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Philosophers have long had a soft spot for like-from-like reasoning. Whatever produces a good person must be good. Whenever something is heated it is heated by something hot. The degree of perfection contained in the effect cannot exceed the degree contained in the cause. And so on. We know that there is an intuition that underlies transmission theories of causation, but we also know that the intuition is unreliable. Gin is colourless but it makes you see rainbows. Populations can become increasingly fit over time. And so on. If we were surprised to discover that knowledge can come from mistaken belief, maybe we shouldn't have been. Without some specific reason for thinking that only knowledge can beget knowledge, we should have been open to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood (KFF). In KFF cases, a subject acquires knowledge by reasoning through a falsehood. Most of the literature on knowledge from falsehood is concerned with the possibility of KFF cases. Some of it focuses on the significance of such cases. This is a paper about the significance of the possibility. For various reasons , people think that KFF cases cause trouble for the knowledge-first approach to evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. These arguments all assume that certain like-from-like reasoning fails for knowledge but holds for justification. I think this is a mistake. If it's unreliable for knowledge, it's unreliable for justification.
Este artigo está licenciado sob forma de uma licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que a publicação original seja corretamente citada. ABSTRACT: The knowledge from falsehood (KFF) advocates present us with putative examples of inferential knowledge in which a subject S apparently acquires knowledge by competently inferring it from a falsehood. If they are right, then we will have to face some major problems for the epistemology of reasoning. However, in this paper, I will argue that there is no knowledge from falsehood (KFF), that the cases presented by KFF advocates are not cases of genuine inferential knowledge at all, and that the intuitive reaction to attribute knowledge to the subject in such cases has no relation with the falsehood. My opposition to KFF will be directed to the KFF account put forward by Peter Klein in his paper " Useful False Beliefs " (2008). In particular, I show that Klein's account fails because (i) it is unable to describe how the falsehood can inferentially provide a positive epistemic status to the inferred belief in order to upgrade it to knowledge; and (ii) it is incompatible with a tacit and widespread notion of inference. Keywords: Knowledge. Reasoning. Falsehood. Inference. RESUMO: Os defensores da teoria do Conhecimento a partir de Falsidade (KFF) nos apresentam exemplos putativos de conhecimento inferencial nos quais um sujeito S, supostamente, adquire conhecimento através de uma inferência competente realizada a partir de uma falsidade. Se eles estiverem certos, teremos que enfrentar alguns problemas importantes para a epistemologia do raciocínio. No entanto, neste artigo, argumentarei que não há conhecimento a partir de falsidades (KFF), os casos apresentados pelos defensores de KFF não constituem casos de conhecimento inferencial genuíno e a reação intuitiva de atribuir conhecimento ao sujeito em tais casos não tem nenhuma relação com a falsidade. Eu irei direcionar a minha oposição à KFF através de duas objeções que ofereço à explicação apresentada por Peter Klein em seu artigo "Useful False Beliefs" (2008). Em particular, mostro que a explicação de Klein falha porque ela (i) é incapaz de demonstrar como uma falsidade pode fornecer um status epistêmico positivo à crença inferida para torná-la conhecimento; e (ii) ela é incompatível com uma noção tácita e amplamente aceita de inferência. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Raciocínio. Falsidade. Inferência.
Erkenntnis, 2021
What is knowledge? I this paper I defend the claim that knowledge is justified true belief by arguing that, contrary to common belief, Gettier cases do not refute it. My defence will be of the anti-luck kind: I will argue that (1) Gettier cases necessarily involve veritic luck, and (2) that a plausible version of reliabilism excludes veritic luck. There is thus a prominent and plausible account of justification according to which Gettier cases do not feature justified beliefs, and therefore, do not present counterexamples to the tripartite analysis. I defend the account of justification against objections, and contrast my defence of the tripartite analysis to similar ones from the literature. I close by considering some implications of this way of thinking about justification and knowledge.
Philosophia, 1985
One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), 2017
IRJET, 2023
The most common devices used for extracting the ocean current energy are the current turbines. Most people use the wind turbine blade design methods for the horizontal axis current turbine design; however, the current turbines operate in the water, and their physical behaviours are more like marine propellers. In this paper, two turbine blade design procedures are adopted. The first design procedure is similar to the propeller designs, and the second design procedure is to use Genetic Algorithm and boundary element method (BEM) to find a geometry which can provide the maximum torque. After completing the designs, hydrodynamic performances of the marine current turbine are then computed and analysed by the potential flow BEM and the viscous flow RANS method. The computational results show the geometries designed by the presented procedures can not only satisfy the hydrodynamic design goal, but also predict the delivered power very close to the experimental data. After the blade performance meets the design target, the performances of designed 20kw nomadic type Kuroshio turbine including the floating body at different operation conditions are demonstrated in the paper. Also, the structural strength of the turbine blade is computed by FEM, and the results are evaluated to see if the design complies the rule requirements.
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