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Geopolitics and the Crisis of European Politics: an Analysis of the geopolitical
discourse in some political reviews in the 20ies and 30ies.
(paper presented at the International Conference of Critical geopolitics, August 2011 Frankfurt)
The aim of my current research is to consider the formation of the “geopolitical
imagination” at the beginning of the 20th century. With the expression “geopolitical
imagination” I refer to John Agnew and his definition of a constellation of geographical
assumptions, representations and criteria of definition that frame a specific historical
perception of space – at this regards the interaction between a historical and a space
perception of an individual or collective identity is shown.
My investigation starts from the following assumption: at the beginning of the 20ieth
century a “spatial turn” was emerging in Europe in cultural and political discourses. The
term “Spatial turn” was recently defined by some authors, historians and geographers
(Schloegel, Osterhammel, ...) in two ways: as a methodological concept used to indicate a
emerging new and deeper interest on the meaning and relevance of spatial categories and as
a description of a new geopolitical condition, characterised by globalisation,
informationalisation and risk society. In this meaning “spatial turn” has been referred to a
postmodern society.
Contrary to these interpretations I insist that the period between the 19 th and the first half of
the 20ieth century can be also seen as a “spatial turn”. In that time the European states had
been coping with upsetting social and political processes that gave birth to a new perception
of the space. These new phenomena were: the beginning of the economic processes of
globalisation, the technological progress that accelerated the ordinary life's time and reduced
the space between states and continents (Osterhammel), the huge migration of ethic groups
inside Europe, the end of the primacy of Europe with regards to its colonies and to the
worldly balance of power, the emerging need for an internationalisation of politics. These
facts had a tremendous impact on the geopolitical imagination at various levels: not only on
the academic discourse, but also on the political strategies and decisions and on the popular
one – which is shown in the representations given by reviews and newpapers of the
identity and interest of a specific “nation” and of the European continent.
In this perspective the analysis of the transformations of the “geopolitical imagination”
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between the end of the 19th century and the first haf of the 20th century could shed light on
the crisis and new interpretations of some fundamental categories, that were used by
academics and politicians in order to re-orient and to give order to the political and social
phenomena: concepts like nation, state, people (as Volk), and also Empire, Reich were
therfore transformed in this process.
At this regards geopolitics – as a new discipline and above all as an emerging discourse
used by non-academics – played a pivotal role with regards to the re-orientation of the
geopolitical imagination because it seemed to offer scholarly explanations for a political and
social crisis that Europe was experiencing.
My research focuses on the period when the political geography and then the geopolitical
discipline emerges and enjoys a huge success, i.e. from the end of the 19 th century to the
Second World War. In particular during the years between the two World Wars, the theories
elaborated at the end of the 19th century by political geographers (like Ratzel in Germany)
had been rediscovered by academics and opinion-makers. They were assumed to be
fundamental in order to figure out an alternative European – and worldly – balance of power
and hierarchy, and respectively to create new concepts both of the European space and
identity. The theories and models elaborated in Germany by the political geographers
became a wide-spread knowledge, a popular discourse during the inter-war years and
created certain assumptions and themes that significantly influenced the political debate in
Europe and the representations of the European space.
Geopolitics was therefore not tremendously influential as such, i.e. as an
“academic/scholarly discipline”. It was rather the diffusion of the geopolitical images and
concepts across the cultural fields and in particular the correlation between geopolitics -as a
dicipline - and other disciplines and discourses that creted a new kind of “geopolitical
imagination”. What is at stake in this research is precisely the impact of geopolitics on the
larger public opinion, on other academic disciplines and on politics. This kind of analysis
seems to be crucial for the study of a “discipline” that enjoyed its huge success outside the
academic field and was defined by one of its founders (Ratzel) as the scientific basis for the
fusion of natural sciences and human sciences, and more precisely as the only science that
could give a synthetic and general perspective on social and political phenomena.
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From the point of view of the history of political thought, I aim at looking at the interactions
between the intellectual and academic discourses, politics and commons sense. In order to
develop this kind of approach, it is useful to look at the use and transformation that concepts
and visual supports undergo during their transition between disciplines and fields of
discourse, in particular from a specialised academic/scholarly to a “popular” discourse, i.e.
from the geographical sciences to political journals and reviews. In the following part I will
explain my research method and at the same time I will narrate my research experience,
referring to my approach on the Mitteleuropa concept.
As I began to study the emergence of the idea of Mitteleuropa during the beginning of the
20th century from the perspective of an historian of political thought, I had the possibility to
follow on the one hand a historiographical and political approach and, on the other hand, a
geographical one. Indeed the separation of these two disciplinary fields made it difficult to
understand precisely the object of my research and the context in which it was formed the
idea of Mitteleuropa. In other words: what makes Mitteleuropa so successful between the
two World Wars is on the one side its particular definition as both a geographical and a
historical/political concept, and, on the other, its success and popularity outside the
academic fields. One has to deal not with an a academic theory but with a constellation of
definitions and visions that are spread in the academic, political and popular culture.
For this reason it is necessary to contextualise Mitteleuropa independently from “our”
contemporary disciplinary fields and take it as an discourse that was emerging at different
levels – academic, popular, strategic ex. Here I am using both O'Tuathail's partition between
different kinds of geopolitical discourses (popular, structural, formal. practical), as also
Bourdieu's difference between “fields” - intellectual, academic, scientific ex. - and
discourses (common sense, academic ex.). We have therefore to look at the complex and
multi-layered connotation of the idea of Mitteleuropa, as some historians like Osterhammel
and Schloegel tried to do. In this way we can shed light on the conditions of its success and
on the impact that the project of “Mitteleuropa” had on political strategies and on popular
and academic culture. In particular my goal is to outline on the one hand the context – seen
as a cultural and political one – of the emergence of the “Mitteleuropa” idea and, on the
other hand, its effects/impact on the popular and academic discourses and, finally, on the
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development of a specific geopolitical imagination.
In the geopolitical perspective the term Mitteleuropa was used to designate a geographical
space and at the same time a cultural and political idea. The Mitteleuropa concept was
therefore ‘placed’ at the crossroads between a political, a cultural and a purely geographical
definition. It became a very particular geographical expression. It did not correspond to a
‘reality’ existing per se on maps: it was not a chain of mountains; nor was it a politically
determined State or nation. It could be described rather as a projected ‘empire’ or
confederation legitimized through some ‘natural’ and ethnical-cultural features.
Mitteleuropa is therefore both a description of a geographical unit – that was never
politically acknowledged as such – and of a cultural constellation – seen as “unity in
diversity” or under the hegemony of the German ethnic group. The political concept of
Mitteleuropa is different / opposed to that of the nation state. It refers rather to the political
form of the Empire or more precisely “Reich”. Although the contemporary historiography
points out the formation of the nation states as the fundamental political process in modern
Europe, Empires were successful forms of political organisations till the End of the First
World War. Nevertheless Mitteleuropa was not a projection of a nostalgic idea of the old
Empires that failed after the First World War – as Magris seems to believe. At least not at
the beginning of the 20th century.
Therefore it is interesting to insert the “project Mitteleuropa” in the kind of visions that are
projected outside the nation-states and are juxtaposed to it. In this regard Ratzel's
considerations about the necessity to overcome the nation-state and to “widen the
geographical horizons” (“Erweiterung des geographischen Horizontes” Ratzel, Gesetz des
räumlichen Wachstums, S. 98) is relevant to study the “career” of the Mitteleuropa-idea.
Ratzel, the founder of poitical geography, reformulates the project of Mitteleuropa – and of
a united Europe - and gives it a new scientific and altogether political legitimacy, that is not
based on old aristocratic traditions, but on the necessities given by new technological and
political developments. New technologies (like the train, the new scientific developments)
make it possible to unite spaces and to study them; the new progresses in natural sciences
(darwinism for ex.) make it possible to look at and make sense of the whole history of
nature and mankind, with no reference to God; new political giants – Europe and Russia –
are huge spaces politically organised that could menace Europe. In this regard Europe – and
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Mitteleuropa – as a unity can gain for Ratzel a meaning as a possible way out of the
European crisis – and as a possible redefinition of the political aims of the new German
state. “Mitteleuropa” is just one of the symbols – and altogether of the outcomes - of that
“revolution in mind” that had to take place in the education of the German generations
following Ratzel: very often had Ratzel made a plea for a revolution in the mentality of
German citizens and politicians, that could radically increase the German and the European
power.
A few decades later, in a different and crucial period, after the First World War, “Thinking at
continents” (Haushofer), i.e. the geopolitical education of ordinary people and of scientists
and politicians, will be seen as a priority not only for the rebirth of a greater Germany, but
for the survival of the Continent Europe between other continents. At that time the literature
about political geography and geopolitics re-emerges and enjoys a popular and academic
success that it never had before. Geopolitics becomes a discipline, that is acknowledged in
universities and schools: its professionalisation starts and its status as a discipline
consolidates it as the “bridge” between a practical/political knowledge and a
theoretical/academic one (Haushofer). Although this process has been described after the
Second World War as a typical outcome of German radical nationalism, geopolitics
develops at the same time in whole Europe. Germany is therefore only a particular and
extreme example of a European development.
Geopolitics is not only successful: it reveals a new way of looking at political order, i.e. at
political and historical fundamental categories that have oriented the political and cultural
life. Long before the great historian Meinecke wrote his book on the “reasons of State”
(1924) and reasserted the state paradigm in historical sciences, Ratzel made a plea to
overcome a static idea of state and to read politics as a dynamic pattern of relations. At the
same time a colleague of Ratzel, Karl Lamprecht had elaborated a new interpretation of
history, based on the observation of groups and not individuals, and at the same time had
supported a “cultural imperialism” - what we could call today a kind of soft imperialism.
Ratzel and Lamprecht worked together in Lipsia at the end of the 19th century in order to
give birth to a new revolution in historiographical and geographical paradigms: their holistic
vision of human and natural phenomena and relations tried to combine the recent doctrine of
social darwinism with German romantic organic theory and with neo-positivistic axioms.
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Their project was re-emerging after 1914. Why? Not because of the success of nationalist or
voelkisch movements – even less because of the rise of nationalsocialism. Geopolitics was
not developed as a science in order to legitimate a political order a project – this is shown
also in retrospective by the weakness of the main exponent of geopolitics under
Natonalsocialism, Karl Haushofer's, position as “regime intellectual”. The importance of
geopolitics has been exaggerated – when we look at it as a “discipline”. But if we look at the
diffusion of “geopolitical” maps, terms, concepts, its role in the elaboration of a specific
“geopolitical imagination” in the first half of the 20th century its role cannot be exaggerated.
This paradox can be better explained if we separate “geopolitics as a discipline” supported
by Haushofer and the group around “Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik” and geopolitics as a set of
assumptions, images, visual representations, concepts and theories, that penetrates in many
disciplinary fields and discourses. I will call this phenomenon the general “impact” of
geopolitics: geopolitical concepts and images are spread and transposed from one
“scientific” context to another for ex. from the disciplinary to the context of political
reviews. When they are used in another context they undergo two transformations: firstly
they are “taken for granted”, i.e. seen as scientific data given once for all and therefore not
able to be discussed; secondly they acquire different meanings and, by doing so, they
modify the meanings of pre-existing political concepts in the political lexicon.
What the neo-conservative publishers of “Die Tat” did in the 1920ies , when they used
geopolitical categories, was to point out the clash between the “old” - and obsolete –
concepts of nations, states, citizenship, parliamentary democracy, and the new – and “fit” ideas of Lebensraum, Grossraum, Volk, Panregion etc. In this way “geopolitics” could carry
a revolutionary meaning: could subvert some traditional ideas on which the nation state and
the European balance of power was grounded – the “revolution in minds” could begin!
Let's take an example. The popular review “Die Tat” was in the 1920ies a place where
many exponents of different political positions could discuss on the future European order.
Grabowski, a strong supporter of the Weimar democracy, and Zeher, an intellectual
belonging to new conservative groups, advocated both a stronger orientation of the etlies'
education in order to know the characters of the space. Following them, the space
determines not only the political strategies, but also the political identity and interests of a
state (Grabowski A., Politisches Verständnis durch Karten“, „Die Tat“, 1928, 20, 1, S. 65-71
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and Zeher, Ist eine Deutsche Außerpolitik überhaupt möglich? in „Zeitschrift für
Geopoltik“, 7,1, 1930, 1-28).
The knowledge of the space makes the difference between a “good” and a “bad” politics.
Not only: the authors of the main articles in “Die Tat” and in “Zeitschrift fuer Politik” cast
doubt on the idea of the nation-state. If the space – and the fight in order to conquer it – are
the main factors to understand politics and to pursue a good political strategy, the concept of
the “nation-state” has to be understood in a different way. For Zeher this is a old term and
therefore it has to be replaced by the idea of Reich: the Reich is a dynamic and expanding
political unit that on the one hand refers to a “organic entity”, and on the other is capable to
live and expand – with no respect to any limitations and restrictions imposed by the
international state balance accepted after the Westphalian peace ( Zehrer H., Der Umbau
des deutschen Staates, Die Tat, 1933, 25, 2, S. 7).
In this way not only Zeher justifies an imperial politics using the traditional political power
language: he creates a new language and coins new categories that will be spread in many
reviews of that time. He is not the first and the only author to do so: but this is precisely my
point. In other words, what happens a the beginning og the 20th century is that specific ideas
and concepts – like Reich, Volk – and perspectives – organic, holistic – that were scattered
in the previous literature come to build a new “geopolitical imagination” that changes the
perception of space, politics and history. Geopolitics plays a key role in this process: it gives
a legitimacy to the “new” language and allows the transformations/crisis of “old” ideas, like
nation-state, democracy, citizenship and so on.