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chapter t wo
God gazing and homovisuality
When will you restore the glory, so we could ascend three times a year
and see the face of the shekhinah?
Pesiqta Rabbati (ed. Friedmann, a)
“Show me your God,” said Hadrian to R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah. “When
shall I come to see the face of God?” asks the Psalmist. For emperor and
Psalmist alike, the logic here was obvious: If one had a god, one wanted to
see him or her. The desire to see God was no less obvious to the Jewish
sages of late-antique Palestine and Babylonia – indeed, these men thought
of “seeing” or “receiving the face” of the shekhinah (God’s presence) as the
ultimate religious reward. Even in the polemical context of b. H
. ullin b,
R. Joshua b. H
ananyah,
who
compares
the
difficulty
of
beholding
God to
.
trying to look at the sun, does not negate God’s theoretical visibility. His
analogy suggests, rather, that God is hypervisible and too bright to absorb.
Such an analogy would make eminent sense in a world in which luminosity
(or rays of energy or fire) was thought to be bound up with vision, and to
be especially pronounced in sacred beings.
The date of Pesiqta Rabbati is uncertain, with scholars’ suggestions ranging from the sixth or seventh
century (Sperber, “Pesikta Rabbati,” –; Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, ), to the ninth
and beyond (e.g. Herr, “Midrash.”
B. H
. ullin b. The story in b. H
. ullin b–a has an unnamed Roman emperor, understood to refer
to Hadrian, addressing the second-century Tanna. This is one of several post-Tannaitic stories in
Palestinian and Babylonian sources in which R. Joshua has theological discussions with the emperor
and/or “heretics.” Most would see these stories as apocryphal (cf. Herr, “Significance”).
Fox, Pagans and Christians, –.
Psalms :.
This is not to espouse a uniform conception across rabbinic sources.
Compare to the simile of the difficulty in looking at the sun in Jerome, Tractatus in Psalmos
(Homily ); Ephrem, Hymnem de Fide .–; Avitus, De Spiritalis Historiae Gestis .–. The
relationship between the sun and divinity is a topic of some scholarly debate, stimulated also by
depictions of Helios, the sun-god in Palestinian synagogue art, and sources such as Sefer Harazim.
Of note is the recipe in Sefer Harazim :– (ed. Margaliot, –) for seeing the sun during the
day and the night.
These notions would have been intelligible across Roman and Persian worlds. On the idea that
divine and sacred beings were extra-luminous and therefore difficult to behold, see Frank, Memory,
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God gazing and homovisuality
However, unlike the Psalmist and the Roman emperor, the rabbis lived
in a world without a dedicated place in which to see their God and without
cult objects to behold – that is, in a world without a temple and without
divine images. There had been no temple since the Romans destroyed the
Jerusalem temple in ce, in their eventually successful attempt to quash
the Jewish Revolt. Thus, the question driving the inquiry in this chapter
and the next is: how did the rabbis see God in a post-temple era? That
the rabbis conceptualized God in visible terms and thought of seeing God
as a peak religious experience is itself hardly a new observation. In this
chapter and the next we will trace the ways in which the rabbis envisioned
God in their ritual and narrative expansions and expositions of biblical and
second temple traditions about the temple and temple pilgrimage. We will
also situate these rabbinic visions of the divine in the context of GrecoRoman religion and pilgrimage, and across the works of the Palestinian
Tannaim (sages of the first to early third centuries ce) and the Amoraim
of Palestine and Babylonia (sages of the third to fourth and early sixth
centuries respectively).
Framing our investigation around the temple’s destruction follows the
rabbis’ own framing of the question of God’s visibility. Across its territories,
Roman imperialism effected the overturning of established ideas, pieties,
and ways of being in the world. For the rabbis, Roman intervention,
particularly in response to Jewish insurrection, resulted in a crisis of (divine)
, –, –. For a discussion of the variety of ways in which Philo, Aristotelians, Platonists,
Stoics, and others used the sun, literally and metaphorically, to understand divinity and its visibility,
see Calabi, God’s Acting, –. The sun was also central to the thought and theology of those such
as Galen, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Julian (Frede, “Galen’s theology”). On the importance of fire and
other luminaries in Zorastrianism, see Boyce, “Ātaš.” The late Sasanian Mēnōg ı̄ Xrad .– requires
Zoroastrians to pray in the presence of fire or heavenly fire (i.e. the sun or moon). On radiance in
ancient near eastern traditions, see Smith, “Near Eastern background”; Sanders, “Old light.”
As we shall see, the question of whether and how God took visible and material form, even in the
days of the temple, was the subject of speculation on the part of the rabbis and others. The question
was sometimes also linked to the second commandment (Exodus :–) which in some cases gave
the Jews a reputation for a curious lack of images in their temple worship.
Boyarin, “Ocular desire”; Wolfson, Speculum, –; Stern, Parables in Midrash, –. Scholars have
drawn our attention to the ways in which humans were seen as “images of God” by the rabbis and to
how God was anthropomorphized (Schofer, Confronting Vulnerability, –, –; Lorberbaum,
Image of God; Goshen Gottstein, “Body,” and references therein). Others, including Lorberbaum,
have attended to the relationship between the human as imago dei (or tselem elohim) and the Roman
imperial cult (Stern, Parables in Midrash, –). However, as discussed in the introduction to this
book, my practice here is not to assume “vision” every time the term “image” or its like come into
play. Instead, my concern here is to examine ways in which the rabbis explicitly thought about seeing
per se, and while they frequently invoke images (e.g. icons and statues) in describing God, I am only
interested in those instances in which the sense of sight itself is invoked in these contexts.
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vision. In this regard, there was a political, as well as theological dimension
to rabbinic ways of seeing God.
Without the physical presence of the temple, the rabbis chiefly relegated
divine visibility to the past of the temple era or postponed it to the messianic
future of the “world to come.” These sages placed the possibility of a
physical, material, and visual encounter with God into a mythic past, with
consequences for their willingness to contemplate such an encounter in
their everyday present. The recognition that rabbinic ways of seeing God
were (carefully) shaped by absence, by gaps in time and space, informs my
analysis of the import of God gazing in rabbinic piety.
The fact that, in their minds, the rabbis lived in an era informed by
a crisis of (divine) visuality is related to another claim that I will make
concerning the production (by rabbis and others) of a Jewish singularity.
The vaunted uniqueness of how Jews saw their God, whether cast as a mark
of pride or a badge of shame, played its part in the production of Jewish
identity. As I have argued in the Introduction, some of this supposed
singularity stems from misunderstandings of the second commandment
that have in turn obscured the existence of a strong tradition, from the
Bible and onwards, of God’s visibility.
The present chapter centers around the concept of “homovisuality”
and traces how the Tannaim developed the biblical commands concerning
cultic pilgrimage into laws for a bygone Jerusalem temple pilgrimage to see
and be seen by God; it shows how these laws were subsequently transformed
by the later sages, especially by the Babylonians, into a radically reciprocal
ocular experience whose loss becomes a focal point. Our investigation
highlights the degree to which b. H
. agigah is centered on the desire for,
and loss of, the sight of God’s face. The next chapter, on “heterovisuality,”
considers an alternative model of vision, one that concentrates on the cult
objects that the rabbis imagined pilgrims of previous generations to have
seen as part of the “seeing” ritual in the Jerusalem temple.
From biblical visuality to Babylonian homovisuality
There will be time, there will be time
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet
T. S. Eliot, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”
For the argument that Roman imperialism impacted religions across the empire, see Beard, North,
and Price, Religions of Rome, vol. i, –. On Pausanias’ writing Greek religious subjectivity as
an act of resistance again Roman imperialism, see Elsner, “Pausanias.” For the impact of Roman
imperialism on the Jews, see Schwartz, Imperialism.
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The rabbis were heirs to biblical and second temple traditions in which
God was seen in a variety of ways and toward a variety of ends. The
rabbis, in turn, expanded upon these ways of seeing. Thus, they elaborated
on the divine theophanies at Sinai and in the Tabernacle, and on visual
encounters, described in biblical sources, between God and the patriarchs
and God and Moses. They also did not hesitate to read divine sightings
into biblical narrative even when they were not explicitly mentioned. For
example, some midrashic sources explain Isaac’s blindness as the result
of his having gazed at the shekhinah as he lay on the altar waiting to be
sacrificed by his father. Rabbinic sources also take an expansive view that
all ancient Israelites saw God at the Red Sea, according to one tradition
even fetuses, whose mothers’ bellies became transparent in order to allow
them to experience this revelation.
The Bible provided narrative fodder with which rabbis elaborated theophanic encounters. It also laid out ritual and cultic contexts for God
gazing. A clear example, which invites rabbinic reinterpretation, is found
in Deuteronomy:
Three times a year all your males shall see the face (yir’eh et-pene) of the Lord
your God in the place that he shall choose – on the Feast of Unleavened
Bread, on the Feast of Weeks, and on the Feast of Tabernacles – and they
shall not see the face (yir’eh et-pene) of the Lord empty.
As we will see, this verse (and several biblical parallels) provides the basis for
the rabbinic depiction of a ritual of “seeing,” re’iyat panim, accompanied
by a sacrifice, re’iyat qorban, and located in the temple. The rabbis take
the Bible’s phrase “they shall see the face of the Lord,” which is used in a
common sense, though with a specific theological significance, and turn it
into a technical term for a ritual of their own invention.
On the superiority of seeing over hearing at the Sinai revelation, see Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el,
Bah.odesh (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ). On these and other sources see Fraade, “Hearing and seeing.”
Genesis Rabbah : (ed. Theodor-Albeck, ii:–). See also Genesis Rabbah : (ed. TheodorAlbeck, ii:), in which Potiphar “saw the shekhinah hovering over him [Joseph],” derived from
Genesis :–, “And his master saw that the Lord was with him . . . and Joseph found favor in his
eyes.”
Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Shirta (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ); b. Sotah b–a. On infants and
fetuses seeing the shekhinah, see t. Sotah :; y. Sotah :, c. On the superiority of the vision
of a mere maidservant to that of Ezekiel and Isaiah, see Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Beshallah.
(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, –) and Mekhilta Derabbi Shim‘on bar Yoh.ai to Exodus : (ed. EpsteinMelamed, ). See also Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Bah.odesh (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ).
Deuteronomy :. See also Exodus :–, :–. For the use of similar language in the
context of the septennial obligation to hear the reading of the Torah (haqhel ), see Deuteronomy
:, “When all of Israel comes to see the face of the Lord your God in the place that he shall
choose.”
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As has been noted by many scholars, “seeing the face” in Near Eastern
cultic parlance usually referred to seeing an image of the deity or to the
privilege of having an audience with a king (a deliberate emphasis of the
king’s divinity). This is clearly the original meaning of the biblical phrase
in this context. Centuries later, the Masoretes and some targumists would,
in their discomfort with biblical depictions of a visible God, render the
active verb “will see” (Qal: yir’eh) as the passive “will appear” (Niphal:
yera’eh). Rather than the pilgrim traveling with the purpose of seeing God,
the pilgrim went to show himself to God instead. Yet the rabbis and
some targumists continued happily with the notion that pilgrims went to
the temple to see God. What exactly this meant would await its fullest
elaboration in post-Tannaitic sources.
The laws derived from this verse are laid out in m. H
. agigah, which is
dedicated in part to the laws of the pilgrimage festivals of Sukkot, Pesah., and
Shavu‘ot. The Palestinian and Babylonian talmudic tractates of H
. agigah
follow and elaborate m. H
. agigah, as well as other Tannaitic sources. An
examination of the Tannaitic materials reveals the creation of a re’iyah ritual
that envisions a very particular kind of pilgrim. We will see that the later
Babylonian sources take up this particularity in ways that emphasize what
we will call “homovisuality.”
Re’iyah
Without the temple, what did the Tannaim do with the biblical injunction
to make pilgrimage three times each year to see God’s face? By the time these
rabbis were flourishing, the temple was a thing of the past. As they did with
much biblical and temple-related ritual that was effectively defunct, the
Tannaim brought pilgrimage under the domain of halakhah. M. H
. agigah
:– states:
Terrien, The Psalms, ; Davies, “The ark in the Psalms,” –; Fowler, “The meaning of
‘lipnê YHWH’”; Gruber, Aspects of Nonverbal Communication; Uehlinger, “Anthropomorphic cult
statuary,” –; van der Toorn “Iconic book analogies,” ; Smith, “‘Seeing God.’” For the
expression to “see the king’s face,” see Kings :; Jeremiah :; Esther :.
Geiger, Urschrift, . The Septuagint, Vulgate, and Peshitta also opted for the passive in these cases.
Other instances where the Masoretic text reconfigures seeing God into appearing before God are:
Psalms :, :; Isaiah :. For a stimulating discussion of God’s face and its erasure, see Chavel,
“Face of God.” For a brief history of Exodus :–, :–, and Deuteronomy :–, see
Naeh, “En em lamasoret,” –.
E.g. Fragmentary Targum to Exodus : which reads lemekhme (to see), and Targum Neofiti
Deuteronomy also has lemekhmeyyeh. On anthropomorphism, and its avoidance, in the Targumim, see Klein, “The preposition ‘qdm,’” –, and references therein.
While the rabbinic movement emerged after the destruction of the temple, much of its earliest
texts focused on cultic matters. Over half the Mishnah’s laws concern temple, sacrifice, and purity
(Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah, , and Goldenberg, “Destruction”).
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All are obligated in re’iyah (“seeing”) except for the deaf-mute, the fool,
the minor, the hermaphrodite, the androgyne, women, slaves who are not
freed, the lame, the blind (hasome), the sick, and the old person who cannot
ascend with his feet . . .
The school of Shammai says: the re’iyah is two coins, the h.agigah is one
coin. The school of Hillel says: the re’iyah is one coin, the h.agigah is two
coins.
Tannaitic sources delineate three separate obligations for the pilgrimage
festivals: re’iyah (seeing), h.agigah (festivity) and simh.ah (rejoicing). The
rabbis nominalize these terms, transforming them from verbal expressions
in the biblical text to nouns defining ritual acts. This is both a ritual and a
terminological innovation on the part of the Mishnah. Here, the Mishnah
exempts certain categories of people from the obligation of re’iyah, and it
appears from m. H
. agigah : that re’iyah itself is conceived of as having a
sacrificial component.
The Tannaitic legal-exegetical commentary Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el
dissects the injunction at Exodus :–:
“Three times” (regalim, lit. “feet” ) – those who walk with their feet, to exclude
(lehotsi’ ) the lame.
“He will see” – to exclude the blind.
“Your males” – to exclude women.
“All your males” – this excludes the hermaphrodite and the androgyne.
“Read this Torah in front of all of Israel (Deuteronomy :)” – to exclude
converts and slaves.
“In their hearing (Deuteronomy :)” – to exclude the deaf-mute.
“And you shall rejoice (Deuteronomy :)” – to exclude the sick and the
minor.
“In front of the Lord your God (Deuteronomy :)” – to exclude the impure.
From here they said, “All are obligated in re’iyah except for the deaf-mute,
the mentally incompetent, the minor, the hermaphrodite, the androgyne,
the lame, the blind, the sick and the old person.” (m. H
. agigah :)
Here we see the Tannaim read “shall see” (Exodus :) to exclude those
who do not see, the blind, from re’iyah. The Mekhilta passage elaborates
For all three, see n. below.
As per Anderson, “Expression of joy,” . Note the designation, re’iyah (“vision”), rather than
mar’eh (“appearance”), though on the nomen actionis form Qetilah in mishnaic Hebrew, see ibid.
On the Tannaitic innovation of re’iyah and h.agigah and the lack of evidence for such terms and
sacrifices in temple times, see Werman, “CD XI:,” esp. –.
Compare m. Pe’ah :. The obligation to sacrifice is based on “he/they shall not see me empty[handed]” (Exodus :; Deuteronomy :).
Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Kaspa (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ). Unlike the mishnah’s list, women
and slaves are missing from all mss.
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the details of the pilgrimage ritual using typical exegetical reasoning, for
example relying on the biblical specification of “males” to exempt women
and of “feet” (regalim, which means both “feet” and “times, pilgrimage
festivals”) to exempt the lame. The precise contents of the re’iyah ritual
are ambiguous. On the one hand, it involves seeing (hence “re’iyah” and
the exemption of the blind). On the other hand, according to m. H
. agigah
:, it has a monetary value; in other words, it is a sacrifice. On both
these components, seeing and of sacrifice, t. H
. agigah : offers additional
clarification.
The Tosefta seeks to define re’iyah by comparing it to other festival
obligations. Its discussion places the relative values of the h.agigah and
re’iyah sacrifices in the context of a biblical instance of seeing God that is
highly instructive:
The school of Shammai says: greater is the value of the re’iyah than the value
of the h.agigah; re’iyah is wholly for the most high [God], which is not the
case with the h.agigah.
The school of Hillel says: greater is the value of the h.agigah than the value
of the re’iyah; h.agigah is applied before and after the revelation at Sinai,
which is not the case with the re’iyah . . .
What is the re’iyah? These are the burnt offerings that accompany the
re’iyah.
This parallels the debate between the schools of Shammai and Hillel in
m. H
. agigah :. There, the positions were staked out in terms of minimum financial value (one or two coins for the re’iyah or h.agigah offering).
Here, the school of Shammai elevates the value of re’iyah over h.agigah
because the former is a burnt sacrifice, all of which is consumed by God,
whereas the latter is not. Bet Hillel’s claim bears scrutiny. Its claim is that
h.agigah must be of greater value because peace offerings were sacrificed
before and after the revelation at Sinai, unlike re’iyah (burnt offerings).
The Mekhilta exploits Deuteronomy : in order to exclude the deaf and converts. However,
contrary to the inclusion of women and all minors in that passage, it still excludes women on
the basis of zechurekha (“your males”) in the other three pilgrimage commands. This ambiguity of
exclusion will continue into the talmudic texts. In the Yerushalmi, it is resolved by distinguishing
between re’iyat panim (“seeing the face”) and the qorban re’iyah (“seeing sacrifice”). Whereas women
are exempted from re’iyah, they are obligated in simh.ah. See, e.g., t. H
. agigah :; Sifre Deuteronomy
(ed. Finkelstein, ); Anderson, “Expression of joy.”
T. Hagigah :.
See the Bavli’s discussion of re’iyah and re’ayon (b. H
. agigah a).
.
See the extended discussion about the debate between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai and the derivation
of the values of re’iyah and h.agigah in b. H
. agigah a-b. Y. H
. agigah :, b identifies Exodus :
(veyah.oggu) as a pre-revelation instance of h.agigah. See Exodus : (note Exodus :) and Numbers
:–.
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The post-revelation sacrificesl, into which Bet Hillel reads these two rabbinic ritual sacrifices, are a striking episode in the Exodus narrative. It
combines both sacrifice and seeing:
And he sent young men of the people of Israel, who offered burnt offerings,
and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord. [ . . . ]
Then Moses and Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, and seventy of the elders of
Israel went up and saw the God of Israel. Under his feet was a kind of paved
work of sapphire stone, like the very heaven for clearness. Upon the nobles
of the people of Israel he laid not his hand; they saw God, and they ate and
drank.
Thus, Bet Hillel derives the relative worth of re’iyah and h.agigah from these
biblical “precedents.” This roots the notion of re’iyah as both sacrifice
and seeing in the biblical text and further connects both aspects of the
ritual. However, the element of seeing is not exactly distinguished from
that of sacrifice in the definition of re’iyah given at the end of t. H
. agigah
:. In fact, the definition of re’iyah as “burnt offerings that accompany the
re’iyah,” is somewhat circular.
We learn more about the constituent elements of re’iyah from t. H
. agigah :.
A. The impure (tame’ ) is exempt from re’iyah, as it says, “and you shall
come there” (Deuteronomy :), “and you shall bring there” (Deuteronomy
:), [referring] to that which is ra’uy (“worthy,” lit. “seen”) to enter the
courtyard (‘azarah), thus excluding the impure, who is not ra’uy to enter
the courtyard.
B. R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay says in the name of R. Judah: Also the blind
(hasome), as it says, “He shall see” (yir’eh, Exodus :, et al.), thus excluding
the blind.
The Bavli reads this as prior to the Sinai revelation (b. H
. agigah a). The debate between Bet Hillel
and Bet Shammai concerns whether the ‘olot mentioned in Exodus : were re’iyah or just regular
burnt offerings.
Exodus :, –.
Thus, one coin for re’iyah and two for h.agigah. Note that the sacrifice to and sighting of God
takes place among an exclusive set, the biblical author having gone to some pains to emphasize the
dangers of hoi polloi approaching the mountain by touch, or in order “to gaze” at God. See Exodus
:–, – (in the latter, distinctions are made between common folk, priests, and Aaron and
Moses); Exodus :–, –.
Ska, “Vision and meal.”
Furthermore, t. H
. agigah : then goes on to muddy the waters even further, defining h.agigah as a
peace offering and then stating, “Both of these (re’iyah and h.agigah) are called h.agigah.”
Deuteronomy :–, “For only to the place that the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall
come there. And you shall bring there your burnt offerings.”
Ms. Vienna reads Yoh.anan b. Rah.abay, while Ms. Erfurt and London read Dahaba’y.
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Rabbi responded [in disagreement] to the words of R. Yoh.anan b.
Dahabay.
The sages supported the words of R. Judah. “And Hannah did not go up
( Samuel :).”
The Tosefta starts off by giving the basis for the exclusion of the impure
person. It cites phrases in adjacent verses in Deuteronomy :– that refer
to “coming” (uva’ta, “you shall come”) into the temple courtyard, in the
rabbinic understanding, and to “bringing” (vahave’tem, “you shall bring”)
sacrifices. The impure person is forbidden to come into the ‘azarah, in
order to see, and on this basis he is exempted from bringing the sacrifice.
Likewise, the blind person who cannot see (yir’eh, in Exodus : and
parallels) is exempted from the sacrifice. Or, more straightforwardly: the
impure person is exempted from re’iyah (sacrifice or seeing) because he
cannot, due to prohibition, enter the ‘azarah, where it takes place, and
the blind person is exempted from re’iyah (seeing or sacrifice) because
he cannot see. It is worth attending to the language used to express the
disqualification of the tame’: the tame’ is not ra’uy, literally, “not to be
seen”; that is, he, along with others, ought not be seen in the courtyard
(en ra’uy . . . la‘azarah). The blind person is excluded from re’iyah on the
basis of his inability to see (yir’eh).
Aharon Shemesh takes the Tosefta’s juxtaposition of the exclusion of
the impure and the blind one step further, arguing that the prohibition
underlying the exemption of the impure person also applies to the blind,
as well as to the other excluded categories. Shemesh concedes that in
rabbinic law the “deformed” were not excluded from the sanctuary, in
contrast to explicit biblical prohibitions against the presence of the blind,
lame, uncircumcised, and impure ( Samuel :; Isaiah :). However, he
argues, on the basis of additional suggestive rabbinic evidence, which has
strong echoes in Qumranic sources, that in the case of re’iyah those whose
bodies were not “esthetic” were prohibited from the ritual of seeing God.
Shemesh, along with Shlomo Naeh, Israel Knohl, and Yaakov Sussman,
reads the rabbinic sources to suggest that the re’iyah actually took place
The Mekhilta, above, cites “In front of (lifne) the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy :).
See t. ‘Arakhin :: “A woman was never seen (nir’et) in the courtyard (‘azarah) other than at the
time of her sacrificing; and a minor was not seen (nir’ah) in the courtyard (‘azarah) other than at
the time that the Levites recited songs.”
Shemesh, “‘Holy angels.”
M. Kelim :– has a series of exclusions that increase as the spaces come closer and closer to the
holy of holies; cf. Shemesh, “Holy angels,” –.
Shemesh, “Holy angels,” .
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in the priestly section of the courtyard, within the inner priestly court,
between the hall and the altar (per m. Kelim :), in which stringent
exclusions applied (as per Leviticus :–). These scholars read the
evidence in order to uncover actual second temple pilgrimage practices
and conflicts between Sadducee and Pharisee ideas about lay participation
in the pilgrimage cult. Regardless of the value of these sources as repositories
of pre-rabbinic traditions, they manifest rabbinic notions about pilgrimage
past. In this regard, traditions such as m. H
. agigah :, which has priests warn
pilgrims, “Take care, lest you touch the table [of the face-bread] and the
menorah [and render it impure],” make it clear that the rabbis envisioned
a ritual in which laity might reach far beyond their usual permissible
terrain.
Shemesh’s observations, combined with the implication in t. H
. agigah
: that re’iyah took place in the ‘azarah and the statement in t. ‘Arakhin
: that women were rarely seen in this part of the temple, suggests that
perhaps all these excluded categories, including the blind, were at the very
least discouraged (by lack of inclusion in the obligation), if not forbidden
(as per Shemesh), from performing the component of re’iyah that entailed
entry into the inner part of the priestly ‘azarah. The foregoing discussion
of the Tosefta should draw our attention to the important role of sight and
visibility in the re’iyah ritual, as well as in shaping the ideal pilgrim through
halakhic reasoning of exemption and exclusion.
Exemptive (or exclusionary) logic
In t. H
. agigah :B, R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay (like the Mekhilta) excludes the
blind on the basis of a common type of exegetical reading of the words “‘he
shall see’ (Exodus :, et al.).” The Sifre, the Tannaitic legal-exegetical
commentary on Deuteronomy, uses yir’eh for a different exegetical
purpose, one that begins to explain the broader logic underlying the set of
exemptions from re’iyah found in the rabbinic sources quoted above:
Knohl, “Post-biblical sectarianism,” –; Sussman, “History of the halakhah,” –; Naeh, “En
em lamasoret,” –. According to m. Kelim :, non-priests were allowed into the priestly court
for laying their hands on animals dedicated to sacrifice and other related sacrificial rituals, but those
with blemishes could not enter the area between the hall and the altar, or beyond.
Shemesh, “Holy angels,” and Sussman, “History of the halakhah,” relate this to m. H
. agigah :.
Naeh, “En em lamasoret,” and Shemesh, “Holy angels.”
Note that in the Tosefta, Rabbi takes issue with this reading and argues that the correct reading
should be in the passive, as in Samuel :, in which we also find the verb ra’ah (r-’-h/y) and pene
adonay. For this interpretation of the Tosefta and parallel Mishnah, see Naeh, “En em lamasoret”
(pace Lieberman).
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“He [the pilgrim] will see the face of the Lord” (Deuteronomy :) – just
as he comes to see (lir’ot), so he comes to be seen (lera’ot).
The Sifre reads the word yir’eh not as a basis for the particular exclusion of
one who cannot see but rather as the basis for a larger principle governing
the ideal re’iyah pilgrim. Here is a principle of reciprocity that underlies
the mechanics of re’iyah itself (and which does not concern sacrifice).
The principle can be articulated on two levels. On one level, we have the
notion that re’iyah constitutes not just seeing (the plain meaning of the
text) but also (on the basis of a derashah that transforms it into the passive)
appearance. The force of the derashah is to declare that just as the pilgrim
goes to see God’s face (the verse’s plain meaning), so too is he a visual
object to be seen by God. However, the Sifre’s statement also articulates a
deeper and broader basis for reciprocity that explains the remainder of those
exempted (or excluded): “just as (kederekh, ‘in the way that’) he comes to
see, so (kakh, ‘in this way’) he comes to be seen.” This mandates a principle
of reciprocity that goes beyond mutual vision, suggesting that something
about the way that the pilgrim sees must also apply to his appearance. It
is this broader principle of visual reciprocity, coupled with the Tannaitic
anthropomorphic notion of God’s appearance (or its reverse, the notion
of humanity as imago dei) that explains the “visible esthetic” standards
for the pilgrim who goes to see God’s face. Just as the pilgrim goes
to see divine perfection, so ought he (ideally) present a perfectly bodied
appearance.
This dual principle of visual symmetry and reciprocity explains and
undergirds the various requirements that follow: The pilgrim, as he draws
close to the inner parts of the priestly courtyard must, like the priest, be
unambiguously male and in full possession of his body parts and capacities,
just like his divine object of vision. This idealized, priestly notion of
Sifre Deuteronomy (ed. Finkelstein, –). This double reading finds added support in the
repetition of yir’eh in the verse adjacent to the one under examination (Deuteronomy :, ). This
is the only one of the pilgrimage festival passages where yir’eh is found twice in succession. In the
Exodus parallels, one finds yir’eh and then lir’ot. Here in Deuteronomy, the repetition, doubling, or
reversal of yir’eh (i.e. from yir’eh to yera’eh) enacts the very principle of mirroring that it undergirds.
This principle also explains why the pilgrim must be male and sound of body, senses, and reason.
Naeh, “En em lamasoret,” suggests that the midrash may actually invoke Exodus :, the one case
in which the verb yera’eh is convincingly niphal.
Shemesh, “Holy angels,” –; Lorberbaum, Image of God.
In the Sifre’s exegesis, blindness need not even be stated, because the entire enterprise has already
been predicated on the notion that the pilgrim sees. The Sifre continues: “‘Your males’ – to exclude
women. ‘All your males’ – to include minors.” Cf. the debate between the schools of Hillel and
Shammai about the definition of minor in this context (in m. H
. agigah : and t. H
. agigah :).
The suggestion that these exemptions have prohibitory force is challenged by Mekhilta Derabbi
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human–divine encounter is partially reflected in the Mekhilta’s claim that
there were no blind, lame, deaf, or mentally disabled among the Israelites
gathered at the Sinai revelation.
In summarizing the impulses at play in the Tannaitic sources on the
thrice-yearly visit to see God’s face, we can note the following trends:
the emphasis on the visual aspect of the encounter (beginning with the
creation and nominalization of re’iyah as a technical term for a specific
ritual); the move toward ritualizing re’iyah by the institution of a sacrificial
component (also called the re’iyah); an expansion from unidirectional vision
to visual reciprocity; and a consequent expansion of the ritual focus from the
pilgrim’s vision to his appearance. There is still ambiguity in the Tannaitic
sources as to the differences (if any) between the sacrificial and visual
components of re’iyah and the differential legal obligation, exemption, and
exclusion for each. Finally, the sources in their exemptions (or exclusions)
promote an ideal pilgrim who sees (and is seen by) God: one who reflects
the deity in whose image he is created.
Babylonian Re’iyah
As noted, the desire to gaze at God’s face, was no invention of the Tannaim;
nor was the desire to be seen by God. The Bible, among other ancient
Near Eastern texts, speaks of the human desire to see God’s face and depicts
God’s face and eyes being turned toward or away from humanity. God’s
countenance is said to shine toward humans or to be “set against” or “turned
away from” them; God’s eyes scan all of humanity.
Yishma’el, Pash.a (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ), which states that Jonah’s wife made pilgrimage to
Jerusalem, but this may point to the sacrificial element of pilgrimage (the h.agigah and re’iyah
sacrifices) rather than the visual component of re’iyah. Mekhilta there also states that Michal
the Cushite and Tabi, Rabban Gamaliel’s servant, donned tefillin, phylacteries, which obviously
points to exceptional cases in which exempted categories nonetheless perform positive, time-bound
mitsvot.
Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Bah.odesh (ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ). This principle is only partially
reflected here, since women are not excluded from the Sinai revelation, though as mentioned
above, there are graduated levels of exclusion and inclusion depending on status and proximity
to the sacred. Shemesh notes that the gathering of so many excluded (or exempted) categories
(gender: woman, tumtum, androgyne; body: blind, lame, deaf-mute; mental capacity: the mentally
incompetent, minor; status: slave, woman, minor), to which the Sifre adds converts, is relatively
unusual. The three Tannaitic instances in which one finds significant overlap are all in priestly
contexts: (a) exclusions of priests (Leviticus :–, m. Bekhorot ), (b) exclusions of sacrificial
animals (Leviticus :–; m. Bekhorot ), and (c) m. Menah.ot :. Cf. m. Kelim :. Shemesh notes
the overlaps between these exclusions, the re’iyah exemptions and those in QSa :: (Shemesh,
“Holy angels”).
Psalms :, .
On God’s eyes and face toward the righteous and against the wicked, see Psalms :–. On the
desire for God’s face to radiate toward his worshippers, see Numbers :–; Psalms :. On
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Where early Palestinian rabbis were innovative was in their extrapolation
from the few biblical verses on seeing God’s face thrice a year to a pilgrimage
ritual that emphasized human and (in the case of the Sifre) divine vision.
This is a move, taken up later by Babylonian rabbis, toward the kind of
“ritual-centered viewing” or “mystic viewing” that emerged in the Roman
East in the second century ce. Jaś Elsner uses these terms to describe the
climactic moment of pilgrimage, in which the devotee and deity share a
“reciprocal gaze.” Yet, for the rabbis, unlike for adherents of other gods,
there was no temple and thus no contemporary re’iyah, so this seeing took
place on a purely imaginary, exegetical level. We will treat the implications
of these different types of vision and their concomitant visual objects
(material and mental) at the end of the next chapter.
Over two centuries later, in Babylonia, we find visual reciprocity elaborated and celebrated in terms of ocular reciprocity. The opening sugya in b.
H
. agigah (which comments on m. H
. agigah :) suggests that a person who
is blind in only one eye might be allowed to do re’iyah. It then rebuts this
suggestion as follows:
R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay said in the name of R. Judah:
One who is blind in one eye is exempt from re’iyah, as it says, yir’eh (“he
will see”), yera’eh (“he will be seen”) – just as he comes to see, so he comes
to be seen; as he comes to see with both eyes, so [he comes] to be seen
with both eyes.
the removal of God’s face, see Deuteronomy :, :; Isaiah :; Ezekiel :–. On the
expression “see the face of PN” in Akkadian texts in cultic contexts, see Chicago Assyrian Dictionary,
vol. i, A, part , –.
Elsner, Roman Eyes, –. This is one way to understand the rabbinic prohibition against looking
at idols. I expand this argument in Chapter .
The Yerushalmi does not contemplate this possibility.
Compare t. H
. agigah :, “R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay said in the name of R. Judah: Also the blind
(hasome), as it says, ‘He shall see (yir’eh, Exodus :, et al.),’ thus excluding the blind.”
Compare Sifre Deuteronomy (ed. Finkelstein, –). Note that Mss. Göttingen (at a and
b), Oxford-Bodl. heb. d. () –, Cambridge T-S F () , and Oxford Opp. Add. fol.
have kederekh sheba’ lir’ot/lera’ot kakh ba’ liro’t/lera’ot (the text is unvocalized), whereas Munich
(a and b), London-BL Harl. ()[b], Munich (b. ‘Arakhin b), Vatican , Vatican
, Oxford (b. ‘Arakhin b), and Spanish Printo (a and b) have the passive, i.e. kederekh
sheba’ lir’ot kakh ba’ lira’ot (= lehira’ot). Jerusalem – Yad Harav Herzog actually has lehera’ot (once,
and another which is a doubtful reading). Geiger, Nachgelassene schriften, vol. v, –, argues that
the Babylonian Amoraim here are struggling to understand what R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay (in the
Tosefta) is adding to the plain meaning of the Mishnah. In other words, from the Mishnah it is
already obvious and stated that the blind person is excluded. R. Yoh.anan is taken to be expanding
the exclusion even to the case of one who is blind in one eye, with the prooftext provided because
they were not aware of changes in vocalization.
B. H
. agigah a, b (parallels in b. Sanhedrin 4b, b. ‘Arakhin 2b). In the first instance (b. H
. agigah
a), the double yir’eh is cited incidentally in a series of similar hypotheticals (clearly Babylonian)
which all involve “half ”-category cases (half-slave, half-blind, lame on the first day but healthy on
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The rebuttal is achieved by an ostensibly Tannaitic teaching which is a
reworked combination of both the Tosefta and the Sifre. The Sifre’s
symmetrical principle of visuality, “just as he comes to see (lir’ot) so he
comes to be seen (lera’ot),” referred there both to reciprocal vision and to a
similar manner or content of seeing. The Babylonian Talmud, in adding
“with both eyes,” converts it into a hyper-reflexive and literal principle that
refers to the very organs of sight themselves.
The Babylonian principle of symmetry shapes the very form of the
exegesis; on the basis of this principle the human body should (ideally)
mirror the perfection of the divine body. This principle of symmetry
makes the hermeneutic of the visuality transparent: Not only does like see
like, but each is alike in its very seeing (of the other), down to the eyes
themselves. The effect is what we can call a “homovisual” encounter: The
two eyes of two similar, perfectly bodied males, albeit one human and the
other divine, meet each other. I define homovisuality as a type of viewing
that is homos, in the sense of “same” or “like.” This refers to seeing that
takes place between like entities, or that produces like visual content, or
that has the effect of engendering sameness (and thus mirroring), whether
in terms of the viewers or the visual object. In the act of viewing itself
there is a mimetic effect.
It is worth repeating that this type of homovisual or mirroring vision is
accomplished here in specifically ocular terms. The eye, after all, is a body
part or visual object that “stares back” at its viewer. Unlike the leg or the
hand, it is an organ that, when viewed, can reciprocate and return the gaze.
It is the visual object that is also visual subject.
the second). The Talmud runs through such cases to get at the extent of obligation expressed in the
Mishnah’s kol (“all”).
T. H
. agigah : and Sifre Deuteronomy (ed. Finkelstein, –). It is, of course, always possible
that the Bavli had access to a different tradition than that preserved in the midreshe halakhah and
the Tosefta.
The Sifre bases its derashah on Deuteronomy :; Naeh sees the derashah in the Bavli as invoking
Exodus : (“will see”) and Exodus : (“will appear”). Cf. Ta-Shma, “One who is blind.”
Just before the citation of this tradition in b. H
. agigah b, the Bavli treats the exclusion of the impure
person under the principle of “all that there is in ‘bringing’ there is in ‘coming’” and vice versa. This
renders the similar mirroring reasoning between the case of the impure (bringing, coming) and the
blind (seeing, seen) far more transparent than in the earlier sources.
This visual “sameness” could be along the lines of gender, bodily appearance, ethnicity, etc., in which
like sees like, or in which the seeing has a mimetic, mirroring effect. Homovisuality could include
homoeroticism, but need not. I distinguish my use of homovisuality and heterovisuality from the
way it is currently used in queer theory and film studies, in which it is opposed to visual regimes that
represent straightness and heterosexuality as normative. In my use, it could include such oppositional
regimes, but need not. For gendered and sexualized notions of homo- and heterovisuality, see Veri,
“Homophobic discourse,” and Veri, Wiegman, and Zwinger, “Tonya’s bad boot.”
Elkins, The Object Stares Back.
This is, of course, culturally and historically variable. Other things in the world could be understood
to reciprocate the gaze, in addition to the human eye.
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This extension of visuality to two eyes and their mirrored doubling in
the Bavli is also a move toward a more explicit anthropomorphic literalism
in the divine–human encounter of re’iyah, and it conjures a vision of a
surprisingly intimate interaction of two entities looking into each other’s
eyes. Indeed, as we will see, much of b. H
. agigah, within which this passage
is located, mourns the loss of this intimacy. Through a blend of narrative
and exegesis, the Babylonian rabbis in effect write an extended elegy for
the loss of God’s face. And, as I hope to show, having constructed a past
tethered to such a precious visuality between human and deity, they frame
a present that is heavily informed by the visual asymmetry that divine
absence effects.
A similar experience of reciprocal vision, emerging with the Tannaim,
and taken up fully by the Babylonian Amoraim, is described with great
vividness by the fourth-century Roman emperor Julian, who talks not only
of the delight that the pilgrim experiences while looking at images of the
gods, but also of the shuddering awe when he feels “the gods looking at
him.” He evokes the physical and affective power of gazing at and being
gazed at by the gods, comparing the delight in looking at images of the gods
to the delight in looking at images of parents, children, or the emperor.
His point is as much about visual pleasure in general as it is about the
potential and power of such pleasure when looking at images. Indeed, for
the Platonizing Julian, it is important that the images are distinguished
from the gods themselves, who are ultimately “unseen.” By contrast, the
homovisuality of the Babylonian Talmud’s re’iyah is an unmediated one.
God does not appear through images or objects, but eye to eye, as is
emphasized by the double reading of r-’-h. The Babylonian and lateantique pagan understandings of human–divine “mystic viewing” do share
the sense of their heightened affect at the exchange of gazes, whether in
terms of pleasure or awe.
Julian, Oration on the Mother of the Gods c–d (with minor alterations to the translation of Wright,
Works of Emperor Julian, vol. ii, –). I treat this again below (p. ).
Such a distinction, between direct seeing and seeing through images, is not obvious, nor is it the
only way in which the Babylonian and later Palestinian rabbis imagined human–divine visuality.
We will later discuss the parallel existence of what I will call a “heterovisual” way of seeing God, in
which images or material representations are crucial to the experience. This mode was not imagined
to effect a reciprocal gaze.
God is described as having revealed himself “visible eye to eye” (‘ayin be‘ayin nir’ah) to Israel
(Numbers :); a similar idiom is used regarding watchers (tsofim) (Isaiah :).
For other accounts of reciprocal vision, we have Pliny’s description of a painting of Athena who
looks back at the spectator from all angles (Pliny, Naturalis Historia, .) and Lucian’s account
of an image of Hera that looks back at the viewer from wherever he is (Lucian, De Syria Dea, ).
See the explanation for this phenomenon in Ptolemy, Optics ii, . On reciprocal vision, see Elsner,
Roman Eyes and Francis, “Living icons.”
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In the next section we pause to look at the lack of an Amoraic Palestinian
visual reciprocity as it pertains to re’iyah after which we return to b. H
. agigah.
We then examine key moments in this tractate that relate to the loss of
pilgrimage homovisuality (b. H
. agigah b again, and b. H
. agigah a–b).
Re’iyah in the eyes of the Palestinian Amoraim
To better contextualize the Babylonian rabbis’ understanding of re’iyah in
terms of reciprocal vision, it is useful to examine and briefly compare how
the Palestinian Amoraic sources treat the earlier Tannaitic understandings
of re’iyah. Perhaps most striking is the fact that the notion of visual
reciprocity, first evidenced in the Sifre and sharpened in the Bavli, fails
to appear in the Yerushalmi. Rather, we’ll see that the Yerushalmi (edited
in the late fourth to early fifth century) deploys the double reading of
yir’eh (yir’eh, Qal; yera’eh, Niphal) alongside a parallel principle of “he
shall come (ba’ah, Qal) . . . he shall bring (mevi’, Hiphil),” in order to
posit a relationship between the obligation or ability to see/come and to
appear/bring. This concern to find a relationship between the capacity
to enter and to see and the obligation to bring and to sacrifice reflects the
Palestinian Talmud’s position that there are two separable components of
re’iyah: seeing the face (re’iyat panim, or re’ayon) and an accompanying
sacrifice (re’iyat qorban or qorban re’iyah).
“All are obligated in re’iyah, etc.” [except for the deaf-mute, the mentally
incompetent, the minor, the hermaphrodite, the androgyne, women, slaves
who are not freed, the lame, the blind, the sick, and the old person who
cannot ascend with his feet.] (m. H
. agigah :)
The mishnah refers to rei’yat qorban (seeing of the sacrifice), but for re’iyat
panim (seeing of the face) even a minor is obligated, as it says, “Gather the
people: the men, the women, and the children” (Deuteronomy :)
The Yerushalmi here declares that the exemptions of m. H
. agigah : apply
to the sacrificial component of re’iyah, but not to the visual component.
The key moments pertaining to visuality in the tractate include: b. H
. agigah a (yir’eh, yera’eh
exegesis); b. H
. agigah b (R. Eli‘ezer blinds R. Yose b. Durmasqit for failing to honor him); b.
H
. agigah b (second instance of the yir’eh, yera’eh exegesis followed by re’iyah-related exegetical
narratives); b. H
. agigah a–b; b. H
. agigah a–a (elaboration of gazing upon the merkavah, God’s
chariot); and b. H
. agigah b (pilgrimage display, which we examine in the next chapter).
For a Palestinian rabbinic exegesis that describes the divine gaze upon Israel as two-eyed when they
fulfill his will and monocular when they do not, see Song of Songs Rabbah :.
Y. Hagigah :, b.
See t. ‘Arakhin :.
Y. H
. agigah :, b.
.
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However, even a minor is obligated to do re’iyat panim, based on Deuteronomy :. Does the Yerushalmi’s citation of this verse mean that all those
obligated to gather for the septennial recitation of the Torah (haqhel )
are also obligated to perform re’iyat panim? In other words, does the
Yerushalmi’s use of “even” (afillu) regarding the minor mean, on the basis
of Deuteronomy :, that women and perhaps all the other categories
excluded in the Mishnah are also obligated to see? This conclusion is
uncertain, since the Yerushalmi has no trouble using Deuteronomy : for
both inclusive and exclusive purposes as it continues in its discussion of
the mishnaic exclusions. Additionally, Deuteronomy : fails to speak
to the other exempted categories of m. H
. agigah :.
Elsewhere, the Yerushalmi seems at pains to imply that even if women
were not prohibited from pilgrimage-related obligation, they were discouraged from fulfilling it. Here (in the case of Jonah’s wife going up
for pilgrimage) it seems, at least according to the view of one Palestinian
Amora (R. Abbahu), that exemption (at least in the case of women) does
imply prohibition (of sorts) and that even on the view of the remainder,
the very fact of this mention implies that such prohibition is conceivable.
In the Yerushalmi, the conceptual and terminological distinction
between seeing God’s face and offering the “seeing sacrifice” implies differential obligation (and in some cases perhaps exclusion), even as the
parameters of each are unclear. While the Yerushalmi reads m. H
. agigah
: and its exclusions to pertain to re’iyat qorban, it nonetheless does not
clearly spell out obligation for all in the case of re’iyat panim, and other
This ignores the terms of debate between the schools of Hillel and Shammai in m. H
. agigah : that
are about the physical and visual element of re’iyah, rather than its sacrificial component.
Sifre Deuteronomy (ed. Finkelstein, ) obligates the minor (whether for sacrifice or vision is
not distinguished): “‘Your males’ (Deuteronomy :) – to exclude women. ‘All your males’– to
include minors (lehavi’ et haqetanim).” The Sifre then recasts the Mishnah’s debate between the
schools of Hillel and Shammai in terms of the minimum qualification for minority status.
The Yerushalmi reads Deuteronomy : selectively, excluding the deaf and mute based on the
continuation of the verse, “so they may hear and so they may learn” (though it could have used this
phrase to include women). Note that the exclusion of the mentally incompetent is based on “It has
been clearly shown (hor’eta) to you” (Deuteronomy :) (y. H
. agigah :, a).
Y. Berakhot :(), c (parallels in y. ‘Eruvin :, a; Pesqita Rabbati [ed. Friedmann, b]):
“Mikhal the daughter of the Cushite wore tefillin [and] Jonah’s wife went up for pilgrimage, and the
sages did not object. [R. H
. izkiyya in the name of R. Abbahu: the wife of Jonah was sent back, and
the sages objected to Michal.]” In y. Berakhot, questions about the exemption of women from the
obligation of tefillin and pilgrimage are placed amidst considerations of circumstances in which the
wearing of tefillin might be prohibited. Compare the opposition to Jonah’s wife’s performance of
pilgrimage in Palestinian Amoraic sources to b. ‘Eruvin a and Mekhilta Derabbi Yishma’el, Pash.a
(ed. Horowitz-Rabin, ).
The Yerushalmi considers the possibility of particular categories who have the obligation to send
their sacrifice via third parties (if they are unable to “come” and do re’iyat panim).
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evidence suggests that some rabbis viewed extra-obligatory participation in
pilgrimage cult as problematic. This comes close to Shemesh’s argument
about the de facto prohibitory nature of the exemption in m. H
. agigah :
and related sources.
The formal division between seeing the face and sacrificing also makes
sense of some of the ambiguities we noted in the Tannaitic materials. One
implication of the distinction is clarified elsewhere in the Yerushalmi:
These are the things that do not have a fixed quantity: the leaving of corners
of the field for the poor, the first-fruit offerings, the seeing (re’ayon), acts of
kindness and Torah study (m. Pe’ah :).
“The re’ayon” – the mishnah refers to re’iyat panim (seeing of the face),
but re’iyat qorban (seeing sacrifice) does have a fixed amount.
Here we are told that there is no limit to “seeing the face.” Compare this to
the disputes about the relative worths of the re’iyah and h.agigah sacrifices
in m. H
. agigah :. Of course, m. Pe’ah : is not strictly, or solely, about
quantity in the narrow pecuniary sense. The overall message of the Mishnah
is that the items listed are infinitely valuable acts that ought to be endlessly
pursued. The Palestinian Talmud makes sure that we understand that one
among such experiences is seeing God’s face (rather than sacrificing).
The categories of exclusion from the obligation of re’iyat qorban treated
in the Yerushalmi are excluded by virtue of their inability or unsuitability
to perform re’iyat panim in terms of their aesthetic visibility. Thus, the
Yerushalmi cites a subtly different reading of the double yir’eh from that of
the Sifre or the Bavli: “R. Illa says: ‘He shall see’ (yir’eh), ‘he shall appear’
(yera’eh) – he who is fit for coming brings (hara’uy lavo’ mevi’ ), and he
who is not fit does not bring.” In other words, one who cannot come
Y. Pe’ah :, a. The two terms, panim and qorban, are reversed in Ms. Leiden, though the editors
of the Academy of Hebrew Language edition mark it as a problematic reading. For a Babylonian
discussion of the meaning of re’ayon versus re’iyah that cites m. Pe’ah :, see b. H
. agigah a.
Y. H
. agigah :, b. This is a version of the Sifre’s principle of reciprocity that is wedded to
the parallelistic principle of exclusion we saw in t. H
. agigah : in relation to the impure. The
term of exclusion, not being “fit” (ra’uy), is the perfect participle of the root r-’-h (“to see”). My
understanding is that rather than a derashah on alternate vocalizations of the word yir’eh in the three
biblical passages (Exodus , Exodus , and Deuteronomy ), the rabbis in these derashot are, as
Naeh argues for the Sifre, focusing on the repetition of the root r-’-h in Exodus : and Exodus
: (the former is convincingly Qal, the latter is convincingly Niphal); cf. the repetition of b-w-’
in Deuteronomy :– (Qal and Hiphil, respectively). The Mishnah uses the term ra’uy to describe
the aesthetic, bodily fitness of various things that come into contact with the cult. So, sacrificial
animals become sanctified by contact with cultic objects such as the altar’s ramp or cult vessels, but
only if they are “ra’uy lo” or “ra’uy lahem.” See m. Zevah.im :, :, :, :; t. Bava Metsi’a :.
See y. H
. agigah :, a for R. Ze‘ira’s use of the same formula as a basis for the continuation of the
obligation to perform re’iyah on the first day of the festival throughout the remainder of the festival.
On aesthetic terminology and ra’uy, see Leiter, “Worthiness.”
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into the temple (in order to do re’iyat panim) is exempted from bringing
(his qorban re’iyah). According to one opinion, those with boils or polyps
are exempted on the basis of Deuteronomy :, “When all Israel come
to see (lir’ot),” being deemed unworthy or literally not seeable, “for they
are not fit (re’uyin) to come with all of Israel.” Here, the notion of being
“fit” or “regarded” (ra’uy) is tied into seeing (re’iyah), and from seeing it is
connected to bringing the re’iyah sacrifice. The formulae and phrases used
by the Bavli to construct the reciprocal dynamics of vision are used by the
Yerushalmi to emphasize and construct a standard of aesthetic visibility.
This summary of the Palestinian Talmud’s treatment of the visual aspects
of re’iyah is not exhaustive. In the next chapter we will look at further
instances in y. H
. agigah that say more about what was seen. What we have
surveyed so far reveals that y. H
. agigah focuses more on the eligibility of the
viewers (or sacrificers) than on the relational dynamics of the seeing itself
(as in the Bavli). We shall see in the next chapter that to the extent that
the Yerushalmi deals with the seeing itself, it is hesitant about the notion
of seeing God’s face directly, imagining instead visual objects that stood in
for God’s face. On both counts, this is a far cry from the Bavli. This is not
to say that we do not find evidence of desire for reciprocal human–divine
vision in other Palestinian texts. In Pesiqta Derav Kahana, we have one
such instance, vividly set at Sinai:
R. Levi said: “The Holy One, Blessed Be He, was visible to them as an icon
(ikonin) with faces [that could be seen] from every place (mikkol maqom);
a thousand humans were gazing at it (mebbitin bah), and it was gazing
(mabbetet) at all of them. So when the Holy One Blessed Be He would
speak, every single one of Israel would say, ‘To me the Word speaks.’”
This teaching about the divine gaze and address is attributed to the fourthcentury Amora R. Levi. In R. Levi’s eyes, not only does an icon (multifrons) of the Jewish God “stare back,” but it also addresses each spectator.
The midrash uses visual and artistic idioms that Julian, Pliny, and Lucian
would have recognized – this is the dream of the (divine) image that looks
back at its viewers. This notion does not enter the Palestinian visual lexicon
surrounding pilgrimage until a century or so later (as per our citation from
Pesiqta Rabbati at the head of this chapter). Furthermore, this Amoraic
Hence the impure person is exempted from sacrifice because of his exclusion from entry into the
‘azarah.
Y. H
. agigah : a. This exclusion rests on the extraction of a fitness (re’uyin) requirement alluded
to in the prescription in Deuteronomy : that all Israel “come to see (lir’ot).”
Pesiqta Derav Kahana : (ed. Mandelbaum, i:).
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midrash safely set at the one-time revelation at Sinai imagines divine visuality to occur, unlike the Bavli, via the mediating imagery of an image
(ikon). The visual encounter it contemplates may be emphatically personal
but it is not direct. And it is set in biblical history rather than as part of a
pilgrimage ritual that is hopefully to be restored.
Remembrance of sights past: losing face in the Babylonian Talmud
Having followed the different path taken by the Yerushalmi, we now
return to the Babylonian conceptions of re’iyah, tracing the key narrativeexegetical moments in b. H
. agigah. The following anecdotal and affective
exegesis serves as a poignant example of how Babylonian rabbis represented
their own complex of desirous and mournful feelings for the lost pilgrimage
encounter.
Rav Huna wept when he came across the following biblical text, “He shall
see” (yir’eh), “He shall be seen” (yera’eh).
He said: a servant whose master (rabbo) expects (metsappe) to see him
(lir’oto), shall he distance himself from him? As it says, “When you come to
see my face (lir’ot panay), who asked you to trample my courtyards?” (Isaiah
:)
Rav Huna, a third-century Babylonian Amora, reads scripture and weeps.
This anecdote (b. H
. agigah b) heads a string of fourteen such cases in the
Bavli sugya (b. H
. agigah b–a). Almost all of them lament Jewish loss and
punishment in the wake of the temple’s destruction.
Rav Huna’s lament is placed immediately after a second occurrence of
the baraita of R. Yoh.anan b. Dahabay, discussed above, which reads the
doubling of yir’eh, yere’ah to exclude a pilgrim who is blind in one eye
from performing re’iyah. The juxtaposition of this baraita, which I have
argued above is one of the Bavli’s clearest statements of the importance of
visual reciprocity, with the story of Rav Huna’s weeping, invites the reader
to connect the two and to read Rav Huna’s tears as a lament for the loss of
Here, the double yir’eh points backwards to the previous exegesis about reciprocal vision. Coupled
with master–slave imagery, it is enhanced here, as it undermines the expected hierarchy of roles
between slave and master, humanity and God. This imagery continues through several of the
fourteen similar traditions that follow in the Bavli of sages weeping when they encounter certain
biblical verses.
The use of metsappe plays on the connotations of the root ts-f-h which has the meaning of gazing or
looking (Qal) and the more metaphorical meaning of looking forward or anticipating (Piel).
B. H
. agigah b.
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this reciprocal vision. Indeed, Rav Huna’s tears are occasioned by reading
this statement of reciprocity – yir’eh, yera’eh – in the context of the verse
from Isaiah, which retracts the promised intimacy (“When you come to
see my face, who asked you to trample my courtyards”). The master’s
eager expectation both to see and to be seen is rescinded in Isaiah, and
as a result, the ocular intimacy of the temple era is replaced by a reality in
which God disdains Israel’s sacrifices and cultic worship.
Let us return to the observation that the baraita on b, which establishes
the yir’eh, yera’eh reading, is the second occurrence of this text, which
first appears on a. This goes to the clear thematic flow of the tractate’s
editorial arrangement, through which the motif of seeing God’s face is
threaded. In other words, the Bavli, after finishing its discussion of all
the mishnaic categories excluded from the obligation of re’iyah (on a),
reiterates this particular baraita (on b). Then the reading of yir’eh/yera’eh
as a requirement that two pairs of eyes behold each other during the re’iyah
ritual, the Bavli launches into a sequence of fourteen anecdotes about rabbis
who come across a certain biblical passage and weep, beginning with Rav
Huna (on b), and including God, who weeps over the destruction of
Jerusalem. It then follows with a quartet of exegetical narratives (on a–b).
In these narratives, the Babylonian Talmud moves from despair about
the lack of access to God’s face to the implications of God’s absence in
The juxtaposition of the verse from Isaiah with that from Exodus effects an ingenious rhetorical
inversion. The invitation to see God’s face in Exodus :: “All your males shall see the face (yir’eh
et pene) of the Lord, God” is mocked by Isaiah :: “When you come to see my face (lir’ot panay),
who asked you to come?” Similarly, the foot festival, “Three festivals (regalim, lit. “feet”) a year you
shall celebrate for me” (Exodus :) is disparaged as a “trampling of courtyards” (remos h.atseray).
Contrast with b. H
. agiga a: “Rava explains: ‘How beautiful are your feet in sandals, daughter of
nobles!’ (Song of Songs :) – How beautiful are the feet of Israel at the hour when they make
pilgrimage by foot.” See parallels in b. Sukkah b; b. Mo‘ed Qatan a; and versions in Genesis
Rabbah : (ed. Theodor-Albeck, i:–) and Song of Songs Rabbah :. In Isaiah :, God’s
rejection of Israel is described in specifically visual terms: “I shall turn my eyes from you (a‘lim ‘enay
mikkem).”
This is echoed by the ambiguity of the subject and objects of the verbs in Rav Huna’s analogy:
“A servant whose master expects to see him (metsape lo lir’oto), shall he distance himself from him
(yitrah.eq mimmennu)?” The master’s expectation could refer to his own beholding of the slave, or
to the slave coming to look at him (the master). There may be similar ambiguity about the subject
of yitrah.eq mimmennu.
Though there is still intimacy in the language of dominance and subordination (servant–master)
in Isaiah :. The phrase lir’ot panay (“to see my face”) is another instance in which the Masoretic
Text renders the verb in the passive, lera’ot. Targum of Jonathan has le’ith.aza’ah qodamay (“to be
seen before me”), but the Peshitta has lemekhze appe (“to see my face”).
This comes as commentary on the tanu rabbanan, which picks up tangentially on the mention of
tame in the discussion of ‘arel brought in right at the end.
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contemporary terms. This arrangement transitions from loss to consolation
to defensiveness to optimism:
() “My anger shall be kindled against them on that day, and I will forsake
them and hide my face from them [and they shall be devoured, and
many evils and troubles shall befall them]” (Deuteronomy :). R.
Bardela b. Tavyumi said in the name of Rav: To whomever “hiding of
the face” does not apply is not one of them [the people of Israel]; to
whomever [the words] “and they shall be devoured” does not apply is
not one of them.
() The rabbis said to Rava: Neither “the hiding of the face,” nor “and they
shall be devoured” applies to [our] teacher [i.e. to Rava]. He said to
them: Do you know how much I secretly send to the court of King
Shapur? Even so, the rabbis set their eyes upon him. Meanwhile the
court of King Shapur sent [men] who plundered him. He said: So it is
taught, Rabban Shim‘on b. Gamaliel said: Wherever the rabbis direct
their eyes there is either death or poverty.
() “And I will hide my face on that day” (Deuteronomy :). Rava said:
The Holy One, blessed be He, said, “Although I hide my face from
them, ‘I shall speak to him in a dream”’ (Numbers :). Rav Joseph
said: His hand is stretched over us, as it is said: “And I have covered you
in the shadow of my hand” (Isaiah :).
() R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah was at the court of Caesar. A certain min showed
him [by gestures]: A people whose Lord has turned his face from them.
[R. Joshua] showed him: His hand is stretched over us. Caesar said to
R. Joshua: What did he show you? [R. Joshua replied:] “A people whose
Lord has turned his face from them,” and I showed him, “His hand is
stretched over us.” They said to the heretic: What did you show him?
[The heretic replied:] “A people whose Lord has turned his face from
them.” [They asked:] And what did he show you? [He replied:] “I do
not know.” They said: Should a man who does not understand what
they show him by gesture sign before the king! They took him out and
killed him.
As this passage and the preceding fourteen vignettes of weeping and mourning demonstrate, the rabbis understood divine inaccessibility as a punishment whose effects need to be understood as much as they were bitterly
Cf. Rava and tax evasion in b. Nedarim b.
The heretic’s statement is recorded in Aramaic, but is based on Deuteronomy :. R. Joshua’s
Hebrew response, yado netuyah ‘alenu, is the same expression used above in Rav Joseph’s statement
as an explanation of the quote from Isaiah :.
B. H
. agigah a–b. While the printed edition, Vilna, has apikoros, the manuscripts have hahu mina
(Göttingen ; Munich ; Oxford-Bodl. heb. d. () b; London-BL Harl. (); Munich
; Oxford Opp. Add. fol. ; Presaro Print (); Venice Print (); Vatican ; Vatican ;
Spanish Print (ca. ) as per Lieberman database). Given the content and context, it is likely that
min was censored in the printed edition.
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felt. The words of Augustine strike at the same affective nexus: “If your
heart shuddered at what has just been said, that God will deny you the sight
of his face, it means that you accounted not seeing your God as a terrible
punishment; it means you have loved freely.” The deeper the affective
response to the loss of God’s face, the deeper the love – hence the tears
shed in the preceding material.
However, the rabbis would have walked a fine line between their understanding of God’s inaccessibility in terms of Augustinian ocular desire,
love, and loss, and Christian supersessionist readings of historical events
such as the destruction of the temple and access to God’s face, as signs
of God’s removal of his favor from the old Israel. Thus, after the weeping
of Rav Huna over Isaiah : and the loss of God’s face in b. H
. agigah b,
the thrust of the first midrashic exegesis in b. H
agigah
a–b
(part one,
.
above) is to reappropriate God’s manifest absence as a positive marker of
Jewishness. Rava, a leading, and apparently wealthy, fourth-century Babylonian Amora, fails to exhibit the signs of being “one of them,” the Jewish
people, who, in the exegesis of the passage from Deuteronomy :, are
marked by the troubles and evils that are the consequence of God’s having
turned away from them. Despite, or because of, his quip, Rava’s colleagues
look askance at him, and as a consequence, agents of King Shapur plunder
Rava’s wealth. This very suffering, in turn, marks him again as “one of
them” (mehem).
The significance and power of the gaze in this story, and the rabbinic gaze
in particular, is boldly emphasized in the chastened (or perhaps reproachful)
words of Rava, “Rabban Shim‘on b. Gamaliel said: Wherever the rabbis
set their eyes there is either death or poverty.” The motif of rabbis
killing, incinerating, or injuring with their gazes is found in Palestinian
and Babylonian sources; this capacity is attributed to both Palestinian and
Babylonian sages. This kind of harmful gaze seems to reflect GrecoRoman theories of “extramissive” vision, which explained the power of
vision, sometimes understood as a fiery ray, as a force that emanated from
Augustine, Sermones (Patrologia Latina, ., ed. Migne; Works of Saint Augustine, trans. Hill,
part iii, vol. v, ). These words are preceded by: “If you are longing to see your God, if during
this exile, this wandering, you are sighing for love of him, why then, the Lord your God is testing
you as if he were to say to you: ‘Look, do what you like, satisfy all your greedy desires . . . I won’t
punish you for any of this, I won’t cast you into hell; I will just deny you the sight of my face.’ If
that has horrified you then you have really loved.”
Compare the use of this tradition in b. Sotah b.
E.g. Rav Sheshet (b. Berakhot a); R. Shim‘on b. Yoh.ai (b. Shabbat b; Pesiqta Derav Kahana :
[ed. Mandelbaum, :]); R. Eli’ezer (b. Bava Metsi’a b); R. Yoh.anan (Pesiqta Derav Kahana :
[ed. Mandelbaum, i:–]). See Turan, “‘Wherever the sages set their eyes.’”
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the eye. As discussed in Chapter , such understandings of sight were likely
to have been current in Mesopotamia and Persia. Certainly, the notion
of the harmful or evil eye was also a fixture of Zoroastrian thought and
“popular” Mesopotamian and Persian religion. In rabbinic texts, rabbinic
vision, in particular, is marked as singularly powerful. This may be read
as part of a move by Babylonian (and Palestinian) rabbis to locate sanctity
in the physical person of the sage. As we will see, b. H
. agigah reinforces this
move quite explicitly.
Once Rava has been brought into conformity with the rest of “them” by
suffering (part two, above), he offers his own interpretation of the current
situation in which God’s face is no longer visible (part three). Here, the
passage moves from loss to consolation. Rava argues that though God’s
face is hidden, God nonetheless appears to Jews through dreams. It is
worth dwelling on the contrast that Rava draws between seeing God’s face
in the temple and the contemporary state of affairs. This contrast between
direct, unmediated, and reciprocal vision and the dream vision as a lesser
form of communication is based on Numbers :–:
And [God] said: “Hear now my words. If there is a prophet among you, I,
the Lord, will make myself known to him through a vision (bamar’ah), I
shall speak to him in a dream. Not so with my servant Moses; he is trusted
throughout my house. Mouth to mouth I speak with him, an appearance
(umar’eh), and not through riddles; and [at] the image of the Lord will he
gaze (utemunat adonay yabbit).”
Kalmin argues that these punitive gazes can be distinguished from the evil eye (Kalmin, “Evil eye”).
Cf. Genesis Rabbah : (ed. Theodor-Albeck, ii:): Rabbi Akiva’s disciples died “because their
eyes were narrow with each other” (shehayetah ‘enehem tsarah ellu be’ellu); y. Shabbat :, c; y.
Sanhedrin :, c (note the penetrative language: “the evil eye entered them”); and b. Bava Metsi’a
b for its deadly effects.
See Bundahišn :, Vendı̄dād :, Forrest, Concept of Evil and sources in Chapter , especially
n. . Pace Turan I believe that the Bavli, like Christian Mesopotamian and Zoroastrian sources,
shows overlap with Greco-Roman notions of vision. For example, Ephrem shows familiarity with
Greco-Roman visual theory (Possekel, Evidence, –). Such notions of the gaze would also have
found happy company with Zoroastrian physiological theories, in which sight was bound up with
fire (Daryaee, “Sight, semen and the brain).”
Divine beings whose eyes and other body parts radiate fire or transmit rays is a commonplace in
second temple and early Christian and Jewish sources. See, e.g., Daniel :–; Joseph and Aseneth
; 2 Enoch ; 3 Enoch (where Metatron describes how his body turned to flame and his eyes to
fiery torches); Revelation :. For those among the Triballi and Illyrii who kill with their gaze, see
Pliny, Naturalis Historia, .; cf. Solinus, Collectanea Rerum Memorabilium (ed. Mommsen, ). For
instances of a flaming and potentially fatal rabbinic gaze, see b. Berakhot a, b; b. Mo‘ed Qatan
b; b. Nedarim b; b. Sotah b; b. Bava Batra a (cast eyes . . . died), a (cast eyes . . . heap of
bones).
Like other ancients, the rabbis conceived of dreams as something that one “saw” rather than “had”
(e.g. b. Berakhot a–b). Dreams were thus a form of revelation.
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This contrast between how God appears to and communicates with Moses
and how he appears to other prophets is resoundingly visual in nature.
Prophetic dream visions of God (mar’ah, “visions” and h.idot, “riddles”
that need to be deciphered) cannot compare with the “mouth-to-mouth”
(mar’eh, “appearance”; temunah, “image”) encounter with Moses. While
this describes Israel’s former (and hopefully future) glory, in the present conditions, without a temple, the Jewish people do still enjoy lesser prophetic
communication through dreams.
Rava’s striking exegetical theology is followed by Rav Joseph, who further
mitigates the divine disfavor and facial aversion. He claims that God’s hand
rests upon the Jews, even if his face is averted, citing Isaiah :, in which
God covers Israel in “the shadow of his hand” and goes on to reassure them,
“You are my people.”
That there may be a subtext of Christian supersessionism to the Talmudic
discussion here is particularly suggestive given the final anecdote (part (),
above) and what follows. Here is that story once again:
R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah was at the court of Caesar.
A certain heretic showed him (ah.ve): “A people whose Lord has turned
his face from them.”
[R. Joshua] showed him (ah.ve): “His hand is stretched over us.”
Caesar said to R. Joshua: “What did he show you?”
[R. Joshua replied:] “A people whose Lord has turned his face from them,”
and I showed him, “His hand is stretched over us.”
They said to the heretic: “What did you show him?”
[The heretic replied:] “A people whose Lord has turned His face from
them.”
See also those biblical traditions that emphasize the direct appearance of God to Moses, such as
Exodus : (“God spoke to Moses face-to-face, as one man speaks to another”); Deuteronomy
: (“Never again did there arise in Israel a prophet like Moses, who knew God face-to-face”).
Deuteronomy :, in which temunah, “image” or “picture,” indicates a direct visual encounter
with God, here in the negative, describing what the Israelites did not see at Sinai. Psalms :,
where gazing at God’s image, temunah, indicates a particularly intimate and direct visual experience
of God. Here temunatekha, “your image,” is used as a parallel for panekha, “your face.”
Rava reads against the explicit sense of the biblical verse in its original context, which is at pains
to distinguish Moses as unique among other Israelite prophets. In Rava’s reading, all of Israel is
supposed to have seen God’s face when the temple still stood, and it is only the absence of the
temple which has removed this direct experience of God from the Jewish people. For the different
types of vision enjoyed by Moses and the prophets, see Leviticus Rabbah : (ed. Margaliot, i:–,
citing portions of Number :–) and b. Yevamot b (Moses saw through fewer aspaklaria).
Compare Targum of Jonathan to Isaiah :.
Note the pattern of exegesis + narrative fulfillment + exegesis by the narrative’s protagonist (Rava).
On the occurrences of Christian-Jewish confrontations in the Babylonian Talmud, see Kalmin,
“Christians and heretics,” and Boyarin, “Hellenism,” .
See Sokoloff, Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, , s.v. h.-v-y/h-v-y: “) to make a sign (as
a means of non-verbal communication),” and examples therein.
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[They asked:] “And what did he show you?”
[He replied:] “I do not know.”
They said: “Should a man who does not understand what they show him
by gesture sign before the king! They took him out and killed him.”
R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah is the only Palestinian in this quartet of tales
and exegesis, which otherwise all have Babylonian Amoraim as their
protagonists. This story falls into the category of Babylonian narratives that are clearly constructed by Babylonian storytellers but which
feature earlier Palestinian Tannaim or Amoraim. The min, in this case
likely meant to be a Christian given his particular taunt, mocks the Rabbi
(and by extension, Jews) in visual gestures (“visions” and “riddles” rather
than direct speech): You are of a people from whom God has removed his
face, in other words, you are no longer his people.
Perhaps the implication is that not only has God removed his countenance from the Jews and allowed them to suffer, but that he is now gazing
in a new direction, towards a New Israel. Jews, after all, were no longer
able to see or recognize God, in contradistinction to those who recognized
Christ. We already see this kind of claim in Corinthians :, which
contrasts clear perception of the divine with the obstructed vision of the
Jews:
And we all, with unveiled faces, beholding (as in a mirror) the glory of
the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to
another.
Such notions of Christian vision compared to Jewish blindness is a trope
that found its way into a variety of late antique Christian discourses. A
venerable motif in Christian discourse, for example, was the attribution
of the destruction of the Jerusalem temple to divine judgment against
the Jews. This motif was often expressed in terms of vision, or lack
B. H
. agigah a–b.
R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah appears several times in rabbinic stories as a protagonist who answers challenges of non-Jewish, imperial, or Christian interlocutors, e.g. Genesis Rabbah : (ed. TheodorAlbeck, i:–), : (ed. Theodor-Albeck, ii:–); b. Shabbat a, a; b. Ta‘anit a and
especially b. Bekhorot b.
In Lamentations Rabbah : (ed. Buber, b) gentiles declare to Israel that God has abandoned
them and has removed his shekhinah from them. On this parable’s relationship to the theological
challenge of Christianity, see Hasan-Rokem, Tales of the Neighborhood, –.
This, in turn, recalls Numbers :–. See also the preceding passage, Corinthians :–, which
makes an analogy between the veil over Moses’ face, which prevented the Israelites from seeing his
radiance, upon descending from Sinai, and the veil still over the face of Jews when they read the
old covenant and which can only be removed through Christ.
Gager, Origins of Anti-Semitism. From Justin to Augustine to Ephrem, Christian writers employed
the motif of Jewish blindness. Jews in these writings could function as figures for Christians
(Fredriksen, “Augustine and Israel”).
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thereof. Whether linked to the temple or not, the genre of Adversus
Judaeos writings, which took the Jews as their target, often cast Jews as
unseeing, blind, or insensible. For example, Augustine figures the Jew as a
blind man with a lantern who illuminates the way for others, but who, due
to his own lack of sight, is unable to travel along the path. For Jerome,
not only were Jews blind, as per Corinthians, but in their insensible state,
they were themselves like idols:
The curtain of the temple is torn, for that which had been veiled in Judea
is unveiled to all the nations; the curtain is torn and the mysteries of the
law are revealed to the faithful, but to unbelievers they are hidden to this
very day. When Moses, the Old Testament, is read aloud by the Jews on
every Sabbath, according to the testimony of the apostle: “the veil covers
their hearts.” They read the law, true enough, but they do not understand
because their eyes have grown so dim that they cannot see. They are, indeed,
like those of whom Scripture says, “They have eyes but they see not; they
have ears but they hear not.”
The figure of the blind Jew also surfaces among Syriac-speaking Christians
closer to the Babylonian rabbis. Ephrem, for example, liked to characterize
the Jews as sensorily blocked and, as a consequence, despised of God.
Of particular use was the motif of blindness, which is no surprise given
Ephrem’s stress on vision, in approaching the divine. The Jews’ blindness
to their own God led to their building of the golden calf; their blindness
to Christ led to their rejection of him. It is possible that the Babylonian
storytellers knew of such claims. Certainly this story looks very much like
a satire in which a “heretic” signs such a claim to the rabbi, only to sign
his own death warrant. The story highlights the importance of vision in
competing claims about access to God’s favor.
Eusebius repeatedly makes much of the visuality of Jerusalem. In Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica
., Theophania ., the Jewish inability to look is contrasted with Christian eyes, which see the
visible witness of the temple ruins as evidence of God’s disfavor. The recurring language here is
strongly visual: phainesthai, opthalmois, horān, theōrein, autoptou. For more examples of this, see
Eusebius, Theophania ., ..
Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, . Tertullian, Adversus Judaeos ., contrasts Christian vision
(invoking Isaiah :) with restricted Jewish vision (invoking :). See also Athanasius, De
Incarnatione, : “The Jews are afflicted like some demented person who sees the earth lit up by
the sun, but denies the sun that lights it up” (trans. in On the Incarnation, .
Jerome, Tractatus in Psalmos () (Homilies of St. Jerome, trans. Liguori Ewald, vol. i, ).
For these and other examples see Shepardson, Anti-Judaism, –, .
On rabbinic parody, see Zellentin, Rabbinic Parodies of Jewish and Christian Literature.
It is difficult to posit with any certainty that, in both Palestinian and Babylonian literature, a
reference to a heretic necessarily indicates a Christian, but because of the content of this particular
narrative I do not think that it stretches credulity to suggest it in this instance. On the function of
the min in rabbinic literature, see Kalmin, “Christians and heretics”; Teppler, Birkat haminim. For
a careful and cautious analysis of this problem, see Cohen, “‘Nehardea.’”
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To the heretic’s signing, R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah responds in kind and
“quotes” Rav Joseph’s teaching that God’s hand covers the Jews (and, as the
verse continues, claims them as his people). At this point, the emperor
intervenes, having apparently observed the mime between the rabbi and
the min (heretic). The story contrives to have R. Joshua triumph on
several levels. He has triumphed not only in the content of the argument –
he has the last word – but also in its form: The Christian, who has essentially
accused the Jews of not seeing, cannot himself see, in order to decode the
gestures in a conversation of his own initiation.
The “showing” (mah.ve) and showy communication – which uses hands
and faces and which is also about hands and faces – plays on the inadequacy
of the Christian who initiated the “conversation” by making his mime into
a farce. The min can gesticulate, but he cannot read. While the Jewish
inability to see, and to read, God’s countenance, or Word, was supposed
to account for the Jew’s fall in status, in the Talmudic story it is the min’s
inability to read the Jew’s body(-language) that causes his own downfall and
demise, through the imperial court’s reprimand and execution. Christian
triumphalism is ill-advised, argues this tale.
The story functions as a masterful staging of the exegesis that preceded
it. The Talmudic sugya effectively moves away from the bitterness of
a post-temple era without access to God’s face toward a somewhat more
hopeful, and even triumphant, interpretation of the contemporary situation. And it does so in a complex fashion that plays, on different levels,
with visuality and its loss.
Notice that the Bavli has juxtaposed two different imperial powers and
concomitant Jewish situations in the story of Rava and the Persian king
and of R. Joshua and the Roman emperor. The story ensures that Rava
Note the allusion to Exodus :–, another instance of restricted visual access combined with
God’s hand: “As my presence passes by, I will place you in a cleft in the rock and shield you with
my hand (vesakkoti khappi ‘alekha) until I have passed by. Then I will remove my hand (vahasiroti
et kappi), and you will see my back (vera’ita et ah.oray), but my face may not be seen (ufanay lo’
yera’u).” R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah is a Tanna and lived over two hundred years earlier than Rav
Joseph, so the “quoting” happens only on the editorial level of the passage.
Given the corporeal nature of the content being communicated (God’s face turned away, God’s
hand is stretched over us), the story allows us to imagine the gestures and hand motions quite
easily.
On the mime or pantomime actor (cf. the Talmud’s mah.og, “gesture”) in the ancient world, see
Purcell, “Does Caesar mime?”; Barnes, “Christians and the theater”; Moss, “Jacob of Serugh’s
homilies”; Lateiner, “Humiliation and immobility.”
That the context is likely Jewish-Christian debate is reinforced by the Talmud’s account of R.
Joshua b. H
. ananyah’s deathbed scene, in which the rabbis ask R. Joshua, “What will become of us
at the hands of the unbelievers?” (b. H
. agigah b).
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suffers through the hands of King Shapur in order to mark him as one who
shares the fate of the Jews (suffering), while it is the Roman emperor who
dispenses with the min who argues that Jews are suffering from God having
turned away from them. Through the mediation of Persian and Roman
imperial authorities, these stories reiterate the rabbinic perspective on the
loss of God’s face: mournful yet confident that it still remains a sign of the
singular Jewish relationship with the divine.
As mentioned, this play with visuality and its loss suffuses the entire
Babylonian tractate of H
. agigah. If these last two narratives about Rava
and R. Joshua b. H
. ananyah frame the loss of divine visuality under the
aegis of Imperial Rome and Persia, a narrative that follows shortly after
these (at b. H
. agigah b) represents a rabbinic attempt to relocate visible
sanctity in a post-cultic era:
Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] and R. H
. iyya were on a journey. When they
arrived at a certain place they said, “Is there a student of the rabbis here? Let
us go and receive his face (apehh).”
They said, “There is a student of the rabbis (tsurba merabbanan) here,
and he is blind (ma’or ‘enayyim).”
R. H
. iyya said to Rabbi, “Sit, do not treat your position as patriarch lightly.
I will go and receive his face.”
He [Rabbi] took hold of him and went with him.
When they were departing from [the blind scholar], he said to them, “You
have received a face that is seen but cannot see (panim hanir’im ve’enan ro’in);
may you merit to receive the face [of the shekhinah, the divine presence],
which sees and is not seen (haro’im ve’enan nir’in).”
He said [Rabbi to R. H
. iyya], “If now [I had listened to you], you would
have deprived me of this blessing.”
They said to him, “From whom did you hear this [teaching]?”
[He replied,] “I heard the teaching at a lecture of R. Jacob. For R. Jacob
of Kefar H
. ittiya used to receive the face of his teacher every day. When
See note above.
Note the similar scenario and phrasing in b. Niddah b (Rav Pappa goes to a town, asks whether
a student of the rabbis lives there so he can receive his face, and is told that a tsurba merabanan
lives there). For Rava’s explanation of the excitement of a tsurba merabanan in terms of the fiery
nature of Torah, see b. Ta‘anit a. ‘The meaning and etymology of tsurba (and ts.r.b.) is uncertain
(Sokoloff, Dictionary of Palestinian Aramaic, , ). Suggestions range from young student to
intermediate student of the rabbis (Sokoloff ) to “one who has caught fire by associating with
Rabbis” (Jastrow, Dictionary, ). For various interpretations of this term and bibliography see
Miller, Sages, –.
All the primary mss. read explicitly, tizku uteqabbelu pene shekhinah, “May you merit to receive the
face of the shekhinah,” which is omitted and left implicit in the Vilna edition.
See Genesis Rabbah : (ed. Theodor-Albeck, iii:–), where R. H
. ama blesses a blind student
of Torah.
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he [R. Jacob] grew up, he [his teacher] said to him, ‘Sir, do not trouble
yourself, if you are unable [to visit every day].’ He replied, ‘Is what is written
concerning the rabbis a small thing? “He shall still live always, he shall not
see the pit. For he sees that wise men die”’(Psalms :–). Now, if he
who sees wise men at their death shall live, how much more so [he who sees
them] in their life!”
Both by its strategic placement in this tractate and by its content, this
story makes a curious argument for post-temple visions of God. Instead
of a pilgrimage to see God’s face, R. Judah the Patriarch and R. H
. iyya
seek a rabbinic face when they arrive at a town in the course of their
travels, niqabbel appeh, “let us receive his face.” It turns out that the local
scholar is blind, ma’or ‘enayim. While this is a euphemistic expression
for blindness, the particular combination of words in Hebrew also recalls
rabbinic expressions for explaining, teaching or enlightening, literally “to
illuminate (in Hiphil ) the eyes.” This expression for blindness draws the
reader’s attention to the complex relationship between seeing, not seeing,
and the special role of the sage in this story.
Let us also recall that it was precisely through excluding the blind
from the obligation of re’iyat panim (seeing the face) that the Babylonian
rabbis imagined a radically anthropomorphic and reciprocal divine–human
visuality at the center of the pilgrimage ritual. It is poignant and fitting that
the blind scholar points to the restoration of such visuality, in the person
of the sage. In a world without God’s face, the blind scholar exemplifies
everyone’s inability to see. Perhaps the narrative puts a certain rebuke to the
physical elitism required by the mirroring logic of homovisuality. R. H
. iyya,
using logic similar to that which deems those with blemishes, the blind,
and others, neither “fit” nor “worthy” (re’uyin) to fulfill the obligation of
seeing (re’iyah), argues that the patriarch’s dignity would be impinged by
visiting a blind man, even a scholar. His position is discredited, and R.
Judah the Patriarch’s virtuous refusal to insist on his honor is made all
the more apparent by what unfolds as a result of their visit to the blind
Alternatively, this could be “when he (the teacher) grew old.” On this reading the teacher seeks to
absolve his student from his visits because he is no longer able to teach him (cf. y. ’Eruvin :, b;
y. Sanhedrin :, b).
B. H
. agigah b. See partial parallels at y. Pe’ah :, b; y. Sheqalim :, b, discussed below, and
Rosenthal, “Traditions”; Kister, “Another fragment,” .
This qabbalat panim recalls the re’iyat panim pilgrimage.
The narrative is ripe with literary play on the visual. See Marcus, “Some antiphrastic euphemisms.”
Cf. y. Pe’ah :, a; y. Ketubot :, a; Leviticus Rabbah : (ed. Margaliot, ii:); b. Berakhot
a.
For the use of me’ir ‘enayim to refer to teaching, see, e.g., t. Bava Metsi’a :, t. Horayot :; y.
Bava Metsi’a :, d; b. Shabbat b; b. Yevamot a; and b. Bava Metsi’a a.
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scholar. The ideal of homovisuality, however, is upheld by the wish for its
restoration expressed in the blind scholar’s blessing.
The blessing of Rabbi and R. H
. iyya by the unnamed blind student of the
rabbis, together with the nested stories about its derivation, are remarkable,
particularly in terms of how it appropriates and subverts a version of the
narrative found in the Palestinian Talmud:
The rabbi (rabbeh, or “teacher”) of R. Hosha‘ya Rabbah’s son was a blind
man (sagya nehorya), and he was accustomed to dine with him daily. On
one occasion R. Hosha‘ya had guests and did not ask the teacher to eat with
him.
That evening, R. Hosha‘ya went to him and said, “Sir, do not be angry
at me; I had guests and did not wish to injure sir’s honor. For this reason I
did not dine with you today.”
The teacher responded, “You have apologized to the one who is seen but
does not see. May the one who sees but is not seen accept your apology.”
R. Hosha‘ya said, “Where did you learn this [expression]?”
The rabbi responded, “From R. Eli‘ezer b. Jacob. For a blind man once
came to R. Eli‘ezer b. Jacob’s village, and R. Eli‘ezer b. Jacob sat below him.
As a result, the others said, ‘If he were not a great man, R. Eli‘ezer b. Jacob
would not have sat below him,’ and they provided for the blind man an
honorable maintenance. The blind man said to them, ‘Why have you done
this for me?’ They responded, ‘R. Eli‘ezer b. Jacob sat below you.’ And so
he offered the following prayer on the rabbi’s behalf, ‘You have performed a
deed of mercy for one who is seen but does not see; may the one who sees
but is not seen perform a deed of mercy for you.’”
The Palestinian story presents a rather different context for this blessing
from that in the Babylonian Talmud. In the Palestinian version the blind
teacher in the initial, framing, narrative is actually dishonored when R.
Hosha‘ya fails to include him among his guests. As Seth Schwartz points
out, R. Hosha‘ya’s apology is disingenuous, and the response of the teacher,
“May the one who sees but is not seen accept your apology,” is a rebuke.
The reported narrative with which the teacher explains the origins of
this particular saying illustrates the ideal behavior toward the blind. It is
supposed to contrast with R. Hosha‘ya’s conduct. This literary device of
mise en abyme highlights the theme of conviviality, as Schwartz observes;
these are two sympotic tales. If the rabbinic status of the teacher is (at
the very least) uncertain, the second, illustrative tale clearly concerns a
blind layperson, not a sage. The above-mentioned features are significant
Y. Pe’ah :, b; cf. also y. Sheqalim :, b. I have slightly modified the translation in Schwartz,
“No dialogue at the symposium,” . See the interpretation of the story there.
Schwartz, “No dialogue at the symposium,” .
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differences to the Babylonian version. The relationship between blindness
and sageliness is not thematized in the Yerushalmi in the way that it is in
the Babylonian Talmud.
Comparing the Palestinian with the Babylonian version allows us better
to appreciate the boldness of the latter. We see the ways in which the
Babylonian editors have redeployed the Palestinian motifs to point toward
a rehabilitation of the re’iyah ritual in a post-temple world. The “unseen
seer,” an easily recognizable epithet for God (in the manuscripts of the
Bavli version it is spelled out as the shekhinah), is more loaded in the
later Babylonian story not just because of the blind/seeing contrast and
juxtaposition to the discussion of the re’iyah ritual, but also because it
describes the current historical moment in which God continues to see
the Jews, but they cannot see him in return. In other words, the present is
difficult because the cherished reciprocity, or homovisuality, has been lost.
The face of this particular rabbinic scholar, in both its visibility and its
blindness, stands in for all Jewish faces and eyes vis-à-vis the divine.
Furthermore, the thorough rabbinization of the Babylonian story is
quite striking. It is not simply a measure-for-measure morality tale, but
rather it is about seeing sages as a way to merit seeing God. Thus, while
in the original tale, the blind teacher’s story concerns a blind man who is
honored by a rabbi, in our Babylonian version, the blind sage tells a story
that is simply about a rabbi going to see (receive the face of ) his teacher on
a daily basis. Furthermore in the third nested narrative in the Bavli (R.
Jacob of Kefar H
. ittiya and his teacher), the teacher is not even blind. This
is not an anecdote designed to uphold the principle of honoring a blind
rabbi (or person), but rather the life-giving impact of seeing a rabbi. At
the suggestion that R. Jacob need not continue his daily visits, the Bavli
has him respond “is what is written concerning the rabbis a small thing?”
Psalms : is then strikingly reread as pertaining to the value in seeing
sages. The actual verse in context refers to the inevitability of death, to the
idea that there is no way to redeem the cost of a soul such that “he shall
still live always, he shall not see the pit.” The Psalm then says, “He shall see
that wise people die, that the fool and the brute perish together” (Psalms
:). The Bavli’s midrashic exegesis reads, “He shall live always, he shall
Compare to b. H
. agigah b, discussed below.
I think a good case can be made for the Bavli’s story as a heavily reworked version of the prior
Palestinian story. The deep contextual connections in the Bavli and the typically Babylonian themes
of the narrative are arguments for this. So too is the near-duplication of language in b. Niddah b.
Conversely, in the second, embedded, Palestinian story, the blind person is not a rabbi. So the
“moral” is less about respect toward (blind) rabbis and more about respect toward the blind person
in general.
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not see the pit” as the reward for one who “sees wise men,” omitting the
verb “die” from the biblical verse. R. Jacob, in the blind sage’s tale, argues
that if seeing dead rabbis results in longevity, then surely the sight of living
sages will be even more efficacious. Finally, the story as a whole argues,
as much by its editorial placement as by its content, that in the present
moment, seeing the rabbinic sage offers a substitute for re’iyah.
As I have argued throughout, the progression and arrangement of material in b. H
. agigah as a whole makes a case. We can trace a lingering rabbinic
nostalgia for an intimate ocular moment between God and pilgrim, which
then undergoes a melancholic shift in a post-temple era in which God’s
face is absent. If reciprocity was central to re’iyah, then the Babylonian
rabbis conceive of the present as a time in which Jews are seen without
seeing in return. This leads to meditations, through narrative and exegesis,
that deal with the implications of this “loss of face.” Once the heretics have
been disposed with, there is a recuperative turn to the face of the rabbi as
a temporary substitute for the “face of God” – temporary because in the
face of the blind rabbi, who is seen without seeing, there is an exemplum
of its loss.
The narrative of the blind rabbi also gestures with hope toward the
restoration of “seeing and being seen.” With his blessing – “may you merit
to receive the face that sees and is not seen” – the Babylonian Talmud
turns the blessings of the Palestinian story to quite different effect. The
Palestinian blessings clearly contrast the “unseen seer” with the blind protagonist(s), but the content of the blessing’s request does not concern vision.
In its version of the blessing, the Babylonian Talmud frames the present
not only in the light of a lost past, but also in terms of hope about and
expectation of a future in which visual reciprocity will be once more.
Visuality in Masekhet H
. agigah: re’iyah, histakkelut, hatsatsah
Sight, and specifically sight of God, is a theme in m. and t. H
. agigah that
extends beyond the tractate’s discussions of the re’iyah pilgrimage in the
first chapter. Seeing God also surfaces in the second chapter of this tractate.
However, the tone therein is cautionary, to say the least. We find warnings
Compare this to the y. Pe’ah :, b narrative, where the blind teacher says, “May the one who
sees but is not seen accept your apology,” while the blind person in the blind teacher’s story offers
the blessing, “You have performed a deed of mercy for one who is seen but does not see; may the
one who sees but is not seen perform a deed of mercy for you.” Thus, the content of the blessings
does not itself relate to sight, as the Bavli’s blessing.
Cf. Pesikta deRav Kahanna : (discussed below at p. ). For various approaches to the visual
reciprocity or asymmetry between the human and the divine, see notes and below.
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in m. H
. agigah : and t. H
. agigah : against “looking into” (mistakkelin
be-) and in t. H
agigah
:
against
“expounding” (doreshin) certain matters,
.
including theophany (the divine chariot or merkavah, as per Ezekiel ).
In t. H
. agigah :, we hear about the fate of those who entered the orchard
( pardes) and “glimpsed” (hetsits):
Four entered the orchard (pardes): Ben ‘Azay, Ben Zoma, the Other (Ah.er),
and R. Akiva. One glimpsed (hetsits) and died, one glimpsed and was hurt,
one glimpsed and cut the shoots, and one went up safely and came down
safely.
What is this orchard, whose contents are visually apprehended to potentially catastrophic effect? Clues lie in the restrictions and prohibitions in
m. H
. agigah :, t. H
. agigah :, and t. H
. agigah :. The Tosefta enhances
the esoteric sense of the journey into the pardes by refusing to divulge any
details about what was seen. Instead it operates by way of parable:
To what can this be compared? To a king’s orchard (pardes) with an upper
chamber built over it. What is a person to do? [He should] just peek
(lehatsits), as long as he does not feast his eyes upon it ( yazin et ‘enav
mimmennu).
Here, too, the object of the gaze is left vague, and this seems to be the point.
The parable enacts the very caution it advises. If the king is a stand-in for
God, then the parable cautions against letting one’s gaze linger on the king’s
upper chamber. Rather, one should merely glance (lehatsits), precisely the
kind of looking attributed to the four rabbis who entered the pardes. The
visual emphasis here cannot be denied.
T. H
. agigah : describes a curious encounter between Ben Zoma, one
of the sages who “glimpsed and was hurt,” and R. Joshua, which expresses
M. H
. agigah : (par. t. H
. agigah :): “Anyone who gazes at (mistakkel be-) four things, it would be
fitting for him (ra’uy lo) as if he had not come into this world: what is above, what is below, what
is in front (other mss., ‘in the past’) and what is behind (other mss., ‘to come in the future’).”
T. H
. agigah :– (parallel in Song of Songs Rabbah s.v. Songs :). Significantly, there are accounts in
Palestinian and Babylonian sources of Palestinian rabbis undertaking (sometimes through fasting)
to see dead sages in their dreams. See, e.g., y. Ketubot :, a (parallels in y. Kil’ayim :, b;
Genesis Rabbah : [ed. Theodor-Albeck, ii:–]) and b. Bava Metsi’a b.
See t. Megillah : for the distinction between “expounding on” and “seeing” the Chariot: “Many
have expounded on the Chariot but have never seen it.” Cf. b. Megillah b.
T. H
. agigah : (trans. in Schäfer, Origins, ). The reading of the printed edition, yaziz (“as long
as he does not remove his eyes from it”), is not supported by any of the manuscript traditions.
Fascinatingly, the Palestinian Talmud’s version of this tradition, y. H
. agigah :, c, reads, “[He
should] just peek, but not to touch.” This version evokes the purity/gaze concerns discussed above,
in the context of the face-bread and m. H
. agigah :. In terms of late-antique visual theory, “feasting
one’s eyes” is practically “touching.” Schäfer does not think that this source refers to the divine
(Origins, –).
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the confluence of the conceptual, exegetical, and visual registers of this
inadvisable looking:
Once R. Joshua was walking along the road and Ben Zoma was approaching
him. Ben Zoma came alongside him and did not greet him.
[R. Joshua] said to him, “From where to where [are you going]?”
Ben Zoma said to him, “I was gazing (mistakkel, according to Ms. Erfurt;
Ms. Vienna reads tsofe, ‘looking’) at the work of creation, and there is not
even a handbreadth’s distance between the upper and lower waters. As it
says, ‘The spirit of God was hovering over the waters,’” (Genesis :) . . .
R. Joshua said to his students, “Ben Zoma is already beyond (mibbah.uts).”
It was not many days until Ben Zoma was gone (nistalleq).
Ben Zoma is not just glimpsing but is “gazing” or “looking” (mistakkel or
tsofe), and so his injury is ultimately mortal. While some of the cautions
and prohibitions in m. H
. agigah and t. H
. agigah refer to exposition
(derishah) of certain subjects, others are emphatically visual. Interestingly,
the object of Ben Zoma’s inspection is as much visual as exegetical. The
more intent and lingering kind of gazing (histakkelut or tsefiyyah) can also
have the sense of “looking into” or “speculating.” In this way, cognition
is conceptually intertwined with the literal, physical, and possibly, given
the editorial placement of this chapter, cultic sense of seeing. The move
from re’iyah, or going to see God on pilgrimage, to the varieties of looking
in this second chapter of the tractate echoes the move in Plato from the
cultic, visual sense of theōria (lit. “viewing”) to its philosophical meaning.
As has been shown, theōria’s cultic, visual sense continued to be part of
its philosophical meaning. So, too, can we understand the looking referenced in these Tannaitic sources, as indebted to the re’iyah of pilgrimage
cult.
The differences in the usage of vision in these first and second chapters
are informative. Even as the details of “mystical” sights are elusive, we
can note some important features. First, the insistence upon the sense of
sight has a semantic and verbal range, as is evinced by the repeated use of
visual verbs and expressions, such as looking (re’iyah), gazing (histaklut),
glimpsing (hatsatsah), and feasting the eyes (hazanat ‘enayim). Secondly,
these are doubly rabbinized accounts, in their use of protagonists, and in
T. H
. agigah : (paralleled in y. H
. agigah :, a–b; b. H
. agigah a; Genesis Rabbah : [ed.
Theodor-Albeck, i:–]).
For a description of how Plato used theōria in his philosophy in its visual sense, particularly in
cultic contexts (“sacralized visuality”), see Nightingale, Spectacles, –.
This is based on literary context rather than etymology.
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their intertwining of the scholastic with the visual. These accounts then,
unlike the re’iyah of the first chapter, pertain to a post-temple era – less
common in Tannaitic sources which tend to be reluctant to contemplate
present-day visions of God. And these sources hardly supply a ringing
endorsement of such enterprises.
If the above Tannaitic texts cast latter-day rabbinic attempts to penetrate
divine mysteries, conceptually or visually, as dangerous enterprises, it is
notable that an account of a successful and lauded exploration of the
theophanic chariot in t. H
. agigah : concerns R. Ele‘azar b. Arakh, who
“expounds” (derishah) the “account of the Chariot”; rather than “gazing”
(histakkelut) or “glimpsing” (hastetsah). In its retelling in the Yerushalmi
and the Bavli, this successful study session becomes a spectacular event,
in and of itself, with fire descending from heaven. In both Talmuds,
but particularly in the b. H
. agigah, this event itself (and a second related
account) becomes a theophanic (rainbow appears, along with angels and
the shekhinah), fiery, Sinaitic spectacle. Especially vivid is the Bavli’s
appended story in which Rabban Yoh.anan b. Zakka’y declares his joy at
what his eyes saw (ashre ‘enay shekakh ra’u), relating a dream in which
he and R. Yose were “reclining together at Sinai.” In their insertion of
spectacular, theophanic, and revelatory qualities into the rabbinic study
of God’s revelation, these later, remarkable tales fuse the exegetical and
scholastic together with the ocular. In the Bavli, angels come “to see”
(lir’ot) the sight of rabbis expounding the theophany; the spectacle or
visual object here is the rabbi, not God (who is a spectator). This comports
with the trend that we find in various contexts in post-Tannaitic materials –
the visual turn toward the sage – which we noted with respect to re’iyah in
b. H
. agigah b and which we will explore in Chapter . While the Bavli
sustains the Tannaitic ambivalence and caution about rabbis exploring
There need not be a contrast between the visual and exegetical-scholastic aspects of whatever it is
that is the object of derashah/histaklut/hatsatsah. Given the preceding chapter on re’iyah, and the
editorial logic placing these two issues in proximity, it seems advisable to take the visual aspects of
the second chapter of H
. agigah seriously. For consideration of the non-binary relation of vision and
exegesis-scholasticism, see Chapter , pp. xxx.
This story is placed in the Talmud’s commentary on the m. H
. agigah : injunction against expounding the Chariot theophany.
See y. H
. agigah :, a–b; b. H
. agigah b.
See further, y. H
. agigah :, b (parallel in b. H
. agigah b), in which R. Eli‘ezer and R. Joshua
are studying together, and fire instantly surrounds them. They recount this as follows: “We were
sitting searching around in the words of the Torah from the Pentateuch to the Prophets, and from
the Prophets to the Writings, and the words were as bright as when they were given at Sinai, and
the fire made them glow as they glowed from Sinai.’” In this narrative, the spectacle induced by
the rabbinic study mirrors that of the divine revelation at Sinai. On the Sinaitic spectacle attached
to the sages, see Urbach, “Torat Ha-Sod,” –.
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God’s mysteries, it does not dispense with their visuality and physicality
in its expansive commentary on Ezekiel’s theophany and m. H
. agigah :
(b. H
agigah
a–a).
We
learn
that
expounding
the
Chariot
can
result in
.
being consumed by fire (b. H
agigah
a);
what
Ezekiel
saw
doesn’t
compare
.
to what Isaiah saw (b. H
. agigah b); the rainbow is theophanic and that
gazing at it is disrespectful (b. H
. agigah a); gazing at the rainbow, the
patriarch and priests causes blindness (ibid.).
Given b. H
. agigah’s particularly vivid understanding of re’iyah, threaded
throughout, it behooves us to take seriously the relationship between
the Bavli’s re’iyah and its understanding of investigations into theophany
related to m. H
. agigah . The Bavli’s presentation of rabbinic engagement
with theophanic and other speculation is certainly scholastic in orientation, but is also not without its visual components. Its caution about the
pursuit of God in the present dovetails with the tractate’s emphatic construction of a present without the sight of God. Not only does the Bavli’s
presentation of m. and t. H
. agigah comport with the resolute pastness
of re’iyah and its idealized location in the temple, but to the extent that
it is positive rather than cautionary about theophany and its study, it also
echoes the move from God gazing to sage gazing (with its depiction of
spectacular study sessions in b. H
. agigah a–b).
When we compare this attitude toward beholding God to that in
Hekhalot literature, we find something different. The latter sources feature rabbinic protagonists seeking (among other things) to “see the King in
his beauty” (Isaiah :). These writings are also informed by a healthy
For a reading of Song of Songs : to refer to (among other things) God gazing over the priests’
shoulders as they utter their blessing, see Pesiqta Derav Kahana : (ed. Mandelbaum, i:). For a
prohibition against looking at priests while they are blessing, see y. Megillah :, c (paralleled in
y. Ta‘anit :, b).
The exegetical trend, and the cautionary tone, need not vitiate against a serious concern with the
visual, here. After all, the very premise of binocular re’iyah is unabashedly exegetical (yir’eh, yera’eh).
So too does the Talmudic text itself engage exegetically with these forbidden sights.
On the relationship between b. (H
. agigah a–b and Hekhalot materials see Schäfer, Origins,
–; Boustan, “Rabbinization,” .
Wolfson, Speculum, –. For an assessment of the variety of goals, and a de-emphasis of the
vision itself, in various mystical texts from ascent apocalypses to the Hekhalot sources, see Schäfer,
Origins, –, , , –, –, . Swartz notes that scholastic expertise is another aim
of this literature. For an example of vision, memory, and scholasticism combined, see Merkavah
Shelemah (ed. Mussayeff, b); cf. Naeh, “Art of memory.” These texts, which are all about the quest
to see God, were produced by groups of mystics that may have overlapped somewhat with rabbinic
circles, even if they were not identical. Some scholars have sought to analyze these sources in a
Mesopotamian-Zoroastrian context, while others have placed them in a Byzantine Christian world.
For the view that these mystical texts represent the esoteric practices of an inner group of rabbis,
see Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, – and Scholem, Major Trends, –. For accounts of different
views, see Boustan, “Study,” and Swartz, “Jewish visionary tradition,” , and bibliographies
therein.
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sense of danger, often (but not only) posed in terms of visual damage by
the fiery eyes and bodies of angelic guards and God himself. However,
their aim is to surmount rather than succumb to these obstacles. Unlike b.
H
. agigah, this literature fixates upon the sight of God and other heavenly
beings rather than the sage, refusing the melancholy trope of pastness or
the wait until death or restoration of cult. Hekhalot writings ostentatiously
chart the journey to God in this lifetime, ostentatiously risking life itself
in so doing.
B. H
. agigah: vision and the face of the sage
Our consideration of the various preoccupations with divine visuality in
the tractate of H
. agigah is especially borne out in the Bavli, which as we
have argued attempts a similar transfer as b. H
. agigah b and a (and again
in b) from theophany to sagely visuality. In this section, we simply note
that a third example of this move also occurs early in the tractate, at b.
H
. agigah a–b, in a doublet of stories about sages going to see their masters
on the festival.
In the second of these stories, R. Yose b. Durmasqit goes to “receive the
face” of R. Ele‘azar at Lod and unwittingly insults him. R. Ele‘azar instructs
R. Yose to, “stretch out your hands and take out your eye.” Later R. Ele‘azar
softens and prays for R. Yose’s sight to be restored. As Jeffrey Rubenstein
notes, the first tale is placed here because the content of the derashah
discussed within pertains to the halakhic discussion (regarding haqhel )
that precedes the sugya, and that this follows the Palestinian parallel. The
relationship of the second story (with the eye loss) is less obvious.
Rubenstein also considers the broader redactional context of re’iyah and
cautiously suggests that this story juxtaposes the halakhic deliberations
about “journeying to the temple and honoring God, the Master of the
Universe, and the students’ journeying to their masters and honoring them
with their presence,” in order to promote the rabbis’ holiness. He says:
The redaction of the aggadic sugya in the context of mHag : could be seen
as arguing for a kind of transference of religious devotion from the temple
to the rabbinic master . . . Whereas in biblical times the Israelite appeared
Scholars have studied the links between Jewish and Christian mysticism (Orlov, Enoch-Metatron;
Stroumsa, “To see”; DeConick [ed.], Paradise Now).
Vision’s centrality to the master–student relationship and the transmission of teaching is upheld
by its removal when honor is not accorded. See Rubenstein, Culture, –.
Rubenstein, Stories, (see also –).
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before God in the temple to show honor and homage, in the time of the
storytellers the disciple appears before his master.
Given the second story’s explicit deploying of “receiving the face of the
master,” which alludes to the previously discussed Deuteronomy : and
to the re’iyah in Exodus :, and also the earlier reading (b. H
. agigah
b) of yir’eh that stresses the need for both eyes, I certainly press for this
interpretation. Add to this the ways in which this story foreshadows, if in
inverse fashion, the ocular dynamics in b. H
. agigah b, as well as the ocular
power of the sages against Rava in b. H
agigah
a, and this story about
.
R. Yose is yet another example of the overall transference in this tractate
from the ocular encounter with God to the encounter with the sage. Thus,
R. Ele‘azar’s removal and restoration of his student’s “eye” and R. Yose’s
consequent (dis)ability to see his “face” during the festival is manifestly and
tightly linked to the Bavli’s severally iterated characterization of re’iyah as
a facial and ocular pilgrimage encounter. We find the equation of festival
pilgrimage to master and God made explicit elsewhere in the Bavli.:
Rav Isaac says, “A man is obligated (h.ayyav) to receive the face of his teacher
(lehaqbil pene rabbo) on the pilgrimage festival (baregel ).”
This equation makes best sense as an implicit reading of the Bible’s re’iyat
pene ha’adon (seeing the face of the lord) transferred to the rabbi. The
teaching is Babylonian and Amoraic, and given that we find nothing
quite like it in the Yerushalmi, just as there is no parallel to the ocular
episode in b. H
. agigah b or to the particularities of the blind sage story in
b. H
agigah
b,
we can concede that this particular trend is a Babylonian
.
phenomenon.
Conclusion
We have traced the career of the biblical commandment to see God’s face
thrice yearly. In so doing we have probed how the Tannaim and later rabbis
across Palestine and Babylonia conceived of God gazing. The Tannaitic laws
Rubenstein notes that while there are other compelling redactional reasons for the placement
of this sugya, there can be “multiple connections between texts and their redactional contexts”
(Rubenstein, Stories, ).
B. Rosh Hashanah b (paralleled in b. Sukkah b, which also has a narrative about R. Ilay receiving
the face of R. El‘iezer b. Hisma in Lod).
Rubenstein, in making the argument about the aggadic sugya in b. Hagigah b, views it as Stammaitic
but concedes that it may be later Amoraic. In Chapter we discuss Palestinian texts in which sages
visit their masters at festivals, but these are descriptions or exhortations rather than prescriptions.
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God gazing and homovisuality
of re’iyah, elaborated in the tractate of H
. agigah and elsewhere, continue the
active sense of vision inaugurated in the biblical sources. At the same time,
the Tosefta and Mishnah treat contemporary visionary quests as dangerous.
The Sifre lays the ground for the Bavli’s emphatic mirroring vision. While
the Yerushalmi fails to elaborate this possibility, it nonetheless understands
re’iyah to involve seeing on the part of the pilgrim. The Bavli brings the
earlier focus on the body of the pilgrim, together with the Sifre’s mirroring
principle of seeing and being seen, into a radically reciprocal vision along
with an explicit and divine anthropomorphism. The Bavli’s construction
of a thoroughgoing homovisuality, with its promotion of a perfect male
body gazing at its divine double, sets the tone of much of b. H
. agigah,
which is as much a lament and meditation on the loss of God’s face as it is
a bid for its transference to the face of the sage.
Through its concatenation of law and narrative, the Bavli produces a
present suffused with a sense of loss, desire, and expectation. At the same
time, it acknowledges the political conditions in which the cessation of
temple visitation has transpired, by confronting the crisis of God’s absent
face with narratives with imperial figures and challenging, supersessionist,
minim. Just as Rava reads the vicissitudes of his own life by refering to
divine visuality (as well as to rabbinic vision), so too does (not) seeing God
become for the rabbis, a means by which to understand and frame the
present.
In many Near Eastern pieties, the gods were “all-seeing.” However, for
some the god’s capacity to see was inversely related to the human ability to
see him; god was the “unseen seer.” In rabbinic culture, this conception
of a God who sees everything but is not readily visible was sustained in part
by a story about reciprocal vision between God and humans that was set
in the distant past and alleviated by the promise of its eventual restoration
(at least for the righteous or rabbinic few). In the next chapter we will
see how the present-day imbalance of vision signified a deeper imbalance
between humanity and divinity, which the rabbis also cast in gendered and
For epithets that highlight the power of divine vision, see: Genesis :; Psalms :; Ecclesiasticus
:–; Maccabees :, :; Homer, Iliad .–; Hesiod, Works and Days (Zeus’s
all-seeing eye); Aeschylus, Eumenides, – (Zeus pantoptas). Similarly, in Zoroastrian sources
Ahura-Mazda is all-seeing (Yasna, :; : and Yašt :, , ) (Boyce, “Ahura Mazda”), as is
Mithra (who has ten thousand eyes; Yašt :, ; Sick, “Mit(h)ra(s) and the myths of the sun,”
–).
For divine epithets that emphasize God’s invisibility, see, e.g., Hebrews :; Colossians :. For
the combination of divine omni-vision and invisibility, see, e.g., Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies
.., ..-; Aristides, Apology , . On these characterizations of God, see Finney, Invisible
God.
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eroticized ways. Desire, as we shall see, became one mode through which
absent divinity could be visualized by the sages. Such desirous seeing was
aided by a combination of memory, fantasy, and postponed gratification.
With God as the unseen seer, humans, or at least Israel, became visual
objects rather than seeing subjects; in relation to God, all were blind, as
embodied by the Bavli’s blind rabbinic scholar. To be seen but not to see;
so the rabbis understood the Jewish situation after the destruction of the
temple.
In the coming chapter we press further on the affective, ritual, and
political implications of this particular construction of a historical moment
of loss of divine pilgrimage visuality in rabbinic sources. We will also explore
other modalities by which they imagined the visuality of the pilgrimage
encounter, particularly, a non-homovisual event, in which pilgrims look at
particular objects that represent God, without a returning gaze.
For a sense of ocular desire between God and Israel at the crossing of the Red Sea and at Sinai, see
Song of Songs Rabbah :– and Boyarin, “‘This we know,’” (and the rabbinic sources cited
therein).