AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY SYRIA AND ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM Paul J. Kopper 27-May 2011 FINAL PAPER FOR IRLS501, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS MASTERS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION Background and History of Syria The Syrian Arab Republic, having gained independence only in 1946 from France, is formally a parliamentary democratic republic. It is headed by a President - currently Bashar Al-Asad – who, according the Constitution ratified in 1973 must be a Muslim, and who is elected to 7-year terms (International). The President is also the head of the Ba’ath Party, as well as of the National Progressive Front, a political entity to be defined presently. Included, too, in the Executive Branch are two Vice Presidents – currently Farouk al-Shar'a and Najah al-Attar, and a Prime Minister – currently Muhammad Naji al-Otari. The Legislature - or the People’s Assembly - consists of 250 members who are voted to 4-years terms. In the most recent elections in 2007, the Ba’ath Party/National Progressive Front garnered 169 seats (of which 134 were won by the Ba’ath party); other independents parties gained 81 seats. In addition, according to the Constitution, Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation (International). As for the Judicial Branch, it includes the Supreme Court, High Judicial Court and State Security Courts. There are 5 members on the Supreme Court. In essence, Syria is a one-party state, that party being the Ba’ath Party, whose members must receive at least one-half of the parliamentary seats. The Ba’ath Party along with other leftist, socialist and communist parties make up the “National Progressive Front,” which can be considered “the ruling coalition” of parties in the Syrian Legislature. The other “independent”, non- Ba’athist parties hardly have an independent, strong voice, however, as their candidates are all vetted by the government, i.e. the 16-member Regional Command, on which the leadership of the Ba’ath Party sits (Lesch 2011, 278). The National Progressive Front was formed in 1972 by former president and father of the current president, Hafiz Al-Asad, for the purpose of creating a “safety valve” for other non-Ba’athist parties; in other words, he “opened up” the political process in order to protect his regime from being overthrown by disenfranchised members of society, who may have felt repressed under Al-Asad’s authoritarian regime. The idea of a coup d’état in Syria at the time was not foreign and not one that could be ruled out. After the final French troops left in 1947, there were four coups and countercoups by the end of 1949, with three occurring in 1949 alone. After the Ba’ath Party came to power in 1963, via a coup, there were seven attempted coups between 1963 and 1976, the last one being orchestrated by Hafiz’s brother Rif’at (ibid. 272-3). Modern Syria was born after World War I, while it was under the French Mandate, which itself was the consequence of both the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, both of which secretly and unbeknownst to most Arab leaders divided up the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France. Before this period, the idea of a Syrian state had not existed; the lands currently between, as well as beyond, the borders of modern day Syria had been ruled over by a succession of dynasties stretching back to the time of Muhammad. The notion of “Greater Syria”, also known as as-suriya al-kubra or bilad ash-sham, did, however, exist at that time, at least in the minds of the elites of the region. This “Greater Syria” included modern day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. It is this region, and the regaining of which, that is a driving force behind Syrian identity and policy; Greater Syria is considered merely the first stage toward a unified Arab nation, an entity that will be alluded to later (Hinnebusch 2002, 142). It was under the French mandate between 1920 and 1946 that the ‘Alawi minority was able to gain a stronghold within the military establishment. This was the result not only of the French strategy of “divide and conquer”, whereby the various ethnic groups living in Syria were geographically separated and resettled to preclude any united opposition or uprising against French rule, but also French recruitment of minorities, particularly the ‘Alawis, into the armed forces (Lesch 2011, 271). For the ‘Alawis, this was a chance for them, as a long-persecuted minority within Syria, to gain some upward mobility and to be able to gain a voice in a country where Sunni Muslims constituted the majority (approximately 70%) among religious groups within society; with this being the case, they took advantage of this opportunity (Kandil 2008, 423). This state of affairs turned out to be very providential for the ‘Alawis, for, after the French withdrew from Syria, a military junta took power within the country and the ‘Alawis already in the military found themselves in a very favorable position. After the withdrawal of France from Syria, the “nationalistic” landed elite that had existed during the period of the Ottoman Empire and which had resisted French rule took power. It was this elite and subsequent ruling oligarchy, presided over by Shukri Al-Quwatli, which led the Syrian army against Israel in the first Arab-Israeli War in 1947 and which, having been decisively defeated, lost much credibility within the political establishment and people of Syria. It was on the heels of this military loss, in 1949, that the regime was toppled and replaced temporarily by a military dictatorship under Colonel Husni al-Za’im, who was subsequently overthrown by Colonel ‘Adib al-Shishkali later that same year. It was amidst this political instability that Syria became easy prey for outside influence, particularly from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq and the United States (Hinnebusch 2001, 145) (Lesch 2011, 274). These states, among other rival Arab states, financed Syrian clients and backed military coups in Syria. For example, the Hashemite King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia attempted to make Syria a satellite of the Saudi kingdom within his “Greater Syria” plan; the same was true regarding Iraq’s “Fertile Crescent” and “Baghdad Pact” schemes. These realities forced then-president Shukri al-Quwatli to join forces with the anti-Hashemite Egyptian government, ruled by the Pan-Arab hero Jamal Abd al-Nasser. Furthermore, the influence of the American Central Intelligence Agency came to bear on the Syria army after the American government planned to build an oil pipeline through Syria from Saudi Arabia. The Americans, guided by the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” also were behind attempted coups within Syria during the 1950s. It was the sum of the loss of Palestine to Israel in 1949, the creeping foreign influence within Syria, as well as the dissatisfaction of the middle and lower classes within Syria that swept more radical, leftist, anti-Western and anti-imperialist, nationalistic parties into the political fray and, in the case of the Ba’ath party, later into power. It is this Ba’ath party that still remains in power today. This brief discussion of Syria’s recent history has attempted to illustrate the foundations on which Syria’s political tendencies, aims, institutions, and culture have been based on, and are still based on today. This paper will discuss these aspects and the political system of Syria in general, namely the political culture, the relationship between the government and the citizenry, the history of the Ba’ath party, its inner-workings and policy-making structure and methods, as well as the interest articulation and interest aggregation that takes place during the political process in Syria Political Culture The political culture of Syria is quite dissimilar to what one may find in Western countries. In other words, there is not much of a political culture in Syria of which to speak, mainly because there isn’t in fact a political history in Syria. The only political culture to speak of, truly, is the one generated by the Ba’ath party. The ideas of democracy, republicanism, pluralism, a politically healthy opposition to the ruling majority, freedom to criticize the government, among others, are non-existent in Syria. All that Syria has known is authoritarianism. This is not to say such ideas have never existed or been realized to any extent, however. After Bashar Al-Asad took power in 2000, it seemed as if there were to be a new direction for Syrian politics and society. During the “Damascus Spring,” as it was called, political prisoners were granted amnesty, private newspapers were licensed, state-controlled media were liberalized, and political forums and salons opened where free criticism and dissent toward the government were tolerated (Lesch 2011, 291). Even Al-Asad, himself, supported this movement. At the forefront of this trend was the Civil Society Movement, headed by Michael Kilo. In September 2000, it had written up the “Manifest of the 99” followed up in December by the “Manifesto of the 1000.” These two documents called for a constitutional state, a fair market economy, an independent parliament, independent courts, and a free media. The movement also called for a so-called “Independent Parliamentary Block” and for the breakup of economic and political monopolies (Wiesland 2006, 46). What was outlined here illustrates precisely the political reality that existed in Syria in 2000 and still is prevalent today. After only eight months, the conservative forces within the government called an end to the Damascus Spring. Arrests of members of the Civil Society Movement, including Kilo, were made and the Publishing Law, passed in 2001, limited freedom of the press. The nature of the party system, as well as of the regime, is an important part of the political culture of a country, as the durability of a regime may provide insight as to its legitimacy, or, even the opposite: its lack thereof, as in Syria’s case. As aforementioned, Syria is a one-party state. It is also what some consider a “presidential monarchy,” (Hinnebusch 2002, 148) or a “Bonapartist” (Lesch 2011, 278) or “populist authoritarian” (Hinnebusch 2001, 2) regime. It is also a country whose rule is based on a personality cult. The scope of this one-party regime can particularly be seen during presidential elections. Firstly, the person running for President must be nominated by the Regional Command and the parliament, both of which are essentially run by the Ba’ath Party. There have only been two people ever to run for President within Syria: Hafiz Al-Asad and his son, Bashar. Secondly, the election is more similar to a referendum, where a citizen is given a piece of paper with the candidate’s name and two boxes next to it: one for yes and one for no (Lesch 2011, 279). Hafiz Al-Asad ran unopposed and was elected 5 times, winning 99% of the votes during his regime. Bashar has run twice unopposed, winning in 2000 with 97.29% of the vote and being re-elected in 2007 with 97% of the vote. However, to truly gain insight on the regime, one must describe in more detail the ruling party, namely the Ba’ath Party. The Ba’ath Party was created in 1947 by Michael Aflaq, a Christian Arab, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Arab. Initially fierce communists, they abandoned such a platform, lest they did not have a large enough base to make gains politically. Thereafter, they articulated the Ba’ath platform as such: “unity, freedom and socialism,” an ideology and phrase which came to be articulated prominently in the Constitution. The Ba’athists did not become particularly popular until their power takeover in 1963, however. Initially, Aflaq and al-Bitar determined it politically necessary to merge with the Arab Socialist Party in order to gain a wider popularity base among the rural classes, a section of the populace the Ba’athists came to rely on heavily to gain power in the coming years and decades (Wiesland 2006, 105). Even after this merger and increase in popularity, the Ba’ath party still realized that it had to compete with other parties battling for power against the ruling oligarchy during the years of political instability in the fifties and sixties. One of these parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, advocated Islamization of society, as well as the legislation of sweeping social reforms. They had much influence in the markets, or aswaq, but had little clout neither among the middle class, who had embraced the Arab nationalism which the Ba’ath party also championed, nor among religious minorities who supported a more secular state. The Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) also stood in the way of the Ba’ath party’s endeavor to come to power. The SSNP, like the Ba’ath Party, was able to gain support from the middle class, officer corps and the minorities. However, its support of a pure, secular Syrian nationalism and its view of pan-Arabism as too Islamic found no support among the Sunni majority in Syria. In addition, the fact that it was secretly supported by the West caused it to lose potential backing among the army and educated youth. As for the communists, another Ba’ath rival, they were fiercely secular and only had a following among minorities, intelligentsia and the working class. They were anti-Arabist and not interested in championing the Palestinian cause. The Ba’ath party’s platform, unlike its rivals’, was able to gain support from most sections of society. Its pan-Arab, pro-Palestine, anti-Zionist, socialist, nationalistic, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchy, secular, pro-land reform stance was able to mobilize the peasantry, the new middle class, the army and minority groups toward its cause (Hinnebusch 2001, 35). The consolidation of Ba’ath party rule began in earnest with the election of Hafiz Al-Asad in 1970. It is Hafiz al-Asad’s policies, organization of the party and scope and identity of the clientele he made reliant on the Ba’ath party after assuming power that still proves to be an influence on policy under his son today. During the so-called “Corrective Movement,” al-harakah al-tashihiyah, he proceeded to replace upper and middle-class, Nasserite-oriented officers in the Army, with Ba’thist-oriented officers from rural and lower-middle class backgrounds (Hinnebusch 2001, 48). He, himself an ‘Alawi, formed ties with the ‘Alawis in the military establishment and assigned them to posts in the many security and police forces within Syria (Lesch 2011, 278). It was also then that he cemented an alliance with the Sunni merchants in Damascus, and placing them in the top ranks of the Ba’ath party, which formed the beginning of the “military-merchant complex” that came to define the regime for decades (Hinnebusch 2001, 67). Asad also liberalized the economy and “leveled” the social structure, to an extent, after he came to power, in order to satisfy both the bourgeoisie and lower-middle classes (ibid. 57). In his second 5-year plan, the oil and chemical industries, railroads and the public industrial sector were modernized. The third 5-year planned succeeded in bringing about agrarian reform, which attracted the lower classes to the Ba’ath cause (ibid. 55). By being able to redistribute land and property and demolish the control of the landed bourgeoisie over the economy for the sake of lesser well-off citizens, as well as reduce the costs of foreign trade for the sake of the better well-off, Asad was able to both greatly broaden the base of the Ba’ath party and at the same time make that base beholden to the party. As Hinnebusch concisely puts it: “Asad’s policies broadened the base of the Ba’ath regime. A purge of the radical leaders swept the party, but most rank and file Ba’athis chose accommodation with the new leadership which continued to expand the party’s organized mass base; Asad thus maintained the core of the regime…This, plus economic liberalization, the opening to conservative Arab states, a muting of radical secularism, Asad’s public deportment as a pious Muslim and a palpable political relaxation, all helped win the acquiescence of sections of bourgeois and conservative middle class opinion in Ba’ath rule (Hinnebusch 2001, 66).” Then, as is the case still today, it can easily be concluded that the Ba’ath party’s influence extends everywhere and its main goal is survival. It does not tolerate dissent or opposition. The only time it may tolerate opposition, as in the case of the other parties within the National Progressive Front (NPF) and the other non-NPF independent parties, is when, one: the candidates have been vetted by the Ba’ath party in advance and, two: the allowance of such opposition precludes the onset of a strong, unified opposition movement within society and thus the possibility of a coup d’état; as the saying goes: keep your friends close, but your enemies closer. Socialization Political culture is transmitted from one culture to the next through a phenomenon known as political socialization. The political views one has are often acquired by the time one becomes a teenager, but these views can prove to be fluid and can evolve throughout one’s life (Almond et al 2010, 51). There are many avenues by which one acquires political views, as well. People can be influenced by their parents, siblings, teachers, fellow students, friends, churches/mosques/temples, as well as political parties, media and interest groups. The latter three, more likely than not, are attempting to influence the population for their own advantage. In Syria, one can look at the ideology and nature of the regime to gain an understanding of the state of political socialization within the country. The political culture that has been passed from generation to generation has been one defined by the existence of either one-party rule or military dictatorship; it is a political culture where the ideas of freedom of thought, dissent against authority, or democracy in general are foreign. It is political culture that tends to be anti-Zionist, anti-American, pro-Palestinian and officially pro-Arab, though this last aspect has been waning in past decades and may be replaced by a more nationalistic, pro-Syrian trend. “Democratic” elections are an exercise in regime maintenance. Protests and public dissent, common and tolerated in the West, are put down forcefully and lethally in Syria, as was the case in 1982 against the Sunnis living in Hama and is currently the case in 2011 against all classes of society. It is also a political culture that is based on the multi-sectarian and multi-ethnic nature of Syria, and, furthermore, on the lack of any past Syrian state. One word, however, may define the political identity of modern day Syria and which the ruling Ba’ath Party has embodied since its genesis as a political entity: Pan-Arabism, also known as Arab Nationalism. As the state of Syria came into existence only in 1946, and its lands having been inhabited by different ethnicities and religious sects, there was no basis for any notion of Syrian identity which a regime, following the withdrawal of French forces, could rely on in order to garner support or gain legitimacy. In this way, “political identities inherited by the new state focused not on it, but on smaller pre-existing units – city, tribe, sectarian group – or a larger community – the empire, the Islamic umma, or nation, and, increasingly, the idea of an Arab nation (Hinnebusch 2001, 18).” “(S)ecular Arab nationalism was its most plausible and potentially integrating identity (Hinnebusch 2002, 141).” As such, while the French had taken the route of “divide and conquer,” the Ba’athist regime, on the other hand, took the tack of bringing everyone under one tent. The Ba’athists took advantage of the fact that 90% of the peoples were ethnic Arabs and the fact that there were various religious sects within the country and ran on a platform of “secular pan-Arabism,” as outlined earlier. When looking at other possible sources of political socialization, it is clear that the Ba’ath party has all but succeeded in stifling these potential anti-regime influences. The Ba’ath party, through its ability to gain cross-sectarian support due to its all-encompassing ideology, has managed to prevent both all and even singular groups of society from being able to find a great enough cause to fight to bring down the government (at least until very recently). One can see how decades of life under a one-party authoritarian regime might be conducive to the passing down of a political culture from parent to child that is defined by that very authoritarian rule; what else is the parent supposed to pass down? What else does the parent know? Concerning schools, the curriculum for grades equivalent to 1-12 in the U.S., practically unchanged since 1967 when Nasserism was still in vogue, promotes purely Sunni Islamic values – for the purpose of mollifying the Sunni majority in the country, the untrustworthy and deceitful nature of all Jews, as well as pan-Arab ideology (Landis 2003). It is this that all school children are exposed to for the whole of their upbringing. Moreover, according to Article 21 the Constitution, the goals of the educational system within Syria are as follows: “The educational and cultural system aims at creating a socialist nationalist Arab generation which is scientifically minded and attached to its history and land, proud of its heritage, and filled with the spirit of struggle to achieve its nation's objectives of unity, freedom, and socialism, and to serve humanity and its progress (International).” This reality, too, plays a considerable role in the political socialization of Syria’s youth. Regarding other agents of political socialization, in terms of religious institutions, interest groups, and even the media, one can safely conclude that these play a minute part in the political socialization of the population. This stems from the secularist policies of the regime, concerning the religious aspect, its suppression of anti-regime groups, concerning interest groups, and its control of essentially all of the media. Interest Articulation and Aggregation As can be easily deduced by now, the Ba’ath party’s influence is felt in all places in society. In this way, a notion such as interest articulation, much like democracy or freedom of the press, is a rather alien concept in Syrian society. In truth, only the groups within the Ba’ath sphere, such as Ba’ath party members, ‘Alawis, and some Sunnis are able to directly influence policy. It is a contradiction, in fact, about the Ba’ath party, that it proclaims to serve the interests of so-many unrepresented and disenfranchised groups, and allowing them a louder voice and a better lot in life, then oppressing any dissent these groups may manifest against the regime. Policy-making The features of policy-making within the Syrian government are exactly what one would expect when one-party rules the whole government. Most legislation benefits the Ba’ath party interest and its clientele’s interest directly and any legislation that may outwardly seem as beneficial to a certain segment of society in fact is only to the advantage of the Ba’ath party, as was illustrated when Hafiz Al-Asad opened up the economy in the 1970’s; this in fact only made the upper classes beholden to the Ba’ath party. There has been somewhat of a change in the manner of policy-making since the period when Hafiz Al-Asad ruled. Whereas Hafiz was clearly the decision-maker in the government (Kandil 2008, 431), the regime under Bashar has experienced a movement away from a president-dominated one toward one with “a number of power centers that are paralyzing each other (Wiesland 2006, 15).” It seems that the Mukhabarat – a more nefarious and lethal version of the American FBI – and the army have gained more influence in the policy-making sphere. Bashar has even been called a “junior partner” in the Ba’ath party (ibid.). This trend, away from the Ba’ath party and its ideology of pan-Arabism and toward a secular Syrian nationalism has been a trend that has been ongoing for some time. Conclusion Syria is the birthplace of the Ba’ath party and Arab nationalism. The Ba’ath party, able to capitalize on the political instability of the 1950s, the weaknesses and deficiencies of rival parties and the political mobilization against the ruling oligarchy that occurred during that time, while using an ideology that won support from most segments of society, came into power in 1963. It wasn’t until 1970, when Hafiz Al-Asad was elected, having run unopposed, that the Ba’ath party was able to consolidate its power and gain influence in all parts of society. Arab nationalism was the platform the Ba’ath party ran on, because of the nature of Syria’s political history. There had been no previous Syrian state, and thus no basis for Syrian nationalism, and thus no possibility for a political party to win favor by running on “pro-Syrian” platform. The Ba’ath party also exploited the multi-sectarian nature of the country and espoused secularism. The Ba’ath party, one could say, espoused many policies to curry favor from all segments of society, particularly the ‘Alawi minority and the lower classes; this is the very reason why it came into power and has stayed in power since 1963. Ba’ath rule is very oppressive and tolerates no dissent. The Syrian political culture has no experience with democracy or the kind of personal freedoms that Westerners take for granted. Interest articulation is extremely limited. Interest aggregation and policy-making take the Syrian citizenry under absolutely no account; interest articulation comes from the party itself and policy is made by the elite of the party. Ba’ath party rule is a very tenuous one, however, as it is based on an outdated ideology of pan-Arabism, which fell out of favor in the region shortly after the death of Jamal Abd Al-Nasser. The Ba’ath party, too, loses much legitimacy when one realizes the contradiction that exists when it oppresses the very people it is supposed to represent and who make up the base of the party, namely the minorities and lower classes. The Ba’ath party, indeed, according to Hinnebusch, has been “downgraded, deideologized, and turned into a patronage machine with little capacity for independent action (Kandil 2008, 431).” The party has been described as being a “convenient instrument to enlist broad public support,” but, in effect, it is nothing more than a “necessary cloak for the regime” and “more an instrument for the execution of policy than an originator of policy (ibid. 431-2).” Indeed, it seems that the political trend is more towards Syrianism today than the pan-Arabism that the Ba’ath party espouses. Yahya Sadowski posits that Syrians are becoming more homogenized and more nationalistic as time progresses (Sadowski 2002, 137-54). This is the direct result of four things: the decline in the pan-Arab Ba’ath ideology; a consensus among the public for the pursuit of a more capitalist economy; the increasing movement of people to the cities away from the rural areas; and the intermarriage among the elite. Whether this trend directly relates to what is happening in Syria currently or if the uprising is more economically driven is unclear. Either way, it is clear that Syrians, most likely through the forces of globalization and the freedom they see existing outside Syria, want to be liberated from under the hand of the Ba’ath regime. References Almond, Gabriel A., Powell, G. Bingham., Dalton, Russell J., Strøm, Kaare. 2010. Comparative Politics Today: A World View. Updated 9th Ed. New York: Longman Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2002. “The Foreign Policy of Syria.” In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. 141-165. 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