialized differentiated structures, processes and personnel that are devoted to the task of performing on a continuous basis, one of the three inter-related and independent governmental functions in modern and modernizing societies. The specific governmental functions performed by the judiciary in these societies are what are known as rule adjudication as distinct from the two governmental functions of rulemaking and rule application. Judiciary in the light of the above, therefore, is an essential arm of government, a constitutional institution, a creation of law and a working machine of which are the courts under the functional attitudes of the managers (judges)16. Judiciary has also been further described as an early 19th century word, carved out of the Latin word judiciarious from the word judicium, meaning judgment. It is further defined as the combination of judges of a state or a nation, when considered as a group17. It can therefore, be described as judges of the courts with a standardized system of law, a branch of government that is vested with judicial power. Judicial power derives from the word “judiciary” and it generally connotes the activities that are connected with a court of law like the powers vested in the courts established by the constitution18. Hence, by virtue of Section 6(1) (2) of the constitution19, the judicial powers of the federation are vested in the courts established for the federation and for the state. “Judicial power” has been further defined in the case of Muskrat v. United States20 as the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision”. Consequently, the courts are the final arbiters in all disputes between persons inter se and between such persons and the state or states inter se. 95 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis It must be underscored at this juncture that election petition tribunals also fall under the umbrage of judiciary as their memberships are composed of judges. For the purposes of resolving electoral disputes and adjudicating on election petitions, the 1999 constitution of Nigeria21 created three types of election petition tribunals, namely: The Presidential Election Petition Tribunal, National Assembly Election Petition Tribunal and Governorship and State Legislative Houses Election Petition Tribunal. However, by virtue of section 239 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine election petition relating to the offices of the President and Vice President22. Causes of Election Petitions Election petitions generally stem from the dissatisfaction of candidates on the conduct of election which may be as a result of any perceived irregularity or malpractice. Electoral disputes may arise either at preelection stage or at post-election stage. Pre-election disputes relate to matters that took place before the election whereas, post-election disputes relate to matters that took place during the election or resulted from the election23. It suffices to state at this juncture that pre-election matters, as far as the law is concerned cannot form the basis of election petition. However, there are instances when the echoes of unresolved pre-election matters resonate in legal contests, thereby questioning the returns of elections24. Pre-election electoral disputes include certain preliminary matters or malpractices that took place prior to the election which if not properly handed may end up making the election incredible unfree and unfair. Some of these activities that can mar the conduct of an election are issues like nomination of candidates to stand for election and for conduct of primaries25, registration of political parties26, registration of voters27, delineation of constituencies28 and screening of candidates. However, electoral disputes that can constitute grounds for election petition may stem from outright contravention of the constitution, accreditation of polling stations, voting, collation and announcement of 96 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria results29, insufficiency of ballot papers30, return of candidates31, cancellation of election, thuggery, violence, bribery and corruption. Other electoral malpractices that may lead to election petition include rigging or over voting32, snatching of election results33, ballot box stuffing34, falsification of election results and forgery. The Electoral Act35 provides that any aggrieved party as a result of any of the afore-mentioned malpractice or irregularity should present his petition in person or through his solicitor to the secretary of the appropriate tribunal. The petitioner must have locus stand otherwise the tribunal cannot properly assume jurisdiction to entertain the petition36. Hence, the proper parties must seek the invocation of the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the petition to be alive and upstanding till the final adjudication. The respondent must also be a proper party. An election petition may also be filed by both the candidate and his political party, which participated in the election jointly. The political party needs only to participate. The word “participate” has been given judicial interpretation to mean “taking part” in an election37. Consequently, in the recent case of CPC v. INEC38 which was an election petition in which the presidential candidate of the CPC, Alhaji Muhammadu Buhari did not file a petition but the party did, the court upheld the CPC as having the standing to sue despite the fact that the candidate himself did not sue. Role of the Judiciary on Election Petition: Contemporary Challenges In this segment of the chapter, we shall conduct a conspectus of the challenges that have militated against smooth election petition process and that constitutes albatross to the role of the judiciary on election petition. We shall appraise the issue of time for taking steps in election petition, corruption, penal sanctions for electoral offences and jurisdictional issues. I. Time for taking steps in Election Petition Election tribunals are established to fast-track judicial proceedings arising from the electoral process. Consequently, it follows that promptness in presenting election petitions before the tribunals is indispensable for a 97 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis speedy determination of petitions and a condition precedent under the Electoral Act 2011. The essence of imposing time limit within which to file an election petition is also to avoid a situation where a candidate who was wrongly declared winner of the election continues performing the functions of an office illegally39. This rationale was lucidly adumbrated by Pats Acholonu JCA (as he then was) in Balogun v. Odumosu40 when he said: The issue of time to complete filing of processes relating to hearing and determination of an election petition was uppermost in the minds of the legislators. The enactment stretches itself further afield to do away with tardiness and waste of time and endeavoured to constrict the time of doing a particular act within a time framework. In other words, it is the intention of the legislators that parties stick strictly to the times stated in the decree. The court could not aid anyone who decides to sleep only to wake up when it is too late. It has also been held that the time limit requirement cannot be compromised whether by reason of delay occasioned by late arrival of the tribunal’s officers or compilation of records, as such difficulties cannot override the express provisions of the law41. The timeline for disposing election petitions are enshrined in the 2011 amendments to the constitution42 and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The Electoral Act43 stipulates a period of 21 days from the declaration of results for instituting any election petition and provides that any petition brought outside this limit becomes statute barred. Thus, the courts have held that the jurisdictional limit/limitations as contained or provided in the statute must be blindly followed and applied44. The Act45 also provides that the application for the pre-hearing session must be brought within 7 days of the conclusion of the filing by all parties. The pre-hearing session is to last for only 14 days whilst the respondent has 14 days after the service of the petition on him to file his 98 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria reply46. All the interlocutory applications are dealt with at the pre-hearing session so that only the substantive issue is left to be dealt with during the hearing proper. Appeals arising from interlocutory application must be dealt with and concluded within 60 days of the delivery of the ruling47. As regards the hearing proper, the parties are only entitled to five (5) days’ notice48 and once hearing commences, there are no adjournments as the tribunals sit every day of the week except for Sundays and public holidays. The Election petition tribunal has only 180 days for hearing and delivery of judgments whilst appeals from the tribunal to the appellate courts are also to be determined within 60 days from the date of the delivery of judgment49. However, as lofty as the ideals of the speedy trial process is, it appears that it may amount to denial of the appellant’s fundamental right to fair hearing under section 36 (1) of the 1999 constitution to deny him hearing and dismiss his petition for being statute barred on account of the fact that time to hear his petition or appeal was frustrated by vacation of judges, labour strike or unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the court or parties50. Consequently, it is submitted that fair trial, (an attribute of fair hearing), should not be sacrificed on the altar of quick disposal of election petitions. This submission lends credence to an old adage that “justice rushed in justice crushed”51. The constitution also permits a court to deliver its judgment and reserve the reason for the judgment to a later date in order to comply with the time statutorily provided for the delivery of judgment in election petitions52. Another commendable aspect of the time limit specification is that the Electoral Act also provides for the constitution of panels to sit over election tribunals fourteen days before the election and for the opening of election tribunal registries at least 7 days before the election53. II. Corruption The judicial arm of government is imbued with vast powers to decide on any dispute respecting persons and authorities. The judicial power of the 99 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis federation is vested in the courts and by extension, the election petition tribunals, established under the constitution for the federation and for the states54. In the discharge of their judicial powers, judges are not immune from temptations which confront them daily as they undertake their tasks. Hence, the power of adjudication and determination of disputes does not make judges less accountable. Rather, such vested powers make it imperative to hold them answerable if and when the need arises. Thus, while mechanisms are entrenched to secure judicial independence, other mechanisms also exist for accountability and discipline of judges who fail to comply with the ethics of their calling55. Central to the administration of the judiciary in Nigeria is the role of the National Judicial Council (NJC) which was established under the 1999 constitution56. The reasons for establishing the NJC was to reduce the control of the executive and legislative arms of government in the running of the affairs of the judiciary which was the case under the previous regimes. Aside from the power to recommend the appointment and removal of judges, the NJC has since exercised other powers. These include collecting, controlling and disbursing of monies, capital and recurring for the judiciary advising the president and governors on any matter pertaining to the judiciary as may be referred to the council57. The Code of Conduct for public officers is enshrined in the constitution and this Code applies to judicial officers as well since they are public officers58. Judicial officers in Nigeria undertake to abide by the code of conduct in the constitution at the point of appointment59. The code of conduct prohibits judicial officers from collection of bribes and other benefits60 inter alia. However, there have been consistent allegations in Nigeria that corruption exists in the judiciary, just as in other arms of government61. In the words of the former justice of Nigeria, Justice Dahiru Mustapher: It is a sad fact that not only are the registries of courts becoming a cesspool of corruption but judicial officers are increasingly being seen as corrupt …A “participis criminis in this unholy 100 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria act are some members of the bar…. it is sad to see that in most cases where there are allegations of corruption leveled against the judiciary, the dark spectre of an unscrupulous lawyer looms as a conduit pipe of such corruption62. As an attestation of the learned jurist’s lamentation, it is on record, that some judges have been dismissed for receipt of graft from desperate seekers of political offices, and it is further perturbing that these grafts were given in election petition released cases. For example, Justice Matilda Adamu was dismissed in 2004 for receiving bribes to pass judgment in respect of a governorship election petition tried by her and other judges63. In the same vein, Justice Chudi Nwokorie of the Federal High Court Katsina, was dismissed for entertaining and making orders in respect of an election matter that had been tried by a Court of Appeal64. In most cases, the holders of political offices accumulate stolen money and deploy same to influence judicial officers. It is indubitable that corruption of judicial officers constitutes a major challenge to the Nigerian judiciary living up to the hallmarks of the institution. A UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despony, once noted that corruption within the judiciary is “particularly serious in that judges are supposed to be moral authority and reliable and impartial institution to which all in the society can turn when its rights are violated”65. A corrupt judge in the justice administration system is regarded as a deadly poison or disease that completely destroys the whole purpose of the system. Honourable Justice Akanbi likened a corrupt judge to “an afflicted person just like the carrier of the AIDS virus” or one suffering “from a deadly disease”66. Retired Justice Samson Uwaifo also once observed that “a corrupt judge is more harmful to the society than a man who runs amok with a dagger in a crowded street. He buttressed his assertion on the basis that, while the latter can be physically restrained, a corrupt judge deliberately abuses his office while still being referred to as “honourable”67. Hon. Justice Niki Tobi has also described a corrupt judge as one who is incapable of doing justice in the matters before 101 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis him68. Thus the effect of corruption on the integrity of the judiciary is pernicious69. Sequel to the foregoing, judges, in dispensing justice, especially in election petition cases, should strive to fulfill the requirement of optimal good conduct, which remains unassailable. Judges, like Caesar’s wife of Ancient Rome, are expected to live above board and above suspicion for the judicial process not to experience, any reverse or suffer detriment. III. Efficacy of Penal Sanctions for Electoral Offences Across the democratic Nations, electoral laws, rules and regulations are designed to ensure free and credible elections, which will be devoid of violence, corrupt practices and any form of manipulation. Towards attaining this end, Nigerian electoral system has evolved both legal and institutional frameworks that are targeted at ensuring free and fair elections. These include the whole gamut of electoral malpractices in the Electoral legislations and the establishment of successive electoral bodies. However, regardless of the avalanche of legal and institutional frameworks aimed at attaining credible election in Nigeria, especially, with the criminalization of certain electoral malpractices in the Electoral Act, Electoral Offences are committed with impunity. In reality, no serious prosecution is carried out to reprimand or deter the violators; save for the punishment for electoral offences, which are contained in the statute books as mere window dressing. The Electoral Act made provisions for various punishments for the commission of any of the electoral offences. These punishments range from six months imprisonment70 to ten years imprisonment71. In some cases, there were options of fine, while in others; there was no option of fine72. There is no doubt that the stiffness of the said punishments that attract high imprisonment terms is necessitated by the perceived injury that such electoral offences are capable of unleashing on the citizenry. 102 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria The severity of the punishment is also predicated on how egregious the offences are to the society. There is no doubt that all the electoral malpractices that deserve to be criminalized have been so criminalized with adequate penal sanctions. However, the problems mainly lie with the efficacy of the penal sanctions and the enforcement mechanism. It is submitted that since the offences are becoming rampant, the sanctions should be modified and the options of fine expunged for electoral offences, such that the punishment for electoral offences will strictly be imprisonment terms only. There is no doubt that if the punishment is effective for electoral offences, it will deter the commission of electoral offences and the spate of election petitions will be greatly reduced. The Act73 also vests prosecutorial powers in the legal officers of the commission or any legal practitioner approved by it. It is submitted with due respect, that this position is anomalous. This is due to the fact that most election petition tribunal trials have revealed that the major perpetrators of election malpractices are the electoral officers. The electoral officers engage in the falsification of election results. Our electoral law reports are replete with avalanche of cases bothering on nullification of election results by the election petition tribunals. In some, the Supreme Court declared a wrongly excluded candidate as the actual winner74 while in a lot of others, re-run elections were ordered due to a myriad of irregularities and malpractices involving the electoral officers75. It is against the backdrop of the foregoing malaise that made the Uwais Commission76 in its wisdom to recommend inter alia, the establishment of the Electoral Offences Commission that shall be independent of INEC and its functions shall be strictly restricted to arrest, investigation and prosecution of electoral offender. Hence, the hitherto existing INEC shall be divested of its investigative and prosecutorial powers. It shall limit itself to registration of voters and the conduct of elections inter alia as contained in the Act. This will pave way for members of the public to give 103 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis information directly to the Electoral Offences Commission for investigation on matters bothering on Electoral Offences77. IV. Jurisdictional Issues The inefficacy of penal sanctions for Electoral Offences in Nigeria is also predicated on jurisdictional problems. It is observed that though, jurisdiction is vested in the High Courts or Magistrate Courts, in the State where electoral offence is committed. However, a major flaw in the adjudicatory capacity of the Election Petitions Tribunals on electoral offences is the requirement of Standard of Proof. The universal criminal law principle is that the standard of Proof is a criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt and that the onus of proof is on he who asserts, whilst the onus which is required in an election petition case is beyond the balance of probabilities. The implication of this therefore is that the Election Petitions Tribunals lack jurisdiction over electoral offences that emanate from election petitions. Expressing the incapacity of the Election Petitions Tribunals on Electoral Offences, Uwais, CJN (as he was) said in Buhari v. Obasanjo78 thus: Section 129 of the Electoral Act creates a criminal offence (imprisonment) which in terms prescribes punishment for the offence. I do not therefore see how such an offence can be the subject of an election petition or a civil proceeding. If the petitioner wants to prosecute the 1st and 2nd respondents under S. 129, then, there must be a charge to which they must plead in a normal criminal proceeding…. It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the election petitions tribunal is incapacitated in adjudicating over electoral offences and that has greatly hampered the crusade for combating election malpractices in Nigeria. The issue of corrupt practice or irregularity had also been held not to be capable of nullifying an election, if there is no proof that the candidate expressly authorized the illegality. The scenario here simply implies that 104 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria the office holder will end up benefitting from his supporters’ fraudulent acts. This is presently absurd79 as it will amount to the candidate benefitting from his supporters’ illegality. It is submitted that such electoral victories should be nullified by the tribunals. Uwais Committee80 had also recommended the establishment of Electoral Offences Tribunal, which would be vested with the exclusive jurisdiction on electoral offences. It is believed that this will enhance speedy trials of electoral offences. V. Concluding Remarks This chapter has analysed the causative elements of election petitions in Nigeria. The author has also attempted a conspectus of the presentation and conduct of electoral matters in the various Election Petitions Tribunals in the country. The chapter also delved extensively on the exposition of the various contemporary challenges that have bedevilled the smooth conduct of election petitions in Nigeria together with constraints of the judiciary in the enterprise. It is pontificated in that the judiciary, being the third arm of the government is vested with the adjudicatory powers in the conduct of election petitions in Nigeria. The author has also canvassed that there are certain provisions of the Electoral Act that constitute clogs in the wheel of the progress of election petitions in Nigeria. The chapter also identifies the issue of time for filing of petition and the time for the conclusion of an election petition matter as being capable of foisting an injustice on litigants especially, where the delay is not resultant of the litigant’s act. It has also been indicated that the judicial corruption has constituted a big threat to the actualization of fairness and justice in election petition cases. We have also appraised the anomalies that are inherent in the penal sanctions for electoral offences, especially as it emanates from election 105 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis petitions, jurisdiction of the election petitions Tribunal on electoral offences and investigative cum prosecutorial powers in electoral offences. Consequently, in charting a new course for the way out of the identified quagmire, the following recommendations are hereby proffered: 1. The judiciary should eschew corruption in all ramifications to entrench the public confidence in the Election Petitions Tribunals. After all, it is often said that justice ceases to be justice if it can be bought with money. 2. Gleaning from the aphorism that prevention is better than cure, the INEC should live up to expectation by ensuring vigilance, transparency and avoiding collusion with political office seekers in the act of electoral irregularities or malpractices. This will reduce the spate of election petitions a great deal. 3. The time limit for taking steps in election petition cases should be reviewed, especially to exclude from computation the days that fall on strikes, inability of the tribunal to constitute a quorum and delays that are occasioned by administrative ineptitude of the judicial staff. 4. Candidates should be disqualified or their election nullified on established allegations of fraud, corrupt practices and irregularities regardless of whether the victorious candidate authorized the malpractice or not. It suffices that the political office holder had benefitted from the criminal act. It has earlier been canvassed in this chapter that a person should not be allowed to profit from criminality irrespective of the perpetrators. However, the office holder should only be exempted from criminal liability since criminal liability is personal. 5. Since we have canvassed in this chapter that “justice rushed is justice crushed”, it is recommended that whenever an appellate court orders that trial should commence de novo, the computation of time should start counting afresh and not merge with the initial computation. This has led to a lot of injustices to the litigants in time past. 106 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria In the light of the foregoing, it is submitted that it is when the above recommendations and others being provided by other stakeholders are considered for implementation by the Nigeria’s policy makers that we can boast of a safe pedestal for conducting credible elections, trimming the volume of election petition cases and engendering a transparent fair and just judiciary. 107 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis References  1 Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (iii) of 1948. 2 D. A. Oluwagbami, “Institutional and Legal Dimensions to Electoral Administration and Management” in Administration of Justice and Good Governance in Nigeria, Essays in Honour of Hon. Justice A. I. Katsina-Alu, E. Azinge & A. Adekunle (eds), NIALS 2012, p. 427. 3 The government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had in the past set up a number of electoral reform panels to resolve this matter. In 1983, for example, Babalakin Commission of Enquiry was set up. In 2008, the Mohammed Uwais panel on Electoral Reforms was also set up. Despite the fact that these panels had made several recommendations, some of which have been legislated into law, it appears that the problems still persist. 4 For a comprehensive analysis of election malpractices in Nigeria, see K. O. Amusa, “The Prospects of Prosecution of Electoral Offences in Nigeria” in The Nigerian Journal of Public Law, Published by the Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos, Nigeria, Vol. 2, 2013, pp. 142 – 145. 5 A. Onibokun (Hon. Justice), “Fundamentals of Commencement and Filing of Election Petitions, in Election Petition Practice and Procedure in Nigeria: A Practitioner’s Guide, In Honour of Hon. Justice Olufunmilola Adekeye JSC, CON. A. Akeredolu (ed) 2012, p. 56. 6 Ibid, p. 67 7 Ibid, p. 55 8 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. B. A. Garner (Ed) (West Publishing Co. U.S.A) P. 596. It must however be noted that Black’s definition is restrictive because election petition is equally applicable to challenge election into executive positions as well. 9 (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt 871) p. 16 @ 55 10 6 EPR 685 11 C. Ochem, “Practice and Procedure Relating to Evidence in Election Petition” in Current Issues in Nigerian Electoral Law: A legal Perspective, by the College of Law, Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State, Nigeria, C. U. Okoboh (ed) 2007, p. 43. 108 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria  12 (2004) 11 WRN 153. See also Samawo v. Anka (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 640) p. 283 13 K. M. Mowoe, Constitutional Law in Nigeria, (Malthouse Press Limited, 2008), p. 176 14 Black’s Law Dictionary, Ibid, (Note 8 ante) p. 924 15 O. Oloko, “Independence of the Judiciary with Particular Reference to Appointment, Removal and Discipline” Published in Law, Development and Administration in Nigeria (1990), Y. Osibajo & A. U. Kalu (eds) p. 533 16 A. H. Folorunsho, “Human Rights and Judiciary: A Conceptual Analysis” Published in The University of Ilorin Law Journal (UILJ) 2012, Vol. 8, p. 148 17 Ibid, p. 148 18 See Section 6 (5) (a) – (j), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 19 Ibid 20 219 U. S. 346 @ 361 (1911) 21 Ibid 22 See Section 29, Alteration to Section 285, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act 2010. Jurisdiction in election petitions for the office of Governor and his Deputy was vested in the Governorship and State Legislative Houses Tribunal of Respective States. 23 A. Olatubora, Electoral Law and Practice in Nigeria, (Aderemi Olatubora & Co. 2006) p. 12 24 O. B. Agu, “Legitimacy of Government and Resolution of Electoral Disputes” in Administration of Justice and Good Governance in Nigeria, Essays in Honour of Hon. Justice Katsina, Alu, E. Azinge & A. Adedeji (Eds) NIALS 2011 p. 518. 25 See Section 78 (1) of the Electoral Act 2010. in Tsoho v. Yahaya (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt 600 ) 657, it was held that nomination of candidate constitutes a preliminary matter before the actual election. On nomination of candidate, See also Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt 1048) 109 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis  26 Section 78 (1) Electoral Act 2010. See INEC & Anor. v. Musa, Vol. 2 CLC 471 27 Section 9 (1) Ibid, See Onoyomi v. Egari (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt 603) 28 Section 105 Ibid 29 J. M. Asagh, “The Supreme Court and the Resolution of Election Petitions: Expediency as a Factor” in The Uwais Court: The Supreme Court and the Challenge of Legal Development (1995 – 2006) (Lagos : NIALS, 2007) 158 30 A. Babalola, Election Law and Practice Vol. 1. (Ibadan: Afe Babalola, 2009) 281 31 The word “Return” means the declaration by a returning officer of a candidate in an election under the law as being the winner of the election. See Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108. 32 See A. Babalola, Ibid (Note 30 ante) 33 E. O. Akingbehin, “Combating Election Malpractices and Promoting Democratization in Nigeria: The Role of the Police” in British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 6 (2) August, 2012 p. 24. 34 M. A. Ayoade, “The Legal Framework for E-voting System in Nigeria” in Ambrose Alli University Law Journal, Vol. 1, 2009, p. 2. 35 Paragraph 3(i) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 36 See Waziri v. Danboyi (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 598) 239. See also Egolum v. Obasanjo 3 EPR 601 where it was held that the petitioner must establish his locus by stating his right to present the petition. 37 Per Kalgo, JSC in Obasanjo v. Buhari (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 510. See also Okocha v. INEC (2009) Pt. 1140, 295 @ 309 38 Appeal No. CA/A/EPT/PRES/1/2011. Hence, Subsections (a) and (b) of S:137 of the Electoral Act 2010 are disjunctive. 39 Many election petitions filed in courts or tribunals dragged on for an unlimited period of time. Some even lasted to the end of the tenure the persons against whom the petitions were filed. For example, in Hon. Issa Garba & Anor. v. Labaran Abdul & 115 Ors, the decision of Election Petition Tribunal No. EPT/KS/HA/06 delivered on the 30th January, 2008 lingered on at the Court of Appeal Kaduna until 13th October, 2010 which was a few months to the end of the tenure. 40 (1989) 1 NWLR (Part 98) 478 at 487 110 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria  41 Malah v. Kachalla (1999) 3 NWLR (Part 93) 478 @ 487 42 See Section 285 (5) 1999 Constitution (as amended in 2010 & 2011) 43 See Section 134, Electoral Act 2010. 44 See Ifeanjuna v. Ifeajuna (2000) 12 WRN 53. See also A. G. Kwara State v. Olawale 1993 7 NWLR (Part 305) 96 at 191. 45 Electoral Act 2010, Paragraph 18 of the First Schedule. 46 Paragraph 18 (11) (12) Ibid 47 J. O. Okeaya – Inneh (Hon. Justice) “Timeline for Presenting Election Petition in Nigeria” in Election Petition Practice and Procedure in Nigeria: A Practitioner’s Guide in Honour of Hon. Justice Olufunmilola Odekeye JSC CON, A. Akeredolu (Ed.) (St. Paul’s Publishing House, 2012) pp. 105 – 106. 48 Paragraph 20, 1st schedule 49 Sections 285 (6) and (7), 1999 Constitution (as amended) 50 K. Dabo, “Time Limit to Determine Election Petitions and Appeals: A Call for Review of Section 285 (6) & (7) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”, in The Nigerian Law Journal Vol. 15 No. 1 2013 p. 183. Such circumstances also include lack of quorum of the Court because of ill health of a member. 51 In ANPP v. Goni (2012) All FWLR (Part 609) 1001 the petition was dismissed for failure to comply with paragraph 18 (1) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The Supreme Court allowed an appeal and ordered a retrial by a different panel and the tribunal’s decision was appealed by the respondent to the Supreme Court again. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal ordering the tribunal to rehear the petition when the Tribunal had ceased to have jurisdiction in the matter was an attempt to create jurisdiction for the said Tribunal by a Court order, which was not only very erroneous but unacceptable. It is submitted, that since this case involved a trial de novo, the decision did not achieve justice for litigants. 52 See Section 285 (5) of the 1999 Constitution. 53 See generally Section 133 of the Electoral Act 2010. 111 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis  54 Judicial power means “The power to give a binding decision or determination”. See B. O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa, (London, Hurst & Company, 1977) p. 2. 55 Y. Y. Dadem, Removing the Judge: Challenges to judicial Independence in Nigeria, The Nigerian Law Journal Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, pp. 73 – 74. 56 The 1960, 1979, and 1989 constitutions did not have the N.J.C. It was recommended by stakeholders in the justice sector during the 1994 – 1995 constitutional conference but was equally rejected for failing the federalism test. However, it was later inserted in the 1999 constitution. See 3rd Schedule to the 1999 constitution. 57 See Item 21, Part 1. 3rd Schedule to the 1999 constitution (as amended). 58 This is contained in the 5th Schedule to the constitution. 59 See the judicial oath contained in the 7th schedule to the constitution. By the provisions of item 5, part II, 7th Schedule; judicial officers are also public officers to which this code applies. 60 Items 6 & 8 of the code. 61 The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Dahiru Mustapher acknowledged that corruption exist in the judiciary. The former President of the Nigerian Bar Association had also argued at the Supreme Court Abuja that eminent lawyers and retired justices offer themselves as consultants in election petition cases but that this was a veiled conduit for bribing judges trying election petition cases. See http://www.punchng.com/news of 4, April, 2012. Last accessed 15 May 2014. 62 http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011 of 4, April, 2012. Last accessed 15 May, 2014. 63 http://accesstojustice.ng.org. of 6 May, 2012. Last assessed 15 May, 2014. 64 http://www.nigerianbetforum.com/index of 6 March, 2012. Last assessed 15 May, 2014. 65 He made this statement in April 2014 in his report to the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights. See also N. Jayawickrama and J. Wysluch, “Global Challenge: Restoring Trust for Peace and 112 The Judiciary and Election Petitions in Nigeria  Security” a paper presented at the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference on the 12th November 2010. 66 M. M. A. Akanbi “The Many Obstacles to Justice According Law”, Paper Presented at the 1995 All Nigerian Judges Conference in Kano on 30th October, 1995, pp. 18 - 19. 67 S. O. Uwaifo, Being a valedictory speech delivered at the Special Session of the Supreme Court on 24 January 2005. 68 N. Tobi, “Code of Conduct and Professional Ethics for Judicial Officers in Nigeria” in J. O. Irukwu & I. A. Umezurike (Eds) Judicial Excellence: Essays in Honour of Honourable Justice Anthony Iguh. (Enugu: Snap Press Ltd., 2004) p. 82. 69 It is rather perturbing to realize that substantial proportion of the cases of dismissal of judges brought before the NJC bothered on acts of corruption. See J. C. Otteh, “Reforms to Strengthen Judicial Integrity and Accountability” in J. C. Otteh (Ed) Reforming for Justice (Access to Justice) p. 170. 70 For example, Section 125 (3) punishes any person that interferes with a voter casting his vote with a fine of N100, 000.00 or an option of six months imprisonment. 71 For example, section 118 (3) of the Amended Electoral Act, 2011 punishes illegal printing of ballot papers inter alia with 10 years’ imprisonment or an option of N5,000,00.00 or both. It is submitted that this punishment is severe enough to deter people from committing the offence. 72 For example, section 123 (4) (5) & (6) of the Act prescribe the punishment of 3 years imprisonment without an option of fine for any person who announces, publishes or delivers false election result, knowing same to be false. Also, section 129 (4) punishes any person who snatches or destroys any election material with 24 months imprisonment without any option of fine. 73 Section 150 (2) of the Amended Electoral Act 2011. The Commission here refers to the Independent National Electoral Commission. 74 For example, Governor Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State. 75 The cases of Governors Mimiko of Ondo, Fayemi of Ekiti, Oshiomole of Edo and Rauf Aregbesola of Osun States are apt examples. 113 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis  76 The Federal Government set up a commission on Electoral Law reform headed by Justice Mohammad Uwais CJN (Rtd) and the commission came up with a lot of recommendations. It is saddening to note that hitherto, the government is yet to implement a lot of the recommendations. 77 This commission can be likened to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, which has both investigative and prosecutorial powers. This is unlike the present position where the only window of commencement of investigation and prosecution: through the recommendations made to the commission INEC by the Election Petitions’ Tribunals, of any person for any offence disclosed in any election petition. See Section 149 of the Amended Electoral Act 2011. The Poser here is how many recommendations have been made to the commission so far by the Election petitions Tribunal to INEC. How many prosecutions have been conducted by INEC so far? 78 (2005) 50 WRN, 1 at 39. 79 See Oyegun v. Igbinedion (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 747 at 760. 80 See Note 76 ante. 114  7 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories Adeolu Durotoye Introduction The August 9, 2014 governorship election in Osun state, South West Nigeria was another test run for the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) towards the 2015 General election. The election was important because it took place not long after the Ekiti state governorship election of June 21, 2014, which was largely adjudged free and fair. Besides, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate won the Ekiti election by defeating the All Progressive Congress (APC) candidate who was the incumbent. (Durotoye, 2014). The Ekiti election increased the momentum in Osun as the PDP was emboldened that it could pull the same feat in Osun, while the APC was bent on avoiding another slip. At the end of the day, the APC won in Osun and the PDP lost. What was responsible for this outcome? Why was the PDP not able to repeat the feat it achieved in Ekiti? These are the questions facing this chapter. The chapter will set out to provide answers to these questions. The most interesting questions about an election are not concerned with who won but with such questions as why people voted the way that they did or what the implications of the results are. These questions are not always easily answered. Looking only at the campaign events and incidents will not suffice. This chapter will Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis blend the unique aspects of the Osun election with a more general understanding of electoral behaviour to create a full explanation. We will set out by reviewing the state of the art in voting behaviour theory, next is a historical overview of Osun state, then we look at the political parties, the candidates and their antecedents. We will then proceed to the issues in the run up to the election, the conduct and results of the election, as well as why the PDP lost. We will conclude by looking at the implications of the election outcome. Among other factors, the study reveals that the performance of the incumbent governor and the internal wrangling within the PDP conspired to deliver victory to the APC. Research Questions and Methodology Two major research questions characterize the study of electoral behaviour. One concern is with explaining the election result by identifying the sources of individual voting behaviour; how and why the voters voted the way they did. Another major concern in voting research emphasizes changes in voting patterns over time, usually with an attempt to determine what the election results tell us about the direction in which politics is moving. For our purposes, these two concerns provide a useful basis for discussing key aspects of voting behaviour. To accomplish these tasks, the twin method of participant observation and content analysis of the available relevant primary and secondary materials were carried out. Theoretical Framework In voting behaviour research, several factors can be identified as reasons for choosing a candidate in an election. A combination of attitudinal, social and psychological factors is related to individual voting behaviour. Attitudinal factors such as assessments of the personal characteristics of the candidates, evaluations of government performance, orientations on specific policy issues, party identification, and ideology are the primary determinants of candidate’s choice. For social factors, race, religion, region, and social class are all related to voting behaviour. Psychological factors are based on emotions. Examining how these factors are related to the voting behaviour in 116 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories this particular election forms the core of this chapter in order to explain the outcome of the Osun state 2014 governorship election. In other words, a voter may choose a candidate on the basis of one or more of the following considerations: • orientations on specific issues of public policy • general evaluations of the government performance • evaluations of the personal characteristics of the candidates • party identification • general ideological orientations • Psychological factors Electoral changes can be divided into two types: short-term and long-term. Short-run changes can result from fluctuations in factors that are specific to an election, such as the characteristics of the candidates or the condition of the economy. These short-term factors may favour one party in one election and the other in the other election. Long-term change occurs when there is a critical realignment of the party system, which refers to a relatively rapid, fundamental, and durable alteration in the pattern of party loyalties held by the electorate (Sundquist, 1983). Evaluations of candidate qualities and government performance are shortterm forces capable of substantial shifts from one election to the next. Party identification and ideology are much more stable in the short term. Nigerian political parties are fluid in their ideological orientations. In most cases in Nigeria, people join political parties mainly on sentimental grounds based on their affinity with the party stalwarts or based on the assessment of their political fortune in a particular party. Issue orientations are not so intense. The field of political psychology has explored psychological factors to explain political and voting behaviour. Political psychology researchers study ways in which affective influence inform and affect how the electorate makes informed political choices in spite of low overall levels of political attentiveness and sophistication. 117 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The literatures on the significance of affect in politics assume that affective states play a role in public voting behaviour. Affect here refers to the experience of emotion or feeling, which is often described in contrast to cognition. The works of Winkielman etal (2007), shed light on the ways in which affective states are involved in human judgment and decision-making. Researchers have argued that affective states such as anxiety and enthusiasm encourage the evaluation of new political information and thus benefit political behaviour by leading to more informed choices. (Marcus, 2000). The differential impact of several specific emotions on voting behaviour has been identified as follows: Surprise – The emotion of surprise may magnify the impact of emotions on voting. In assessing the impact of home-team sports victories on voting, Healy etal. (2010) showed that surprising victories provided close to twice the benefit to the incumbent party compared to victories overall. Anger – Affective theory would predict that anger increases the use of generalized knowledge and reliance upon stereotypes and other heuristics. Anxiety – Anxiety is an emotion that increases political attentiveness while decreasing reliance on party identification when deciding between candidates, thus improving decision-making capabilities. Voters who report anxiety regarding an election are more likely to vote for candidates whose policies they prefer, and party members who report feeling anxious regarding a candidate are twice as likely to defect and vote for the opposition candidate. In the area of fear, research shows that people experiencing fear rely on more detailed processing when making choices (Tiedens, 2001). One study found that subjects primed with fear spent more time seeking information before a hypothetical voting exercise than those primed with anger. The use of emotional appeals in political campaigns to increase support for a candidate or decrease support for a challenger is a widely recognized practice and a common element of any campaign strategy (Brader, 2006). Campaigns often seek to instil positive emotions such as enthusiasm and hopefulness about their candidate to improve turnout and political activism while seeking to raise fear and anxiety about the challenger. (Marcus 2006). 118 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories Another theory in voting research is the loss aversion theory. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1984). It states that voters are more likely to use their vote to avoid the impact of an unfavourable policy rather than supporting a favourable policy. From a psychological perspective, value references are crucial to determine individual preferences. For instance, free education may be a value which voters do not want to lose thus they are more likely to vote for the candidate that promises such benefit, instead of voting for a candidate closer to their political beliefs. History of Osun State Osun State is an inland state in southwestern Nigeria. Its capital is Osogbo. It is bounded in the north by Kwara State, in the east partly by Ekiti State and partly by Ondo State, in the south by Ogun State and in the west by Oyo State. The State is situated in the tropical rain forest zone. It covers an area of approximately 14,875 sq. km. According to the 2006 National Population Census, the population of the state is put at 3.4 million. The state is rich in human and material resources. Though a landlocked state, it is blessed with presence of many rivers and streams, which serves the water needs of the state. The state is within the tropical rain forest with abundance of resources. Minerals resources found in the state include gold, kaolin and others, which are being extracted for the benefit of the state and the people. (Osun.gov.ng). Map of Nigeria: Osun state shaded black Source: Wikipedia Created in 1991 from part of the old Oyo State, the major sub-ethnic groups in Ӑৢun State are Ife, Ijesa, Oyo and Igbomina of the Yoruba people, although there are also people from other parts of Nigeria. Yoruba and Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis English are the official languages. People of Osun State practice Christianity, Islam, and paganism called traditional faith. Osun State has a large population of both Muslims and Christians. Osun State is divided into three federal senatorial districts, nine federal constituencies and thirty Local Government Areas. Col. Leo Segun Ajiborisha was the first Military Administrator of the State and he governed from August 1991-January 1992 when he handed over to an elected governor, Isiaka Adeleke who ruled from 1992 to November 1993. The civilian rule in the state was terminated when Col. Anthony Udofia, (December 1993-August 1996), Col Anthony Obi (August 1996-August 1998) and Col. Theophilus Bamgboye (August 1998- May 1999) served as Military Administrators respectively. Chief Bisi Akande was an elected governor from 29th May 1999- 29th May 2003. Prince Olagunsoye Oyinlola took over from Chief Akande and governed from 29th May 2003- 29th May 2007 for the first term. Prince Oyinlola had spent three and a half years out of his second term until he was removed in a landmark judgment on 26th November 2010, by the Court of Appeal, sitting in Ibadan which nullified his election and Rauf Aregbesola was declared the validly elected Governor in the 14th April, 2007 Gubernatorial Election. Rauf Aregbesola was then sworn in as governor on 27th November 2010. His first term of office ends in November 2014 which necessitated a governorship election in the state on August 9, 2014. The people of Osun are believed to be politically sophisticated and dynamic. Different political parties have ruled the state since 1991. The Political Parties, Candidates and their Antecedents Even though 20 political parties presented candidates for the August 2014 governorship election, it was apparent that the Osun governorship election was a straight fight between the APC and the PDP. The All Progressives Congress (APC) was formed on 6 February 2013 as a result of an alliance by Nigeria's four biggest opposition parties – the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) –which merged to become a progressive party to take on the conservative 120 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories People's Democratic Party. The party received approval from the nation's electoral umpire Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on 31 July 2013 to become a political party and subsequently withdrew the operating licenses of the three previous merging parties (the ACN, CPC and ANPP). On 25 November 2013, five governors in the existing ruling party, PDP, decided to join APC, as well as 49 federal legislators giving APC a slim majority of 186 legislators in the federal House of Representatives and 58 Senators. (Durotoye, 2014). The APC candidate, Rauf Aregbesola, an engineer, was born on 25 May 1957. He is from Ilesa. Aregbesola was formerly an activist. He was Lagos Commissioner for Works and Infrastructure when he ran for governor of Osun State in the 2007 elections on the platform of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Although the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, Olagunsoye Oyinlola was declared the winner, Aregbesola appealed the decision. Aregbesola called over 100 witnesses and tendered 168 exhibits in his petition before the Election Petitions Tribunal, alleging violence and ballot boxes stuffing in the election. Justices of the Federal Appeal Court, Ibadan finally declared Aregbesola the winner of the 2007 election, ordering that he be sworn in as governor by noon on 27 November 2010. For his re-election, Rauf Aregbesola, was on Saturday 12th April 2014 endorsed as the governorship candidates of the All Progressives Congress in the states gubernatorial election slated for the 9th of August 2014. The emergence of Aregbesola was preceded by the state congress held by the party in which he was unanimously endorsed as the candidate of the party. According to the party, there are about 355,000 card-carrying members of the party in the 332 wards across the state. The People's Democratic Party (Nigeria) was founded in 1998. The People's Democratic Party is a conservative political party which has won every Presidential election since 1999. In 1999, the party lost all the governorship seats in the South West of Nigeria despite Olusegun Obasanjo, a south 121 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis westerner emerging as the president. Reverse was the case in 2003 when the PDP won all the elections in the Southwestern states of Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, and Ekiti states except Lagos. The PDP favours free-market policies, which support economic liberalism, and limited government regulation. Its candidate in the 2014 governorship election in Osun, Iyiola Omisore, also an engineer, was born on 15 September 1957. He is from Ile-Ife. Iyiola Omisore served as Deputy Governor of Osun State from 1999 to 2001 before he was impeached when he fell out with his boss, Chief Bisi Akande. He was detained for about 2 years and charged for the death of the then Attorney General and Minister of Justice of Nigeria and AD leader, Chief Bola Ige, murdered in his home in Ibadan in December 2001. He was later discharged and acquitted. While in prison custody and on trial for the murder of Bola Ige, Iyiola Omisore was elected to the Senate for the Osun East senatorial district in April 2003 running for the PDP. Iyiola Omisore was re-elected for Osun East in 2007. At the senate, Iyiola was appointed to the committees for Police Affairs, Housing, Culture & Tourism, Aviation and Appropriation. He was prominent as chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriation responsible for considering the nation’s annual budget. Omisore had wanted to contest for the Osun state governorship election since 1998. Issues in the Run up to the Election • INEC Commissioner accused of partisanship: PDP’s candidate, Senator Iyiola Omisore, repeatedly accused the Osun State Resident electoral commissioner, Rufus Akeju, of being partisan in favor of APC. Akeju was later transferred out of Osun state before the election. He was replaced by Segun Agbaje, a few weeks before the election. • “Stomach infrastructure”: Stomach infrastructure entered the political lexicon of Nigeria after the June 2014 Ekiti state governorship election. This term is used to describe the electorates’ preference for immediate gains like food and money as opposed to long term development. The two 122 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories major political parties shared rice, kerosene, cooking oil and money to woo voters prior to the August 9 election. • Militarization: Just as in the Ekiti state governorship election, there was a heavy presence of different security agencies about two weeks before the election, a move which according to President Goodluck Jonathan was necessary to ensure safety of life and property before, during and after the election. The leadership of the All Peoples Congress (APC) continually alleged that the heavy presence of military personnel was to manipulate the polls in favor of the PDP candidate. To counter what the APC perceived as potential victimization of its supporters by the security agents, Rauf Aregbesola told APC members to fortify themselves spiritually with Psalms and Bible verses for Christians, Quran and Quranic verses for Muslims while traditionalists should feel free and be ready to defend their votes with the use of amulets and other charms should the poll turn violent. Two days before the election, people alleged to be security operatives attended at the houses of some APC stalwarts, arrested some of them and shot at the houses of some in a bid to gain entrance. One of those whose houses were vandalized was a former senator and APC leader, Bayo Salami, in Osogbo. His doors were shot at severally to gain entrance to his house for his arrest without success. There were reports that soldiers and officials of the Department of State Security (DSS) randomly chased down and arrested APC leaders and members across the state. Former Vice President and APC member, Atiku Abubakar said the use of the military for the purpose of election is an anathema to the very spirit of electioneering politics, because the rules of engagement of the military violates the principles of fundamental human rights which gives the people the power of franchise. (Premium Times, 2014a). • APC’s Allegation of Discovery of PDP's Rigging Manual for Osun Governorship Election Two days to the election, the All Progressives Congress (APC) claimed it uncovered the PDP's manual to rig the governorship election in Osun State with projected fake results in all the 30 local government areas of the state. The APC national Chairman, John Odigie Oyegun said the rigging 123 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis plans were contained in two documents prepared by the PDP in Osun, and which were in the possession of the APC. Knowing APC’s propaganda machinery, the alleged document could have been easily waived aside but for the meticulous details including names provided by the APC as allegedly contained in the “Rigging manual”. “The first is a 'secret' document marked ''HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL'' that contains a meticulous outline of plans to rig the election, polling unit by polling unit, using pre-programmed ballot papers already designed and thumb printed with vanishing ink in favour of PDP. The second document, entitled ''Task Force: Operation (PDP) takeover of Osun'', lists the actions to be taken at most of the 30 Local Government Areas in the state, including thuggery, snatching of ballot boxes and instigation of violent clashes, the PDP members to coordinate the recommended actions and the APC members to be arrested to pave the way for such actions”. (Premium Times, 2014b). • Mega Rallies: The two political parties campaigned in different parts of Osun state. The campaign rallies were concluded by mega rallies at the Osogbo township stadium. The PDP took the stage on Saturday August 2, 2014. The rally was attended by the President, the Vice President, PDP national chairman, and many state governors of the party. In the wellattended rally, the president appealed to voters to vote for the PDP candidate to be able to attract federal presence in terms of infrastructures to the state. The PDP candidate, Iyiola Omisore, when called upon to speak failed to itemise his programs for the state. The APC rally took place three days later at the same venue. It was also well attended despite the rain. Party leaders from all over the country and APC state governors attended. APC candidate, Aregbesola promised to continue with his good work of turning the state to another “Dubai”. Just before coming to the event, Aregbesola had gone round Osogbo, the state capital on top of a luxury bus in a show of popularity. Election Conduct and Results The turnout of voters on August 9, 2014 recorded 54.17% of eligible voters. The voters defied the early morning rain in some areas of the state to cast their votes. There was heavy presence of security operatives in all the polling 124 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories units to ensure a trouble free poll. There was no single case of ballot snatching or ballot stuffing. This was due to many reasons: • INEC customized all ballot papers according to local governments such that ballots assigned a particular local government were peculiar to it and cannot be used in another. • The Commission customized all result sheets such that they were unique to each Polling Unit (PU) and they could not be used in any other. • The Commission serially numbered all ballot boxes such that they could not be transferred to other PUs and so that if a ballot box is snatched and stuffed it cannot be brought back to the PU. • The Commission gave additional training to the staff recruited to conduct the election so that they could perform their tasks with proficiency and integrity. (Durotoye, 2014). Osun State Governorship Election Results, August 9, 2014. NAME OF STATE: OSUN CODE: OS S/N CONTESTANT 1 BARR. NIYI OWOLADE GENDER MALE PARTY VOTES RECEIVED A 377 2 BABATUNDE ORALUSI MALE AA 379 3 MR. FEMI ADELEKE MALE ACPN 4,370 4 SENATOR SUNDAY FAJINMI MALE AD 1,982 5 COMRADE GABRIEL G. OJO MALE ADC 1,783 6 ALHAJI AGBOOLA A. OBASANJO MALE APA 3,306 7 OGBENI RAUF A. AREGBESOLA MALE APC 394,684 8 AKINTUNDE A. ADETUNJI MALE APGA 806 9 ALH. RAFIU S. ANIFOWOSE 1,087 MALE CPP 10 ALHAJI FATAI AKINBADE MALE LP 8,898 11 CHIEF BABATUNDE ADETORO MALE MPPP 24 12 COM. AFOLAYANKA O. JIMOH MALE NCP 457 13 PRINCE ADEFARE S. ADEGOKE MALE NNPP 493 125 REMARK ELECTED Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis 14 OLUDARE TIMOTHY AKINOLA MALE PDM 1,909 15 SENATOR IYIOLA OMISORE MALE PDP 292,747 16 ALHAJI LAWAL G. ABIODUN MALE PPA 2,628 17 ELDER OLUSEGUN AKINWUSI MALE SDP 534 18 MR. BUNMI FUNSO MALE UDP 261 19 ADEOTI IBRAHIM ABIODUN MALE UPN 212 20 PRINCE VICTOR O. ADENIYI MALE UPP 159 a TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS 1,411,373 b TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCREDITED VOTERS 764,582 c TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID VOTES 717,321 d TOTAL NUMBER OF REJECTED VOTES 32,700 e TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST 750,021 f PERCENTAGE TURN OUT 54.17% Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) According to the election results released by INEC on the morning of August 10, 2014, the APC candidate won the majority vote and was declared the winner of the election. Rauf Aregbesola won in 23 local government areas polling a total vote of 394,684 while the PDP candidate, Iyiola Omisore won in seven local government areas with a total vote of 292,747. An analysis of the results shows that the two candidates won in their home local governments. Besides, the state capital of Osogbo with two local government areas of Osogbo and Olorunda delivered the highest number of votes for Aregbesola. This is understandable because apart from his deputy, Grace Titi Laoye Tomori from Osogbo, most of Aregbesola’s developmental projects were visibly located in the state capital. It was also apparent that Ifedayo and Boluwaduro local government areas have the least number of voters in the state. Out of the twenty governorship contestants, there was no female contestant. Despite President Jonathan’s congratulatory message to Aregbesola, the Osun State chapter of the People’s Democratic Party rejected the election result. Even Aregbesola, despite his victory complained that that the number 126 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories of accredited voters in most local governments was less than half of registered voters. He queried how the bulk of the PDP candidate’s votes came from only four Local Governments- namely Ife Central, Ife East, Ife North and Ife South, PDP candidate’s home local government and surrounding local government areas. Aregbesola said this suggests an inexplicable large turnout in the PDP candidate stronghold, which is a curious departure from the general trend of voting across the state. The PDP candidate who eventually accepted defeat three days after the election declined to congratulate Aregbesola. He claimed APC was helped by INEC’s former resident electoral commissioner in Osun state, Rufus Akeju. Even though Akeju was transferred before the election, Omisore stated that by the time the electoral Commissioner was removed, he had already done the damage. He said Akeju opened the entire electoral system to the APC from registration stage through data storage to personnel loading. “Though the leadership of INEC eventually took him out of the state weeks to the elections, he already did a lot of harm in the system that would take years to rectify”. (Daily Post, 2014). Why PDP/Omisore lost Character Preference: APC, more than anything else tried successfully to associate Omisore, the PDP candidate, with thuggery and violence and warned that the state would lose the relative peace it had enjoyed since Aregbesola became governor in 2010 should Omisore become the governor. Omisore was painted as a desperate politician whose hallmark remains deeply rooted in trouble making. Rather, Aregbesola was projected as “Omoluabi”- a gentleman. Internal Crisis in PDP: The PDP was a hotbed of crisis in Osun state before the election as will be shown later. Traditional Rulers: Omisore, whose father was a traditional ruler, did not fare well before many of the traditional rulers in the state. On the other hand, the APC government in the state had warmed itself to the heart of the traditional rulers by consistent patronage in terms of funding and spread of 127 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis infrastructural projects to their respective communities. According to the Yoruba tradition, traditional rulers are largely respected in their domains. In the last week before the election, Aregbesola reached out to many traditional rulers promising them roads, local government area council among many others. Adeleke and Oyinlola’s Defection: Two former governors of the state, Isiaka Adeleke and Iyiola Omisore defected to the APC on account of assault in the case of Adeleke and greed in the case of Oyinlola. Adeleke alleged that he was assaulted, molested and manhandled by Omisore and his crony, Jelili Adesiyan, the Minister of Police Affairs, a few days to the PDP governorship primaries. (Africa news hub, 2014.) Oyinlola, the immediate past governor of the state, and former National secretary of the party, accused Omisore of being selfish, and that the PDP had not been fair to the Yoruba people. “Let us look at this; he (Omisore) picked Prof. Wale Oladipo, who was in the prison with him (over Bola Ige’s case) to replace me as the National Secretary of the PDP. He nominated Jelili Adesiyan who was also with him at Agodi Prison as a minister and he installed Gani Olaoluwa, who was also with them at the prison as the PDP chairman in the state. Does it mean that we cannot hold public office except we are former prisoners? The PDP is now empty; they pushed former Governor Isiaka Adeleke out, Alhaji Fatai Akinbade (Labour Party candidate) left them when he saw the way they were doing, I also left them for the APC.” (Punch, 2014). Oyinlola added that Omisore had nothing good for the people of the state while hailing the performance of Aregbesola whom he urged the people to support. The Stigma of Bola Ige’s Death: Even though Omisore was discharged and acquitted in the Bola Ige murder case, the stigma continued to hunt him as some believed the judicial process was compromised by the ruling party to free Omisore. Omisore had to consistently plead ignorance during his campaign. (Daily Times, (2014). It did not appear many people believed his alibi. He even authored a book where he tried to justify his acquittal at the court over Bola Ige’s murder. Bola Ige’s son, Muyiwa, who is a member of Aregbesola’s cabinet, whipped up the matter before the election. Ige, who was the Attorney General of the Federation, was assassinated at his residence 128 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories in Ibadan on December 23, 2001. Bola Ige was a former governor of the old Oyo state between 1979 and 1983 of which Osun state was a part. He was very popular and largely respected in Yoruba land in general and Osun state in particular where he came from. Aregbesola’s Achievements: To many indigenes of Osun state, Aregbesola had performed creditably well in the past 4 years of being in office and should be rewarded with another 4 years to complete the many projects he commenced. Some of his achievements include 40,000 Youths Employed under the Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES) with over N2.4 billion injected to the economy as allowances for the OYES Volunteers; 5,000 Youths trained and empowered in information communication technology under the Osun Youth Empowerment Technology (OYESTECH); 4.123 kilometres of waterways (streams, arteries, canals) dredged to keep the state flood-free; 750,000 school students provided with school uniform coupled with empowerment of 3,000 tailors; 150,000 students provided with computer tablets (Opon imo), an electronic learning tool preloaded with 17 subjects, 54 textbooks, and past questions of JAMB, WAEC AND NECO of the past 10 years; Introduction of bi-monthly environmental sanitation exercise under the O’CLEAN Initiative to keep the state clean; Beautification of the 185 km Oyo boundary (Asejire) to OsunOndo Boundary (Owena); Trucks provided for a Public-Private Partnership waste management model in the state; Increase of Primary School Funding Grants from N7.4 million to N424 million a year; feeding of 240,000 school kids daily with nutritious meals under the Osun Elementary School Feeding and Health Programme coupled with empowerment of over 3,000 caterers. Others include building of mega schools; Increase of Secondary school basic funding grants from N171 million to N427 million per year; Reduction of Tuition Fees in State-owned Tertiary Institutions reduced by 30%; Security of lives and properties being guaranteed with provision of 5 Armoured Personnel Carrier, over 100 security patrol vehicles and one helicopter for area surveillance; 2 state of the art police stations built; Increase in Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) from N300 million to N700 million without increasing tax payable by citizens; Setting up of Omoluabi Conservation Fund with a N4.2 Billion reserve; Establishment of Osun Debt Management 129 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Office; Building of the largest commercial apiary in Sub-Saharan Africa for refined honey production; Over 1,765 hectares of land cleared and prepared to support farmers, and rehabilitation of farm settlements in the state with over N1 billion committed to support farmers; Construction of super highways to connect Osun to Lagos and Osun to Kwara States; 61 Township roads covering 128km being upgraded all over the state; Increase of Ede Water Works capacity from 13% to 30% and on-going plan to reach 100% capacity before the end of 2014; Over 3,000 permanent teachers employed into the state education sector; 27. 218 km roads being built across the 30 Local Government Areas and Ife East Area Office, Modakeke; Osun Ambulance Service Authority established with 400 youths trained as paramedics; 9 State Hospitals and 12 comprehensive health centers being rehabilitated in the state; 74 Primary Health Centers built, and Osogbo Railway Station undergoing massive rehabilitation. (Nairaland.com, 2014). Other achievements include the establishment of a modern shopping mall (Ayegbaju Market) and the construction of a “Ring road” around the Osogbo Township. No Clear Manifesto and Message by PDP: Omisore’s billboards did not contain any message to convey his manifesto. Such messages as “Eni tanwi de”-Here comes the one we have been talking about, “Ni Ipinle Osun, eniyan iyi ni wa”-in Osun state we are men of honour” did not convey any message about his programs. Besides, the PDP and their candidate did not take full advantage of alleged Aregbesola’s shortcomings such as his school uniform program in which all the elementary and high school pupils wear the same uniform and the school merger policy that led to some religious tension in the state. Even though PDP harped on the accusation of “capital flight” in which they claimed resources in the state are concentrated in the hands of those people Aregbesola brought from Lagos state who repatriate resources back to Lagos state, the negative impact of the damage did not go far. Aregbesola’s Acceptability as a Grassroots’ Politician: Aregbesola was widely popular and was able to connect with the people at the grassroots. Osogbo Factor: Aregbesola commands large following in the state capital, Osogbo. Osogbo has two local government areas and the largest number of 130 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories registered voters in the state. Apart from his deputy coming from Osogbo, the Deputy speaker of the state House of Assembly is also from Osogbo. Aregbesola warmed himself into the heart of the Osogbo people by his many developmental projects in the state capital under his urban renewal program. Aregbesola scored 66,534 votes in Osogbo as against Omisore’s 19,996 votes. The bloc of votes from Osogbo gave Aregbesola about 45% of his victory margin in the election. Ekiti Experience: The loss of the Ekiti state governorship election by the APC in June was a big lesson for the party. The party was able to correct some of the loopholes that cost them victory in the Ekiti election. Implications of Aregbesola/APC victory APC victory in Osun state has a lot of implications especially for the 2015 general elections. The party is well positioned to win the general elections into the state Houses of Assembly, and the National Assembly in 2015. This will intensify competition amongst party members to become the party’s candidates for the legislative elections. Besides, based on the unwritten rotational principle in the state, Iyiola Omisore will not be able to contest for governorship in the state again until another 8 years because he is from the same senatorial district as Aregbesola. After Aregbesola’s term in the next four years, the two other senatorial districts of Osun central and Osun west will take a shot at the governorship. This is not a constitutional provision though but it has always been the practice. More importantly is next year’s presidential election. President Goodluck Jonathan may find it harder to win in the state than if his party’s candidate, Omisore had won the governorship. Most observers praised INEC for performing above average in the Osun election. There is growing confidence and positive disposition among Nigerians about INEC’s ability. They believe the commission would be able to deliver in 2015 if given the necessary support and funding. However, the partisanship displayed by some overzealous security operatives by arresting some APC leaders a few days to the election does not portend well for the 2015 election. 131 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Conclusion This study has shown that a combination of attitudinal, social and psychological factors influenced the voting behaviour in the August 9, 2014 governorship election in Osun state. Attitudinal factors such as assessments of the personal characteristics of the candidates, evaluations of government performance, orientations on specific policy issues, and party identification are the primary determinants of candidate’s choice. Social factors such as religion, race, and social class played less significant roles although the performance of the two candidates in their home areas may be attributable to race. Looking at Party identification, APC’s 255,000-registered membership in the state may have played a part in the victory. It must be noted that evaluations of candidate qualities and government performance are distinctly short-term forces, capable of substantial shifts from one election to the next. Hence, the outcome of this election does not necessarily portend future voting behaviour in the governorship election in 2018. Affective influence referring to the experience of emotion or feeling in voting behaviour also played a role in the Osun election. Anxiety, an emotion that increases political attentiveness while decreasing reliance on party identification when deciding between candidates, thus improving decision-making capabilities also played a role. Voters who report anxiety regarding an election are more likely to vote for candidates whose policies they prefer. In the area of fear, research shows that people experiencing fear rely on more detailed processing when making choices. The use of emotional appeals in political campaigns to increase support for a candidate or decrease support for a challenger was widely used by the APC to instil positive emotions such as enthusiasm and hopefulness about its candidate among party bases to improve turnout and political activism while seeking to raise fear and anxiety about Omisore. Enthusiasm reinforced preferences, whereas fear and anxiety about the PDP candidate provoked a negative voting behaviour towards him. The loss aversion theory that voters are more likely to use their vote to avoid the impact of an unfavourable policy also played a role. From a psychological perspective, value references are crucial to determine individual preferences. For instance, Aregbesola’s policies are a value which voters did not want to lose thus they voted for him to continue those policies. 132 2014 Governorship Election in the State of Osun: Issues and Trajectories References Africanewshub (2014). “OSUN 2014: Omisore, Police Minister Beat Me UpAdeleke” Available:http://www.africanewshub.com/news/ 1228980-osun-2014-omisore-police-minister-beat-me-up-adeleke (August 10, 2014). Brader, Ted (2006). Campaigns for Hearts and Minds. How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press Daily Post (2014) “Omisore Reveals Why he lost Osun Governorship Election” Available: http://dailypost.ng/2014/08/12/omisore-revealslost-osun-governorship-election/ (14 August 2014) Daily Times (2014), “I Did Not Kill Bola Ige, Omisore Tells Ige's Family”. Available: http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/i-did-not-kill-bolaige-omisore-tells-iges-family. (August 14, 2014). Durotoye, Adeolu (2014) “Electoral Behaviour in Ekiti 2014 Governorship Election in Nigeria”, Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.4, No.15:58-64. Healy, A.; Malhotra, N.; Hyunjung Mo, C. (2010), "Irrelevant events affect voters’ evaluations of government performance", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (29): 12804–12809, James Sundquist (1983) “Dynamics of the Party.System”, Washington, DC. The Brookings. Institution. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1991), "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model", The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (4): 1039–1061 Ladd, J.; Lenz, G. (2011), "Does Anxiety Improve Voters’ Decision Making?" Political Psychology 32 (2): 347–361 Marcus, G.; Neuman, R.; MacKuen, M. (2000), “Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement”, University of Chicago Press. Marcus, G.E. (2000), “Emotions in Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 3: 221-250. Miller, P. (2011), "The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication", Political Psychology 32 (4): 575–600, Nairaland.com (2014). “30 Achievements in 30 Months”. Available: http://www.nairaland.com/1312734/30-achievements-30-months- 133 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis ogbeni Achievements In 30 Months - Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola (August 10, 2014). Premium Times (2014a) “Osun Election: Atiku Condemns Arrest, Clampdown on APC Members”. Available: https://www.premiumtimesng .com/regional/166439-osun-election-atiku-condemns-arrests-clampdown -on-apc-members.html#sthash.5MGRKj2c.dpbs (August 14, 2014). Premium Times (2014b) “How PDP Plans to Rig Osun Election-APC”. Available: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/166223-how-pdpplans-to-rig-osun-election-apc.html#sthash.nJ0b54v1.dpbs (August 14, 2014). Punch (2014) “Why Osun Must Not Vote for Omisore-Oyinlola”. Available: http://www.punchng.com/news/why-osun-must-not-vote-for-omisoreoyinlola/ (August 12, 2014). 134  8 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 Tolu Lawal Introduction In every modern society, election and democracy are classified as essential ingredients of development. Electoral politics began in Nigeria in the 1920’s with the introduction of elective principles by the 1922 Clifford Constitution. This constitution was very symbolic as it served as a landmark in the electoral history of Nigeria. Nigerians were, for the first time allowed to exercise their political rights by voting their own candidates during elections (Ezera, 1960). Consequently, other constitution that emanated after 1922 improved on the elective principle. These preceding constitutions further expanded the scope of electoral participation. There is no doubt that election has been a factor in Nigeria’s political development since independence, even in pre-independence era, it played significant role both at the national and regional levels. But the fact remains that post-independence elections in Nigeria have a unique feature of crisis, which has gone a long way in affecting the democratic ideals and developmental ethos (Lawal, 2005). In May, 1999, Nigeria made a successful democratic transition after almost two decades of military. The inauguration of the country’s fourth Republic Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis thus marked a renewed sense of optimism and great expectation by Nigerian citizens and members of the international community. People had high hopes that this new wave of democratic politics in Nigeria would be characterized by the nurturing of a civic political culture that is conducive for rule of law, respect for human rights, consolidation of institutional transparency, and indeed the political accountability of the elected officials. Nevertheless, the past fifteen years of democratic experimentation have been characterized by undemocratic tendencies, rather than consolidate the “hard earned” democracy. This unwarranted attitude (election crisis) has continued to affect generally, the political development and particularly, sustenance of democracy in Nigeria. This ugly trend and the implications make this work inevitable. The chapter is therefore set out to achieve the following objectives; • To examine the role of election in democratic consolidation • To assess the level of democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s democracy • To identity the causes of election crises in Nigeria • To examine the effect of election crises on democracy and democratic consolidation • To contribute to scholarship on the need for democratic consolidation in developing countries • To make viable recommendations capable of solving election crises and facilitating democratic consolidation in Nigeria Conceptual Clarification Some basic concepts that are relevant to this study are reviewed and analysed for the purpose of clear understanding of the content to which these concepts are being put into use. Election Election is a device for filling an office or post through choices made by a designated body of people called the electorate (Heywood, 1997). Elections 136 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 are not just casting of votes to elect leaders, but also the active participation of the people in governance to ensure sustenance and survival of democracy. In this sense, it is not a ritual organized for people to queue up every four years to cast their votes but also a veritable process of changing leadership through peaceful means for improved socio-economic policies that benefit the people (LEMT, 2003). Ajayi (2005) maintains that election is a process through which suitable candidates are chosen for public offices through voting. It is a method of making choices by voting. He identifies two forms of election; direct and indirect election. Direct election is a method by which the electorates vote directly for candidates of their choice, while indirect election serves as a means by which representatives are indirectly elected through Electoral College. According to Key (1960), election establishes a framework for change. It provides continuity and a sense of political community, for they are links in a chain that bind one generation of voters to the other. Every four years the voters come together in an act of decision that is influenced by the past and present, but designed to shape the future. Lawal (2003) argues that election has become a necessity in liberal democracies. He describes election as basically a democratic method. However, he opines that not all elections are democratic. According to him, undemocratic elections are capable of causing electoral crisis and unstable democratic system. Flowing from the foregoing, elections are elections when they are freely and fairly conducted. In any democratic arrangement, elections are supposed to be free and fair; it is free and fair when it is conducted under peaceful and orderly atmosphere. This kind of election legitimizes regime and consolidates democracy. The implication of this is that there cannot be true democracy as long as free and fair elections remain elusive. This is because election malpractices bring about election crises and democracy cannot thrive in an environment bedevilled with crises. Election Crises Longman Dictionary of contemporary English defines crisis as a situation in which there are a lot of problems that must be dealt with quickly so that 137 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis the situation does not get worse or more dangerous (Longman, 2003). Election crises can therefore be perceived as a situation in which there are a lot of problems emanating from the conduct of elections that must be dealt with quickly so that the situation does not lead to political and or democratic instability. These problems may come in form of election malpractice, intimidation of voters, attack of voters by party supporters, hijacking of ballot boxes, rigging of election results, ballot stuffing, and the like. All these problems are capable of causing election crises and crises emanating from elections are capable of truncating democracy. Democracy Democracy may be described as a system of government under which the people exercise political power, either directly or through their representatives periodically elected by themselves (Appadorai, 1975). Democracy ensures fundamental human rights, respect for the rule of law, equality of persons, popular participation, competition, multiparty system as well as the machinery for political and economic development of a society (Adeyemo, 2008). There is a general but specialized tendency to see democracy only in terms of a system of government rather than the totality of social relations and a system of values. In this way, it is defined as representing, in reality or in fiction, the supremacy of many over the few through the mechanisms of state. This conception of democracy narrowly distinguishes it from other types of government where small minorities dominate the majority. This is for example, the case of theocracy, where only the priests rule, monarchy, where only royal family or dynasty rules, aristocracy, where only the elite usually of landed property rules, oligarchy, where a few families rule, and of course, military dictatorship, where an omnipotent command of the armed forces rules (Bako, 1997). The essence and major objectives of democracy is the creation of good condition for individuals and groups to have their fullest freedom and right to develop their actual and potential capabilities to realize whatever their stated goals are. 138 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 Ajayi (1998) opines that any claim to democracy by any regime or state must essentially embrace popular participation, competitive choice, the enjoyment of civil and political liberties by the citizenry in real terms, and the accountability of the leadership. The participatory opportunity offered the citizenry in the choice and selection through periodic elections of credible representatives confers inestimable avenue for psychological selfsatisfaction and self-fulfilment. This is so as the electorate who participate in the electoral process that eventually leads to the enthronement of a government and the political leadership can therefore lay claim to the government as rather than being an imposition. Consequently, the mandate to govern emanates from them, while at the same time, they act as legitimizers of the governmental system. The government is seen as legitimate and therefore not illegal. Democracy is believed to be a vehicle of human development, and without it, there can be no development. The Western world has developed certain institutional mechanisms which include the competitive party system, impartial electoral system independent judiciary free press, free and peaceful elections and so on. Democratic Consolidation A democracy is said to be consolidated when the people come to accept that a democratic regime is the most appropriate for the society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine (Diamond, 1999). According to Beethan (1999), democracy can best be said to be consolidated when we have good reason to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressure or shock without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedom on which it depends including those of dissent and opposition. The process of consolidation begins with the inauguration of a new regime after a free and fair electoral process (Oquaye, 2000). It is a longer and more difficult process than the transition itself. To scholars, it means an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic systems that are critical to the establishment of a stable, 139 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis institutional and lasting democracy (Beetham, 1994, Diamond 1989). Holistically, democracy can be said to be consolidated when its probability of breakdown is very low or on the other hand, its probability of survival is very high. In other words democratic consolidation reaches a closure when all relevant observers, including major political actors, the general public and the academic experts expect the democratic regime to last into a foreseeable future, thereby having the capacity to build dams against a reverse wave (Baker, 2000). Democratic consolidation is meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the shortterm, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian repression. (Beetham, 1994). The inference from Beetham’s definition of democratic consolidation reveals the starting point of a regime to be consolidated. Any discussion about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process. Democracy is therefore the indispensable starting point in the form of a consolidating democracy, and its hopeful outcome in form of a consolidated democracy. That is, democratic consolidation cannot set in before a democratic transition has been successfully completed. Fundamentally, democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the results. The point here is that, it is not winning elections that matters, but losing it and accepting the verdict, because this demonstrates that powerful players and their supporters are prepared to respect the rules of the game above the continuation of their power. Theoretical Framework This study is essentially the effect of election crises on democratic consolidation. It examines why and how election crises affect the growth and development of democracy. Based on this, the study will be situated within the ambit of two theories namely the group theory and frustration aggression theory. 140 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 Group theory explains the importance of group in governmental process, and election process is also part of this governmental process. Election crises which is the major focus of this chapter is being carried out by group(s) either political party(ies) or supporters of such parties, party thugs, voters, politicians etc. Essentially, election crises revolve around group(s). Frustration aggression theory tends to explain the reasons behind the aggressive nature of people in certain situation. Election crisis is a manifestation of people’s aggression resulting from election fraud. Therefore, the two theories are capable of giving deeper and scientific understanding of this study. Bentley (1975) in his analysis says it is interests which lead to the organization of groups. This fundamental presupposition is that achievement could be made fast by combination of efforts through the formation and existence of a group rather than individual and that, group behaviour can influence things such as policies or decisions rather than individual. It is easier for group to catalyse action or spur people into action than individual. Election crises are an action that is mostly influenced and carried out by group(s). For instance, group of voters, party supporters, party thugs, party members etc. are all groups that are capable of causing election crises. It is reasonable to note that election crises are mostly carried out to achieve some interests that are paramount to the groups or their sponsors. Frustration aggression theory believes that the primary source of the human capacity for crisis of violence is the frustration aggression mechanisms. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression irrespective of its instrumentalities. If frustration is sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quickly likely to occur (Dugan, 2004). Men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence or cause crisis. According to Gur (1970), the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation. This relative deprivation (frustration) predicts collective crisis or violence by social groups. When people perceive that they are being prevented from achieving 141 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis a goal, their frustration is likely to turn to aggression. The closer one gets to a goal, the greater the excitement and expectation of the pleasure and vice versa. Unexpected occurrence of the frustration also increases the likelihood of aggression. From the foregoing, it is understood that election crises do not just happen without any reasons leading to its occurrence. It manifests when group is frustrated. The frustration may be in different forms, for instance, voters may be frustrated when their votes are ‘stolen’ and or when they are prevented from voting for candidate of their choice in an election, or still, when their electoral rights are not respected by the appropriate authority. Political party may also be frustrated when mandate given to it by the electorate is stolen and or prevented from achieving its electoral goals etc. This frustration easily leads to anger and tension, thereby leading to crisis. Most of the election crises that happened in Nigeria between 1960s and 2014 can be traced to the aforementioned reasons. This framework will therefore enhance scientific understanding and stand as operational tools to further explain the circumstances that surrounded election crises between 1999 and 2014 in Nigeria and its implication on democratic consolidation. Election Crises in Nigeria: An Examination Nigerian politics has, since independence, been characterized by thuggery and crisis because election has become the only means of assuming political power in a democracy. Consequently, electoral politics in Nigeria manifest in acrimony, assault, assassination, intimidation, harassment, maiming and killings (Lawal, 2007). Since independence, most of the general elections conducted so far in Nigeria, such as 1964/1965, 1979, 1983, 1993, 2007 and 2011 have been characterized by crises. Such crisis manifested in 1964/1965, which eventually led to the termination of the first Republic. Also, in 1983, the crisis was so much especially in the South Western Nigeria (old Ondo and Oyo States) to the extent that the military had to intervene, and that also marked the end of the second Republic (Arowolo and Lawal, 2009). 142 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 The trend of electoral crisis varies according to the government in power. In 1993, the military president, Ibrahim Babangida conducted a free, fair and peaceful election, but due to sit-tight tendency of the military ruler, he annulled the election, which led to enormous outburst and violent protest by Nigerians. This culture of violence and crisis has not only been one of the country’s political behaviours, it has also been one of the potent causes of political decadence and underdevelopment in Nigeria. From 1999, with the passing of new federal constitution, Nigeria moved to civilian rule with democratic elections in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. However, all of these elections were damaged by widespread electoral crises. By many accounts, these elections were far from being free and fair. The various incidences of election crises witnessed in Nigeria were products of a political process, where candidates will always want to win, but not ready to accept defeat. Losers in elections who felt cheated usually become frustrated and aggrieved at the winner and are ready to inflict injury or death on persons and destruction to properties (Abegunde, 2007). Both Nigeria’s federal and state elections were marred by serious incidents of crises. The scale of the crises questioned the credibility of these elections. In 2003, at least one hundred people were killed and many injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria. In 2007, over 300 people were killed in the course of presidential and gubernatorial elections (Paul and Pedro, 2008). In July 2005, two persons were killed in Gombi Local Government Area of Adamawa State when supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) clashed in the aftermath of a bye-election as a result of electoral manipulation levelled against the PDP by supporters of the ANPP. Also, on October 14 and 15, 2005, two persons were killed in the wake of the PDP’s Ward and Local Government Congresses in Edo-State. In 2007, there were various electoral crises across the nation, these include crisis in Ondo State as a result of protest by the people against the result of gubernatorial election, the same thing also happened in Ekiti State. The crises in Oyo and Osun States were not different from that of Ondo and Ekiti States. In Sokoto State, there was crisis that emanated from disputed gubernatorial election result. In Kogi State, It was a theatre of war etc. 143 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The 2011 general elections in Nigeria were not free from crisis. These strategies of causing electoral crisis are used predominantly by the incumbent party and are deployed most vigorously where the electoral contest is expected to be particularly tight. Although, electoral crises have not been the exclusive preserve of the ruling party, candidates and supporters of the larger opposition parties also carry out the acts of violence in the pursuit of electoral victory. Furthermore, whenever crisis is instigated by supporters of one party whether ruling or the opposition, their opponents usually do not hesitate to respond. (Lawal, 2014). Election Crises Relationship and Democratic Consolidation: The Parallel Election is one of the key pillars of democracy. It is the means of translating the critical element of equality of citizens in democratic societies into relating through ‘one person, one vote’, in the constitution of the elective offices of the state. However, this is so only, if elections are free, fair and credible (Alemika, 2011). Electoral crisis is the employment of force by political parties or their supporters to intimidate opponents contrary to electoral law and threat to a democratic regime and has often accounted for seizure of political power by the use of undemocratic means, while democratic consolidation is perceived to be a situation in which democracy has become irreversible, a situation, which political actors and citizens abide by the rules and norms of democratic procedures and only seek to resolve their differences by constitutional means. This aptly describes the ethos and values of democracy. Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable to note that electoral crisis and democratic consolidation are two parallel lines that cannot meet; they are contrapuntal to each other. Democracy as understood can only be consolidated in a peaceful political atmosphere devoid of rancour and crisis of any kind. It is however unfortunate that the incessant crises and conflict in Nigerian politics are derived on the missing link between democratic consolidation and the electoral processes meant to complement democratic ethos in order to consolidate democracy. The electoral processes have been subjected to 144 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 various manipulations resulting to crisis such that the emerged leaders have failed to command the support, obedience and cooperation of the people. The emergence of such leaders cannot but pave way for electoral crises, which consequently obstruct democratic consolidation. Democracy is all about people, the power of the people to determine whom their leaders will be. It is sacrosanct and can only be expressed in an atmosphere devoid of conflicts, threats and crises. Causes of Election Crises in Nigeria Winners take all syndrome: politicians and political parties go about their electioneering campaign in a way and manner that suggest that losing is an abomination (Lawal, 2010). This is more so because politicians that lose at the polls are usually shut out from power and influence by the party in power. This practice of politics of exclusion and its implications propel the resolve of politicians to employ any means to be victorious at the polls. Sit tight syndrome: This has become a phenomenon in Nigerian politics. This is a situation in which an individual tries to hold on to power for personal aggrandizement or gains. In an attempt to hold on to power, leaders often create crises during election. They organize political thugs, hooligans to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them if they become intransigent (Oyetope, 2003). Poverty and unemployment: A vast majority of the populace is poor and unemployed; so, some of them cannot easily resist the temptation to engage in act that can cause crises for a fee. Pre-bendal politics: In Nigeria, politics is conceived as an investment. The politicians having invested colossally on political activities coupled with the existing system of winner takes all would want to win at all cost. The need to cause crisis to rig or destabilize election becomes inevitable, especially when such politicians are not popular. Others are; refusal to accept electoral defeat in good faith, disenfranchisement due to inadequate voting materials at the poll, absence of issue-oriented electioneering 145 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis campaigns, electoral fraud, such as rigging before, during and after voting (Lawal, 2007). Effects of Election Crises on Democratic Consolidation Election crises have been a cog in the wheel of democratic consolidation in Nigeria since 1999. Democracy would be meaningless and its consolidation will also be hampered if the individual does not have the right to choose among competing candidates for positions of government leadership. The manipulations and subsequent crises that bedevilled the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections are capable of truncating democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Election in this regard cannot guarantee support, acceptability and cooperation that are essential to elicit democratic consolidation. Election crises retard political, economic and social growth and development. It causes insecurity of lives and properties. Many people have died, while some have lost valuable properties in the course of election crises. Democracy, when consolidated guarantee security, but consolidation of democracy cannot thrive in a violent environment. Election crisis is capable of creating conflict in the society among the people. It can cause inter-party conflict, inter-group conflict and intra-group conflict; it can lead to breakdown of law and order, which are capable of affecting the consolidation of democracy. Election crises destroy democracy and its virtues, which has negative consequence on democratic consolidation. Democracy cannot thrive in crises let alone consolidate in crises. Conclusion Efforts have been made in this chapter to discuss election crises and democratic consolidation in Nigeria since 1999. It was evident that crises have enveloped our electoral processes since 1999. The elections conducted within these periods were marked with cases of electoral fraud and marred with cases of crises. Unfortunately, the hard earned democracy since 1999 had refused to be consolidated; rather it had been subjected to mockery and violence. The politicians who are in power have refused to understand the 146 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 game of democracy as a winning and losing game. They manipulate election results at will. Therefore, elections become subject of crises, which further inhibit democratic consolidation. It has been demonstrated in this study that well organized, credible and acceptable election results contribute significantly to democratic consolidation and its sustainability by building confidence and trust into the democratic process. Based on this, we make the following suggestions; • The constitution should be amended and Electoral Act reviewed to make Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) truly independent and not a tool in the hand of the president. The electoral body must indeed be impartial in the conduct and organization of elections. This will engender the confidence of all parties in electoral competition. • The commission should also make adequate and timely provision of electoral materials needed for the conduct of elections so as to prevent eligible voters from disenfranchisement. There must be constant review of voters register to ensure that those who are qualified to vote are allowed to do so in order to avoid unnecessary crises during voting. The body must also make proper recruitment of the requisite calibre of electoral personnel with adequate training and timely orientation, as this in a way minimizes incidences of partisanship and outright connivance of officials in the perpetration of electoral irregularities. • The Nigerian political class must also stop seeing winning an election as a matter of life and death, where the incumbent would use any means possible to ensure that he retains power, while the opponent would also use the same means to unseat the incumbent. Political education of the voters is very important for a sustainable democratic consolidation. INEC, National Orientation Agency (NOA) civil society organizations and other relevant agencies should step up public enlightenment on the evil of electoral crises and its effects on democracy. Politicians should imbibe the spirit of tolerance, maturity and accommodation. There is need to embrace dialogue as a veritable tool for resolving conflict. Electoral defeat should be accepted without rancour and 147 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis bitterness. All perpetrators of electoral crises, regardless of their political affiliation must be punished to serve as deterrence to others. Government should create employment opportunities so as to reduce the high level of poverty in the Nigerian society. Finally, since democracy is about ensuring good life and peaceful co-existence, there is need for us to embrace peace and reject crises during election so as to consolidate the hard earned democracy. 148 Election Crises and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria Since 1999 References Abegunde, O. (2007) “Electoral Politics and Political Violence in Nigeria” in Omotoso F. (Ed) Readings in Political Behaviour, Ibadan, Johnmof Printers Ltd. Adeyemo, D. (2008) “Institutionalizing Democratic Governance Through Effective Management of Public Resources: The Role of Legislator” A Chapter Delivered on Constitutional Review, Akure, June 23-24, 2008. Alemika, E. (2011) “Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and Electoral Violence in Nigeria” in Olurode, L and Jega A. (Eds) Security Challenges of Election Management in Nigeria, Abuja. The Independent National Electoral Commission Headquarters. Ajayi, A. (2005) “Electoral Processes” in Agagu A. and Omotoso .F (Eds) Citizenship Education and Governmental Process, Ado Ekiti, University of Ado Ekiti GST Unit. Ajayi, K. (1998) “Problems of Democracy and Electoral Politics in Nigeria” in Kolawole .D. (Ed) Issues in Nigerian Government and Politics, Ibadan, Dekaal Publishers. Appadorai, A. (1975). The Substance of Politics, New Delhi, Oxford University Press. Arowolo, D. and Lawal, T. (2009) “Political Violence and Democratization in Nigeria (2003-2004) Journal of Contemporary Politics, 2(1) 172181. Baker, B. (2000) “Can Democracy in Africa be Sustained?” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 38(3). Bako, S. (1997) “Problem of Democracy in Nigeria: Cultural Imperatives and Impediments” In Yakubu, N. and Igoli, I. (Eds) Culture and Democracy, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press. Beetham, D. (1999) “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation” Review of Africa Political Economy 3(2). Bentley, F. (1975) “Group Theory” in Varma, S. (Ed0 Modern Political Theory, New. Delhi, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd. Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press. Dugan, M. (2004) “Aggression” retrieved http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/aggression. 149 from Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Ezera, K. (1960) Constitutional Development in Nigeria, London, Cambridge, University Press. Gurr, T. (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press. Heywood, A. (1997) Politics, London, Macmillan Press Ltd. Key, V. (1960) Political Parties and Pressure Groups, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co. Lawal, T. (2014) “Electoral Violence, Democracy and Development in Nigeria” International Journal of Social Sciences and Communication Studies 1(1) 13-21. Lawal, T. and Abe, O. (2010) “The 2007 General Elections in Nigeria: The Implication” Academic Leadership 8(3) 1-8. Lawal, T. (2007) “Thuggery and Violence in Nigeria Politics” in Omotoso, F. (Ed) Readings in Political Behaviour, Ibadan, Johnof Printers Ltd. Lawal, T. (2005) “The 2003 General Elections in Ondo State, Nigeria” Unpublished M.Sc Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. Lawal, G. (2003) “Governance and Electoral Process in Nigeria” in the Journal of International Politics and Development, 1(2). LEMT (2003) A Report of 2003 General Election by Nigeria Labour Election Monitoring Team, NLC Abuja. Oquaye, M. (2000) “The Process of Democratization in Contemporary Ghana”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38(3). Oyatope, S. (2003) “The Sit-Tight Readership and Stability of Nigeria in Kwanshie (Ed) Politics and Political Power Relations in Nigeria, Zaria, Dat and Partners Ltd. Paul and Pedro (2008) Votes and Violence Experimental Evidence from a Nigeria Election. Retrieved from unser oxac.uk econpco/research/ newsdesk/1182587htm. 150  9 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy Mike Omilusi Introduction Nigeria’s dilemma has deep historical roots. Like most African states, Nigeria was an artificial creation of colonialism, including some 250 ethnic and linguistic groups, of which three –the north-western Hausa-Fulani, south-western Yoruba, and south-eastern Igbo – became dominant rivals. The stresses of ethnic and regional competition led to political turbulence and civil war in the late 1960s, and these tensions have influenced the nation’s politics in succeeding years (The Carter Centre and NDI, 1999:13). Polazzo (2014) asserts that Nigeria is one of the most fragmented countries in the world. Its division, as Lewis (1994) observed, is largely along overlapping religious and ethnic lines. Regionalism has continued to define and characterize political party politics in post-independent Nigeria, especially in determining where the President, Vice President, Senate President or Speaker of the House of Representative should come from (Golwa, 2013:5). As its history reveals, democratic struggles are not new in Nigeria. In colonial and post-colonial times, Nigerians waged unceasing struggles against colonial officials, warrant chiefs, native authorities, international Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis financial institutions and big business, as well as military rule. These struggles focused on the denial of political and civil rights, excruciating taxation, poor living and working conditions and, above all, military authoritarianism (IDEA, 2001:7). Evaluating the trend line of Nigerian democracy requires a critical yet realistic perspective about the many barriers confronting Nigerian democrats. Indeed, in addition to overcoming the authoritarian legacies of colonial and military rule, the enormous size, ethnic diversity, and political complexity of Nigeria would daunt even the most talented and committed democratic reformers (USAID, 2006:1). Elections are central to democratic transition and help to democratically manage diversity in four main ways—participation, representation, leadership rotation and fulfilment of local needs and aspirations (UNECA, 2013:47). Also, elections offer the opportunity for citizens to choose freely between several programmes or policies presented by several parties or candidates. Holding elections in Nigeria presents many challenges, not least the large size of the electorate, the limited infrastructure, low literacy levels, and an environment that is characterised as violent and corrupt. There are also complex ethnic, religious and geographical divides (Independent Electoral Assessment Team, 2010:1). There are about 250 ethnic formations in Nigeria. They share various similarities in cosmology, culture, economy and politics. They also differ in a number of ways. The challenge that the leadership of the country has faced before and since independence is that of: harnessing the similarities among them for national unity; managing their differences to ensure harmony; streamlining their internal structures and inter-relationships to entrench a democratic culture. Unfortunately, the similarities have often been ignored and the differences overplayed among the different cultural formations (IDEA, 2001:90). In poor and under-developed countries, democracy is not just a system of government. It is the vehicle conveying the people from despair and poverty to hope and security. It does that through the institutions of election, popular representation and political accountability (Katsina, 2015:7). Though electoral activity is judged by some scholars to facilitate democratic learning, consolidation is inevitably a much longer-term process. What matters more is what happens once a new leader is in place. 152 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy In this respect, a common critique in parts of Africa has concerned the prevalence of diminished forms of democracy whereby polls are held to lend a veneer of legitimacy to what may otherwise be highly undemocratic regimes (Haenlein, 2015). In Nigeria, as Orji (2015) noted, “elections are not yet primarily characterised by voters’ rational choice between policy proposals. They are therefore not yet issue-driven in the strict sense of the term. Rather, the electoral contest is characterised more by a convergence of policy directions”. Indeed, most Nigerian voters lack the requisite knowledge to freely and independently vote for credible leaders. Most Nigerians vote on the basis of party and ethnicity. The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, the historical brief of electoral politics in Nigeria is examined. Second, I analyse the interplay between electoral democracy and ethnic politics, drawing from scholarly works on the subject matter. Third, a review of how voting in the country is tinted with ethnic considerations, through the manipulation of the elite, is carried out. Fourth, the discussion about the citizens’ right to stand for elective posts in any part of the country- which has always been a contentious issue- is brought to the fore. Fifth, the 1993 presidential election which appears to be an exception to ethnic voting syndrome is analysed, stating the propelling/circumstantial factors for such. The next section discusses the implications of the foregoing on sustainable democracy while the last section concludes the essay with some suggestions. Electoral Politics in Nigeria: Historical Perspective Political party originated in Nigeria and most colonial states as nationalist movements. Thus, when the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), believed by many to be the first political party in Nigeria, was formed by Herbert Macaulay in 1923, it was partly in reaction to the elective principle introduced by the Sir Clifford Constitution of 1922 and partly in response to the need to form a rallying point for the emergent educated class and students in the impending struggle against colonial rule (Ikeanyibe, 2008:78). At this time, election was restricted to the municipalities – Lagos and Calabar with grossly unacceptable elitist prerequisite for franchise 153 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis which required the electorates to be resident in Lagos and Calabar, have an income of $100.00, among other things. Nigeria’s first general elections were held in 1959 when the British colonial authorities were preparing to hand over power to a local political leadership under the parliamentary system of government. The dominant political parties then were the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG); there were also other opposition parties. The second general elections in 1964 were marked by boycotts in many areas. This led to the end of the First Republic in January 1966 and a military takeover of power. During the first republic, the Federal Republic of Nigeria adopted a parliamentary system of government- the type of her colonial master. This lasted for six years until the military coup flushed it out owning to political unrest. After 13 years of military rule, the military under the Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime was faithful to a transition to civilian rule. This transition programme produced a constitution which provided for, among other things, an executive president fashioned after the American model. General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over power to a civilian government headed by President Shehu Shagari. This was the birth of the second republic on October 1, 1979. The subsequent elections in 1983 were characterised by widespread electoral irregularities and other malpractices. Opposition parties such as the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian Peoples Party, the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) and later the Nigeria Advanced Party (NAP), as well as the civil society decried the election results and violence erupted in some parts of the country. As observed by Iyayi (2004:23), the 1983 election was among the most chaotic ever held in the country. The NPN led by Shagari governed as a minority; there was lack of cooperation between the NPN-dominated federal government and the 12 states controlled by opposition parties. On December 31, 1983, the military seized power once again amidst allegations of fraud associated with Shagari's re-election in 1983. Thus, the second republic was succeeded by a military junta led by Major- General Muhammadu Buhari and Brigadier 154 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy Tunde Idiagbon as the head of state and Chief of staff, supreme headquarters, respectively. As noted by (Iseghohime (2009:5), the regime failed to come up with a plan to hand over power to the civilian government. A palace coup took place on the 27th of August, 1985, to oust Buhari and Idiagbon. The new regime was headed by Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. As part of the move towards full civilian government, state governors and legislative bodies were elected during 1992 and 1993. This returned the thirty states to civilian rule, but left the military in federal control. In June 1993, a federal election was held to elect a president (Geddes, 2010:6). Nigeria faced its worst crisis since the civil war after military ruler General Ibrahim Babangida, in his reluctance to leave power, annulled presidential elections in 1993, adjudged free and fair by local and international observers (one of the sections discusses this further). Babangida was forced to leave power by massive protests but in the ensuing turmoil, he handed over power to the Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, in August 26, 1993. Ten weeks later, on November 17, 1993, General Sani Abacha took over power following the resignation of Chief Ernest Shonekan. Abacha unleashed even greater repression and began a process to transform himself from military to civilian ruler and thus, it was no surprise that he succeeded in gaining the nomination of all recognized political parties for the presidential elections to be held in the late 1990s.(IRIN, 2003). However, he was not able to reap the benefits of his manoeuvring, as he died in June 1998, before the elections were held. He was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who freed the detainees jailed during Abacha’s reign and got the constitution building process back on track (Simpkins, 2004:8). Only three (of 24) parties were registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1999 and contested the general elections: The People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Alliance for Democracy (AD) and All People's Party (APP) (European Parliament, 2015). Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar permitted the conduct of local government elections in December 1998, state legislative elections followed in January 1999, and the federal legislative and presidential 155 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis elections in February 1999 which completed the transition to civilian government. Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president on the platform of Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) that won majority of seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives (Soboyejo, 2014:3). It is argued that the military doused ethnic tensions in the country, but failed to suppress ethnic consciousness among the populace. Ake (2000:105) opines that “the military failed to stem the tide of ethnic consciousness partly because of its blockage to democracy”. The return of the country to civilian rule in 1999, therefore, ushered in a renewed hope that the lost opportunities for political progress and economic development squandered by successive despotic military regimes would be regained with the unleashing of the creative energies of the people in a new era of governance and democracy (Adejumobi, 2010:1). Following democratic elections in 1999, the country experienced rapid political improvements and for a short while outperformed the majority of its neighbours in terms of democratic governance. Since these elections, however, democratization has stalled in Nigeria. Corruption is rampant at all levels of government, and the authorities’ often heavy-handed response to Islamist militancy has had perverse effects on the rights of citizens. Today, Nigeria ranks 27th out of 50 sub-Saharan African countries and territories in the Freedom in the World report (Freedom House, March 25, 2015). Electoral Democracy and Ethnic Politics: The Nexus Democratic governance is an electoral contract between the governors and the governed through free and fair elections because qualified citizens in democratic societies have the constitutional right to elect who leads them. The electorates can also negotiate the terms of governance with political candidates by the choice of who they vote for or against (Ifukor, 2010:404). Clapham (1993:32) posits that democracy is a process that requires consensus building among all stakeholders. It involves an agreement over the management of political competition, including competition to hold the major offices in a particular nation, by means short of escalated violence, save in very limited and containable circumstances. It calls for accountability of rulers to the governed according to procedures 156 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy which are broadly accepted by those rulers, and which can be enforced on them should they dissent. For Horowitz (1994) however, democracy is basically about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. While the spirit of competition may be seen as healthy for democracy, anchoring this competition on ethnicity or ethnic factors may be counterproductive to the movement towards democratisation and democracy, and that ethnic conflict may negate the developmental function of democracy (Anugwom 2000:67 cited in Agbu, 2011:10). As observed by Horowitz (1994:6 cited in Agbu, 2011:13), given the dilemma of multiparty politics, it is reasonable to maintain that in ethnically divided societies, majority rule will not be a solution but a problem, because it permits the domination of one group, which is in the majority, over the others. This creates some sort of fear among the dominated groups, which could lead to conflict. Ethnicity exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groups; it involves a common consciousness of being one in relation to the other interacting groups (Nnoli, 1995:2). Studies have focused principally on the reciprocal impact of ethnicity and multi-party democracy. Some argue that multi-party democracy reinforces ethnicity, and therefore there is a negative impact of multi-partism on ethnicity (Wolfinger, 1965; Parenti, 1967 cited in Ibeanu, 2000:55). But others insist that ethnicity has a positive link with multi-party democracy, and that democracy offers an auspicious context for the management of ethnicity, particularly through a policy of equalitarian pluralism (Osaghae, 1986; Schwarz, 1979 cited in Ibeanu, 2000:55). Horowitz defines ethnic parties as those that derive their support from an identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group. “To be an ethnic party, a party does not have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members. It is how that party’s support is distributed, not how the ethnic group’s support is distributed, that is decisive” (Horowitz 1985:293). Most African states are multi-ethnolinguistic societies where both the ‘major’ and ‘minor’ ethnicities are locked-up in a protracted competition 157 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis for the control of state power, larger access to scarce resources, both social and material at the expense of others (Badmus, 2009:10). Elections in developing countries are often characterized by clientelism—the practice of garnering the vote of constituencies through gifts and the promise of favours and patronage. Research in economics and political science suggests that such targeted redistribution is inefficient but electorally effective (Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013:241). The persistence of clientelistic and ethnic politics in Africa’s emerging democracies does not preclude substantial improvements in developmental governance. Clientelism and ethnicity are both often associated with poor governance, in that they tend to encourage competition for a fixed basket of particularistic benefits, at the expense of providing more generally welfareenhancing public goods (Clapham 1982; Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983). As observed by Ndegwa (1997), Africans are members of two types of political communities in the same temporal and spatial world. On the one hand, they are members of their civic republican community which is often their ethnic or community group and to which they owe some obligations. At the same time, they are members of the modern national state. Horowitz (1993:18) argues that the bond of ethnicity has a strong direct impact on electoral behaviour in ethnically-segmented societies, generating a long-term psychological sense of party loyalty anchoring citizens to parties, where casting a vote becomes an expression of group identity. Ethnicity and the inordinate passion weaved around it are no strange elements to Nigeria. The socio-political history of Nigeria has been a study in the dynamic, divisive and deepening role of the ethnic factor in the state building project (Anugwom, 2003:5). It is however, argued that nothing is inherently conflictual about ethnic differences. They lead to strife only when they are politicized, and it is elites who politicize ethnicity in their quest for power and political support (see Claude Ake, 2002). David Lamb (1984:9) argues that: African leaders deplore ethnocentrism. They call it the cancer that threatens to eat out the very fabric of the nation. Yet almost every African politician, practices it, most African presidents 158 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy are more ethnic chief than national statesman, and it remains perhaps the most potent force in dayto-day African life. It is a factor in political struggles and distribution of resources. It often determines who gets jobs, who gets promoted, who gets accepted to a university, because by its very definition ethnicity implies sharing among members of the extended family, making sure that your own are looked after first. To give a job to a fellow ethnic member is not nepotism, it is an obligation. For a political leader to choose his closest advisers and bodyguards from the ranks of his own ethnic group is not patronage, it is a good common sense. It ensures security, continuity, and authority. The introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s opened a competition that has shaped the context of struggle for political power among the political leaders and ethnic communities. Under the influence of ethnic politics, voters do not appeal to the criteria of economic performance, health services, education and the common good. The important concern for them is enabling their members to control the state (Aquiline, 2008:8). Evidence suggests Nigeria is not an exception. This has been a seemingly permanent feature of Nigeria’s electoral democracy since independence. The language of Nigerian politics, according to Ibrahim (2007:11), is often expressed within the syndrome of ethno-regional domination. It is a language whose grammar is defined by two elements. The first is the control of political power and its instruments such as the armed forces and the judiciary. The second is the control of economic power and resources. Both are powerful instruments that are used to influence the authoritative allocation of resources to groups and individuals It is a truism that Nigeria is the most populous African state and one of the world’s most ethnically diverse societies. Formally, these groups were agglomerated into a single political unit in 1914, but integration among them was minimal because Britain’s policy of “indirect rule” sustained and even magnified differences between them (USAID, 2006:3). It is affirmed that challenges arise not because diverse groups live together, or share the 159 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis same national territory. They arise when tensions among groups lead to inefficient political decision making as well as to disproportionate access to material resources and patronage (UNDP 2004). The Nigerian political elites, who inherited the powers of the colonialists at independence in 1960, continued this manipulation of ethnic differences for their own selfish interests. In the process, they succeeded in creating the false impression that various politicians and political parties were champions of the interests of the ethnic formations for which they spoke, and that the struggles of these parties for political dominance represented the struggles of their various ethnic groups for ascendance in society. They covertly and even openly used emotive ethnic symbols and played on negative feelings arising from alleged ethnic conflicts of interest, as a means of mobilizing mass support for their own personal interests (IDEA, 2001:93). Many political elites dispense public and private resources and services through patronage networks that perpetuate political exclusion. The "winner-takes-all" style of politics raises the stakes and encourages politicians to exploit ethnic, religious and regional identities to achieve political office and power (NDI, 2015). As documented by Lewis (2011:8): Political competition is organised around personalities and parochial appeal, which are typically pursued through the use of money, intimidation and the compromise of election authorities. Local notables or “godfathers” frequently anoint candidates and furnish resources for capturing elections. In consequence, the party system has evolved as a set of clusters among competing elites rather than a vehicle for voter preferences or political choice. It can then be said that regional leaders employed ethnic affiliations for selfish reasons. This has brought about political instability as a result of the fad that Nigeria is a heterogeneous society with a high population running into over 180 million people, whereby inter-ethnic rivalry have always heated the polity. It has been argued that the first military coup of 1966 was ethnically calculated to affect a particular region and among the reasons 160 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy alluded to this was the fact that the majority of those that were assassinated were Northerners (Osaghae, 1998). During the colonial period, political parties were formed along ethnic lines. Apparently, the British colonial administrators’ ethnic policy and the regional autonomy reinforced the division of the three regions; a factor which contributed to ethno-regional character of governance in Nigeria (Igbuzor; 2011). For instance, the 1959 Federal elections were marred with the problem of ethnicity in the sense that no single party was able to have majority vote to rule the country. The 1959 election results were: the NPC 134, the NCNC 89, the AG 73, while the remaining 16 seats went to the independent candidates (Dudley, 1982: 61). The election results confirmed the assertion that these parties were regionally based parties; thereby relying on ethnic supports from their respective region. At this particular point, ethnicity was seen by the political elite as the basis of their electoral support, while the electorates themselves favoured politicians from their ethnic stock (Badmus, 2009:14). Thus, at independence, regionalism structured on ethnic and regional politics had become the organizing principle of Nigeria’s political and electoral behaviour. Thus, economic, administrative, and political resources were distributed, and ethnic and regional politics grounded in three main separate political parties, with purely regional character (Lergo, 2011:89). It is observable therefore, that ethnicity, from independence, has remained an impediment in the process of nation building in Nigeria. Right from the "divide and rule" tactics introduced into the polity by the British, it has led to the emergence of regional and ethnic leaders and this led to a situation whereby parties at the time of independence were ethnically based (Sklar, 1983 cited in Odeh, n.d:138). The three main political parties during the First republic (1960-66) were seriously afflicted by ethnicity and were regionally based, with Nigeria People’s Congress (NPC), National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) being more popular and obtaining their support from and dispensing patronage to people of the North, East and West respectively. Politics then has been correctly described largely as one that was based on a tripod, which eventually constituted one of the major reasons for the collapse of that 161 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis republic through the first Nigerian military coup of January 15, 1966 (Olagunju, 1992). The resumption of party politics in 1979 did not change the orientation of the politicians (Omoweh, 2015:11) even though political parties were required to have certain characteristics before they could be registered for the elections. Amongst other requirements, they had to demonstrate that they were genuinely Nigeria-wide parties, with active party organisation in each of the nineteen states. The range of requirements was detailed and aimed at ensuring that politics could not devolve into competition for power between major regions (Beckett 1987). However, the trend of undemocratic and ethnic-based party leadership, violent elections and corruption that characterized the First Republic was prevalent during the Second Republic headed by an NPN-led Shehu Shagari government (Omoweh, 2015:11). In other words, ethnic coloration and affiliation played out in political parties’ formation and electoral behaviour during the second Republic as voting patterns followed ethnic lines in the elections. Nigeria’s struggles for sustainable democracy, good governance, and development have been so daunting that all previous attempts at democratic transition have been futile. The collapse of the First (1960–6) and Second (1979–83) republics, and the abortion of the Third Republic through the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election, are clear indicators of the failure of previous attempts at democratization (Osaghae,1999: 7). Perhaps to allay fears of domination in the present political dispensation, most Nigerian political parties have written or unwritten zoning and power rotation arrangements in which the parties agree that key offices and candidates should be produced by designated sections of the country for a certain number of years (Adibe 2015:4). Voting with Ethnic Sentiments in Nigeria: A Brief Overview For decades, Nigeria was governed by a succession of military governments and transitions in power happened through coups. Since 1999, however, Nigeria has had a civilian government with leadership determined by elections. It should be noted however, that elections are not synonymous 162 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy with democracy but are an important ingredient of a functioning democratic system. For this, elections need to be transparent and acceptable to all the contesting political parties and to the electorate (IDEA, 2001:1). The issue of election has become very important in political discourse because it constitutes the fulcrum upon which rests the survival of democracy. In Nigeria today, tribalism has been elevated to dominate national discourse, controls how people think and talk, and determines what they oppose or support. It is promoted by the political elites, embraced by the young and the old, passed from generation to generation, and even has base in the constitution. The ethnic diversity of Nigeria has more or less been a threat rather than a source of national pride and development. (Adeyanju, 2014:2). Ethnic and regional politics had been nurtured since colonial era with new trends and dimensions taking place in the contemporary era. Political parties and candidates are easily perceived as representatives of a particular ethnic or religious group and voting pattern in Nigeria largely mirrors the various cleavages in the country – North-South, ChristianMuslim, among others (Olayode, 2015:4). Tribalism has been described as political curse on Africa. Tribalism calls that we are Fulani, Yoruba, Ijaw, Hausa, Tiv, Igbo, Ibibio, and the other tribes, but not Nigerians. The same applies to all African states that have tribal identification and outlook (Eleke 2005). Nnoli (1980:176) captures this development especially in relation to Nigeria’s ethno-political trajectory thus: Most Nigerians have come to believe that unless their 'own men' are in government they are unable to secure those socio-economic amenities that are disbursed by the government. Hence, governmental decisions about the siting of industries, the building of roads, award of scholarships, and appointments to positions in the public services, are closely examined in terms of their benefits to the various ethnic groups in the country. In fact, there has emerged a crop of 'ethnic watchers' who devote much of their time 163 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis and energy to assessing the differential benefits of the various groups from any government project. In his analysis, Anugwom (2003:5) contends that the failure or otherwise of a candidate in election is seen as the failure or otherwise of his own group. Even in the contest for political positions within a given geographical zone or state in the country, intra-ethnic and primordial factors are usually utilized in defining the aspiration of the candidates as those of their primary social groups. Anugwom explains further that: Logic and the wisdom of hindsight would suggest that politicians in Nigeria with a notable history of mediocre performance see the ethnic factor as an attractive selling point. In this case, the ethnic factor and primordial considerations come into play and over-shadow the more important issues of performance, antecedents and service Nigerian politicians are more interested in the ends rather than the means of achieving power. ‘Get power by all means, the rest will be sorted out’, goes the popular Nkrumahist saying amongst politicians. There are different, albeit crosscutting, manifestations of the struggles for power: for instance, between the ruling party and the opposition; politicians from the ‘populous’ north and the more ‘educated’ south; majority and minority ethnic groups; resource-bearing and ‘resource-guzzling’ constituencies; as well as Muslims and Christians (Tar and Shettima, 2010:141). The 2015 elections, while improving the chances of national reconciliation, also laid bare some ugly aspects of Nigerian politics. Of particular note is the tendency of candidates to inflame sectional tensions, whether ethnic, regional or religious (Downie, 2015). It was possibly the most divisive election, drawing Nigerians into a devious web of mudslinging as well as ethnic and religious chauvinism (Premium Times, 2015). The emergence of APC, according to Orji and Iwuamadi (2015:6), further divided Nigerians regionally and religiously. To boost its appeal to northern Muslims, the party nominated Muhammadu Buhari, former military leader from the north-western state of Katsina to challenge PDP’s candidate President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian from the Niger Delta region. By 164 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy so doing, a race between northern and southern candidates was set up. Salawu and Hassan (2011:32), however, argue that “ethnic politics has less prominence than it had in the first and second Republics. This may not be unconnected with the informal rotation arrangement of principal political offices of the federation among the six geo-political zones in the country”. Also, this could be seen from the 1999 Presidential Election in which the presidential candidates of the three political parties, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) hailed from the same ethnic group, Yoruba. The PDP, widely regarded as the party of the military had a retired General and former head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo as its candidate, while APP/AD coalition fielded a consensus candidate, Chief Olu Falae. This consensual arrangement by the elites was seen by many political observers as a compensation for annulment of June 12 1993 presidential election, which was believed to have been won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola from the South-West. Right to Vote and Be Voted for: The Ethnic Dimension It is argued that most of the political constituencies in Nigeria are conterminous with ethnic homeland. As such, it is easy for candidates to contest elections without any program but their ethnic credentials of being ‘the son of the soil’. In this case, they utilize ethnic appeals and idioms to solicit votes, emphasizing the neglect of their respective ethnic groups of which they promise to rectify on assumption of office, thus promoting the ‘us versus them’ syndrome (IDEA, 2003 cited in Metumara, 2010:95). Ndegwa (1997:54) attributes ethnic voting in Africa to the dual citizenship that exists in African states. A situation where one has to refer to one’s ethnic enclave to enjoy certain benefits which are not granted elsewhere, this tends to create dual loyalties within the same country. Powell (1976) argues that where a voter's social class, ethnic group, and religion are associated with consistent political interests, it is likely for that person to be a strong supporter of one of the political parties. Today, in the daily experiences, the classification of Nigerians into indigenes and settlers only indicates who is native to particular locality and 165 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis who is not. It creates problems because the classification is a basis for citizenship rights, entitlements and access to opportunities. Nigerians’ daily experiences are replete with tales of denial, exclusion and discrimination of some groups on the one hand, and access, inclusion and a sense of belonging by other groups on the other. One of the greatest form of discrimination against non-indigenes is seen standing for elective posts— while non-indigenes can vote, they are frequently not allowed to stand elections in their area of residence once it is established that they are nonindigene (Ali, 2010:5). Mustapha (1999) suggests that one possible approach to the national question is to take a cue from pre-colonial state formations which did not promote the indigene-settler distinction in identity formation, but granted full citizenship rights to non-natives that had settled and become important actors in their political economy. Citizenship is indeed, the social and legal link between individuals and their democratic political community. The status of citizenship involves important responsibilities and duties that have to be fulfilled, and where these are not fulfilled, democracy becomes disabled. Citizenship is a key to the comprehension of what democracy is and how it operates (Klusmeyer, 1996). However, the politics of claiming exclusive ownership of any locality has been described as baseless and short-sighted which will only deny people with genuine interests to give back to the society that made them and at the same time 'make positive and useful contribution to the community where he resides" (Ali, 2010:12). In Nigeria, there exists tension between the formal provisions in the constitution on citizenship and fundamental rights on the one hand, and the practical application of these rights because of the reality of difference introduced by the politically introduced dichotomy between elites seeking to increase their power by defining themselves as “indigenes” and “natives” through the definition of others as “settlers” and strangers (Imam et al, 2014:1040). The 1993 General Elections as Exception The transition to the Third Republic began with the setting up of a seventeen-member Political Bureau in 1986 to formulate a blueprint for the transition, based on ideas collated during a nationwide debate. In its report, 166 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy the bureau recommended that a socialist ideology be introduced through a process of social mobilization, that local governments be strengthened as an effective third tier of government, and that a two-party system be created. The government accepted the recommendations except for the proposal advocating socialism (See http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/76.htm). Two unique aspects of the transition program since 1989 require emphasis. One was the blanket ban placed on all former politicians and top political officeholders, especially those found guilty of abuse of office. To participate in the Third Republic, each prospective politician needed a clearance certificate from the Federal Electoral Commission. The second important factor was the decision to create in October 1989 two parties wholly run and financed by the state. After the ban on political activities was lifted in May 1989, a number of political associations were formed, and thirteen applied for registration. The requirements for registration were very strict. The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) acceded to the recommendations of the Political Bureau, augmenting them with the following as the logical basis for the two-party system: 1. Political associations were dominated by a few rich individuals; 2. associations were interested in serving their parochial interests instead of the nation; 3. the groups showed the very deficiencies of intolerance and selfaggrandizement which brought about the collapse of earlier experiments in democracy; 4. the associations paid little attention to the organizational structures at the grassroots level (Udogu, 1995:207). The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC, dissolved all the political associations and decreed two new parties--the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Presidential elections were held on 12 June 1993 as part of what was supposed to be a transition from military rule under Major General Ibrahim Babangida to a civilian government. The elections occurred without incident, despite an attempt by the Abuja High Court two days earlier to prevent them from taking place. The High Court continued its opposition to the process and, on 15 June, ordered the Electoral Commission not to release the election results. On 23 June, the government annulled the elections and Babangida remained in power until he appointed an Interim 167 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis National Government on 26 August 1993 (Simpkins, 2004:7). Before the elections, Babangida had taken Nigerians through what seemed like an endless transition programme, during which he banned and unbanned politicians, and formed and dissolved political associations. Abiola’s election seemed to have succeeded in reducing voting along ethnic and regional lines, as he was a Muslim from the south who won where northerners had dominated before him (Lergo, 2011:93). He did not only win in northern states such as Kano (where his opponent hailed from), Jigawa, Kaduna, Borno, Yobe, Plateau, Taraba and Benue but also won in such predominantly Christian states as Anambra, Edo, Delta, Cross River, and Ondo. The experience of the aborted Third Republic was an indication of existence of an inverse relationship between ethnicism and good governance. This is so because, it was the hope of good governance that Nigerians expected from M.K.O. Abiola that made them vote for him across the nation irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliations (Salawu ad Hassan, 2011:32). The popularity and general acceptability of the two candidates were tested through the unconventional “option A4”– election conducted hierarchically from the Ward level. According to Udogu (1995:211), it might be difficult to ascribe the result or success of Option 4 to astute political engineering. The fact, though, was that it was efficacious probably because the republic was suffering from electoral fatigue, and was determined to do whatever it took to consummate the process and consequently put a stop to the Babangida administration which had promised to hand over power to a civilian government on August 27, 1993. Revelations by the participants during the transition programme showed that the election was not only transparent and credible, but that the result represents a watershed in employing an election as an instrument of social engineering and national unity (Nwosu 2008; Jinadu, Olagunju and Oyovbaire 1993 cited in Bolaji, 2014:53). In his analysis of election administration during the Third Republic, Jinadu (2011 cited in Bolaji, 2015:53) observed that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was more compact, as its membership was based on ethno-regional zonal 168 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy representation rather than on state-by-state nomination. But even more decisively is the fact that the victorious ticket was a Muslim-Muslim ticket; a ticket that swept the votes across the country. In that sense the election marked a new beginning, and the realization of the mandate could have helped to lay afresh the foundation for a new Nigeria, where loyalty is to Nigeria citizenship and not to ethnic or religious origins (Gaskia, 2013). Implications of Ethnic Politics for Sustainable Democracy Democratization is a never-finished business. It is a process through which countries -democratic and semi-democratic-seek to build, refine and strengthen their institutions, processes and frameworks. As a contested political project, it is often marked by crises, contours, breakthroughs, reversals and resolutions. It is a process of change characterized by political contestations involving the political leadership, civil society, political organizations and forces as well as other social actors (Adejumobi 2010; Denk and Silander 2012). It has always been argued that one of the fundamental problems facing majority of post-colonial African states is that of how to sustain and consolidate their democracy through credible elections (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1989). Scheddler (1998:91) observes that in its original meaning, democratic consolidation was generally taken to be ‘the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual “reverse waves”. It is pretty difficult to place political parties in terms of origin, structure, organization and function. Rather than serving as springboard for consolidating democracy, what obtains is that the personal interests that bring their membership together cannot be reconciled through consensus because of human nature that is egoistic and acquisitive to paraphrase (Gbadegesin, 2013:64). For many years, the natural tendency of elites everywhere has been to monopolize power rather than to restrain it--through the development of transparent laws, strong institutions, and market competition. And once they have succeeded in restricting political access, these elites use their 169 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis consolidated power to limit economic competition so as to generate profits that benefit them rather than society at large. The result is a predatory state (Diamond, 2008). In such states, the behaviour of elites is cynical and opportunistic. If there are competitive elections, they become a bloody zero-sum struggle in which everything is at stake and no one can afford to lose. Ordinary people are not truly citizens but clients of powerful local bosses, who are themselves the clients of still more powerful patrons. Stark inequalities in power and status create vertical chains of dependency, secured by patronage, coercion, and demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and prejudice (Diamond, 2008). Nigeria’s great cultural diversity, however, is not in itself why consensus remains elusive. Class differences between the few rich (of all ethnicities) and the masses of poor create an environment in which culture-based competition flourishes. Grinding poverty amidst a centralized, oildependent economy, combined with the centralization of political power in the hands of the executive, exacerbate cultural differences and promote intense political competition. This economic and political centralization promotes a zero-sum perspective on politics that deepens the divisions among Nigerians. This makes it harder to achieve consensus on issues of common good (USAID, 2006:10). The trend of internal crisis within the part since 1999 shows that parties in Nigeria spend more time on reconciliatory process, than on a programme that would benefit the electorates. It is equally deduced that failure of political parties to embraced dialogue in resolving their internal crisis is antithetical to democratic consolidation. Since the principal tenet of democracy is the possibility it offers to resolve crisis through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even when they are irksome (IPU, 2006). In general, the outbreak of ethnic nationalism the world over dilutes the anticipated benefits of democratization. Furthermore, multiparty democracy appears to have heightened ethnic nationalism and has been associated with ethnic violence (Mbatia, Paul et al 2009:3). Ethnic nationalism threatens national patriotism as political elites increasingly mobilize citizens to participate in the political and electoral processes along ethnic lines. Citizens are now more conscious of their ethnic identity as opposed to their 170 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy national identity as citizens of their nation (ibid:9). Indeed, as argued by Berma (2010:14), all of the nationalist ideologies of postcolonial Africa ultimately failed to reconstruct an effectively hegemonic ‘national’ moral economy attached to a legitimate, widely trusted arena of civic politics in the state. Other consequences of ethnic nationalism, according to Ibrahim Babangida (Daily Trust, Nov 28, 2002), are wastage of enormous human and material resources in ethnically inspired violence, encounters, clashes and even battles, and increasing gaps in social relations among ethnic nationalities including structural suspicions and hate for one another. Ethnic nationalism is equally responsible for upspring of ethnic militias across the country. Aluko (2003) identifies the legacy of colonialism and monopoly of power by the major ethnic groups and their consequent marginalisation of the minority groups as major factors promoting ethnic nationalism in Nigeria. Thus, ethno-regional cleavages have continued to remain a major determinant of electoral outcome and related political issues with attendant implications for democratisation and nation building in Nigeria (Olayode, 2015:4). The fact remains that the winner-takes-all outcome of elections in systems without proportional representation in most states, increases smaller communities’ fear of domination by larger groups, the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth, and their ultimate exclusion from access to the state. Instead of reducing corruption, democratization allows it to reach new heights as elected politicians seek ‘our turn to eat’, and politics of the belly reveals the personal, materialistic and opportunistic character of politics and the relative unimportance of ideology, principal or policy in the circumscribed political arena (Berman, 2010:26). Though it is argued that the democratization process is seen to be on course, especially when elections come at regular intervals since 1999, but Sa’ad and Unom (2011:3) contend that the limitations of the political parties as institutional foundations of democracy and the irresponsibility of political actors have significantly weakened electoral democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Principal weaknesses of the party system include: the absence of internal democracy; exclusion and marginalization of women; weak financial accountability; lack of effective representation; 171 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis and resort to violence as means of political competition. In his analysis of party politics in Nigeria, Opadokun (2012:44) observes that “since 1999, party conventions have become nauseating scenarios, where government and party bigwigs exhibit personal wealth. Elective conventions are much more bizarre because there is usually the presence of out-spent and outbribed delegates who usually become praise singers at these events”. Thus, the maintenance of fair and equal procedures in the selection of party executive officers as well as their presidential and parliamentary candidates is, therefore, a microcosm of efforts towards enhancing democratic national elections. A political party whose delegates’ congress and primaries are characterized by antidemocratic practices or worse still, factional violence, has already failed in its duty to foster a violence- free election and build a culture of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict among its followers (AGR III Ghana Country Report 2012). Conclusion It is argued that years before the attainment of independence, Nigeria’s constitutional development experiences were concerned with the principal goal of managing ethnicity, which had shown clear signs of subverting the nation-building project. Federalism, the creation of regions and states and local governments, the shift from parliamentarism to presidentialism, the institutionalization of quota systems, the prohibition of ethnic political parties, consociational politicking, and the adoption of the federal character principle are some of the approaches that Nigeria has taken to manage ethnic diversity (Ukiwo, 2005:14). Golwa (2013:27) recommends good governance as a panacea to the challenge of manipulated and divisive forces confronting the country: Through provision of good governance, the society would evolve a mechanism that modifies the present system to suit our mental, social, economic and political development and ensure the miniaturizing of the potential of separation. Through the institutionalization of good governance, the means for orderly, credible and peaceful political transition in a democratic 172 Elections with Tribal Marks: Interrogating the Primordial Sentiments in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy setting, devoid of ethnic, religious or sectional rancour would evolve. Through it too, the rule of law will become a culture in the socio-political lives of the citizenry for an enduring polity Ordinary citizens, as posited by Richard Downie (2015:5), can advance electoral democracy by maintaining the impressive commitment shown during the elections. However, their civic responsibility should not end at the polling booth. In 2015, they displayed the power to hold elected officials accountable by voting them in or out of office. Building on that experience, they can, through active engagement and vigilance, further strengthen the connection between democracy and good governance. In his analysis, Chilee (2013) contends that “we must begin to identify ourselves as Nigerians first, before identifying our ethnic groups and national interest, not ethnic interest, should be given supreme importance. A deep understanding of the principles of citizenship must be shown by Nigerians. Power must also be decentralized rather than be concentrated in the hands of an unproductive and clustered centre, headed by the president.” Consolidating democracy and ensuring credible elections in Nigeria requires building the institutional capacity of the electoral commission, comprehensive and broad based electoral framework as well as controlling the level of violence through a framework that would give responsibility to all stakeholders with radical reprimand for failure (Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011:14). Activities to strengthen electoral management bodies can involve: creating an open dialogue process between the body and other stakeholders; supporting the monitoring of compliance with international professional best practices and legal requirements; and deterring fraud and intimidation (UNDP, 2009). Also, citizens must build links across ethnic and regional divides to challenge elitist hierarchies and rule by strongmen. This requires dense, vigorous civil societies, with independent organizations, mass media, and think tanks, as well as other networks that can foster civic norms, pursue the public interest, raise citizen consciousness, break the bonds of clientelism, scrutinize government conduct, and lobby for good-governance reforms (Diamond, 2008). Thus, as African scholars attend to the problem 173 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis of democratization and multiparty politics, they should also address the escalating problem of ethnic nationalism and violence. The overriding poser is how to manage multiparty democracy in multi-ethnic African states. As rightly posited by Mbatia, Paul et al (2009:12), the State, as a referee, must ensure checks and controls to prevent tyranny of the majority – by taming competing interests, limit the rise of ethnic nationalism, reduce the escalating problem of exclusion in the distribution of national resources. 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They are fundamental to modern democratic processes and represent an important engine-room of democratic practice because of their many functions without which democracy will be a farce. Little wonder Heywood (1997) describes them as the “major organizing principle” of modern (that is, democratic) politics. Moore (2002, cited in Omotola, 2010:129) argues that political parties perform three major groups or levels of functions, namely electorate-related functions, government-related functions and linkage-related functions. Perhaps due to these inclusive functions of political parties in democracies, Sartori (1976:41) made a rather persuasive case for political parties, warning that “the masses cannot be kept out indefinitely, but it is useful to involve them. If their enmity is dangerous, their indifference is wasteful. Parties may be repressed, but the problems raised by politicization remain. And a party-less polity cannot cope, in the long run, with a politicized society”. Emphasizing the electorate-related, democratic participation functions of political parties, another scholar submits that: Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Political parties…have a most crucial role to play in any democracy… Not to have a properly functioning party system…in a supposedly democratic country is worse than tea without sugar… There can be no meaningful democracy without a properly functioning party… Parties…constitute the heart of democracy-the more vigorous and healthy they are, the better assured is the health of the democratic process itself. (Agbaje, 1998:15-16). In the first instance, political parties provide a veritable organ of citizen involvement in the politics of the society by acting as a link between government and the governed. Also, political parties aggregate and articulate interests; socializes the people politically and mobilizes them socially; provides an acceptable platform for political representation; helps to impose order on an otherwise chaotic struggle for power and for this purpose, produces manifestoes which they intend to implement if they win election. Political parties also recruit and train people for political leadership. For this purpose, they nominate candidates to contest elections. However, political parties may play different roles in different political systems. Therefore, the nature of the political environment will determine the roles that political parties will play in a particular political system. In agreement with the above, Omordia (2010:65-69) argues that the structure and operation of political parties across political systems can serve as an index (or measuring rod) of comparing political systems across states in terms of strength and fragility. In developing societies where the structure of economic ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange is not egalitarian and does not cut across socio-economic strata but is concentrated in a few hands, the control of the political life of the society assumes extra-ordinary importance. In such situations, control of political parties and ultimately, the electoral process as instruments of social, political and economic domination becomes paramount and is worthy of ‘investment’; a ‘cake’ that is worth any length of struggle, whether by legitimate or illegitimate, peaceful or violent means. Richard Sklar puts the above in perspective with particular reference to Nigeria. According to him: 184 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic In non-industrial countries like Nigeria … it is virtually impossible to comprehend the idea of a dominant class apart from the determining impact of political forces… political power is exerted to create and expand social organizations. The leading members of such organizations have a common interest in social control… (are) the wellspring of class formation….since political parties are crucial to the promotion of the process, they play a major part in shaping the structure of Nigerian society (Richard L. Sklar, 1980: xviii). What are Primary Elections? In most competitive democracies, primary elections constitute a means of streamlining political competition by narrowing down the number of contestants for political office. In many open democracies, it is an accepted way of selecting candidates for election in order to determine the most popular and the most acceptable candidate(s). In conventional terms, a primary election is a means by which a political party, registered political movement, alliance or group chooses or nominates candidates to represent the party at a future election or bye-election. The candidate that wins a party’s primary election receives the support of all party members thereafter (up to the election) and represents the party at the main election. Primary elections may be organized either by political parties or the government, although the former is more common. Where primary elections are conducted by political parties, it could be at party caucuses, conventions or at meetings called specifically for party candidate nomination. In such situations, the primary election is either closed or open, although there are variations of both types in several political systems. Such variations include the semi-closed primary, the semi-open primary, the blanket (or Louisiana) primary, unified primary and the non-partisan blanket primary election (Wikipedia @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Primary_election, accessed on June 24, 2014). An open primary is one in which all voters can participate and vote on a ballot of any party whatsoever. However, the party of a voter’s choice may require him or her to demonstrate support for the party’s values (which may 185 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis include manifesto) and make a financial contribution to defray the cost of the primary election. This practice is common in the United States of America. In contrast, closed primaries (otherwise called party or internal primaries) are those in which only registered party members can vote. This is the practice in Nigeria, many other African countries, the United States of America and most parliamentary democracies in Europe before 2010 when the Conservative Party had open primaries in the United Kingdom and October 2011, when France’s Socialist Party had its maiden open primary election. With at least one political party adopting open primaries in each of Greece and Italy since 2011, the system is gradually becoming popular across Europe (Wikipedia @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary_election, accessed on June 24, 2014). The Importance of Primary Elections to Democracy Democracy as a form of government thrives when elections are predictably regular, credible and the outcomes are acceptable to a wide spectrum of stakeholders, both local and international. Since political parties constitute the main organ through which candidate emerge for elections (although independent candidacy is accepted and encouraged in several developed countries with consolidated democracy), political parties must nominate and present candidates for election. Due to the large number of people who indicate interest to stand for election on the platform of political parties, it becomes important for political parties to devise means to reduce the number of political office seekers to the acceptable number or level. This is a big responsibility for political parties which must ensure that only qualified, credible and socially and politically acceptable candidates are presented for election. For the above reasons, political party primaries must be fair, peaceful, credible and acceptable while they must ensure a level-playing ground for all contenders for political office. This is to avoid rancour and extreme internal wrangling that can affect the political system adversely. In other words, political parties must possess and impose internal democracy on the processes by which they conduct primary elections. A political party that lacks internal democracy in its structure and processes cannot impose same on its primary election and this spells doom for the practice of democracy. 186 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic This point is germane because, as Kehinde (2015:49) points out, elections are not only at the core of citizens’ democratic rights and the means by which leaders are elected to govern the state, in West Africa they are gradually emerging as instruments of structural conflict prevention. Since man is no longer in the Hobbesian state of nature, to prevent political problems, elections (whether primary or internal, secondary or external) must possess the qualities expected of them for the sake of wide acceptability. Qualities of Primary Elections For a party primary election to be acceptable, it must possess the following minimum qualities: (a) Justice and fairness: A primary election must foster justice and fairness for all aspirants for political office. Where candidates fail in their nomination bid, the reasons should be clearly understood to lie with the candidate rather than the system. Elements of negative discrimination and double-standards must not feature so that both insiders and outsiders can have confidence in the process. (b) Participation and Inclusion: It must encourage participation by all qualified candidates by setting standards that can be met easily by the average interested contestant. Since political offices are not for sale to the highest bidder and political leadership is not to be imposed on subjects in democratic political societies, political parties must eschew discriminatory and autocratic tendencies in the conduct of primary elections. Such includes but are not limited to class-discriminatory fees for expression of interest and nomination forms that can scare the average interested person for expressing interest; discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, etc. as these can be counter-productive for the sustenance and consolidation of democracy. (c) Competitiveness: A political party’s primary election must be competitive. This means that every interested aspirant for prescribed political offices must be able to run for such offices without let or hindrance by the party hierarchy or leadership, or by any group or faction whatsoever. Candidates should not be imposed on the party by 187 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis any ‘godfather’, party ‘elders’ or group. The question of ‘consensus’ candidacy that does not abide by party constitutions is therefore, an aberration. This also presupposes that barring potential candidates from such contests by the imposition of financial and other conditionalities that may prove difficult to meet for the average candidate who is genuinely interested in serving the people is bad for the political system. Aggrieved candidates should also have access to fair hearing within the boundaries of party rules, regulations and universal standards of human rights. (d) Credibility: Political party primaries must be credible by way of generating sufficient trust in its managers and the process as a whole. Credibility will be lost if party members and the public have reasons to suspect any plan or attempt to impose candidates on the party. There should be no political grandstanding of candidates in order to maintain party order and discipline. (e) Transparency: A primary election must be transparent in its organization and conduct. It should not be shrouded in secrecy. The campaign, venue and time of primary election, voting, vote-counting and announcement of results must be done in the open for all to see. Also, election observers, the media and national electoral body should not only be allowed but also encouraged to cover all aspects of the procedure and report same without hindrance. These requirements are important for the results of a primary election to be acceptable. The acceptability or otherwise of the result of a primary election is important to a political party’s performance in the main or general election. This, in turn, has great significance for the outcomes and overall assessment of an election and consequently, on democracy as a form of government. Definition and Signposts of Internal Party Democracy A perusal of relevant literature reveals several connotations of internal party democracy. Ojukwu and Olaifa (2011:27) submit that it is one of the institutional guarantees that political parties have to fulfill if they were to effectively perform the roles expected of them in a democracy. Scarrow 188 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (2004) conceives of it in very broad term as a wide range of methods for including party members in intra-party deliberations and decision-making; a way of measuring the extent of democracy within a political party and how much a party subscribes to basic and universal democratic tenets. Internal party democracy can be defined as the aggregate of attributes that measures the extent to which a political party conforms to the norms of inclusion, representation, participation in its internal workings with respect to party structure, process and organization as well as how well or deep important party processes are institutionalized. These include the way and manner by which party leadership emerges, how the leadership conducts itself in running the affairs of the party, how decisions are taken and how party flag-bearers for elections emerge. The main idea is that a political party should represent and reflect the different shades of opinion present, subject issues to discussion by members before taking decisions and that the decisions of the majority should prevail unless there are cogent, defensible reasons why the leadership may want to act otherwise. In all cases, the leadership should be accountable to the followership by giving detailed explanations for its actions. Since political parties constitute the major building blocks of any truly democratic system, and internal party democracy is a critical requirement for a sound, vibrant and resilient political party, it follows that a political system cannot be truly democratic when the political parties lack internal democracy. To that extent, internal party democracy is a measure of the health, resilience and how soon and how well a democracy can become consolidated. Cular (2004:34) suggests that for parties to be deemed to possess internal democracy, they should be “bottom-up” in their formation and should disperse power at different levels. These would include wards, local government areas, state and national levels. Mimpen (cited in Okhaide, 2012:61) argues that to possess internal democracy, a political party should be grounded on the principles of electivity, accountability, transparency, inclusivity, participation and representation. Okhaide (ibid) further noted two essential instrumental elements of intra-party democracy and three levels at which we can observe internal democracy in the working of political parties. The first element of 189 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis intra-party democracy is organization of free, fair and regular elections to fill internal positions and to choose “representative” candidates while the second is equal and open participation of members and member-groups in decision making. The three levels identified by Okhaide (2012:61) at which we can observe internal democracy in parties include adherence to legal requirements, observance of party regulations and actual practice. Theoretical Foundations It is impossible to interrogate deeply, the question of internal party democracy and electoral credibility in Nigeria without examining the nature of the Nigerian state, the place and role of political parties in it and the connection of the above to the quest for credible elections in the country. Questioning the nature of the Nigerian state cannot be done outside the nature of the African state, an issue that has received significant attention in the literature. Generally, scholars have approached the question of the nature of the African state from three main approaches namely the organic, the configurational and the interactive approaches (Kawabata, 2006:1). The interactive approach that interrogates the relationships between the state, its institutions and social groups is especially useful for our analysis because of its capacity to uncover not just the role, but also the relationships of political parties with the state and the citizens, who constitute the electorate, as well as the dynamics of political party primaries through which internal democracy should be guaranteed. For the above reasons, the study will interrogate the study with the aid of social class analysis or theory. Neo-Marxian analysis of class relations is built on orthodox Marxism that interrogates the main class struggles in society. Espoused by socialists like Karl Marx, Engels and Lenin, Orthodox Marxism treats the history of human society through different epochs (including capitalism) as the history of class struggles (Engel, 1942; Marx, 1970; Lenin, 1976 and Marx and Engel, 1976). Its foundation lies in the materialist conception of society in which the economic substructure (of production, distribution and exchange and the relationships they generate) constitutes the foundation upon which the superstructure (of law, politics, religion, arts, etc) is built. Recognizing the state as the supposed saviour of society from its selfimposed insoluble contradictions and irreconcilable antagonisms, it assumes the primacy of material conditions of existence (at the least, 190 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic survival) in all human relationships. The analysis rests on the following three major premises: first, that all social phenomena are interrelated and interconnected; second, that social reality is not static but dynamic; and third, that social forces are not harmonious but conflictual and that resolutions of the contradictions in a state of being will always lead to its replacement by a higher one (dialectical materialism). Taking its root from orthodox Marxism, neo-Marxian analysis investigates the impact of intra-class struggles on other forms of social relations and the character of the state. It argues that class struggle involves mainly internal and external contradictions, either of which can affect the relative autonomy (that is, the degree of freedom or constraint) with which a state can act in relation to class issues. While it is less concerned with external contradiction which involves social classes from two or more countries (e.g. between indigenous and foreign bourgeoisies in a state), neo-Marxian analysis focuses on internal contradictions which involves mainly class struggles within a state and is either primary or secondary in nature. According to Egboh and Aniche (2012:3): primary contradiction depicts inter-class struggle between two classes such as bourgeoisie and proletariat, arising as a result of the position they occupy in the historically and economically determined social relations of production either as owners/non-controllers of means of production; and in which the latter produces surplus value and the former appropriates it… secondary contradiction depicts intra-class struggle within the same class, or between two or more segments of the same class, for example, between petty bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie. With the degree of freedom or autonomy of a state to act measured by the level or degree of commodification or penetration of capital into the state’s economy, Ake (1973) argues that a state can either enjoy high autonomy (implying high commodification of capital) by agents of private capitalism or low autonomy (which translates to low commodification of capital), in which case the state intervenes to provide major infrastructure (often through corporations and national industries), thereby encouraging 191 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis primitive accumulation of capital by members of the ruling class. Under such circumstances, the state has bourgeois sympathy and leanings while politics becomes very lucrative, decisively taking the centre-stage in the allocation and primitive accumulation of state resources. Political office takes on very important significance, something that is worth fighting for with every means deemed necessary, whether legal or otherwise. Clapham (1985: 41) puts this in perspective concerning Third World states, arguing that: (state) power is attractive, and competition to control that power saps and subverts the state itself…where the state provides a source of power and wealth entirely disproportionate to that available from any other organized force within society, the quest for state power takes on a pathological dimension…a prize which can be fought for, and therefore is…the prize of state control is too appealing to be abandoned. Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere (Olaoye, 2005: 69), state power becomes a political prize to be captured in Third World states. This makes control of political parties as the main vehicle for the capture of state power in democracies becomes imperative. So, rather than have credible electoral contests, elections become must-win competitions that are manipulated even if lives are lost in the process. As Heywood (2007:112-113) noted, “almost everywhere working classes (are) excluded from political life…universal suffrage and regular and competitive elections are at best a façade, their purpose being to conceal the reality of unequal class and to misdirect the political energies of the working class”. In the same vein, Ake (1995, paraphrased in Egboh and Aniche, 2012:4), opined that electoral processes dissociate voting from choice and rights from the exercise of political power, leading to elections that cannot promote political responsiveness, accountability and democracy. Ogban-Iyam (2005, cited in Egboh and Aniche, 2012:4) argues that under the circumstance, electoral democracy does not approximate to popular democracy, and thus, could only be termed “electocracy”. This is one reason for the high level of bureaucratic, institutional and other forms of corruption in African states, and this does 192 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic not exclude the ways in which political parties and their primary elections are administered fraudulently. Political Party Primaries and Internal Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic As institutional incubators that nurture citizens’ political orientations, midwife their participation and help mature their political competencies, political parties should embrace internal (or intra-party) democracy, not just for the benefit of the citizens or political parties alone, but also for the consolidation of democracy. However, Nigerian political parties have found it increasingly difficult to adopt or sustain internal democracy, particularly in the Fourth Republic. Okhaide (2012:60) has observed that “in Nigeria, there seems to be total disregard for internal party democracy among the registered political parties particularly as it relates to the conduct of party primaries”. Other scholars that have noted this include Ofuebe and Anierobi (2005), Aniche (2015). Beyond the above-mentioned fact, some of the negative implications of this development have been noted in literature. It has been argued, for instance, that: many political parties in Nigeria find it very difficult to adopt an open system that will not only allow members of the party to participate in the decision-making but also give them unrestrained opportunity to contest elections under the party’s platform. This kind of sociopolitical restriction and constraint has increasingly resulted in party wrangling, war of attrition, recrimination, acrimony, coordination dilemmas and cross-carpeting in many Nigerian political parties. (Ojukwu and Olaifa, 2011:16). The problem grew worse in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, in particular, as the incumbent Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) dreamt of ruling for an unbroken sixty (60) years while other political parties struggled to wrest power for it. In the process, individuals and groups jostled for positions while others seized the opportunity to hijack party structures by becoming 193 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis major financiers. Still others in government capitalized on the power of incumbency to impose their will on party structures. Causes and Effects of Low Internal Democracy in Nigeria’s Parties of the Fourth Republic A number of factors can be identified as causes of low internal democracy in Nigeria’s political parties since the Fourth Republic. Poor Ideological Orientation of Political Parties A first identifiable factor is the bankruptcy of ideology by many parties of this era. Most political parties of the colonial period that survived into the First Republic were either primarily ethnic in outlook and orientation and, or united their members by a common desire to end colonialism. This contributed significantly to the fall of the First Republic, and the same feelings were largely carried into the Second Republic which also collapsed due to political indiscipline by parties and politicians. The Third Republic was arguably worse, with a military oligarchy with selfsecessionist agenda practically forcing Nigerians of different ideological persuasions into two ideologically-impotent government-orchestrated political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). In the Fourth Republic, the above made many to assume that in forming political parties, ideological orientation was less important than wrestling and securing power. As Ojukwu and Olaifa (2011:29) have rightly noted, “this bankruptcy in ideology and vision has made party politics in Nigeria to be a bread and butter game where monetization of the political process is the bedrock of loyalty and support”. Internal democracy was one of the first victims of the process as sponsors of political parties insisted on calling the shots, with dire consequences for leadership selection, choice of candidates for election, party order and discipline, etc. But the critical question is “without a strong ideological foundation on which to propose solutions to myriads of problems, what would a political party do with power?” Party Finance Party finance is another source of challenge to internal democracy in Nigeria’s political parties of the Fourth Republic. Paragraph F 15 (c) and 194 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (d) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes provisions for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to monitor the organization, and operation of the political parties, including their finance; and to arrange for the examination and audit of the accounts of political parties, and publish findings for public information (FRN, 1999). However, apart from the fact that the regulations concerning political party finance are too scanty to address the core issues, most political parties do not want to abide by these regulations. These make such political party funding-related functions difficult for INEC to perform. The difficulties stem from several sources. One, the issue of political party finance has not been placed on the front burner of political discourse in the past; therefore, so much has gone wrong such that scanty regulations cannot cope with existing challenges. Two, implementation or enforcement is challenging because the electoral body (INEC) is ill-equipped for such functions. Also, much of the funds that go into electoral campaign activities do not pass through the banks directly, and are often moved at night, with the connivance of security agents who also get their shares of the ‘cake’ (Facts obtained from the author’s participant observation of the 2011 and 2015 elections). Three, control of party funding is difficult because even ruling parties are guilty of party funding offences. As such, they cannot regulate the behaviours of other parties. For example, parties view the sale of ‘expression of interest’ and nomination forms for elective posts as smart sources of party revenue. While the Anambra State chapter of the Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA) sold the gubernatorial ‘expression of interest’ form for one million Naira each and the gubernatorial form proper at five million Naira each for the state’s 2013 governorship election, the nomination forms for the 2014 gubernatorial election in Ekiti State sold at eleven (11) million Naira each (Daily Sun, August 2, 2013) which was collected from sixteen (16) gubernatorial aspirants (Saharareporters.com, 2014). This makes a total of three hundred and twenty million Naira whereas only thirteen (13) aspirants were cleared for the primaries. This means only the very rich that can easily part with huge sums of money are ‘qualified’ to contest political offices in the country. In addition, every political aspirant must be ready to spend money and be spent during the electioneering campaigns. It is, indeed, 195 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis the politics of money by which political aspirants view political officeholding as business investments that must yield private profit rather than the benefits of democracy to the citizenry. Another problem with party funding in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is the momentum-gathering new wave of open and secret fund-raising activities by political parties to support their electioneering campaigns. Like many individual candidate electioneering campaign launching, such programmes are often held in flagrant disobedience of party funding and electoral campaign regulations where they exist. An example of such rules is the ceiling on amount that any individual or corporate group may donate to an electoral campaign. In the run-up to the 2003 general elections, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) held a campaign launching programme at which about six billion naira was realized, both from members and non-members of the party, businessmen, etc. who were definitely seeking contracts, connections and power of control within and through the ruling party. The existence of a weak legal and regulation implementation framework for party funding in Nigeria made that possible. In such cases, internal party democracy is negatively affected, with the credibility of elections as the main instrument and processes for the orderly change of government in democracies the major victim. In some instances, this development has led to unsavoury outcomes such as I described elsewhere (Olaoye, 2005) as the ‘civilian coup’ in Anambra State in which the failed ambition of Chris Uba, the sole financier of Dr. Chris Ngige’s electioneering campaign to the Government House to control the government fully led to the governor’s abduction and his subsequent dismissal from the party. The scenario was comparable to Emeka Offor’s attempts to control Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju’s government in the same state between 1999 and 2003. Similar motivations may be behind the relationship of Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, former governor of Lagos State and chieftain of the All Progressives Congress (APC) with President Muhammadu Buhari of the same party. Whether they feature as individuals or groups, the motive is always to control party primaries, impose candidates and party positions, bankroll such parties and call the shots. 196 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Imposition of Candidates Where funding is not the problem, the challenge of internal democracy is the imposition of candidates on other party members by sections of political parties. For example, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) printed only one presidential nomination form that was meant for the (then) incumbent Dr. Goodluck Jonathan while preparing for the party’s 2015 presidential contest. This meant that other potential candidates were ruled out of the contest by that act of imposition. Also, although the All Progressives’ Congress (APC) congratulated itself for instilling discipline in its members, the party’s gubernatorial primary elections in Lagos, Bayelsa and Kogi states were not without their downsides as accusations of imposition of candidates were common. In Lagos, the “New Lagos Movement”, a group within the APC besieged the State House of Assembly and the Government House condemning the unilateral endorsement and imposition of Mr. Akinwumi Ambode as the party’s candidate by some party leaders (Oloniruha, 2014). Also, irregularities and violence that degenerated into blood-letting were reported in the APC gubernatorial primaries in Kogi and Bayelsa states due to imposition of candidates by party elites (Vanguard@http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/09/apcprimaries, accessed on 31 January, 2016; Idris and Sule, 2015). Poor Party Administration Often, the leadership of political parties run party affairs without carrying other members along, claiming a consensus position on issues as sensitive as the choice of party flag-bearers for elections. This can get worse if the party happens to be in government either at the state or federal level. In such cases, the political chief executive assumes the role of party controller and main financier, thereby collapsing the party into government and viceversa. They fail to abide by party rules and regulations that should encourage internal democracy and if the president or governor is strong and the party has majority in the legislature, the exception becomes the rule as all his actions become the rule. This happened in the PDP at the federal level between 1999 and 2007 during Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency. In particular, it was President Obasanjo’s backing and the party’s controversial zoning formula that produced Umaru Musa Y’Ardua as PDP’s presidential flag-bearer in December, 2006. It is also common with governors in the states. These practices are against the institutionalization of internal party democracy in political parties. 197 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Poor Legal and Institutional Framework for Primary Elections and Amendment to the 2010 Electoral Act The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Electoral Act constitute the frameworks within which elections (including primary elections) can be conducted in Nigeria. While the Third Schedule (Part 1) Sections F-14 and F-15 of the 1999 Constitution establishes the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and spells out its election-focused functions, the Electoral Act (2010) regulates the conduct of federal, state and Area Council elections in Nigeria. Section 85 (1) of the Act mandates political parties to inform INEC at least twenty-one (21) days before it conducts any convention, congress, conference or meeting to elect members of its executive committee, other governing bodies or to nominate candidates for elective posts. Section 85 (2) empowers INEC to attend such party programmes with or without prior notice to the political party, including meetings called to approve mergers with other political parties. In a bid to ensure internal party democracy by political parties and make them adhere to provisions of the Electoral Act with regards to it, Section 87 gives a comprehensive procedure for the nomination of candidates by political parties and states expressly in Section 87 (9) that “where a political party fails to comply with the provisions of this Act in the conduct of its primaries, its candidate for the election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue” (Underline mine for emphasis). Unfortunately, in a move calculated to stifle internal democracy in political parties and impose arbitrary rule by party chieftains, President Goodluck Jonathan proposed an amendment to the Electoral Act, expunging this important proviso and replacing it with Section 31 (1) of the Amended Electoral Act, 2010, calculated to make INEC a toothless bulldog as far as regulating internal party behaviour and democracy is concerned. The new section states that: Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Bill, submitted to the Commission in the prescribed forms, the list of the candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the Commission shall not reject or disqualify candidates for any reason whatsoever. (Underline mine for emphasis). 198 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (Section 31 (1) of the Amended Electoral Act, 2010). A second look at the amendments reveals that they were meant to strengthen the strangle-hold of political chief executives on political parties by including political appointees of the President and Governors at party primaries and conventions and giving them cheap votes, which Section 87 (8) of the 2010 Electoral Act prohibits. This ambition was pursued through the removal of Section 87 (8) of the 2010 Electoral Act (Amended Electoral Act 2010). Fortunately, Senate rejected the bill, noting its negative effects for the practice of democracy in Nigeria. The outcome of the situation is the lack of institutionalization of political party structures and processes that may advance internal democracy in political parties. Parties are easily ‘colonized’ or taken-over either by few moneybags or politicians in power who also arrogate to themselves the ‘right’ to dictate party policy and directions as well as to impose electoral candidates on political parties. Expectedly, this breeds in-fighting and schisms within the ranks and files of party members, loss of elections to more acceptable candidates from other parties, much litigation on the outcomes of elections, etc. which, together, constitutes destabilization factors within political parties. Internal Democracy and Electoral Credibility There is an unassailable relationship between internal democracy in political parties and the credibility of elections. Political parties constitute a major fountain-head of democracy, a key initiator of political participation and custodian of political inclusion while elections represent the major acceptable means of effecting peaceful change of government in democracies. Therefore, internal democracy in political parties is a major requirement for faith in, and acceptance of electoral candidates, credibility of elections and election outcomes. Three major criteria can be identified as determinants of the credibility and constitutionality of elections (Democracy International, 2014), particularly in young and emerging democracies. They are: (a) Increase in the capacity of state institutions to implement legitimate political processes; 199 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis (b) (c) Ability of political parties to represent citizens more credibly; and Citizen engagement to make them more aware of, and involved in political processes. However, in light of the experiences of struggling, yet stunted democracies in the Third World, we may add a fourth criterion. This is the willingness of political gladiators to allow the electoral process to run smoothly by deliberately refusing to tamper or tinker with political, electoral, legal, security and judicial institutions, structures and processes that are directly related to the conduct of elections and electioneering processes as a whole. When this is not the case, electoral candidates are not likely going to be the people's choices; the elections will likely be rigged; the results will likely be disputed and acrimony, schisms, chaos, rioting, arson, litigations and political leaderships with credibility and legitimacy problems will emerge. In turn, this will breed political unrest, violence, political assassinations and sometimes, terrorist and guerrilla movements. Examples of such abound in Nigeria, Africa and other parts of the Third World. While several state institutions in Third World countries are undergoing reforms aimed at strengthening them to implement legitimate political (and economic, infrastructural, healthcare, educational, etc) processes, a number of the reforms are not comprehensive and holistic but partial and selective as they affect areas determined by the whims and caprices of the political leadership. In other words, many state institutions are being controlled by political leaders who are not neutral but seize the opportunity of reforms to pursue vested interests. For instance, the Presidency-sponsored amendments to Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2010 would have made INEC a toothless bulldog where regulation, supervision and control of political parties’ primary elections are concerned if not for Senate’s refusal to assent to it. It would have given political chief executives cheap votes (by political appointees) and unbridled control over party primaries. Political parties have not developed to the point of representing citizens credibly in many parts of Africa and other Third World countries. The hegemonic nature of politics and the due respect given to the elderly in many developing societies is still interfering with popular understanding 200 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic of Western democracy in such political systems. For instance, during Olusegun Obasanjo’s tenure as President in the early part of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, it was common for citizens to refer to him as ‘Baba’, meaning a benevolent father. Since theoretically, benevolent fathers were not expected to do evil or harm his ‘children’ or subjects; and since the elderly were thought to be wise, it was culturally acceptable to allow the elderly decide certain things on behalf of the subjects or ‘children’. Such decisions could include choosing who will be a political party’s flagbearer at an election, but this would conflict with the ethos of democracy as party rules would not be followed. Former Chairman of INEC, Professor Attahiru Jega (Peoples’ Daily, Saturday February 6, 2016), noted “the lack of internal democracy in the parties had been having negative implications on national stability and efforts to consolidate the country’s democracy”. He noted as worrisome, parties’ difficulties in selecting candidates and the high volume of litigations that follow the process; the lack of clear rules and procedures for selecting candidates and for resolving issues to the satisfaction of members; inability of parties to follow the few available rules; as well as the spate of ex-parte injunctions that are issued on INEC and how these threaten to derail preparations for elections. Thirdly, in many instances, citizens’ understanding of political participation is still shallow and materialistic in many cases, due partly to deep poverty. Voters still expect material things like money, foodstuffs, clothing, etc. in exchange for their votes. Even though orientation programs are mounted against this by government, voters get deorientated faster by the reality they confront on a daily basis: hunger, unemployment, diseases, etc and the fast rate at which their political representatives recover from poverty once they hold political office. Given the above, it is certain that without internal democracy in political parties, elections cannot be credible. Lack of credibility, in turn, will lead to other problems such as encumbering the electoral body with many problems including fallouts of litigation over primary elections, countering election-rigging plans by displeased politicians, threats of pre and post-election violence and, with respect to the larger political system, lack of consolidation of democracy. 201 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis The Way Forward Our findings in this study indicates that lack of internal democracy in political parties constitute a major drawback to the attainment of credible elections in Nigeria. This outcome agrees with Elklit’s (2007:83, cited in Kehinde, 2015:63) finding that the party system constitutes one of the important institutional factors that influence electoral processes, the other three being the constitution, the electoral law and election management. Incidentally, the present study also identified political manipulation of the electoral law (i.e. the Amendment to the 2010 Electoral Act) as another big obstacle on the way to institutionalizing internal democracy in political party primary elections. This outcome agrees with Elklit’s (2007:83, cited in Kehinde, 2015:63) finding that the party system constitutes one of the important institutional factors that influence electoral processes, the other three being the constitution, the electoral law and election management. Incidentally, the present study also identifies political manipulation of the electoral law (i.e. the Amendment to the 2010 Electoral Act) as another big obstacle on the way to institutionalizing internal democracy in political party primary elections. So, what is to be done, or how do we achieve electoral credibility in Nigeria by ensuring internal democracy in our political parties? One, Nigerian political parties must stop operating as cult groups by opening up to every member, creating a level playing ground not just for political office aspirants but also for every member to contribute to party progress through fresh ideas, debates, etc. The danger of relinquishing party control and decision-making to few sponsors or moneybags is quite clear, going by various experiences already cited in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Democratizing our political parties will help protect the integrity of the system, restore internal party democracy and the credibility of our electoral system. Two, to ensure the above, the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) in collaboration with INEC and registered political parties should draw up a code of conduct for political parties to open up the political space within parties in order to ensure internal democracy within parties. This should affect major party issues like the choice of party executives, the choice of party candidates, convening of meetings and conventions, etc. and help put an end to imposition of candidates on party members. 202 Political Parties, Internal Democracy and the Challenge of Electoral Credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Three, primary election offences should be criminalized so that offenders can face the wrath of the law just like those of wider elections with specified deterrent punishments. Merely stating that INEC will not field candidates who emerge through questionable means in elections is begging the question, and will not impose order on the system. Specifying punitive measures for primary election offenders and empowering the judiciary to enforce them will instil sanity into the conduct of primary elections by political parties in Nigeria. Four, although sensitive, the issue of party funding must be addressed qualitatively. Extant regulations on political party funding must be applied and limits to individual and group donations to political parties must be reviewed and applied. This will help reverse the trend of a few rich individuals taking control of political parties and by it, our governments as if Nigeria was for sale. Five, amendments to the electoral act must be properly considered before ratification. A major shift should be that instead of emanating from the Presidency, requests for amendments to the Electoral Act should come from INEC and should be reviewed by the judiciary before presentation to the legislature for ratification. This would help avoid unpatriotic amendments like the Amendment to the 2010 Electoral Act. Such can bolster the confidence of ordinary Nigerians in the electoral process, improve the credibility of our elections and help to prevent regular postelection conflicts. Six, as Kehinde (2015:49) argues, election management bodies (EMBs) (in the case of Nigeria, INEC) should be resuscitated, redesigned and reorganized to secure for them operational and financial independence, professionalism, transparency, impartiality and a greater ability to contribute to the integrity and credibility of elections. The outcomes of the 2015 General Elections demonstrate both the wisdom and timeliness of the Mohammed Uwais Panel on Electoral Reform, 2008 that was instituted at the instance of former President Umaru Musa Y’Aradua. Finally, citizen re-orientation will be necessary to help them align with the goals of ensuring orderly political party primaries, their roles in helping to secure credible elections and the benefits they stand to gain from having elections with integrity. Thus, the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and 203 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis other relevant state and civil society/community-based actors should be reigned-in to sensitize citizens on their roles, responsibilities and benefits from this. Conclusion This study has drawn on the strengths of relevant literature, historical research and extant practical experiences to examine the relationships between political party primary elections and electoral credibility in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, identifying the lack of internal democracy in political parties as the missing link. The study made relevant recommendations on how to ensure internal democracy in our political parties, ensure the credibility of elections and to strengthen not just the electoral body but also to sharpen the resolve and skills of the citizenry in actualizing these. 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(2014): “Promoting Credible Elections via Parties’ Internal Democracy”, Peoples’ Daily, Sunday, July 27th. Omordia, S.M. (2010): “Political Parties and Party Politics in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, Trakia Journal of Sciences, Vol. 8 (3). Saharareporters.com (2014): “Ekiti Guber Race: PDP Clears Olukolade, Fayose, Bodunde Adeyanju and 10 others for Primaries”. Posted on March 11, retrieved from http://nigeriadecide.org/blog/ekiti-guberrace-pdp-clears-olukolade-fayose-bodunde-adeyanju-and-10-othersfor-primaries/ on June 24, 2014. Sartori, G. (1976): Parties and Party Systems (Vol. 1), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press. Scarrow, S. (2004): Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing Intra-Party Democracy, Washington: NDI. Sklar, R.L. (1980): Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, New York: Nok Publishers International. Vanguard Newspapers (2015): “APC Primaries, A Show of Shame”, Vanguard@http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/09/apc-primaries, accessed on 31 January, 2016). 207 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Wikipedia (2014): “Primary Election”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary _election, accessed June 24, 2014. 208  INDEX ballot papers, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 29, 43, 48, 97, 113, 124, 125 benchmark of democracy, 5 Boko Haram, 14, 15, 17, 18, 49 Bola Ige, 29, 37, 122, 128, 133 Botswana, 92 brigandage, 5 broadcast stations, 69, 71 A Abel Guobadia, 10 Academic Staff Union of Universities, 42 accountability, 6, 28, 43, 100, 136, 139, 152, 156, 171 ACN, 11, 44, 120, 121 Action Congress of Nigeria, 11, 44, 120, 121 Action Group, 59, 154, 161 Action Group of Nigeria, 59 Affective theory, 118 African countries, 5, 156 Aggrieved candidates, 188 All Nigeria Peoples Party, 11, 26, 120, 143 All People's Party, 155, 165 All Progressive Congress, 11, 115 All Progressives Grand Alliance, 11, 120 Alliance for Democracy, 15, 155, 165 annulment, 5, 70, 71, 162, 165 ANPP, 11, 26, 29, 30, 31, 93, 111, 120, 143 anti-democratic mindset, 4 APC, 11, 12, 13, 14, 22, 39, 44, 45, 46, 49, 54, 55, 62, 80, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 134, 164 APGA, 11, 26, 30, 31, 120, 125 aristocracy, 138 Armed Forces Ruling Council, 167 ASUU, 42 Attahiru Jega, 42, 71 Attorney General, 122, 128 authoritarianism, 2, 152 Awolowo, 59 C Campaign adverts, 59 campaign spending, 28 cancellation, 97 Card readers, 1, 16 Civil Defence, 31 civil governance, 5 civil rule, 4, 10, 11 civil servants, 40, 47, 50, 51 civil society, xiii, 28, 42, 48, 65, 147, 154, 169 Civil Society Organizations, 71 civilian government, 154, 155, 156, 162, 167, 168 civilian rule, 4, 120, 143, 154, 155, 156 Clientelism, 158, 176, 177 Clifford Constitution, 135, 153 collation centres, 7, 8 colonialism, 151, 171 Commonwealth of Nations, 91 Congress for Progressive Change, 11, 120 constituencies, 40, 50, 52, 96, 120, 158, 164, 165 constitution, 15, 25, 57, 58, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 112, 135, 143, 144, 147, 154, 155, 163, 166 cosmology, 152 Court of Appeal, 96, 101, 110, 111, 120 CPC, 11, 97, 120 credible elections, ix, 11, 32, 71, 92, 102, 107, 169, 173, 178 criminal law, 104 B Bahamas, 92 balance of probabilities, 104 ballot boxes, 6, 7, 29, 31, 121, 124, 125, 138 209 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis cultural differences, 34, 170 cultural diversity, 170 culture of tolerance, 172 customs, 31 Election Petition Tribunal, 96, 110 election results sheets, 8 electioneering, ix, 10, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 72, 75, 81, 82, 84, 85, 123, 145 electioneering campaigns, 65, 146, 196 electioneering process, 57, 58, 72 Electoral Act, 34, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 147, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206 electoral behaviour, 116, 158, 161, 162 Electoral College, 137 Electoral Commissions, 24 Electoral Credibility, xii, 183, 199 Electoral crisis, 144 Electoral disputes, 96 Electoral frauds, 6 electoral history, 14, 91, 135 electoral institutions, 41 electoral integrity, 31 Electoral irregularities, 16 electoral law, 94, 103, 144 Electoral legislations, 102 electoral malpractices, ix, 91, 93, 97, 102, 103 electoral manipulation, 10, 18, 143 electoral materials, 7, 31, 147 electoral offences, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105 Electoral Offences Commission, 19, 103 electoral officers, 7, 103 electoral officials, 6 electoral petition, 19 electoral politics, 41, 42, 49, 51, 53, 142, 153 electoral process, 11, 24, 27, 32, 35, 40, 91, 97, 139 electoral promises, 81 electoral regulations, 18 electoral support, 50, 75, 84, 161 electoral system, 10, 36, 43, 102, 127, 139 D Dakar, 51, 175 democratic consolidation, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 23, 24, 136, 140, 142, 144, 146, 147, 169, 170 Democratic dividends, 25 democratic elections, 27, 143, 156 democratic neighbours, 3 democratic procedures, 144 democratic regime, 139, 140, 144 democratic survival, 10 democratic system, 23, 25, 137, 163 democratization, 91, 156, 162, 170, 171, 174 developing countries, 3, 136, 158 dictatorship, 138 documentaries, 63 domestic monitors, 8 dynasty, 138 E Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 31, 114 editorial, 60, 67, 72 editorials, 60, 61 EFCC, 31 Ekiti election, 40, 41, 44, 49, 50, 52, 115, 131 Ekiti politics, 77, 84 Ekiti polls, 43, 44, 52 Ekiti State University, xiii, 47 election crises, x, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146 Election Crises, 142, 144, 145, 146 Election Day, 13, 18, 28, 47, 49 election malpractice, 138 Election Management Bodies, 24 election materials, 6, 43, 91 election petition, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 114 210  electoral umpire, ix, 10, 11, 14, 25, 31, 121 electoral umpires, ix, 10, 11 electoral victory, 61, 76, 84, 144 electorate, 10, 18, 25, 29, 32, 34, 40, 42, 50, 52, 67, 68, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 117, 122, 136, 137, 139, 142, 152, 154, 156, 161, 163, 170 Electronic Card Reader, 19 enforcement mechanism, 103 Ephraim Akpata, 10 ethnic diversity, 152, 163, 172 ethnic group, 157, 159, 165 ethnic nationalism, 170, 174 ethnic politics, 153, 158, 159, 165 ethnicism, 34, 168 ethnicity, 153, 157, 158, 159, 161, 172, 175, 179 governance, xiii, xiv, 4, 11, 24, 25, 34, 45, 77, 84, 137, 156, 158, 161, 162, 168, 172, 173, 182 government performance, 116, 117, 132, 133 governorship election, 39, 40, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 101, 115, 117, 120, 122, 123, 131, 132 grassroots, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 130, 167 Great Nigerian Peoples Party, 154 group conflict, 146 Group theory, 141 gubernatorial election, 30, 121, 143 Guyana, 92 H headlines, 61 Herbert Macaulay, 153 High Court, 101, 167 hijacking, 16, 29, 30, 91, 138 hooligans, 145 Humphrey Nwosu, 71 F Facebook, 63 fake ballot, 7 falsification of election results, 6, 91, 97, 103 faulty elections, 4 FCT, 14 Federal Appeal Court, 121 Federal Capital Territory, 14 federal election, 155 federalism, 112 first Republic, 1, 142 flag-bearers, 189, 197 forgery, 7, 97 Free and fair election, 5 free press, 139 Frustration aggression theory, 141 fundamental human rights, 123, 138 I identity formation, 166 incumbency, 40, 72 independence, ix, 6, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 42, 45, 58, 59, 80, 135, 142, 152, 159, 160, 161, 172 Independent candidature, 19 infant voting, 6 inflation, 3, 6, 91 insecurity, 11, 146 Insurgency, 15 insurgents, 14, 18, 64 interest groups, 59, 63 Interim National Government, 155, 168 internal democracy, xii, 19, 171, 183, 186, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207 Internal party democracy, 189 international observers, 30, 33, 70, 155 Internet, 65, 74 Inter-Party Advisory Council, 202 G general elections, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 34, 43, 131, 142, 144, 154, 155 geo-political zones, 15, 30, 165 Ghana, 10, 86, 92, 150, 172 godfatherism, 11 211 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis intimidation of voters, 138 multiparty politics, 157, 159, 174 multiparty system, 138 Multiple voting, 7 multivariate statistical techniques, 3 J journalism, 59, 68 journalists, 61, 67, 68 judicial independence, 100 judicial proceedings, 97 judicial process, 102, 128 Judiciary, x, xi, 4, 91, 94, 95, 97, 109 jurisdictional issues, 97 justice administration system, 101 Justice, Development and Peace Committee, 30 N National Assembly, 4, 5, 16, 35, 67, 96, 131 National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, 161 National Council of State, 42 National Democracy Institute, 30 National Judicial Council, 19, 100 National Orientation Agency, 147 National Party of Nigeria, 60 National Population Census, 119 national question, 166 National Republican Convention, 60, 65, 167 National Youth Service Corps, 16 nationalism, 170, 171, 174 nationalist movements, 153 Neo-Marxian, 190 new democracy, 2, 18 New York, xiv, 54, 65, 74, 78, 89, 90, 150, 175, 179, 182 News, 55, 60, 178 newspaper, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66 - 69, 70, 77, 78, 84 NGOs, 71 Niger-Delta, 63 Nigeria Advanced Party, 154 Nigeria citizenship, 169 Nigeria People’s Congress, 161 Nigerian National Democratic Party, 153 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 18 Nigerian Peoples Party, 154 NJC, 19, 100, 113 NNPC, 18 Non-Governmental Organizations, 71 North Central, 15 North East, 14, 15, 18, 64 Northern Peoples’ Congress, 154 K Karl Marx, 190 Kenya, 50, 92, 175 L Lagos, xiv, 22, 30, 37, 45, 46, 86, 90, 108, 110, 121, 122, 130, 153, 177 law and order, 146 leadership change, 6 London, 74, 86, 112, 150, 176, 177 loss aversion theory, 119, 132 Lusaka, 51 M M.K.O. Abiola, 165, 168 Malta, 92 manifesto, 85, 130 Marxism, 190, 191 Maurice Iwu, 10 media, ix, xiv, 11, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 79, 84, 173 media organizations, 68, 69, 72 military, 3, 4, 5, 12, 16, 26, 32, 39, 42, 46, 49, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, 72, 123, 135, 138, 142, 143, 152, 154, 155, 156, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167 military rule, 39, 46, 152, 154, 167 Minister of Justice, 29, 122 monarchy, 138 multi-party democracy, 157 212  NYSC, 16 political communication, x, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88 political community, 137, 166 political culture, 3, 136 political freedom, 139 political gladiators, 75, 80, 81, 83 political journalist, 58 political leaders, 6, 23, 81, 159 political leadership, 25, 139, 154, 169 political observers, 83, 165 political party, 4, 11, 29, 43, 59, 62, 66, 67, 70, 97, 121, 141, 151, 153, 172 political power, 25, 32, 138, 142, 144, 159, 170 political psychology, 117 politicization, 183 polling centre., 8 Polling Stations, 7 polling unit, , 6, 7, 13, 16, 43, 124, 125 power of incumbency, 1 Presidency, xiv, 4, 14, 43 presidential campaign, 64 Presidential Debate, 20 presidential election, ix, 1, 2, 15, 17, 30, 44, 62, 64, 69, 71, 131, 153, 162, 165 primaries, 96, 128, 172, 186, 188, 190, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 207 primary election, 185, 186, 187, 188, 203 prison, 31, 122, 128 professionalism, 35, 67, 72 public policy, 117 publication, 28, 61, 66, 71, 182 PVC, 1, 13, 14, 19 O Obafemi Awolowo, 45, 59 observer groups, 42 okada, 40, 47, 55 oligarchy, 138 Online media, 63 online poll, 17 opposition, 5, 11, 14, 27, 40, 44, 60, 61, 63, 118, 120, 139, 144, 154, 164, 167, 180 opposition parties, 11, 44, 120, 144, 154 Orthodox Marxism, 190 Osun election, 116, 131, 132 Osun state, 115, 116, 117, 122, 124, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132 P parliamentary democracies, 186 party agents, 8, 9, 29 party loyalties, 117 party politics, 151, 162, 172 party rules, 188, 197, 201 party supporters, 7, 16, 138, 141 party system, 117, 139, 160, 167, 171 PDP, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 26, 29, 30, 31, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 62, 63, 64, 80, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 134, 143, 155, 164, 165 PDP governors, 12 People’s Redemption Party, 154 Peoples Democratic Party, 12, 26, 143 Permanent Voter Cards, 1, 13 police, 7, 8, 16, 28, 31, 43, 129, 133 political activism, 59, 118, 132 political appointees, 34 political associations, 167, 168 political attentiveness, 117, 118, 132 Political Bureau, 166, 167 political campaign strategy, 76 political campaigns, 20, 118, 132 political change, 18, 52 political class, 5, 10, 84, 147 Q Quality Assurance, 14 R Radio, 62, 63 real democracy, 5 referendum, 44 regional autonomy, 161 rigging, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 52, 91, 97, 123, 138, 146 213 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis Road Safety, 31 ruling party, 4, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 121, 128, 144, 164, 196 running mate, 12 thuggery, 97, 124, 127, 142 Thumb printing, 8 Tobago, 92 traditional rulers, 7, 127 transition, 1, 36, 40, 41, 135, 139, 140, 152, 154, 156, 162, 166, 167, 168, 172 Transition Monitoring Group, 48 transparency, 13, 27, 28, 35, 106, 136 Transparency International, 18 tribunal, 31, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 111 Trinidad, 92 true federalism, 11 trustees, 57 twitter, 63 S second Republic, 1, 60, 142, 162 security forces, 4, 14, 33, 49, 53 Senegal, 50 Seychelles, 92 Singapore, 92 Sit tight syndrome, 145 Smart Card Reader, 13 social class, 116, 132, 165, 190 Social Democratic Party, 60, 167 social groups, 141, 164, 190 socialism, 11, 167 Socialist International, 11 Socialist Party, 186 South East, 15 South West, ix, 12, 15, 86, 87, 115, 122 South-south, 15, 29, 30 spokesman, 64, 66, 68 standard of Proof, 104 state building, 158 State Legislatures, 4 state of freedom, 57 state of nature, 187 state security, 29, 68 State Security Service, 31 state-level politics, 41 Stomach Infrastructure, x, xi, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90 Structural Adjustment policies, 46 stuffing of ballot boxes, 6 system of government, 24, 25, 138, 152, 154 U UN, 51, 101 United Kingdom, 25, 182 United States of America, 75, 78, 83, 133 Unity Party of Nigeria, 59, 154 urban poor, 51, 52 US, 1 V values of democracy, 144 violence, 1, 4, 5, 18, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 42, 63, 97, 102, 121, 127, 141, 143, 144, 146, 154, 156, 170, 172, 173, 174 vote buying, 18, 32, 91 vote selling, 20 vote-counting, 188 voter’s registers, 91 Voters, 7, 13, 89, 118, 132, 133 Voters register, 7 voters’ cards, 6, 8, 33 voters’ lists, 6 voting behaviour, 116, 117, 118, 132 voting cards, 8 Voting cubicles, 16 voting materials, 6, 145 T Television, 61, 63, 64 Temporary Voter Card, 13 theocracy, 138 third Republic, 1 Third World, 3, 21, 176 Third World democracies, 3 214  Y YouTube, 63 Z Zambia, 50, 92, 178 Zimbabwe, 25, 180 zoning, 162 215 Elections in Nigeria: A Contemporary Analysis 216