The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms in the Fashion Industry: A
Historical and Comparative Study of France, Italy, and the United States
Marie-Laure Djelic; Antti Ainamo
Organization Science, Vol. 10, No. 5, Focused Issue: Coevolution of Strategy and New
Organizational Forms. (Sep. - Oct., 1999), pp. 622-637.
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The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms in
the Fashion Industry: A Historical and
Comparative Study of France, Italy,
and the United States
Marie-Laure Djelic
Antti Ainamo
ESSEC, HR Management Department, Av. B. Hirsch, BP10.5, 95021 Cergy-Pontoise, Cedex, France,
djelic @essec.fr
Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, Runeberginkatu 14-16, FIN-00100 Helsinki, Finland,
ainamo @ hkkk.$
Abstract
In many industries, the contemporary context of acute environmental dislocation shows the limits of traditional organizational
recipes. In direct response to environmental challenges, companies are experimenting with new organizational solutions.
While flexibility, or the capacity to redefine organizational form
to follow changing purposes, is undeniably a common trend,
these experiments otherwise differ greatly. Diversity is such, in
fact, that it is difficult to clearly identify and define a unique
organizational paradigm for the future.
To explore the connection between environmental dislocation and organizational transformations, we adopt a historical
and comparative perspective. Our empirical base of evidence is
the luxury fashion industry in three countries, France, Italy, and
the United States. For many years, this industry was defined by
stable environmental conditions, and a craft model of organization remained dominant. We show that, over a more recent
period, increasing environmental turbulence has brought about
a redefinition of the rules of the game. A common response has
been for organizations to move towards greater flexibility or
modularity and to experiment with network forms. However,
we also show that the paths or trajectories leading to organizational flexibility have varied significantly across countries,
reflecting historical legacies and institutional constraints. W e
identify in fact three different network forms in that industry,
which represent national ideal types-the "umbrella holding"
company in France, the "flexible embedded network" in Italy,
and the "virtual organization" in the United States.
We argue that the process of change in the luxury fashion
industry has been one of coevolution, where environmental
transformation and organizational change have fed upon each
other through time. Pioneer firms in the luxury fashion industry
originally devised organizational solutions within the bounds
set by nationally defined constraints and opportunities. Becoming institutionalized, these early solutions in turn shaped the
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Vol. 10, No. 5, September-October 1999, pp. 622-637
environment for individual organizations and organizational
populations, creating new sets of opportunities and constraints.
In a path-dependent manner, different models of organization
and national competitiveness thus emerged.
In conclusion, we are brought to question the likelihood of
full and stable convergence towards a unique organizational
form or paradigm. There appears to be, in each national context,
a process of construction of new organizational solutions that
starts from local foundations. Embedded as they are in powerful
historical and institutional legacies, organizational differences
are there to stay, we believe, beyond the period of transition
and acute environmental dislocation.
(Fashion Industry; New Organization Forms; Coevolution; Historical Perspective)
1. Introduction
Globalization, acute competition, the information technology revolution, and increasing customer sophistication
are radically redefining environmental conditions. In
many industries, these environmental challenges are
showing the limits of traditional organizational recipes.
Insisting on a necessary fit between organizational solutions and environments, organization theorists argue that
periods of severe environmental dislocation call for flexible organizational solutions that can adapt to changing
purposes (March 1991, Lewin and Stephens 1993, Brown
and Eisenhardt 1998, Volberda 1998). At the same time,
a look at organizational practice shows that there are multiple paths to organizational flexibility. Such diversity
1047-7039/99/1005/0622/$05.00
1526-5455 electronic ISSN
MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO
Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
makes it difficult to clearly identify and define a single
organizational paradigm for the future.
To explore the connection between environmental
challenges and organizational transformations, we focus
in this paper on the luxury fashion industry. Adopting a
historical and comparative perspective, we find that, for
many years, luxury fashion companies operated within a
relatively stable environment, and the "craft" model of
organization, characteristic of French pioneer firms, remained dominant. More recently, environmental conditions have started to change, becoming increasingly turbulent. In the face of global environmental challenges,
luxury fashion companies have tended to move towards
greater organizational flexibility. However, a comparison
of the industry in France, Italy, and the United States
shows that the trajectories leading to such organizational
flexibility have differed significantly across national
boundaries. We identify, in fact, three national patterns
or "ideal types," each one corresponding to one of our
national cases.
We thus find strong support for a coevolution perspective where environmental transformation and organizational change interplay through time, feeding upon each
other (Koza and Lewin 1998; Lewin et al., this issue;
Koza and Lewin, this issue). Through our historical and
comparative approach, we contribute to discussions about
the mechanisms of coevolution. In each of the three countries examined, we point to a path-dependent and historically constructed process of interaction between-or
coevolution of--organization forms, global environmental trends, and national institutional legacies. Using our
findings to speculate further, we also take up the issue of
the possible consequences of the coevolution process. We
thus touch upon a key dimension of the debate on new
organization forms-that of the ultimate congruence or
convergence of forms. We believe that, in the luxury fashion industry, the current period of acute environmental
turbulence is in fact a period of transition, characterized
by search, exploration, and multiple but temporary solutions (Lewin et al., this issue). A matter open for discussion is whether, after this period of transition, the organizational landscape will end up converging upon a
unique, widely legitimated, and institutionalized organizational paradigm (Lewin et al., this issue). Building upon
our empirical results, we propose at the end of the paper
our own view on the question.
2. Organization Forms and
Environments
In relatively simple and stable preindustrial times, small
and craftlike organization forms were dominant. The first
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and second industrial revolutions, at the beginning and
end of the nineteenth century, created the conditions for
mass production and economies of scale. The large size
of many new companies then turned coordination and
control into key organizational challenges. The solution
that emerged was the standardization of organizational
routines combined with a hierarchical and rigidly centralized form of control and reporting. This tightly coupled organizational solution, labeled here for short the
bureaucratic paradigm, was gradually established
throughout the first part of the twentieth century as a "one
best way" that could be equally suited to all companies
and situations (Taylor 1911).
2.1. Bringing the Environment Back In
In time, though, this illusion of a possible "one best way"
ran against a stubbornly complex and multifarious empirical reality. "Prebureaucratic" craft organizations survived, particularly in those industries where cost competition was not significant and customers valued quality
craft production. There was increasing evidence, in fact,
that the bureaucratic paradigm was not efficient in all situations. This led to the idea of a contingent fit between
organizations and their environments. The survival and
effectiveness of organizations appeared to hinge upon the
right match between organizational capabilities and environmental peculiarities (Burns and Stalker 1961).
While this idea has shaped organization theory to this
day, the nature and direction of the fit and the mechanisms
for change still very much remain a matter for debate.
On one side, some have argued that environmental
characteristics essentially determine and shape organization forms. Contingency theorists (Woodward 1965,
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), population ecologists
(Hannan and Freeman 1984), and more recently, organizational neoinstitutionalists (Powell and DiMaggio
1991, Scott et al. 1994) all propose variants of this argument. Others have put forward an entirely different
claim. Strategic choice (Child 1972) and resource dependency theories (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the cognitive
(Weick 1969), and the more recent postmodern argument
(Clegg 1990) all have, in one way or another, defended
the idea that organizations choose and shape, at least in
part, their own environments.
A third framework is currently emerging that appears
to bridge the above controversy. Adopting a longitudinal
perspective, coevolution theorists argue that environmental transformation and organizational change interplay
and feed upon each other through time (Koza and Lewin
1998; Lewin et al., this issue; and Koza and Lewin, this
issue). In periods of relative environmental stability, existing and dominant organization forms define organizational populations and shape in part environmental landscapes. In turn, environmental transformations tend to
623
MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO
Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
affect organizational populations and forms. In periods of
relative stability, change takes place but only in an incremental way, in a manner analogous to species variation.
To use the seminal and by now classic formulation of
March (1991), organizations and populations "exploit"
existing resources, dominant solutions, and institutionalized search routines. In times of significant environmental
dislocation, on the other hand, individual organizations
and organizational populations appear to be threatened.
This triggeqs "exploration," that is a radical search for
entirely new kinds of solutions.
2.2. Organization Forms for the Future
There is little doubt that the end of the twentieth century
is a period of significant environmental dislocation, at
least as much as the end of the nineteenth century had
been in its time. Many industries and companies are having to face increasingly turbulent, ambiguous, and hypercompetitive environmental conditions (Volberda
1996, 1998; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). In those conditions, the capacity to search for or "explore" appears
necessary to ensure organizational survival. And such capacity requires flexible and organic organization forms
(March 1991, Lewin and Stephens 1993). Although they
should not give up some of the clear advantages that come
together with standardization and exploitation, companies
should be moving towards-or preserving-looser types
of integrating mechanisms and more flexible organizational features (Volberda 1996, 1998). They should find
ways to promote cultural and political variety and still
avoid inefficiencies, fragmentation, and political strife
(Webb and Pettigrew, this issue).
Design theory suggests a solution for handling this apparent contradiction-a redefinition of the organization
as a "nearly decomposable system" (Simon 1996). According to Simon, "the potential for rapid evolution exists
in any complex system that consists of a set of stable
subsystems, each operating nearly independently of the
processes going on within other subsystems" (Simon
1996: p. 193). In such complex systems, each organizational part or module may be better adapted either for
"exploitation" or for "exploration." Pioneering experiments by leading firms appear to point towards this kind
of flexible combination of subsystems or modules, where
a core competence corresponds to each module (Taylor
1991, Miles and Snow 1986). Near decomposability, or
modularity as it is commonly labeled, thus seems to be
key to managing complexity in tomorrow's organizations. And network forms of organization, allowing modularity, are in fact emerging and thriving in many industries (Nohria and Eccles 1992; Koza and Lewin, this
issue).
624
However, while there is widespread agreement among
organizational practitioners and theorists alike that modularity can indeed make it possible for organizations to
reconcile flexibility with cost efficiency, the "network
form" is, as of now, more of a ragbag than a clear paradigm. Many different organizational experiments do fit
under the label. It seems, in fact, that the road to the future
is not straightforward but rather leads to multiple "migration paths" or trajectories of change. A coevolution
perspective with a historical and comparative dimension
can help account for this-each trajectory only makes
sense, in fact, within a particular institutional context and
in connection with specific historical legacies. We illustrate this below, using the case of the luxury fashion industry. The question remains whether these multiple
forms, solutions, and trajectories may nevertheless end
up converging or whether differences are there to stay,
beyond the period of transition and acute environmental
dislocation. We give our own view on the matter in the
discussion at the end of the paper.
3. The Luxury Fashion Industry
Outlining the boundary of the luxury fashion industry is
not an easy task. Although a number of apparently "objective" dimensions come to mind when trying to define
luxury-such as, for example, price, intrinsic aesthetic
value, quality, rarity-those dimensions are not, in themselves, fully satisfactory. They correspond to a traditional
and somewhat outdated understanding of the luxury
good, where value stemmed from the intrinsic features of
a product (CERNA 1995, Jellinek 1997).
3.1. The Luxury Fashion Industry-Definition
Our understanding of the luxury fashion industry has in
fact significantly evolved, particularly over the last 20
years, at the same time that the boundaries of the industry
were expanding. There is no such thing anymore as an
objective and unanimous definition of aesthetic value.
Rather, there are a potentially infinite number of lifestyles, discourses, and definitions revealing a multiplicity
of aesthetic worlds (CERNA 1995, Djelic and Gutsatz
1998, Ecole de Paris 1998).
A key defining characteristic of luxury fashion companies, in this context, is that they do not deliver only
products but diverse sets of representations as well. Luxury fashion companies are also brand names and brand
names are "spaces for dreams" (Ecole de Paris 1998)
where customers can satisfy not only their material but
also their symbolic needs. Luxury fashion products are
generally intended for use, but they are also associated
with some intangible dimensions that pertain to the realm
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of meanings or aesthetics and give these goods their marginal value (CERNA 1995, Gutsatz 1996). The definition
proposed here reflects and reveals the fact that the borders
between the luxury and the nonluxury segments of the
industry may not today be as watertight as they were 30
or 40 years ago. For luxury brands, competition may in
fact increasingly come from beyond the boundary of the
luxury goods industry (Nueno and Quelch 1998).
The worldwide luxury goods market now represents a
total of $35 billion (U.S.) (Financial Times, 27 February
1998). On that market, French companies have contributed a little less than 50% of total turnover in the mid1990s (calculated from CERNA 1995). If one considers
only the fashion segment of the luxury market, though,
French companies emerge as much less significant than
their notoriety would lead one to expect. The combined
turnover of Yves Saint Laurent Couture, Dior, Givenchy,
Kenzo, and Christian Lacroix reached a mere $0.5 billion
(U.S.) in 1997. In the meantime, the Italian Armani or
the American Ralph Lauren each had a turnover of around
$1 billion (U.S.) (Les Echos, 30 April 1998).
3.2. The Luxury Fashion Industry-Methodology
This paper takes the fashion segment of the luxury goods
market as its empirical focus and builds upon the work
both authors have been doing on the fashion industry
(Ainamo 1996, Djelic and Gutsatz 1998). In particular, it
draws selectively upon the first results of a large-scale,
comparative project on the luxury goods industry. The
object of that project has been to identify and describe
evolutions through time and tendencies in the luxury
goods industry with regard to environmental trends, organizational forms, and managerial competencies. Upon
completion of the project, the empirical base will include
around 40 companies in three different countriesFrance, Italy, and the United States-the distribution by
country paralleling more or less closely the weight of
each country in the industry.
For the purposes of this paper, we considered only the
fashion segment of the luxury goods industry, and we
decided to focus more particularly on a few companies
for each country. These particular companies were selected for their ideal typical nature andlor for their overall
weight in the national or worldwide markets. The results
presented in this paper reflect information obtained on
this small sample of companies through interviews, press
reviews, and the analysis of available written documents.
The data collection and the chosen methodology have had
both a comparative and an historical dimension, allowing
us to identify similarities but also differences across time
and space (Chandler 1990, GuillCn 1994, Djelic 1998).
We were able in this way to identify national patterns and
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to point to path-dependent and historically embedded trajectories in each country. At the same time, though, our
methodological choices have constrained our ambitions.
And the most we can claim is that these national patterns
are ideal types, to which exceptions may easily be found
in each country. Table 1 gives a summary description of
the sample of selected companies.
In France, the Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy group
(LVMH) brings together under the same umbrella company some of the world most famous fashion names
(Givenchy, Christian Lacroix, Kenzo, CCline, and
Christian Dior). Together, these houses or brand names
represent a significant share of the French luxury fashion
industry, and the peculiar structure of LVMH makes it a
unique entity worth looking at in greater detail. We also
chose to focus on Hermits as possibly the most vocal advocate of a French tradition of luxury and, as such, an
interesting ideal type for the purposes of our study. For
contrast, we finally looked at Pierre Cardin, the French
company that may stand the furthest away from this
French model and tradition.
In Italy, we selected Armani on the grounds, firstly, of
its overall weight in the Italian, but also in the worldwide
fashion industry. The recent and astounding success of
Gucci and Prada, which have become important players
on the fashion market in only a few years, explains why
they were also included in our sample.
In the United States, the sheer size of Ralph Lauren
and Calvin Klein and the apparent success of their relatively similar strategy have made them interesting ideal
types. For good measure, we also included Donna Karan,
which, with a similar strategy, is turning out to be much
less successful.
Our historical and comparative data collection allows
us to document major transformations, particularly over
the past twenty years, in the environment of luxury fashion companies. In 4, we point to a number of global
trends affecting all of these companies across national
boundaries. We then present, in 3 5, the different responses which these companies have come up with to
adapt to environmental transformations. Beyond a common tendency towards increasing flexibility, these organizational responses are very much embedded in national
institutional contexts and peculiar historical legacies.
4. Environmental Trends and Challenges
in the Luxury Fashion Industry
The luxury fashion industry originated in France in the
middle of the nineteenth century when a British tailor
who had settled in Paris-Charles Frederick Worth-decided to sign his products, thus claiming the originality
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MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO
Table 1
Luxury Fashion Companies-A
FRANCE
LVMH (sales 1997: US$450m)
Hermes (sales 1997:US$120m)
Pierre Cardin (ma.)
Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
Sample
ITALY
UNITED STATES
Armani (sales 1996:US$750m)
Gucci (sales 1997:US$lOOm)
Prada (sales 1997:US$190m)
Ralph Lauren (sales 1997: US$9OOm)
Calvin Klein (n.a.)
Donna Karan (sales 1997:US$540m)
Note. Sales figures are for apparel only. They do not include accessories, leather, cosmetics, or perfumes.
of his creations and the specificity of his image. Until the
1960s, the industry amounted in fact to a handful of Parisian haute couture houses serving a privileged clientele
and characterized by labor intensive, craftlike processes.
This small but dominant group of French players all but
managed to close off the boundaries of the industry.
4.1. The Institutionalization of Stability before 1970
Organized though a professional association-the
Chambre Syndicaie de la Haute Couture-French traditional players were for a long period of time able to control entry into the luxury fashion industry by institutionalizing a set of strict rules (Grumbach 1993). Under those
rules-for the most part still in force today-the label
haute couture could be delivered only to those companies
that fit the following requirements:
(a) employing at least 20 persons in the production of
clothes in the company's studios,
(b) presenting for each season-spring and fall-a collection of at least 75 designs,
(c) presenting these collections with the help of at least
three live models, and
(d) doing so in the house itself, in special areas designed for this purpose (Crane 1997).
The stringent nature of these rules in effect made it
nearly impossible for foreign competitors to obtain the
label haute couture and thus, at least until the 1960s, to
gain the legitimacy that was required to impose themselves within the industry. Thanks in part to their first
movers' advantage, French traditional players in the luxury fashion industry thus managed to define and control
their own environment. For many years, they were able
to institutionalize and enjoy a stable and predictable environment, creating around themselves a comfortable
buffer zone. Behind these protective boundaries, French
haute couture houses did set creative and fashion trends
that had a worldwide impact. They also very much dictated technological and organizational solutions, institutionalizing them as key defining dimensions of the industry's identity (Grumbach 1993, Dumas 1998).
However, over the past 30 years, the predominance of
French haute couture houses has come to be contested.
626
It has become increasingly difficult for these traditional
fashion companies to ignore and fend off the pressure
stemming from emerging environmental trends. These
environmental trends, playing out at a global level, have
created many new and significant challenges, to which
traditional players in the luxury fashion industry have finally had to react.
4.2. Global Pressure from the Late 1960s
Many of the global trends that have come to redefine the
environment for luxury fashion companies are quite similar in fact to those shaping other industries. An evolution
of the customer base and of its lifestyle has combined
with technological transformations and a globalization of
markets. These global trends have been further reinforced
by an increasing competition and by the emergence, in
particular, of companies challenging the predominance of
traditional French haute couture houses. These outsiders
have welcomed, seized upon, and pushed along a redefinition of the rules of the game in the luxury fashion industry that could only be to their benefit.
Market demand for luxury fashion has changed significantly over the last 30 years or so. Traditional marketsWestern Europe and the United States-have become
mature. The original elite target groups for French haute
couture houses, that had worn only or mostly made-toorder clothes, have gradually declined (Crane 1997). This
could in part be explained by increasing costs and prices
but also by changes in lifestyles. While this small elite
was running dry, a growing mass of middle- and uppermiddle class customers, with rising buying power, was
looking for signs of "distinction" (Bourdieu 1979).
Through their consumption of luxury goods, these new
groups of customers have been searching for symbolic
satisfaction in ways that have often differed from those
of traditional elite group members (Gutsatz 1996, Ecole
de Paris 1998). When traditional elite groups valued distinction, hierarchy, order, or nobility, highly educated
middle-class customers seem to care for entirely new sets
of values-solidarity, meaning, genuineness, and ethics.
Together with the education level of Western customers, expectations also have grown. Customers have become increasingly able to manage their own choices; they
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are autonomous and demanding. They have their own
particular lifestyle and representation of the world, with
which they expect the products they consume to resonate.
Traditional haute couture houses, which used to rely on
the intrinsic features of their products to trigger sales,
have found that the product, nowadays, is far from selfsufficient. Customers look for perfect quality and service
but also for price and immediate satisfaction as well as
for a fit between the space for dreams characteristic of a
brand and their own symbolic needs and representations.
While markets have radically changed in nature, they
have also expanded in geographic scope. The oil shock
and the consequent influx of revenues in the Middle East,
the economic boom in Asia, and the fall of the Berlin
Wall, have pushed back the frontier for luxury goods
companies. These new markets, characterized by an
emerging elite hungry for symbols of status, have become
highly attractive for fashion houses. But they have also
contributed to making demand less homogeneous, reinforcing a trend already characteristic of the industry's traditional markets. Thus, like many other industries, the
luxury fashion industry is facing a global challenge. The
internationalization of markets is such that luxury fashion
products and brands can potentially become universal. At
the same time, though, luxury fashion companies will increasingly have to be sensitive to the multiplicity of
needs, and they will have to adapt to the local peculiarities
of demand.
For those fashion houses embedded in a tradition of
craftsmanship-the French players in particular-the expansion and diversification of markets have brought along
another significant challenge. To handle change and diversity in their markets, luxury fashion companies have
had to consider the integration of new technological tools
and the adoption of modern management practices. At
first sight, these appear to threaten the craftsmanship tradition. Managing the integration and striking a balance
between tradition and innovation, mass production and
customization, have thus become key challenges in the
luxury fashion industry, in particular for those players
deeply embedded in the industry traditions (Ecole de
Paris 1998, Dumas 1998).
4.3. Increasing Foreign Competition from the Late
1970s
The redefinition of markets and the strength of global
pressure have created a window of opportunity in the luxury fashion industry, through which competition has
rushed in. By playing upon and using these environmental
transformations to their own advantage, new competitors
or challengers have in fact come to reinforce them.
Competition to traditional haute couture houses originally emerged from within France as early as in the
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1960s. A number of small companies were then set up
that did not fit the requirements for getting the haute couture label. These crkateur companies thus remained at the
margins of the industry. They made the most of their marginal position and as a matter of fact invented a new industry, the luxury ready-to-wear. They seized upon the
unmistakable decline of the haute couture business, betting upon instead and tapping into a widening group of
middle- and upper-middle class customers that were benefiting from a period of significant economic growth in
France (Grumbach 1993).
The organized haute couture community still managed
to keep control over this French competition. French
crkateur companies remained relatively small in size and
never became a significant threat to the haute couture
community (Crane 1997). The main and real challenge
came, in fact, a little later from beyond French national
borders. Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, new
players originating mostly from Italy and from the United
States imposed themselves at the luxury end of the fashion market. These challengers perceived evolving market
and market demand in the luxury fashion business more
as opportunities than as threats.
By anticipating and building upon the global trends
identified above, Italian and American entrants have
made significant forays into the luxury fashion industry.
Bypassing the stringent requirements for entry into the
haute couture industry, they have bet instead upon luxury
ready-to-wear. These outsiders have welcomed and
pushed further along a redefinition of the rule of the game
that could only be to their benefit. In the process, they
have reinforced existing global trends and significantly
contributed to reshaping the luxury fashion industry
(Gutsatz 1996, Ecole de Paris 1998, Martin 1998).
Defining customers as coconstructors or cocreators and
not merely passive consumers, Italian and American challengers have brought about a redefinition of the relationship between fashion companies and their markets. These
challengers take into account customers, their various
profiles, and symbolic needs or expectations. Quite similar in that to fashion companies at the lower end of the
industry, these new entrants to the luxury fashion industry
do not only design, manufacture, and sell their products.
They also interact with their customers and systematically
segment their markets and channels of distribution
(Nueno and Quelch 1998). The challenge here thus becomes to accept and integrate, at least to some extent,
different symbolic needs and expectations without losing
control of the identity of the brand.
At the same time, the multiplicity and diversity of symbolic needs has very important consequences. A "streetwise" creator, having a good sense of the symbolic needs
627
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Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
of a particular target group and able to secure significant
financial backing, can create a new brand or renovate an
old one and successfully develop and exploit it. The
astounding revival in the 1990s of brands like Gucci and
Prada or the success of the Italian Etro, which in less than
ten years has been transformed from an obscure fabric
designer to a cult fashion brand, bear witness to that (La
Tribune, 7 April 1998). Quick success, though, goes together with quick failure, as when the space for dreams
associated with a particular brand no longer resonates
with the symbolic needs of a large enough group of customers. The recent bankruptcy of the American Isaac
Misrahi, which experienced rapid growth and success in
the early 1990s, or the difficulties of the British company
Laura Ashley are clear illustrations of that (Wall Street
Journal, 20 April 1998).
5. Organizational Responses: The
Institutional Embeddedness of
Trajectories
Facing radical market transformation, increasing technological complexity, and heightened competition, luxury fashion companies have had to react and adapt. In the
context of significant environmental dislocation, many
have felt the need for greater organizational flexibility.
The meaning of organizational flexibility, though, and the
paths or trajectories leading to it have varied significantly,
particularly across national borders. In the luxury fashion
industry, one can in fact easily identify national paths or
trajectories to flexibility. Differences between these national ideal types can largely be traced to historical legacies and institutional constraints, which, at least thus far,
have been defined, constructed, and reconstructed at the
national level. Exceptions to these national ideal types
can naturally be found in each country, but they remain
on the whole marginal and isolated.
5.1. French Craft-Based Organizations-The Weight
of Tradition
Until World War 11, French haute couture was a highly
stable industry where made-to-order clothes for women
were the principal source of revenue. The business of
designing, malung, and selling fashionable custom-made
clothing was a craft and labor-intensive process that did
not require significant investments. The clientele was
small and homogeneous, mostly drawn from within the
ranks of the French aristocracy and upper-middle class
(Grumbach 1993, Crane 1997). This privileged elite was
furthermore fairly loyal, and clients tended to dress exclusively with one single house.
In the tradition pioneered by Charles Frederick Worth,
628
a couturier or artistic designer typically owned each
house. The image and success of each house was closely
dependent upon the unique creative power of its designer,
who was also often in charge of running the business.
This designer has traditionally been a "cult" figure,
around whom everything seemed to revolve and upon
whom everything seemed to depend. As artist and craftsman, he or she ensured that the process as a whole, from
creation to manufacturing and distribution, would be fully
integrated (Dumas 1998). This step-by-step monitoring,
which amounted in fact to a quality control integrated
upstream, was essentially achieved through a reliance on
traditional savoir faires-or
traditional craft techniques-inherited from the past. Thus, while the success
and predominance of French haute couture houses originally built upon their explorative capacities in design and
creation, the dominant logic when it came to technology
and organization was an exploitation of old and seasoned
recipes. To this day, the very identity of French haute
couture houses has appeared to lie in their reliance upon
traditional practices at all stages of the integrated production process.
As already underscored, the predominance of French
haute couture houses was further strengthened for a while
by the existence of a protective set of institutions and
rules that all but sealed off the boundaries of the industry.
Each house had in itself little slack, but the institutionalized organization of the French fashion industry created
somewhat of a buffer zone around members of that industry. This system emphasized stability and conformity,
preventing radical breaks and rejuvenation. As a consequence, the creative spirit within French haute couture
houses has gradually tended to dry up. Losing somewhat
their creative edge, French haute couture houses thus entered the 1980s in an already weakened position. By that
time, furthermore, the global challenges described above
were becoming too strong to be ignored. Facing competition and increasing levels of environmental turbulence
and ambiguity, French haute couture houses had to think
of possible ways to respond. They had, in particular, to
consider how they might integrate a degree of organizational flexibility. They came up with essentially two kinds
of answers-outsourcing and what we call here the "umbrella holding."
Outsourcing and the Risk of Losing One's Identity. Breaking up the integrated, in-house process and
outsourcing or licensing parts of it represented an obvious
way to secure advantages of scale and scope while still
integrating a degree of organizational flexibility. This solution has tempted several French haute couture houses.
Companies like Pierre Cardin or Christian Dior were
among the first to license their lines or products on a large
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scale. But, starting in the 1970s, most haute couture
houses were engaging in at least partial licensing or outsourcing for their perfumes, accessories, and ready-towear lines.
Although easy and tempting, such a strategy undeniably entailed a number of risks. In the craft-based and
tradition-grounded French luxury fashion industry, stable
organizational solutions were more than a virtue. They
were part and parcel of the product and of the brand image. Because it was bound to disrupt the integrated, inhouse process, any attempt to develop productive capacities, to exploit particular products or the brand name,
could threaten the specificity of the products and the identity of the company. This has been the argument put forward to this day by a company like Hermirs in refusing
any tampering with its image through licensing or outsourcing. A source of great pride for Hermks-and an
important dimension of its self-definition as a "luxury"
company-is undeniably the fact that never in its history
did it give in to the temptation of outsourcing or licensing
(Dumas 1998; Les Echos, 26 March 1998).
In striking contrast, Pierre Cardin did bet on systematic
licensing. This company explored new solutions to the
detriment of traditional craft techniques and organizational routines, which had for a long time made up the
core of its identity as a haute couture house. It privileged,
in the process, the systematic exploitation of existing
products and of its brand name over the explorative core
competence, which had originally built and maintained
its identity as an innovative fashion company. This eventually led the Chambre Syndicale de la Haute Couture to
exclude the Pierre Cardin house. The company Pierre
Cardin still exists and it is in fact quite prosperous-a
total turnover of $6.5 billion (U.S.) in 1997, profits undisclosed. The Pierre Cardin brand name, though, has undeniably lost some of its luster and its products are not
so readily identified as luxury goods (Les Echos, July 11,
1998).
Constrained by peculiar historical legacies and institutional conditions, French haute couture houses have
thus had limited room for maneuver. They have traditionally been defined by the very integration of their activity and by the full control which the main designer has
kept over it. In this context, the classical and easy path
to flexibility-outsourcing parts of the process and some
of the activities of the organization-has appeared to
threaten the very identity of these companies. This does
not mean, though, that under conditions of severe environmental turbulence the French luxury fashion industry
is necessarily doomed. In the face of global challenges,
some French luxury fashion houses appear to follow their
own, quite unique path to organizational flexibility. This
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path is leading them directly from a craft-based model of
organization to a form of flexible or modular organizational arrangement, which we label here the "umbrella
holding."
The "Umbrella Holding. " The strategy of diversification devised before the First World War by the French
couturier, Poiret, anticipated what we call the "umbrella
holding" trajectory. Poiret had early on been aware that
the haute couture industry faced an uncertain future. His
idea was to launch a diversification of the product range
and in particular to add subsidiary lines of products to
clothing (Grumbach 1993). This type of strategy seduced
other couturiers. It became increasingly successful and
widespread after the Second World War, when the market
for made-to-order clothes gave clear signs of rapid decline. The main subsidiary product was perfume, but
many haute couture houses also diversified into cosmetics, accessories, and most importantly into different types
of ready-to-wear lines of clothing for women, but also for
men, and in some cases for children.
When it gained significant scope, such a strategy required integrating a degree of flexibility and modularity
within the boundaries of the organization. Each product
line was different, and each unit producing and marketing
it became relatively autonomous, talung a life of its own
under the umbrella of the brand name. Some companies-Christian Dior or Yves Saint Laurent for example,
but not Hermks-subcontracted parts of the production
for subsidiary lines. In this context, the all-important role
of the main designer or couturier was to maintain tight
control over the subsidiary lines and the subcontractors,
so that quality problems would not impact upon the brand
name.
The diversification strategy in the French luxury industry has thus traditionally amounted to creating, under
a single brand name, several relatively autonomous organizational entities, each being fully in charge of a given
product line and only controlled from the core. By hindsight, at least, it is thus not surprising that a peculiar conglomerate or holding company such as LVMH (Louis
Vuitton Moet Hennessy) would emerge in that industry.
The strategy of Bernard Arnault-founder and present
Chairman of LVMH-has been to bring together, under
the same umbrella holding company, a number of formerly independent luxury houses, and to exploit their
brand reputation while keeping each house largely autonomous. The idea is that each brand is valuable on its own
and that more harm than synergy could result from too
close an integration. The portfolio of LVMH currently
includes luxury fashion houses such as Givenchy, Kenzo,
Christian Lacroix, CCline, and Christian Dior but also a
number of luxury companies producing accessories
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MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO Coevolution in the Fashion lndzrstly
(Louis Vuitton, Loewe), perfumes, wines, or spirits. Recently, LVMH has diversified further into selective retailing and distribution, an activity that directly complements the production of luxury goods. The most famous
example of such vertical diversification has been the acquisition in 1996 of Duty Free Shoppers (DFS), a worldwide chain of duty free outlets (Choez 1998; Le Figaro,
16 March 1998). The umbrella holding or the peculiar
French path to flexibility is sketched out in Figure 1.
As of now, LVMH is still an aggregate in search of
identity. A number of recent developments, though, seem
to indicate that this aggregate could in time develop into
a truly flexible internal network. Bernard Arnault and his
top management are working to create and foster interfaces between the various modules or entities. The objective is to optimize the overall performance of the aggregate or internal network by rationalizing a number of
potentially common activities-marketing, distribution,
or even production (Martin 1998). At the very same time,
the top management of LVMH is very conscious of the
need to preserve the traditional craft-based nature of each
module. This, after all, is where the value of French luxury fashion brands lies. While the umbrella holding trajectory is still very much in construction, we believe that
it may be the only chance of survival in the long term for
individual French fashion-and in particular haute couture-houses.
5.2. Italian and American Fashion Companies-The
Challengers
Most French haute couture houses have thus been finding
it hard, outside or within LVMH, to strike a balance between their traditional identity and the changes required
by evolving markets and market demand. In the meantime, new entrants from Italy and the United States have
seized upon these trends, constructing them as opportunities rather than threats. These challengers chose not to
compete head-on with traditional French players. Rather,
they welcomed and fostered a radical redefinition, for the
industry, of the rules of the competitive game that could
only be to their benefit.
They did so by betting on and building upon what had
merely been a side strategy for French couturiers. They
systematically turned subsidiary lines-luxury ready-towear, perfume, cosmetics, or accessories-into the core
of their business. In the process, they developed what
were, for the luxury goods industry, original and innovative organizational solutions. To make the most of the
expansion of markets, Italian and American challengers
increased their productive capacities through mechanization and standardization as well as partial outsourcing.
To handle the greater sophistication of customers, the
630
multiplicity of their profiles, and the changing nature of
their needs, they designed flexible and speedily reactive
organizations, directly tuned into the "world of the
street."
In the recent past, two variants of the flexible network
organization-one
Italian, the other American-have
thus emerged in the luxury fashion industry. These variants differ essentially along two dimensions. In the Italian
case, the networks of partners and subcontractors tend to
have a smaller and much more stable membership than
in the American case. The extent of outsourcing is much
more significant in the American case than in the Italian
case, with only a minimal range of activities being kept
in-house. While both the Italian and American variants
have emerged in the context of significant and global environmental dislocation, each exemplifies a particular trajectory towards flexibility and modularity. In turn, these
two trajectories are quite different from the one identified
in the French case.
These trajectories, we show below, have been shaped
in part by the early choices of national pioneer companies
and by the national institutional environments in which
these companies were embedded. In fact, the difference
between both variants can be traced to the historical and
institutional legacies peculiar to each national environment.
The Italian Model: The Flexible Embedded Network. A peculiarity of the Italian economy-particularly in the region that has come to be known as the Third
Italy-has been the survival and dynamism of traditional
industrial districts. The prosperity, since 1945, of industrial districts in this region has in fact quite strikingly
contrasted with their near disappearance in some other
Western European countries, particularly in France
(Djelic 1998). These industrial districts are made up of
large numbers of small entities, whether craft workshops
or small industrial firms (Brusco 1982, Goodman and
Bamford 1989, Lazerson 1995). Engaging in multilateral
forms of cooperation, these entities have traditionally created dense networks backed by adequate institutional and
political support, at the regional and national levels
(Weiss 1988).
Embedded as they often were in these traditional industrial districts, Italian fashion houses have been able to
come up with innovative organizational solutions. When,
in the French case, the path to luxury fashion has been
design and creation, manufacturing has been the core
competence Italians have built upon (The Economist, 11
April 1998; La Tribune, 7 April 1998). The Italian fashion
industry has emerged as a set of flexible and relatively
stable networks, tightly embedded in local or regional
industrial communities. These networks have enabled
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MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO
Figure 1
The French Trajectory-The
Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
Umbrella Holding
Finance, Personnel...
C O M M O N SERVICES (or potentially so)
Logistics, Marketing, Advertising,
Distribution, Manufacturing, Subcontracting
CORE
PERIPHERY
Individual House
Individual House
Individual House
Manufacturing,
Sales, Brand
Management
Manufacturing,
Sales, Brand
Management
Manufacturing,
Sales, Brand
Management
Some subcontracting :
second lines or accessories
Italian fashion houses to reconcile flexibility with almost
limitless production capacity. Italian fashion companies
have subcontracted a large share of their manufacturing
activity, keeping in-house only a few key product lines.
Their networks of industrial partners have typically been
small and stable, allowing them to keep tight but still
informal control. By privileging networks over organic
growth, Italian fashion companies have been able to combine the best of two worlds. On the one hand, they have
been able to easily and flexibly manage variation in demand. On the other hand, they have not had to sacrifice
craft production or the quality of products.
By setting up networks, Italian fashion companies have
kept the advantages of small size and flexibility-creativity, adaptability, and speed of reaction to market
changes. By limiting, and sometimes altogether avoiding,
the licensing strategy, they have been able to keep stricter
control over products and brands (Women's Wear Daily,
10 December 1997). The tight nature of the network linking Italian luxury fashion companies to their subcontractors and the regularity of partnerships have made direct
control and monitoring relatively easy. Italian fashion
companies have naturally handled problems of interface
by setting up and systematically using quality-control
tools. The foundation of trust, though, stemming from a
common institutional and cultural background, has by far
been the most powerful coupling mechanism (Brusco
1982, Granovetter 1985, Powell 1990, Lazerson 1995).
This particular path to flexibility or modularity has
been common to Italian fashion companies from the low
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NO subcontracting
Some subcontracting :
second lines or accessories
to the high end of the industry. It is characteristic of a
company like Benetton, but it also defines the organization of luxury fashion companies such as Armani, Gucci,
or Prada (The Economist, 11 April 1998; Le Monde, 18
January 1998). By following this particular path towards
the network form, Italian fashion companies have decoupled somewhat their brand name from the product and
the production process, in striking contrast to French
haute couture houses. Italian fashion companies thus pay
close attention to brand management in itself, distinct
from the monitoring of product, creation, or distribution.
As shown in Figure 2, core activities have increasingly
been handled as separate modules-and these core activities have included design and creation, brand management (marketing, advertising, promotion), or quality control.
Gucci's Tom Ford explains the rapid success of his
company in the 1990s by the creation of a coherent brand
and by its close monitoring. In the case of Gucci, reaching
Figure 2
Core and Peripheral Modules in the Italian Trajectory
MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO
Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
coherence has meant revamping all products and product
lines. A combination of coherent brand management with
high-quality manufacturing, subcontracted to a tight network of regular partners, has also been the recipe behind
the rapid and astounding success of a company like
Giorgio Armani (Le Monde, 18 January 1998).
The organizational model described above is naturally
an ideal type and a number of exceptions may be found.
Its key features, however, are important to explain the
success of Jtalian luxury fashion companies in the 1980s
and early 1990s. Success has bred confidence and,
through confidence, stability. The fundamentals of the
model have thus been institutionalized, and they are not
being questioned. New challenges, though, are emerging.
For companies like Gucci, Prada, or Armani, the main
questions today seem to be how to sustain growth, ensure
survival, and create the conditions for continuing performance independent of the current designer or management team. Rather than going public-a strategy more
readily considered in the United States-Italian companies seem to take an interest in the model of the umbrella
holding company as exemplified by LVMH. Patrizio
Bertelli, Prada's Chairman, praises LVMH's strategy and
seriously considers, apparently, following it himself:
The idea is to acquire other luxury goods brands that could not
only coexist, but exploit synergies wherever possible. For example, in the area of service and financial management-these
areas of business can be in common. (Patrizio Bertelli in
Women's Wear Daily, 10 December 1997).
The American Model: Towards the Virtual Orga~zization. A specific feature of the American economy is the
sheer size and buying power of its national market. That
the United States invented mass production and mass
marketing is therefore not surprising (Djelic 1998). With
such a market to serve, and to reach economies of scale,
American companies have for some time viewed specialization and subcontracting as possible and efficient
strategies. The sheer size of the country, though, and the
history of its settlement explain that subcontracting was
not as likely as in Italy to be contained within strict regional boundaries. Even in those locally or regionally
constituted communities that share a common basis of
trust, interfirm networks have always included, in the
United States, a majority of arm's-length ties regulated
by spot contracts (Uzzi 1997, p. 42). In contrast, the Italian flexible and embedded networks have generally favored tight links and long-term partnerships.
The particular path or trajectory followed by American
fashion companies mirrors the peculiarities of the institutional context in which they have evolved. It also reflects the process through which these companies have
632
entered the luxury segment of the fashion industry. Ralph
Lauren, Calvin Klein, and Donna Karan have managed
to establish themselves in the luxury fashion industry
without submitting to the stringent rules and requirements
set up by the French community of couturiers. Even more
than their Italian competitors, American fashion companies are new entrants at the luxury end of the fashion
industry. They have managed to impose themselves without building upon a product legitimacy that had traditionally been symbolized, in the industry, by an haute couture
activity. American fashion companies originally started
from mass production at a lower end of the industry. To
this day, Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan do
not have any haute couture activity. Over time, though,
they have managed to scale up their products and their
image by creating around their brand name a coherent
space for dreams that echoed the symbolic needs of a
particular customer group. This particular strategy has
made it possible for American companies to price beautiful but rather standard ready- to-wear products at a level
comparable to that of their French haute couture competitors-Christian Dior or Chanel for example.
These particular historical and institutional legacies explain why it has been relatively easy for American players
to fully decouple brand from product and to outsource
most of the production process. Brand management has
emerged, in this context, as the core or strategic competence of the organization. When design and creation are
still at the heart of the French luxury fashion industry and
manufacturing is key to Italian fashion, one could easily
argue that, for American players, the source of competitive advantage has been brand management. There are,
naturally, a number of small- or medium-sized American
fashion houses, which play upon creative design and innovation rather than brand management. The names Anna
Sui, Michael Kors, or Bob Mackie come to mind. These
companies are closer in type to the French cre'ateur
houses. Altogether, though, they weigh very little on the
American and worldwide market and cannot compare to
the likes of Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, or even Donna
Karan (Women's Wear Daily, 7 November 1997).
In the case of those leading American companies, the
radical decoupling of the brand name from product and
production has made possible and even triggered organizational modularity. In fact, the path to modularity followed by these companies has been characterized by
speed and by its systematic nature. The emerging network
form of organization is quite close, in the end, to what
the literature has labeled the "virtual organization."
American fashion companies have kept in-house only a
minimal range of activities-those defined as strategic
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Coevolution in the Fashion Indzlstry
and core competences and amounting in effect to a monitoring of the overall coherence of the brand. For companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan,
the value of the brand name is naturally related to the
quality of products and processes. At the same time,
though, and maybe more importantly, the legitimacy and
the value of products and product lines stem from the sets
of symbolic representations that are associated with the
brand name. American fashion companies build upon
concepts-those
intangible goods that define brand
names. From these concepts, they deduce product lines
and products but also marketing strategies, the design of
stores, and other communication tools (Nueno and
Quelch 1998).
For fashion companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin
Klein, or Donna Karan, managing the brand has thus implied much more than a simple attention to the quality
and consistency of products and services. It has meant
ensuring the overall coherence of the script, articulating
a series of interdependent sequences of events, selecting
some, dropping others, arranging and rearranging them
according to changing conditions and needs. These companies have not been afraid of complex organizational
arrangements consisting of large numbers of relatively
autonomous modules. They can be described as "hubs,"
where the core competence is the coordination and management of interfaces between modules.
Like the Italians, but unlike the French, leading American fashion companies have entirely licensed off or subcontracted manufacturing. In contrast to both the Italians
and the French, the Americans have also outsourced, at
least in part, design, creation, or brand management to
freelance designers, communication and advertising
agencies, or consultants. As Figure 3 shows, leading
American fashion companies have retained in-house little
more than strategic decision making. They have kept full
control over important choices regarding design and
Figure 3
product lines, the selection of materials, brand management (marketing, advertising, promotion, merchandising), the handling of quality-control tools, the monitoring
of subcontracting partners or licensees, and, finally, the
elaboration of a distribution strategy.
American fashion companies like Ralph Lauren,
Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan have thus evolved towards
a network form of organization. Unable to build upon,
though, a locally embedded community of potential partners and subcontractors as in the Italian case, they have
created networks their own way. They have mostly relied
on arm's-length ties and spot contracts and they have built
in flexible membership so as to follow organizational
needs and market transformations. The challenge with
this type of network arrangement stems essentially both
from the shifting geometry of the network and from the
great number of interfaces between the various modules.
To reach a satisfactory level of control, American fashion
companies have had to foster and bring about a degree of
standardization of these interfaces. They have done so by
setting clear and detailed sets of instructions to map out
the work of subcontractors and partners, but also by defining strict quality standards, deadlines, and control procedures. This monitoring of interfaces has generally been
formalized through explicit legal contracts. It has been
made possible by the integration of sophisticated information systems.
In this particular context, the role of what we call here
an "organizational pilot" appears to be quite significant.
In companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna
Karan, the responsibility with respect to the overall coherence of the brand does indeed lie with such a pilot. He
or she is at the same time the founder, the designer, and,
maybe most importantly, the top manager. Naturally, the
role of this organizational pilot is far from being a simple
one. The recent difficulties Donna Karan has faced in her
attempt to articulate the core of her company with its
Core and Peripheral Modules in the American Trajectory
I
CORE
(OUTSOURCED)
PERIPHERY
STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
1"V.I- 1 1
71
Design, Creation
designers)
(subcontractors)
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subcontractors and
licensees
(multiple licensees
and outlet stores)
MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
peripheral modules clearly bear witness to that (Les
Echos, 24 March 1998).
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The environments in which organizations are embedded
set constraints and define opportunities. They very much
shape, as a consequence, the paths or trajectories which
these organizations are going to follow and their structural evolution through time. Focusing on the luxury fashion industry as our empirical base of evidence, we found
that it has had to face increasingly turbulent and ambiguous environmental conditions, particularly over the past
30 years. Before this period of significant environmental
dislocation, French haute couture houses had been able,
due to their early lead in the luxury fashion industry, to
set the rules of the game and to control the boundaries of
the industry. In the process, they institutionalized technological and organizational stability. In recent years,
though, French fashion houses have found it more and
more difficult to ignore the pressures stemming from
global challenges. Market expansion and diversification
have combined with radical technological evolution and
increasing competition to alter the rules of the game.
The main challengers have been Italian and American
companies. Without an haute couture tradition, these
companies have successfully managed to scale up their
product lines and to reposition themselves at the high or
luxury end of the fashion industry. These outsiders have
seized upon global environmental trends to foster a redefinition of the rules of the game in the luxury fashion
industry that could only be to their benefit. They have
contributed, in the process, to increasing the level of environmental dislocation and turbulence in that industry.
In the face of such environmental turbulence, most
companies in the luxury fashion industry, including
French haute couture houses, have felt the need to react.
Organizational flexibility and modularity-or the network form-have emerged as a common answer. However, we have found that organizational modularity or the
network form did not always mean the same thing and
that there were in fact different paths or trajectories leading to organizational flexibility. Historical legacies, we
have shown, and the peculiarities of national institutional
contexts have to a significant extent shaped these trajectories. Opportunities and constraints have differed from
one national environment to the next. Nationally defined
opportunities and constraints had an impact upon the
French pioneers, who created and institutionalized early
organizational solutions in that industry. In turn, these
early solutions shaped environmental conditions for organizational players, setting the boundaries of the industry, the rules of the game, and even the possible ways to
go around them.
634
Altogether, we have thus been able to document in this
paper that global trends or challenges on the one hand,
historical legacies and the peculiarities of national institutional constraints on the other, have shaped and continue to shape paths to organizational flexibility as well
as the network forms emerging in the luxury fashion industry.
In France, the weight of organizational legacies and
institutionalized practices turned out to create significant
constraints for haute couture houses, narrowing and limiting the range of possible reactions in the face of global
challenges. In particular, licensing and outsourcing, as
strategies to integrate a degree of organizational flexibility, have appeared to be fraught with dangers. Such strategies were bound to disrupt the integrated, in-house production process and, as a consequence, they were likely
to destroy the value of the products and to threaten the
image and the very identity of French haute couture
houses.
This does not have to mean, though, that under conditions of significant environmental disruption, the
French luxury fashion industry is necessarily doomed. As
a matter of fact, a peculiar trajectory to organizational
modularity has been emerging in the French case, which
we have labeled the "umbrella holding." The umbrella
holding brings together existing organizational entities
and brand names. It becomes in the process an internal
network that can rationalize a number of shared competences while respecting the autonomy and integrity of
each component module. Considering the historical and
institutional constraints characteristic of the French case,
the umbrella holding appears to be a locally legitimate
way to adapt to global change. At the same time, we argue
that it might be the only chance of survival, in the long
term, for individual French fashion houses.
While French haute couture houses have generally
been quite reluctant to change, Italian and American challengers early on seized upon environmental trends to
make significant headway in the industry. Identifying
global challenges as opportunities, they have managed to
redefine in part the rules of the game. In order to be at
the same time globally efficient and locally in tune with
their customer base, Italian and American players have
created flexible organizational solutions. Instead of bringing together several craft-based entities and brand names
under a single umbrella holding, they have defined themselves and organized as networks of competences. A
number of these competences-those considered particularly strategic-were integrated at the core, while others,
more peripheral, were outsourced or licensed off.
Beyond the similarities, though, there were enough differences between the Italian and the American cases that
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Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
we could in fact identify two variants of the flexible network organization-one Italian, the other American. In
the context of significant and global environmental dislocation, each variant exemplifies, we argue, a particular
trajectory towards organizational flexibility. We have
shown in this paper that differences between those two
trajectories can be traced to the historical and institutional
legacies peculiar to each national environment.
Italian fashion companies have made the most of the
industrial districts in which they were locally embedded
to construct flexible but relatively stable networks with
regular partners. In the Italian case, as a consequence,
networks of partners and subcontractors have tended to
be tight and strictly embedded within the local or regional
community. The foundation of trust stemming from a
common institutional and cultural background has made
the management of interfaces fairly easy and not too
costly.
Evidence from the American case, on the other hand,
points to a more open network form. In this case, the
extent of outsourcing has been much more significant and
only a minimal range of activities has been kept in-house.
This would seem to indicate an evolution in the direction
of what has been labeled in the literature the "virtual organization," where more and more activities are being
outsourced. The open character of such an organizational
solution means that an increasingly smaller core has been
responsible for the articulation of a series of relatively
independent tasks. Even in situations of high ambiguity
and uncertainty, this form of organization could remain
most flexible and adaptable. Modules could be rearranged, newly created, or altogether dropped to fit changing conditions and purposes.
The American or "virtual" model gives a lot of weight
to an organizational pilot or manager, in contrast to the
key role of the product designer in the French tradition
of haute couture or to the collective responsibility characteristic of the Italian flexible and embedded network.
The manager becomes responsible for steering the organization, identifying opportunities, making choices, and
mapping the migration path of the organization. Of
course, this particular characteristic of the American solution is also its main weakness, and the identification of
the skills and competencies necessary for such organizational pilots is certainly an interesting path for future
research.
To sum up, we have documented in this paper that, in
the luxury fashion industry, organizational flexibility or
modularity has emerged as a common answer to global
challenges and increasing environmental dislocation.
Probing further, however, we have been able to identify
ORGANIZATION
SCIENCE NO^. 10, NO. 5, September-October 1999
three different paths or trajectories leading to such organizational flexibility or modularity-the "umbrella holding," the "flexible embedded network," and the "virtual
organization." In each case, we have traced the peculiarities of these paths or trajectories-constructed in the
paper as national ideal types-to peculiar historical legacies and institutional constraints.
We have thus found strong support, in the case of the
luxury fashion industry, for a coevolution perspective
where environmental transformation and organizational
change interplay through time, feeding upon each other
(Lewin et al., in this issue). By pointing to path-dependent
and historically constructed processes of interaction between organization forms, global environmental trends,
and national legacies, this paper contributes to discussions about the mechanisms of coevolution. We have to
conclude, though, that, in our minds, the existence of different trajectories makes convergence or congruence
highly unlikely. The evidence we have built from does
not allow us to claim that the different variants of flexible
organizations might someday converge towards a global
and uniform standard. In the debate on new organization
forms, we thus question the likelihood of a future stabilization around a unique organizational solution that
would become widely legitimated and institutionalized.
Rather, we argue that differences are there to stay beyond
the period of transition and acute environmental dislocation, embedded as they are in powerful historical and
institutional legacies.
On the basis of this study, we believe that more research should be undertaken in at least two directions.
There is a need, firstly, to test the applicability of the three
network forms or ideal types identified here in other contexts and in other industries. Another important issue
seems to be the role of organizational pilots or managers.
While the coevolution perspective provides an interesting
theory of organizational and institutional constraints,
there is a need to cross-fertilize it with a theory of agency.
More work is undeniably needed, both empirical and
theoretical, in that direction.
Acknowledgments
For critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the authors would
like to thank Arie Lewin, Henk Volberda, the participants at the EGOS
1998 Meetings-Subtheme 3 on New Organizational Forms, and Jane
Salk, as well as three anonymous reviewers for Organization Science.
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The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms in the Fashion Industry: A Historical and
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Marie-Laure Djelic; Antti Ainamo
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