Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason and Michael Watts (eds), Subterranean Estates: Life
Worlds of Oil and Gas, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-0-8014-5344-1
(cloth); ISBN: 978-0-8014-7986-1 (paper)
This thick edited collection from Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason and Michael Watts
contains 18 interdisciplinary chapters (as well as an introduction and photo essay) on the
“life worlds of oil and gas”. The work attends to an industry that is as all-pervasive as it
is seemingly impenetrable: our Earth is crisscrossed by the circuit of more than two
million kilometers of pipeline and is spotted with the depressions of approximately five
million oil wells. Oil seems to be so everywhere-present–(in our quotidian plastics of
need and leisure and lubricating the transportation of our bodies, food and goods)–that it
has been equated with modernity and attributed with reconstituting modern capitalism
(indeed, Matthew Huber [2013] calls it capitalism’s “lifeblood”). Simultaneously, oil has
been likened to actual human blood and, hence, to death. The Saudi novelist, Abdul
Rahman Munif, for example, “laid down the equation that in the dialectic of oil, each
drop of oil equals a drop of blood” (Kadri 2014: 2). This ubiquity of oil has led some to
characterize the contemporary capitalist world as having an “oil ontology” (Szeman
2010)–that is to say, a penchant to live as if oil is the origin and center of human
existence. Through our oil ontology, we have arranged our societies so that oil is our
collective raison d’être. Imre Szeman (2010:34) observes some of the paradoxes of this
ontology:
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Oil was everywhere, connected to everything–and yet there was something
missing…it still seems to be difficult to capture the fundamental way in which
access to petrocarbons structures contemporary social life on a global scale…Oil
is not just energy. Oil is history…And oil is also ontology, the structuring “Real”
of our contemporary sociopolitical imaginary, and perhaps for this reason just as
inaccessible as any noumenon in the flow of everyday experience from the
smoggy blur of sunrise to sundown.
Considering oil’s biopower as the “artificer of the world” (p.29), Peter Hitchcock
describes oil’s biophysical power as a slick, sticky, viscous substance that is ambiguously
central to a modernity that is nonetheless speciously premised upon its inexhaustible
consumption. In this reading, oil is the cure and the poison: it is modernity’s
“pharmakon” (Hitchcock, p.51). At the same time that some espouse “disposable energy”
as a new metric for national economic health relative to “happiness” (rather than GDP–
see Jane Guyer’s chapter, p.237), the conditions and relations of the industry produce and
promote “a form of gluttony and rapaciousness” that is intrinsically socially and
ecologically destructive (Anna Zalik, this volume, p.356). The modernity narrative
directed by an oil ontology is one of unrelentingly intensified progress (faster-and-faster,
bigger-and-bigger, more-and-more!), while nonetheless resigning us to a scorched earth
as fossil-fuel capitalism embarks on the “the pitiless destruction of everything and
everyone it cannot use” (Berman 1982: 121).
The editors of Subterranean Estates expound that the “scale and reach of the
sector is in fact almost impossible to fully grasp in part because of the difficulty of
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deciding on its circumference and its limits” (p.5). Yet, knowledge of the elements of the
industry and of the substance itself is paramount for the safeguarding of human and
more-than-human ecosystems, for (re)negotiating rights and asserting resource justice,
and for imagining, constituting, and defending a world that is livable without oil as
capitalism’s lifeblood and, consequently, our collective death-blood. Accounting for the
complex orderings and fixings of oil and gas temporalities, spatialities, dynamics and
flows is exigent when the varying worlds of oil both sustain the depth and breadth of
global inequalities and nurture the apocryphal narratives of inevitability and progress
embedded within modernity.
Juxtaposed between the “intellectual vertigo” induced by this massive industry
and “oil’s cynosural politics”, the authors seek to clear away some of the “epistemic
murk” that pervades the worlds of oil and gas (p.9). This murk is a consequence of the
scale and influence of oil within fossil-fuel capitalism (see Huber’s chapter here), the
secrecy and ventriloquism of the industry (see Saulesh Yessenova’s chapter, and also
Silverstein 2014) and the contestations of oil knowledge (see the chapters by Suzana
Sawyer, Sara Wylie and Zalik). The editors refer to the latter as the “startling degree of
inexactitude, fundamental empirical disagreement, and lack of confidence in [even] basic
data” regarding oil (p.9)–this, in an industry that portents to be “transparent” (as Zalik
aptly illustrates in her contribution on the industry in Canada, “transparency” is an arena
of legitimization to be captured by the industry). Navigating the murk is essential in
uncovering the multiple contestations within the production of oil “truths”–from the
determination of the toxicity of hydrocarbon molecules, to calculations of remaining
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barrels of oil, to the fluctuations of paper oil prices, to the meteorological forecasts of
hurricane trajectories.
The chapters that make up Subterranean Estates build upon recent
reconfigurations of the scholarship on oil and gas, including Timothy Mitchell’s (2011:
2) work on the “apparatus of oil production”. Longstanding debates in the social sciences
around the “resource curse” have tended to equate oil with the oil money that is produced
through the extraction, refinement, transport, exchange, and consumption of that oil
(Mitchell 2011; see also Andrew Apter [2005] on how commodity fetishism conceals the
money-generating powers of oil in Nigeria). Rather, according to Mitchell, greater
attention to the extraction, refinement, etc. of oil generates novel understandings of its
changing material and political powers, including “how a particular set of relations [has
been] engineered among oil, violence, finance, expertise and democracy” as well as other
political systems (Mitchell 2011: 428; on the varied influence of these relations for
bolstering other political systems, see Bebbington 2009; Coronil 1997; Soremekum 2011;
Strønen 2012; Watts 2001, 2004 as well as Yessenova’s chapter here). The contributors
to Subterranean Estates respond with precisely this focus on rendering intelligible the
assemblages of oil and gas (see Watts’ chapter, in particular): the hard and soft
infrastructures, the actors, the networks, the flows, the representations, the images, the
films, the archives, the regulatory mechanisms, the price dynamics, the competing
sciences and expertise, the technopolitics, the social lives, the futures, the prognostics, the
transparency initiatives, and more, of oil and gas. The editors explain that “rather than
dwell in fetish…while an entire infrastructure is built, maintained, and defended around
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us”, this edited collection seeks to account for “the natural, material, symbolic, political,
[and] spectacular in the contemporary world of oil and gas” (p.25).
Readers will note a meticulous focus on revealing, demystifying or engaging
anew those features of the substance and the industry that have remained mostly out of
the purview of examination: the material properties and viscosity of oil (see Hitchcock’s
chapter); the chemical compositions of hydrocarbon molecules (Sawyer’s); the
socializations and figurations of crude oil price fluctuations (Guyer’s); the financial
computations, mobilities of paper barrels, and convertabilities of oil-as-carbon through
carbon trading (chapters by Hannah Knox, Wylie and Watts); the speculative futures,
prognostics, spot markets, and hurricane derivatives (chapters by Leigh Johnson and
Mandana Limbert); the quantity of barrels spilled, platforms destroyed, and drilling units
set adrift from hurricanes (Watts again); the depths and modes of extraction (Appel’s)
and the varied cultural relations of oil and gas (chapters by Douglas Rogers, Elizabeth
Gelber, Johnson and Limbert). The renewed engagement with oil materialities reveals
important aspects of the everyday life of a resource and an industry that is as convoluted
as it is complicated, powerful, destructive, ubiquitous and ambiguous.
Building upon previous work (Sawyer 2003), Sawyer’s examination of the
politics and contestations of the science of hydrocarbon toxicity in the 2003 class action
lawsuit (filed on behalf of 30,000 people) against the Chevron Corporation in the
Ecuadorian Amazon illustrates some of the tensions in the fissures of the “epistemic
murk” surrounding oil. She traces the inherent complexities of the compound itself,
exposing the difficulty of establishing a “matrix of legibility” through which oil toxicity
is materialized and demonstrated (Sawyer, p.136). While both Chevron and the plaintiffs
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agreed on the presence of crude oil in the environment, there was neither consensus that
this oil contamination was detrimental to humans nor agreement on the appropriateness
of the mechanisms through which to measure and assess oil contamination. In fact,
Sawyer reveals, the majority of hydrocarbon compounds have never been scientifically
analyzed, let alone studied over time to determine their changes when released into the
environment. Moreover, while there have been some studies on the long-term exposure of
fish to crude oil, there has been little done on the consequences of human exposure over
decades (the oil contamination in question in Ecuador occurred 30 years prior to the filing
of the lawsuit). While these limitations would perhaps defang the plaintiffs’ case in the
legal context of other countries like the United States, in Ecuador, the judge ruled that
“where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health,
precautionary measures should be taken even if cause and effect relationships are not
determined scientifically”, and fined the company US$8.646 billion (Sawyer, p.144).
What the chapter does not relate is that although the judge ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor,
Chevron has tied the case up in a series of subsequent legal actions, including filing fraud
and embezzlement charges against environmental activists and plaintiffs in US courts as
well as a freedom of information ruling released the extra footage from the 2009
documentary film, Crude.
Wylie (p.111) analyzes the US under the rubric of a “petro-state” (and Watts and
Zalik similarly look at the North American context through this lens). Drawing on
Foucault’s notion of security, she describes an alignment between science and
technologies–including statistics, mapping, and databases–that work to secure and protect
oil field service companies. More particularly, she shows how intellectual property rights
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within hydraulic fracturing and industry-science relations, through the apparatus of the
state, are creating a new form of “petro-violence”, one in which “widespread public
health threats from chemicals…are made structurally impossible to monitor” (Wylie,
p.109). In 2004, fracking was exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act after
considerable lobbying. More insidious was the industry’s “subtle work” of influencing
the science-based regulatory processes of the Environmental Protection Agency. These
uncertainties in oil knowledge–this “epistemic murk”–have tended to be profitable for oil
companies, so much so that the promotion of doubt (or the “manufacturing of
uncertainty”) is a prevalent corporate operating procedure, eliciting the proliferation of
“produce defense” consulting firms. The ability to manufacture uncertainty to deflect
criticism has been an intrinsic constituent of the durability of what is a gravely
destructive industry. Of course, uncertainty has been profitable for other industries, as
well, among them the industrial producers of asbestos, benzene, beryllium, chromium,
diesel exhaust, lead, plastics, tobacco, genetically modified seeds and pharmaceutical
drugs (see Michaels 2006). Stuart Kirsch (2014:127) argues that the widespread corporate
management of scientific technologies and claims–including a strategic manipulation of
time in order to prolong profit-making during an interim of manufactured
uncertainty–“suggest[s] that the problems associated with corporate science may be
intrinsic to contemporary capitalism rather than restricted to particular firms or
industries”.
To better understand the image and representational worlds manufactured by the
oil industry, in his chapter Andrew Barry considers the politics, materialization, intent,
and constitution of the internet-available “oil archive”. The “oil archive” includes all of
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the documents, films, pamphlets, reports, advertisements, etc. produced by the oil
industry (and mostly, but not entirely, available online). According to Barry, the archive
can be read as a “political actor” that can indicate corporate commitments to ethical
values (Mason provides an alternate understanding of some of the oil archive–including
“the printed brochure, newspaper article, and gossip column” [p.334]–which he argues
acts as a sort of supernatural “epistemological glue” that unites actors within Big Oil on
the basis of their shared myths). While this archive of industry-produced materials
functions as a legitimating devise with the purpose of “overwhelming possible criticisms”
with a deluge of documents nearly impossible to synthesize, the power of the archive is
always shifting. Nonetheless, Barry (p.107) notes, this archive is “marked by systemic
absences”. While Barry (2013) has argued elsewhere that the narratives offered up within
the “oil archive” create new spaces for political contestations, Omolade Adunbi (2015: 23, emphasis added), for example, argues to the contrary in the case of Nigeria, where the
industry’s glossy self-representations:
not only…conceal the violence that has pervaded [the region] as a result of the
struggle over control of oil and resources–the violence that oil pipelines, flow
stations, and oil wells inflict on the land as well as the violence orchestrated by
militants in an attempt to reclaim lands and livelihoods. The duality of violence
creates a rupture that enables multiple actors–NGOs, the state, insurgency
movements, and community members–to create spaces that legitimate the
violence.
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The silences in the mega-narratives of the industry are also annotated by Limbert, who
characterizes the annual self-reports produced by oil companies as “highly partial” and
notes the politics of data appearing in easy-to-read language one year and then falling out
of the report all together (subsequent to criticisms) in the next year. Indeed, she shows
how in Oman, claims from industry and state representatives regarding the immanent
depletion of oil (including the ever-shifting categories used to signify this depletion) have
triggered a deep skepticism and even cynicism in ordinary people. She explains (p.341),
“recent interventions to enhance accuracy and science in oil forecasting have been
accompanied…by greater disbelief in state and oil-company transparency and greater
expectations of a hidden truth”.
Mona Damluji looks at another sort of oil archive, in this case the early films–
which she calls “petrofilms”–produced by the industry. She shows how companyproduced documentaries saturated an oil narrative with the promises of wealth,
modernization, and civilization. The silent, three-hour film produced by Shell,
Bataafsche Petroleum Film, for example, which premiered in the Hague for government
and press in 1924, showcased the company’s “concern with the wholesome aspects of
civilized life, nature, and art” (Damluji, p.152). During the 1950s, Shell produced an
incredible 130 films, reaching an estimated 8.5 million people worldwide (Damluji,
p.155). It is unlikely that the modern “oil archives” (even if available online) have this
reach and impact. In fact, incongruously enough given today’s context, Shell’s
unprecedented film output created “the first ‘genuine’ international documentary film
movement” (quoted in Damluji, p.155). The documentary film movement–what we think
of today as instrumental in holding corporations and governments accountable to wider
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publics by revealing untold truths about injustice–arose in the course of a nascent
partnership between the “technologies of fuel and film” that sought to promote the story
of fuel as “the promise of postcolonial modernity” (Damluji, p.148).
These banal self-representations and the pseudo-concessions of the industry do
not reveal the disaster, catastrophe, and violence embedded within the structures of
relations, flows, and interactions that make possible the vast and divergent oil
accumulations across time and space. To effectively address “oil’s cynosural politics”
(that is to say, the politics and frameworks that guide and inform the politics of oil), the
subterranean and above-ground relations within all phases of the hydrocarbon commodity
chain must be evacuated. This is reflected in the chapters on the aggressive relations
embedded in petrol contract-agreement-making (Yessenova), the extractive processes
(Rebecca Golden Timsar; Watts; Wylie) and the uneven distributions of wealth and
insecurity in “petro-states” (Golden Timsar; Huber). Discussions of the mutual
embeddedness of forms of violence with oil extractions can be had without reducing our
frameworks to commodity determinism or metonym–indeed Watts’ larger scholarship on
the political ecologies of fossil-fuel capitalism has made this abundantly clear.
Nowhere is accumulation through (a complex nexus of) violence and disaster
more apparent than in the chapters from Golden Timsar, Watts and Johnson. Rebecca
Golden Timsar (p.72, 81), for example, describes the social mechanisms that young Ijaw
men in the Niger Delta draw upon in order to “navigate a violent, alienating, lived
experience” of the Nigerian “oil frontier”. She writes,
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There is an unseen additive in the automobile tanks of Nigeria’s oil trading
partners such as the United States–namely, young Ijaw men’s lives. In a globally
connected world, there is a price to pay for insatiable desires for consumption,
locally, nationally, and internationally. (p.73)
She traces the ways in which the intricacies of these local geographies provide the ground
for the forging of “productive agency and a sense of community–[a sense of being] torn
together–in a flimsy world” (Golden Timsar, p.89). Men’s lives are not, of course, the
only “unseen additive” of oil extraction in, and export from, Nigeria. Oluwatoyin
Oluwaniyi’s (2011: 150) work in Okerenokoko and Kokodiagbene (both Ijaw
communities) reveals the struggles of women against “the state-oil partnership as well as
oppressive gender relations”. Sokari Ekine’s (2000, 2008) scholarship on women’s
resistances in the Niger Delta provides a powerful gendered critique to the militarization
that has accompanied oil extraction in the region, including the ways in which elderly
women are particularly vulnerable to “petro-violence”.
Watts demonstrates how disasters like the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe–which,
over 87 long days, released a quantity of crude oil sufficient to suffocate 3,850 square
miles of the Earth’s surface (p.213)–are far from “accidental”. These catastrophic events
are quite within the norm of expectation and predictability, Watts explains, writing that
they are in fact “overdetermined by…[a] vast accumulation of insecurity and risk…[They
are] a social product of the manufacture, on a larger historical landscape of reckless
frontier development, of catastrophic risks rooted in the ‘systemic failures’ of neoliberal
capitalism” (p.230).
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The subsequent maneuvering by corporations to further profit from those very
climate volatilities and fluctuations exacerbates this reality of corporate-induced natural
disasters. Leigh Johnson (p.196), for example, explains that the devastation of the 2005
and 2008 hurricane seasons in the Gulf of Mexico “motivated the development of…a
number of new financial instruments and meteorological forecasts that rendered…
weather risks into tradable instruments for hedging and speculation”. There is enormous
profitability in predicting and managing weather and atmospheric volatilities of the “near
future”. Despite the real-world environmental and human consequences of hurricanes,
[a]s the Gulf’s escalating vulnerability to climate change brings certain energy
and weather derivatives closer to embodying ‘perfect hedges’ for the Gulf oil
complex, the very fact that the landscape is growing ever more environmentally
precarious [due to accelerating climate change] could make it increasingly
financially profitable. (p.197)
First, disaster is precipitated by the oil industry through dangerous extractive practices
and carbon emissions, which accelerates anthropogenic climate change and increases
weather volatility. Second, as Naomi Klein’s (2007) work shows, capitalist forces
maneuver these disasters (and potential disasters in the form of “near futures”) to
facilitate continued expansion and to ensure continued profit.
The profitability of the climate crisis and hurricanes reflects the financialization
(alongside deregulation) of the industry since the 1980s. This financialization is
demonstrated through the fact that, on a given day, “paper oil trades exceed wet oil trades
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by 15-20 times” (Watts, p.232, emphasis added). Volatility affects the industry’s price
dynamics, as well, as Guyer’s account of the discrepancies in the petroleum industry’s
explanations for price fluctuations and pricing models evinces. I read Guyer’s
contribution in mid-January 2016, at the same time that a spokesperson for the
International Energy Agency speculated that the “oil market could drown in oversupply”
and the price per barrel was rapidly declining. Just one week earlier, we experienced a
several day shortage of oil in Jimma, the town where I live in Ethiopia. The shortage had
resulted in taxi and bajaj drivers waiting in line for hours at the pump (see Guyer, this
volume, for an interesting account of the localized management of a supply shortage at a
Nigerian petrol station)–this, despite the fact that, as Huber shows, the history of oil price
fluctuation reveals the management of surplus rather than scarcity.
These sorts of seeming conundrums–between falling international prices,
international surplus, and local shortages–occur, Guyer explains (p.247), because oil
pricing depends upon “multiple models all working out their own ways, coordinated with
difficulty”. Pricing is a “deeply socialized and figured” product of the interplay between
futures projections (including hunches and guesses) of assets based on wide-ranging
variables in local and global markets (p.250). In fact, pricing is highly uncoordinated and
uneven, with enormous geographical and temporal fluctuation: at the pump,
gasoline/petrol can be as expensive as US$9.89 per gallon in Turkey (with the highest
prices in the global market) to as cheap as US$0.06 per gallon in Venezuela (with the
lowest prices), “although”, Guyer writes (p.238), “all 60 ranked countries presumably
participate in the same global market”. While regional and national public figures posit
varied explanations for these differences in price (including subsidies, embargoes,
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political turmoil, elections, violence, climate-provoked disasters, etc.), profit tends not to
figure as a causality of price shifts although it surely is a leading motivator for
fluctuation.
At the same time, the financialization (and hence profitability) of risk has
triggered the influx of new instruments and technologies for forecasting (with greater
precision) the pathway and time-span of hurricanes. This desire for greater and greater
projections of meteorological events has reinforced relations between the oil industry and
the academy. Academic meteorological centers, Johnson explains, sometimes house
enormously profitable private forecasting groups that consult with and/or are funded by
Big Oil. At one university, a private forecasting group offered
…a proprietary seven-day forecast for which they claimed track accuracy within
100 miles. The National Hurricane Center’s forecast, by comparison, only
claimed 100-mile track accuracy out to three days, beyond which the area in the
“cone of uncertainty” increased dramatically. (Johnson, p.205)
At the same time that the industry works vigorously to manufacture uncertainty regarding
the scientific research of oil toxicity or anthropogenic climate change (see Sawyer’s and
Knox’s chapters), millions of dollars is pumped into scientific research on technologies to
drill deeper, farther, faster, and for longer. Echoing the doctrine within military
counterinsurgency on “total information awareness” (see Campbell and Murrey 2014),
the desire within the industry for “perfect information”–defined by Mia de Kuijper
(business strategist, dean of the Duisenberg School of Finance in Amsterdam, and former
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Royal Dutch Shell executive), as “the immediate availability of, and connection to, all
existing information regarding anything and anybody, at extremely low costs” (quoted in
Zalik, p.360)–is a hegemonic strategy intended to ensure the industry maintains its
information and technical dominance.
Writing of “university capture” by the fossil fuel industry in the United States,
Bret Gustafson (2012: 313) describes expert enclaves of “fossil men” as dominating the
creation, circulation, and policing of “fossil knowledge”. He defines this particular sort of
knowledge as the “representations of truth, sentiment, and expertise produced by, or in
relation to, the oil, gas and coal industries”. In his chapter, Mason (p.326, 328) provides
an alternative conceptualization of Gustafson’s “fossil men” by looking at the energies
and motivations (the “promise and disappointment cycle”) produced through face-to-face
meetings and other convergences between the “total social network of people and their
wishes”, which he calls “events collectives”. Mason explains that events collectives are
“agenda-setting” socio-temporal collectives that orient expectation and are characterized
by “talking simultaneously, getting excited, and making the unreal into a probability by
putting wishes into worlds” (p.327). Mason’s contribution is important for identifying the
emotionalities (promises and disappointments) and community-building within
exchanges by policy makers, government officials, representatives of strategic knowledge
firms and industry representatives (“fossil men”). For example, his examination shows an
unrelenting optimism created during the specific time-space of the “event collective”, in
spite of the considerable technological impracticalities of extraction in what is called the
“stretch” (seasonal ice) and “extreme” (year-round ice), as opposed to the “workable” (no
ice), Arctic.
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Given that “the annals of oil…are an uninterrupted chronicle of naked aggression
and the violent law of the corporate frontier” (p.16), the “event collective”, when
addressed within a larger examination of the materiailties, politics and powers of “oil
assemblages” emerges as less banal than the title might immediately suggest. These
convergences, while perhaps invigorating for the “expert” participant, are nonetheless
exclusive and exclusionary bubbles of gate-keeping, truth-making, and (if successful)
world-racking. For example, Gustafson’s retelling of a university event on “America’s
Energy Future”, including Arch Coal, Peabody Energy, and Ameren UE (a regional
electricity company dependent on coal-burning), demonstrates a small fraction of the
ideological gate-keeping within “expert” conclaves. Mason (p.337) concludes that, for
the event collective that arose (and eventually fell) around the construction of an Alaskan
gas pipeline, “the organizing principle that bound these events into a collective might
well be…a stupidity…drenched with yearning”. In my reading, I wondered about the
instances in which the event collective proceeds with the extraction project despite the
enormous associated risks. Indeed, Paul Hirt (1994) writes of a “conspiracy of optimism”
that is created through mining company exchanges, in which company employees
persistently refuse to acknowledge the socio-environmental damages of mining activities,
even in the presence of overwhelming evidence. Surely the continued ideological and
material commitment to modernization through hydrocarbon extraction–despite
knowledge of its attendant disasters, violence(s) and risks–is evidence of a larger
“conspiracy of optimism” within capitalist dogma and capitalist convergences.
There are some disconnects between the “oil assemblages” presented from one
chapter to another, sometimes usefully indicating the differences within a contradictory
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globalized system. I found that some of these gaps facilitated reflection on the
convergences and conjunctions between the chapters and their entanglements with wider
political, social and ecological realities of oil and gas. In these gaps and disconnects, the
reader might make useful connections across and between the chapters, as I endeavored
to illustrate through the multiple interpretations of the “oil archive” above.
Elsewhere, Ali Kadri (2014: 3) explains that “to exclude violence, power, and
contradictions in general from the hypotheses of the mainstream is to exclude reality
itself”. So that while Watts reminds us of the militarization of oil concessions, Appel
critiques the discourse of modularization or standardization against a backdrop of highly
unequal and racialized labor operations in off-shore work. Guyer’s analysis seems
checkered with inequalities that remain unnamed and I found it useful to situate the
chapter within the intention of the book to consider oil assemblages as polymorphic and
to address them from multiple angles. Guyer (p.247) briefly recounts the World Bank’s
involvement in the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, writing that the “World Bank project
was terminated in 2009, on the grounds that the government’s response breached the
commitments of the project”. This explanation does not mention the timing of the Bank’s
termination, which occurred alongside an agreement with the government of Chad to
repay $140 million in project loans to the Bank ahead of schedule. The timing of this
agreement throws into contest the Bank’s claims that the pipeline was engineered in a
way that could ensure social welfare, as opposed to being engineered in a way that
ensured returns for investors (for a thorough retelling of the interplays between
ExxonMobil, the World Bank, and the government of Chad, see Coll 2013). Kirsch’s
(2014:232) recent assertion of the need for a grounded political perspective in scholarship
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on the mining industry (one in which we reposition dis/belief in the social sciences) is
particularly insightful here. He writes:
Studying the mining industry requires a healthy dose of skepticism and perhaps
even a measure of cynicism, especially in relation to the promotion of the virtuous
discourses of sustainability and corporate responsibility. In contrast to the
anthropological tradition of suspending one’s disbelief when conducting
ethnographic research, I have declined to give the mining industry the benefit of
the doubt: its track record demands a higher standard of proof.
A similar argument can be made for scholars working on the oil and gas industry. Indeed,
although this argument is not made in Subterranean Estates, part of the project of
uncovering the “epistemic murk” of oil and gas lifeworlds might be asserting an informed
skepticism of industry claims even (or perhaps especially) when we cannot access
information due to corporate secrecy laws that privilege “client information” (see
especially the chapter by Zalik).
If read in order, Mason’s chapter follows on the heels of Knox’s exploration of
carbon footprints and convertibility. While Mason describes an inherent component of
the social power of oil “event collectives” as the members’ insistence on face-to-face
exchanges, this can be enacted only through extensive and nearly continuous cycles of air
and road travel. Knox reminds us that “flying on an airplane is about the worst single
thing you can do as an individual to emit carbon” (p.320). The multifaceted venality of
these “events collectives”–gatherings of powerful people to discuss, negotiate, and
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engineer potential extractive projects–are made apparent as the seeming ubiquity of oil is
again emphasized. Simultaneously, Huber (p.32) describes a protest in Washington, D.C.
against the Keystone pipeline, during which activists were discredited merely for having
driven to the protest. He explains that in a “neoliberal era where politics is equated with
what we do and consume it appears as if resistance is only possible through the
impossible task of living an oil-free life” (p.32).
Watts’ definition of the term “oil assemblages” stresses the multiplicity and
complexity of actors, actions, and relations within the “vast institutional fields of oil and
gas operations” (p.221). Unlike his earlier terminologies (including “petro-violence” and
“petro-state”), “oil assemblages” does not seem to immediately assist in directing our
focus within this enormously complicated and entangled landscape of oil. Other
scholarship on oil extraction has generated a substantial lexicon for a range of
phenomenon and transformations associated with the hydrocarbon commodity chain.
This petro-specific terminology includes: Big Oil, oil frontiers, oil archive, oil
assemblage, oil epiphany, oil ontology, oil science, oil spectacle, oil talk, oil-critique,
fossil men, fossil knowledge, petro-violence, petro-capitalism, petro-state, petrosocieties, petro-money, petro-resistance, petro-magic, petro-imagery, petro-film, petrofiction and probably many others. Do all of these terms reinforce the very idea of the “oil
ontology” and (somehow particular or discrete) “oil worlds”? Do they provide the
conceptual tools to challenge petro-dominance? So we critique the metonyms of oil-asviolence, oil-as-curse, oil-as-money–what about oil-as-world? Might we step back for a
moment and consider: is everything related to oil somehow particular to oil (what about
other extractive-oriented economies, among them fur, salt, timber, and sulfur or other
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global capitalist hegemons characterized by monopoly and subterfuge, including the
agro-business industry or global biotech and pharmaceutical companies)? How does this
rendering occur? Have we (scholars) also given oil an ontological power as the/a petroworld unto itself?
Attending to oil as a patterned assemblage of spatially and temporally specific
constituents (rather than as an unfolding teleology) offers a reorientation for scholarship
on oil and gas that challenges some of the illusions of coherence within Big Oil. Readers
of Antipode might yet be left wanting more attention to “the political value of concepts
such as assemblage theory” (Russell et al. 2011: 577). In the pages of City, Bertie Russell
and colleagues go on to assert that:
It is no longer enough to further expound on the complexities of what we think
and feel we are up against. Our academic-political work must provide resources
for us all to push against, antagonize, and go beyond the present condition. We
simply want to ask: what is assemblage theory for? What can it do to help us out
of this capitalist present?
These scholars outline the need for collaborations and collectivities that assemble and
offer alternative organizations of social and political relationships (see also McFarlane
[2011: 213], Rankin [2011] and Saldanha [2012] for accountings of the political urgency
to move beyond debunking or criticizing to “assembling”–“offer[ing new] arenas in
which to gather”). Oil assemblages are helpful to understanding contemporary (fossil
fuel) capitalism but the task of putting oil and gas assemblages to work is less apparent in
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the book–in fact, it seems absent. It is not oil itself that requires changing as we pursue
more just socio-economic and political relations. Rather, “it is the criterion that organises
the relationships by which societies reproduce themselves by commodifying the basic
goods [like oil] that are required to sustain life that has to change” (Kadri 2014: 2). So,
how can the oil assemblage help us to go beyond our present, as Russelll and colleagues
insist?
We have no survival need fulfilled by oil, as Hitchcock and Huber remind us in
Subterranean Estates. Oil is better characterized as an addiction than a need–but an
unevenly racialized global-social addition, with an ideological, infrastructural, and
relational assemblage characterized by deep inequalities that reflect a history of
colonialism and a present of militarism and financialization (see Watts’ photo essay). In
our investigations into these murky oil assemblages–and as we wade through the
“epistemic murk” of oil and gas–we should not lose track of that which is too often much
more difficult to track: what Paul Farmer (2004) calls the “body count” of capitalist
structural violence (see also Nixon [2011] on the slowness of violence that unfolds over
decades, so much so that tracing the cause and effect informing ecological destruction is
an inherently challenging task).
We can calculate the cumulative kilometers of pipelines stretching across our
shared planet and offer the chemical makeup of hydrocarbon molecules (and, in so doing,
remove some of the “murk” that inhibits our view of “oil assemblages”). The number of
villages and people impacted and the sorts of human (physical, psychological, spiritual,
emotional, intergenerational) and ecological impacts felt as a result of this globalized
infrastructure of pipelines alongside, and compounded by, other capitalist structural
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violence(s), remain more challenging to conclusively determine, measure, standardize,
prove, or “de-murk”. Alongside the industry’s oil archive is an extensive scholarly
literature and activist archive on gas and oil, much of it critical of the industry–(indeed,
Szeman [2010:33] notes that his automatic email alerts for articles on oil resulted in as
many as 50 different articles a week on the topic between 2008 and 2010).
Zalik (p.364) describes the “kind of epistemological battle” currently underway to
establish (some sort of) “truth” regarding the life worlds of oil and gas; Subterranean
Estates is an important contribution to this “epistemological battle” and it will be a useful
resource for us as we continue to address and critique the assemblages of oil and gas. A
nurse’s loss of smell, and even liver, heart and respiratory failure, after exposure to
unknown chemicals inserted into ground water during fracking (Wylie) and the rise of
embodied occult practices to protect young men’s bodies from “petro-violence” in the
Niger Delta (Golden Timsar) reveal that there is much that is murky in this “world” of oil
and gas.
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Amber Murrey
Development Studies
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Jimma University, Ethiopia
ambermurrey@gmail.com
March 2016
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