Angela Willey Banu Subramaniam Jennifer A. Hamilton Jane Couperus The Mating Life of Geeks: Love, Neuroscience, and the New Autistic Subject T he magazine Psychology Today asks “Autism: What’s Sex Got to Do with It?” ðKunzig 2004Þ, while the New York Times features young couples in love in the story “Navigating Love and Autism” ðHarmon 2011Þ. Time Magazine inquires “Could the Way We Mate and Marry Boost Rates of Autism?” ðMelnick 2011Þ, and New York Magazine features “The Autism Rights Movement,” introducing a new wave of neurodiversity activists who want to “celebrate atypical brain function as a positive identity, not a disability” ðSolomon 2008Þ. In an article for CNN, “Miss Montana: Autism Doesn’t Define Me,” Miss Montana 2012, who describes herself as autistic, writes “there is a lot for me to do to make sure people really get that ‘Normal is just a dryer setting’ ” ðWineman 2013Þ. The confluence of such stories, and their ubiquity in science and other news sources of late, planted the seeds for this article. Each of us observed the shifting public narrative regarding autism and Asperger’s syndrome and pondered the implications of what we term a new autistic subject.1 In these stories, as in fictional representations, we noted the increasing familiarity of an image of the autist as socially inept yet brilliant, earnest yet charming, obsessive yet humorous, arrogant yet vulnerable. In these more recent portrayals, we see the emergence of a new autistic subjectivity in the figure of someone with the potential to be self-sufficient and functional in We would like to thank the Foundation for Psychocultural Research–Hampshire College Program in Culture, Brain, and Development for their support of this project. We are also grateful to the following people for their helpful feedback at various points in the writing process: Laura Briggs, Kristin Bumiller, Sara Giordano, Karen Lederer, Aimee Placas, Anne Pollock, Jacob Speaks, Vanessa Vogel, and three anonymous reviewers. Any errors or omissions are our own. All authors contributed equally to this article. 1 We use different terms to distinguish the objects of our analysis. We use “autism spectrum disorder” ðASDÞ to refer to a set of diagnostic criteria. We use the phrase “diagnosed with autism” to highlight the medicalization of autism, referring to those who having undergone tests. In contrast, we use “autist” to refer to the figure in public discourse who comes to represent the face of autism. These distinctions are at the heart of the essay. [Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2015, vol. 40, no. 2] © 2014 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/2015/4002-0009$10.00 370 y Willey et al. society, someone utterly capable of loving and being loved, albeit with a quirky and idiosyncratic spirit. In many ways such shifts—for example, from a biomedical model of disability to a neurodiversity framework—can be seen as a result of the success of disability rights movements that have expanded our conceptions of the normal to include modes of human variability that speak to the diverse cognitive forms among our species ðOsteen 2007Þ. We see this in popular portrayals of those diagnosed with autism as independent, as working adults, and, recently, as loving spouses. In contrast to the historic definition of the autist as one lacking the capacity for love, the new autist holds the promise of a potentially productive and even ðdesirablyÞ reproductive subject. Yet, we also note the simultaneous rise of neuroscientific research seeking to ðreÞdefine the nature and scope of autism spectrum disorder ðASDÞ in ways that serve as sites for the biologized reinscription of normative ideas of gender, race, and sexuality, including the naturalization of sexual dimorphism, whiteness, and heterosexuality. More specifically, we examine how the popular theories of the extreme male brain and assortative mating heterosexualize autism. We argue that these theories reinvoke a conception of sexual complementarity—what we term neurocomplementarity—to explain what is otherwise rather queer about autism. This complementarity allows autism to be defined as something other than the inability to love and thus for the autist to be imagined as different without being cast as deviant. We posit that these scientific theories of sexed and implicitly raced brains, along with emergent scientific theories of love and monogamy, together constitute the heterosexualization of the new autistic subject. Through an examination of scientific notions of extreme male brains, assortative mating, and love, we demonstrate why and how such theories are “reliant on the institution of heterosexuality for their coherence” ðGarlick 2003, 157Þ. In particular we focus on emerging popular narratives, and on the interconnected scientific discourses, of love and autism. To make our argument about the emergence of the new autistic subject and its relationship to love and neuroscience, we discuss two shifts in contemporary autism research: first, the increasing focus on biological sex differences as causal mechanisms in ASD and, second, the shift away from traditional understandings of ASD as a disorder of affect. Finally, we speculate that while this emergent subjectivity has profound consequences for those diagnosed with autism, it also has broader social implications, especially in terms of the contested terrain around gender, race, and sexuality. The emergence of a new autistic subject is marked by ambivalence and anxiety, even while it is celebrated as a success of the neurodiversity movement. The specter of reproduction and its attendant eugenic concerns haunt the new autistic subject. S I G N S Winter 2015 y 371 Heterosexualization as process In tracking the emergence of the new autistic subject, we are concerned with how processes of heterosexualization inform the shift from loveless to loving ðand lovableÞ, casting neurodiversity in remarkably normative terms. Through these processes that reformulate the meaning of autism in relation to gender and relationships, the autist is rendered potentially productive and reproductive. Steve Garlick argues that “an interrogation of how the institution of heterosexuality underlies modern constructions of masculinity has been largely untouched” ð2003, 156Þ. Garlick’s insight has particular resonance for a critical inquiry into the gendered terrain of autism and neuroscience. He argues that very often critiques of hegemonic masculinity—the white middle-class ideal of manhood constructed as oppositional to historically white ideals of femininity—fail to engage the historic centrality of heterosexualization to contemporary notions of masculinity. In other words, we need to understand masculinity as a relational category. We argue that heterosexualization—the erasure of queer implications and the eschewing of queer readings—constitutes a central process in the recovery not of autism per se but of a particular kind of autistic subject, a subject who is symbolically, if not literally, white, straight, and male. Recent efforts to biologize human variation and behavior are central to this process. In particular, the new autistic subject is enabled through scientific studies about sexed brains and the new biology of love. The emergence of the new autistic subject signals shifting terrain with respect to the biologization of gender in the larger culture and should urgently be addressed by scholars of gender. The arguments in this article are grounded in the feminist study of science and its long-standing concerns with questions of what and how we know, the stakes of knowledge production, and the naturalization of difference.2 We urge feminists to pay attention to scientific studies that biologize the body, studies that locate complex sociopolitical developments as immutable bodily structures and processes. Women’s studies in particular, and feminism in general, needs feminist science studies not only to help us read science critically but also to help us understand what intersectionality is ðSubramaniam 2009Þ and how the body becomes a key site where constructions of sex, gender, and race reside. Moreover, we begin from the premise that categories of sex and gender are always already racialized and that the notion of a binary gender system is enabled and perpetuated by the myth of race neutrality ðMar- 2 See Hubbard ð1990Þ, Schiebinger ð1991Þ, Birke ð2000Þ, Hammonds and Herzig ð2009Þ, Fisher ð2011Þ, and Fausto-Sterling ð2012Þ. 372 y Willey et al. kowitz 2001Þ. In her discussion of the necessary relationship between categories of sex/gender and race, Sally Markowitz notes that the very category of sex/gender “has been saturated with racial meanings for centuries and not always in ways that are easy to discern” ð2001, 389Þ. In examining the history of science, it is critical to recognize that there is no unmarked, generic, universal body; the racially unmarked body always reflects universalized ideals of whiteness.3 With these premises in mind, we explore the shifting representations of autism as sites through which what was formerly queer, strange, and unassimilable is now unqueered and rendered normal. We argue that heterosexualization is doing this for autism—that the process by which autism is rendered intelligible within and through a binary and complementary gender scheme domesticates or unqueers it and leaves behind a vast number of those diagnosed with autism that it cannot accommodate. Further, we note that this process, reliant as it is on a purportedly race-neutral gender binary, depends upon and reproduces whiteness as an invisible and deeply entrenched ideal within constructions of masculinity and femininity and their complementary status. Here, we describe a process of heterosexualization wherein the vast expanse of human bodies, desires, and practices is reduced to a story of the pairing of binary and complementary halves. Sex, gender, and sexuality are of course inextricably interconnected concepts—they comprise what Judith Butler calls “the heterosexual matrix” ð1990, 35Þ and Rebecca Jordan-Young “the three-ply yarn” ð2010, 12Þ. Their coherence is fragile, and pulling on any one thread reveals the gap between these explanatory schemata and the realities of human biology.4 The recent popularity of sexed brain theories in general, and of sexed brain theories of autism in particular, reflects a serious investment in the innateness of biology as an explanatory regime.5 As is so often the case, in these theories gender is biologized. As Markowitz notes, “far from liberating gender from sex, the distinction between sex and gender is more likely to naturalize and justify gender through sex” ð2001, 406Þ. We use these insights here to explore the emergence of a new autistic subject, a subject both enabled by the gendered construction of ASD and recoverable from the abject spaces of pathology and social isolation through a naturalization, indeed biologization, of normative heterosexuality. 3 See Frankenberg ð1993Þ, Morrison ð1993Þ, Ahmed ð2007Þ, and Carter ð2007Þ. See Rosario ð2009Þ, Roughgarden ð2009Þ, Mortimer-Sandilands and Erickson ð2010Þ, and Rubin ð2012Þ. 5 See Eliot ð2009, 2010Þ, Fine ð2010Þ, Jordan-Young ð2010Þ, and Fausto-Sterling ð2012Þ. 4 S I G N S Winter 2015 y 373 Autism spectrum disorder, extreme male brains, and assortative mating In this section, we look briefly at the history of ASD and the shifting terrain of autism diagnosis. While we note that autism and its associated diagnostic criteria have shifted profoundly over time ðYu et al. 2011Þ, the absence of a stable definition for autism is not our primary concern.6 Rather, we argue that this instability is what makes this terrain so rich and fertile for a discussion of larger issues. In this context we examine how contemporary popular theories of autism, as well as debates about both its nature and its etiology, contribute to the heterosexualization of the autist. Moreover, we examine these theories and debates as culturally compelling artifacts with important implications for how we think about race, sex/gender, and sexuality, especially in its heteronormative dimensions. While it has only been in the last three decades that the US public has become acutely aware of autism, ASD has been around in the psychological literature for far longer. Autism finds its historical roots in the work of Dr. Leo Kanner. In 1943, Kanner observed a number of children with severe cognitive, language, communication, and social impairments who shared common symptomology ðMash and Wolfe 2010Þ. Kanner proposed a new disorder, early infantile autism, to describe these children whose symptoms he attributed to the inability to form loving relationships with other people. Early theories suggested that autism resulted from a having a cold, unfeeling mother, often described as a refrigerator mother ðWard 1970Þ. Later, researchers introduced a milder version of autism, Asperger’s syndrome, typified by individuals who had classic symptoms of autism but retained language abilities ðFrith 1991Þ. In recent decades the scientific community has begun to think about these disorders as falling along a continuum: the autism spectrum. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ðDSM-5Þ, those with ASD show deficits in social communication and display repetitive behaviors and interests ðAmerican Psychiatric Association 2013Þ. Importantly, those diagnosed with ASD must show delays or abnormal functioning in these areas in early childhood, and these symptoms must impair daily functioning. Moreover, ASD is far more commonly diagnosed in boys than in girls, averaging a ratio of 4.3 to 1 ðNewschaffer et al. 2007Þ. Indeed, scientists 6 In May 2013, the new DSM-5 eliminated Asperger’s in favor of an overarching category: ASD. ASD now includes all individuals along the continuum. Experts cite the reality of the continuum, the instability of diagnoses ðwhich often shift for an individual over timeÞ, the denial of resources to some individuals on the continuum and not others, and the need for a cohesive identity as some of the reasons for this shift ðWallis 2009Þ. 374 y Willey et al. have recently suggested that girls may enjoy a “female protective effect” against autism ðJohnson 2013Þ. The controversies surrounding the characterization of the multitude of behavioral differences seen in individuals diagnosed with autism have spanned several decades.7 However, while many theories have had their moments of popularity, some have taken hold of the public imagination more than others. For example, the inability of autistic individuals to understand the minds of others, termed theory of mind, emerged as a prominent theory in the 1980s ðBaron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985; Frith 1989Þ. This theory’s popularity can be seen in stereotypes of autistic individuals as lacking empathy and understanding of others. Additionally, theories such as this evolved from early conceptualizations of autism that identified lack as a defining feature of the mother-child bond, with diagnostic criteria emphasizing that “the child appears to be deaf and blind to people,” that the child exhibits a “lack of object relations,” and that the “mother-infant relationship” is “excessively diluted” ðWard 1970, 350– 51Þ. However, as we discuss later in this article, it is precisely this primary feature, the ability to love that develops out of the mother-infant bond, that has recently seen reevaluation. One of the main proponents of the theory of mind, developmental psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, has more recently argued for an even more specific etiology of autism: the extreme male brain ðBaron-Cohen 2002, 2004; Baron-Cohen et al. 2011Þ. The extreme male brain theory of autism posits that female and male brains are hardwired for different but complementary capacities: empathizing and systemizing. Thus, according to the extreme male brain theory, our outward behaviors are manifestations of sexually dimorphic brains ðBaron-Cohen 2002Þ. What is key for our argument here is that Baron-Cohen locates autism itself in this “essential difference” ð2004Þ, namely in the hypermasculinized, extreme version of the normal or neurotypical systematizing male brain. The theory of the extreme male brain posits that “the male brain is a defined psychometrically as those individuals in whom systemizing is significantly better than empathizing, and the female brain is defined as the opposite cognitive profile. Using these definitions, autism can be considered as an extreme of the normal male profile” ðBaron-Cohen 2002, 248Þ. The theory of the extreme male brain is really a sex theory of autism. It is based on the notion that male and female brains are different as a function 7 See, e.g., Leslie ð1987Þ, Frith ð1989Þ, Hobson ð1989Þ, Courchesne et al. ð1994Þ, Ozonoff ð1995Þ, Baron-Cohen ð2002Þ, and Oberman and Ramachandran ð2007Þ. S I G N S Winter 2015 y 375 of both biology and the social milieu they inhabit; neurotypical males and females are born with different predispositions in terms of how they process the environment ðBaron-Cohen 2003Þ. Moreover, the extreme version of these predispositions in males is the underlying phenomenon that leads to ASD. According to Baron-Cohen, the male brain is predisposed to process information in a particular way: systemizing. Systemizing, according to Baron-Cohen, “is the drive to analyze, explore, and construct a system. The systemizer intuitively figures out how things work, or extracts the underlying rules that govern the behavior of a system. This is done in order to understand and predict the system, or to invent a new one” ð2003, 3Þ. In contrast, the female brain is predisposed to “empathizing,” or “the drive to identify another person’s emotions and thoughts, and to respond to them with an appropriate emotion” ðBaron-Cohen 2003, 2Þ. Autism is thus characterized by a brain that is hypersystemizing. This hypersystemizing, in turn, leads to mind-blindness—the inability to recognize or understand the thoughts and intentions of others. One of the key claims to emerge from the theory of the extreme male brain is what has been termed the empathizing-systematizing theory ðBaronCohen 2009Þ. The empathizing-systematizing theory posits that people on the autism spectrum will demonstrate a greater tendency toward systemizing and will demonstrate deficits in empathizing; in other words, they are hypersystemizing and hypoempathizing. Baron-Cohen and his fellow researchers use this model to explain the characteristics of the extreme male brain ðBaron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, and Belmonte 2005Þ. What Baron-Cohen and his colleagues characterize as male predominance in ASD has been a significant scientific problem in autism research ðe.g., Brosnan, Ashwin, and Gamble 2009; Baron-Cohen et al. 2011Þ, and they locate this sex imbalance in biology, specifically in the notion of sexually dimorphic brains. However, according to Baron-Cohen, the new autistic subject, whether male or female, has an extreme male brain. To account for the exponential rise in ASD, Baron-Cohen and his colleagues pair the extreme male brain with a theory of assortative mating. The theory of assortative mating posits that individuals choose reproductive partners in a nonrandom manner, selecting mates with similar characteristics, thus perpetuating and reproducing such characteristics. This theory further entrenches extreme male brain theory in biology and, as discussed in the next section, ties it to reproduction and heterosexuality ðBaronCohen 2005; Hoekstra et al. 2007Þ. It is important to note that among the larger community of ASD researchers, these theories are not universally accepted, nor are they un- 376 y Willey et al. controversial.8 Yet when looking at popular accounts of the science of autism, these theories appear regularly. Why do we see the extreme male brain theory in particular emerging in the popular literature on autism when it is not the most prominent theory in the scientific literature? What work do the theories of the extreme male brain and assortative mating do in the early part of the twenty-first century, particularly in relation to the new autistic subject? We suggest that the extreme brains that populate and animate these contemporary theories of autism are a particular, and indeed a peculiar, iteration of sexed brains, albeit an iteration that echoes older and rather familiar ideas. These binary sexed brains prime and reinforce ideas concerning the need for complementarity in mating of a particular, heterosexual variety and suggest what can go awry “when geeks meet” ðBuchen 2011Þ. When geeks meet: ASD and the absence of neurocomplementarity Lizzie Buchen’s article “Scientists and Autism: When Geeks Meet,” which appeared in the November 2011 special issue of Nature on autism, is framed by a striking image. This drawing foregrounds a small, brownhaired, fair-skinned, and rather large-headed boy who is in the midst of organizing his toy cars into six neat rows, three cars across, methodically, some might say obsessively, arranged by color ðin a spectrumÞ and kind ðfrom pickup trucks to Model TsÞ. In the background, from their easy chairs, his parents watch him worriedly. The man on the left, presumably the boy’s father, is dressed in “geek chic” ðBuchen 2011Þ: black hornrimmed glasses, pants ðone imagines corduroysÞ, and a blue T-shirt sporting Albert Einstein’s image. The woman on the right, presumably the mother, is reading Nature in a crisp white shirt, khaki pants, and brown flats. Both parents are distracted from their tasks—the father from his laptop, the mother from her reading—and are observing their son intently and anxiously, furrowed brows and frowns ðsee fig. 1Þ. 8 While Baron-Cohen’s theory has been picked up by the popular media, it has not received the same attention in the scientific community. Conversely, theories receiving more attention in the scientific literature are not as present in the popular media. Evidence of this disjunction comes in the form of paper citations within the psychological literature, which show that Baron-Cohen, Frith, and Leslie’s earlier theory-of-mind explanation of autism was cited an average of 135.8 times per year over the last five years. In contrast, Baron-Cohen’s extreme male brain theory has only been cited an average of 44.2 times per year over this same period. These figures are based on a search of the database Scopus for Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith ð1985Þ and Baron-Cohen ð2002Þ for the years 2007–11 conducted on June 11, 2012. S I G N S Figure 1 Winter 2015 y 377 “When Geeks Meet,” Nature, 2011. Pete Ellis/Drawgood.com. We discuss this image because it illustrates two of the key, and controversial, dimensions of Baron-Cohen’s framework: the extreme male brain and assortative mating. In particular, the concern about “geeks meeting” expressed in Buchen’s article is central to our discussion of a new autistic subject and the naturalization of normative heterosexuality. Through an exploration of the extreme male brain and assortative mating, we argue that the intelligibility of this new autistic subject depends on a logic of sexed brains and neurosexual complementarity. What animates these theories and gives them particular purchase in the discussion of ASD is the explicit pairing of deeply entrenched notions of fundamental male/female differences with the concept of nonrandom or assortative mating. According to the application of assortative mating to the extreme male brain theory of autism, the children of individuals who are both systemizers account for at least some portion of the increase in cases of autism/ Asperger’s.9 The extreme ðmaleÞ brains and genes of two hypersystemizers, the theory argues, produce children with an increased risk of autism and Asperger’s. While no strong evidence has been found to support this argument, it seems to make intuitive sense as a potential causal mechanism because it resonates with perceptions that autism has increased in particular communities, such as Silicon Valley in California ðCroen et al. 2002Þ, 9 See Baron-Cohen et al. ð1997Þ, Silberman ð2001Þ, Wheelwright and Baron-Cohen ð2001Þ, and Baron-Cohen ð2005Þ. 378 y Willey et al. and because it aligns with a range of social anxieties, including the role of women in the workforce ðMelnick 2011Þ. Buchen’s piece follows Steve Silberman’s widely disseminated article “The Geek Syndrome,” published more than a decade ago in Wired magazine ðSilberman 2001Þ. Silberman’s explication of the geek syndrome relied heavily on Baron-Cohen’s theories of both the extreme male brain and assortative mating and suggested that “math and tech genes” might be to blame for the rate of ASD “among the children of Silicon Valley.” The idea of math and tech genes as somehow implicated in the rise of autism is bolstered by historical stereotypes of gender differences, stereotypes that posit males as innately superior in math and spatial abilities; this superiority in turn allows for their perceived greater prowess in technology fields ðHines 2004Þ. Moreover, such stereotypes lend credence to tensions and anxieties about women entering not only the workforce in general but male-dominated fields such as engineering, computer science, and the life sciences in particular. This fear is exemplified by Silberman’s claim that “something dark and unsettling is happening in Silicon Valley,” referring to the high rates of autism diagnosis in California. Baron-Cohen also points to similarly high rates in other high-tech areas such as Eindhoven, a technology hub in the Netherlands ðBuchen 2011; Roelfsema et al. 2012Þ. One of the main implications of extreme male brain theories that we want to underscore is that the extremes both define and reinforce normative notions of sex and gender and their relation to the brain. In other words, the invocation of extreme brains necessitates a condition without extremes—that is, normal—and does important work in defining and reinforcing what we think of as normal gender. As feminist scholar Jordynn Jack recently argued, “In the ½extreme male brain$ theory, normal men are ‘autismized,’ understood as functioning analogically to individuals with autism, only in a lesser or reduced manner” ðJack 2011Þ. The autismization of nonautistic males also works to normalize and humanize ASD under the rubric of neurodiversity. Thus, autism is not pathology but rather simply part of a normal spectrum of human capacities and experiences. As Kristin Bumiller notes, “Baron-Cohen’s explanation for autism has the twin effect of normalizing the condition ðby suggesting it includes all of usÞ while essentializing gender differences ðby rooting the condition in biological malenessÞ” ð2008, 973Þ. In many ways these new theories of ASD work to recuperate an extreme form of masculinity—one that highlights intellect, superrationality, and logic and at the same time minimizes emotions such as empathy and sympathy—and it recovers this form of masculinity within the bounds of neurodiversity and normalcy. S I G N S Winter 2015 y 379 Neurodiversity and normalcy, of course, are both raced and classed. For instance, Markowitz points out that the concept of sexual dimorphism was itself linked to racialized evolutionary schemes. With the evolutionary development of sexual dimorphism, “the manly European man and the feminine European woman” came to represent not a universal, human, or species-wide sexual dimorphism but rather an advanced evolutionary stage ðMarkowitz 2001, 391Þ. That is to say, perceived differences in gendered roles and capacities, supposedly the result of a natural and complementary dimorphism in sex, were read and cited as evidence of European evolutionary superiority. While European males were not the most masculine of men, they were the most masculine when compared to their female counterparts. In the frameworks of contemporary neuroscience, brains, like bodies, are sexed and raced. The extreme male brain invokes a gender that does not denote extreme masculinity but rather marks an extreme version of an ideal of masculinity that is decidedly raced and classed. This is a rational, unemotional, and productive form of masculinity associated with theories of sex differences in intelligence. Who can be a geek? And about whose mating habits are we concerned in the context of ASD? While black men, for example, are often seen as embodying an extreme, dangerous masculinity, they are not represented as having an intelligence superior to that of white men. As Ron Eglash ð2002Þ points out, representations of the compulsory cool of hypersexualized black culture are mirrored in those of the compulsory nerdiness of orientalized, undersexed Asians. Thus, white male masculinity emerges as a “perfect balance” between these two extremes ðEglash 2002, 52Þ. The recuperation of the hypernerdy autist as a potential romantic/sexual subject marks a move toward this white center. While he may be white or Asian, the autist as a subject with an extreme male brain cannot be black or Latino. The myth of universal, unmarked categories of gender always disguises assumptions about race. Moreover, as we note above, assortative mating is premised on the idea that like-minded individuals seek out and mate with other like-minded individuals. But what is at stake in such a theory, especially in terms of its heteronormative dimensions? We want to underscore several implications of Baron-Cohen’s pairing of extreme male brain theory and assortative mating. First, one of the fundamental assumptions of sexual dimorphism is a kind of sexual complementarity—what we term neurocomplementarity—here located in the brain. When male-brained persons mate with other male-brained persons, the absence of neurocomplementarity potentially results in ASD. Second, we want to reiterate the heteronormative assumptions regarding the naturalness of sexual dimorphism and com- 380 y Willey et al. plementarity among “normal-brained” people that the extreme male brain and assortative mating theories reinforce. In other words, the anxiety produced when geeks meet and mate serves to normalize sexual dimorphism and neurocomplementarity. Third, we point to the extraordinary ambivalence surrounding the new autistic subject. The emergence of this subject is an attempt to recover ASD as part of human experience—neurodiversity—but nevertheless reflects incredible anxiety about issues of reproduction, especially in light of males with extreme male brains mating with females who also have extreme male brains. The logical extension of these theories is that the absence of what we are calling neurosexual complementarity produces offspring with ASD. Thus, extreme male brain and assortative mating theories demonstrate the continuing reinscription and reentrenchment of biological sex differences. Moreover, they highlight a second dimension of the stakes of research into sex differences: the reliance on heteronormativity in attempts to humanize the autistic subject, to bring him into relations with others, to help him to recognize cues and be able to experience the fullness of human emotions, especially heterosexual romantic love. Love The history of autism offers a genealogy of our socioscientific preoccupations with, and understandings of, love. Shifting conceptions of love can also be a lens through which to read autism ðSilverman 2011Þ. The sexed brain theory of autism offers a new way of thinking about autism and love and thus new possibilities for the full inclusion of the autistic subject within the category of the human. Here we ask how Baron-Cohen’s theory of autism implicitly and explicitly enables this reconfiguration of assumptions about autism and love, how the gendered construction of autism enables and inflects this new autistic subject, and finally how autism itself serves as a site for the naturalization of normative heterosexuality. The assortative mating theory of autism enables the production and legibility of a new autistic subject for whom love is no longer categorically unthinkable. From diagnostic criteria ðe.g., American Psychiatric Association 2000Þ to media representations ðMarks 1999; Sarrett 2011Þ, the autistic subject has historically existed in the American medical and popular imagination as a person for whom love has no meaning, no draw, no neurochemical reward. While these types of representations persist, this characterization is no longer a definitional imperative. Chloe Silverman charts the history of love in autism research, summarizing thus: “Autism is understood as a disorder of affect, from the inappropriate expression of S I G N S Winter 2015 y 381 affect, where laughter does not necessarily mean anything like humor, to ‘social blindness,’ to the possibility that the desire for an embrace is only, in fact, a desire for deep pressure. Love was the missing term, mothers were told, in the origins of their children’s autism during the 1950s and 60s; in the early twenty-first century, parents are told that their child can learn appropriate behaviors but may never ‘feel’ the way that they do” ð2004, 30–31Þ. This history shows how central the absence of love has been to the meaning of autism from its inception; it is not just a symptom but rather the problem itself. The introduction of a theory of autism that is not based on this lack but instead on traits that are heritable through assortative mating sets the stage for the curious emergence of an autistic subject who is both capable of love and, as a result, lovable. Thus the autist, no longer deviant in this regard, is rather part of a continuum and can learn to love. In recent years, oxytocin, often called the “love” or “cuddle” hormone, has been researched and celebrated for its potential to treat autism ðKuehn 2011Þ. Oxytocin is typically released during natural childbirth and nursing, hence its association with maternal bonding; indeed the maternal brain ðBuchheim et al. 2009Þ has been researched for its role in sociality and bonding in general ðRoss and Young 2009Þ. Research addressing oxytocin’s role in bonding ðLim, Murphy, and Young 2004; Lim et al. 2004Þ underlies seemingly endless reports on the science of love, including reports on the discovery of a monogamy gene ðWilley and Giordano 2011Þ. Research that seeks to understand what makes love neurochemically rewarding is funded in the hopes of developing treatments for autism. The leap is not a huge one, conceptually: the inability to love is the problem of autism, so the science of love is also the science of autism treatment. Thus, the same research on the role of oxytocin in social bonding has led to the use of intranasal oxytocin in clinical treatment trials both for people diagnosed with autism and for straight couples in counseling. It is utilized to stimulate and to enhance capacities for trust, empathy, and other emotions associated with “bonding” ðKuchinskas 2009, 2Þ. Oxytocin is the love potion for the incurably modern condition—the solution to rising autism rates and to rising dysfunctions in all our abilities to love and empathize. Maternal bonding ðin its imagined purityÞ is the model for love at its most natural and highest functioning. As with empathy and the neurochemical rewards associated with normal sociality, we see love as the province of the female brain. Love is a feminized concept, reflected in notions like “women are from Venus”; it is women’s nature to love. Men, on the other hand, are from Mars; when it comes to love, men just don’t get it. Men may need instructions, to be taught compassion, or to be bludgeoned from 382 y Willey et al. time to time with corrective training, but they do need and want love, we are told, regardless of whether it seems that way ðGray 2004; Quirk 2008; Brizendine 2011Þ. The figure of the daft chap baffled by the workings of the fairer sex is part of hegemonic masculinity and what masculinity studies scholar Michael Kimmel calls the “flight from the feminine” ðKimmel 2007, 77Þ. The performance of lack of interest in and ignorance of romance and love is not only naturalized through scientific theories of sex difference but also rigidly policed through sexism and homophobia. The work that the new sciences of love and of autism treatment do to recover males and females with extreme male brains within the bounds of heterosexuality is striking. By suggesting that increasing rates of autism are the result of pairs of hypersystemizers not only reproducing but also being drawn to one another and falling in love, the assortative mating theory of autism suggests a new way of thinking about autism. If two systemizers are capable of enough empathizing to find each other and reproduce, this implies that they are not too male to participate in the heterosexually gendered systems of lust, love, and attachment that the evolutionary biology of love tells us keeps the human species going ðFisher 2004Þ. But what of their offspring with extreme male brains? A spate of recent media attention to autistics in love suggests that there is hope for them, too, when it comes to living happily ever after. Here we touch on recent high-profile journalism on autism and love that appeared in the New York Times and aired on National Public Radio in the winter of 2011–12. A major uniting feature of these stories is that they construct an essential need for connection in the form of a significant other or pair bond that exists beneath all the social awkwardness. Whereas the old subject was not wired to want love, this one—an extreme version of normal masculinity when it comes to emotional competence—just isn’t wired to get it easily. In the New York Times series “Autism, Grown Up: Love on the Spectrum,” the voices of autistic teenagers are mobilized to call into question long-standing stereotypes about autism ðHarmon 2011Þ. The “grown up” in the title of the series refers both to the coming of age of our understanding of autism and to the transition into adulthood of autistic children. This passage to adulthood is marked by puberty, a cultural shift from the life stage of presumed innocence to that of compulsory sexuality and romantic love. Not to make this passage would be not to grow up, to be fated to an eternal childhood, a fate once largely assumed to be sealed for those labeled autistic. This series directly addresses and defies this formulation, arguing that autists indeed grow up and so too must our understanding of autism. S I G N S Winter 2015 y 383 In a spin-off series on National Public Radio’s Talk of the Nation, reporters follow up with a pair of the original series’ subjects and declare that while autists in love face many challenges, “We are here to discuss both the right of people on the autism spectrum to love and to be loved, and the ways to overcome the obstacles that may come with autism.” They continue, “If this is your story, or if it’s your child’s story, we want to ask you: What has gotten in the way of love? And how have you gotten around it? Give us a call” ðNational Public Radio 2012Þ. These stories have been celebrated for their journalistic merit ðElkin 2011; Mnookin 2011Þ, touted for giving voice to people diagnosed with autism. As we seek to interpret these untold realities, it is important to note that neither of these series is about the experiences of autists in general, with love just happening to emerge as a prominent theme. Rather these journalistic accounts of breaking silences and telling truths are actively engaged in producing subjects, not simply showing us what is. Moreover, these accounts take it a step further, emphasizing strategies, resources, and services oriented toward overcoming challenges. Among these are counseling, flirting and communication advice in various forms, as well as possibilities for biomedical intervention, such as the use of intranasal oxytocin. The idea that romantic partnerships ought to be mutually beneficial conduits of authentic self-expression and personal growth—and indeed that romantic relationships are the most important sites for self-actualization— is foundational to modern love. As Julian B. Carter argues in The Heart of Whiteness: Normal Sexuality and Race in America, 1880 –1940 ð2007Þ, this ideal of sexual and romantic intimacy emerged historically through a process whereby a respectable white sexual subjectivity was articulated as distinct and separate from the animal passions that marked the sexuality of the uncivilized. While virility is associated with masculinity, tempered virility has long signaled racial superiority. Intimacy within marriage and the importance, indeed sanctity, of that bond is what separates “us” from “them.” In the heterosexualization of autism, and its attendant shift in the status of the autist, sex itself matters less than love. In these representations of autism, a lot of work is being done to normalize heterosexual coupling as universally human, even for those who have historically been definitionally indisposed to it. Not wanting to be touched and not understanding social cues no longer means not needing a partner, a complementary companion with whom to go through life. The naturalization of a universal disposition toward pair bonding has implications for those various queer subjects for whom this is not a desirable or achievable possibility. Rather than asking whether these struggling lovers are a more or less accurate representation of autistic individuals compared to outdated or 384 y Willey et al. wrong ones, we are concerned instead with what this universalization of love and this inclusion of the autistic within this narrative does. This heterosexualization is a process of normalization that is efficacious and yet productive of new meanings, not simply corrective. Conclusion Despite its inclusion of a wider range of bodies within the bounds of the normal, the heterosexualization of the autist has created a new truly abject body. What has been allowed into the bounds of normality are those bodies that are capable of productive and reproductive work. The ability to be independent is contingent on an ability to work—to provide labor that is recognized by market forces ðCook 2012Þ. However, the experiences of companies such as Specialisterne, which employs autistic adults as consultants and hires them out to other firms, demonstrate that despite the great demand for placement on the part of autistic people, their families, and the general society, the issue is not so simple. This particular company is only able to hire about one of every six men and women it assesses. Most do not have the “right qualities” because they are “too troubled, too reluctant to work in an office or simply lack the particular ‘skills’ required” ðCook 2012Þ. The narratives of these individuals are strong reminders that while efforts for greater inclusion have moved away from older notions of pathology, this recovery comes at the price of tremendous surveillance and control. Indeed, expanding the definitions of workers to include those diagnosed with autism has done little to challenge or expand work environments to be more inclusive. Instead, only those individuals who can function and indeed thrive in an automated and increasingly asocial workplace are the ones included. Such individuals demonstrate high productivity in the new logics of market efficiency while still being read within the bounds of normalcy by coworkers. The new autistic subject therefore can only be imagined to represent a very small segment of those diagnosed with autism. Furthermore, the heterosexualization of the autist has also created new tensions. The neurodiversity movement has flourished alongside the growth of genetic technologies such as amniocentesis, genetic testing, and preimplantation genetic diagnoses. Thus, parallel to the growth of a robust movement for neurodiversity has emerged an equally robust set of practices for selecting the neurotypical. This has, for example, led to a shrinking population of individuals diagnosed with Down syndrome. Statistics suggest that as many as 90 percent of women presented with a positive pre- S I G N S Winter 2015 y 385 natal diagnosis of Down syndrome choose to abort the fetus ðHarmon 2007Þ. While there is currently no such test for autism—and while the emergence of the new autistic subject would suggest that autism is something qualitatively unlike Down syndrome within this eugenic schema— the specter of these technologies haunts autism. Attempts to identify genetic mutations positively correlated with autism continue. The rise of a new autistic subject that, as we have argued, is distinctly sexed, gendered, raced, and classed, suggests yet another set of tensions. The notion of assortative mating on the part of individuals with “male” brains helps to reify ideas of sex, gender, and heteronormativity. The process of heterosexualization has allowed the autistic subject to be recouped, if precariously, from the undesirable side to the desirable side of eugenics. It shifts our understanding of larger questions about who lives and, by extension, who dies, either literally or socially. Yet the process of heterosexualization, in recovering the autist from abjection, also reifies the naturalness of heterosexuality and love and their centrality to the definition of what it means to be human, thereby leaving others out. But haven’t we seen this before? Indeed we have. First, these shifts are but recent appearances on the long historical scaffolding of theories of sexual difference. In the extreme male brain theory of autism, the hypersystemizing brain is masculine and productive while the empathetic brain is feminine and needed only as a complementary figure that ultimately leads to reproduction. Second, the implicit heteronormativity is striking. The problem is two male brains mating, leading to mentally challenged and underfunctioning progeny. It would seem that we need “real” heterosexuals—dimorphic in brains and bodies. Third, like the older “refrigerator mom,” we see the mother being blamed yet again. The rise of autism rests on the emergence of a growing group of women who are developing their hypersystemizing brains by entering fields in science and technology. After three decades of somewhat successful efforts to get more women into such disciplines, we see the fruits of our labors: a rise in autism! Fourth, the inclusion of the autist on a continuum of both masculinity ðin the extreme male brainÞ and love ðthrough assortative matingÞ is an attempt to domesticate difference rather than embrace it. The new autistic subject does not expand our conceptions of love and loving but instead conforms to quite normative notions, naturalizing heterosexual coupling within the biological body. Finally, we need to understand these representations of autism within the context of the contemporary United States. We have witnessed a process, fueled by shifts in governmentality over the last half century, of the profound privatization of life. The political instruments of 386 y Willey et al. recognition—diagnosis, intervention, and care—are embedded in local, state, and national governmental structures. Popular representations mirror this transformation, privatizing dependency through a return to the family and to the bonds of heterosexual coupling. It is critical to note that popular recuperations of the autist focus on individual interactions with generous and patient lovers, friends, and family rather than structural solutions of rebuilding community or challenging social structures. As the autist is salvaged from the category of the necessarily unproductive and uncoupled, who is left behind? As with all moves toward greater inclusivity within the category of the normal, further exclusions are produced ðRubin 1999Þ. People without genius to compensate for their strangeness, people for whom the work of romance holds no appeal or is impossible, people without male brains to block their empathy, are excluded. A truly abject subject emerges as the underside of the recuperation of ðhigh-functioningÞ autists as colorful additions to the spectrum of normality. These are the contradictions and congruencies of the twentyfirst century; the world appears new and yet startlingly familiar at the same time. 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