Veremis-web

The Modern Balkans: A Concise Guide to Nationalism and Politics. The Rise and Decline of the Nation State. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ....................................................................................... 4 PREFACE ............................................................................................ 6 Part I. THE BALKANS: FROM THE 19th TO THE 21st CENTURY. THE BUILDING AND DISMANTLING OF NATION STATES .......................... 9 Chapter 1: Perceptions and Misreading ....................................... 9 Chapter 2: Common Elements in the State Formation of the 19th Century ....................................................................................... 18 Chapter 3: From the Nation State to the Stateless Nation ......... 35 Chapter 4: Albanians, South-Slavs and Bulgarians ..................... 51 Chapter 5: Era of Fermentation and Wars .................................. 58 Chapter 6: The Interwar Conundrum ......................................... 71 Chapter 7: From War to Communism......................................... 87 Chapter 8: The Balance of Forces in the Balkans ...................... 103 Chapter 9: In Search of Multilateralism .................................... 115 Chapter 10: Redefining Security: Yugoslavia 1989-1995 ......... 127 Part II. THE BALKANS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ................. 139 Chapter 1: Nationalism & Identity in the Balkans..................... 139 Chapter 2: The Economies ........................................................ 153 Chapter 3: The Army in Politics ................................................ 167 Chapter 4: Western Amateurs and the End of History ............. 191 Part III. UNFINISHED BUSINESS ..................................................... 207 Chapter 1: The Macedonian Question 1991-2010 ................... 207 Chapter 2: Independence for Kosovo ....................................... 225 Chapter 3: Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Intractable Problem? ...... 262 EPILOGUE: The Chances of Post-Modernity in the Balkans ......... 271 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUPPLEMENT .................................................. 281 CHRONOLOGY ............................................................................... 289 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................ 303 FOREWORD The Balkans has often been a source of confusion for foreign observers, leading to a sense of a separate identity o othe ess . Balka a d Balka isatio ha e ee pejorative terms transferred to describe or dismiss other contexts. Undoubtedly, the region has also been of geostrategic importance in the modern development of Europe and the ise a d de li e of e pi es a d g eat po e s . I the 1990s, the West looked with horror at the wars emanating from the collapse of Yugoslavia. More recently, the European Union has embarked on a set of strategies that may lead to the accession of further countries from the region. Underlying this historical landscape are the themes of what constitutes a nation, the tensions of distinct nationalisms, and the capacity of nation states to achieve their stated goals. Thanos Veremis has long been recognised internationally as a pre-eminent authority on the modern political history of the Balkans. LSEE Research on South East Europe, a research unit at the London School of Economics, is very pleased to be able to bring his latest work to the attention of a wider audience. In this book, Veremis synthesises much of the contemporary historiography of the Balkans and provides a clear, accessible narrative. The book has a broad historical reach, from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries. It has three main sections: the first covers the emergence of the new nation states and the stateless nations; the second makes thematic connections between this Balkan history and that of the wider world, with respect to issues of nationalism and identity; and 4 the thi d e plo es the u fi ished usi ess of the p ese t – the issues that linger and challenge the region and its allies. This work will be of much value to students and scholars, new and old, who seek a ready companion and reference to their inquiries. It will illuminate the grand themes of Balkan history, but also answer more specific queries. Individual episodes are located easily within the bigger picture. LSEE has a mission to promote the better understanding of the Balkans internationally, through its own scholarly contributions and by facilitating informed public debate. It has developed a strong research programme of its own; created innovative research networks internationally; and promoted a variety of public events to debate key issues. LSEE welcomes international collaboration in these activities. Ve e is e o k se es a of these o e objectives. We are confident that you will find it a very u seful addition to your library – either as a first guide or as a stimulus to renewed reflection. Professor Kevin Featherstone Chair, LSEE Research on South East Europe European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 5 PREFACE Besides a common religious tradition, there are other elements that run through the nineteenth century nation states of South Eastern Europe. Nationalism, a vital western import, will prove a lasting influence within and between the young nation states of the region. Nationalism as a powerful creed will undergo many transformations before it confronts western ultimatums at the last part of the twentieth century. In this work we will attempt to pursue the pervasive nationalist theme that went hand in hand with other significant western influences in the Balkans. Throughout the state-building process of Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and later, Albania, the West provided legal, administrative and political prototypes to this less developed part of the European continent, bedevilled by competing irredentist claims. Our intention, furthermore, is to present the above elements alongside political highlights of the modern Balkan states in concise form and discuss their current reincarnations and of course their relations with other states. “i e Lefte “ta ia os o u e tal o k a ot e abridged without losing the charm of its narrative, the student of regional politics that wishes to excel in his/her field must still look into the entire oeuvre: The Balkans since 1453 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1963, Hurst & Co, 1999). Traian Stoianovich with his, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe (M.E. Sharpe, 1994) offers extracts of lasting wisdom on the subject. This is nevertheless a work to be consulted after having secured a basic knowledge of 6 South Eastern Europe. Other prominent scholars of the Balkans, such as Charles & Barbara Jelavich and Robert Lee Wolff, have dealt extensively with the modern history of the region but their works need updating. This author has attempted 1) a cursory analysis of Balkan history, 2) a comparative study of Balkan economies, the military and nationalist creeds and finally 3) a discussion of unfinished business in Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and FYROM. The reader will also discover that this book does not reproduce the conventional western wisdom in dealing with the Balkans. It s somewhat contrarian slant however may provoke scholars into new discussions of Balkan phenomena. During his years of teaching Balkan history and politics at Princeton, the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy and the University of Athens, the author realised that a concise history of events and the presentation of recurring themes, would be useful to the uninitiated scholar and university student. The author has therefore tried to be selective in his use of secondary sources, many of which appeared without critical care in the thick of the Yugoslav crisis. Separating the essential from the trivial and facts from passionate conviction, is part of the task of teaching history. Without a doubt his greatest debt is to the late Mark Dragoumis who discussed salient points of this work and encouraged him to put the manuscript to print. Many thanks are due to Professor Susan Woodward for her important corrections, Assoc. Professor Dimitris Livanios of Thessaloniki University for his valuable remarks, to Dr. Evangelos Kofos of ELIAMEP for his expert advice, to Yannis Armakolas of the University of Macedonia Thessaloniki, for vital updates and to Ms Maria Konstantaki for reaching the finishing line in her typing Marathon. 7 Much of the research for this book was completed during the autho s te at the Hellenic Observatory of the LSE (January – May 2010). His gratitude for their hospitality goes to Kevin Featherstone, Spyros Economides and Ismini Demades. Without the valuable input of the LSEE – Research on South Eastern Europe and especially the editorial work of Tena Prelec and Dimitris Sourvanos, this work would not have been published in this form. Thanos Veremis Athens 2014 8 Part I. THE BALKANS: FROM THE 19th TO THE 21st CENTURY. THE BUILDING AND DISMANTLING OF NATION STATES Chapter 1: Perceptions and Misreading The te Balkanisatio first appeared in British agazi es of the s to de ote the f ag e tatio of la ge administrative entities as well as the hostile relations between the ensuing states. Balkanisation is a derogatory term that signifies weakness, underdevelopment and a hapless division.1 The Balkans as we know them, consist of states that broke free of Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian rule. Their ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity is similar to the state-entities of Central and Western Europe before the policies of absolute monarchies, and later those of each nation state, had managed to attain an extensive cultural and religious homogenisation. Yugoslavia came together because of the common linguistic heritage of most of its constituent parts and the many external threats that surrounded them. The experiment of statebuilding was performed twice before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the really existing socialism whipped up in Yugoslavia 1 Ja es De De ia S/N: International Theory, Balkanisation and the New Wo ld O de in M. Ringrose & Adam Lerner (eds.) Reimagining the Nation, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 104. 9 the local nationalisms that Tito had bridled after the Second World War. Although the dismantling of Yugoslavia from its multicultural configuration of 1919 and then again 1945, did not occur elsewhere in the Balkans, the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria and more recently the economic bailout of Greece by the Eurozone and the IMF, entailed a reduction in national sovereignty for all nation states involved. Did the Balkan states ever exercise their sovereignty to the full? This author will note that the gunboat diplomacy of the past has been replaced by the influence that creditors exert over their indebted clients. It might therefore be safe to assume that extraneous military control is a thing of the past while economic influence, with its positive as well as negative attributes, is here to stay. Nationalist aspirations were given a new lease of life and irredentisms were summoned from the past. While visiting Pristina in April 2010 this author was given a handsome picture book by the Kosovo tourist agency and was surprised to find a map indicating the borders of the Albanian irredenta in Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and FYROM. The schoolbooks of FYROM with a map of the greater Macedonian state straddling Bulgarian and Greek territories can be easily obtained in bookshops at Skopje. Could this be considered part of the unfinished business in the Balkans along with the claims of the Kosovar Albanians for recognition as the last independent state of the Western Balkans? This work may suggest that wars of liberation from imperial domination and subsequent ethnic competition between Bulgaria and Serbia, Greece and Turkey and Albanians with Serbs, have not all expired, although some have. The last remnant of ethnic competition took place in Kosovo, but Albanian irredentism may not be entirely finished. This work will attempt to explain the 10 sources of lingering aspirations of national unification in the Western Balkans. Historical accuracy has not always been displayed by those western authors who turned the Balkans into the scapegoat of the European continent. Moreover, the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia, added new brushstrokes to an already dark picture of the area. The famous American diplomat George Kennan attributed the responsibility for the Yugoslav tragedy to the Balkans as a whole: Eighty years have now passed he notes since the Carnegie commissioners paid their visit to that region. And this writer knows no evidence that the ability of the Balkan people to interact peaceably with one another is any greater now than it was eighty years ago .2 However, the relations between states in South Eastern Europe since 1994 bear no resemblance whatsoever to the era of irredentist competition in the Balkans that Kennan refers to. There are nonetheless contemporary commentators such as Misha Glenny (The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London, Granta, 1999) and also Susan L. Woodward (Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1999) who assign a large share of responsibility for the violence that prevailed in the recent Balkan developments to the influence of Western Powers. Woodward maintains that the economic upheaval created by the second oil crisis intensified the pressures that the Powers brought to bear on Yugoslavia to repay her debts to them. The measures dictated by the International Monetary Fund demanded a reform 2 Introduction to The Other Balkan Wars, in the re-published Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1996, p.15. 11 of the Yugoslav federal system that would strengthen the authority of the central Government over the federated republics. At exactly the same time, many western countries put pressure on the Yugoslavs to liberalise their economy and reduce the powers of the central Government in favour of the federated republics. Such contradictory western pressures contributed significantly to the dismantling of Yugoslavia and the violence that hit it. It is not just their ideology and their systems that the Great Western Powers brought into the area but also their quarrels. As noted by Jonathan Eyal: The view that the Balkans represent a disease rather than a geographical entity is based on a fundamental misreading of history. While the region has suffered more than its fair share of violence, much of it was engineered by competing alliances hatched in the West, rather than local animosities. 3 The history of the Balkans had started to be written by the Europeans long before the area was labelled Eu ope s po de keg . This less de eloped egio of the o ti e t fou d during the 18th century its moral scourge in the person of the British protestant E. Gibbon who had painted the Byzantine Empire and its realm in the darkest possible colours. It was thus that all the Balkan nation states emerging in the 19th century out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire inherited the original sin of having been part of a da k o ie talisi g ultu e that a ui i g its Otto a shape ended up by breaking totally with the West. The difference separating Gibbon from Samuel Huntington4 – who classifies both T. Veremis, Gree e s Balka Entanglement, ELIAMEP, 1995, p.2 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 3 4 12 Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Balkans as belonging to a non-European part of the world that confronts the pure-blood Catholic and Protestant Europeans – is not that great. Huntington is better known for his previous work on the role of the military in post-colonial societies. The Clash of Civilisations o the othe ha d displa s the autho s a alie attitude toward history and his inability to bring such an ambitious project to fruition. Nonetheless such repetitive, standardised, degradation of the Balkans consolidates this prejudice in western minds and ends up by turning it into a dead certainty. The only way of overcoming this exclusion of the Balkans from the European cultural tradition would be if a credible western intellectual and writer undertook to re-instate the Orthodox Balkan Peninsula into the European mainstream.5 The collapse of Yugoslavia and the atrocities that followed it were the work of ethnic leaders who were keen to play a dominant role in the new, unitary states (except Bosnia). The various secessionist ethnic forces, instead of accepting a secondary role within the federated units of former Yugoslavia, created five state entities of which they gained full control. Ethnic cleansing thus became the natural consequence of the creation of statelets based on the dominant position of a single ethnic group. Western perceptions of the war in Yugoslavia were shaped by the mass media that reduced a complex reality to simplistic aphorisms, easy to absorb by a bewildered public. Very few were the voices heard in the West condemning the biased presentation 5 The book by Maria Todorova, a professor at the University of Illinois, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, 1997, is the most serious rebuff to date of this superficial view of the Balkans. 13 of the facts of war. Amongst them was Charles Boyd, second-incommand of the U.S. European Forces. In an article published in Fo eig Affai s he e tio ed that any distinction between the warring factions in Bosnia has to do with power and degrees of opportunism rather than morality .6 The good side as disti guished f o the ad side o the asis of i es o itted on the battlefront, but also with regard to more permanent features and cultural ties, the outstanding political debts, the good or bad public relations, the circles of influence in Europe and in the United States as well as on the basis of a host of other such factors. It is certainly true that there were no innocents among the leaders of the war but the CNN and most of the mass media in Europe projected the Serbs as the only villains in this carnage. Even while the Serb population was being expelled from Krajina there was not a word of sympathy for the fate of people who were driven from their homes by force. The West took sides in this conflict while deluding itself that it was acting as a mediator between the opponents. The solution of the Bosnian issue on 21 November 1995 in Dayton Ohio was the work of a super-power whose belated decision was prompted by calculations of home policy concerns (the forthcoming presidential elections). Even so, the conjunctures worked perfectly. In summer 1995, the Croatian army evicted the Serbs form Krajina while the Serb-Bosnians cleansed their share of Bosnia. No agreement would have been reached, whether with or without the bombings, if ethnic cleansing had not first been completed. This is the unfortunate conclusion that future Cha les Bo d Maki g Pea e September/October 1995, p.23. 6 ith the Guilt Foreign Affairs, 14 proponents of ethnic cleansing will adhere to, unless refugees are repatriated in sufficient numbers. European pronouncements after Dayton reveal the awkward feelings that the American success did generate (International Herald Tribune, 23 November 1995). The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that the USA appeared on the scene just when the possibility for a settlement had started to come dimly into light while his French counterpart Hervé de Charette criticised the USA for having hampered efforts to find a diplomatic solution in previous stages. In spite of their cogency, such remarks reveal, nonetheless, the resentment felt by those who had failed in their efforts to find a solution. The truth is that the p i e o e s of the Eu opea U io s fo eig poli failed to work out a common stand during the Bosnia crisis. The USA, on the other hand, promoted their cohesive and well integrated solution with the required decisiveness. The Dayton Treaty had a serious impact on the policy o e i g Koso o s futu e. The lesso s that its Al a ia inhabitants drew from this Treaty were the following: the territorial gains resulting from the war in Bosnia were ratified; the external borders of Yugoslavia remained intact; and the sanctions were lifted without any concessions being made on the Kosovo issue. The appeal to the international community by Ibrahim Rugova – the leader of the Albanian Kosovars – to be granted independence without the use of violence, proved futile. At the radical end of the Albanian political spectrum, voices were heard advocating the use of violence. The Serbian authorities refused to revise the 1974 regime of autonomy as long as the Albanian leadership persisted in rejecting any arrangement, short of full independence. 15 The problem created by the confrontation between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo is not exclusive to the region. The Al a ia s of the Fo e Yugosla ‘epu li of Ma edo ia , fo instance, make up 25% of the population and claim to be recognised as a constituent non-Slavic ethnic community within a state which, they say, is entirely run by its ethnic majority. The European Union, the USA and the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) believe that the major threats agai st the se u it of the Fo e Yugosla ‘epu li of Ma edo ia a e i te al a d ill o ti ue to g o unless they are dealt with. After the bombings of 1999 that set back the economic development of the Western Balkans, the West continued to fight the previous war. Western media considered Miloše ić and his associates as the sole cause of every evil while the mafias that stalked the land passed unnoticed. Organised crime hates state authority of any kind and does its best to dismantle it. The collapse of Yugoslav authority favoured the blossoming of lawlessness. The insufficiency of forces that were necessary to stem the growth of criminality, namely police, magistrates and prison guards, made the future of the region unpredictable. The splintered remains of Yugoslavia did not possess a credible centre that would be able to coordinate the reconstruction of the broken economies. Slovenia and Croatia have found their way to normalisation but the southern countries – Serbia, Mo te eg o a d the Fo e Yugosla ‘epu li of Ma edo ia – are still struggling to escape their predicament. Western countries must encourage all possible forms of cooperation that will avert inertia and underdevelopment that could become permanent features of the Western Balkans 16 Our era is one during which fundamental principles, and concepts concerning the nation state are being redefined. The West, not with military might, but bearing gifts in the economic field penetrates successfully into central and South Eastern Europe. At a time when Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia have become full members of the EU, some orphans of the Communist past are still facing domestic problems that impede their progress towards Europe. 17 Chapter 2: Common Elements in the State Formation of the 19th Century Once one of the cradles of civilisation, and now the fault line of civilisation according to Samuel Huntington, the Balkans are the least developed European region. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania – all successor states to the Ottoman Empire – emerged from the ecumenical tradition of the Eastern Roman Empire, moved on to the discovery of the equally ecumenical Enlightenment and ended up by adopting its divisive but natural upshot, namely nationalism. As the Balkan states that emerged from the liberation struggles against Ottoman rule upgraded their eth i t aditio s a d la guage i to high ultu e fo thei itize s, the common elements amongst Balkan peoples evaporated. What is it that remains today of the common Byzantine tradition in the Balkans? It is only perhaps in the national Orthodox churches that some common ritual still survives. Otherwise the Balkan countries are separated by three cultural traditions, the Greek, the Latin and the Slavonic while their recent history is replete with conflicts between them. A common denominator among these peoples was the art of commerce and tax evasion. Abusive Ottoman taxes drove some into the better developed Habsburg markets and others to explore the Balkan waterways. The Greek merchant fleet of the Black Sea and its search for access into the Ottoman markets, had much to do with the 1770 Orlov uprising. This early upheaval of Christian Orthodox people against Ottoman rule was put down with a ferocity that discouraged rebellions for the next half a century. By 1774-1783 Catherine the Great had forced the Ottomans to grant ships with a Russian flag the right to engage in transit trade through 18 Ottoman ports. Furthermore the Napoleonic wars and the British blockade damaged French commerce in the Levant and after 1815 this passed to Orthodox hands. The conquering Orthodox Balkan merchant knew his heyday and out of his ranks came the enlighteners, or at least those who gave the enlightenment the opportunity to spread throughout the region.7 Before the break of the Church with the Enlightenment, caused by the persecution of clerics by the French revolutionaries, top enlightenment figures had emerged from the bosom of the orthodox clergy. As the Church had the monopoly of educating the orthodox, it also made sure to renew its scholarly arsenal to use against its opponents. Given that certain views of the enlighteners did not threaten the Orthodox doctrine as such, the prelates had no reason to oppose the circulation of secular ideas. The great majority of Orthodox believers in the Balkans however were peasants devoted to the Church and its prelates who remained thus untouched by ideas originating in the West. The Orthodox Church based its power primarily on the agrarian masses of Balkan society. The peasantry, which formed the overwhelming majority of the Christian population (more than double the size of the Balkan Muslims in 1830) 8, remained firmly T aia “toia o i h, The Co ue i g Balka O thodo Me ha t Journal of Economic History, XX (1960) p.243-313. Also see John Lampe & Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History 1550-1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations, Indiana University Press, 1982, p.39-42. For a comprehensive view of the Enlightenment in the Balkans, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, The Enlightenment as Social Criticism, Princeton University Press, 1992. 8 Halil Inalcik & Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (1300-1914), Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 7 19 within the fold of the Church and lived by the traditions of Orthodoxy, sustaining and replenishing the main bastions of ecclesiastical power and spiritual life, the extensive network of monastic institutions. The peasantry remained of course outside the radiation of the new culture of the Enlightenment, conceived of themselves primarily in terms of their religious identity and accepted as a rule the authority of the Ottoman state. Instances of violent protest and disobedience did occur from time to time among the peasantry, but they stemmed primarily from socioeconomic motives and lacked ethnic or national content. Thus at the close of the eighteenth century South Eastern Europe under Ottoman rule formed a fundamentally unitary cultural region, whose identity was defined by the traditions of Orthodoxy and the heritage of literary education transmitted by the Orthodox Church. Politically, Orthodox Balkan culture attained a milestone in the last decade of the eighteenth century, when the winds of change emanating from revolutionary France reached the distant southeast corner of Europe. The influences of revolutionary and Napoleonic France in South Eastern Europe were felt primarily through four channels. First, direct contacts with the French Revolution were provided by the two Balkan geographical regions that came directly under French rule: the seven islands of the Ionian Sea off the weste oast of G ee e a d the Ill ia p o i es in Croatia and Dalmatia. The manifestations of the revolutionary spirit and the social and administrative reforms enacted in these areas under French rule brought to the Balkans the vocabulary and concepts of revolution and evoked alternative political models for shaping the future. Secondly, the carriers of 779. According to the Ottoman census of 1831 the province of Rumelia had 724,000 Christian subjects and 337,000 Muslims. 20 F e h ideas (diplomats, secret agents, local liberals and revolutionaries) constituted the human factor that propagated revolutionary influences within Balkan society, stimulating expectations of political change. Thirdly, the intellectual circles of the Balkan mercantile diaspora in Central and Western Europe also provided channels for the transmission of the principles and the new political culture of the French Revolution to their home societies. Finally, Balkan attempts at revolutionary activity inspired by the French Revolution inaugurated a tradition of local radicalism, which lingered on until the 1820s. The paradigmatic case of revolutionary action was the movement of Rigas Velestinlis in 1797-1798. Rigas and his companions visualised the replacement of Ottoman despotism by a democratic republic in which the whole Balkan population, regardless of ethnic or religious distinctions, would pa ti ipate as e ual itize s . 9 The creation of states and the shaping of national consciousness of their populations was the most revolutionary development in the Balkans, fighting to free themselves from the Ottoman rule. The new nation states undermined the cohesion of the O thodo E u e i G eek o d ea i g the i ha ited universe) with their clashing irredentist ambitions, to such an extent as to oblige Turkey, the largest successor-state of the Ottoman Empire, to become a nation state too. In spite of the fact that all these populations adhered, to a large extent, to their traditional way of life, the leaders of the new states dismantled the structures of the Ottoman Empire and built the new system with materials they imported from the West. 9 Excerpt from a manuscript by P. Kitromilides and T. Veremis for the History of the Scientific and Cultural Development – The Nineteenth Century in South Eastern Europe, Vol. VI, 1985. 21 The western-leaning elites and the bourgeois strata where these originated, chose the western models of modernisation such as the French system of public administration (that reached Greece via the Bavarians) and English parliamentarism. The struggle between the centre and the periphery, the government and the traditional primates, was a common feature in all the Balkan entities during the first twenty years after the liberation from the Ottomans. The rule of law and modernisation prevailed only after a struggle between the central government and the periphery, was resolved in favour of the former. Constitutional monarchies in Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria evolved from the extraordinary powers of the ruler, to a gradual sharing of authority between hegemons and elites. The executive and the legislature achieved their mutual balance during the dynastic changes in Greece (1863), Romania (1866), Serbia (1869) and Bulgaria (1879). The Belgian constitution exerted considerable influence in the Balkans, while Serbia looked to the Greek and Romanian prototypes. In turn the Bulgarians imitated certain Serb institutions such as the Grand National Assembly – the Skupština.10 The antagonism between the liberals and the conservatives in Bulgarian politics was closely linked to the role of the Russians as guarantors of that state. The Liberals, who controlled parliament, enjoyed the support of Russia, the most conservative Great Power of its time. At the heart of the la do e s o se ati e esista e to ha ge i Bulga ia e e the Church and the Crown. Edda Binder – Iiji a & Ekkeha d K aft, The Making of States. Constitutio al Mo a hies i the Balka s , in Wim Van Meurs & Alina Mungiu – Pipidi (eds.), Ottomans into Europeans State and Institution – Building in South-Eastern Europe, London: Hurst & Co, 2010, pp. 5-6. 10 22 In spite of the misleading names of the Balkan parties that refer to West-European models, the societies of South Eastern Europe often answer to the description of the traditional seg e ta so iet as des i ed E est Gell e . This t pe of society also tends to undermine the central government – whether authoritarian or democratic – but unlike civil society, a seg e ta society does not ensure the freedom of the individual but subjects it to some patronage network or other subgroup. 11 The dynasty of Ka ađo đe ić in Serbia appropriated the term liberal to distinguish itself from the opposing camp of O e o ić, who were presented as conservatives. Such categories had little to do with the social reality of the British liberal and conservative model. They were rather person-centred groups and clientelistic networks that adopted foreign-sounding denominations to gain international legitimacy. So, in Serbia, the two dynasties alternated in power just as the liberal and conservative parties alternated in Greece. With certain differences, this feature is encountered in all Balkan countries. Thus in Serbia, the original rebellion against the Belgrade Janissaries was mainly the work of Ka ađo đe Pet o ić. In Greece there was no single agency or force that launched the war of independence in 1821. The idea of a e olutio as the ai hild of the F ie dl “o iet , consisting of diaspora Greeks who were instrumental in modernising the new state once it gained its place in the sun. In Serbia, on the other hand, the role of the local notables was stronger than that of their counterparts in Greece (known by their Tu kish a e as kotza ashi . While these e e g aduall incorporated in the new state, the Serbian primates continued 11 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, Civil Society and its Rivals London, Hamish Hamilton, 1994, pp.1-12 23 throughout the 19th century to cause difficulties to the parliamentary system. The Greek Constitution of 1863 was more democratic than the Serbian one of 1869 and G ee e s parliamentary life smoother. Between 1817 and 1818 Serbia doubled the size of its easte te ito a d a o di g to the i pe ial fi a de ee of 1830 gained its full administrative autonomy. The revolution of 1821-30 made Greece the first independent nation state of the Balkan Peninsula. In 1833, Greece acquired its own monarch, the Bavarian prince Otto, of the house of Wittelsbach. His kingdom contained only one fourth of the total Greek population under Ottoman rule (eight hundred thousand souls) and a countryside destroyed by warfare and the Egyptian occupation. With the annexation of the Ionian Islands in 1864 (under British rule since 1815) and of Thessaly in 1881, Greece achieved most of her initial irredentist goals without bloodshed. Ho e e , G ee e s i depe de e o t i uted to the e e ge e of rival Balkan nationalisms, which finally undermined the influence of the Greek cultural tradition in the Balkans. The relationship between the Balkan states and the Great Powers i.e. England, France and Russia (for the Serbs one must also add the Habsburg Empire) was shaped by a combination of state relations and political penetration. The influence of Russia on the traditional agricultural societies of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria from the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) until the end of the Crimean war (1853-56) was instrumental in encouraging their irredentist aspirations. After its Crimean defeat, Russia was replaced in Greece in terms of influence by Britain that had never stopped competing with Russia since the very beginning of the Greek Revolution. In Serbia, Austria and Russia were the main rivals, while in Bulgaria 24 Russian patronage knew periods of intermittent success during the last quarter of the 19th century. Romania commenced by accepting Russian protection, but later sought an alternative patron by turning to France. The hostility of the native-born (autochthonous) Greeks against those born outside the realm who competed with them for public office, was one more element that Serbia and Greece had in common. In Serbia the autochthonous primates viewed with suspicion those of the same descent as themselves who returned from Austria. The same treatment was meted to foreign-born (heterochthonous) Greeks when they came into contact with the natives of Rumelia and Moreas. The native Greeks succeeded in excluding their foreign-born compatriots from public office by a special article in the Greek Constitution of 1844. The distribution of national lands, or large private estates to the landless peasants, was the commitment that enhanced the credibility of the new states. While in most Balkan countries it was the Ottomans who owned the bulk of the arable land – duly appropriated by the new states after their liberation – Romania was the great exception to the rule. Wallachia became a tributary state to the Ottomans in the 15th century and Moldavia followed suit a century later. Contrary to what happened in the rest of the Balkans, the Ottomans did not settle in Moldavia and Wallachia so that the local Boyar landowners retained their estates as well as a considerable degree of autonomy. The 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, between the Russian victors and the defeated Ottomans, made Russia joint sovereign of oth these p i ipalities. A o di g to the O ga i La s of 32 that were imposed during the period of Russian occupation, the Boyar primates were legal landowners of the provinces they represented while the tenant farmers who cultivated them 25 remained in a state of serfdom. Even though agricultural output doubled between 1829 and 1859, the problem of landless peasants became the most serious social issue in Romania during the 19th century and the cause of major political upheavals. The fact that ownership was concentrated in few hands did not result in the modernisation of agriculture in Romania, as was the case in England, or even Russia. The population increase at the start of the 20th century and the rising price of land for the tenants, contributed to the peasant revolts of 1907. Of all the Balkan states, Romania was the most affected by the upheavals of 1848 that shook the cities of Europe. The Romanian elite that sided with the causes of political independence and social reform, also sought to improve its position in the running of the state. The other consideration of liberals and nobles that partook in the Romanian version of 1848 was nationalist irredentism. The problems of autonomy and the unification of Romania however divided the Great Powers. France and Russia favoured Romanian expansion while Austria and Great Britain did not. The Crimean war (1853-56) was an early equivalent of the European wars that the continent would experience in the next century. Although England and France entered the conflict in order to keep the integrity of the Ottoman Empire intact, their victory over Russia led to the autonomy of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Napoleon III of France became the great supporter of the Romanian cause12. When the war between France and Austria diverted the attention of the European Powers from the Balkan area, the Romanians grasped the chance in 1859 to declare the autonomy of Wallachia and Moldavia under Prince Alexander 12 Peter N. Stearns, The European Experience Since 1815, New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich Inc, 1972, pp. 94-97. 26 Cuza, a native aristocrat who had taken part in the 1848 uprising in Jassy. The two principalities were officially united in 1862 to form the autonomous state of Romania with Bucharest as its capital. In 1863, Cuza carried out a referendum for the ratification of the Constitution, which consolidated the autocratic, leader-centred, form of government that he had established. The same year he implemented the agricultural reform that abolished serfdom. In Austria, serfdom was abolished in 1841, in Prussia 1850 and in Russia as of 1861. However, this attempt at land redistribution failed because the Boyar landlords managed to exploit the opportunities that the law gave them and retained most of their la d. Cuza s failu e ost hi the t ust of the peasa ts hile the Boyars saw him as opposed to their interests and kept fighting his policy of distributing land to the landless. In 1866, Cuza was ousted and was replaced by Charles Hohenzollern who reigned as Prince Carol I. Even though the new Constitution had all the characteristics of the parliamentary system, the Conservative Party (representing the interests of the big landowners) and the Liberals (representing the bourgeoisie) left the peasants without a voice in Parliament. 13 The monarchs in the Balkans were, as a rule, imported from German statelets, with the exception of Cuza and the two local dynasties of Serbia, where after the assassination of Prince Ka ađo đe in 1817, the 19th century was dominated by the dynasty of the O e o ić. The longest lasting monarchs were Carol I of Romania – who kept his crown for forty-eight years – and George Glű ks u g of G ee e ho su eeded i the deposed Ki g Otto and reigned for forty-nine years. Carol I who became King in 1881, proved a master balancer of Romanian politics. As head of Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866 – 1947, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 15ff. 13 27 the army he kept it out of party politics and secured for himself the reputation of the even-handed ruler of his country. He died in 1914 afte elu ta tl g a ti g his o se t to the ajo it s de isio that Romania remains neutral during the Great War. This neutrality however did not last. Following the Congress of Berlin the Romanian Liberal party and its leading B ătia u family, represented the aspirations of the nationalist bourgeoisie but showed little interest for the plight of the peasantry. Neither the Liberals, nor the land-owning Conservatives promoted the necessary land reforms that could have averted the coming storm of 1907. Driven by poverty the Moldavian peasants, who did not see the Greater Romania ideal of the nationalists as a substitute for agrarian reform, went into a rampage of destruction against their landlords and their Jewish middlemen. The rebellion was put down with great ferocity by the authorities. More than 10,000 peasant insurgents were massacred, but several years later the Romanian government saw it necessary to implement a major redistribution of land. Romanian nationalism, with its irredentist claims and its strong anti-Semitism, persisted.14 Amongst all the Balkan Orthodox peoples under Ottoman rule, the Bulgarians suffered the longest delay in their national unification as this became linked, during the last third of the 19 th century, to the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Exarchate Church. The auto o of the Bulga ia Chu h as g a ted the “ulta s fi a de ee of 1870. The autocephaly of a church representing the Bulgarian state profited from a lesson that Greece had taught 14 Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times. A revised edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978, p.86. The author makes reference to the Romanian official documents of the 1907 event, published in Bucharest, 1948-49. 28 her Balkan neighbours: how a national church could secede from the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1833, the Bavarian regents declared, in the name of Otto, the independence of the Greek Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Nineteen years elapsed before a compromise i.e. a mutually accepted arrangement was reached between the Greek state and the Patriarchate. However, the secession of the Bulgarian Exarchate followed a somewhat different path. According to article of the “ulta s fi a a e E a hate Bishop i ould e created if two thirds of the flock voted in its favour. This legislative arrangement created religious havoc to begin with and later led to ethnic antagonism especially in areas as ethnically diverse as the Ottoman region of Macedonia. The struggle of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians to claim Macedonia began as a clash between the supporters of the Patriarchate with those of the Exarchate and ended up in the involvement of three states, namely Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The Crimean war put an end to the pan-Orthodox policy of Russia. About twenty years later, Russia came back to the Balkans with a new policy that was no longer addressed to the Orthodox but to the Slavs. Supranational Slavophilism became a movement of national awakening for the Russians themselves, and it included a rainbow of views that ranged from extreme conservatism to radical anarchism. In their effort to emancipate themselves from the authority of the Ecumenical Pat ia hate, the Bulga ia s found in Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, the most senior panslav in the Russian foreign ministry, a powerful ally 15. Since a major task of the panslav Russians was the liberation of the Slavic subjects of the 15 Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question. Britain and the Southern Balkans, 1939-1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 16. 29 Habsburg and Ottoman empires, the Russian state itself became an instrument, rather than an initiator, of the revolutionary outbursts in the Balkans. Although the imperial government was suspicious of ethnic demand for self-determination, Czar Alexander II was compelled to declare war against the Ottoman empire in 1877 because he could not ignore the widespread pro-slavic sentiment within his own realm and also because this war served as a convenient diversion of public attention from domestic problems.16 Russian imperial designs focused thereafter on the Serbs and the Bulgarians rather than all their Orthodox brothers in Christ. Czar Alexander III went a step further. He made Russification the policy of the Romanovs in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire. His nationalist project, besides causing the reaction of non-slavs of his vast realm, also succeeded in rallying the support of Russian nationalists around the throne17. Pan-Slavism was revived during the Second World War by none other than Stalin, as an ideology with a direct appeal to Russians and their alleged kin in Eastern Europe. The irredentist programmes of Serbia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria became a dominant feature of their foreign policy, and their nationalist outbursts allowed the Great Powers to interfere in their internal affairs. The revolt of the Bulgarians in 1876 and its most violent suppression by the Ottoman forces generated the sympathy of Britain and Russia. The Russian victory in the war against the Ottomans and the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) offered Bulgaria the prospect of territorial expansion that Ada Dialla, σία α έ α ι σ α Βα ά ια (Russia and the Balkans) Athens: Alexandria, 2009, pp.215-292. 17 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983, pp. 83-84. 16 30 became the motto of Bulgarian irredentism and developed into the idea of the Integral Bulgaria . The Tirnovo Constitution in its first two articles addressed territorial boundaries and frontier issues how to maintain a common institutional framework for all orthodox Bulgarians inside and outside the principality in anticipation of political unity 18. The other example of a state that views itself as a rump entity is the present FYROM (see preamble of the constitution). The Berlin Treaty (1878) that inaugurated the entry of a unified Germany into the circle of the great and the powerful interfering in the Balkans, revised the San Stefano Treaty thus li iti g the te ito ial gai s of Bulga ia a d o se ue tl ‘ussia s influence in the region. In this way, Britain – which had caused these revisions – e te ded the Otto a E pi e s lease of life so that it could continue to play its role as a bulwark against Russian expansionism. According to the Treaty of Berlin, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained full independence while Bulgaria became an autonomous principality. In this way, the Great Powers determined the fate of the Balkans for the next forty-five years. The countries that gained their independence after 1878 (Serbia, Romania) and 1908 (Bulgaria), found themselves trapped between the antagonism of Russia with Austria – in the case of Serbia – or under Russian influence – such as Romania and Bulgaria. In Serbia, the O e o ić dynasty, having sided with the Austrians and the Germans, avoided, for that reason, claiming Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ka ađo đe ić dynasty on the other hand, joined the Russian bandwagon, and relied on the support of the Radical Party of Nicola Pašić. The rebellion of Timok (1883) against 18 Iijima & Kraft, op. cit., p. 10. 31 the autocratic moderniser Milan O e o ić, failed and its bloody suppression gratified the Austrians. The clash between the Liberals and the Conservatives dominated political life in Bulgaria during the last quarter of the 19th century. The 1879 Constitution adopted by the Parliament of primates at Tirnovo was a triumph for the Liberals.19 The same year, a German aristocrat, Alexander Battenberg, once officer of the Russian army, was elected by Parliament as Prince of the Bulgarian principality. Even though the Liberals dominated Parliament (Sobranie) and won the 1880 elections, Alexander – supported by the Conservatives – refused to give the winners the mandate to form a Government. The Russians, who were on the side of the Liberals, were displeased, but Alexander opted for the emancipation from Russian tutelage and sought support among the Bulgarian landowners, the Church leadership and the nationalists. On 18 September 1885, the nationalists took over Plovdiv (Philippopolis) in Eastern Rumelia and declared the union of the region with Bulgaria. Alexander dithered but finally took the side of the rebels, provoking the ire of Russia because it had been obstructed from playing a decisive role in the future of Bulgaria. The mass resignation of Russian officers from the Bulgarian army left the ou t e posed to “e ia s atta k i . No etheless, the Bulgarians achieved a swift, as well as unexpected, victory against the forces of Milan O e o ić and Belgrade was saved from being occupied by the enemy thanks to the intervention of Austria. By attacking Bulgaria, Milan had hoped to provoke the intervention I id, p. , The constitution reflected a mistrust of the powers of the executive – the prince and the government – and tried to establish parliamenta autho it i state affai s . 19 32 of Russia and perhaps even a Russo-Austrian war. His failure obliged him to abdicate in favour of his son Alexander. The Bulgarian victory, however, came with a stiff price for the Prince. The efforts of Prince Alexander to rid his state of Russian tutelage cost him his throne. In 1886 he was made to resign and in 1887 he was replaced by Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, an officer of the Austrian army. The new leader of Bulgaria was bound to generate greater disappointment to the Russians than his predecessor. Some twenty-seven years after his ascent to power, he led his country to side with the Germans in the First World War. He also displayed little tolerance for parliamentarism in Bulgaria. The most notable politician during the first eight years of Fe di a d s ule as P e ie “tepha “ta olo . I spite of his authoritarian methods in power, he wisely avoided friction with the Ottoman Empire and saved his country from economic collapse. The efforts by Stambolov to keep the irredentism of secret organisations under control and to avoid conflict between his country and the Ottoman rulers of Macedonia, generated the undying hatred of the nationalists against him. When Ferdinand removed him from office in 1894, thus depriving him of the protection by the state security forces, he was exposed to the wrath of his sworn enemies and was savagely assassinated in 1895 by followers of the VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation).20 20 Duncan M. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-95, Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 33 The 19th century saw the liberation of the Balkan peoples from Ottoman rule and the creation of autonomous and independent nation states, national consciousness and national Churches. The antagonistic nationalisms and irredentisms of these nation states led to the first armed confrontations (Serb-Bulgarian, Greek-Turkish, and Bulgarian-Turkish) that escalated during the 20th century. Most information about the region in western media came from James David Bourchier, the ubiquitous Balkan correspondent of The Times. He dealt with subjects as far apart as was the popularity of Gladstone in Greece and Bulgaria, and the regicide of King Alexander O e o ić in 1903, but his support for Bulgaria became his trademark. Generally speaking, the second half of the 19th century was peaceful for Europe and allowed most countries to develop. The Balkan peoples, in spite of their progress in creating state institutions, lost ground to Western Europe in the field of economic modernisation. The agricultural sector continued to provide jobs for some 80% of the Balkan workforce, while industrial activity was restricted to the food sector and the building of roads and railways. The need to carry out public works of infrastructure obliged Balkan states to resort to foreign loans with, as a result, over-borrowing that led to the inability of amortising the debts incurred. Bankruptcy caused the establishment of international financial control during which foreign lenders took control of large sectors of the economy. The Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1881, Greece in 1893, Serbia in 1896 and Bulgaria in 1902. 34 Chapter 3: From the Nation State to the Stateless Nation From 1821 [the year of birth of the modern Greek state] to the first decade of the twentieth century, the ideological association of state and nation in Greece underwent significant transformations. The western principles of government and administration that inspired Greek statecraft were ushered in by an enlightened elite. Nationalism, however, secured its popular base only after the state became the champion of the nation and assumed the task of liberating its unredeemed brethren. By the end of the century, Greek irredentism had foundered on the many weaknesses of the state. The disastrous war of 1897 with the Ottoman Empire discredited the most vociferous exponents of irredentism and generated wide intellectual discourse aimed at salvaging the imperilled nation from the blunders of an ineffectual state. The transition from the consensual basis of the national state to the subsequent criticism generated by its failures lies at the heart of this paper. The political prototype of the merchant intelligentsia that imported western ideas along with goods in the Balkans was at the centre of western enlightenment and revolution. The centralised state, evolving out of French absolutism, became the prime example for all emerging nation states of the European nineteenth century to emulate.21 No doubt the peasant warlords, the local notables and the seafaring islanders who waged the War of Ha s Koh , Natio alis , in David Sills, ed., Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, London 1972, Vol. II, p. 67. 21 35 Independence against the Ottomans had a far less clear view of their ideal polity than did their intellectual kin of the Greek diaspora. The dedication of these social groups to the Enlightenment was questionable, but even the most backward of armatoles realised that to secure legitimacy among European powers, Greece had to embark on a process of modernisation. This function was ideally performed by a mobile intelligentsia whose impact on the ideological formation of the new state was disproportionate to the size of the stratum it represented. Although the high principles which they served were far removed from the experiences of the Christian Orthodox peasant communities, such harbingers of the uprising as Rigas, Korais and the a o ous autho of the G eek No a h , provided the ideal model for future state builders. Their goal was to transform peasant subjects into full-fledged citizens of a unified liberal state. By doing so these intellectuals, situated on the margins of Greek society, hoped to re-join an ethnic community larger than their own circle. They developed a strong commitment to collective interests and communal solidarity, and continued to exert considerable influence on Greek nationalism.22 The varied content of Greek nationalism and its ideological antecedents are more complex than the state's terms of reference. Religious and secular elements form the basic analytical categories of the concept.23 From the outbreak of hostilities in 1821 the influence of the Church among the insurgents and its capacity to lead them against a Muslim adversary became obvious. After Independence, the state's efforts to extend its authority to the 22 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge 1981, p. 126. John A. Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843, Princeton 1968. 23 36 periphery required considerable concessions to indigenous religious sentiments. When the Church of Greece was declared independent from the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch in 183324 and was brought firmly under state control, it became all the more associated with the nation. Instead of adopti g Ko ais dim view of the clergy, the state incorporated the Church and its martyrs into the pantheon of Greek heroes and made them integral parts of the national myth. Thus the Church became an accomplice of the state in its mission to spread the cohesive nationalist creed and in turn undermined the initial impetus of the enlightened statebuilders. Once the state established its authority, the irredentist creed (liberation of ethnic brethren under Ottoman rule) became an article of faith of all governments and the most potent ingredient of political socialisation.25 To each Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian it offered membership to an imagined community26 extending its boundaries beyond the puny realm of Greece. Thus the state acquired its foremost justification by becoming the sole champion of the nation. Its underdevelopment and poverty did not warrant the loyalty of its subjects, but the promise of a glorious future did. The first sixty years of modern Greece the equation of state and nation stood unchallenged. 24 Petropoulos, op. cit., p. 181. The act [of 1833] declared the church in Greece independent of the mother church in Constantinople, of which it had been a part until the outbreak of the Revolution. In effect, the Bavarian only formalising a de facto division precipitated early in the Revolution when the patriarch of Constantinople, under duress from the Ottoman authorities, excommunicated the rebel Greeks. 25 K.T. Di a as, The Ideological Infrastru tu e of the Ne Helle i “tate . Iσ ο ία ο ι ού Έθ ο ς, Vol. XIII, Athens: Ermis 1977, p. 458. 26 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities, London: Verso 1986. 37 By the mid-nineteenth century the content of European nationalisms was transformed along with the circumstances that had brought them into being. The 1848 uprisings were the last of the post-1789 tremors. They were caused by social strata that suffered the dislocations of profound economic changes such as the p og ess of li e al o e ial apitalis .27 Although French Revolutionary principles were often invoked by irredentist causes, the goal of national unity and collective power overshadowed the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment. The transition from ecumenical humanism to the exclusivity of the nation - from human rights to the sanctity of the Hegelian state - marked the features of the new nationalism.28 The suppression of most 1848 revolts gave rise to a new brand of conservatism, innovative and aggressive rather than obstructive and backward-looking. Besides being the depository of traditional values and divine rights, conservatism also turned to the masses for wider support. Once recognised as full members of the nation, the lower middle classes followed by the workers began to press their special claims upon the liberal state; and whenever the latter ... could not or would not come to their aid, they became receptive to the lures of demagogues or turned almost instinctively to the conservatives .29 No one represented the resurgent Greek nationalism better than the historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos. A champion of national unity, he strove to justify the continuity of Greece in geographic terms by proving its continuity in historical time. His multi-volume history began to appear in the 1850s and introduced 27 John Weiss, Conservatism in Europe 1770-1945, London 1977, p. 56. Hans Kohn, Nationalism, its Meaning and History, New York 1965, pp. 50-2. 29 Jan Romein, The Watershed of Two Eras: Europe in 1900, Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press 1978, p. 108. 28 38 Byzantine civilisation, which had been excluded by the exponents of the Enlightenment, as an integral part of Greek history. His effort to restore Byzantium met with strong opposition from the entrenched classicism of such prominent figures as Nikolaos Saripolos, Pavlos Calligas and lakovos Rizos Neroulos. Paparrigopoulos eventually prevailed over his critics. He was preoccupied with the incorporation of unredeemed people and territory into the realm of the Greek state and naturally held in high esteem the political and cultural unity of the Eastern Orthodox Empire.30 The shift of intellectuals towards Greece's medieval past may not have been incompatible with the European romantic reappraisal of the Dark Ages, but eclipses of interest in classical antiquity always put distance between Greece and the West.31 Despite the sound and fury generated by King Otto of Greece in the early 1850s, the progress of irredentism depended more on international conjuncture than on the raw will of the Greek people. During the Crimean War the cause suffered a major setback when the Anglo-French forces cancelled Russian designs to dismember the Ottoman Empire. An allied blockade (1854-7) of the most vital Greek harbour obliged the king to withdraw his troops from Ottoman Thessaly and Epirus and caused his ultimate overthrow. It took a decade before the international coast was clear for a sortie of Greek irregulars, which led to yet another reversal. The suppression in 1869 of a major Cretan uprising against the Ottomans that raged for three whole years, and more significantly the emerging Balkan nationalisms, obliged the Greek state to review its priorities. Slavic nationalist movements, with K.T. Dimaras, Κ. α α ό ο ος (C. Paparrigopoulos), Athens 1986. K.T. Dimaras, ι ός ο α ισ ός (Hellenic Romantism), Athens 1982, pp. 424-5. 30 31 39 their overlapping claims on the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, posed a new, formidable obstacle to Greek irredentism. The Ecumenical Patriarch was summoned to aid the imperilled nation; but the leader of the unredeemed Orthodox people with his dedication to the religious, rather than the secular, aspect of the national identity, often proved far less co-operative than the Greek state would have liked him to be. 32 Faced with the predicament of choosing between the priorities of the Greek state and his own ecumenical mission, Patriarch Joachim III could only opt for the latter. Whereas Greece in the 1870s and 1880s tilted towards friendlier relations with the Turks in order to face the Slavic challenge, Joachim strove to bring the Bulgarian Exarchate, which declared its independence in 1870, back into the fold of the Great Church. The Millet-Bashi favoured mediation and cooperation among the Orthodox people of the Balkans and resisted the efforts of the Greek Prime Minister, Harilaos Tricoupis, to establish a modus vivendi with the Ottomans, leading possibly to a joint Greco-Turkish barrier against Slavic incursion in Macedonia and Thrace. Attached to his religious perspective, Joachim failed to appreciate the magnitude of the nationalist tide and was forced to retire in 1884 after having been exposed to the displeasure of the Ottoman authorities.33 The crisis was not only a question of a clash between two extraordinary personalities; it also underlined certain incompatibilities of interest between Athens and the Patriarchate 32 Relations between the Church of Greece and the Patriarchate in Constantinople were restored in 1850. 33 E a gelos Kofos, Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Poli of the G eek “tate , Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (October 1986), 115- . E a gelos Kofos, Attempts at Mending the GreekBulgarian Ecclesiastical Schism (1875, Balkan Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1984). 40 the two most important centres of the Greek world.34 Moreover, it signified the rise of the Ottoman Greeks to economic prominence. Although the Pat ia h s flock did not always agree with his policies (in Joachim's case there was strong opposition), the Ottoman Greeks enhanced the authority of the institution with economic and moral support. The most convincing reformer of late nineteenth century, Harilaos Tricoupis, believed that national unification was unattainable without prior modernisation of the state and economic development. His distaste for adventures abroad was shared by followers who viewed the obsessive adherents of irredentism as one-track-minded madmen who continued to draw inspiration from the haphazard irredentist activities of the kingdom's first decades.35 There were others who disavowed the p i iple of the G eat Idea altogether as Utopian and felt that the state should pursue its improvement as an end in itself. 36 The altera pars, however, castigated the state for its inertia in national issues and its self-seeking materialism. This criticism overlooked the bloodless incorporation of the Ionian Islands in 1864 and the breadbasket of Thessaly in 1881, and glorified the unsuccessful and costly uprisings in Epirus, Thessaly and Crete. Anastasios Byzantios, an influential journalist, deplo ed G eek i a ti it : Behold our decline 34 In his History of the Greek Nation (Athens 1930, Vol. V, 81-2), Paparrigopoulos criticised the Patriarchate for failing to Hellenise the nonGreek-speaking Christian Orthodox people of the Empire over four centuries. Quoted in Kofos, 'Patriarch Joa hi ΙΙ , op. it., , . . 35 Elli Skopetea, The Model Ki gdo and the Great Idea (1830-1880) (in Greek), Univ. of Thessaloniki Ph.D. dissertation 1984), p. 332. 36 D. Bikelas, Le role et les aspirations de la Grece dans la Question d'Orient (The role and aspirations of Greece in the Eastern Question), Paris 1885, 23: quoted in Skopetea, op. cit., 27, n. 28. 41 since 1821 ... Where are the Greek dreams of fifty years ago? The descent in our ladder of expectations progresses with the passing years. The realm of the ideal Greece approaches the boundaries of the real one. 37 The th ust of the de elop e t advocates was blunted by T i oupis ultimate failure. Throughout his terms in power he had given absolute priority to the modernisation of the state apparatus and to works of infrastructure that would encourage the private sector to take the initiative. His costly undertakings led the state to bankruptcy and destroyed its credibility. When his cardinal opponent, Theodoros Diliyannis, took office, the state was briefly reconciled with the unredeemed nation and irredentist passions were once more unleashed. In 1897 the Greek David confronted the Ottoman Goliath in the plain of Thessaly. However, the conclusion of the misconceived campaign bore no resemblance to the biblical outcome. The Greek forces were badly beaten and retreated in disarray. It was only through foreign intervention that Greece was saved from catastrophe, but the price of this service was the establishment of an international financial control agency to supervise the repayment of Greece's debts to its foreign bondholders. By the end of the century the state had lost all its credibility, both as the main representative of the nation and even as a reliable administrator of its own fortunes. Furthermore, nationalism had shed its liberal principles in favour of parochialism and extra-logical action. Nietzsche, with his exaltation of the human will as a formidable force emanating from the psyche rather than rational intelligence, paved the way. At the same time as G ee e s defeat in Thessaly, French writer Maurice Barres 37 Skopetea, ibid., p. 310. 42 repudiated international standards of abstract truth, liberalism and parliamentary democracy, and gave priority to national intuition. 38 Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism was supportive of a worldview based on the primeval struggle for survival in which the fittest nations prevail. The 1897 turning-point in Greek irredentism was mildly affected by the association of western nationalism with the radical right. The most articulate disciple of Barres in Greece, Ion Dragoumis, reiterated his teacher's basic tenets without their racial overtones.39 However, the Greek 1897 became the rough equivalent of France's 1870. Dragoumis put the blame for the defeat not on foreigners and Jews (since there were none of any prominence in the Hellenic kingdom) but on the state itself and the liberal bourgeoisie that ran it.40 He kept Barres' inclination for the mystical property of soil and climate in moulding the national character, but preferred Nietzsche's cult of the individual to Barres' emphasis on communal values. As a politician, Dragoumis failed to secure a wide following because his ideas were scarcely in tune with the trends of his day. He yearned for a return to nature in a country that suffered not from the negative effects of industrialisation but from the hardships of rural underdevelopment. He sought to resuscitate 38 Weiss, op. cit., pp. 103-7. Dragoumis met with Barres in Athens and kept correspondence with him. 40 If we are a live nation we will not stick to the political system that was imposed on us. The constitution and the deputies are a sickness. It is not our life. It will either kill us or die itself. And then we will live with another political system which will suit us ette . Ion Dragoumis, Ο η ισ ός ο αι οι Έ η ς My Hellenism and Greeks), Athens 1927, p. 8. 39 43 communal traditions, which had been irrevocably abolished by the centralising impact of the modern state. Finally, he expounded aristocratic values derived from Barres, Maurras and Taine, in a society without the aristocracy that served as the model of the radical right in France. He did, however, capture the popular exasperation with the state and the nationalist fever, which was revived by the struggle between Greeks and Bulgarians for the domination of Ottoman Macedonia.41 His reputation as an intellectual activist, dedicated to the nationalist ideal, won him the respect of friends and foes. As a volunteer in the war of 1897, at the impressionable age of nineteen, he was forever marked by the experience. While serving as Greek consul in Monastir, Serres, Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and Constantinople, he worked for the Greek cause in the Macedonian struggle, and with the aid of his officer friend, Athanasios Souliotes-Nicolaides, constructed a theory dissociating the future of the nation from the fortunes and misfortunes of the Greek state.42 The sole eth i authority over the Greeks outside the kingdom was the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Although the atio al e t e a d the G eat Chu h co-operated on many occasions, there was also an inherent antagonism between the two ce t es of Helle is . D agou is a d “ouliotes drift from the state would normally have led them to the spiritual rallying point of the stateless nation. Yet the two men, unlike their western prototypes, For a i ti ate ie of D agou is life and ideas, see his own diary: Ίω α ού ης, Φύ α ο ο ίο (Ion Dragoumis, Pages of a diary), edited by John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, Athens: Ermis, 1985, Vol. IV. 42 Athanasios Souliotes, an officer of the Greek army, served in Macedonia as an agent with the assumed name Nicolaides. He was sent to Constantinople in 1908 where he met and influenced Dragoumis in his political thinking. 41 44 had little regard for the church43 and their secular nationalism was hardly compatible with the ecumenical spirit of the Patriarch. Whereas the Patriarchate viewed all the Orthodox as brothers in Christ, Dragoumis and Souliotes felt that the Greeks were more compatible with the Turks than with the Bulgarians. In his eastern flight from western rationalism Dragoumis looked to a secular version of the communities during the Ottoman centuries, as a model of national organisation. His romanticised view of communal life under the Ottomans, eighty years after Independence, was the ultimate affront against the Greek state. 44 Strangely enough, it took a civil servant and an officer of the Greek army to formulate the most systematic criticism against the state and propose a viable alternative to it. Public discontent against the representatives of the state simmered for a decade before it erupted in a military display of force. The p o u ia e to of 15 August 1909 in Athens aspired to reform a lethargic state mechanism and render it capable of pursuing the irredentist aspirations of the nation. In that respect the coup proved more than successful. It stirred political life and produced a statesman of the highest calibre. Eleftherios Venizelos, who came to power in 1910, concluded the unification of Greece 1912-19. D agou is and Souliotes course was entirely different. Whereas Venizelos reformed the state and reconciled it with the nation, the two men attempted to upgrade the Greek millet within Prelates of the church are not G eeks, the a e Ch istia s ... α ού ς, Ο ισ ός (Dragoumis, Hellenism), op. cit., p. 22. 44 The appeal of Greek communities in the Ottoman years survives even today. The myth surrounding communal life was challenged by historical works presenting the communities as a functional component of the Ottoman tax system rather than a product of national volition. 43 45 the Ottoman framework and inject it with a sense of mission in the East. The G eek state s change of policy towards the Ottoman Empire coincided with the progress of pan-Slavic plans in the Balkans. What was perceived as a Bulgarian threat in Macedonia and the 1897 debacle obliged Greek governments to revise their foreign policy priorities. Traditional Greek irredentism was eclipsed by the Macedonian struggle during the first decade of the century, and diplomats of the Hellenic kingdom in Ottoman centres often advised their ethnic brethren to refrain from subversive activities against the authorities. This new development in the Balkans ushered in an era of attempted Greek-Turkish co-operation, a policy which also included the efforts by agents of the Greek state to develop new political orientations among the Ottoman Greeks. Athanasios Souliotes was a product of this new official policy vis-á-vis the Ottoman Empire and the imaginative turn toward friendly relations between the two states. An undercover agent of Greece in Thessaloniki,45 Souliotes was sent to Constantinople in 1908 to explore the possibility of co-ordinating Greco-Turkish relations and establishing contact with Ottoman officials. A i i g o the e e of the You g Tu k upheaval, he realised that the authority of the sultan Abdul Hamid had been greatly diminished and that his regime was about to be replaced by new social and political forces. That same year Souliotes founded the clandestine “o iet of Co sta ti ople and developed his own theories and plans of Greco-Turkish co-operation, over the instructions of his superiors. In framing his ideology of a Athanasios Souliotes-Nicolaides, Ο α ο ι ός Α ώ : H Ο ά σις σσα ο ί ς -1908 (The Macedonian Contest: The Thessaloniki Organisation). Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1959. 45 46 multinational eastern state he was assisted by Dragoumis, serving as consul in the Ottoman capital.46 Irredentism had been the dominant creed of latenineteenth-century Balkan states, but Souliotes believed that the empire should be kept intact from Balkan as well as western designs. If equality of political status was granted to the ethnic communities of the Ottoman state, he felt that the Greeks would be able to develop their full potential in their natural eastern environment. In turning to a multi-eth i Easte E pi e as a remedy to state parochialism, Souliotes also voiced the mistrust of Constantinopolitan Greeks for the West. Faced with the stiff competition of western interests in Asia Minor, certain Greek financiers were eager to support a strong Ottoman state reinforced by the consensus of its non-Muslim bourgeoisie. This, however, was by no means the only viewpoint among Ottoman Greeks. Souliotes was soon confronted with the full range of Greek opinions and diversity.47 Far from being politically monolithic, the Athanasios Souliotes-Nicolaides, Ο ά σις Κ σ α ι ο ό ς (The Organisation of Constantinople), edited by C. Bouras and T. Veremis, Dodoni, Athens 1984. 47 Feroz Ahmad failed to acknowledge the segmentation of the Rum Millet: Unlike the Armenian (and Bulgarian) community whose divisions found expression in political parties, the Greek community was politically monolithic, accepting without question the absolute authority of the Orthodox Church and the Patriarch ... Implicit in the attitude of the Greek community was its total identification with Athens where the twin flames of irredentism and the Megali Idea [Great Idea] burned strongly and for whom the Ottoman community was co posed of u edee ed G eeks. Thus, Ahmad lumped together the entire spectrum of ideologically opposite camps within the Ottoman Greek community: Feroz Ahmad, Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire 1908, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 46 47 Ottoman Greeks formed groups whose allegiances sometimes overlapped but also clashed with each other. The oldest and most revered institution among Ottoman Greeks was the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Patriarch opposed the secularising effect of the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms and on various occasions found himself at loggerheads with the religious and national priorities of Greece. Since the influence of the institution diminished with every enlargement of the Greek state, there was scarcely an incentive for it to identify with the G eat Idea of Greece. Unlike spokesmen of the Greek state who i itiall looked upo the You g Tu k revolution with favour, the Patriarch did not conceal his preference for the ancien régime of the Old Turks and the preservation of the millet system. Joachim, who ascended to the patriarchal throne again in 1901, expressed his opposition to the Young Turks and retracted his hostile statements only after admonition by prominent members of his flock.48 Ottoman Greeks who backed the Young Turk Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) were moved by its initial promise to grant political rights to all Ottoman subjects and to make citizenship the equalising factor among people of different religious and ethnic origins. Adherence to the principles expounded by the CUP amounted to abandoning the privileges as well as the handicaps of the millet system. The liberal wing of the Young Turk eds. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Vol. I, New York 1983, p. 402. 48 Cate i a Bou as, The Young Turk Revolution and the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire 1908(unpublished paper prepared in 1976 for the King's College (London) Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies), p. 7. 48 movement, which developed into a full-fledged liberal party, attracted most Greek support because it combined the promise of liberalisation with the preservation of the millets' cultural identities.49 Conditions for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement were favourable in 1908; given the widespread relief and heightened expectations generated by the Young Turk revolution and the deterioration of Turkish-Bulgarian relations after Bulgaria declared its full independence from Ottoman suzerainty. Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina precipitated a hardening of Russia's resolution to support the interests of the Balkan Slavs. Non-Slavic nations began to appreciate the consequences of isolation and were motivated to improve relations between themselves. Dragoumis and Souliotes were not alone in separating the two concepts of state and nation. Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century the principles of statehood were furiously revised by intellectuals, politicians and officers in the Balkans. The stateless nation wandered in intellectual discourse before it returned to its original point of departure. 50 After the Balkan War of 1912 the nation placed its hopes on the state once again. Domestic grievances subsided and the Ottoman Rum were 49 Souliotes notes that even Athens in 1908 was jubilant over the Young Turk success. When the liberal Sabaheddin visited Greece that year he was given a hearty welcome by the authorities. Souliotis, Ο ά σις Κ σα ι ο ό ς (The Organisation of Constantinople), op. cit., p. 66. 50 Georgios Skleros, Erga, Athens: Epikairotita 1981. 49 eventually forced by circumstances to turn to their national centres for their salvation. By the early 1920s, the nation finally came to terms with the state and entered a mutual relationship without routes of escape. 50 Chapter 4: Albanians, South-Slavs and Bulgarians If Romania was the exception to the rule of the small landholding farmers prevailing in the Balkans, the Albanians differed from all other Balkan peoples (except for the Bosnian Muslims) as to their relationship with the Ottoman rulers. The poor soil of the country could not sustain its demographic growth with, as a result, the periodic movement of Albanian populations. The strong antagonism between factions and tribes shaped the warlike mentality that turned Albanians into good mercenaries. Two thirds of the population converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule while a number of Christian Orthodox Albanians in the north of the country turned to Catholicism. The high percentage of conversions to Islam, as compared to the Serbs, the Greeks, the Bulgarians and the Romanians, can be explained by the quest for security by the ou t s elite. Isla p o ided Al a ia s ith oppo tu ities i the Ottoman power structure and safeguards against their Orthodox opponents. Eminent Albanians in the Ottoman army and administration are numerous. This comparative advantage, however, delayed the emergence of their national consciousness and any liberation struggles. Just as the Ottoman Empire offered safeguards for the integrity of Albanian settlements, its collapse exposed Albanians to the rival Balkan nationalisms and irredentisms. Albanian society was geographically differentiated between the Ghegs of the north and the Tosks of the south. The o al Code of Lekë Dukagjini , determined for centuries the behaviour of Gheg society and its origin was attributed to the feudal family of Dukagjini that dominated the north for almost a century. Although some anthropologists have argued that the 51 Ghegs belong to the Dinaric group and the Tosks to the Alpine, aside from features of development and underdevelopment, the two can only be differentiated in dialectical interpretations of the same Albanian language.51 When the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was set in motion at the Berlin Conference of 1878, the Albanians gathered at P iz e i Koso o eated the Al a ia Asso iatio fo the Defe e a d of the ‘ights of the Al a ia Natio . The goal of this Association was to safeguard the Albanian territories from foreign occupation and to gain their autonomy from the Sultan. The Asso iatio lai ed the ila ets egio s of Ioa i a (Yannina), Monastir, Kosovo and Skodra. The Albanians managed, for a start, to prevent the occupation of Podgorica and Adivar by the Montenegrins but the Ottoman troops that obeyed the will of the great powers obliged them to withdraw from these territories. However, the Albanians continued to exert pressure on the Sultan to grant them autonomy and when he refused they responded by evicting Ottoman officials from a number of Albanian cities. The Sultan quelled the rebellion and dissolved the Association in 1881.52 In the meantime, a group of Albanian intellectuals in Istanbul created the first Albanian alphabet composed mainly of Latin and some Greek elements but in 1886, the Ottoman authorities forbade the use of the Albanian language and the Ecumenical Patriarchate urged the Orthodox Christians among them to abide by the orders of the Sultan. However, the ban did B a do Doll, The Relationship Between the Clan System and other I stitutio s i No the Al a ia , Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3,No.2, May 2003, pp.147-162, renders some anthropological aspects of a traditional society. 52 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 361-366. 51 52 not affect the Albanian communities outside the Ottoman realm. In Bulgaria, Italy, Egypt, Romania, Greece, Britain and the USA a number of newspapers and periodicals in Albanian continued to circulate. The community of Boston, under the Orthodox priest Fan Noli, declared in 1908 the Albanian Church as autocephalous.53 The same year, the movement of the Young Turks fanned the aspirations of the Albanians leading to a blooming of Albanian culture. The Young Turks, who aimed at creating a centralised system of government that would promote the Turkish ethnicity, fought against the Albanian particularity and proscribed once again the use of the Albanian language. The Albanian rebellion of 1911 won some concessions from the Ottomans but the Italian-Turkish war presented the Albanians once again with their old dilemma. As the Balkan countries came closer together against the Sultan, the Albanians realised that the collapse of the European part of the Ottoman Empire would bring the Slavs and the Greeks into territories that they claimed for themselves. After coordinated revolts, the Albanians evicted the Turkish garrisons and on 28 November 1912 their National Congress under Ishmail Bey convened in Vlorë and declared the independence of the country.54 The independence of Albania was received with satisfaction by Italy who saw this as a check to Greek irredentism, and Austria-Hungary who did not favour Serbian expansion to the shores of the Adriatic Sea. They also reckoned that a weak Albanian state would be more dependent on them than an enlarged Serbia a d a st o g G ee e. F a e a d ‘ussia e e opposed to Al a ia s 53 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453. New York: Holt, Rinehart &Winston, 1965, pp. 504-506. 54 Basil Kondis, Greece and Albania 1908-1914, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976, pp. 63-111. 53 independence because they preferred a strong Serbia to promote their interests in the region. The Treaty of London, after the first Balkan war, mandated the Great Powers to decide the fate of Albania and these referred the issue to an international organisation, the Ambassadorial Conference. On 29 July 1913, the Conference decided that Albania would become an independent principality under Wilhelm zu Wied. The young prince, who took power on 7 March 1914, lasted only six months in his office. The Conference then appointed two committees, to fix, the northern borders of the country with Serbia and Montenegro and then the southern ones with Greece. The other territorial claims of the Albanians (Kosovo, Montenegro, Tetovo and Yannina) remained unfulfilled.55 The national identities of the Balkan peoples were based, to a large extent, on the traditions of their medieval states. The Bulgarians of the 19th century drew their inspiration from the kingdom of Samuel (976-1014) while the Serbs drew theirs from the Empire of Stefan Duša (1331-1350). Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians (even though the original Bulgarians were not of Slav but of Asiatic origin) shared common elements of their Slav traditions and were divided by the rival claims of their states whose borders kept changing constantly. Old Serbia was situated south of the i e Da u e i the a ea of toda s Koso o hile Bulga ia, centred on Ohrid, and included the larger pa t of toda s FY‘OM. From their first appearance in the Balkans in 580 AD, the Slavs opted for agricultural settlement rather than in favour of the 55 Stavrianos, op. cit. For an excellent historical account of Albania see Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1872-1912, Princeton University Press, 1967. 54 constant movement of the German invaders. The Turkoman Bulgarians settled south of the Danube in 679 AD and mixed with the locally established Slav population. When Cyril and Methodius gave the Slavs their written language in the 9th century, the Bulgarians joined the Slav cultural community. The Serb Patriarchate of Peć in Kosovo contributed to a large extent in spreading the Serb identity. The Serb linguist Vuk Karađic (1787-1864), who shaped the south-Slav dialect making it accessible to the masses, transferred the centre of gravity of the south-Slav identity, from the divisive religious belief to the unifying common linguistic idiom. The Serb politician Ilija Ga aša i (18121874) was instrumental in introducing constitutional reforms but also in spreading Serb nationalism. However, the main representatives of south-Slavism were the Croat Catholic bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-1905) and his associate Cannon Franjo ‘ački (1828-1894). Their common goal was the creation of a federal south-Slavic state on the ruins of the Hapsburg monarchy that would include Serbia and Montenegro. However, the policy of O e o ić at that time was exceedingly friendly towards Austria. Between 1884 and 1892 some 87% of Serbian exports went to Austria and some 66% of imports came from that country. In this way, the foreign policy of Serbia was really in Habsburg hands. The assassination of Alexander O e o ić and his wife by an organisation of nationalist officers in May 1903 brought Peter Ka ađo đe ić (1844to “e ia s th o e. Co t a to the O e o ić clan, the Ka ađo đe ić were the enemies of AustroHungary and their policy favoured the creation of a south-Slavic state (Yugoslavia). In the Serbian elections of 8 September 1903, the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić t iu phed hile the ou t s institutions were strengthened. Serbia thus acquired a genuinely 55 constitutional government, but its dependence on Austria continued until 1906 when the Serbs entered into a relationship of free exchange with the Bulgarians. At the same time the Serbian Government cancelled a large arms purchase agreement with the Austrians and turned instead to the French market. The development of Serbia during the first years of the century prepared the country for the events of 1908, the Balkan wars and the First World War.56 When the Habsburgs occupied Bosnia –Herzegovina militarily in 1878, the population of this Ottoman province contained 43% Muslims, 39% Serbs, and 18% Catholics. The Muslims were the most privileged since they owned the largest portion of arable land. As the Habsburgs allowed the landowners to retain the semi-feudal regime of the Ottomans, the Muslim feudal lords had some eighty five thousand serfs working for them, of which sixty thousand were Serbs, twenty three thousand were Croats and two thousand Muslims. These conditions kept the province in permanent socio-political turmoil. After the troubles of 1903, Croat and Serb politicians agreed to cooperate in order to achieve self-determination from Austria. The 1906 elections for the Croat Chamber were won by a coalition of Croats and Serbs. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in October 1908 brought the anger of the south-Slavs to a boiling point. When the first Balkan war broke out, Croat volunteers joined the Serbs and called Peter Ka ađo đe ić their king.57 In spite of the existence of factions that differed by their Serb-centric or Croat- 56 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p.11-97. 57 Stavrianos, op.cit. p.454-466. 56 centric interpretations of south-“la is , the U ita ia s u de the Croat Milan Ma ja o ić believed that the differences between Serbs and Croats were superficial while the opportunities that a union of the two peoples could offer them both were immense. The fact that Serbia had already created a south-Slavic state turned its apital Belg ade i to the e t e of the Yugosla U ita ia o e e t. Just efo e the Fi st Wo ld Wa oke out, “e ia s capital became a magnet for Croat supporters of Yugoslavism.58 In Bulgaria the government of Konstantin Stoilov heralded an improvement of relations with Russia and a period of modernisation and economic growth. The thaw between Russia a d Bulga ia as also fa ilitated Fe di a d s ag ee e t to baptise his son Boris in the Orthodox faith. Stoilov who had declared his ambition to make Bulgaria the Belgium of the Balkans passed a bill in 1894 that encouraged the establishment of industry and that same year he began the development of the harbours of Varna and Burgas. By the turn of the century Bulgarian society was being thoroughly transformed. Political power nevertheless rested with Ferdinand not the political parties. I ‘i ha d C a pto s o ds, Ele tio s… e e o e ofte a ied out si pl to p o ide a newly appointed cabinet with a dependable majority in the assembly .59Ferdinand also secured the control of the army and foreign policy became his personal preserve. 58 Banac, op.cit. pages 99-115. See also Charles & Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the National Balkan States 1804-1920, University of Washington Press 1977, p.266-283. 59 R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 124. “ee also, A d eas L e atos, Privileged Scapegoats: Nation-State Formation and Civil Officialdom in Bulgaria, 1878in 57 Chapter 5: Era of Fermentation and Wars The end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th brought about intense fermentation in the foreign policy of the European states. The German factor pushed old opponents – France, England and Russia – into revising their relations. On the other hand, the fact that Germany turned in favour of the Ottoman Empire obliged the English to gradually shift their policy regarding the si k a of Eu ope . By the end of the century, Austrians and Germans attempted to bring together the non-Slav nations of the Balkan peninsula (Romanians, Greeks and Turks) against the Slavs. In April 1897 Franz-Joseph, Emperor of Austro-Hungary and Nicholas II of Russia set forth a future distribution of the Ottoman provinces in the region. Thus Austria-Hungary would annex Bosnia-Herzegovina a d the Sandžak p o i e of No i Paza while Albania would become an independent state. The rest of the Balkan territories would be distributed among Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Ignoring this peaceful general rehearsal, the Balkan peoples themselves pursued their own agenda. The rebellion of the Slav-Macedonians against the Ottoman authorities in Kruše o du i g the “ai t Elijah s Feast (Ilinden) on 2 August 1903 was the result of the antagonism between the Internal and the External (Bulgaria-controlled) Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation. These two organisations were at loggerheads as the former aimed at an autonomous Society, Politics and State Formation in South Eastern Europe during the 19th Century, Athens, Alpha Bank, 2011, pp. 65-92. 58 Macedonia under Slav-Macedonian control while the latter pursued the territorial annexation of the area to Bulgaria. The Ottoman repression proved a catastrophe for all the Christians in the area. The violence that prevailed in Macedonia prompted Franz-Joseph, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary and Czar Nicholas II, to sign in October 1903 the Mürzsteg agreement that allowed the two countries to supervise the policing of the province. Meanwhile Germany had won the trust of Sultan Abdul Hamid and had secured from the Ottoman state large orders for military hardware. When in 1895 the ed “ulta d o ed i lood the Armenian revolt in Istanbul, the German Kaiser – unlike his European counterparts – preferred to turn a blind eye to this event.60 The absolute monarchy of Abdul Hamid – who had accepted the first Constitution in 1876 and the first sitting of Parliament in March 1877 – suspended all parliamentary functions ithout offi iall a olishi g the Co stitutio . The “ulta s autocratic behaviour gradually generated a reaction within the ranks of the Ottoman establishment. Ottoman reformist tendencies ade a se o d appea a e ith the ideolog of the Co ittee fo the U io a d P og ess ette k o as the o e e t of the You g Tu ks . The antagonism between the Serbs and the Bulgarians, lost all meaning when the Russophile Peter Ka ađo đe ić sat on “e ia s th o e. The esto atio of o e ial a d politi al relations between Serbia and Bulgaria opened the way for the Balkan Entente against the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 against Abdul Hamid was, initially, greeted by the Christians as a panacea for the solution of 60 Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey, London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1974, p. 51. 59 all their problems. However, the initial positive climate created by this movement was soon reversed when the Young Turks began to show their true nationalistic intentions. Taking advantage of the upheaval that the Young Turks created in the Ottoman system, Austria-Hungary annexed BosniaHerzegovina while Bulgaria declared its independence. The coincidence of the two events was far from accidental. Austrians, Bulgarians and Russians agreed on these steps as the latter received from the Austrians the assurance that they would support the free passage of the Russian fleet through the straits of Bosporus. Nonetheless the speed, with which the Bosnian annexation and the Bulgarian independence were completed, exposed the Russians to the criticism of the Serbs. The AustroRussian cooperation that had begun in 1897 came to a pitiful end in 1908. After the Austrian coup in Bosnia, Russia revised its Balkan policy and in October 1909 agreed to handle the Balkan crisis in common with Italy. The Italian attack against Ottoman-held Libya in 1911 speeded up the war preparations of the Balkan Entente. The good relations between Bulgaria and Serbia since the 1904-07 era made negotiations easier. Bulgaria opted for the creation of an autonomous Macedonia consisting of Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Albanians61, which she hoped to annex one day, while Serbia insisted on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the fair distribution of its European territories. Serbia also aimed at securing guarantees by the allies against any Austrian threat. In the secret agreements between Serbs and Bulgarians the precise area of Macedonian territories to 61 H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and their Future, London: Methuen & Co, 1906. 60 be occupied was not fixed but the extreme limits of ea h ou t s claims were nevertheless defined. In case of disagreement, Russia would arbitrate. As relations between Greece and Bulgaria improved after the appearance of the Young Turks, negotiations between the two countries made progress. The bilateral treaty that ensued had a purely defensive character since the two contracting parties were unable to agree on their Macedonian claims and the sovereignty over the city of Thessalo iki. The a e Ma edo ia did ot even figure in the agreement at all. From the vantage point of a great regional power, Russia began to realise that the Bulgarian claim of the Ottoman Edirne (Adrianople) was bringing the Balkan alliance closer to Istanbul and therefore to one of the major spots of international dispute. Russia certainly preferred to keep the other powers away from the Ottoman capital and in 1912, in tandem with Austria-Hungary, tried to dissuade the Balkan states from carrying out their war plans. The two Powers warned the Balkan Alliance that no change in the Ottoman status quo would be tolerated. However, the warning came the very day when Montenegro first declared war against the Ottomans. The Greek fleet blockaded the supply of the Ottoman forces by sea and a total of six hundred thousand troops from the Balkan countries attacked the three hundred and twenty thousand defenders of Ottoman-held territories. The Bulgarians laid siege on Edirne, the Greeks on Yannina and the Serbs on Skodra. Greek troops also took over Thessaloniki just hours before the Bulgarians entered the city. The atrocities committed by the Balkan allies against the fleeing Ottoman Turks during the first Balkan War, and against each other on the second, are documented in the report released in 1914 by the Carnegie Endowment for International 61 Peace (Report of the International Commission. To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars). In May 1913, the Treaty of London was signed with the intervention of the Great Powers. The end of hostilities brought the allies face to face with their competing claims on Ottoman Macedonia. The Serbs had conquered territories beyond the agreed limits and refused to abandon them. As the Serbs were holding the northern part of Macedonia and the Greeks the southern one, sharing out was feasible. The Bulgarian claims, however, were horizontal on the map and extended from Sofia to Albania cutting through both the Serb and Greek occupation zones. The proposal by Russia to a it ate stu led agai st Bulga ia s o ditio s, a fa t that tu ed the Russians in favour of the Serbs. The Bulgarian attack at the end of June 1913 against Serbia and Greece, launched the second Balkan War. When Romania, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire threw in their weight against Bulgaria, she was compelled to capitulate (end of July 1913). The Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August returned Edirne to the Ottomans and ceded Southern Dobrudža to Romania. Bulgaria could only hope for a future war to reverse its misfortune of 1913. According to the Treaty, Greece extended her territory fifty miles north of Thessaloniki, while in the she secured Yannina and in the East, Kavalla. Serbia almost doubled her territory a e i g a la ge pa t of toda s FY‘OM a d Koso o hile the “a džak (province) of Novi Pazar was divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Bulgaria received part of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. The Treaty also provided for the emergence of an independent Albanian state. The creation of Albania as an independent state with the support of Italy and Austria was aimed at stopping Serbia and Greece from annexing territories bordering 62 on the Adriatic Sea and at making a weak Albania a pawn for the two Western Powers. ‘ussia s eventual turn for Serbia was long in the making. The Bulgarian monarch Ferdinand had proved slippery as an eel towards the Russians. A much coveted loan finally extended to Bulgaria by Germany made clear the contours of the Balkan alliances during the first Great War.62 The Balkan wars marked the beginning of the exodus of non-Turkish people from Asia Minor. The Ottoman defeats in Macedonia and Thrace, as well as the loss of Lesbos, Chios and Samos, infuriated the Young Turks and summoned the persecution of Greeks and Bulgars in the area of Adrianople that was soon to spread eastward. The assassination, on 28 June 1914, of the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne in Sarajevo by a fanatical adherent of irredentism, on the anniversary of the 1389 battle of Kosovo, launched the Great War. Serbia became the first victim of the World War in the Balkans and suffered the greatest hardships. The odds were clearly against its population of 4.4 million and its army of 520,000 soldiers. The Dual Monarchy with a population of 51 million could put an army of 1,800,000 in the field. It took the Austrians much longer than they had anticipated to beat the Serbs who suffered a protracted bombardment by the Austrian artillery and lost 150,000 lives from the ensuing Typhus epidemic. 62 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914, London: Penguin Books, 2012, pp. 266-292. See also the definitive work on the Balkan Wars by Eleni Gardikas Katsiadakis, Greece and the Balkan Imbroglio: Greek Foreign Policy 1911-13, Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Vivlion, 1995. 63 Early October 1915, Field-Marshal von Mackensen launched his offensive with Austrian and German divisions and took Belgrade on 9 October. Bulgaria succumbed to the enticement of Germany and attacked Serbia from the East. Caught in a pincer the Serb forces could only retreat south through the Ibar valley and a hostile Al a ia te ito . Old King Peter, a sick man lying in a wagon drawn by oxen, the members of government, the General Staff, ordinary troops and many civilians with women and hild e … ade thei a th ough o k ou tai s i the depth of i te … 63 The long march lasted three months before the decimated Serbs reached the Adriatic Sea. It cost them 20,000 lives but the survivors along with the Pašić s government were transported by allied ships to the safety of Corfu and improvised camps in Tunis for training the troops.64 Following the Austrian attack, Russia declared war on Austria while the Ottoman Empire received two German warships with which it bombed the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The efforts of the British fleet to violate the straits of the Dardanelles and of the expeditionary troops, consisting mainly of commonwealth soldiers, to occupy the peninsula of Gallipoli, were repulsed by the Otto a fo es. The failu es of the T iple E te te i the Balka s e e ou te ala ed i Ma Ital s de la atio of a against the Triple Alliance. Right from the start of the Austrian attack against the Serbs, supporters of the south-Slavic unity created in Italy the Yugosla Co ittee Jugoslavenski Odbor). Although the Serbs 63 George Castellan, History of the Balkans, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992, p. 393. 64 Ibid, pp. 390-394. 64 belonging to the Radical Party of Pašić were more interested in a Greater Serbia than in a united Yugoslavia, they were compelled by adversity to o e to te s ith the Yugosla Co ittee . Nonetheless, it was the Italian ambitions in the Adriatic Sea that represented the greatest obstacle to the concept of Yugoslavia. With the London agreement of 26 April 1915, the Italians received from their allies promises offering them sovereignty over South Tyrol, Trentino, Trieste, Istria, part of Dalmatia and the port of Vlorë in Albania. Italian sovereignty over the Dodecanese was also confirmed. Bulga ia s positio et ee “e ia a d the Da da elles made her valuable as an ally for both camps. The Germans offered Bulgaria portions of Serbian and Greek Macedonia and Romania s Dobrudža, a fact that weighed decisively in the Bulgarian decision in favour of the Triple Alliance. In this way, Germans, Austrians, Ottomans and Bulgarians found themselves, in 1916, with the upper hand over their opponents in the region. Romania managed to secure from the Triple Entente promises that would almost double its territories. When, after long negotiations by the Prime Minister Ion B ătia u, Romania finally declared war against the Triple Alliance in August 1916, the adversaries of the Entente had won the advantage. The Romania political leader s procrastination in making a decision between neutrality and their irredentist dream of adding Transylvania to Romania cost them dearly. On 28 August 1916 General Avarescu entered Brasov with his troops forcing the Hungarians to flee the city. Germany declared war and in early September, Bulgaria attacked in Dobrudža and won a clear victory against the Romanian army. On 25 November the German forces took Bucharest forcing the authorities to set up the Romanian government in Jassy. General Falkenhayn advanced through the Carpathians to sweep over Wallachia along the Jiu and Olt valleys, 65 while the German-Bulgarian troops of the ever present von Mackensen, took control of the port of Constanta in the Black Sea. Romania was split in two.65 The fact that Russia withdrew from the war after the Russian Revolution, rendered Romania s positio even more precarious leading her to sign a treaty with the Germans in 1918 that yielded Do udža to Bulgaria. Russian Bessarabia was one of the many Romania gains Romania would win after the end of the war. Greece delayed participating in the war as a unified state. As early as 1916, the Greek statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos, had esta lished his head ua te s ith the a of Natio al Defe e i Thessaloniki and joined the Macedonian front that the English and the French had set up. In 1917, the forces of the Entente obliged King Constantine to abdicate in favour of his son Alexander and helped Venizelos take over the premiership and lead the war effort. Ten Greek divisions joined the eight French divisions in Thessaloniki along with six Serbian and four English. The May offensive of the allies began in the region of Skra-Gevgelija, on the Vardar river. On 15 September Ge e al F a het d Espèrey launched his 280 battalions against the 260 Bulgarian battalions and carried the field. The Bulgarians capitulated soon after and the Serbian troops finally returned to Belgrade. On 30 September the Ottoman government signed the armistice of Mudros and opened the straits and Istanbul to allied ships.66 The First World War ended in 1918 while operations in the Balkans had still not been completed. For the Greeks and the Turks, the war ended in 1922 with the Asia Minor Greek catastrophe . 65 66 Castellan, op. cit., pp. 394-398. Ibid, pp. 404-405. 66 The Romanians invaded Hungary in 1919 and the Yugoslavs did the same in Austrian territories in 1921. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was held without the presence of two of the pre-war Great Powers – namely AustriaHungary and Russia – and with Germany in the camp of the defeated.67 Their absence created a new balance of power in Europe with France playing the leading role. Italy, with its revisionist stance on the treaties, emerged as a source of claims and trouble during the inter-war period. Dismembered AustriaHungary ceded bits and pieces of territory to Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia while revolutionary Russia was planning to transform the world. Two conflicting factors shaped the international acts that led to the e o figu atio of Eu ope: The fou tee poi ts of the American President Woodrow Wilson that promoted the selfdetermination of nations on the one hand and the secret treaties that the victors had concluded to share the territories of their opponents, on the other. In the Balkans, the most fortunate were Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Thanks to the Treaty of Trianon, Romania acquired Transylvania with two million Hungarians concentrated in the eastern and central part of the province. The Romanians had also received promises from their allies about acquiring Bukovina from the Germans, while as mentioned, they also received Bessarabia from Russia and Dobrudža from the defeated Bulgarians. Their success had thus exceeded all their expectations. 67 N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979. 67 Those supporting a state of Southern Slavs managed to realise their dream of a Triune Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. The Italian claims on Dalmatia and Fiume were based on the secret Treaty of London (26 April 1915) but President Wilson supported the policies of the Southern Slavs. Finally, thanks to the Istria arrangement in September 1920, Italy received Trieste and abandoned most of its claims on Dalmatia. 68 Greece suffered the greatest loss among the victors. Instead of resting satisfied with winning Thrace (Western and Eastern) she chose to get involved in the Smyrna (Izmir) adventure, a misguided acceptance of an allied mandate to maintain order in the Turkish province of Aidin. In 1922 the Greek forces and the Greeks of Asia Minor were evicted by Atatü k s a a di Greece lost Eastern Thrace while having to deal with the rehabilitation of one million four hundred thousand Greek refugees. The independence of Albania occurred in 1912 by decision of the Ambassadorial Conference that also undertook to fix the Greek-Albanian borders. What the international commission and Italian diplomacy did produce in the end was the Florence Protocol (December 1913) according to which the southern borders of Albania from cape Stylos (Stilo) to the Prespa lakes, included Delvino (Delvinë), Agioi Saranta (Sarandë, district of forty saints), Cheimara, Argyrokastro (Gjirokastër), Premeti, Leskovik and Corytsa (Korçë). On February 1914, Greece was notified by the forces of the Triple Entente that she could annex the islands close to the 68 Banac. Op.cit. p.141-225 68 shores of Turkey. The e og itio of the alidit of G ee e s lai s over the islands was conditional upon her abandoning her claims over Albania. The reaction of the North Epirote Greeks took the shape of an autonomy movement. Under the chairmanship of the Former Foreign Affai s Mi iste Geo ge )og afos, the go e e t of auto o ous No the Epi us i A g okast o urged the population, in February 1914, to defend their rights. In order to avert a Greco-Albanian conflict, the International Commission arranged on May 1914 for the signature of the Corfu Protocol which recognised the autonomy of Northern Epirus. The implementation of the Protocol was left to the International Control Commission which designated Corytsa and Argyrokastro as the two centres of the autonomous area. The Corfu Protocol was ratified in July 1914 by Italy and Austro-Hungary while the same month, the Albanian Government notified the auto o ists that it full a epted the P oto ol s o te ts. During the war, Albania was occupied by Italian, Austrian, French, Greek, Serb and Bulgarian troops. Through the secret treaty of London, Italy gained control of Vlorë and of a considerable part of its hinterland. Having secured her post-war claims in the Alps and the Adriatic Sea, Italy was willing to recognise the demands by Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. Central Albania would thus become an autonomous and neutral statelet under Italian tutelage. The plans to dismember Albania were cancelled by President Woodrow Wilson but its economic weakness made it totally 69 dependent on its guarantors. This dependence prefigured the end of Albanian sovereignty in 1939.69 T. Veremis, Th.Couloumbis, E.Nikolacopoulos, Ο ισ ός Α βα ίας (Hellenism in Albania), Athens: I.Sideris, 1995, p.19-22 69 ς 70 Chapter 6: The Interwar Conundrum The annexation of territories and the population exchanges gave the Balkan countries greater ethnic homogeneity. A direct outcome of the population reshuffles was also the distribution of large estates, a measure that provided landless peasants with the minimum necessary for their survival. With the partial exception of Southern Albania and Romania, great landowners gradually vanished in the Balkan countries. In Greece and Bulgaria, the land distribution served to rehabilitate the refugees while in Romania and Yugoslavia it o solidated these ou t ies national sovereignty as the large estates in the annexed territories belonged to Austrians, Hungarians and Russians. However, there was also another motive besides land distribution, as Stavrianos notes: The overriding motivation behind land reform was undoubtedly the fear of revolution. After six years of almost continual fighting, the Balkan peoples were war-weary and disaffected. The great upheaval in Russia and the spread of Bolshevism in Hungary and other parts of Central Europe raised the spectre of a vast revolutionary wave sweeping over the Balkan Peninsula. This induced landowners and the ruling political circles to enact land reform in the hope that it would function as a lightning conductor during the revolutionary storms .70 Thus in Yugoslavia, one in four peasants acquired land, in Romania the estates that were distributed represented 21% of the total arable land, in Greece, 38% (including the Turkish estates) and 70 Stavrianos, op.cit. 1965, p.594 71 in Bulgaria – where large estates were few before the war – 6%. Land distribution, however, did not solve the livelihood problem of the peasants. The rapid population increase that resulted, in the Balkans, from the establishment of peace and the beneficial impact of medical sciences (admittedly delayed as compared to other countries) was enlarging the ranks of the jobless in the countryside. The low yield of the splintered-off allotments, the inability of the cultivators to improve their methods and the American constraints on immigration, created a serious social problem in the Balkan countries. In the two largest states, the parties dominating the political scene (such as the Liberals of Ion B ătia u in Romania and the Radical party of Nicola Pašić in Yugoslavia) were the ones that relied on the intervention of the state to grant favours to their middle-class supporters. In the countries with large landless peasant populations as Romania, the tradition of agricultural opposition acquired considerable new strength. Russian peasant populism had a significant impact on the agrarian movements of the Balkans. In spite of their strength in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, the agrarian parties failed to overcome the communists. The first communist cells were created by industrial workers or – in the case of Romania – by those working at the oil wells. Most of their followers, however, were seasonal workers who flocked in the urban centres from the countryside in order to supplement their meagre income from agriculture. The Serb social democrats identified with the ideas of the Russian Revolution and became a model for other communists in Yugoslavia. The Interior Minister Milovan Drašković excelled as a persecutor of the party until such time as he became its target. Afte his assassi atio i , the ou t s o u ist pa t as 72 outlawed and remained so during the whole interwar period. In 1928, Moscow changed the Yugoslav party leadership but its new leaders such as Josip Broz (Tito) also found themselves in prison. Tito became General Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) in 1937. His organisational talent stood him in good stead during the years of the Axis Occupation. Bulgaria – in spite of the fact that it was an essentially agricultural society with a numerically insignificant industrial proletariat– became, thanks to its Russophile tradition, the Balkan country with the strongest communist movement. During the life of the Soviet Union the population remained sympathetic towards anything Russian. Enjoying a considerable influence within the Third International, incommensurate with the small size of the country it represented, the leadership of the Bulgarian communist party under Vassili Kolarov and Georgi Dimitrov played a decisive role in shaping the Balkan policy of the Communist International. The Social-Democratic Party of Bulgaria was founded in a d soo split i to fa tio s: the Na o a d the B oad (Socialists). The former following the Marxist view, opposed the involvement of Bulgaria in the wars and joined in 1919 the Third International under the name of the Bulgarian Communist Party . In the elections, the communist MPs did not exceed 44 out of 236 and posed no serious threat to the bourgeois regime. In 1935, they created, in cooperation with other parties, the Popular Front and in 1939 they secured 68 out of 160 MPs in the Sobranie (Parliament). The German-Soviet treaty of 1939 put an end to the cooperation of the parties forming the Popular Front. In Romania, the Social Democratic party, founded in 1893 as a counter-revolutionary movement, opposed the peasant revolt of a d the ou t s pa ti ipatio i the a s. The 73 involvement of its leader Christian Rakovsky in the Russian Revolution radicalised the party, so that in 1921 it split into two. As a result, the Social Democratic party followed the course of the other socialist reformist parties while the Communist party joined the Third International. The communists were outlawed in 1924 because they followed the instructions of the Comintern which asked for the return of the territories that Romania had been given by the Peace Conference. The outcry that this position generated is comparable to the reactions in Greece against the Greek Communist Party for its stance on Macedonia at approximately the same time. The National-Peasant Party of Romania sought democratic social reform and appealed primarily to the peasants, but also to progressive intellectuals and professionals. Not unlike the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, the National-Peasant Party was opposed by Liberals, nationalists, anti-communists and antisemites. The extreme right-wing parties in the Balkan countries provided one more proof of the failure of parliamentarianism. The I o Gua d of Romania, under Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, remains the closest Balkan equivalent of the Nazi party. It originated from an ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic tradition, strengthened by the presence of uniform-wearing paramilitaries, the display of standards and the ritualistic murders of opponents. The outrages performed by the movement gave King Carol II the opportunity to outla the I o Gua d , e e ute its leade s a d establish his own right-wing dictatorship. Similarly inspired was also the outlawed C oat o e e t of the Ustasha a o d ea i g i su ge t movement). This was fuelled by the vexations the Croats felt because of the centralised administration of Yugoslavia as imposed the “e s. The leade of the Ustasha A te Pa elić lived in Italy 74 a d as fi a ed Mussoli i. The Ustasha disti guished itself its political assassinations and virulent anti-Semitism.71 Among the Balkan countries which took part in World War I, on the side of the Triple Alliance, the greatest losers were the Bulgarians. The dream of San Stefano was thrashed, the war dead exceeded one hundred thousand and Bulgarian agriculture collapsed. On 25 September 1918 the revolt of Radomir freed the imprisoned leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) Alexander Stamboliyski and aimed at placing him at the head of a republican regime. As allied forces entered Bulgaria an armistice was signed and the revolt petered out. King Ferdinand was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Boris II (1918-1943). The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) and its leader Stamboliyski, constitute the most original contribution of Bulgaria to Balkan politics. Stamboliyski won the 1920 parliamentary elections and became prime minister. He believed that human nature consisted of two elements, the individual and the social. The former demanded property while the latter evolved along with the complexities of society. Unlike the Marxists, the Agrarians separated society in occupational categories rather than social classes and stressed the paramount role of agriculture in Bulgaria. The movement harboured hostility against the urban professionals, the church hierarchy and the military.72 The Agrarians won 110 deputies to 51 for the Communist Party and were nine seats short of absolute majority. Stamboliyski promptly annulled the returns of the thirteen deputies and replaced them 71 72 Hitchins, Romania 1866-1947, pp. 400-410 op. cit. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, op. cit., pp. 127-128, 147-151. 75 with agrarians.73 The paramilitary arm of the BANU was the O a ge Gua d , consisting of peasant militants that turned against the Communists as well as against traditional parties, the IMRO and the army. Gradually the O a ge Gua d began to lodge itself into the power structure of Bulgaria and replaced the police in some of its functions. Redistribution of land –one of the great promises of Stamboliyski- made slow progress, although the performance of BANU in building 1,100 new schools was impressive.74 The fact that Stamboliyski had signed the Treaty of Neuilly that had ratified the loss of Macedonian territories turned him into a hated figure for the IMRO nationalists. He was almost exclusively i te ested i i p o i g the li i g o ditio s of his ou t s agricultural population and did not lay claim on Bulga ia s lost territories. On 9 June 1923 the military, with the help of IMRO activists, overthrew Stamboliyski and assassinated him. The Communist Party initially adopted a neutral position in this conflict but then decided under orders from Moscow and with considerable delay, to rise against the military and IMRO. The result was a lood ep essio that e luded the Left f o Bulga ia s politi al scene throughout the interwar period. During this time Bulgaria came to know the violence of the IMRO which joined forces with the fas ist C oat Ustasha . Most of the IM‘O assassi atio s e e the result of the internal conflict between the supremacists or Ve ho ists and the federalists. The former, under the leadership of Ivan or Vancho Mihailov, were fighting for the annexation of 73 Ibid, pp. 149-151. Ibid, pp. 152-154. See also, John D. Bell, Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliyski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923, Princeton University Press, 1977. 74 76 Yugoslav Macedonia while the more moderate federalists, many of them communists, demanded its autonomy. In spite of his apparent mildness, Boris of Bulgaria proved a determined monarch. His close relationship with fascist Italy notwithstanding, he did not favour the revisionist ideas of IMRO and the other nationalists about the need to alter existing borders. O Ma the ) e o political group managed to seize power in collaboration with the military. The o e e ts strongman Damyan Velchev proved to be the enemy of the revisionists and was able to smash the IMRO structure in no time. He did not manage, however, to bring under his control the political life of Bulgaria even though he virtually abolished Parliament. This was achieved by King Boris himself who became, after 1934, the essential arbiter of his ou t s politi s. In Bo is methods of manipulating Bulgarian nationalism to his advantage, as a e i al of Bulga ia s past as a atio of Hu s. A o g the alleged virtues of the Huns, besides bravery and discipline, was their stern loyalty to the head of their state. The other advantage that this revival brought to Boris was that it put distance between the Slavs and the Bulgarians and more explicitly, the Russian communists were estranged in Bulgarian perceptions from local traditions. In the foreign policy front the King secured the return of Southern Dobrudža to Bulgaria in September 1940, thanks to Hitle s i te est i i i g Boris on his side.75 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was problemridden right from its birth. The sole national Parliament in Ma i V. Pudeff, Bulgarian Nationalism , in Peter F. Sugar & Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 149-152. 75 77 operation as the “e ia “kupšti a , while Croatia and Bosnia functioned under their provincial administrations. The most important bone of contention between Serbs and Croats became the centralised governance preferred by Prime Minister Pašić as opposed to the federation that the Croat politician Stjepan Radić believed in. The Constitution that was voted in 1921 - with the Croat Peasant Party of Radić abstaining - reflected the preferences of Pašić who managed to secure the support of the Bosnian Muslim landowners by promising to indemnify them. Nikola Pašić passed away in 1926 of natural causes while ‘adić died in 1928 soon after being shot in the Skupština. In order to return to Parliament, the Croats demanded arrangements that far exceeded any previously known limits of loose relationships with central Government. In January 1929, King Alexander abolished the constitution and imposed a royal dictatorship. The state was officially named Yugoslavia while the use of all ethnic names (Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia) was forbidden as these were replaced by nine administrative units (banovine) most named after the rivers that flow through them: Drava, Sava, Vrbas, Drina, Vardar, Zeta, Morava and Danube. Even though Alexander did not fa ou the “e s o e a othe Yugosla s, the C oat Ustashe declared him their mortal enemy and in collaboration with VMRO assassinated him in 1934. He was succeeded on the throne by his nine-year old son Peter while his cousin, Prince Paul Ka ađo đe ić was appointed to act as regent. 76 76 Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999, Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London: Granta books, 1999, p.396-402, 436-442. Mark Biondich The Historical Legacy: The Evolutio of I te a Yugosla Politi s , in Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic-Soso (eds.), State Collapse in SouthEastern Europe, Purdue University Press, 2008, pp.43-74 78 In the elections of 1935, the opposition gained a considerable percentage of the popular vote. Premier Milan “tojadi o ić displayed moderation and willingness to compromise i his elatio s ith Yugosla ia s eth i g oups ut follo ed ‘ege t Paul in his policy of friendliness towards the Axis. In the elections of 1938 the Government managed to defeat the united opposition only because it used fraud to secure an electoral victory. Throughout the interwar period Yugoslavia as most European multicultural states, remained a mosaic, each part contributing to a loose sense of u it . I I o Lede e s o ds In this context the national issue, particularly between the two wars, was compounded by the fact that the external vulnerability of the state ould e e ploited fo pu poses of do esti politi s… the e e e limits beyond which even the aggrieved and disgruntled Croatian Peasant Party would not venture in exploiting the international vulnerability of the state .77 In September 1920 the last Italian troops left Albania while the Greek and Yugoslav armed forces did so in 1922. On 30 July 1926, Greece, Yugoslavia, Britain and France signed an agreement recognisi g the Al a ia o de s. Al a ia s politi al pa ties reflected the great social differences that had emerged in the country. The Progressive Party under Shefqet Vërlaci, especially strong in the central hinterland, was opposed to the agricultural reform and represented the interests of the landowners. The Popular or Reformist Party under the orthodox bishop Fan Noli was formed by repatriated Albanians whose ambition was to modernise their country. As a priest and leader of the Albanians in Boston, I o J. Lede e , Natio alis cit. p. 433. 77 a d the Yugosla s , in Sugar and Lederer op. 79 Noli contributed in 1908 to the creation of an autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church, headed by himself. In 1920 he was elected deputy of the Albanian-Americans in the new Albanian Parliament. The other leader of the Popular Party was Ahmet Zogu, offspring of a fa il of Otto a pashas a d stude t i a Ottoman military school.78 The division of Albania into tribes and family clans as well as the ou t s split i to Ghegs in the north and Tosks in the South, rendered Albanian politics extremely volatile. Between July and December 1921, five governments succeeded one another. Attacks by rebels against the centre of Tirana were not an exceptional occurrence. When Zogu got engaged to the daughter of the great landlord Vërlaci and became Prime Minister in December 1922, it became obvious that he had abandoned the reformist Popular Party in order to join the camp of the landowners. His former colleagues, with Noli as their leader, formed the opposition party of the Democrats. They were flanked by the landless orthodox peasants of the South who wanted the distribution of the la ds elo gi g to the e s . I Jul , )ogu had to fa e the occupation of Tirana by his opponents and was forced to flee to Yugoslavia. Noli, who succeeded him, tried to implement his reformist programme. However, in December the forces loyal to Zogu, strengthened by Yugoslavs and White Russian mercenaries, obliged Noli to flee to Italy and restored Zogu in power. Noli withdrew from politics in 1930 and returned to his religious duties in Boston. I Ja ua , )ogu as ele ted P eside t of the e l formed republican regime. Two years later he changed the 78 Stavrianos, op.cit. p.709-726 80 constitution and proclaimed himself King Zog of Albania. The landowners were his main support and Italy became the creditor of his regime. When in 1932 the Italians asked to redeem their protection of Albania, Zog started by refusing to grant them sovereignty over his country. However, once Italy had finished with Ethiopia and its involvement in the Spanish civil war, she turned her attention to Albania, free of any distractions.79 International developments The temporary absence of Russia and Germany from the redrawing of Balkan borders after the First World War, affected the stability of the region. On the other hand, the withdrawal of Britain and the appearance of the expansionist ambitions of Italy, were counter- ala ed the Petite E te te Cze hoslo akia, Yugoslavia, Romania suppo ted F a e a d the Balka E te te (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey) whose aim was to protect the Balkans from foreign interference. Both alliances were created in order to preserve the status quo.80 In Greece, the fact that the Populist Party (Laiko Komma) gained power in 1933 altered the Venizelist policy that G ee e s foreign policy in the Balkans ought to be based on bilateral, not multilateral relations. Venizelos was convinced that Greece ought 79 R. J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 144-151.Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Twentieth century, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.181-184, 218-219. Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956, pp.136-143. 80 L.S.Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times, Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1964. 81 to avoid becoming enmeshed in the conflicts among the Great Powers and should therefore avoid participating (for the same reason) in multilateral regional security systems. This policy was revised as the world was entering an era of great realignments. As of the start of 1933, the regime emerging from the Peace Treaties of 1919 began to break down. The withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations created considerable insecurity among the smaller European nations. The Balkan countries tried, through their bilateral agreements, to create a multilateral system that would ensure their integrity and could lead, in the future, to an economic and perhaps political commonwealth. A e isio ist Bulga ia a d a isolated Albania, became permanent obstacles to a Balkan federation. From October 1933 until January 1934, a number of preparatory intergovernmental contacts took place among the four Balkan countries in view of the signature of a Treaty that would ensure the territorial arrangements as established by the Treaties. The inter-Balkan cooperation was naturally of interest to France but was resented by Italy. Britain was displeased by the fact that the Treaty excluded two Balkan states, while the Soviet Union, fearful of any German penetration towards its western borders, was in favour of anything that strengthened the status quo. This Treaty of the Balkan Entente was signed on 9 February 1934 in Athens by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. Its two-year duration could be automatically extended to five years and then again to seven years. Eleftherios Venizelos was most critical of the Treaty stressing the damage this would cause to G ee e s elatio s ith Ital . He also deemed the Greek-Turkish cooperation sufficient to avert any Bulgarian threat. The fact that his Liberals had the power to block 82 atifi atio of the T eat G ee e s t o legislati e odies o account of the majority they commanded in the Senate, obliged the Foreign Minister, D. Maximos, to explain that the aim of the Treaty was to secure the intra-Balkan borders against any threat to them by a Balkan country. This interpretation reduced considerably the scope of the Treaty and pushed Belgrade towards Sofia and Ankara. At about the same time, the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern issued a resolution which acknowledged the reality of a Macedonian nation.81 The Italian takeover of Ethiopia, the creation of the Berlin‘o e a is a d the e pa sio of Hitle s Ge a ha ged the ules of the international diplomatic game. Any Balkan solidarity that had emerged from the 1934 Treaty gradually broke down. The incorporation of Romania i to the A is sphe e of i flue e a d Yugosla ia s effo ts to es ape its isolatio i p o i g elatio s with Italy and Bulgaria in 1937, compelled the Treaty partners to revise their attitude. The rapprochement with Sofia marked the beginning of the incorporation of Bulgaria into the Balkan family but under its own terms. Having violated in practice the Treaty of Neuilly as to its obligation to reduce its armed forces, the Bulgarian Government managed to legalise its disengagement from the interdictions of that Treaty. On 31 June 1938, the Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas, in his capacity as chairman of the Balkan Entente, signed in Thessaloniki with the Bulgarian Premier Georgi Kioseivanov a Treaty exempting Bulgaria from its commitments, 81 Disillusionment with the concept of collective security championed by the League of Nations, drove Balkan states to sign bilateral agreements between them, or such regional multilateral pacts as that of 1934. See J. S. Koliopoulos & Thanos Veremis, Modern Greece. A History since 1821, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 102. 83 even though this country had not (as was proved later) abandoned any of its revisionist designs. The Greek-Turkish relations followed, until World War II, the original spirit that had animated the 1930 Venizelos-Atatürk app o he e t. G ee e s ad o a in favour of Turkey during the Montreux Conference in 1936 that abolished the Treaty under the same name, the demilitarised zones and the International Commission on the Straits, allowed Greece to militarise the Aegean islands of Lemnos and Samothrace with Turkish approval. Fu the o e, a o ple e ta t eat as sig ed i Athe s o April 1938 providing that in case of an attack by one or more Powers against one of the contracting parties, the other was obliged to remain neutral. The two countries also undertook the obligation that in case of an attack by a third party they would consult in order to oppose by all means at their disposal the passage th ough thei soil of the atta ke s a ed fo es a d military material. Even if, in such a case, Greece became obliged to stop Bulgarian forces from attacking Turkey, she signed the Treaty in the belief that the security of countries threatened by revisionist forces (mainly Italy) was indivisible. In 1939 both countries became associated, in different ways, with the security system of Britain and France. On 13 April, Greece accepted the guarantee of the two Powers and on 9 October, Turkey signed the tripartite AngloFranco-Turkish Treaty.82 The Metaxas dictatorship, supervised by King George II, turned unequivocally towards Britain with, as a result, Greece becoming gradually exposed first to Italian and then to German 82 Thanos Veremis, Greeks and Turks in War and Peace, Athens News Books, 2007, pp. 119-121. 84 hostilit . The pe a e t goal of Mata as as to se u e B itai s gua a tee of G ee e s te ito ial i teg it i the fo of a alliance. The British Government, however, avoided any such commitment up until 7 April 1939 when the Italian armed forces abolished the monarchy of Ahmet Zogu and imposed their own regime in Albania. Nonetheless the oral assurances about supporting Greece militarily never led to the much hoped-for treaty of alliance. When Italy offered Greece the renewal of the bilateral oope atio alo g the p e ede t of , Meta as asked B itai s opinion for an approval but got an ambiguous and discouraging response. The final rejection, by Greece, of the renewal of the 1928 t eat left the ou t e posed to Ital s agg essi e ess. The e a of relative autonomy in the diplomatic manoeuvres that Greece had experienced during its interwar parliamentary period ended for good in 1936, not only because foreign policy was conducted by King George II, a monarch totally dedicated to Britain, but also because the oncoming conflict on a world scale, excluded any freedom of choice for the small players. Albania with 80 per cent of its population in agriculture (40 per cent of which were landless peasants) was the most underdeveloped, and isolated Balkan state of the interwar period. Tirana which became the capital of the new state after World War I, numbered only thirty thousand inhabitants in 1939. Poverty prevailed in a land of which only one tenth was arable. Large quantities of wheat, corn and rice were imported, amounting to 23 per cent of total imports in 1938. Ital s atta k o Ap il o Durrës, Vlorë, and Saranda, was met with weak Albanian resistance. King Zog and his wife fled to Greece leaving armed opposition to Italian occupation in the hands of gendarmerie commander, Abbas Kupi. Vërlaci - who 85 had al ost e o e )og s fathe -in-law, reaped his revenge against the man that jilted his daughter by offering the King of Italy the Albanian crown. Nevertheless, the subsequent tribulations of Albania endowed it with centralised institutions and a broadly based national identity. Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussoli i s so -in-law, masterminded the Albanian operation and believed that he would generate popular solidarity among his new subjects if he gave them an irredentist mission in the region. Occupying Greece would serve that purpose, and what was more important, would enhance Mussoli i s Medite a ea e pi e. The Ca e ia egio i No the Greece with its unredeemed Albanian minority became the o e ie t ta get of Ital s p opaga da i Al a ia83. On 28 October 1940, eight Italian divisions (140,000 men) crossed the Greek-Albanian borders along a 150-mile front. They were met with unexpected resistance by the Greeks that soon turned into a rout of the Italian invaders. By December the Greek army had pursued the assailants deep into Albanian territory, taking Gjirokastër, Pogradec and Porto Eda. Finally, Ge a s divisions bailed out Mussolini from his disastrous undertaking and overran Yugoslavia and Greece. 83 Bend J. Fischer, Albania at War. 1939-1945, London: Hurst & Co., 1999, pp. 21-58, 76-83. See also, Derek Hall, Albania and the Albanians, London: Pinter, 1994. 86 Chapter 7: From War to Communism The war years The seeds for the extension of the war in the Balkans were planted right from the start of the German presence in the region. It was thus that in the years that followed, Bulgaria and Romania became satellites of Germany while Yugoslavia and Greece found themselves under axis occupation. The degree of exploitation and plundering of the economy was much greater in the occupied countries where inevitable resistance movements against the Axis soon took shape. Hitle s ilita pe et atio i the Eastern Balkans generated serious worries in his Soviet partner. On the other hand, the Soviet territorial claims on Romania (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina) were the first issues to cause a cooling of German-Soviet relations. Moreover the return – on German insistence – of Southern Do udža to Bulgaria and part of Transylvania to Hungary, deprived Romania of one third of its territory and population without a shot being fired. As a result of the crisis that followed, King Carol resigned in favour of his son Michael on 6 September 1940. This meant in essence that Romania s leader became the dictator general Ion Antonescu. King Boris of Bulgaria decided to accept German troops in his country, obliged as he was to choose between the German and the Soviet influence and also because he was convinced that the Germans would give Macedonia, Thrace and Do udža to Bulgaria. The su ess of the G eek fo es agai st Mussoli i s a in Albania prompted the German attack on Greece in April 1941. Hitle s Ju e de isio to lau h his a paig agai st the Soviet Union turned the presence of the British air force in Greece into a permanent danger for the Romanian oil wells that supplied the German forces. It was the Italian aggression that had brought the British into Greece and the Germans had to annul this u desi a le de elop e t efo e lau hi g ope atio Ba a ossa against Soviet Russia. The architects of the coup against Regent Paul on 26 March immediately declared that they would honour all international obligations of the previous regime but Hitler, who did not trust them then invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia. At the same time he also attacked Greece from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Part of the German forces crossed the Axios valley and invaded Thessaloniki, another part reached the Florina area through Monastir-Bitola, thus outflanking the allied frontline along Aliakmon river and a third one met with desperate Greek resistance on the Metaxas line. The retreat of the Anglo-Hellenic divisions to Mount Olympus first and Thermopylae next, took place while lieutenant-general Tsolakoglou was signing a protocol of surrender to the Germans on 20 April 1941.84 The escape of fifty thousand men of the British expeditionary force (80% of the total number) took place from Southern Peloponnese under considerable difficulties. After the death of Metaxas and the suicide of banker Alexander Koryzis who succeeded him, Emmanuel Tsouderos was appointed Prime Minister by the King. Together with King George they left continental Greece for Crete which, in turn, fell to the Germans on 84 John Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection. 1935-1941, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 263-286. 88 2 June 1941. From Crete, the Greek Government passed on to Egypt first and London thereafter.85 Yugoslavia was occupied through Hungary and Romania. Two thirds of Slovenia were annexed to the provinces of Austria and colonised by Germans. Fascist Italy grabbed the remaining third, as well as a large part of Montenegro and the Adriatic coast. Kosovo, part of Montenegro and the Albanian-inhabited part of the Serbian province of Vardar (later to become the Socialist Republic of Macedonia) were united with occupied Albania. The para-state Albanian Scanderbeg Divisions became the nemesis of the Serbs in the area. Bulgaria took over the largest part of the Vardar province and proceeded to assimilate its population. Hungary usurped part of C oatia a d a la ge pa t of “e ia s Voj odi a. C oatia e a e Ge a s a d Ital s puppet state ith, the leade of the Ustashe , A te Pa elić, at its head. Bosnia-Herzegovina was included in the state of Pavelić who distinguished himself for his massacres of Serbs and Jews with the alleged assent of Alojzije “tepi a , )ag e s atholi a h ishop. Unlike the Croats, which they considered as their allies, the Germans treated the Serbs as defeated enemies. Occupied Serbia was shrunk to its size before the Balkan wars and was placed under the command of a German military governor. The collaborationist government of Milan Nedić worked under the illusion that it was serving the interests of King Peter and his government-in-exile while in reality it was totally dependent on the German, even on the Bulgarian, occupation forces. 85 Ibid, pp. 281-293. 89 The resistance organisation of the royalist colonel Draga Mihailo ić represented the anti-communist Serbian nationalists. The Chet ik fighte s appea ed fi st i Bos ia i o de to p ote t the “e s f o the Ustasha assa es a d e e a ui ed a unified command. On the contrary, the Pa tisa s of Josip Broz (Tito) – a Croat who had been initiated into communism as a prisoner of war in Soviet Russia – obeyed a strictly hierarchical system and promoted the principle of self-determination for the egio s eth i ities. I spite of the i itial u de sta di g etween them, the two organisations ended up waging a civil war after No e e . Tito s g adual do i a e as follo ed the decline of Mihailo ić who – convinced that he should avoid resistance acts that might provoke German retaliation – condemned his men to inertia and ended up collaborating with the enemy.86 In Albania, the leaders of the Left and the Right met in “epte e i Peza to fo the Natio al Li e atio F o t LNC (standing for Levizie National Clirimtara). About the same time a nationalist resistance movement was created under the name of Natio al U io Bali Ko eta . Although f ie dl to a ds the Allies the leadership of this organisation feared that a defeat of the Germans and the Italians would mean the return of Kosovo to Yugoslavia. The fall of Italy allowed the Germans to take over the governance of Albania and to split the cooperation between communists and nationalists by promising Albanians their independence after the war. The new government under the Germans was formed mainly by Kosovars. The only resistance 86 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988, London: Hurst & Co, 1988, pp. 10-15. 90 movement that was both against the Germans and the communists was the one led by Abbas Kupi, supporter of the deposed King Zog. In spite of the blows that the LNC suffered by the Germans, its leader Enver Hoxha – secretary general of the Albanian communist party – managed to set up a provisional government with himself as Prime Minister and postponed the issue of the return of Zog for after the war. In July 1944, the civil war between the communists on the one hand and the nationalists cum royalists such as Kupi on the other, was in full swing. By October 1944, Hoxha in Albania – just as Tito in Yugoslavia – had triumphed.87 This was the same month that Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow and discussed the future of the Balkans. Roosevelt, who was otherwise engaged with the American elections, was silently represented by the American ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman. The Red Army was advancing rapidly in the Danube valley and Churchill saw that Romania and Bulgaria were coming under total Soviet occupation. He therefore offered Stalin control of these two countries in exchange for British influence in Greece and shared influence by London and Moscow in Yugoslavia. Tito, in spite of being a communist, had won the trust of Churchill and the support of the Allies. Stalin had his reservations about Tito but accepted the share-out as ell as Chu hill s p oposal in toto. During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the three leaders agreed, among other things, to strengthen the temporary governments that had popular support and to expedite the holding 87 Wolff, op.cit. p.232-234 91 of free elections that would consolidate the democratic form of government. The De la atio o Li e ated Eu ope p o ed ea i gless in the cases of Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. In the former, Tito s sup e a as e o d dou t f o ight afte the li e atio , but in the case of the other two countries the presence of Soviet troops did not allow the popular will to counter Soviet influence. Stalin insisted, both at Yalta and at the summit meeting in Potsdam (17 July – 2 August 1945) on the terms of the agreement with Churchill, reminding everyone of his neutrality during the British intervention in Athens in December 1944. In Potsdam, Stalin rejected bluntly the American pressures for free elections in Easte Eu ope sa i g that a f eel ele ted go e e t ould e anti-“o iet a d this is so ethi g that e a ot allo .88 The post-war communist regimes Up until the summer of 1948, Yugoslavia was for the Soviets, the star jewel in their Balkan crown. This country was the first to initiate the collective ownership of land in 1947 thus proving its loyalty to the principles of Leninism. This was a reckless decision taken as it was in an agrarian society where land ownership had al a s ea t i depe de e. E e E e Ho ha s Al a ia, uled the harshest political regime in South East Europe, was reluctant to implement land collectivisation. P.E Mosel Fa e to Fa e ith ‘ussia , Headline Series no 70, July-August 1948, p.23 88 92 Tito s i itiati es i the Balka s a d his i depe de t position however, began to irritate Stalin. In 1947, Tito persuaded other communist states in the region to mobilise mass organisations from below. Furthermore, he signed treaties with Albania, Bulgaria and Romania to set up a Communist customs union as a first step toward a Balkan federation. His outright support for the communist insurgents of the Greek civil-war in 1948 and his decision to station support troops in Albania, incurred the ath of “tali . Afte Tito s efusal to fall i li e ith “o iet instructions, Stalin convened a Cominform meeting in Bucharest in June 1948 and expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist International with the accusation that its regime was a Trotskyite and capitalist deviation.89 Tito in turn denounced Stalin but felt the need to counter the Soviet blow. After the German occupation, agricultural output had been halved and the means the population disposed to satisfy the demands of the state were limited. Collectivisation and requisition of their output was the last straw for the angry peasants. The rebellions by Serb and Muslim Bosnians in the area of Kasin in 1950 were acts of desperate peasants against a state that tormented them. Repression was fierce but proved a good lesson for the tormentors as well. The collectivisations were gradually reduced in numbers and finally abandoned. Resistance to collectivisation occurred in Romania as well, about the same time. Even though its intensity was nothing like Kasin, it lasted longer. Unlike, however, what had happened in Yugoslavia, the Romanian Communist Party learned nothing from this experience. Its leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej belonged to the category of the home communists who had lived throughout 89 Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002, p. 404. 93 the war in Romania. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ana Pauker was the most prominent amongst the so- alled Mus o ites . E e though “tali o de ed the atio al o u ists su h as Wladyslaw Gomulka – who like Tito sought a Polish way to communism – Dej managed to prevail over his rivals, first over Păt ăș a u and then over Pauker. His tactics consisted in following the orthodox Marxist course towards industrialisation at the expense of agriculture. In Bulgaria, the country with the largest agricultural sector in the Balkans, the party leader, Vulko Chervenkov, did more than any of his contemporaries to destroy agriculture. Within three years he had eliminated all the small landholdings on which the economy was based ever since the creation of the Bulgarian state. At about the same time, Dej was opening up a canal at the delta of the river Danube from Constanta to the Black Sea. Financed by COMECON, this work was based on the debilitating manual labour of thousa ds of olu tee s ho e e ai l politi al p iso e s from concentration camps. “tali s death i deepl upset Dej and Chervenkov. The new Soviet leadership – especially Khrushchev – demanded of his ou t s pa t e s to e p ess thei a ti-Stalinist feelings and to hand over their power to be managed collectively. COMECON abandoned support for the famous Danubian canal, a project that was to be continued ten years later by Nicolae Ceaușes u. Dej pretended to have become anti-Stalinist but unlike Chervenkov, refused to abandon power. Chervenkov handed over the post of first secretary to Todor Zhivkov who presented himself for some time as the reformer of the Bulgarian Stalinist regime. Dej pursued a policy of gradual disengagement from the Soviet Union while preserving an unyielding regime within his own country. The 94 condemnation of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 reconciled him with Khrushchev. The same year he repressed harshly the rebellions of the Hungarians of Transylvania who had demonstrated their solidarity with Budapest. 90 Dej won the trust of the new Soviet leadership, as mentioned, by condemning the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Twelve years later, his successor, Nikolae Ceaușes u (Dej died in 1965) gained public support and admirers in the West by denouncing the Soviet invasion of Prague. This breach with the Warsaw Pact won him the backing of the USA and the congratulations of China. Both Dej and Ceaușes u managed to keep Romania free of the division of labour ordered by Khrushchev. They refused, in other words, to be in the same category as Bulgaria and devote their agricultural output to feeding the COMECON countries. The dream of every true Marxist has always been industrialisation. Even though Ceaușes u exploited international attention to increase his independence and his prestige, he was careful never to cause a final break with the Soviet metropolis. His deviation from Soviet-style coercion created among many Romanians the illusion that the system was being led towards liberal reform. However, the Romanian dictator (President of the Republic since 1974) created a personal tyrannical regime without the slightest tolerance for innovations. His total control of all the a ti ities of his su je ts as ased o the se i es of the egi e s oto ious se et poli e fo e, the “e u itate . His final achievement was to bankrupt and starve the once richest country in the Balkans. Romanian agriculture was turned back into a primitive mode of production. To pay off his western debts Ceaușes u exported all 90 Crampton, Eastern Europe…,op. it., pp. -314 95 exportable commodities to the West and obligatory public labour was introduced on Sundays and holidays. The only Balkan communist leader who refused to obey Mos o s destali isatio o de s as the Al a ia E e Ho ha. His break with Khrushchev made him turn to Mao-Tse Tung until such time as he broke relations with China as well, seeking total isolation. During his forty years of absolute power he liquidated all those ho had at o e ti e o a othe ee his asso iates. Ho ha s death was the salvation of Ramiz Alia who succeeded him. The break between Tito and Stalin in 1948 was not caused so much a ideologi al ift ut athe the fo e s elu ta e to sa ifi e his ou t s se u it o e s to the p io ities of the Cominform. Furthermore Moscow considered it its prerogative to pa take i the aki g of Yugosla ia s fede al st u tu e. Afte the expulsion of the CPY from the Cominform Tito felt free to develop Federalism without Soviet meddling. At its sixth congress in 1952, the Co u ist Pa t e a ed itself League of Yugoslav Co u ists LYC) and one year later the Popular Front became the “o ialist Allia e of Yugosla Wo ke s . The LYC remained the most powerful collective institution in the Yugoslav system, but part of the day-to-day management of public affairs was taken over by the Socialist Alliance, a body dedicated to implement decentralisation and self-management of the economy.91 91 Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, Cambridge U i e sit P ess, , p. . “ee also, Aleksa Đilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991 and Vojislav G. Pa lo ić (ed.), The Balkans in the Cold War, Belgrade: Institut des Etudes Balkaniques, 2011, pp. 11-42. 96 Tito was undoubtedly the most important of the Balkan communist leaders. He managed to be considered by western ou t ies as i depe de t a d e e og ised e e od as o alig ed e e he he as improving his relations with the Soviet Union. He engineered the association of Non-alig ed “tates with such prominent leaders as Nehru, Nasser, Nyerere and Sukarno. No –alig e t became a basic element in Tito s foreign policy. In the early 60s the standard of living in Yugoslavia was much higher than in any of its communist Balkan neighbours. Movement to and fro Yugoslavia displayed an unusual – for a communist country – f eedo , hile the e o o i poli of selfa age e t e a e a subject for serious study in western research institutions. The innovation of moving from a centrally planned economy by granting the initiative to the periphery was greeted as a Yugoslav patent within the system of the statedirected economy.92 Self-management – the outcome of the clash between Tito and Stalin – was the brainchild of two close associates of the Yugoslav leader, namely the Slovene Edvard Kardelj and the Montenegrin Milovan Đilas. Thanks to this new ideological construct Yugoslavia was able to justify its differentiation from the “o iet U io . Ho e e , the o testatio of Le i s de o ati so ialis e ou aged e e o ei a le de iatio . The disside ts within the League of Yugoslav Communists voiced not only liberal but also nationalist tendencies that the system had banned.93 Milovan Đilas criticism of the authoritarianism of the regime when the Yugoslav leader was at the high point of his career, proved a serious challenge to Tito, originating as it was, from one of his close associates who had nothing to gain by criticising his leader. The 92 93 Pavlowitch, op. cit, pp. 48-63. Dennison Rusinow. The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974., London 1977 97 imprisonment of Đilas and his public condemnation contributed, in tu , to Tito s app o he e t ith the e – as of 1955 – leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev.94 About the same time the invisible secret police of the regime was becoming very active. The man in charge of Yugosla ia s poli e fo e, Ale a de ‘a ko ić was responsible for suppressing rebellions and strikes. In 1955, he launched a wave of arrests in Kosovo, on the suspicion that the Albanians were pla i g to e el. A suppo te of Belg ade s e t alised po e , ‘a ko ić was considered by many Serbs as a nationalist. In spite of the fact that Serbian chauvinism was identified with the policy of establishing the supremacy of the central government over the federated republics, ‘a ko ić was mainly dedicated to the concept of a unified Yugoslavia. I , the ou t s e o o sho ed sig s of se ious e essio . The ole of the o se ati es ithi the League of Yugosla Co u ists as se e el iti ised by the innovators so that during the fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the party on 1st July 1966, Tito was led to turn Ranković into a s apegoat espo si le fo all the ou t s set a ks. The e o al of an important Tito associate opened the way to liberal reforms. Once Tito was rid of ‘a ko ić, he defi ed e t alis as the ost serious threat to the system. However, the centralism that Tito astigated as ot too diffe e t f o the Yugosla is that he had preached until then, which considered the common Yugoslav 94 Milo a Đilas. Tito, The Story from Inside. London, 1981. 98 identity as overriding the secondary identity of the federated republics.95 During the period 1966-79, Yugoslavia and especially the federated republics, experienced their political and cultural spring. As 1968 evolved into the year of strong contestation in the developed western democracies, the Yugoslav model, as well as the Albanian one, became subjects of discussion and disputes within the ranks of the protesters in the West. The Albanian model of abject totalitarianism became the darling regime of the 1968 student-rebellion in the Sorbonne. The lure of the bizarre was al a s st o g a o g the i dole t ou geoisie, ut Yugosla ia s self-management had a sincere audience in the West. Nonetheless, the liberal deviation soon freed the particular features of the various nationalisms in Yugoslavia. The C oats, ho o a ou t of the i i al a ti it the Ustasha during the German occupation did not dare use their ethnic symbols for a long time, were the first to demand that their traditions be respected. The NDH (Independent State of Croatia) the Croat puppet state during the German occupation with its infamous Jasenovac concentration camp, was thoroughly purged Tito s fo es i . Tens of thousands of NDH soldiers and civilians were executed in Blei u g just afte the a e ded .96 The movement of self-determination that locked-in with decentralisation and self-management, became an avalanche for the guardians of Yugoslavism and represented a danger for the unity of the country. The demonstrations of students in Belgrade 95 Paul Lendvai. Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans, London, 1969 96 “la e ka D akuli , Too Little History – Too Mu h Me o , Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, 02/2011, 51. Jahrang, p.14. 99 a d the o e th eate i g de a d of Koso o s Albanian students in favour of upgrading their autonomous region into a Republic, became major sources of concern for Tito. Vladimir Bakarić, the first advocate of the decentralisation reform together with Kardelj, warned Tito that if this trend were allowed to continue, the country would disintegrate. In 1972, the arbiter of Yugoslavia decided to put a e d to the sp i g of )ag e a d i g the C oats a d othe dissidents back into the fold of Yugoslavism. 97 The aroused nationalism of Croats, Serbs and Bosnians appeared to recede but did not vanish. Twenty years later it reappeared in a much more menacing form. The Co stitutio as pa t of Tito s e dea ou to pave the way for his succession after the crisis of 1971-72. His own longevity in office and the expulsion of some of his close associates such as Đilas and ‘a ko ić, obliged him to search for an institutional frame that would ensure the self-management model in Yugoslavia and would guarantee the unity of the country. Even though this long and complex Constitution (that replaced the 1963 one as amended in 1967 and 1971) strengthened the federal character of the country it reinforced at the same time the role of the Yugoslav League of Communists and its cooperation with the army. In case of a threat against the unity of the country, these two basic institutions that represented Yugoslavia as a whole would resist any divisive tendencies originating at the periphery. On the contrary, the 1976 law for the cooperatives created more decentralisation in the decision-making procedure related to labour 97 A te Ču alo, The Croatian Nationalist Movement, 1966-1979. New York,1990. See also, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, ζugosla ia s Great Di tator. A Reassessment, London: C. Hurst &Co., 1992, p.73. 100 issues and reduced the degree of control by the central government over economic planning and investments. The military made their presence felt at the central committee and other administrative bodies during the Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists held in Belgrade between 27 and 30 May 1974. Tito was elected president of the LYC for life. In his speech to the congress he stressed the role of this institution fo the p ese atio of the ou t s u it a d the i po ta e of the principle of democratic centralism. 98 During the last years of his rule Tito became the subject of adulation. He was celebrated as the li i g o u e t of Yugosla ia s u it a d e satilit a d his ou tflatterers declared the longevity of his policies after his demise. Of the leading political figures of post-war Yugoslavia, only two died in office. Kardelj in 1979 and Tito in 1980 (at the age of 87). Although the twelfth LCY s Co g ess i t ied to a o busi ess as usual ith the sloga After Tito, Tito , everyone knew that the leade s a se e left a a i g gap ehi d. Yugoslavia as the o l Eu opea o -alig ed state, ith its self- a age e t alternative to traditional communist command economies and western liberal markets, was slowly losing its originality and flair. The gradual slide of the Soviet Union made the Yugoslav compromise between East and West redundant. In March 1989, Ante Marković, a Croat, became prime minister by rotation. He bought down inflation by saddling the dinar to the Deutschemark and made the Yugoslav currency convertible on January 1990. Marković came an inch to saving the unity of the state by calling for an assembly voted by the citizens of Yugoslavia rather than the federated Republics. His opponents, who looked forward to the 98 Singleton, op.cit. p.260-265. 101 dissolution of the state, opposed his measure and condemned Yugoslavia to death.99 The Go a he pe est oika a d glas ost overture to the collapse of Soviet communism, constituted a dire warning to the Bulgarian and Romanian regimes. Todor Zhivkov was forced to resign by a palace coup within his party one day after the Berlin wall was toppled. Nicolae Ceaușes u s death was accompanied with the violence he had exercised against his people. He was executed along with his notorious wife, Elena, on the day of Christmas 1989.100 99 R.J. Crampton, The Balkans Since the Second World War, London: Longman, 2002, pp.138-146 100 Ibid, pp.175-181, 201-204. 102 Chapter 8: The Balance of Forces in the Balkans The Macedonian issue: A conflict transformed The issue of the Greek province of Macedonia became linked with the establishment of 700,000 refugees from Asia Minor following the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations in 1923. 101 Nevertheless, members of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) along with Yugoslav Communists, felt compelled to support the Bulgarian slogan for a united and i depe de t Ma edo ia a d Th a e , at the Conference of the Bulgarian-inspired Balkan Communist Federation (BCF), held in Moscow in November 1923. The decision was prompted by the Comintern but caused a severe rupture within the Greek party, while the Yugoslavs were reprimanded by their peers for deviating from the national line. 102 101 The Greek census of 1928 reports the number of Bulgarians (slavophones) in Greek Macedonia to be 82,000. See St. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. New York 1935, p. 2728. For an interesting and dispassionate interpretation of Greek, Serbian and Slav-Macedonian views on the development of the Macedonian issue see the a ti le of K il D ezo Ma edo ia Ide tit : A O e ie of the Majo Clai s i Ja es Petife s edito , The New Macedonian Question, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 47-59 102 For a detailed account of the issue see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question. Britain and the Southern Balkans, 1939-1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 30-41. The Greek Marxist historian and founding member of the Greek Communist Party, Yiannis Kordatos (1881-1961) who was opposed to this line, accused the leade ship of the KKE of ha i g e o e a all of Bulga ia hau i is , in the party newspaper Rizospastis, on 25 February 1927. He had already resigned from the party in 1924 protesting against its adoption of the de isio the rd I te atio al to e og ise the u io of the th ee 103 After the German invasion of Greece, Bulgaria occupied the region of Eastern Macedonia and the greatest part of Western Thrace without declaring war. In his speech to the Bulgarian Pa lia e t o “epte e , Ki g Bo is said: Tha ks to this cooperation (with the Germans and the Italians) Macedonia and Thrace, these lands which have been so loyal to Bulgaria, which have been unjustly detached from her and for which Bulgaria has been compelled to make innumerable sacrifices in the span of three generations, have returned to the fold of the Bulgarian Mothe la d .103 The Italian and German occupation authorities granted the Bulgarians freedom to promote their propaganda to the local population in Western Macedonia as well. In this way the Greek resistance movement on top of fighting the occupation forces had to face the paramilitary Bulgarian nationalist battalions Oh a a .104 Macedonian provinces (Greek, Serb and Bulgarian) as an autonomous state under Bulgarian suzerainty. See also A. Dangas, G. Leontiadis, Κο ι έ αι ο α ο ι ό ή α (1924) (Comintern and the Macedonian Issue {1924}), Athens: Trohalia, 1997. 103 Evangelos Kofos. Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia. Thessaloniki : IMXA,1964, p.100. 104 The Oh a a , so eti es alled the Bulga ia -Ma edo ia Co ittee was, during the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia, organised as an instrument of Bulgarian propaganda by the Bulgarian officer, Antoni Kaltchev and was based in the town of Florina in Greek Macedonia. Ohrana promoted the concept of an autonomous Macedonia (a union of its three parts held by Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria) under Bulgaria in which all SlavMacedonians would be considered as having a Bulgarian identity. See John S. Koliopoulos , Plundered Loyalties. Axis Occupation and Civil Strife in Greek West Macedonia 1941-49, London: Hurst & Co, 1999, p.65. 104 During a meeting between Yugoslav and Greek guerrillas , Tito s ep ese tati e used fo the fi st ti e the te Ma edo ia su je ts a d asked the G eek o u ist-controlled resistance organisations EAM (National Liberation Front) –ELAS G eek People s Li e atio A to oope ate i o de to o i e the Bulgarian collaborationist fo es to etu to the Ma edo ia ideology. Even though ELAS refused to allow Tito to organise the slavophone Greeks into separate bands, it accepted their inclusion in its own structure and later allowed them to form their own group (the Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front or SNOF), though under the authority of ELAS. For the duration of the occupation, ELAS was under Yugoslav pressure to allow SNOF greater freedom of movement. Towards the end of the war, SNOF, an organisation friendly to the Yugoslavs, made efforts to win over e e s of Oh a a a d t a sfo ed the f o supporters of fascism into SNOF resistance bands. i The Yugosla pla s to fo a Ma edo ia state that ould i lude the Bulga ia egio alled Pirin Macedonia and Greek Macedonia, displeased the Bulgarian communists, who had first conceived the idea. However, the weakness of Bulgaria, which was liberated by the Soviets, as compared to the Yugoslav Partisans who had triumphed thanks mainly to their own forces, did not allow them the luxury of voicing their objections. So, until Tito was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia enjoyed a period of u uestio ed as e da as its Ma edo ia poli as not opposed to a large degree by the Dimitrov regime in Bulgaria. In the meantime Greece faced the outright two communist neighbours. On 2 August 1945, resistance leader, Tempo (Svetozar Vukmanović), leadership in Skopje (capital of the Yugoslav hostility of its the Yugoslav informed the Republic of 105 Ma edo ia that his go e e t s poli as to i o po ate G eek Macedonia into a unified Republic. Up until 1948 the Slavophones of the Greek Communist insurgency would draw support and instructions from Skopje. An independent Macedonia and Thrace with Thessaloniki as its capital, was in line with the creation of a larger autonomous Macedonia.105 Discussions about a South-Slav Federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria led to the Bled Agreements of 1947 – the highest point in the cooperation of the two countries. The agreements contained the implied condition that the Pi i Ma edo ia s just as thei Aegea others) would claim their cultural autonomy as a first step of their incorporation i to the People s ‘epu li of Ma edo ia . While the Bulga ia s fulfilled their obligations under the agreement with considerable difficulty, the Greek communists were in no position to follow suit. As long as the Yugoslavs continued to provide them with aid and support, however, the Greek guerrillas were obliged to make concessions to the slavophone minorities in Greece and to SNOF (renamed NOF i.e. no longer Slav but simply National Liberation F o t as of . NOF ith its a e of Ma edo ia auto o under Yugoslav tutelage had to face the Bulgarian propaganda of a resurrected IMRO. The latter, supported by non-communist Bulgarian-Macedonian organisations in the USA and Canada as well 105 The most informative analysis of the Athens-Belgrade relations is by Iacovos D. Michailidis. α όσ α ο α ού: Οι ο ιο οσ αβι ές σ έσ ις ις α α ο ές ο φ ίο ο έ ο -46 (The faces of Janus. The Greek-Yugoslav relations on the eve of the civil war 1944-46). Athens, Patakis, 2004. For an updated account of Yugoslav support to the Greek rebelion of 1946- see, Mila ‘isto ić, ο ή α ς ιο οσ αβι ής βοήθ ιας ος ο ο αι ό α ό. (The question of yugoslav military aid to the Democratic Army of Greece) in, I .Mourelos & Iacovos Michailidis (eds.) O ι ός φύ ιος ό ος (The Greek Civil War), Institute of Balkan Studies, 2006, pp.97-121. 106 as offi ial i les i Bulga ia, de la ed it as fighti g fo a i depe de t Ma edo ia outside the Yugosla f a e . 106 The Bulgarian Government abstained from any statements (up until 1948) on the subject of Greek Macedonia while repeating its claims on Western Thrace and on an outlet to the Aegean. Such claims were supported by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946. The Tito-Stalin rift in 1948 had a wider impact on the Balkans as the Yugoslavs suspended aid to the Greek guerrillas who were loyal to the Cominform. In his search for an escape route from the ring of hostile communist forces, Tito signed the death a a t of the G eek De o ati A (the communist guerrilla army) and proceeded to improve his relations with the Greek Go e e t. Withi KKE a deep split de eloped afte Yugosla ia s e ellio . The leade of the pa t , Nikos )a ha iadis, follo i g the Cominform line, dismissed the chief of the armed forces, Markos Vafeiadis and took over his post as commander of the Democratic Army . A number of Yugoslav-friendly elements among the Greeks and some slavophones sought refuge in Yugoslavia. At the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE in January 1949, the party leadership adopted the new Cominform line concerning the creation of an independent Macedonia within the framework of a Balkan Federation. The return to this position of 1924 remained the KKE policy until 1956 when it was officially abandoned. 106 Kofos, op.cit. p.173. After the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, IMRO asked for an independent and united Macedonia under American, British and Soviet protection. See also S.E. Palmer and R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Hamden Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1971, p.117-130. 107 After the Tito-Stalin break, the Bulgarian Government de ou ed the Bled p oto ols. Tea hi g of the Ma edo ia diale t as fo idde i Bulga ia Pi i as this diale t as considered an artificial construct of Skopjean linguists. All traces of Yugoslav propaganda were banned. In 1952, the Bulgarian claims on Greek Macedonia were rekindled, a fact that led Greece to strengthen its bonds with Yugoslavia. For the latter, relations with Greece acquired new significance as fears of a Soviet-Albanian encirclement were on the increase. In 1953, a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries plus Turkey, was signed in Ankara and in 1954 the treaty was completed by the tripartite military alliance signed in Bled.107 The dispute about Greek Macedonia continued within the e iled leade ship of the G eek Co u ist Pa t KKE . The pa t s Secretary General, Nikos Zachariadis – who had expressed his sympathy for the independence of the slavophones since 1949 – subsequently confirmed his support for the political autonomy of the Slav-Macedonians thus108 making life very difficult for communists in Greece. His statement implied that he was in favour of the Yugoslav version which was condemned by Moscow and Sofia. Mitsos Partsalidis, a member of the Central Committee at the ti e, oi ed iti is s agai st his leade s positio s a d the mistakes that had caused grief to KKE unity. With “tali s death i , the elatio s et ee Belgrade and Moscow improved, leading also to a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The repression of the Hungarian 107 Kofos, op.cit. p.174-195. N. Zachariadis έ α χ ό ια α ώ α (Ten years of struggle), November 1951, p.126. 108 108 uprising cooled the relations between these countries until 1960. In 1959, Athens and Belgrade concluded an agreement on border communications whose implementation was, however, temporarily suspended by Athens in 1962 when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) adopted once again a hostile attitude on the Ma edo ia issue . A e e a of u de sta di g et ee Mos o and Belgrade that started in 1962 came to an end with the Soviet intervention in Prague. The ups and downs in the relations among Yugoslavia – USSR – Bulgaria, affected Greece directly. Any normalisation of relations among the three countries meant that Yugoslavia would once again bring to the fore recriminations against Greece for alt eat e t of its alleged Ma edo ia eth i it . G ee e s ai concern after the war was to preserve its territorial integrity. Given the support of the West to the status quo, Greek Governments felt safe when confronting Yugoslav challenges on the Macedonian issue . NATO backing allo ed G ee e to o side Tito s suppo t fo his Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) as a matter of routine and provided Greek security with a guarantee against Bulgaria, the ost lo al e e of the Wa sa Pa t. As a esult, G ee e s tactics towards the Yugoslav and Bulgarian claims during the period 1948-68 was to respond, rather than initiate, rhetorical attacks, so as to reduce tension on an issue that Greece considered artificial. The relations between Greece and the Balkan communist states after 1967 The initiative for the improvement of relations between Greece and its neighbouring communist countries belongs to the Greek dictatorship established in 1967, a regime politically isolated 109 from Western Europe. The positive response of Sofia to the advances made by Athens was strengthened by the desire of Moscow to profit from this new opportunity. The Soviet intervention in Prague had an adverse effect on relations between Tito and Bulgaria and the Greek dictatorship displayed no eagerness to side with Yugoslavia. Furious because of Yugoslav criticisms for the arrest of Greek political dissidents in 1967, the Greek colonels denounced the convention of 1959 that ensured free passage to Yugoslavs. Relations improved after 1970 on the initiative of the Greek Government.109 With the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974 and the crisis in Cyprus and the Aegean, Greece followed a consistent policy to secure her northern borders by improving relations with all communist neighbours (except Albania). Yugoslavia was given first priority because of its relative independence from the superpowers that was of particular interest to Greece. Besides, the fact that it offered the most accessible land route to Western Europe, the i flue e that Tito had o the o e e t of the No -Alig ed was also useful as a source of support for Cyprus. Greece and Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw their troops from their common borders and to transfer them to other areas which were of crucial importance to their national defence. Old quarrels such as the free zone in Thessaloniki harbour were settled to the satisfaction of both sides. Furthermore, trade exchanges were widened, the construction of a pipeline for the transport of oil from the Aegean to Skopje was decided and visits were exchanged between Tito and Karamanlis as well as members “.G.X dis Coup and Countercoup in Greece 1967Science Quarterly, vol. 89, Autumn 1974, p.534-535. 109 . Political 110 of their respective governments. In spite of these positive de elop e ts, the suppo t of “kopje s lai s Belg ade ega di g the alleged Ma edo ia i o ities ai l i Bulga ia but also in Greece, caused turbulence. The difference, however, between the position of Belgrade and that of Skopje consisted in the fact that while Skopje considered the recognition of a Ma edo ia i o it i G ee e as a p e e uisite fo a improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations, Belgrade believed that cooperation and friendly contacts would have a beneficial impact o the Ma edo ia issue .110 Greek-Bulgarian relations improved considerably after 1974. The exchange of visits between Karamanlis and Zhivkov took place without any mention of territorial or minority claims, while trade exchanges reached the sum of one hundred million dollars in 1978. A number of agreements were concluded on industrial cooperation establishing links between power networks, access to the free zone of Thessaloniki and extension of vital road networks was established. Upo G ee e s i itiati e, a i te -Balkan conference at ministerial level was called in Athens in February 1976. Even though Bulgaria was opposed to multilateral Balkan relations, she did take part in the conference wishing to encourage Greece, a NATO member, in its openings towards the eastern camp. A renewed personal effort by Karamanlis to give the conference a 110 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 31st May 1977, report by V. Meier in the Greek newspaper To Vima. M. Ploumidis, To Vima, 7 and 30 July, as well as 8 October 1978. “ee also, Iako os Mi hailidis, “ea hi g fo a Mothe la d: Slav-Ma edo ia Politi al ‘efugees i the People s ‘epu li of Ma edo ia in Dimitris Tziovas (ed.), Greek Diaspora and Migration since 1700. Society, Politics and Culture. Farnham Surrey, 2009, pp. 73-82. 111 more regular and substantial character was politely rebuffed by Bulgaria. This refusal reflected Soviet fears that such a multilateral Balkan body might affect the unity of the Warsaw Pact. Nonetheless during his meeting in Corfu with Karamanlis in April 1979, the Bulgarian President Zhivkov seemed to have overcome his past inhibitions and agreed to proceed with multilateral cooperation in certain fields.111 The dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the Ma edo ia issue as so eti es eki dled Belg ade – spurred by the nationalism of Skopje – and sometimes by Sofia whose claims on Yugoslav Macedonia were encouraged by Moscow. The book by Tsola Dragojcheva, a veteran member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, includes an outright rejection of the e iste e of a Ma edo ia atio efo e as ell as a reminder of the Bulgarian past of the SRM. This work appeared two days after the visit of Brezhnev to Sofia in January 1979 which was judged by Belgrade as the Soviet response to the advances of Peking in the Balkans.112 The last straw for the Soviets was the condemnation by Yugoslavia of Viet a s i te e tio i Ca odia a d the ole Tito pla ed ehi d the s e es, to o i e the No Alig ed ou t ies to i g this issue to the UN. The relations between Greece and other Balkan states displayed during the 80s a superficial homogeneity that did not reflect the great internal problems of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia 111 With reference to the Karamanlis-Zhivkov meeting in April 1979, see the optimistic coverage by the Romanian official periodical Lumea, 11-7 May p. . “ee also P. Mlade o Bulga ia Fo eig Poli Toda i International Affairs No 1 1979, Moscow p.8-15 112 See the publication of this work in Greek: Tsola Dragojcheva. Α ό ή ασ ί (From defeat to victory) Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1983. 112 and Albania. The speedy improvement of the climate between Greece and her neighbours was due to two main reasons: the international détente that had finally reached the area with some delay and the need for Greece to ensure friendly relations in the Balkans so as to be able to face, free of any distraction, her eastern partner in NATO. Fo Athe s, the ost se ious p o le o G ee e s o the o de as the pe siste e of “kopje s claims – addressed also to Bulgaria – o e i g the ights of a Ma edo ia atio beyond the borders of Yugoslavia. While Bulgaria had raised no claims during the previous twenty years on Greek populations or territories, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia never stopped its claims on a unified Macedonian space and promoted itself as the adle of a a ie t atio . G ee e s positio as o a ou ts similar to that of Bulgaria since it considered the Macedonian Slavs as belonging historically to the Bulgarian medieval kingdom. The March 1988 meeting of Balkan Foreign Ministers in Belgrade took place at a time that was propitious to multilateral relations. The Reagan-Gorbachev agreement limiting the use of nuclear weapons, improved the East-West relations on all fronts. The ministers however did not deal with issues of high policy but with the environment, culture, trade, communications and education. Two further meetings, one in January 1989 (by high officials of the Foreign Ministries) and one in October 1990 (Foreign Ministers), yielded the expected declarations of friendship and good neighbourliness. With the collapse of communism and the dismantling of Yugoslavia, the scenery in the Balkan neighbourhood changed radically. The most important change however occurred in the attitude of western allies towards their own former opponents. The 113 claims and the arguments of the new-fangled Republics in the Balkans met with greater understanding by western states. To the Balka p odigal so the Westerners reserved a welcome that was o lo ge the p i ilege of the lo al so .113 Fo o e i fo atio see E. Kofos G ee e a d the Balka s i the s a d s Yearbook 1990, Athens: ELIAMEP 1991 p.193-222. E. Kofos Natio al He itage a d Natio al Ide tit i Ni etee th a d T e tieth Ce tu Ma edo ia i M. Bli kho & T.M. Ve e is, Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality. Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990, p.103-141. 113 114 Chapter 9: In Search of Multilateralism The modern Balkan states that emerged out of two collapsing empires displayed irredentisms which brought them at odds with each other for a good part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, it was also their implicit weakness born out of mutual enmities that prodded the Balkan states on certain occasions to seek out common ground for cooperation. The Balkan Pact of 1934 which included Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey, but leaving out Bulgaria and Albania, was precisely such an attempt by states keen to uphold the territorial status uo to p ote t the sel es f o Ital s e isio is a d to convince Bulgaria to abandon her own. The statutes of the Balkan Pact provided for regular meetings of a Permanent Council o sisti g of the e e s fo eig i iste s a d aspi ed to a ambitious federation in which legislative activities would in time become integrated. However, the danger in this multilateral arrangement was its association with French diplomacy (since Yugoslavia and Romania were also members of the Little Entente ) and possibly its entanglement in Great Power disputes. The more the signatories strove to convince major powers that they did not intend to involve themselves in international power politics, the more futile their exercise appeared to be. Furthermore, the participants were unable to tackle issues of ethnic minorities. Bulgaria and Albania pursued their own implicit claims on neighbouring territories and refused to participate in the Pact until their minority grievances were satisfied.114 Ultimately, since the 114 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, New York: Holt, Rinehart and 115 Balkan Pact did not possess a protective mechanism against external threats, one after another its members abandoned the fold and sought security through bilateral treaties with Germany and Italy.115 Wartime cleavages and post-war bloc alliances, excluded any possi ilit of ultilate alis i the Balka s. Tito s eak ith “tali allowed for a rapprochement with the two non-Communist states in the region. In 1953, a trilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Ankara, between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, was followed by a military alliance in Bled a year later. The subsequent see-saw of improvement and deterioration in YugoslavSoviet-Bulgarian relations also reflected on Yugoslav-Greek relations in an inversely proportional manner. In 1957, the Romania “toi a Pla aspi ed to de elop i to a egio al o t ol agreement. It included provisions for a Balkan Nuclear Free Zone and the removal of foreign bases from the region. The plan foundered on the predictable suspicions generated at the height of the cold war. Neither Greece nor Turkey was willing to distance themselves from their American guarantors and Romania was certainly not an agent free of Soviet influence. 116 No doubt the experience of the 1930s proved that partial multilateralism undermined the credibility of any pact while the bipolar conditions Winston, 1965, p.738-740. 115 Ibid. p.740-742. See also Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, Northampton MA, Smith College. 1944 and T. Geshkof, Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southern Europe, New York: Columbia Un. Press, 1940. 116 “p os E o o ides, The Balka Age da: “e u it a d ‘egio alis i the Ne Eu ope , Lo do B asse s, Centre for Defence Studies, No. 10, 1992, p.24-25. 116 of the cold war excluded local initiatives which lacked the approval of any one of the two superpowers. The beginning of detente in East-West relations encouraged a breakthrough in Balkan bilateralism. Greece and Albania resumed diplomatic relations in 1971 after having been, technically, in a state of war for more than thirty years. The East-West rapprochement however did not extend to relations among the Communist states. Tensions between Romania and Bulgaria, as well as between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, increased after the Soviet invasion of Prague. This opportunity for Greece to act as an honest broker in the Balkans was fully exploited by Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. Since the restoration of democracy in 1974 and as a result of the tensions over Cyprus and the Aegean, Greece pursued a comprehensive Balkan policy to secure her northern frontiers by improving relations with all her Communist neighbours. Besides her importance in providing the most accessible land route to Western Eu ope, Yugosla ia s i flue e a o g the o -aligned was considered useful in the Cyprus dispute. Greece and Yugoslavia also agreed to relieve their mutual borders of a concentration of troops. Such pending problems as the free zone at Thessaloniki were settled and the construction of a pipeline to bring oil from the Greek harbour to Skopje was planned. The general improvement of Balkan relations was the result of a personal initiative by Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. After visiting an enthusiastic Nicolae Ceaușes u in Romania in May 117 1975 and Tito in Yugoslavia in June of that year, he was received by Todor Zhivkov on 2-3 July 1975.117 G ee e s ole as a i te lo uto a o g a ps a d states suspi ious of ea h othe s oti es, p ofited g eatl from the July 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki final act. Although the spirit of Helsinki ultimately contributed to the erosion of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, in 1975 it appeared that the communist status quo had been se u ed i e ha ge fo unenforceable p o ises o hu a ights . This allowed Communist Balkan leaders either to seek further emancipation from Soviet tutelage (Romania) or to feel reassured that regional cooperation did not threaten their relations with Moscow (Bulgaria). In Helsinki, Karamanlis secured the agreement of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for an inter-Balkan meeting at the level of Deputy Ministers of Coordination and Planning. 118 Of the three, Romania was traditionally the most positive toward political multilateralism and Bulgaria, the least. Although ready to reintroduce the nuclear- weapon free zone concept – which was not opposed by the Soviets – Ceaușes u chose to bid his time and opted fo less. I stead of lose politi al oope atio stated i the May 1975 joint communiqué of the Greek-Romanian summit meeting, in Mar h , Bu ha est settled fo cooperation on the commercial and technical fields .119 Tha os Ve e is, G eek “e u it : Issues a d Politi s . Adelphi Papers, No 179, London: The IISS, 1982. p.6-9. 118 C. Svolopoulos, ι ή ο ι ι ή σ α Βα ά ια (Greek policy in Balkans), 1974-1981, Athens : Euroekdotiki, 1987, p.74-79 119 Svolopoulos, op cit .p.80 117 118 Reluctant to enter into a multilateral relationship, even on a limited basis, Sofia attempted to dilute the Balkan initiative by including other East European states. A renewed effort by Karamanlis to make the Summit Meetings a recurring event was politely rebuffed by Bulgaria, reflecting Soviet fears that an institutionalised Balkan cooperation could affect the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. Belgrade took a middle position. Without discouraging multilateralism, Tito felt that it was conditional on a settlement of differences between such states as Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and Albania. Of the two remaining Balkan states, Albania was adamant in its opposition to multilateral arrangements and Turkey agreed to participate once the meeting had been fixed. The inter-Balkan conference of Deputy Ministers of Planning took place in Athens from 26 January to 5 February 1976, with the participation of all Balkan states, with the exception of Albania. Discussions were confined to the participants and minutes were not given any publicity. Decisions on questions of agriculture, water resources, energy, transportation, commerce and tourism, were reached on the basis of unanimity, but the cleavage between the positions of Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other, could not be bridged. Reflecting the Soviet position, Todor Zhivkov insisted that although the inter-Balkan experiment was in keeping with the Helsinki accord, its regional aims contained an isolationism which threatened to cut off the Balkans from international developments. In spite of Bulgarian objections, the concluding statement of the conference included 119 hopes for future multilateral cooperation in the fields in question.120 Bulgaria and the Soviet Union began to change their views on Balkan multilateralism in 1978.121 Karamanlis isit to Mos o i 1979 was therefore perfectly timed for a significant Greek-Soviet rapprochement and the approval of a follow-up on Balkan multilateralism – although confined to fields of technical oope atio . Afte se u i g )hi ko s ag ee e t, Karamanlis proposed to the other Balkan leaders a conference of experts on telecommunications and transportation. The conference took place in Ankara on 26-29 November 1979. The outcome of the second conference on inter-Balkan cooperation made it clear that political questions could not be dealt with in a South Eastern Europe divided into blocs. Karamanlis, nevertheless, was not discouraged from his plan of approaching political cooperation indirectly, through confidence-building in nonpolitical fields. After he became President of the Republic in 1980, he pursued a third conference which took place in Sofia from 15 to19 June 1981 followed by a fourth and fifth, in Bucharest and Belgrade (7-12 June 1982 and 19-23 June 1984). Under Andreas Papandreou (1981-1989) Greek governments experimented with a new concept of multilateralism. Convinced that Bulgaria (the only Balkan member loyal to the Warsaw Pact) 120 Svolopoulos, op cit. p.87-89. For a comprehensive view of Balkan defence relations before the fall of communism, see Jonathan Eyal (ed.) The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans, Mos o s Southern Flank, London: RUSI, Macmillan, 1989. 121 Thanos Veremis, Greek Security Considerations. A Historical Perspective, Athens: Papazissis, 1982, p.45-46. 120 no longer harboured designs on Greek territory, Papandreou initiated his own brand of inter-Balkan cooperation by supporting a nuclear-weapon free zone in the region.122 Although an issue of political multilateralism, this was eagerly supported by Bulgaria which reflected Soviet views. The Soviets realised that the removal of NATO s a heads ga e the a lea advantage in the region since neither Bulgaria nor Romania controlled any nuclear warheads while the Black Sea Soviet bases were not included in the denuclearisation proposal. The initiative was rejected by Turkey that fell i li e ith NATO s positio , ut it enha ed G ee e s standing with Warsaw Pact members. Yugoslavia was lukewarm and Albania once again refused to take part in discussing a multilateral issue. The Balkan nuclear-weapon free zone concept won no points among NATO members who insisted that the region should not be separated from the rest of Europe in terms of arms control or disarmament. In the conference held to discuss the issue in 1984, the nuclear weapon-free zone was shelved and the participants o e t ated i stead o ge e al p i iples of cooperation among Balka ou t ies .123 Papa d eou s effo t to e te d i te -Balkan cooperation to atte s of high politi s a d se u it , p o ed the efo e e e less successful than Karama lis Balka i itiative which had started with 122 On 20 October 1981, Bulgaria offered a denuclearisation proposal and in November 1982 Papandreou and Ceausescu declared their intention to hold a conference that would deal with ridding the Balkans of all nuclear weapons. 123 Do a J. Kli k. A Balkan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Viability of the Regime and Implications for Crisis Manage e t , Journal of Peace Research, vol. 24. no. 2. 1987, p.114. 121 issues of lo politi s . Oh the hole, PA“OK s Balka poli ith the exception of an improvement in relations with Albania) did not change significantly the basic network of relations it had inherited from New Democracy. The March 1988 conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers in Belgrade could not have occurred at a more opportune moment for a multilateral breakthrough. The ReaganGorbachev agreement on nuclear arms limitation improved EastWest relations on all fronts and the February meeting between the Prime-Ministers of Greece and Turkey in Davos, held the promise for the resolution of a long standing regional problem.124 In fact the most significant outcome of the conference was not of a multilateral nature but rather the bilateral meetings between Bulgarians, Turks and Greeks on the sidelines. Given the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations after Davos and the existing friendly conditions between Greece and Bulgaria, the Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement in the form of a protocol of good neighbourly relations signed in Belgrade, did not come as a surprise. The year 1988 would have become a watershed in Balkan multilateralism if the protagonists of the Belgrade meeting could have foreseen the cataclysmic developments in Eastern Europe that were only a year away. Instead, even though Albania participated actively after decades of isolation, the usual inhibitions prevailed with progress made only on issues in the fields of education, communications, environment, commerce and culture. The ministers agreed to meet every two years and to set up a 124 See speech by Karolos Papoulias, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Balkan Conference in Begrade (24—26 February 1988) Yearbook 1988. ELIAMEP. 1989, p.199. Also, Mi ko Ostojić The Balka s i the Eighties , Review of International Affairs. Belgrade. March 5, 1988, p.5. 122 secretariat that would coordinate activities. 125The nuclear free zone issue was not discussed at all.126 The 18-20 January 1989 meeting of high officials from the foreign ministries in Tirana endorsed an Albanian proposal to set up guideline principles for neighbourly relations. A decision was also reached that the next two meetings, in Sofia and Ankara, would deal with questions affecting the media and human rights. Finally, a meeting of experts took place on 23-24 May 1989 in Bucharest and examined proposals for confidence and security building measures.127 The Second Balkan Foreign Ministers Conference took place in Tirana on 24-25 October 1990, against the background of a transformed world environment. From the outset, the Greek and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers proposed that Balkan cooperation be esta lished o a o e fu tio al asis ith the aid of a 128 Secretariat . The purposes of this permanent Balkan Secretariat would be to act as a referee on ethnic and territorial disputes which have bedevilled relations in South Eastern Europe. The institution would also represent the region in its dealings with other groups of countries and international organisations. The Greek Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, requested that the establishment of a research Institute for Balkan economic cooperation be stepped-up and reiterated an older proposal calling for increased relations among Balkan parliaments. N. Kiaos, G adual ‘app o he e t of the “i Balka Mi isters in Belg ade i G eek . Eleftherotypia, 26 February 1988, p.7 126 Ibid. 127 E. Kofos, G ee e a d the Balka s i the s a d s , Yearbook 1990, Athens: ELIAMEP, 1991, p.222. 128 Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, 25 October 1990, p.2 125 123 At the end of the two-day conference, the Foreign Ministers approved measures aimed at promoting and expanding Balkan cooperation as well as an agreement calling for the protection of cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms of minority groups. Yugoslavia, after disagreeing initially on the Helsinki Accord stipulation concerning human rights for minority groups, ultimately fell in line with the others. In the final document the ministers pledged themsel es to st i t adherence to the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, equal rights and non-i te fe e e i i te al affai s .129 In their message to the CSCE heads of state, the Balkan ministers welcomed the positive changes in Europe and said they considered the Paris “u it a i po ta t step to a ds the i stitutionalisation of the 130 C“CE . The Balkan Foreign Ministers persisted in viewing regional priorities through the lenses of the past. Whereas in the 1988 Belgrade conference they could have forged a multilateral relationship between sovereign states sharing similar political and economic goals, in 1990 the process of Yugoslav disintegration was already under way requiring a timely effort on the part of the Foreign Ministers to promote projects of multicultural symbiosis. Given the subsequent deleterious effect of the Yugoslav question on Balkan cooperation, 1990 offered a last opportunity for constructive multilateralism. Although the issue of human rights for minorities did arise in Tirana, no serious attempt was made to 129 Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin, 26 October 1990. p.2 Ibid. “ee also, Balka Natio s Pledge Coope atio , The International Herald Tribune, 27 October 1990. 130 124 apply such a remedy within the broader Balkan context of the proliferation of states in a multicultural environment. Since 1990 the challenge to the security of the Balkans changed radically. Instead of external threats posed by ideological or military blocs, the new threat came from within the states themselves. Whereas Western European ethnic groups have found solace in the concentric loyalties required by European integration, South Eastern Europeans had not developed a significant form of multilateralism that could offer solutions to ethnic problems. Thus Yugoslavia disintegrated into fragments that duplicated the ethnic problems of the original federal state. The five fragment-states that emerged reproduced the very same problem but with a different dominant ethnic group within each realm. To break-up the cohabitation of different groups, these states either continued to spli te to e e s alle eigh ou hood e tities, o e e ised ethnic cleansing to the point of mass extermination and expulsion of people from their land.131 Despite its slow progress, inter- Balkan cooperation constituted a hope for multilateralism until the outbreak of the Yugoslav civil war. From 1991 the Balkan states have looked outside their region for an organisation that could bring them together in an institutionalised form of political and economic cooperation. The policy of the European Union regarding the Balkans had been one of a bilateral rather than a multilateral approach. Relations with Turkey date back to the sixties while association agreements were concluded in 1993 with Bulgaria and Romania and an agreement of commercial cooperation was signed with Albania. During the Yugoslav crisis, EU T. Ve e is, A ‘edefi itio of “e u it Considerations in South-eastern Eu ope , South East European Yearbook 1992, ELIAMEP, p.153-161. 131 125 members failed to coordinate their policy until they were pressured by Germany to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, and then Bosnia on request of the US. Besides Community bilateralism and the absence of a unified policy, the Balkans were still the stalking ground of individual EU member states. Thus Germany has been mainly interested in the Ha s u g pa t of Yugoslavia, Italy in its Adriatic neighbours, France in Romania, Greece in Serbia and Bulgaria. Of course most EU members were at a safe distance from the immediate repercussions of their policy in the region, including the movement of economic migrants and refugees, the impact of war on tourism and commerce and the likelihood of a spill over of the conflict because of the alteration of boundaries. Greece and Italy, being the only EU members adjacent to the troubled peninsula, were motivated enough to launch initiatives of unified Balkan policy. Both states favoured regional stability and peace, because they had much to lose from the consequences of a protracted war in the region and much to gain from a peaceful reintegration of the former communist states into the western system. However, the Balkans must be viewed as a regional continuum and ought not to be split into zones of western influence. As the Little Entente of the 1930s proved detrimental for Balkan cooperation, so would potential rivalries between European states damage the relations of prospective Balkan clients. Balkan cooperation has, since the nineties, included all the Yugoslav successor states.132 132 Economides, op.cit.p.28, 30-32, see also Yannis Valinakis, The Development of an EC Balkan Policy and Greece: The Political Background, Special Study No.15. Hellenic Centre for European Studies. June 1992, p.25 126 Chapter 10: Redefining Security: Yugoslavia 1989-1995 After the end of the Cold War, the challenge for both Western and Eastern Europe no longer came from the external pressures of the ideological and military coalitions, but from within the elements constituting the nation state. If the original purpose of the European Community was to face the dangers originating from the communist camp, once the threat vanished, the Co u it sea hed fo its aiso d t e i eeti g the i te al challenges. Even the smallest European countries and the tiniest ethnic groups wanted to ensure the survival of their cultural identity in a Europe dominated by its three or four great cultural traditions. This endeavour by the smaller entities can best succeed within a federal structure where power is shared by the state with various ethnic sub-systems. In other words, England shares its power with Scotland and Wales and at the same time with the centre of the European Union in Brussels. European unification thus serves the interests of the weak links in the chain which might be threatened by the dominance of the strong nation states. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Wales, Brittany and Catalonia will feel much safer in a system with concentric power centres sha i g the itize s lo alt tha ithi a t aditio al e t alised nation state. However, just as the West-European countries came together to form the European Union, Eastern countries (Czechoslovakia) were broken down to their constituent parts (Czech Republic, Slovakia). Some of the fragments of former Yugoslavia such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and later Kosovo did not initially qualify for national sovereignty that presupposes control of 127 their territory, a self-sustaining economy and consensus of their itize s. No etheless, Ge a s i siste e that the Fede al Republics of Slovenia and Croatia be recognised by the European U io as i depe de t states ope ed Pa do a s Bo . The recognition of Bosnia caused the most bloody ethnic cleansing that Europe had known since World War II. The ight of Yugosla ia s ethnic groups to selfdetermination found greater appeal among Westerners than the thought that there were some three thousand ethnicities living on the planet but only two hundred states. If a fraction of these ethnicities were to acquire their own state, the international system would suffer a most painful fragmentation. Without any guarantees that a functional replacement of the Yugoslav federal state could be set in place, the European Union hastened to recognise multi-ethnic Bosnia as an independent state in 1992. The struggles of the Slovenes, the Croats and the Bosnians for their self-determination had nothing to do with any liberal tradition. We know today that the basically mono-ethnic states which replaced the federal multi-ethnic Yugoslavia did not appear to be particularly sensitive to the rights of their minorities. Selfdetermination has its internal and its external dimension. The internal one regulates the relations between citizens and aims at optimising the function of a regime. The external one regulates the relations of the national (or religious) community with the world of the nation states and the international organisations. When an ethnic group claims the right to self-determination with a territorial component attached to it, it is assumed that it controls the majority and that it aspires to exercise mainly the external dimension of its self-determination. When the dominant ethnic groups of the federated republics of Yugoslavia decided to claim their 128 independence, they immediately became a threat to their minorities. The ethnic communities of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia were in danger of losing some of their rights as minorities within the new states whose nature was not federal but centralised.133 The break-up of Yugoslavia into five militarily weak state entities consolidated five ethnic communities, in most cases hostile towards the minorities living on their territories. The collapse of Yugoslavia happened precisely because Croats, Slovenes, SlavMacedonians and Bosnian Muslims could not coexist with the dominant Serbs within the federal system. The five new entities reproduced the problems tormenting federal Yugoslavia on a smaller scale as each ethnic group became in its turn majoritarian within its state. As the problem of ethnic groups reminds one of the Russian dolls each of which contains a smaller one, the equitable satisfaction of the self-determination claim of all these groups would result in a fragmentation that would yield ethnically pure statelets. Contrary to the superimposed centres of power in the EU which share the loyalties of the citizens (state, federal entity and other sub-systems) the new state entities of South East Europe 134 were born out of ethnic conflict. In this way, while the monocultural and centralised nation states of Western Europe are gradually transformed in multicultural, federal systems, federal Yugoslavia followed the opposite course. The great difference 133 Ka al “. “hehadi, Eth i dete i atio a d the B eak-up of “tates . Adelphi Papers, p.283. London: IISS, December 1993, p.4-7. 134 A tho D. “ ith, Natio al Ide tit a d the Idea of Eu opea U it : , , p. . “ee also I a Volg es Milita “e u it i the PostCo u ist Age: ‘efle tio s o M ths a d ‘ealities i Gu the Wagenlehener (editor) Von der Ost West Konfrontation zur Europäischen Friensordnung. (From the East-West Confrontation to the European Peace O de Mű he , Suedosteuropa – Geselllschaft, 1992, p.105. 129 between the two paradigms is that the Western Europeans embraced the principles of human rights that allow for the relaxation of tensions between the centre and the periphery of the state. The states that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia seem to follow a course similar to the one that Western European states were following in times gone by, when militant nationalisms a d i ede tist isio s e e do i a t. The fall of the eall e isti g so ialis a d the ollapse of the “o iet U io set free the centrifugal forces in Slovenia, Croatia and eventually, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, by awakening past nationalisms. However, the multiplication of these weak and mutually hostile states occurred in an area of Europe that has ceased to be of great interest to Westerners. Without any wealth-producing resources and with a diminished strategic importance, the south eastern corner of the continent did not represent a top priority for the Western Alliance. The Balkan Peninsula is no longer considered the powder-keg of Europe but simply one of its underdeveloped areas. After the repeated bloodsheds in Yugoslavia, the future danger is no longer ethnic cleansing, a process that has more or less been completed, but the networks of lawlessness that stalk the Western Balkans. The most serious cause of this threatening phenomenon is the breakdown of the state structures which, although authoritarian, ensured law and order and averted nationalistic flare-ups. On the other hand the one-party political system did not favour the creation and emancipation of civil society so as to prepare the ground for a smooth transition to democracy and parliamentary life. The European Union was, at the time when the real existing socialism crashed, the institution with the greatest 130 prestige in the Balkans. The EU did not manage, however, to implement a unified foreign and security policy. Even though Brussels made it a condition for Yugoslavia to remain united in order to gain membership, this position was completely reversed during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 16-17 December 1991. The early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany made the recognition of the others a foregone conclusion. The USA were at first champions of Yugoslav unity but during his trip to Yugoslavia in July 1991, the American Foreign Secretary James Baker said that his country would not object to the independence of the Republics provided this was done through a peaceful and consensual process. Whe ‘ussia eated the Co o ealth of I depe de t “tates the A e i a ad i ist atio ithdrew its reservations and supported the independence of the Republics. 135 In this way, the western world encouraged, unwittingly the dismantling of a federal state into independent states which had suffered or practiced ethnic cleansing. The multicultural Yugoslavia could have survived if it had been injected with democratic reforms. Instead Yugoslavia degenerated into a violent fragmentation, followed by the bloodiest of conflicts. With the distance of time separating us from the first Yugoslav dismemberment and the extensive bibliography that has since been compiled on this subject136, we can appreciate the work Ja es Go , De o st u ti g Yugosla ia Survival, vol. XXXIII, issue no 4, July- August 1991, p.306-309. 136 A comprehensive study on important works written on Yugoslavia was atte pted Ja es Go , ‘e ie A ti les. Afte the Flood: Lite atu e o the Context, Causes of the Yugoslav War – ‘efle tio s , The Slavonic and East European Review, vol.75, issue no 3, July 1997, p. 446-484. Gow does 135 131 done by Susan Woodward in identifying the economic motives of the dissolution, as she draws from her experience in the centre analysing the Yugoslav crisis, set up by the UN in Zagreb. Unlike most of the works that view the Yugoslav debacle as resulting from the conflict of antagonistic irredentisms, or as a result of Serbian expansionist policies to the detriment of other Yugoslavs, Woodward starts from an economic rather than political consideration of the problem. She believes that the difficulty of convergence between the developed Federated Republics of Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand and of Serbia, Bosnia, SRM and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina on the other, generated the final flare-up that followed thereafter the route to violence.137 The protracted economic crisis increased the differences between the Federated Republic and this undermined the Yugoslav identity of their inhabitants. The western media classified them into liberal reformist on the one hand and conservative communist, on the other, but this, did not help to clarify their situation. Given the decentralisation imposed by the 1974 Constitution, it was not the central government that protected the interests of Croatia and Slovenia but the political leaders of these privileged Federated Republics. Those whose views seemed the most liberal to Westerners were really the most conservative in economic terms. Slovenia and Croatia, who appeared in the West as the most liberal, resisted to the very end the reforms of the federal system that were deemed necessary for the survival of Yugoslavia. Those two not agree with the economic approach and tends to support the political interpretations of the crisis. 137 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1995. 132 Republics always made the greatest contributions to the federal fu d fo the edist i utio of Yugosla ia s ealth. I Ju e , their Parliaments voted down three bills that aimed at the improvement of the foreign economic relations of the country. Wood a d s a al sis att i utes the su se ue t politi al a d military upheavals to the economic differences between them and the less well-to do. With few exceptions, the majority of books that were published after the crisis personalise the trials and tribulations that led to the downfall of Yugoslavia. Such approaches, however, do not explain the paradox of the emergence of western protectorates in areas which had been ethnically cleansed or segregated. In the climate of tension between East and West that prevailed after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia found herself closer to the western camp. However, the second oil crisis hit the Yugoslav workers in Western Europe hard, thus depriving Yugoslavia of precious remittances. In the country itself, unemployment hit harder the less developed areas of Kosovo, Bos ia, “‘M a d “e ia. I , Yugosla ia s de t e eeded . billion dollars. Kosovo became the original flashpoint that eventually led to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. In March 1981, a student protest over the quality of university food developed into a generalised rebellion in favour of the upgrading of this autonomous province into a fully-fledged Republic with a right to secede. The suppression of the rebellion did not lead to the end of the movement. On the 24th of September 1986 a memorandum by members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences was put into circulation. The text described in vivid terms the hopeless situation of the Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo and asked Belgrade to 133 take drastic measures. The Serbian communist leadership, with Ivan Stambolić at its head, criticised the academicians severely and warned them about the dangers that such nationalistic outbursts could mean for the unity of Yugoslavia and consequently for the future of the Serbs. The favourite of “ta olić, Slobodan Miloše ić, refused to condemn the nationalists. On the contrary he exploited as much as possible the emerging nationalism of the Serbs thus succeeding eventually in replacing his mentor “ta olić in the Presidency of the Union of Serb Communists in 1987. In 1989, Miloše ić abolished the increased autonomy that Tito had granted Kosovo under the 1974 Constitution. The aim of the Serb President was to control as many votes as possible on the Federal Presidency in which the federated Republics and the two autonomous provinces of Serbia were represented with eight seats in toto. The control of Kosovo and Vojvodina together with the vote of Montenegro secured for Miloše ić half of the votes in the Presidency. The remaining four Republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and SRM) were obliged to form an informal alliance in order to stop Miloše ić from passing any constitutional reform he wished. 138 Two years after the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo, Croatia elected as her President the nationalist Franjo Tuđman. Wartime ghosts of the blood feud et ee the Ustashe a d the Chet iks e e e i ed he Tuđ a set forth to purge the Croat civil service from the Serbs that Tito had appointed after the supp essio of the C oat “p i g of .Whe i Ma h the Serbs took to the streets to demonstrate against the authoritarian ways of Milošević, the leadership of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, which defended the idea of a united Yugoslavia and deplored the divisive nationalisms, threatened to take over the entire country 138 Glenny op.cit. p.627. 134 and asked Tuđ a to disarm his police. The Federal Presidency, however, resisted the military and obliged them to retreat. The refusal of the Presidency to keep the country united by using force if need be, turned Miloše ić in favour of the national claims of the Serbs, instead of supporting a united Yugoslavia under communist influence, as was his original intention.139 The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states by German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher in December of 1991, gave the signal for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The leaders of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Alija Izet ego ić and of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, were initially against the recognitions because they feared that if they became independent countries the ethnic groups within their own realm would render their states inoperable. Encouraged by the Americans and not wishing to remain within a Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia, Izet ego ić decided to follow the example of Croatia, once the latter had ensured recognition. When in April 1992 the Bosnian Government declared its independence it generated the fury of the Serbs of both Serbia and Bosnia. The Yugoslav army that had showed hesitation in the case of Slovenia, escalated its operations against the Croats and the Muslims of Bosnia. The UN forces (UNPROFOR) which undertook humanitarian tasks in the war zone did not manage to avert the carnage. The performance of the EU throughout the Yugoslav crisis suffered more criticism than it deserved. The critics overlooked the humanitarian work of EU states via their UN representatives in Yugoslavia, which far outweighs their absence in other flashpoints of the globe. That the EU was not prepared for armed peace-making should come as no 139 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin books, 1993, p.45-62. 135 surprise since the institution was not conceived for armed action and began to consider a common security policy at a time when the major threat to the West had collapsed. The war in Bosnia created dissension among the western allies. The plan of Vance-Owen (the former being the representative of the UN and the latter of the EU) was disclosed in January 1993 and proposed the creation of ten cantons in BosniaHerzegovina. The Europeans, Tuđ a , Milošević and the Bosnian Croats, declared themselves in favour of the plan, while against it were the Americans, the Moslems and the Bosnian Serbs who rejected the plan in their plebiscites.140 The role of the UN was controlled by the policies of the pe a e t e e s of the “e u it Cou il. As a esult, the lue hel ets e e ot a le to p ote t the i ilia populatio of the safe a eas “arajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Bihać) from the massacres perpetrated by Serbian paramilitaries. In May 1995, the Croat forces occupied Krajina and obliged the Serb population to abandon it. On 30 August, NATO aircrafts bombed the Serbs of Bosnia and checked their advance. Miloše ić, who wanted to reduce the initiatives of the Bosnian Serbs so that Belgrade could once again regain control of the situation, signed with American mediator Richard Holbrook, Tuđ a and Izetbegović, the Dayton Accord of 21 November 1995. This Treaty marked the end of the war in Bosnia with the result that 51% of its te ito as gi e to the Fede atio of C oats a d Musli s hile ⃰ We have used the November 1995 Dayton Accord as the official ending of that war. 140 Laura Silber & Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, London, 1995, p.319. 136 49% was given to the Republika Srpska . The twain would never meet in the following sixteen years. Nineteen years after the end of the carnage in Bosnia, the perceptions savoured by each new independent fragment of Yugoslavia concerning the meaning of that war, might lead us to melancholy conclusions. The former adversaries, be they Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia, still consider the war a matter of ethnic survival and national independence. In the case of Serbia and Croatia, ethnic cleansing appears in popular perceptions as a necessity to rid their states from their unwanted minorities. Evicted minorities remain suspect of conspiring against the integrity of each state. The significant difference between Croatia and Serbia however is that whe eas the fo e o side s its Homeland War 141 successful in creating an independent state, preserving its territorial integrity and making Croatia more homogeneous eth i all , the latte has gai ed none of the above. On the contrary, the view of most conservative Serbs is that they have lost Kosovo and even Montenegro while its population remains as diverse as it had been before the war. Furthermore the Serbs have suffered a bombardment by NATO forces and has been ostracised by western public opinion for the atrocities committed against Bosnians.142 Is it at all possible to draw a positive lesson from this Deja Jo ić, The Wa that is ot Allo ed to e Fo gotten: Nationalist Dis ou se o the Ho ela d Wa i Co te po a C oatia , Sudost Europa Mitteilungen, 03/2012, pp. 52-69. 142 Kata i a ‘istić, “ile i g Justi e: Wa C i e T ials a d the “o iet i Fo e Yugosla ia , Sudost Europa Mitteilungen,03/2012. The author has utilised discourse analysis to interpret 5000 articles published in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia between 2001-2011, pp. 32- . “ee also the Mai Fo us of Sudost Europa Mitteilungen, 02/2013, concerning the acquittal of the Croatian Generals, Ante Gotovina and Mladen Mrakac and the 29 141 137 convoluted war if the participants themselves fail to appreciate the advantages of multiculturalism and peaceful coexistence? If the narrative adopted by the Croats makes them complacent about their own acts of violence against their minorities and the Serbs distressed because they failed to emulate the success of their adversaries, be they Croats, Kosovars or Slovenes, the only hope is a change of national narratives. Yet it is difficult to argue with success as perceived by the Croats and with the victimisation syndrome that bedevils the Serbs. How does one convince the latter that they did not lose everything because they lacked the western connections of their adversaries and the former that they more or less escaped the western sword of justice, not only because the Serbs were more violent, but because they had no friends in the West? November 2012 acquittal of Kosovo Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, former commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). Reconciliation is not the objective of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla ia s Appeals Cha e ICTY , e e theless ost of the autho s of this special section of the journal, consider the decisions as a failure of the Tribunal to act as some kind of institutionalised super ego for the postYugoslav nations, pp. 55-59. 138 Part II. THE BALKANS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Chapter 1: Nationalism & Identity in the Balkans Nationalism as a source of collective identity is the most persistent spiritual offspring of the French Revolution. The collapse of Yugoslavia refuted the view of Eric Hobsbawm (Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, 1990) who thought that the subject of his book was, historically speaking, in full retreat. The topicality of this phenomenon of nationalist revival has generated vivid discussions among those who, like Anthony Smith of the LSE, believe that national identity preceded the creation of nation states as opposed to those who, like Ernest Gellner, attribute it exclusively to the educational programmes of the industrial states. Miroslav Hroch reminded Gellner that nationalism had a stronger impact in the pre-industrial societies of the Balkans than in industrial England or the USA.143 Gellner, however, insisted that popular patriotism is a phenomenon common to many societies but that the specific atio alist e sio is ha a te isti of the fi st stage of industrialisation. Be that as it may, few will disagree that the nation state with its secular content is an altogether modern concept. Its primary feature is that it sanctions the entry of the Miroslav H o h, Real and Const u ted: The Natu e of a Natio , i Joh A. Hall (ed.) The State and the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 91-106. 143 139 masses into politics as a legitimising factor of power.144 The nation, therefore, enters the realm of politics when it begins to legitimise political authority and that is why nationalism is mainly about managing political power.145 Ethnicity and its culture (promoted into a high culture) are often upgraded into a dominant element of the nation state and a guarantee of its unity. The French nationalism of the Jacobins was political and territorial. It represented the u it of the epu li a patrie (homeland) and the fraternity of the citizens living in a secular state. At the same time, the linguistic nationalism of Abbe Gregoire expounded the cultural mission of France. His example was to be followed by many subsequent champions of ethnic genius, Germans, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians Croatians and Turks. These two elements of nationalism, the political-territorial on the one hand and the ethnic-organic on the other, have, ever since, represented two sides of the nationalist coin. The organic version of nationalism and the racist theories of the second half of the 19th century resulted from progress in the science of biology and the romantic notions of conflict and heroism. The defeat of the French by the Prussians in 1870, compelled them to adopt the organic nationalism of their German adversaries. German scholars of the late eighteenth century who denigrated the values of Republican patriotism from France and embraced the spiritual and cultural unity of their segmented nation, were actually reacting to the French inspired Mi hael Ma , A Political Theory of Natio alis a d its E ess , in Sukumar Periwal (ed.) Nations and Nationalism, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995, pp. 44-48. 145 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 1-2. 144 140 cosmopolitanism of some of their compatriots. Johann Gottfried Herder identified a pernicious individualism in the Republican brand of liberty that according to his views, distracted man from the spiritual community of his country. He believed that the ancient Greeks, although divided as the Germans were, into different state entities, preserved a common spirit because of their common culture. According to Herder the nation is a natural creation, not an intellectual construct and therefore the progress of humanity is the product of feelings and passions, rather than reason.146 The initial appeal of French Revolution principles in the Danubian Principalities was in time supplemented by the influence of Germanic Romanticism which was strong in the Habsburg Empire and its neighbours. The outcome in the Balkans was a hybrid nationalism transformed by indigenous traditions. The development of Romanian nationalism after the annexation of Transylvania in 1919 was determined by the merging of the Ottoman Wallachia and Moldavia with the Habsburg province. While still under Hungarian rule, the Romanians of Transylvania had exhibited their discontent with acts of low intensity defiance. In Transylvania land and business were controlled by Germans and Hungarians and therefore Romanian nationalism was based on the hatred of the foreign exploiter. The Romanian Jews, who were prominent in trade and finance, became the primary targets of the fas ist I o Gua d as agents of foreign interests. 147 Both fascism and anti-Semitism had already appeared in the former Habsburg realm (Croatia and Hungary) before they made inroads in Romania. 146 Maurizio Viroli, For Love of Country. An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 114-124. 147 Breuilly, op. cit., pp. 263-68. 141 Serb nationalism was also affected by Hungarian Vojvodina and its discrimination against Orthodox Serbs. Nationalism imported from the West offered legitimacy to the rebellion of the animal-breeder notables of Belgrade. 148 During the disintegration of Yugoslavia in recent times, nationalism made an overwhelming return as the strongest collective alternative to communist ideology. As former Republics were transformed into independent states they embraced the old creed that accompanied state-building. Even liberal intellectuals of the past with an anti-communist history, failed to emulate the examples of Havel or Michnik and turned into extreme nationalists. ‘e o ed figu es of the P a is group who had criticised Tito s authoritarian tactics or such figures as Dobrica Ćosić, Vojislav Koštunica and even Vuk Drašković, failed to enter the ranks of the Liberals and embraced Serbian nationalism. 149 In the Greek case nationalism became a point of convergence for a wide range of elites. The French Revolution and its constitutional blueprints were unanimously adopted by the first revolutionary assemblies of the Greek state. The roots of Greek nationalism, under the influence of the intellectual harbinger of the Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais a d the histo ia pa e elle e of Mode G ee e du i g its romantic phase, Constantine Paparrigopoulos, are mainly 148 Ibid, pp. 103-107. Ni k Mille , Whe e as the “e ia Ha el , i Vladi i Tis a ea u & Bogdan C. Iacob (eds.) The End and Beginning, Budapest: CEU Press, 2012, pp. 366. In (Communist) Yugoslavia, unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, the source of opposition was more likely to be definitionally atio al athe tha hu a o e iste tial ... . The fa t that the regime defined itself according to its national policies meant that the national was fundamental. In such a situation decrying the nationalism of othe s as itself atio alis (p. 369). 149 142 connected with cultural features and more specifically the continuity of the Greek language. The Greek-speaki g e u e i receded after the spreading of Islam in the Middle East, but Greek became the lingua franca of the Orthodox Balkan peoples before the respective nationalist movements began to emerge. Korais, writing at a time when theories of race had not as yet made their appearance and Paparrigopoulos, who refuted the racial interpretations of the Greek identity by the Austrian historian, Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer, promoted culture as the main ingredient of national identity. Language had an equally unifying effect among Southern Slav people (Croats, Serbs and Bosnians) before a nationalist slant, inspired mainly by religious differences, took over. As the other orthodox Christian element in the Balkan pe i sula i luded Al a ia s, Vla hs a d “la s a d as Ki g Otto s irredentist policy aimed at extending Greek sovereignty over areas with mixed populations, the Isocratic version about the content of G eek ide tit G eeks a e alled those ho pa take of ou ultu e offe ed the e nation state the most authoritative interpretation about who its citizens were. The creation of a compact nation within the state structure that had resulted from the Constitution, adopted by the Greek Revolution, was the great achievement of the Greek school system. An education based on the linguistic continuity linked with the Ale a d ia Koi e li gua f a a i hi h the 70 Hellenising Jews translated the Old Testament but also with three of the four Gospels written in Greek which was the then spoken language of Anatolia and Egypt, gave the citizens of the new state in 1830 access to a splendid tradition. They could feel proud because, in spite of the dire straits they found themselves in, they felt they stemmed from a civilisation they hoped could be reborn. 143 The centralised state that was created by the Revolution of as alled Hellas , a a e that had e e e isted before as the appellation of a unified state. While the Serbs and the Bulgarians chose names from their medieval history, the Greeks under the influence of the Enlightenment – eschewed their identification with the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) even though they were still called Romans – Romioi as the name was colloquially Hellenised or Rum, as the Turks turned it into. The birth of the neo-Hellenic identity was a mixture of popular piety and constitutionalist enlightenment, as was also the case with the USA. Contrary to most European countries where the old (medieval) regime came into direct, frontal conflict with the modernising forces of the bourgeois constructs, Greece and the USA started life without any aristocracies and therefore without conflicts between conservatives and liberals, believers and atheists. The entangled relationship between Orthodoxy and nationalism, moving from hostility to cohabitation, is commonplace in the Orthodox Balkan states. The Enlightenment, which shaped the origin of Balkan nationalisms, was gradually overtaken by the allure of its Byzantine rival. In the second half of the 19 th century, romantic Byzantinism became the primary source for Greek and other Balkan irredentisms. Religious identity was also responsible for impeding national awakenings. Populations in the Balkans, hose atio alit e ai ed u e tai o a iguous, etai ed a strong identification with their religious creed.150 Contrary to the Paschalis Kitromilides: « ο ές οι ό ς» αι οι α α ές ο θ ι ού ή α ος σ α Βα ά ια (Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans), in Th.Veremis, (ed.) θ ι ισ ός αι θ ό α σ ό ά α, Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 2003, p. 53-131. Jane K. Cowan, Fixing National Subjects i s “outhe Balka s et in Vassilis Nitsiakos et al. (eds.) 150 144 ideas of Kedourie, Hobsbawm and Gellner, Adrian Hastings attaches great importance to the religious roots of nationalism and to the role played by the Reformation. His view that the written vernacular in European countries advanced nationalism is in line ith A de so s se i al positio . The ite o pa es the ole of the Serbian Orthodox to that of the Croat Catholic Church campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia.151 The Balkan states which gained their freedom from the Ottoman rule possessed their own particular cultural traditions (Slav, Romanian, and Albanian) but shared administrative and educational systems they had borrowed from the West. Most Balkan peoples adopted western institutions or acquired heads of state belonging to European royal houses. The nation-building theories of the Romanians, the Bulgarians and the Albanians, stem from western models. Furthermore, each Balkan country built its own historical legitimacy by establishing the relationship of its people with the Hellenes, the Dacians, the Romans, the Thracians or the Illyrians. The implicit competition as to who of the ethnic inhabitants of the Balkans had the oldest lineage was inspired by the p i iple of p io te po e fo tio ju e that legitimises property rights on the land. The degree of truth contained in each of these nation-building myths varies, and western critics were not slow in pointing this out. Both Fallmerayer (1831) and Robert Roesler Balkan Border Crossings, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2008, pp. 45-59. Cowan deals with undetermined ethnic identities with great perceptivity. Through them, we can discern the traces of a pre-national, situationist logic of categories that were not mutually exclusive, where a man could be Greek when he traded, Albanian when he married, and even Musli he he p a ed… Ibid, p.45 151 Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood, Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.146 145 (1871) who tried to refute not just the Greek, but also the Dacian and the Thracian traditions in the making of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, had a common goal: If the ancient peoples of the Balkans (Aimos peninsula) had been assimilated by the Slav metics, then their racial purity (which had a number of devotees in Europe) could be disputed. As a result, these peoples could not be counted upon to represent a credible obstacle to the pan-Slavic surge towards central and Western Europe. Retaining the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to the Slavic flood thus made sense. The major flaw of this integral view lies in the fact that its promoters endowed biology with the power to transmit an ethnic message. Paparrigopoulos was much closer to the modern view when he insisted that culture based on tradition is mainly responsible for shaping national consciousness. All in all, Balkan nation states were the hybrid progenies of the French civic state of the Enlightenment and the romantic cultural concept of the Germans. 152 Balkan nationalism can be categorised according to the actors that formulated and established the various versions of the ideology. Bureaucratic nationalism was the creation of an elite that manned the civil service of the 19th century Greek state and the select functionaries of the Ottoman empire after the Tanzimat reforms. At the same time foreign dynasties in Balkan states secured public approval and the loyalty of their subjects by rallying 152 George Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, the New Politics of Europe, London: Hurst & Co, 2000, p. 9-10. See also his views on the nationalism of the Yugoslavs, p.343-377. George Schöpflin adds to the argument the view that logic and national identity, far from being in conflict – as alleged – complement each other. Logic, according to Schöpflin offers the explanation and the comprehension of action, while national identity offers the individual the security of belonging to a community and of shared meanings with its members. 146 the masses around irredentist causes. Greece, Romania and Bulgaria displayed at different times irredentist nationalism. Populist nationalism found wide public support in Bulgaria and Serbia where the social levelling of the Ottoman centuries was most pervasive. Cultural nationalism was the work of educated diaspora merchants from Istanbul, Vienna and Paris in collaboration with native clergies that partook in the Enlightenment. Cultural nationalism generated national educational systems in most Balkan states and had the most profound and lasting influence in state-building. A subject of significance for the development of Bulgarian national identity, was the role of the clergy in emancipating their compatriots in the 19 th century from Greek educational and cultural dominance throughout the Ottoman centuries.153 The incarnations of the ͚nation͛ in current affairs The International Relations jargon requires a clarification of terms. The nation state needs no introduction. It has been with us at least since Westphalia in 1648 and, although somewhat battered, continues to be the source of the most legitimate form of authority in our world, be it national or intergovernmental. When the G8 heads of state meet, the world pays more attention than to the General Assembly of the UN. Whereas the nation state is a concrete reality, transnationalism is a many-splendoured notion that ranges from humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross, to multi-ethnic companies, the Internet, criminal networks and terrorist cells. 153 Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 44-54, 93-165. 147 Unlike nationalism, transnationalism is a concept without clear-cut state backing and has limited means to antagonise the nation state for noble or vile causes. Globalisation is widely considered to be in the transnational domain but in fact it reflects the intergovernmental priorities of the US, Europe, Russia and, increasingly, China. Nation states, high in the pecking order of influence, had their heyday during the cold war era when their sovereignty was guaranteed by the deadly stalemate of nuclear competition in that bipolar world. Since the end of the cold war, Yugoslavia was bombed into submission, the Soviet Union disintegrated into a new galaxy of troubled nation states, and Iraq was defeated twice before being occupied. The inviolability of certain nation states has come to an end (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Cyprus, however, did not escape their predicament, even before the fall of Communism). There has been a paradigm shift (increasingly since 9/11) i ou esti atio of t a s atio alis . N e a d Keoha e, ho popularised the term in the early 1970s, were reacting against the school of realism in International Relations. The realists considered international organisations mere instruments of governments, and NGOs without weight in international politics. The nation state has si e ee the ta get of the ad o ates of t a s atio alis . The two authors addressed all forms of transnational activity: contacts, coalitions and interaction across state borders that are not 148 controlled by the governments.154 central foreign policy instruments of In 1974, Nye and Keohane narrowed the concept of transnationalism to the international activities of nongovernmental actors, distinguishing these from t a sgo e e tal a to s to defi e the as su u its of governments when they are relatively autonomous from state authority155. The role of transgovernmental organisations such as the UN, OECD, NATO and the World Bank (to name but a few) is to engage nation states in the tasks of conflict resolution, securing stability and peace, and promoting development of the Third World. The malignant form of transnationalism resides in the unwelcome consequences of the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The transition from an authoritarian state to a free-forall market was dominated by mafias within the state and criminal networks outside. The proliferation of nation states in the USSR and Yugoslavia with the encouragement of the West, might well have been inspired by Wilsonian principles but has in fact produced seg e ta so ieties fed the tradition of extreme familism and patronage networks that militate against the formation of a civil society.156 Russia has since supported secessionism at the expense of Georgia and Moldova, while discouraging it in Serbia. 154 Joseph, Nye, and Robert O. Keohane. Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. 155 Ibid. 156 Ernest, Gellner. Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals. London: Hamish Ha ilto , .Also, Cha les Ki g, B i g the Pha to ‘epu li s i f o the Cold . International Herald Tribune, 5 September 2006. 149 Another consequence of the collapse of communism has been the declining fortunes of the UN, an important forum for dialogue throughout the cold war period. The assault against this transgovernmental organisation has come from the superpower that seeks licence to pursue its objectives unhindered by international institutions. In the same vein the US Government has avoided binding obligations emanating from treaties required to set up an International Criminal Court of Justice, the Kyoto Protocol and the agreement against anti-personnel mines. As the Yugoslav crisis proved, we have witnessed the reduction of the sovereignty of medium and small nation states and the aggrandisement of the economic power of the US, the EU, Russia and China. The Balance of Power principle that sustained nation states and the effect of international law as a guarantee against the abuse of international power is being replaced by a tripolar system of power in South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. The US has attempted, in spite of Russian resistance, to establish its hegemony in the energy-producing regions of Eurasia. Its failure so far is perhaps due to the absence of incentives in its strategy. Economic aid, or the rough equivalent of the Marshall Plan, has been conspicuously absent from American operations. The US still ranks last among developed states in providing nonmilitary aid to the needy and, unlike hegemonic powers or empires of the past; it does not distribute benefits such as citizen rights, security guarantees or protectorate status to friendly states or peoples. At the same time it undermines transgovernmental institutions that act as mediators, or distribute benefits to the downtrodden. The policies of the US and Russia are interventionist abroad and parochial domestically. It is in fact the domestic scene 150 that largely determined the international posture of the Bush and Putin administrations. One hundred and seventy or so years ago, Alexis de Toqueville foresaw that the unitary American society ould e a e a i tuous ate ialis ; such a perspective would ega d new theories as perils and innovations as irksome toils . 157 The US has since exhibited considerable political homogeneity and little tolerance for ideological diversity at home or abroad. If the American constitution embodies the enlightenment, the parlance of the former American President, Mr Bush and his constituency, were closer to the apocalyptic element in Jacksonian democracy that decries the congenital flaws of human nature and seeks redemption from the original sin. This resurgent parochialism cannot be reconciled with the spirit of the founding fathers nor with European secular democracy. Russia has retreated from its route to democratisation to assume, under Putin, its old hegemonic position in the near-abroad and a more authoritarian stance domestically. Its influence in Europe (not least due to the energy dimension), and its military relationship with China, have reintroduced Russia as an important international factor. The true division, however, is not between the West and the rest, but rather a division across the global board between transnational rationalism and transnational fundamentalism, between institutional democracy and a plethora of populist views that find an eager public among the disappointed. Transnational European liberals, who carry the torch of enlightenment and rationalism, viewed the Evangelical populism of 157 Alexis de Toqueville, On Democracy in America, Vol. II, 1840. 151 the Bush administration with bewilderment. Sixty years ago, a Greek scholar and statesman, Panayotes Kanellopoulos, alerted the coming generations to the impending threat of irrationalism, rather than the cold war threat of Marxism, whose founding father was, according to Kanellopoulos, a wayward disciple of the Enlightenment. He could not have imagined in 1955 a worldwide resurgence of fundamentalism, and termed the threat Nietzs hea , ele ati g a s i atio al fa ulties a d 158 impulses . How simple the cold war world used to be. Nationalism versus internationalism, national middle classes against transnational proletariats, the nation state a creation of the dominant class, according to Marxists, the communists a transnational conspiracy to destroy democracy and loot the haves, according to the liberals. Now some proletarians seek refuge in nation state protection, refute globalism and discard the supranationalism of the European Constitutional Treaty. Nationalism, that was responsible for the creation of Balkan nation states in the nineteenth century, became an important factor in the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia and even the velvet break-up of Czechoslovakia. Europe is still gravitating between a supranational EU and the national priorities of its larger members. Yugoslavia was torn apart by aggressive nationalisms of its federated units, while the rest of the Balkan states will retain their unity only as multicultural entities. The homogeneous, unitary nation states of the nineteenth century are already things of the past. Panayotes Kanellopoulos, Ο ι οσ ός Αιώ ας (The Twentieth Century), Athens, 1951. 158 152 Chapter 2: The Economies In less than two centuries the population of the Balkans rose from six to sixty million. This prodigious growth is due to the flourishing of trade and the institutional modernisation that accompanied state-building. The trade routes of the Danube, the Adriatic and the Aegean, alternated in importance but established a network of communications that allowed goods and ideas to travel freely between East and West. As budding nation states adopted the policies and the public administration models of their European prototypes, they experienced a metamorphosis of their societies and economies. The subsequent monumental shift from agriculture and trade into industry and services occurred within the larger European context of the twentieth century. The protracted transition to yet another form of modernisation and the social dislocation this caused was shared by a significant part of Europe and was affected by wars, recessions and wholesale changes of regimes that racked the entire continent.159 The two world wars that sucked the Balkans in, and the subsequent separation of Europe into two ideological blocs, were scarcely the responsibility of the neglected south eastern corner of the continent. We shall attempt a cursory discussion of the wholesale changes that four out of the five Balkan states experienced under communist rule. Wartime occupation in the Balkans was destructive for most economies. The Ba k of G ee e s p i ti g p ess covered four 159 John R. Lampe and Marvin Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 15501950, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 1-19. 153 fifths of the budgetary expenses for the German-held area, once the drachma was restored as the national currency in August 1941 .160 The Yugoslav central Bank ceased to exist in 1941. The occupation authorities set up their own banks with varying degrees of cruelty towards the economies, depending on whether they were exploiting the hostile Serbs or the friendly Croats. But even the Croatian State Bank was obliged to advance close to half of its assets for the maintenance of German troops. German occupation cost Serbia seven times the amounts paid by Bulgaria and Romania.161 The post-war recovery of Bulgarian industry was faster than that of Romania. The USSR treated its two partners inequitably and anywa Bulga ia s i dust ial pe fo a e du i g the a as ette tha efo e. Yugosla ia s, a d pa ti ula l “e ia s, de astatio the Ge a s put he at a disad a tage i the post-war period of reconstruction. It as o l afte Tito s selfmanagement doctrine took roots that the industrial performance of Yugoslavia began to overtake that of its eastern neighbours. Yugosla ia s a d G ee e s post-war take-off benefited greatly from external financing in the 1950s. Both countries received western (mostly American) grants and loans that exceeded $ 3 billion. Romania s development was initially hostage to Soviet reparations and Bulgaria was encouraged to remain an agrarian economy with high agricultural output between 1950 and 60.162 160 Lampe & Jackson, op.cit, p.549. Ibid p.553. 162 Ibid, pp.576-599. 161 154 The legacy of forty-five years of communist rule in South Eastern Europe has left its imprint on the economies of the states in question. The command economy isolated the national economies from the world market. Mobility of labour and capital were strictly confined and the drive towards self-sufficiency made every sector an item of planning. Economic growth was rapid – as was the case with all less developed states – in the sixties, but lost its momentum in the seventies and stagnated in the eighties. Socialist agriculture was a resounding failure leading to massive imports of food and animal feed while industrial exports of low quality failed to benefit the balance of payments. The Socialist division of labour within the non-market COMECON integration was based on artificially favourable terms of trade created by Moscow for its allies, as a trade–off for bloc cohesion. 163 Be that as it may the COMECON never became the counterpart of the European Community because many of its members resisted forced integration. Yugoslavia broke the pattern of the Eastern bloc in the early fifties a d ith Tito s do t i e of self-management a measure of economic pluralism was introduced. Corporatism and regionalism however, undermined reforming market forces. Trade between Yugoslavia and the West secured a steady income from the export of livestock products, raw and semi-processed minerals, and certain industrial goods such as cars, ships and appliances. Capital equipment and many consumer goods were the major ite s i Yugosla ia s este i po ts. The e itta es of immigrant workers constituted a significant contribution to the 163 Sotiris Wallden, The Balkan Countries in the International Division of Labour , in EKEM, The European Community and the Balkans, Athens: A.N. Sakkoulas, 1995, p.76 155 balance of payments. Furthermore Yugoslavia received financial and development aid from western institutions but also borrowed heavily accumulating a large hard-currency debt in the eighties. Yet the country was the first communist state to contract an agreement with European Community in 1970 and the 1980 cooperation agreement constituted preferential treatment of Belgrade by Brussels.164 The p o ess of Yugosla ia s dissolutio ega te ea s before the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the need for economic reform became overwhelming so that the country could honour its economic obligations towards its western creditors. During the second half of the sixties and the first half of the seventies, Tito abused the credit facilities that the West had granted his country. The economic stagnation caused by the second oil crisis that coincided with East-West détente, increased western pressure on Yugoslavia to pay back its debts. If the country was to preserve its credit facilities in western capital markets, it needed to take stringent fiscal measures, recommended by the International Monetary Fund. For such measures to be implemented, the federal system ought to have been substantially reformed with the purpose of strengthening the authority of the central government over the Republics. The Union of Yugoslav Communists authorised in 1983 a party committee to study the situation. At precisely the same time many western countries were exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to liberalise its economy and reduce the powers of the central government in favour of its federated constituents. Yugoslavia after Tito, found herself on a procrustean bed, as the West was asking her simultaneously to centralise and decentralise power. On the other hand, the protracted economic crisis 164 Ibid, 82-84. 156 exacerbated the differences between those more and those less developed Republics thus undermining their common Yugoslav identity.165 The demise of communism in the Balkans took a heavy toll o the egio s e o o ies. Most ou t ies egiste ed a o se i g of their macroeconomic situation, declining GDP (gross domestic product), growing trade and current account global deficits, higher budget deficits and rising unemployment. These developments that lasted for almost a decade after the fall of communism were the natural consequences for economies that had been cocooned outside the international market and were cursed with inefficient state bureaucracies. There are those who believe that the term centrally planned economies is a misnomer that defies reality in the former communist states. … e t al pla i g efe s ai l to the aspirations rather than the attainments of these highly regimented economies, which are more aptly called command economies, although reality fell far short even of that aspiration .166 Strangely enough economic recovery in the Balkans proved stronger among former command economies, rather than the decentralised economies of the former Yugoslavia, especially its central and eastern part. The military conflagrations in the former Yugoslavia certainly exacerbated the already problematic economies, but attracting capital inflows would not have been an easy task even if the war had not occurred. Even in the early 21 st century unemployment was rife in Kosovo (40%), Bosnia – Herzegovina 165 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995 166 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, The Balkans. A Post – Communist History, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 19. 157 (40%), Serbia (30%), Croatia and Albania (20%). The gap between South Eastern and Central Europe has not been reversed. Whereas the latter states began to improve their economic performance from the mid-nineties, the Balkans remained mired in stagnation and negative growth rates. Analysts were tempted to draw an analogy with the end of the “e o d Wo ld Wa i e aluati g the egio s prospects. Even putting forward the idea of a new Marshall Plan did draw some of its justification from such an analogy. There are, however, important differences in circumstances. First, at that time there was no process of state formation and dissolution and, therefore, no ensuing conflicts; this fact favoured the process of economic integration through the European Coal and Steel Communities. Second, a clear distinction existed then between victors and vanquished. This is not the case in the Balkans, where borders are still being questioned. Third, the Marshall Plan meant, primarily, an infusion of funds for energising economic reconstruction in an area that possessed the institutional frame of a market economy. Fourth, there was an external and internal common enemy: communism. Who is the common enemy at least in the region of the former Yugoslavia? It is generally accepted that extreme nationalism and irredentism is the main culprit. However, a more pernicious candidate is underdevelopment. Following the collapse of communism, the Balkans registered a worsening of their economic indices. Rising unemployment, growing current account and trade deficits and negative gross domestic product dynamics, painted a dark picture. Given the international slowdown, local economies had a hard time attracting foreign capital and direct investment. Most governments could barely run macro-economic policies without significant 158 inflows of capital from foreign creditors. On certain occasions sustained EU aid encouraged inertia and undermined the development of the beneficiary. Bosnia-Herzegovina is such an example of aid-addiction. 167 As stabilisation of the states set in and prospects of integration into the European Union improved, certain features of underdevelopment such as the low cost of labour began to attract foreign investment into the Western Balkans. Between 2001 and 2008, the economies of the region did enjoy growth in excess of five per cent and a stable macroeconomic environment. High unemployment, poverty and crime however, persist. Furthermore, growing external imbalances in some countries, against the backdrop of a turbulent global financial market, have raised concerns about increased a oe o o i ul e a ilities .168 Of all the Balkan states, Serbia was the hardest hit in economic terms from the post-1989 developments. The U.N. economic sanctions of 1992-95 injured its economy and the 1999 NATO bombing damage is estimated at $30 billion. After 2000 economic liberalisation produced high rates of growth (GDP per capita went from 1,160$ in 2000, to 7,054$ in 2008). The EU has si e e o e “e ia s ost i po ta t t adi g pa t e ut full membership requires curtailing its high unemployment rate and its trade deficit.169 The economic goal of Zoran Djindjic, the Prime Minister who took the helm in Serbia in January 2001, was to Laza Kekić, Aid to the Balka s: Addi ts a d Pushe s , T. Ve e is & D. Daianu (eds.), Balkan Reconstruction, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 20-40 168 Orsalia Kala tzopoulos, P o eedi gs of The ‘etu of the Balka s? , conference organised by EKEM in Delphi, 11-13 Sept. 2008 169 KEPA, Energy View of BSEC Countries 2008, Athens, Hellenic Aid, 2009, p. 365-66. 167 159 privatise at least fifty per cent of the economy. His assassination caused a temporary diversion from such a policy, but by 2012 privatisation had made significant progress. According to information relayed to this author by Ivan Vejvoda of the German Marshall Fund, the American company, US Steel, became the largest exporter with 12% of the export market before the 2008 economic crisis. Yet in spite of great improvements Serbia has still not attained its 1989 level of GDP. The destruction of its infrastructure by the NATO bombardment has left a lasting mark on the economy. U alić speaks of a new wall that surround the Western Balka s , built during the last twenty years. On 30 November 2009 the EU Council of Ministers approved the abolition of visas for Serbia, FYROM and Montenegro. The Schengen wall however is still there for Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania.170 There are heartening developments emerging in the Yugosphere i.e. the territory of former Yugoslavia. Economic relations between the breakaway states that had reached a standstill are being revived. Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia created a joint venture in rail transport. After 18 years of disruption, a train line from Sarajevo to Belgrade has resumed its operation since January 2010. Mass media networks are crossing boundaries and business deals ignore past conflicts. A Serbian advertisement a ou ed the pla ed o uest of C oatia, ot a ed fo es ut CIPI‘IPI , a “e ia ho olate sp ead. In June 2010, a Serbia- Mili a U alić, Ser ia s Tra sitio . To ards a Better Future, London: Palgrave, 2010, p. 277. 170 160 Croatia defence agreement was signed which includes military cooperation.171 With high rates of growth since 2001, Romania began to feel the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and inflation rose from 4.9% in 2006, to 6.3% in 2008, driven by strong consumer demand and high wage rises, energy costs and the relaxation of fiscal discipline.172 The EU accession of Bulgarian and Romania on 1 January 2007, the conclusion of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with most SEE countries and the formation of the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008, constitute reasons for optimism. With the exception of Croatia that became an EU member in 2013, all the others look for that possibility to 2016 and beyond. The prerequisites of democratisation, sustained growth, development of human capital as well as reduction of telecommunication costs and energy shortages, are still ahead.173 As the sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Greece, its Balkan neighbours pondered on the effect the financial problems that Ti Judah, Yugoslavia is Dead. Lo g Li e the Yugosphe e , European Institute, LSEE papers , November 2009, p.7. 172 U alić,op. it. 173 Vladi i Gligo o , Balkan Endgame and Econo i T a sfo atio , in Johanna Deimel & Wim van Meurs (eds.) The Balkan Prism, Munchen, Verlag Otto Sanger, 2007, pp. 229-231. For suggestions of regional oope atio see, Vassilis Mo asti iotis, Quo Vadis “outheast Eu ope? EU Accession, Regional Cooperation and the need for a Balkan Development “t ateg , Helle i O se ato , the L“E, G ee“E Pape No. . Fo a e e t discussion of the impact of the crisis on the Balkans, see, Othon Anastasakis, Jens Bastian & Max Watson (eds.) From Crisis to Recovery. Sustainable Growth in South East Europe, South East European Studies at Oxford, 2011. 171 161 bedevil the primary Balkan investor in the region will have on their own economies. The repercussions have been a decline of their rates of growth and therefore of their ability to fulfil the accession criteria.174 Of course the crisis has implications, not only for the European south but for the future of European unity itself. Much will depend on the fiscal policy Germany will choose to exercise and its decision to maintain or dismantle the southern membership of the Eurozone. Until then, future relations between the EU and the Balkan candidates for membership will be tenuous. TABLE 1 Growth of Real GNP in Eastern Europe Growth of GNP in 1999 Real GNP per capita in 1999 (US$) Albania 8.0 1,098 Bulgaria 0,0 1,315 Croatia -0.5 4,334 Czech Republic 0.0 5,176 Romania -4.0 1,409 Slovenia 3.5 10,708 174 ‘itsa Pa agiotou, The Greek Crisis as a Crisis of EU Enlargement: How will the Weste Balka s e Affe ted? , Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2013, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 89-104. 162 Georgia 3.0 727 Ukraine -2.5 840 T. Veremis, The Contemporary Western World, Athens: Gutenberg, 2008, p. 149 TABLE 2 Economic Growth and Transition Indicators, 1991-2004 Country Annu al Annu al Priva te Avera ge real Avera ge real Shar e of GDP * GDP* GDP* Grow th Grow th 199296 19992004 (%) (%) 5.4 6.4 Trade With EU EU aid** FDI*** 1991-99/ 199199/ 2001-4 200104 (million Euros) 2004 (%) 2001 Albania (million Euros) (%) 75 89 1,840/ 1,143 456/ 773 163 Bosnia and Herzego vina 2,957/ 1,457 203/ 1,272 n.a. 6.0 40 53 Bulgaria -3.2 4.4 70 56 3,675/ 2,775 2,292/ 4,703 Croatia -1.0 3.6 60 52 2,133/ 2,328 4,031/ 4,742 Greece 1.1 4.1 95 49 FYROM -4.9 1.4 60 52 1,438/ 1,216 268/ 770 Romania 1.6 4.0 65 68 8,176/ 6,497 5,549/ 8,173 Serbia and Monten egro -9.0 4.8 40 43 1,326/ 4,182 935/2,713 164 Slovenia Regional cooperat ion Totals 2.7 3.6 70 65 517/ 390 - - - 22,062 / 20,115 13,545/ 23,146 Notes: * Gross Domestic Product; **EU, EU member states, European Investment Bank, European Bank for Recovery and Development; ***Foreign Direct Investment. ****Transferred from EU aid to accession framework by 1998. Sources: George Petrakos and Stoyan Totev, eds, The Development of the Balkan Region (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 6-7; Milica U alić, Economic Transition in Southeast Europe , Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Jan. , 2003), pp. 64-75; Laza Kekić, Aid to the Balkans: Addicts and Pushe s , Journal of Southeast and European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 26-9 and Kekić, Foreign Direct Investment in the Balkans: ‘e e t T e ds a d P ospe ts , vol. 5, no. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 171-90; The Europa World Yearbook, 2004 (London: Europa Publications,2004), passim; Plan Econ Review and Outlook for Eastern Europe, December, 2001 (Washington, DC: Plan Econ, 2001), passim; Office for South East Europe, European 165 Commission/ World Bank, Financial Flows to South East Europe 2001-2005, www.seerecon.org, May 27, 2005. The table appears in John R. Lampe, Balkans into South Eastern Europe, London: Palgrave, 2006 166 Chapter 3: The Army in Politics Most Balkan countries have a history of military involvement in politics. Among the reasons for this is the special role the military have played in the creation of these states upon the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires, but mainly the long-lasting liberation struggles until such time as they were able to acquire their final shape and borders. Because of the fragile parliamentary institutions obtaining in these states and their weak civil societies, the military became active both in the background and on the foreground of the political scene. Most of the literature in English on the Balkan military during the first decades of the twentieth century contains words of praise for the Bulgarian footman and officer and much less for any others in the peninsula.175 Bulgarian freedom was won by Russia in the war of 1877 and the army of the young state was organised and led by Russian officers. The Bulgarian victory of 1885 against the more seasoned Serbian forces won them their reputation as Prussians of the Balkans . Bulgarian officers were instrumental in the ousting of Prince Alexander Battenberg in 1886 and in 1887 some seized the garrisons in Silistra and other cities before they were put down 175 Reginald Wyon, The Balkans from Within, London, James Finch & Co Ltd, , p. The e is o Balka state … that should appeal o e to England than this little country, which has made itself i t e t fi e ea s. Equally complimentary for the Bulgarian military are the following: John Foster Fraser, Pictures from the Balkans, London, Casell & Co, 1908, p. 7475, H.C. Woods, Washed by Four Seas, London, T.Fisher & Unwin, 1908, p.201-252. 167 with force by the Stambolov government.176 Their Serb counterparts distinguished themselves in palace coups and irredentist intrigue. Much of the negative information on the latter comes from Austrian sources and in 1902 the military attaché reported to Vienna that the military machine built up by King Milan was disintegrating.177 On 11 June 1903 a group of officers assassinated King Alexander O e o ić, seized the Government and proclaimed Peter Ka ađo đe ić, King of Serbia. On the day of the Ki g s o o atio i the su e of , the onspirators were de o ated ith the Star of Ka ađo đe . A countercoup, perhaps fa ou ed the “o ialists, as supp essed i . Ale a de s assassins relinquished power to the politicians but their influence remained significant178. In 1911 they organised a secret society by the a e of U it o Death , also k o as the Bla k Ha d which became active during the Balkan Wars and brought Serbia into Northern Albania in 1912.179 I a e e of the Bla k Ha d assassinated the heir-apparent to the Habsburg throne and sparked the First World War. The leader of the society, Colonel Dimitrijević – Apis and other officers were brought to trial in 1914, in Thessaloniki for conspiring Crampton, Eastern Europe…, op. it. pp. 104-105. Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia Between East & West. The Events of 19031908, Stanford Un. Press, 1954, p.21 178 For a thorough history of the period see, Slobodan G. Markovich, British Perceptions of Serbia and the Balkans, 1903-1906, Paris: Dialogue, 2001. 179 The se e th a ti le of the se et so iet s statute efe s to Bos ia, Montenegro, Old Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia provinces. No mention is made of Slovenia which was considered a Germanic land. See V. Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic et al, History of Yugoslavia, New York, Mc Graw Hill, 1974, p.432. See also, David MacKenzie, Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic. Boulder, Colorado: SE European Monograph Series, 1989. 176 177 168 against Prince Alexander (later King) Ka ađo đe and was executed. Having dissolved the organisation, Alexander proceeded to set up his o White Ha d o ga isation, comprising officers who exerted their influence throughout the inter-war period.180 In 1922 remnants of the officer corps of the demobilised Bulga ia a fo ed the Milita League and joined forces with the 1923 coup that culminated with the murder of Prime Minister Stamboliyski. On 19 May offi e s o e ted to the Milita League , seized power. This coup was inspired by republican ideas and was led by Col. Damian Velchev. His opponents however managed to replace republicans in the army with royalists. Finally King Boris intervened to control the military by dissolving the Milita League and gradually appropriated power from the army.181 Most interwar authoritarian regimes in the Balkans consisted of monarchs supported by the military. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania acquired their royal dictatorships in the 1930s. The removal of Romania s Ki g Ca ol from his throne was the outcome of cooperation between army officers and the Iron Guard. King George s return to his throne in 1935 and his subsequent dictatorship in 1936, materialised after a series of military coups made it possible for the royalists to purge the army from their Republican adversaries. Alexander of Yugoslavia established his royal dictatorship in 1929. The post-war establishment of communist systems in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria entailed (with some 180 181 Vucinich op.cit, p.97-105 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, op. Cit., pp. 156-171. 169 differences in degree from one country to another) the quasi-total supremacy of the political authorities over the military and the control of the armed forces by the party hierarchy. This development became possible because in all the above countries the following features were formally established: a) The imposition of the state ideology on the military b) The primacy of politics over military priorities institutionalised not only in the relations between state and army but even within the ranks of the officer corps itself c) The obligatory politicisation of the officers d) The incorporation of the military within the political system by making them join the Communist Party and thus exercising dual control over them by both the state services and the party e) The fact that officers were prohibited from having relations with bodies antagonistic to the party such as the Church f) The recruitment of persons from low social strata for a military career182 These p e e uisites e e fo ulated A to Be le i his pape O Civil-Milita ‘elatio s i the Eu opea “o ialist “tates , Ed a d Ka delj University, Ljubljana, 1989, p.5. 182 170 The common Marxist frame that imposed the above conditions and ensured a basic uniformity in the behaviour of the Balkan military towards the state was not able to erase all the factors that differentiated them. The social and cultural peculiarities in each of these countries, the origins of every officer corps emerging after the war, the way each country stood in relation to the Soviet model and to the Warsaw Pact, determine also the special politico-military relationships in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia Yugoslavia is the Balkan country that has been studied the most. The crop of articles on Yugoslav defence contained in the work ζugosla ia s Se urity Dile as (Marco Milivojević, John Allcock & Pierre Mauser, (eds.) Oxford, Berg, 1988) constitutes a reference work about a subject that has, in the past, attracted the vivid interest of researchers. The origins of the post-war Yugoslav army are to be found in the resistance movement that Tito had created during the German occupation. The proportion of persons of agrarian origins that emerged from this movement and subsequently manned the regular army ranged from 50.4% in 1946 to 42.8% in 1952. On the other hand a percentage of 62% of the members of the Communist Party in 1946 had some involvement in the armed resistance. In terms of ethnic participation the Partisans was the most representative movement in Yugoslavia. 183 The clash of Tito with the Soviet leadership and the fear of invasion rallied ‘o i Aliso ‘e i gto A ed Fo es a d “o iet i Yugosla ia i Catherine Mc Ardle Kelleher (ed.), Political Military Systems, London: Sage, 1974, p.168. 183 171 the newly converted popular masses to the military so that the concept of a nation in arms and the armed forces became synonymous. However, in spite of its major role in shielding the nation f o outside th eats, the Yugosla People s A (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) was superseded until 1966 by the secret services that dealt with issues of internal security. With the downfall of Alexander ‘a ko ić from the leadership of the State Security Service, the army acquired a large part of responsibility on issues dealing with the collection of information and counterespionage, so that its role in the political life of the country was considerably widened during the decades that followed. 184 The ises that ope ed the a to the a s a ti atio i this area were the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the secessionist claims of the Croat nationalists in 1971-72. Tito s u disguised suppo t of the Du ek egi e ade Yugosla ia a target of intense polemics from the countries of the Warsaw Pact, so much so, in fact, that the Yugoslavs started to worry seriously and prepare for a Soviet invasion. This insecurity led Tito to renew his st ateg of Total People s Defe e (Teritorijalna Odbrana – TO) that was based on a guerrilla war to be fought in the level of each federated unit to the bitter end if the country were ever taken over fo eig fo es. The people s defe e ould e o ga ised a ou d the regular army but with additional reserve units which were to wage the guerrilla war. The perspective of a resistance mechanism that would continue to fight in the cities and the countryside even after the collapse of the front functioned as a deterrent for any 184 Denison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1918-1974, London 1977, chapters 3-5. 172 would-be invader. It was thus that the armed forces became once agai the fo us of the atio s i te est.185 The troubles in Croatia posed a serious danger for the unity of post-war Yugoslavia and gave the army an opportunity to emerge as the guarantor not only of the ou t s independence, but also of its integrity. Even though the armed forces did not repress the Croat secessionist moves of their own accord, Tito confirmed, in his speech in December 1971, the role the army had pla ed as a gua a to of the a hie e e ts of the e olutio a d let it be understood that the armed forces structure would not conform to the federal model but would remain a force representing the central government and fight for the unity of the country.186 Afte Tito s death i the i po ta e of the a increased further. During the troubles that broke out in the Kosovo province in 1981, the army acted for the first time as a force of repression and repeated (although less harshly) this role during the troubles of 1988. In spite of their great influence on political developments it was precisely the unifying mission of the armed forces that created serious problems in their relations with particular ethnicities. The officer corps was manned to an extent reaching 60-70% by Serbs, a percentage reflecting the interest Serbs displayed for a military career but also far exceeding the proportion of Serbs in the general population of the country. All the chiefs of General Staff and federal Ministers of Defence (with one exception) have always been of Serbian extraction in the post-war 185 Remington, op.cit. p.171-173. Ma o Mili oje ić The Politi al ‘ole of the Yugosla People s A i Co te po a Yugosla ia i Ma o Mili oje ić, John Allcock & Pierre Mauser ζugosla ia s Se urity Dile as, Oxford: Berg, 1988, p.20-22. See also ‘. Dea , Civil – Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971, in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 3, no 1, 1976, p.24. 186 173 years. This Serbian exclusivity generated bitterness among the Croats who asked in 1971-72 for the creation of a Croat army with the well-known results. The possibility of a military coup in the name of Yugoslav unity would thus have been regarded – especially by Croats and the Albanians of Kosovo – as a threat to impose Serbian rule.187 A common feature in the publications that deal ith the elatio s et ee the a a d politi s is the legiti a e jo ed the ilita i ea h ou t . Legiti a i this ase means the acceptance (or the degree of acceptance) by society of the ilita s i te e tio i politi s. Thus, fo i sta e, the deg ee of a epta e of the a s ole i Tu kish politi s is fo a a iet of reasons) quite high as compared to the low degree of acceptance of such a role in Bulgaria.188 By the time when the Croat crisis broke out, the regime that Tito created was seriously being challenged by the rekindled local nationalisms. Not just Kosovo but also Slovenia and the Bosnian Muslims defied from time to time the legiti a of e t al go e e t so that the armed forces had to undertake initiatives in fields where competence had once rested with the political authorities. However, the revamped role of the a i i te al Yugosla atte s afte Tito s death, although recognised as necessary by those supporting the unity of the federal state, also became the target of strong criticism by the nationalists in the republics and the provinces. It was thus that the easo s hi h justified the legiti a of the ilita a ti it e e at the same time undermining the credibility of the army as an ‘o i Aliso ‘e i gto The Milita as a I te est G oup i Yugosla Politi s i Dale He sp i g & I a Volg es eds. Civil Military Relations in Communist Systems. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, pages 189. Also Mili oje ić, op. it.p. -39 188 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Penguin, 1976, p.75-76. 187 174 i stitutio ep ese ti g Yugosla ia as a hole. As of the s the armed forces had acquired their monolithic centralist character and opposed e e efo o e ted ith self- a age e t . The 1968 crisis and the adoption of the policy called the defe e of the people as a hole eated ha els of communication between the military and society. However, if foreign threats rallied the Yugoslavs close to one another, the nationalist outbursts split them apart. It was for this reason that the internal crises which followed created breaches between the Yugosla People s A a d the a ious eth i g oups. A o gst all the Republics, the one with the smallest representation within the offi e s a ks as “lo e ia. The “lo e es la k of e thusias fo a military career was perhaps due to their high living standards that turned them towards more lucrative professional options.189 The alienation of the Slovenes manifested itself through attacks against the military in the Marine Academy of Split, an occurrence that repeated itself a number of times in 1986.190 Nonetheless the most serious problem between the youths of Slovenia and the army was the emergence of conscientious objectors and their demand to serve in a civilian, not military, service. This issue touched upon the most sensitive chord of the Yugoslav defence doctrine which insisted that everybody without exception should be liable to be called upon to protect the country in times of need. However, the intolerant refusal of the army to a ept a de iatio s f o the do t i e of the defe e the Ja es Go , Legiti a a d the Milita : Yugoslav Civil Military ‘elatio s a d “o e I pli atio s fo Defe e i All o k a d Mause ζugosla ia s Se urity Dile as, op. cit., p.78-79. 190 Op. cit. p.77 189 175 people as a hole a age e t i oked a ou te to the p i iple of those opposi g ilita service. self- The 1974 Constitution clearly defined the role of the army as protector not simply of the homeland but of its political regime as well as of its form of Government. As long as the political leadership protected successfully the principles enunciated in the Constitution, the army remained the right hand of the central Government. The collapse of Yugoslavia engulfed the federal army as well. Bulgaria Of all the Balkan countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria, as mentioned before, was the most reliable ally of the Soviet Union. The close relationship between the two countries manifested itself in the military field as well given that 33% of the se i g Bulga ia offi e s u de the ou t s o u ist egi e had studied or had followed post-graduate courses in the USSR, while an additional 14% had cooperated closely with Soviet military units. This development had its roots in the past of the BulgarianRussian relations despite the fact that in the period between the two World Wars, Bulgaria was closely linked to Germany. When the country was taken over by Soviet troops, the Bulgarian army was cleansed of its Germanophile leadership and transformed into a People s A .191 The new leadership emerged from the small groups of officers who had resisted the Germanophile regime and from the ranks of officers who had spent years exiled in the Soviet 191 Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies, N.C.: Duke Press, 1982, p.31, 34-35. 176 U io a d e a e k o as Mus o ites e ause of thei lose relationship with the Soviet leadership. The second group managed to prevail within the military structure from 1948 to 1956. However, the de-Stalinisation in East Europe marked the end of the Mus o ites i flue e a d the egi i g of the as e t of the resistance fighters. The latter, without breaking the close relationship with the USSR, offered some moral support to the new regime through their personal resistance history. The new army was manned by people coming mainly from rural backgrounds because the perspective of social promotion and of a salary higher than that offered to those working on collective farms never stopped enticing the latter to join the army. 192 The creation of military academies gradually raised the educational standard of the young officers. So while during 1969-1974 only 40% of the officer corps had gone through higher education, in 1980 this percentage rose to 67%. The remuneration of officers was higher than that of civilians (by some 50% or 70% if all the perks these enjoyed are taken into account). Those amongst the military with the highest remuneration were the 12,000 men of the security corps and the 15,000 border guards.193 In spite of their apparent subjection to the political authorities, the military never quite lost their old habit of intervening in politics. The troubles of 1958-1961 that became k o as the offee shop e ellio a d the oup of e e though our knowledge of all this is scarce 194) seems to have had, 192 Volgyes, Op.cit. p.35-35 Op.cit. p.36-37 194 ‘o e t Co uest, Bulga ia i W.C. A d e s & U i ‘a aa , The Politi s of the Coup d Etat, New York: Von Norstrand Reinhold Co., 1969, p.144-150. 193 177 among other goals, the reduction of the control of the armed forces by the party and the Soviets. The role of the Soviets in revealing the coup and also the probable pressure they brought to bear on the Zhivkov Government to display magnanimity at the trial of those responsible for it, betray – if true – Mos o s i te est in controlling the Bulgarian military. It is also probable that many of those i ol ed i this offee shop oup elo ged to a esista e g oup othe tha the o e a ed Cha da hi h )hi kov and his associates were active in, so that the dispute may also have been a i te al lash ithi the g oup of the esista e fighte s to obtain and control power in the Bulgarian army. The accusations of revisionism or dogmatism have not been clarified but both the Yugoslav example and the identification of Zhivkov in the beginning with the Khrushchev experiment made the Soviet leadership extra cautious in handling Bulgaria. What is certain is the fact that the army remained under the control of the political leadership. This control was ensured through uninterrupted ideological indoctrination given that 25% of a offi e s total hou s of t ai i g e e de oted to his politi al so ialisatio . The o te t of this ideologi al a ipulatio as decided by the Central Political Directorate that was responsible for choosing the specialised military personnel. Even though the students of the military academies could hoose to spe ialise as politi al offi e s, this ole as usuall assig ed to lieute a ts o aptai s. The politi al offi e s o ed rapidly upwards all the steps of the hierarchy but their distancing from the ordinary military duties alienated them from the body of regular officers. Their role covered a wide range of activities: the supervision of the indoctrination procedure; controlling every possible deviation from the point of view of ideological orthodoxy; 178 the coordination of the politicisation of the military with the work done by Comsomol; and the cooperation with the civilian and the military secret services. These activities were made easy by the fact that 80-83% of the officers were members of the Bulgarian Communist Party and that 98% of the recruits belonged to the Comsomol.195 In this way indoctrination started at an early age and the state as a le to e e ise ithout a p o le s its su je ti e (according to Huntington) control over the military and the recruits. Bearer of a military tradition incommensurate with its size, Bulgaria devoted a large part of its budget (6%) to military expenses. In 1988 these expenses reached 2.465 billion dollars while the same year, Romania with a population two and a half times as large spent 1.133 billion dollars for its defence while Yugoslavia with a population similar to that of Romania spent 2.86 billion dollars for the same purpose.196 Romania Romania was the member –state of the Warsaw Pact that presented the most numerous deviations from the rules that regulated the relations of the members with the Soviet metropolis. During the time of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the opposition to the Soviet foreign policy by the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușes u came close to open conflict. By sticking, however, to the old orthodoxy in the relations between party and society Romania managed to serve for the Soviets as a useful example for the other states in the coalition. It was for this reason 195 Volgyes, op. cit. p.31-33, 35-38. International Institute for Strategic studies Military Balance 1988-1989. London, p.46, 52, 92. 196 179 that the Soviet Union tolerated the diplomatic escapades of the Romanians and their contacts with NATO, China and Israel as long as they continued to serve as a model, in terms of their internal policies, for the rest of the Easterners. The Gorbachev experiment, however, met its strongest critic in the person of Ceaușes u. The relaxation of the Soviet influence on the countries of the Warsaw Pact did not counterbalance – for the Romanian communist leader – the fact that the USSR with its tendency in favour of internal liberal reforms represented a bad example for the beleaguered Romanians. During the perestroika period Romania thus remained glued to an autocratic system that all its allies tended gradually to get rid of. The bloody downfall of the Romanian dictator revealed aspects of the way the armed forces were organised in this country that has, as yet, not been properly assessed. The post-war relationship of Romania with the USSR acted as the catalyst for most of the political choices of the Bucharest leadership. Under dictator Antonescu, Romania fought alongside the Axis, even in Stalingrad. When in August 1944 the Soviet forces crossed the Romanian border, a military coup, supported by both the Communist Party and the monarch, overthrew Antonescu and ought the ou t i to the Allies a p. As of , the Romanian Communist Party under Petru Groza seized power with Soviet help. Because the strength of the Romanian Communist Party was never comparable to that of other Balkan parties, the e egi e as o liged to el al ost e lusi el o Mos o s protection. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the reorganisation of the Romanian armed forces took place under the supervision of Soviet experts, there never was any official Soviet instructor of the Romanian military. The two men who undertook to play that role 180 were Emil Bod ă aș (dedicated to Moscow) and the then lieutenant-general N. Ceaușes u.197 Romania s leade did not, in the beginning, differentiate his position from the pro-Soviet policy of Bod ă aș and remained a loyal proponent of Soviet policy. Up until 1965 Romania entertained harmonious relations with its partners in the Warsaw Pact, her army was equipped with Soviet arms and she took part in the 1962 manoeuvres without, however, ever allowing since then the Soviet forces to step into her territory. As from the death of Gheorghiu Dej in 1965 and the ascent to power of Ceaușes u, relations with the Warsaw Pact were getting worse but without ever reaching a breaking point.198 The alienation from the USSR came about because of a Romanian nationalism resentful on account of Romania s te ito ial losses, the manipulation of the country by a hostile Power but also because of Ceaușes u s a itio ot to e ai a “o iet puppet fo ever. This nationalism, strengthened by the progressive deterioration of the Soviet-Romanian relations, allowed Ceaușes u to promote the particular aspects of his personal regime. President of the Republic, General Secretary of the Party, head of the ou t s “e u it Cou il a d the efo e High Co a de of the Armed Forces, the man had concentrated all powers in his own hands.199 His principal concern had always been to keep the armed forces on his side, especially after the long-lasting manifold difficulties that his economic programmes had created for the Romanians. 197 Volgyes, op.cit. p.48-49. Volgyes op.cit. p.49-51 199 Walte Ba o J ., The Milita op. cit. p.168 198 a d the Pa t i ‘o a ia i He sp i g, 181 In the 1970s, Ceaușes u began to rehabilitate the reputation of the military in Romania s history presenting them as a force of progress on which national independence was based. While silence covered the activity of the military during the first four years of the war, plenty was written about its subsequent role, especially in the overthrow of Antonescu and the liberation of the country from the Axis powers. Political scientists do not agree on the degree of autonomy that the Romanian army enjoyed under Ceaușes u. Kolkowitz believes that the party controlled the military through the Supreme Political Council (itself controlled by a department of the pa t s e t al o ittee appoi ti g politi al offi e s i the units, while it also kept an eye on their political activity in the military unit for which they were responsible through its local committees. As political activity was one of the conditions for promotion in the military hierarchy, most, if not all, the officers were party members. In this way political control was a smoothly operating process. As a further guarantee, the secret police was always there to correct the malfunctions of the control system. 200 Bacon, on the contrary, believes that the relations between the party and the army were based on mutual accommodation. The Romanian military participated (though in a limited way) in the p o ess of de isio aki g a d suppo ted the ou t s o alig ed fo eig policy without, however, enjoying equality of status with the political leadership.201 200 Roman Kolkowitz. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton University Press, 1967, chapter 4, p.80-89. The author believes that the Soviet model was also in force in Romania. 201 Bacon, op. cit. p.175 182 Alexiev, on the other hand, holds the opposite opinion, believing that the degree of autonomy of the military was much greater. He contends that certain structural changes in the established relations with the party imply that the military were almost on a par with the politi al leade ship. The Central Political Ad i ist atio he ites a t aditio al od th ough hi h the Party supervised the military, was abolished in 1964 and replaced by the Supreme Political Council that came under the Defence Council, which was not a party body and not under the Central Committee of the Party. In the other member-states of the Warsaw Pact the Central Political Administration comes under the Central Committee of the Party while a number of military men – such as the commanders of various branches, the Minister of Defence et. al. – were ex officio e e s of the “up e e Politi al Cou il 202. One can thus conclude that the military played a more significant part in the decisions on defence matters than Kolkowitz but also Bacon believes. A othe fa t that o fi s Ale ie s thesis is the reorganisation of the Ministry of the Interior and the secret police. The Ministry of the Interior came under the competence of the Security Council and the secret police was accountable to the Central Committee of the party and to the High Command of the Armed Forces. This arrangement was without precedent among the Warsaw Pact members. On top of that, as of 1972, the Ministry of Ale Ale ie , Pa t - Military relations in Eastern Europe: the case of ‘o a ia . ACI“ Wo ki g Pape No , Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979, p.21. Alexiev hints here at the mistake of Kolkowitz who believed that the Romanian Supreme Political Council was controlled by the Central Committee of the Party while, as he maintains – it came under the Defence Council. 202 183 National Defence was granted increased powers in the fields of political indoctrination. The doctrine of territorial defence, similar to the Yugoslav one as it developed after 1968, combined the cooperation of professional army units with conscript detachments which, however, were all under the control of the Ministry of National Defence. Assigning officers to command units that included both civilians and military, was indeed a Romanian novelty that showed what a special place the a ed fo es held i the ou t s s ste . The high price the military paid, however, for the relative autonomy they enjoyed in Romania took various forms. For one thing their remuneration did not differ substantially from that of the civil servants so that the habitual system of bribing officers into total su issio to the pa t s o a ds did ot appl i the ase of Romania. On the other hand, the army was assigned agricultural duties, as well as work on public works, a fact that – as some within its ranks believed – was belittling its professional dignity and competence. On top of all this the defence expenditures were low a d the o solete e uip e t u de i ed the soldie s o ale. Information about the role of the army in the overthrow of Ceaușes u is fragmentary. More was leaked about the notorious “e u itate , the I te al “e u it A elie ed to have exceeded thirty thousand men. This select body, created by Ceaușes u, ensured for those manning it the highest salaries and was organised into seven brigades with modern equipment, helicopters and trained parachutists. In this army corps conscripts served for 16 months (students 8-9 months) under a system of extended reservist obligations. Their uniform differed from that of the army but most of the time they went around in their civilian clothes. As it became clear, their main mission was to suppress rebellions. 184 Albania Of all the Balkan countries Albania is, because of its long self-isolation, the least well known especially in a field as covert as the relations between the military and the political authorities. We can, however, sketch a general picture based on a feature encountered, to a lesser extent, in the case of Yugoslavia: The political system of the country emerged from resistance groups combining the party political leadership with the partisan-military o e. I this a , the ou t s a as eated the politi al leadership of the self-same party that organised the guerrilla forces on the model of the Yugoslav Partisans. After the breakdown in relations between Tito and Stalin in 1948, Albania joined the Soviet camp and its army was organised and equipped by the Soviets. The tradition of guerrilla units operating – according to standard communist practice – under dual leadership (military and political) was carried over to the regular army, when this was created, by merging the two identities. The amalgamation of the military and the political command structure was facilitated by the fact that at the congress of the Albanian Labour Party of 1948 five out of the nine members of the Politburo had the grade of general, two had considerable military activity during their life and one was a o issa . O l o e e e of this od did ot ha e a military or political involvement with the guerrilla movement. Also the twelve members of the Central Committee that were not 185 members of the Politburo had in one way or another some involvement in the military operations during the occupation.203 In this way, the military were not led to feel that the fruits of their labour had been usurped by battle-shy civilians, while, on the other hand, they had plenty of time and opportunity to adapt gradually to the requirements of their new political role. Predictably the internal conflicts, after the break with Tito in 1948 and with the Soviet Union in 1961, did affect the normal functioning of the armed forces but any confrontations that did happen were never between groups that were purely military on the one side and purely political on the other. Political leaders appearing in public wearing uniforms and the allocation of military grades to civilians were factors that did strengthen the identification of the military with the civilians, always of course, under the vigilant eye of the party. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 pushed Albania out of the Warsaw Pact for good. Like the Yugoslavs, the Al a ia s adopted the eafte the do t i e of the people s a that required the widest possible mobilisation and preparedness of the ou t s ese es so as to discourage (along the Chinese model) the enemy invasion. However, the decision of Enver Hoxha to fill the country up with machine-gun stations built in concrete that would serve as foci for resistance in case Albania was invaded created the paradox of an immobilised guerrilla army, a fact that raised objections within the military leadership. Such objections led to the purges of 1974 with the Minister of Defence, General Bahir Pete P ifti, A ed Fo es a d “o iet i Al a ia i Willia Gutte idge (ed.) Political Military Systems: The Socialist States. London, 1990, p.191192 203 186 Baluhu as their main victim. In 1981, Hoxha executed Mehmet Shehu, Defence Minister since 1974, architect of the military su ess of the Al a ia gue illa fo es a d Ho ha s ost p o a le successor as leader of the Communist Party and Albania. It is not known whether the accusations against Shehu for seditious activities were true or not, but it is certain that the military were worried about the impact that the international isolation of Albania ight ha e o the defe e apa ilit of the ou t . Ho ha s effo t to keep the armed forces under his personal control strengthened the ole of “igou i i , the se et poli e, hi h as a ou ta le to him personally. The paramilitary role of this five-thousand-strong body and the tailing of the leaders of the armed forces generated the reaction of the army professionals.204 Since the death of Hoxha in 1985 and the ascent to power of Ramiz Alia, the armed forces acquired a stronger voice in the decision-making process. The reduction in military expenditures, the state of utter neglect that the military equipment displayed in Albania ever since Hoxha broke relations with China, strengthened the discontent and therefore the realisation on the part of the officers of how special their professional status really was.205 Having dealt with every Balkan case separately, we can now attempt some generalisations that do not only refer to the countries of South East Europe but also to the members of the Warsaw Pact in general. Regarding the control exercised by the political leadership on the military, two are the main methods adopted by the eastern Ma o Mili oje ić, The Al a ia People s A , Armed Forces. Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1987, p.164-165. 205 Ni holas “ta ou Al a ia i Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987, pp.264-265. 204 187 ou t ies: Politi al supe isio a d so ialisatio a d g a ti g of benefits and incentives. The first category comprises the military joining the party as a prerequisite for their promotion to the higher grades (this applied to the 98% of the offi e s of the People s Democracy of Germany and 85% of Poland and Bulgaria). The activities of the military were also supervised and regulated by a spe ial depa t e t of the pa t s Ce t al Co ittee so that o serious military issue ever escaped from the control of the party leadership. The time devoted to the ideological indoctrination of the conscripts varied between 20% and 30% of the duration of their training as a whole. For the officers the time devoted to their politi al so ialisatio as ua titatively and qualitatively 206 superior. However, the ideal of socialist internationalism that pervaded the Soviet model but also the further education of highgrade officers in Soviet military academies were often (with the exception of Bulgaria) incompatible with the growing nationalism in the eastern countries and with a history full of conflicts with Russia/Soviet Union. It was thus that twenty years of indoctrination on the basis of the Soviet model did not avert the development of nationalism within the ranks of the Romanian and the Polish officers. Political control is best implemented when combined with motives improving the professional and social status of the military. In most Warsaw Pact countries their salaries were significantly higher than those of the civilians. In Bulgaria the remuneration of the military – if all the various benefits are taken into account – guaranteed them a standard of living 50-70% higher than that of Ma k N. K a e , Ci il Military Relations in the Warsaw Pact: The Easte Eu opea Co po e t , International Affairs, winter 1984-85, vol. 61, issue no 1, p.47-50. 206 188 civil servants. Also the prestige of the profession, although differing from one country to another, was on the whole high so that a military career did indeed offer the offspring of agrarian families an avenue of social advancement related to their joining the party machinery.207 As we have already mentioned, the issue that mostly challenged the relationship between the state and the military concerned the rekindled nationalisms in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. From the 50s, a period of absolute party control when Stalinism prevailed in the metropolis, until the 60s when gradually military professionalism and national particularities started to become stronger in each country, the supra-national ideal of party orthodoxy suffered serious damage.208 Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Tito established a Republic and province-based territorial defence system (TO) with local commanders in charge. In the 1980s, the JNA attempted to dominate the territorial defence units and when the war began, the central command sought to disarm them as it had done in the aftermath of the 1981 upheaval with the Kosovo TO. After the half-hearted attempt of the JNA to prevent Slo e ia s se essio , the a s depe de e o “e ia fo its suste a e a d ideological orientation, increased. By the summer of 1991 nonSerbs were retired and officers not entirely dedicated to the integrity of Yugoslavia, resigned. Furthermore the Socialist mantle of Miloše ić appealed to the traditionalists in the JNA. Gradually it became impossible for the military to mediate between the warring 207 Op. cit. p.51-53 Ale Ale ie , Pa t Milita ‘elatio s i Easte Eu ope Op. it. p. . See also Jonathan Eyal (ed.), The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans, London: Macmillan 1989. 208 189 Republics and broker a new decentralised Yugoslavia. Far from attempting to play such a role the JNA in fact became an instrument in Miloše ić s poli .209 After April 1992, the Army of Yugoslavia (Vojska Jugoslavije – VJ) replaced the JNA and became the army of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro). Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia Herzegovina created their own national armies out of scratch. In the post-communist Balkans no military had the opportunity of asserting its role in politics more than the Yugoslav People s Army (JNA). Given its primary mission of keeping Yugoslavia united, the armed forces sided with the champion of Yugoslav integrity initially and then with the aggrandisement of Serbia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the ethnic strife of 1992-95 was responsible for the formation of ethnic armies and warlord-led gangs and not a unified force. Successor regimes of communist Yugoslavia however rely on fou o ple e ta p i iples to bring about and maintain civilian control over the military: depoliticisation, departisation, democratisation and professionalisation210 . New controls have therefore been imposed on the military under democracy. Future developments will test the viability of these measures. 209 Flo ia Bie e , the ‘ole of the Yugosla ia People s A i the Dissolution of Yugosla ia. The A ithout a “tate? in Leonard J. Cohen & Jasna D ago ić–Soso (eds.) State Collapse in South – East Europe. New Perspe ti es o ζugosla ia s Disi tegratio , Purdue Un.Press, 2008, pp.301-322. 210 Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds.) Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet & Yugoslav Successor States, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p.263. 190 Chapter 4: Western Amateurs and the End of History The Balkans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have attracted western amateurs of great variety. Some offered their life-long devotion to the subjects of their affection, as did Edith Durham to the Albanians (High Albania, 1909), or Rebecca West to the Serbs (Black Lamb and the Grey Falcon. A Journey Through Yugoslavia, 1941). Others unleashed creatures of darkness in the Balkan habitat as did Bram Stoker with his famous Dracula and Eric Ambler with The Mask of Dimitrios. Another category of amateurs impressed an unsuspecting readership with much sound and fur disguised as histo . ‘o e t Kapla s Balkan Ghosts even penetrated the inner sanctum of the White House.211 The case of the Princeton-based scholar of antiquity, Eugene Borza, is more complicated. In his own Balkan past he partook in the local sport of appropriating the distant past or de i g it to o e s eth i i als. His ief e u sio i to ode history is both sly and innocent i.e sly in intent but innocent of the ode te ai . Bo za as stu ed (p.251) by the discovery of a gravestone in the Baldwin cemetery of Steelton Pennsylvania, 211 For an imaginative analysis of double standards (especially those of Brailsford, Seton - Watson and the resourceful Robert Kaplan), see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans. 118-119 (Oxford, 1997) Also Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania. The Imperialism of the Imagination, Yale University Press, 1998. For western perceptions of the entire eastern Europe see, Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford Univ. Press, 1994. Wolff points out that the Balka s e e al a s a i teg al pa t of the E lighte e t s view of Eastern Europe. Their recent exclusion is really the doing of amateurs and this constitutes the hallmark of their adverse influence on western public opinion. 191 des i i g its i ha ita t as a Ma edo . This, he concluded, was clear evidence of ethnogenesis. Had he visited other immigrant communities in the North Eastern United States he would have discovered a plethora of Macedonian (Greek, Bulgarian or Albanian), Peloponnesian, Cretan etc., appellations signifying local, rather than ethnic origin. Such designations of clubs, newspapers and tombstones since the early twentieth century abound throughout the habitat of immigrants with a strong attachment to their local origin.212 Former US Deputy Secretary of “tate, “t o e Tal ot s a ti le Self – Determination in an Interdependent World 213 is i di ati e of ho o e s fo eig policy can lead to unexpected developments when the diagnosis of the ailment is based on questionable p e ises. M Tal ot s atte pt to apply the concept of self – determination in a way that is conducive to integration and ot to disi teg atio succeeded in producing the opposite outcome. Even after the events of 1999, he believed that his ad i ist atio as t i g to remake the politics of the region without, this time, having to redraw the map, without splitting up large, repressive, or failed states into small, fractious mini-states that are neither econo i all o politi all ia le . A quick look at the Weste Balka s o fi s M . Tal ot s o st fea s.214 His view of Bosnia is that this ou t has t ied to give all citizens reason to feel that they belong to a single state – not so much a nation state, as a multi-ethnic federal state. There is reason for cautious Euge e N. Bo za, Ma edo ia ‘edu , in Frances B. Titchner and Richard F. Moorton, Jr, The Eye Expanded , University of California Press, 1999, pp.249-266. 213 Foreign Policy (spring 2000), pp.152-163. 214 Ibid, p.155 212 192 opti is a out ea hi g this goal 215, yet Bosnia after all these years remains segregated. On Kosovo he i sists that the Kosovars have historically wanted – and under Yugoslav President, Josip Broz, Tito enjoyed – a high degree of autonomy. Then, under President Slobodan Miloše ić, they suffered a decade of Serbian oppression and more than a year of ethnic cleansing. Now they want more than just self-determination. They want total i depe de e .216 However, the history of the Albanian Kosovars since they found themselves unwillingly in the Kingdom of Serbia does ot o fo ith M . Tal ot s ie that thei optio for independence is the exclusive outcome of Miloše ić s repression. The fact that the unification of Kosovo with Albania during the Second World War was well received by the Albanian population and the subsequent uprisings of the Albanian element agai st Tito s a a ge e ts, def M . Tal ot s i te p etatio . His assessment that autonomy was still an option for the Kosovars within a larger democratic, federalised, ultieth i state 217, if Serbia becomes democratic, is wide off the mark as subsequent developments proved. A democratic regime could have materialised long ago in Serbia if the Kosovar Albanians had chosen to throw their full electoral weight against Miloše ić. Instead, they chose to abstain, so as to avoid legitimising a state they did not want to be part of. Some, according to rumours, even secretly voted for Miloše ić to precipitate the breakdown that would lead to their independence. 215 Ibid. Ibid, p.156 217 Ibid. 216 193 M Tal ot s line was shared by many western commentators. Most refused to come to terms with a reality of warring ethnic nationalisms that resist reconciliation through democratic symbiosis. Western officials pay lip service to the goal of acculturating multi-ethnic states to the ways of the free market economy and multicultural co-existence without explaining how this will come to pass. According to former US Ambassador to Yugosla ia, Wa e )i e a , If the world is to support the idea of multi-ethnicity as an organising p i iple fo states… the it will have to do more to ensure the protection of minorities within multi-ethnic states. 218 M Tal ot s a t a was repeated by the authors of Winning Ugly. The fa t that Koso o s Al a ia s a e o effe ti el in charge of the province – and that they should remain in control of at least most of it, whether through autonomy within Serbia, or eventual independence – has nothing to do with original claims to the land. It has instead to do with the treatment of the Kosovar Albanians by Slobodan Miloše ić and his fellow Serb nationalists in recent times .219 The overlapping and conflicting irredentisms of Serbs and Albanians have everything to do with the state of affairs in Kosovo. To say that latter-day nationalists in Serbia bear the sole responsibility for current developments is like saying that the Franco-German rivalry was invented by Hitler. 218 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 1999, p.239 219 I o H. Daalde a d Mi hael E. O Ha lo , Wi i g Ugly. ΠATO s War to Save Kosovo, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 8. For an objective account of Serbian-Albanian relations see, Steven K. Pavlowitch, Serbia. The History Behind the Name, London: Hurst & Co, 2002, p. 97, 140, 146,47. 194 A brief review of Balkan developments may be necessary to pla e this autho s p e ises i pe spe ti e. The Balkans220 have never constituted a regional continuum, except during the centuries of Ottoman rule that gave them their name. In ethnic and cultural terms they have been as diverse as any geographic region of Europe be it Western, Northern, Southern or Central. In ethnic and linguistic terms, Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia are similar, while FYROM and Bulgaria share common linguistic and cultural legacies. Although Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and FYROM have Christian Orthodox majorities, this has not prevented them from fighting in opposite camps. The Muslim elements in Bosnia, Albania, Serbia and FYROM have not cooperated in the past, e ept as eth i Al a ia s. Ha i g e ai ed outside Eu ope s mainstream for centuries, Balkan societies failed to synchronise their development with the state-building processes of Western Europe.221 The disparate record of emerging Balkan states in attaining independence throughout the nineteenth and even as late as the twentieth century and their intermittent efforts at constructing administrative and parliamentary institutions, were never free of European politics. Their irredentist wars against Ottoman rule and the resultant borders were supervised on many, if not all, occasions, by foreign patrons and regulated by the principles that governed relations among European nation states. If the First World War restructured the boundaries of the Balkans and afforded a period of relative freedom from Great Power 220 The term here includes Yugoslavia (and its successor states), Albania, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. 221 T. Veremis, Action Without Foresight, ELIAMEP, 2002. 195 involvement, the communist era that followed the Second World War imposed Soviet influence and impeded Balkan development along western lines.222 Of the states and institutions outside the region of South Eastern Europe, the European Union wielded initially the greatest influence. From its early support of the unity of Yugoslavia as a precondition for any future application to join the EU decided in the Brussels at the EPS meeting of the twelve Foreign Ministers on 16-17 December 1991, the EU performed an about face. Within half a year the EC had moved from a unified position on the maintenance of the Yugoslav state, to a common but harshly discordant policy of inviting those republics seeking independence to submit applications and u de go the p o edu e ide tified .223 This de isio as p o pted Ge a s i siste e o the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, which initiated a trend that could not be confined to the two Republics. To start with, Washington encouraged Serbian reluctance to abandon Yugoslav unity. However, in his July 1991 visit to Yugoslavia, Secretary of State James Baker stated that his government would not object to a peaceful process leading to independence of the various Republics, however unlikely that was. By the spring of 1992, the US had cast its lot in favour of the recognition of the Republics. Politicians and diplomats, well-versed in regional politics and irredentist strife, warned the EU of the violence that a break222 For a thorough analysis of the subject see, R.J. Crampton, The Balkans Since the Second World War, New York: Longman, 2002. 223 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, London: Hurst, 1997, pp.63-64. 196 up of Yugoslavia would unleash. Their prediction was that recognition of secessionist unitary states, in which preponderant ethnic forces held sway over their own minorities, would provoke a chain reaction until, eventually, the process of disintegration would lead to a plethora of ethnically pure but unworkable neighbouring entities. In a conference on Balkan developments, jointly sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Centre and the Südosteuropa – Gesellschaft in Potsdam (23 -26 June 1992), this author expressed his own worries over the future of the region: The most ominous development in Yugoslavia is the proliferation of weak and mutually hostile state entities in a region, which does not at the present moment, constitute a high priority for the West. In that sense the Balkans are no longer the powder keg of Europe but a decaying backwater cut off from the prospect of communication with the Western Community. The implosion of nationalist strife of Yugoslavia can still create a chain reaction of developments that would undermine the economies of adjacent states and determine the future of the Balkans as the third world of Europe.224 Since the early nineties smuggling and corruption prevailed in sizeable black market economies. Furthermore the T. Ve e is, Ei e Neudefi itio de “i he heits eha ge “udosteu opa , Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 2/33 (1993), p.141. 224 i 197 Balkans were cut off from the rest of Europe, as a result of embargoes and political decisions that directly affected their capacity for growth. The 1995 bombings by NATO put an end to Serbian advance in Bosnia. The Dayton Accord of 21 November 1995 that followed was engineered by a superpower whose timing was perfect. In the summer that preceded the bombings, the Croatian forces evicted the Serbs of Krajina, while Serbian forces cleansed most of Eastern Bosnia. The contours of an ethnically segregated Bosnia were officially settled on paper. The American success in pacifying the region may have been partly a question of good timing but it also signified the failure of the EU to produce and enforce a viable solution. Da to s su ess i f eezi g the lood o fli t ade Bosnia-Herzegovina totally dependent on the West. Although putting an end to the slaughter was a major achievement of the Accord, Bosnian institutions have since been totally supervised by outside forces. Some of its elected leaders were sacked by the High Representative when they failed to meet western standards. The three ethnically cleansed constituent elements of the state continue their segregated lives without promoting the multicultural coexistence which became the hallmark of western intervention. A USIA poll conducted in June 1996 reported that 96% of the Bosnian Serbs and 90% of the Croats believed partition to be inevitable in the future, while Bosniaks (Muslims) disagreed with this prediction.225 Dže al “okolo ić, Bosnia-He zego i a: A Matte of “u i al , in Wim van Meurs (ed.) Prospects & Risks Beyond EU Enlargement etc, Leske & Budrich, 2003 pp.163-176. For the USIA poll see, R.Tanter & J. Psarouthakis, Balancing in the Balkans, London: Macmillian Press, Ltd, 1999, p.122 225 198 For the Americans, the role of arbiter in Western Balkan affairs has been a novel experience. With succeeding administrations that consider the region an embarrassment rather than a strategic asset, the US has since tried to apply its panacea of free market and democratic institutions with little patience. In “epte e the A e i a P eside t s Natio al “e u it Adviser, Anthony Lake, redefined American strategy in the Balkans, from co tai e t to e la ge e t, by which he meant the expansion of the market for the goods and the messages of the capitalist world-e o o .226 “e ia s supe io o a d of fi epo e had ee its greatest weakness in the depiction of the Yugoslav conflict by the western media. Having committed the largest percentage of atrocities among the belligerents, Yugoslavia steadily became the main target of CNN and US attention. As a result, there was a marked change in western policy favouring the adversaries of Serbia as the weaker parts in the conflict. Naturally, the Kosovo Albanians were the weakest of all the victims. Western policy vis-à-vis Kosovo was prompted by the Bosnian precedent, and the Dayton Accord. Unlike Bosnia, however, Kosovo has been a province of Serbia since the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and a territory replete with Serbian history and religious shrines. Whereas Dayton confirmed a fait accompli in the field, Kosovo had remained under firm Serb administration, until the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) began to challenge the authority of Belgrade. Apparently the goal of the UCK was to provoke the Serb authorities into violent reprisals that would capture the 226 Traian Stoianovich, Balkan Worlds: he First and Last Europe, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.312. 199 attention of the West and compel it to act. In the cat-and-mouse game that ensued between the Serb forces and the UCK, an outside intervention could only keep them apart by committing ground troops of the SFOR type. Richard Hol ooke s a o d ith Miloše ić in October 1998 for a partial Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, was repeatedly violated by Serbian troops striving to prevent the UCK from filling the vacuum in the field. Although Miloše ić was adverse to the presence of foreign troops in what he considered to be Serbian sovereign territory, he was at the same time compelled by UCK action to launch large-scale operations that compromised Serbia internationally. Before the West came to Rambouillet, the possibility of committing an SFOR type of contingency to supervise the October 1998 agreement had not been exhausted. The participation of Russians in a force that would have ensured the orderly departure of large numbers of Serb troops and the passivity of the UCK might have been possible if the Americans had not insisted in excluding the Russians. The Holbrooke – Miloše ić agreement brought back displaced Albanians to their homes, but the absence of an enforcement mechanism exposed the agreement to contraventions by the adversaries. An accurate picture of the excesses committed between October 1998 and March 1999 when the bombing began, included in the report of the 1,300 OSCE o se e s i Koso o. The Koso o Ve ifi atio Missio , produced evidence of 496 summary executions and random killings before 24 March 1999 and 5,504 after the bombardment commenced up to the end of that undeclared war in June.227 Regardless of whether 227 Neither Tim Judah, Kosovo-War and Revenge, London: Yale University P ess, , o Daalde a d O Ha lo , Winning Ugly, mention this report: OSCE Report on Kosovo, Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen as Told, Warsaw, 1999 200 the report is damming to Serb operations, or not, the Rambouillet ultimatum was seen by Miloše ić as a iolatio of his ou t s te ito ial i teg it . NATO s de a d to e g a ted a ess to the entire FRY gave the then Federal President the opportunity to present his refusal as an act of resistance against foreign occupation.228 The bombing of the FRY by NATO devastated a centrally located Balkan state in order to rid its people of Miloše ić, to save the imperilled Kosovar Albanians and to secure multi-ethnic coexistence in an autonomous province. Instead, it succeeded in achieving the opposite on all counts. Along with Bosnia, Kosovo became an ethnically cleansed protectorate of the West.229 In the ethnic antagonisms over territory, NATO has clearly taken sides 230 while the US agenda for a multi-ethnic, multicultural Western Balkans failed dismally. Since the 19th century two basic schools of thought have emerged in international affairs, one preoccupied with the universal rights of man as a determining factor of foreign policymaking, and the other exclusively concerned with order.231 The two schools are still identified by their liberal and realist adherents. The Liberals are optimistic about human nature and make little distinction between private and public morality. They are for that 228 The accounts of the Rambouillet deliberations, especially that of Judah, leave little to be desired. Judah, Kosovo-War, p.197-226, Daalder and O Ha lo , Winning Ugly, p.84-90 229 Chris Hedges, Ad UN Organises, Rebels a e Taki g Cha ge of Koso o , The New York Times, 29 July 1999. 230 See view of Deputy Commander in Chief of US European Command, Cha les G. Bo d, Maki g Pea e ith the Guilt , Foreign Affairs, Sept/ Oct 1995, p.22-38. 231 Hu a ‘ights a d Diplo a . The Economist, April 12th 1997, p.21-25. 201 reason more easily prone to adopting double standards. The realists are pessimistic about progress in human endeavour, believe that states live by different moral standards than individuals and therefore see power, more so than principles, as the prime mover of world affairs. In US politics realism is a relatively recent import from Europe and is hardly in line with Lockean Liberalism which constitutes the basis of American political thought. Realists such as Henry Kissinger and his scepticism about the universal application of democratic principles, might occasionally appear in high offices, but will never match the popularity of American Presidents professing liberal confidence in human nature and the rule or easo . Kissi ge s Ho esia ie of hu a atu e, his histo i al erudition and his careful computation of national interest, make him perhaps the most accomplished of the anti-Lockean realists of American officialdom. With a series of articles (April 15, May 31 and June 21, 1999) Kissinger strove to salvage European history f o the ad i ist atio s o slaught. I the g a d t aditio of nineteenth-century conservative statesmen that he admires, he displayed wariness about humanitarian causes with unpredictable out o es. His iti is of M s Al ight s poli a d his solutio fo the Balkan impasse challenged mai st ea ie s o the su je t, If we try to implement the UN resolutio fo a le gth of ti e, he ote we will emerge as the permanent party to arcane and bitter Balkan quarrels. It would be far wiser to cut the Gordian knot and concede Kosovar independence as part of an overall Balkan settlement – perhaps including self-determination for each of the three ethnic groups of Bosnia. In such an arrangement, the borders of Kosovo and its neighbours should be guaranteed by NATO or the Organisation for Security and patrol both sides of these borders for 202 at least a su sta tial i te i pe iod .232 Kissi ge s ad o itio s did not prove hollow. By intervening, the US made its presence a determining factor in shaping the future of the region. The Western Balkans have become again a protectorate of the Great Powers, as they have been so often in the past. The paradox in this exceptional western involvement in a number of protectorates (Bosnia, Kosovo, FYROM) is that unlike the Cold War period, the region does not constitute a US or NATO priority. Given the scarcity of western resources allocated for the reconstruction of the region, the devastation of Yugoslav infrastructure added to the economic plight of the country.233 Western media mould the perceptions of their publics with relative ease when the issue involved has no bearing on that pu li s i ediate i te est. ‘epo ti g on the war in Yugoslavia constitutes a veritable case study of how a sordid civil war was transformed into a clash between right and wrong for the benefit of viewers who crave for simple answers to complicated questions. The good f o the ad side of the conflict was distinguished on the selectively presented evidence of atrocities committed in the field, but also on the basis of the religious and cultural affiliations of each side. Oversimplification however is not the exclusive prerogative of journalis . “a uel Hu ti gto s ie s o civilisations as a factor of the future conflicts are based on simplified paradigms or maps indispensable for human thought He Kissi ge , As the Chee s Fade , Newsweek, 21 June 1999. Ma ti “letzi ge , The Co se ue es of the Wa i Koso o , in Kosovo & NATO. Impending Challenges, Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars, East European Studies, 1999, p.3-5. 232 233 203 a d a tio (to use his own words).234 Thus the most dangerous cultural conflict are those along the fault lines between civilisations 235 and Huntington draws the line that divides the West f o the est across the former Yugoslavia leaving its Muslim and Orthodox element in the company of non-western civilisations and cultures. I Hu ti gto s s he e, G ee e s O thodo a kg ou d relegates it to the o ld of the est . It is obvious that the Harvard Professor of Government relied o Ed a d Gi o s di ie of the Eastern Roman Empire and its people in his quest for the rule of (Roman) law, which was preserved in Byzantium when it had suffered an eclipse during the dark ages in Western Europe. Norman Davies reminds us of western attitudes of the recent past: Nothing reinforced the negative image of Eastern Europe so effectively as the Cold War. For four long decades, a new [Western world] developed under American hegemony and in direct confrontation with, and in isolation from, the other side of the Iron Curtain. Two whole generations of West Europeans, basking complacently in their new-found affluence, were led to believe that they alone were the true Europeans. In common parlance, [Europe] was taken to refer exclusively to the (West European) Common Market, and the the West Eu opea U io .236 The war in Yugoslavia became the turning point in western biases towards the eastern part of the continent. Communism 234 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p.30. 235 Ibid, p.28. 236 No a Da ies, West Best, East Beast . A version of the Special Faculty Lecture presented at Examination Schools on 22 November 1996, Oxford Today, Vol. 9, No 2, Hillary issue 1997, p.31. 204 ceased to be the ove idi g fa to that sepa ated us fo the and the new elements of cultural divergence became the criteria of recognition and rejection. The change of regime in the FRY following the September 2000 elections became the most heartening development in the Western Balkans for a very long time. The US intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo not to facilitate the creation of ethnically pure microprotectorates, but multicultural democratic federations after its own image. The Americans are dedicated to multiculturalism although they remain a multi-ethnic society with a single political culture. Their virtuous undertaking in the Western Balkans foundered in this misconception and in the structural American contempt for history. When the founding fathers turned their backs to the English throne, centuries of convoluted history froze and the future was illuminated by the manifest destiny of the new nation. The end of history happened in the eighteenth century for the Americans, they expected it to occur at the twentieth century for the rest of the world. The renowned film director Emir Kusturica is a Bosnian Muslim who chose to identify with the multicultural experiment of the departed Yugoslavia. In his Underground, which won him the Pal e d O i the Ca es fil festi al, he distributes blame for the sordid end of his country equitably. Communists and meta– Communists are castigated for their greed and the director finds no mitigating circumstances for his compatriots in his grotesque but effective allegory. His newsreel presentation of the different reception afforded to the parading Nazi forces in Zagreb and Belgrade gained him no friends outside Serbia, yet Kusturica is no 205 amateur in Yugoslavian affairs. His films offer more valid information on Yugoslavia than years of western journalism.237 237 For more information drawn from cultural sources see David A. Norris, In the Wake of the Balkan Myth. Questions of Identity and Modernity, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp.154-163. 206 Part III. UNFINISHED BUSINESS Chapter 1: The Macedonian Question 1991-2010 The Macedonian question during the Cold War period was mainly the preserve of diplomats and politicians. It was a battle of words waged between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece according to the twists and turns of their foreign policies vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow. At the same time Belgrade and Skopje, the centre and the periphery of decisions made on the issue, did not always see eye to eye on it. The differences between Belgrade and Skopje over their stance on Greece are visible in the official documents of the Yugoslav archives.238 G ee e s ha dli g of the Ma edo ia uestio et ee 1991 and March 1995 constitutes a veritable case study in how diplomacy fails when it becomes captive to domestic politics. Although prior to 1990, Greek governments had promoted multilateralism in the Balkans and aspired to play a major role in the post-communist era, when the time came to reap this particular harvest Greece was caught psychologically unprepared for the great transition. Greek policy-makers were unable to realise that whereas the Macedonian question — the irredentist claim, the birth of the state and its name – were once associated ith the o ki gs of the Co i te a d late Tito s Yugosla ia, this 238 Society for Macedonian Studies, The Macedonian Issue in Foreign Archives. Classified Documents from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (1950-1967), Athens, 2008. had ceased to be the case in western perceptions as of 1990. Since a revival of communism in South East Europe appeared unlikely, all that the West required of the Balkan prodigal sons was a declaration of loyalty to liberal principles and the market economy. Thus, Greece gradually isolated itself from its northern neighbours while its credibility with its European Union partners declined. After the collapse of the communist regimes in South East Europe, Greece became the obvious candidate for the role of shepherding the wayward states into the western fold. For fifteen years before the collapse, the Karamanlis and Papandreou administrations had systematically cultivated the notion of multilateralism in the region. In spite of Bulgarian, Turkish, Albanian and, to a lesser degree, Yugoslav objections and inhibitions, Greece made important headway in establishing multilateral relations and co-operation in the Balkans. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia on 25 and 26 June 1991 respectively. On 8 September 1991 a plebiscite was held in what used to be the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) favouring independent statehood. G ee e s te s fo e og ising the new state were (1) that it should not insist on being a ed The ‘epu li of Ma edo ia , that it should e ou e its territorial claims, and (3) that it should withdraw its allegation that a Macedonian ethnic minority existed in Greece. These terms were included in the decision of the EU meeting of Foreign Ministers of 16 December 1991 that led to the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. A paragraph was attached to the decision that restricted recognition to Republics that harboured no territorial claims on a neighbouring 208 state and that would desist from the use of hostile propaganda or assuming a name that implied irredentist designs.239 The exclusion of the SRM from the initial group of recognised states was the result of a deal between the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and his Greek counterpart, Antonis Samaras. Eager to secure recognition for Croatia and Slovenia, the German Foreign Minister gave up temporarily on the recognition of the SRM. Concerned that the post-Maastricht European political co-operation would not be disrupted over the future of the secessionist states, the other EU members reluctantly followed suit. The Greek Foreign Minister agreed to fall into line after making sure that the Germans would drop the recognition of SRM from their agenda. Samaras thus sacrificed a principled objection to recognition of the Republics, for the sake of what proved to be a temporary reprieve. Up to that point, Greece had expressed a legitimate objection to recognitions without conditions or alternatives that would preserve in every case the integrity of ethnic groups. Giving up those objections was G ee e s first mistake. The second was to assume that the EU members would not budge from denying the SRM recognition until a negotiated solution was worked out between Athens and Skopje. However, far from being inclined to investigate the possibilities of a negotiated solution, Samaras eventually made it impossible for any Greek politician to touch the issue without burning his fingers. His third mistake was to agree to demote the dispute from a political to a legal level by recognising the competence of the Badinter “p os E o o ides, The Balka Age da: “e u it a d ‘egio alism in the New Europe , London Defence Studies, no. 10, 1993, pp. 24-5. See also Balka Natio s Pledge Coope atio , International Herald Tribune, 26 October, 1990. 239 209 Commission to set the qualifications for the recognition of the Republics. The fourth mistake was the collective decision of 18 February reached by the Greek political leaders (with the exception of Mrs Papariga of the Communist Party of Greece) at their meeting summoned by the President of the Republic, according to hi h o use of the te Ma edo ia i the appellatio of the newly independent state would be recognised by Greece. This fateful decision set a maximalist bargaining condition from which there appeared to be no obvious way out. One day before this decision, the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Lisbon under the Portuguese Presidency produced a ediatio pla k o as the Pi ei o pa kage , hi h, a o g other confidence-building measures, allegedly included the name Ne Ma edo ia fo the state i uestio .240 The Pi ei o pa kage was rejected by both sides, but the Lisbon meeting had been G ee e s est o e t fo a egotiated solutio . F o the e o conditions for a solution deteriorated to the detriment of both parties. Greece had lost an opportunity to disentangle itself from the dispute a d pla its Balka ole, a d The Fo e Yugosla ‘epu li of Ma edo ia FY‘OM fo feited its ai oute to economic development, which passes through Greece. Although at the 13 July Lisbon summit, the EU members e e still of o e i d i upholdi g G ee e s te s, this as i fa t the last stand of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy. A year of problems after Maastricht eventually took its toll on 240In an interview published in Eleftherotypia, 5 July 1993, Mr Pineiro placed the responsibility for the failure of that initiative that bore his name on Samaras. 210 European political cooperation. At the summit meeting in Edinburgh on 12 December 1992, Michalis Papaconstantinou, Fo eig Mi iste si e August, th eate ed G ee e s ithd a al from a common EU declaration on Yugoslavia if the summit did not confirm its solidarity with the Lisbon decision.241 The Minister, an advocate of a common stand on Yugoslavia, did so reluctantly, but the feeling was widespread that the bonds of political cooperation had been loosened and EU members could therefore act as free agents in the UN or the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The second half of 1992 was replete with scenarios of a Balkan Armageddon . The region suddenly became the stalking ground of enthusiastic amateurs and the mass media. Greece was seen by none other than the US Assistant Secretary of State, Strobe Tal ott, as o eti g FY‘OM s te ito , a d “kopje as the i thpla e and centre of activities of Alexander the Great. By the end of the year it was difficult to salvage truth from the massive assault of the media.242 The historian, Evangelos Kofos, composed two lists to reveal the constituent elements of the official position on the Macedonian question as opposed to the new popular perception of it.243 The t aditio al perspective, which in many ways Michalis Papaconstantinou, ο ο ό ιο ός ο ι ι ού. ο ή ο ί (The diary of a politician. The Skopje entanglement), Athens 1994, pp .222—33. 242 Strobe Talbott, Time, 12 October 199 . “ee also Ga Bass, “ i g Kids , The New Republic, 5 April 1993. 243 E. Kofos, H ό α ια ιαφο ά ς ο ο ασίας (The pending issue concerning the difference over the name. The Greek point of view) In the work by E. Kofos and Vlassis Vlassidis (editor), Αθή α – ό ια. 241 211 o espo ded to offi ial dis ou se, as it had ee fo the Second World War: ulated si e (i) Considered that the geographical region of Macedonia extended northwards as far as the Shar and Pirin Mountains and, apart from Greek Macedonia, i luded Yugosla Va da Ma edo ia a d the Blagoe g ad p o i e of Bulga ia Pi i Ma edo ia ; ii A epted the a e “o ialist ‘epu li of Ma edo ia (SRM), as designating the southernmost Federated Republic of Yugoslavia; iii Used the ou “la Ma edo ia s a d the adje ti e “la Ma edo ia , oth i G eek a d, espe iall , i fo eig language communications, thus distinguishing between the Greek Macedonians and the Slav inhabitants of, or migrants from, the wider Macedonian region, in order to prevent the Slavs from monopolising the term; (iv) Appeared to endorse the view that the Slavs, inhabiting the wider Macedonian region during and after the end of the Otto a pe iod, e e eth i Bulga ia s athe tha eth i Ma edo ia s ; (v) Accepted that no other region than the lands o p isi g the Ma edo ia ki gdo i Ki g Philip s ti e th e tu BC e e e titled to e o side ed as Ma edo ia , hi h meant mainly present-day Greek Macedonia and a narrow strip of Southern FYROM; ά ο σ βίσ σ -2002 (Athens – Skopje. The seven year cohabitation 1985-2002) Athens: Papazissis, 2003, p.161. 212 (vi) Recognised the Hellenic origin and language of the a ie t Ma edo ia s; ii ‘eje ted the e iste e of a Ma edo ia i o it , Ma edo ia la guage, o Ma edo ia atio , although it as not quite clear whether such references related to the concepts of i o it , la guage , a d atio , athe tha to thei ide tifi atio as Ma edo ia . With the proclamation of the independence of a Macedonian state in 1991 public perceptions in Greece of the Macedonian problem began to diverge on fundamental key points from the decades-old t aditio al o offi ial positio . O e is st u k by how rapidly the newly minted theories were accepted by a wide seg e t of pu li opi io a d ho the eighed upo the offi ial discourse. Point for point, as in the previous list, the new views: (i) Identified the geographical and historical region of Ma edo ia al ost e lusi el ith the p ese t G eek Ma edo ia region; (ii) Contested, with certain minor exceptions, the view that areas north of the Greek border had ever been Macedonian until su h ti e as, fo its o politi al a d e pa sio ist pu poses, Tito s communist regime assigned the Macedonian name to its southernmost Federated Republic. Therefore, only the Greek part of the geographical region could lay a legitimate claim to being truly Macedonian. For the partisans of this line, any reference to th ee Ma edo ias as pu el a d si pl a t ea he ous a t; iii ‘eje ted the te “la Ma edo ia s a d its derivatives, as it linked the Slavs with the Macedonian name; 213 (iv) Viewed the newly independent state north of the G eek o de as a o st u t , a statelet usi g also othe su h dispa agi g te s , hi h should e efe ed to e el as “kopje . B e te sio , all the state s de i ati es should e ased o this state appellatio , su h as “kopja s ; “kopja Chu h , e e the “kopja uestio ο ο ια ό, to Skopiano ). (v) The only points on which the two approaches, t aditio al a d e isio ist see ed to o e ge e e the Helle i identity of the ancient Macedonians and the denial of the existence of a Ma edo ia i o it i G ee e.244 The promotion of such novel perceptions by public groups led to the adoptio of the popula sloga , No to the a e of Ma edo ia o its de i ati es! as the offi ial G eek doctrine in handling the name issue with FYROM. As a result, the cultural aspect took precedence over purely political arguments, which had at their core issues of se u it . The subsequent development of the issue is well known. Through the provisional solutio of FY‘OM as the a e to e used at the UN (1993), we arrived at the Interim Agreement (1995), bypassing the question of the name. To fully appreciate the provisions of the agreement, we must first compare it with two previous draft texts: the March 1992, the EU-spo so ed Pi eiro pa kage, a d the Va e-Owen UN plan of January 1993. Going back to the diplomatic handling of the issue one must assess the personality of the Foreign Minister, Michalis Papaconstantinou. As an old hand belonging to the centre of the political spectrum, he was a deputy and native of Kozani who had 244 Op.cit.p.161-163 214 written widely on Greek Macedonia and was therefore ideally suited to ha dle G ee e s poli at a diffi ult ju tu e. A ope minded individual with a congenial personality, Papaconstantinou sought to est u tu e the ou se of G ee e s Ma edo ia argumentation. Instead of harping on his count s histo i al ights , the e Fo eig Mi iste i sisted that the fo e Yugosla republic would have to give up its irredentism before it was granted recognition by the EU and the international community. With some delay, Greek policy-makers were beginning to realise that the world was concerned with stabilisation in the region rather than being given lessons in history. In January 1993, the three EU members of the Security Council of the United Nations, Britain, France and Spain, tabled a plan of confidence-building measures between Athens and Skopje, and proposed the accession of the state to the UN ith the te po a a e, The Fo mer Yugoslav Republic of Ma edo ia FY‘OM . Papa o sta ti ou s o hest atio of G ee e s performance in the UN General Assembly in January 1993 was a significant break with the recent past. The Greek Memorandum o e i g the appli atio of The Fo e Yugoslav Republic of Ma edo ia fo ad issio to the UN, su itted to the “e eta Ge e al o Ja ua , o stituted a sig ifi a t ha ge i G ee e s fo eig poli p ofile. A gui g that the appli a t should ot e admitted to the UN prior to a settlement of certain outstanding issues e essa fo safegua di g pea e a d sta ilit 245, Greece efe ed the Asse l to the uestio of the a e du i g Tito s initial years in power. The linkage of the current nationalist claims of FYROM with its communist past brought the debate closer to the 245 Memorandum of Greece, New York, 25 January 1993, ELIAMEP. 215 heart of European concerns, i.e. that regional stability should not be further endangered. After tortuous negotiations and discussions, the plan of the three EU members for the accession of FYROM to the UN was accepted by Ki o Gligo o s go e e to Ma h .246 The UN assumed the mediation between Athens and Skopje, and New York became the locus of the new initiative. On 14 May a draft of an International Treaty between Greece and FYROM, proposed by Cyrus Vance in his capacity as representative of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Yugoslavia and by Lord Owen, was handed to the two parties after long deliberations. The draft consisted of six chapters, the first of hi h, deali g ith F ie dl ‘elatio s a d Confidence Building Measu es as the o e, hi h att a ted ge e al atte tio . The wording had probably been accepted by Greece and FYROM, and i luded No a Makedo ija as the si gle pe a e t a e fo that state. It was on the proposed name (article 5, Chapter I of the draft) that Gligorov expressed his disagreement in his letter to Vance and Owen (29 May 1993). Not unlike Mitsotakis, Gligorov was preoccupied with the political cost of adopting a compound name that would also entail a revision of the constitution. On most other aspects of the draft treaty, the two sides appeared to have been in agreement. The Gligorov objection notwithstanding, considerable progress was made towards a negotiated solution. At that juncture Samaras, who had resigned from the ruling New Michalis Papaconstantinou. ο ο ό ιο ός ο ι ι ού. ο ή ο ί (The diary of a politician. The Skopje entanglement), Athens 1994, p. 337—8. 246 216 Democracy party, declared his intension to mobilise his supporters in parliament and bring the government down if Mitsotakis agreed to a a e that ould i lude the te Ma edo ia 247. The Prime Minister tried on several occasions to evade the politi al ost that the Ma edo ia a e i u ed. He the efo e experimented with double names – one under which that state would be recognised and another to be used by the state itself. Faced with the Samaras ultimatum, Mitsotakis dropped the Papaconstantinou p oje t a d follo ed Gligo o s lead eje ti g a No a Makedo ija o p o ise a d e i i g the “la Ma edo ia appellatio that had al ead ee rejected by Skopje. Mitsotakis tactical retreat averted only temporarily his go e e t s fall. O “eptember two deputies u de “a a as orders defected from New Democracy and obliged Mitsotakis to call ele tio s i O to e . “a a as pretext this time was not the Ma edo ia issue ut the G eek e o o . The campaign for the 10 October elections focused on economic questions and virtually excluded any serious reference to foreign policy issues. PASOK won a resounding 47 per cent of the vote and New Democracy, with its 39.5 per cent, paid the price for its tough – though necessary – austerity policy. The relative silence o the Ma edo ia uestio o stituted p oof of a ta it ag ee e t et ee the ajo pa ties that G ee e s optio s e e limited in this field. The fi st fi e o ths of PA“OK s fo eig poli age da were dominated by a revival of the old Greece-America relationship that had been overshadowed in the post-ju ta ea s G ee e s 247 Ibid., p. 405 217 membership of the European Community. Disappointment with EU, failure to create a common foreign and security policy after Maast i ht, a d Papa d eou s elief that the US would be willing to put p essu e o Gligo o i e ha ge fo G ee e s ju io partnership in the stabilisation of the Balkans were the premises on which the new Greek policy was based. Although the difficulties in pursuing this policy were evident, PASOK faced no opposition from either New Democracy or “a a as. O the o t a , he G ee e s EU pa t e s ega to recognise FYROM one after another (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark), PASOK felt that its American choice had been vindicated. By the end of 1993 it had become increasingly obvious that the battle over a name that would not include the term Ma edo ia had ee lost i the estern arena. From the onset of his term Papandreou decided to rid himself of New De o a s foreign policy inheritance by discontinuing the bilateral discussions with FYROM that had after all produced some confidence-building measures in May. At the start of 1994, Papandreou chose to introduce an altogether new factor into the Macedonia de ate. The US recognition of FYROM in February convinced Papandreou that multilateralism had failed because Greece had been isolated by most of its western allies. A return to bilateral means of reaching an agreement would perhaps allow Greece to use its own advantages in the region. On 16 February the Greek Prime Minister declared his de isio to i te upt the t a spo tatio of e ha dise to a d from Skopje through the port of Thessaloniki, excluding necessary goods for humanitarian reasons, such as food a d edi i e . B doing so he hoped to raise the stakes of recognition as well as to 218 revive the interest of the UN, the EU and the US in an issue that had failed to attract international attention.248 The Greek embargo raised a storm of protest in the western mass media, but international attention was aroused and Greece felt that it had acquired an important bargaining chip in future negotiations with FYROM. Papandreou soon proposed to Gligo o a e ha ge of a tio s fo a tio s – offering to lift the embargo against erasing the ancient Macedonian star on the FY‘OM flag hi h FY‘OM efe to as a su . The e t step ould be a comprehensive package of items that would lead to a bilateral treaty not unlike the one that had been produced in the spring of 1993 in New York. Gligorov refused a step-by-step discussion of the problem, but Vance, an emissary of the UN Secretary-General, with the assistance of Preside t Cli to s spe ial e o , Matthe Nimetz, resumed the mediation that had been discontinued by Papandreou after his election. Early 1995 G ee e s positio had i e e se se e o e unenviable. Thanks to the embargo, FYROM had attracted worldwide sympathy – a sympathy that obscured the true nature of the problem and made its solution all the more remote. Instead of searching for the roots of Slav Macedonian irredentism, international attention became focused on the embargo itself. As foreign pressure mounted on Greece, Gligorov initially drifted further away from a negotiated solution. Convinced that time was on his side, he proceeded with the consolidation of his position and the internal supremacy of the Slav - Macedonians over K. Angelopoulos, H ά ως οβ η α ι ή θέση ης ά ας σ α α ά ια , G ee e s e diffi ult situatio i the Balka s Kathimerini, 20 March 1994. 248 219 the other minorities. With a little help from the EU and the US, G ee e s Ma edo ia lu de as i fa t ausi g o e da age to FYROM than anyone had realised. While G ee e s fo eig i iste improved relations with Albania and Bulgaria, FYROM reaped the harvest of its own intransigence. Having convinced the West that his vulnerable state deserved exclusive attention and sympathy, Gligorov neglected domestic priorities, which soon set him at odds with his own Albanian minority. The discontent of the Albanians in FYROM took the form of violent confrontation with the police in the winter of 1995 and especially in 2001, which led to a virtual war and the treaty of Ochrid between Slav and Albanian Macedonians249. Sixteen years later FYROM still clings to an unreformed nationalism that makes its own domestic ethnic problems intractable. Th oughout G ee e s elatio s ith its o the neighbours improved significantly. Athens and Tirana resumed relations after President Berisha released the imprisoned members of the Greek minority (the Omonia five), Bulgarian Prime Minister Videnov displayed his goodwill towards Greece, and a solution to the impasse between the latter and FYROM was pursued in earnest. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke attempted to clear the log-jam between Athens and Skopje, and Cyrus Vance offered his good services as the emissary of the UN.250 On 13 September 1995 an Interim Agreement was signed in New York by Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias, his FYROM counterpart, Stevo Tsrvenkovski, and Cyrus Vance as a 249 See below about the Ohrid agreement. S. Efstathiadis, Η αθέα η ά ης σ φω ίας α ό ια (The unseen side of the agreement with Skopje) To Vima, 17 Sept. 1995. 250 220 special envoy of the UN Secretary-General. The Agreement was seen from the outset as a temporary one, to be followed by a pe a e t settle e t of FY‘OM s a e. In the meantime Greece agreed to recognise the state and to lift the embargo in exchange for the Verghina star, or sun, to be omitted fro FY‘OM s flag. The e FY‘OM flag etai s the su as the atio al s ol, ut i its e fo this ha dl resembles the ancient insignia of the Macedonian kings. The Interim Agreement also provided for constitutional amendments that disclaimed irredentist aspirations by FYROM at the expense of G ee e. 251 The Agreement caused less controversy in Greece than ould ha e ee e pe ted i the he da of M “a a as a ti ities on the issue. Professor Krateros Ioannou and the PASOK deputy Stelios Papathemelis crossed swords as representatives of opposite views on the document252 and the parliamentary debate on the issue was an opportunity for politicians to exchange accusations for past e o s. 253 The October 1995 assassination attempt against President Gligorov in Skopje postponed discussions over the new name. By the spring of 1996, the government of Costas Simitis was p eo upied ith the Tu kish halle ges to G ee e s so e eig t i 251 For a thorough analysis of the Interim Accord of 13 September1995, see Christos Rozakis, ο ι ι ές αι ο ι ές ιασ άσ ις ς αβα ι ής σ φ ίας ς έας ό ς (Political and legal dimensions of the interim agreement in New York) Athens: Sideris, 1996, pp. 9—45. 252 Krateros Ioannou and Stelios Papathemelis, αι ή όχι σ η σ φω ία α ό ια (Yes or no to the agreement with Skopje), To Vima, 24 Sept. 1995 253 Α ι α άθ ση σω ι ής α α α ώσ ως , (A confrontation for internal consumption) Kathimerini, 7 Nov. 1995. 221 the Aegean islands, while FYROM procrastinated. Although commercial relations between Greece and FYROM are proceeding smoothly after the Interim Agreement, there are those in Greece who believe that only a final agreement on a composite name will dispel the curse of past irredentisms and will also assist the new state on the path of democracy and human rights rather than nationalistic and irredentist aspirations.254 While the media harangued Greece for its embargo on FYROM, the Greek stabilising effect in the region went unnoticed. A magnet for close to half a million economic refugees and illegal migrant workers from the former communist states, Greece has become a vital source of support for South East Europe. Furthermore, Greek businessmen have established themselves in Tirana, Sofia, Bucharest and Skopje. On 2 May, FYROM President Boris Trajkovski secured backing by US President George Bush for a plan to resolve ethnic grievances in his country through dialogue. On 3 May the Government unleashed helicopter and artillery fire against Albanian villages suspected of complicity with the rebels. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski was warned by western sources not to fall into the NLA trap by answering rebel provocations with undue iole e, a d o Ma he a ou ed that the ou t s fou main political parties had agreed to form a broader coalition that would address ethnic problems. On 13 August delegates from the Macedonian Slav majority and the Macedonian Albanian minority concluded an agreement on Ochrid which provided for significant constitutional amendments and reform improving the status of Albanians in FYROM. 254 E. Kofos, To Vima, 24 Sept. 1995 222 The pu li atio of Ki o Gligo o s e oi s shed o e light o the i te tio s of his ou t s hidde age da. Although FY‘OM s go e e ts p o oted thei i age as pea eful state builders, they have concealed from international attention schoolbooks that present this entity as a rump state and maps with the three Macedonias (Greek, Bulgarian and that of FYROM) united in one country. Gligorov makes no secret of this position: We have already achieved the freedom of one third of Macedonians, those that live in the Vardar part and have not yet addressed the question as to what happens about our brothers in the other dispersed parts of Macedonia. From this question springs a view of foremost importance, a partly freed people are not truly free. 255 Nikola Gruevski, of the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE who became Prime Minister of FYROM in 2007, has done everything in his power to vex the Greek Foreign Ministry by invoking such claims to Greek territory that were the cause of the 1946-49 civil war in Northern Greece. Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis refused to lea FY‘OM s e e ship to NATO i the Bu ha est summit meeting. After years of inertia the issue of the name has reemerged with its irredentist regalia and the nightmares of the past. There are certainly those among the Albanian leaders in FYROM who would rather pursue a path of modernisation and development within a multicultural state than submit to the atavistic calling of the irredentist sirens. Yet the rift between the youth of the two communities – Macedonian Slav and Macedonian Albanian – has grown wider. Having fought a successful campaign of public relations, former President Kiro Gligorov managed to prevail over Greek objections concerning the designation of his state. Prime Minister Gruevski however, failed to draw a useful 255 Kiro Gligorov, Memoirs, Athens: Courier, 2000, p.42 223 lesson from this success. An underdog can prove powerful when addressing the western media and their public, but official reluctance to realise the limits of this principle has become counter-productive. The popularisation of the Macedonian question in the 1990s, both in Athens and in Skopje, as opposed to the previous handling of the subject by professionals of the Greek and Yugoslav ministries respectively, made the outcome less controllable and therefore less predictable. Politicians in both states became hostages of the publics they had unwittingly stirred into action. The jack cannot return to his box and will continue to cause trouble until society itself outgrows the nationalist phase of its retarded development.256 George Kalpadakis, To α ο ι ό α ό ίο ο ς σι ής ς ώι α ο ο ι ή ίο ο (The Macedonian question from the period of silence to the early post-cold war era), Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Athens, Political Science dept. 1 July 2009. 256 224 Chapter 2: Independence for Kosovo Kosovo257 was the first entity to disturb the sleep of Yugoslavia's leadership. A carry-over of nineteenth century irrendentist nationalism258, it festered throughout the twentieth century and became the harbinger of Yugoslavia's dissolution shortly after the death of Joseph Broz Tito.259 The architect of the post-war state of the Southern Slavs, had taken special precautions. Ha i g tu ed do Koso o s de a d fo ‘epu li a status, Tito offered more autonomy, financial aid and recognition to the Albanians. The constitutional amendments of 1968 and 1971 granted Kosovo some of the prerogatives of the Republics and the status of a Socialist Autonomous Province. This process of political decentralisation crystallised in the 1974 constitution was pushed through by Tito and his Slovene deputy, Edvard Kardelj. Kosovo was recognised as a constituent element of the Yugoslav federation, was granted the right to fly the Albanian flag with the black eagle Noel Mal ol s Kosovo. A Short History, Macmillan, 1998, is an explicit case of one-sided analysis. The book enjoyed warm reception by reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement, the Economist, the New York Review of Books, etc. The sole exception was Aleksa Djilas s athi g e ie i Foreign Affairs (Sept. - Oct. 1998) in which among others he pointed out the inconsistency of Mal ol s ie s o Bos ia a d Koso o. Whe eas he as a strong advocate of restoring a unified state in Bosnia, Malcolm pleaded the cause of secession for Kosovo. 258 Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804 - 1920, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, pp. 224 227. 259 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, op. cit., pp. 94 -95. 257 225 on a red background and gained policy - making rights. Furthermore, the crash programme for economic development gave it priority over other areas (Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina). From 1971 - 1975, 70 per cent of Kosovo's budget and investments came from federal sources.260 The 1974 constitution granted Kosovo a direct voice at the federal level, principally through representation to the federal instruments of government and the state and party leaderships. The new constitution diminished Serbian control over Kosovo, and signified a process of decentralisation in the federation, which brought about a certain localism leading to friction. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was divided into ethnic segments but was not democratised. It was the arena of a bitter contest between regional groups professing a communist identity but representing above all regional and ethnic interests. Thus the 1974 constitution laid the institutional ground for the trend of ethnic division, which gradually alienated the peoples of Yugoslavia from Yugoslavism. It could be argued that the seventies are especially important in understanding, not only the subsequent break-up of Yugoslavia but also the nature of the Kosovo problem as it stands today. The most salient elements of Albanian Kosovar nationalism developed in those years. The acute economic crisis in the Yugoslavia of 1980 hit Kosovo hard as unemployment soared. The authorities responded with a massive expansion of education and the promotion of capital-intensive industries, which did little to solve the problem. By 260 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems. 1918 - 1988, London: C. Hurst & Co, 1988, p. 82. 226 1981 Pristina University had 51,000 students, the highest concentration of young people in any institution of Yugoslavia. Harsh economic conditions and the grim prospects in job opportunities for graduates prolonged the stude ts university studies and contributed to the formation of an intelligentsia embracing nationalism as an outlet for its discontent. The movement for a Federated ‘epu li of Koso o as ell as pa Al a is attracted widespread grass-root support among students and intellectuals and sparked demonstrations across Kosovo between 1968 and 1979.261 Whereas class cleavages were acknowledged by the communist doctrine, ethnic cleavages were deemed the result of a state of false consciousness by any Marxist regime. The federal state, therefore, chose to address the problem by throwing more funds at the turbulent province. It is evident that liberalisation, instead of pacifying the Albanians, strengthened their ethnic identity and resolve. It is equally evident that Serb nationalism draws upon this period to allege that the Serbs suffered hardships under Albanian rule. Serbs accused ethnic Albanians of using discrimination, intimidation and even violence between 1974 and 1989 to drive them out of the egio i o de to eate a eth i all pu e Kosovo. According to the estimates of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, the extent of emigration varied from 78,000 to 102,000 in the period 1971-1981.262 Ethnic Albanians would claim that such emigration 261 “. K. Pa lo it h, Kosovo: An analysis of Yugosla ia's Al a ia P o le , Conflict Studies, no.. 137/38, December 1982. 262 Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Demographic Studies, vol. III, ed. Miloš Ma u a, The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija, Belgrade, 1982. Although not the most reliable source, the Academy reflected the nationalism that inspired many Serb intellectuals at this time. 227 was due to the harsh economic conditions and the discomfort of the Serbs at the shift of power from the Serbian minority to the Albanian majority. Tito's death i ushe ed i the isis of Yugosla ia s loss of authority. Ethnic nationalisms were on the rise and the Serb variety was revived out of a sense of victimisation rooted in medieval history. Tito was accused of deliberately weakening Serbia by re o i g Va da Ba o i a and Montenegro from its realm and turning the former into the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and the latter into the Federated Republic of Montenegro, while Kosovo and Vojvodina were made autonomous provinces. Kosovo exploded in March and April 1981 bringing about a reversal of fortunes for Kosovo Albanians. Unrest was sparked by students in Pristina, Prizren and Produjevo, protesting over their living conditions. Tensions escalated with Albanians demanding that Kosovo be granted the status of a Federated Republic; with some even calling for union with Albania and the Albanianpopulated region of Tetovo in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The Federal Army used brutal force to establish order. The number of fatalities varied between 500 to 1000, depending on which side was doing the reporting, but the official number of those convicted for conspiracy and irredentism was 658 and on lesser charges 2000263. The event caused much soul-searching in Belgrade over the 1974 reforms. Albania was singled out as the source of irredentism and the roads of communication between Tirana and Pristina were cut. 263 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 196. 228 In the late 1985, the condition of the Serbs in Kosovo began to feature increasingly in the mainstream of Serbian public opinion. Some 200 prominent Belgrade intellectuals petitioned the Yugoslav and Serbian national assemblies in January 1986 on the plight of their brethren. By 1987, Kosovo had become the cornerstone of Serb nationalism with 60,000 Serbs signing a petition allegi g ge o ide against their kind. Slobodan Miloše ić's rise to power in the Serb Communist Party exploited the nationalist tide and put an end to Tito's multi-ethnic politics.264 On 28 June 1989 during the 500th anniversary of the Kosovo battle in 1389, Miloše ić, add essi g a o d at the field of Bla k i ds declared that war was not unthinkable thus raising this national issue to the top of his agenda. Miloše ić thus overcame the taboo of violence between former Yugoslavs. Since his advent in 1987 he had gained support among such nationalist intellectuals as Dobrica Ćosić and had secured a firm power base for an assault on the leadership of the Serbian League of Communists. His nationalist campaign to bring Kosovo under Serbian control and alter its autonomous status granted by the 1974 constitution was a harbinger for future developments.265 In March 1989, Kosovo (as well as Vojvodina) lost the authority to pass its own laws and on 5 July 1990 the Serbian parliament assumed full and direct control of the province. Ethnic 264 S. K. Pavlowitch , Serbia. The History Behind the Name, London, Hurst & Co, 2002, pp. 199-226. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books: London 1993, p.3 .Jas a D ago ić–“oso, “a iou s of the Natio . “e ia s I telle tual Oppositio a d the ‘e i al of Natio alis , London: Hurst & Co, 2002, pp. 177-195. 265 P. ‘a et, Serbia's “lo oda Milose i h: A p ofile , Foreign Policy, Research Institute, Orbis, Winter 1991, vol. 35, pp. 93 - 105, p.99. 229 Albanians reacted to this seizure by boycotting the Serbian takeover and building their own parallel set of political and social i stitutio s. Koso o s pa lia e t a d go e e t efused to e dissolved and went underground. On 7 September 1990 the Kosovo Albanian legislature met in Kačanik and approved a constitution that gave Kosovo Republican status within the Yugoslav federation. A year later (26-30 September 1991) Albanians endorsed the Kačanik constitution with a self-styled referendum and on 19 October the legislatu e et a d de la ed Koso o a so e eig a d i depe de t state . (This state was recognised by Albania on 22 October). On the 23 December, Kosovo appealed unsuccessfully to the EU for recognition and by February 1992 Albanian organisations claimed to have collected half a million signatures for a petition to the UN Commission of Human Rights protesting against the situation in Kosovo, but no action was taken by the Commission. In May 1992, Albanian Kosovars went to the polls to elect their President as well as 143 Members of Parliament. While the police prohibited voting in public places, they did not make a serious effort to stop the elections altogether and the turnout was high. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)a movement that stood for non-violent disobedience was elected, his party winning 96 out of the 143 seats 266. Tore Bogh, head of the CSCE mission to Kosovo stated, soon after the expulsion of the organisation, that the only authority recognised by E. Bi e aj, Koso o. The Balka Po de Keg Conflict Study, 250 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Feb. 1993. 266 230 ethni Al a ia s government.267 i Koso o as the pa allel Rugova The implacable Kosovo problem led to a proposition for the partition of the region 268, an idea which was repeated by the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Aleksandar Despić. In his speech to the Academy's annual assembly in July 1996, Despić warned that the higher birth rate of ethnic Albanians ea t that in twenty or thirty years (Serbia will) become a country of two nations with approxi atel e ual u e s of people . He concluded his speech with a p oposal that talks egi with those who are insisting on secession of Kosovo, about a peaceful, civilised separation and demarcation in order not to repeat the tragic experiences of recent history .269 The shape of peace in Bosnia would also determine the future of Kosovo: If Bosnia were ultimately partitioned between Croats and Serbs, the latter would adopt a similar solution for Kosovo, as part of a Serbian ethnic consolidation. But such a development would require redistributing territory and people, a process that could involve violence. The Dayton Agreement had profound implications on Koso o s politi s. The conclusions drawn from it by many Albanian Kosovars, were the following: 267 The CSCE mission was expelled from Kosovo by the Serb authorities after the expulsion of the FRY from the organisation. 268 The book by B. Kristić, Kosovo between the Historical and Ethnic Rights, Belgrade, 1995, is dis ussed Hi zi Isla i, Albanophobia and the Great “e ia I te ests , Koha, 3 May 1995, p.3 269 “hkeljze Mali i, Jettiso ed to keep ““ “e ia Afloat? , War Report, No, 43, July 1996, p.14. 231 1) The territorial spoils of the Bosnian war were validated, and 2) The i te atio al positio of fo e Yugosla ia s e te al o de s stood firm. ‘ugo a s o -violent appeal to the world community for independence proved to be futile. Adem Demaçi, a political dissident of the 1960s who spent many years in prison under the communist regime and subsequently became leader of the Human Rights Council of Kosovo , a gued that ‘ugo a s poli e el sustained the status quo while the key to a solutio of Koso o s problem was in negotiations with Belgrade. On the radical side of the political spectrum there were voices calling for violent activism. August 1996, however, held a pleasant surprise for Kosovo. Miloše ić and Rugova, agreed to end the six-year Albanian boycott of Schools. If the agreement had materialised, about 300,000 children and teachers would have returned to Kosovo's schools and 12,000 students to the University 270. The Memorandum of Understanding between the two men also signified that, both leaders recognised each other's authority, albeit unofficially. A major impediment to a solution was the reluctance of the two sides to come to the negotiating table on anything but their own terms. The Kosovo Albanians shirked from any bilateral meeting that could be interpreted as an acceptance of the Serbian regime and insisted in international mediation. The Serbian government considered this a domestic dispute and overruled the presence of any international mediator. A third party, acting as a go-between, that would not compromise either the Serbs or the Albanians, might have 270 Laura Silber, Financial Times, 3 September 1996. 232 succeeded in getting the two to the table of negotiations. A nongovernmental organisation that enjoyed the confidence of both sides could go a long way toward breaking the impasse. The role of the San Egidio community in Rome in facilitating the education agreement of 1996, is an example of how small actors can succeed in mediation where Great Powers fail.271 The break between Albanians and Serbs came to ahead in the Spring of 1998 as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made its violent entry demanding independence and rejecting any communication with the authorities. The KLA shared with Kosovo's President elect, Ibrahim Rugova, a claim to independence, but unlike him, the armed rebels were not that patient. In this respect they coincided with Miloše ić who was also unwilling to wait for Albanians to challenge Serb authority at the polls when they had attained a critical voting mass. Western preference for a solution of autonomy convinced both the KLA and Miloše ić, although from different perspectives, that they should present the world with a fait accompli. On 13 October 1998 American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, urged all NATO foreign ministers to approve the Activation Orders (ACTORDS) that would allow air strikes against Serb targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, if President of FRY, Miloše ić, failed to comply with UN Security Council decision 1199 of withdrawing his forces from the battlefield . Although there is little doubt as to who the West considered to be the villain in this conflict, there were certain Thanos Ve e is, How Mediation could help esol e the Koso o International Herald Tribune, 13 March 1998 271 isis , 233 factors that inhibited such a radical undertaking. First of all the attack directed against the forces of a sovereign state exercising (albeit in a brutal manner) authority within its territory, would create a problematic international precedent. In the case of Bosnia, the government of that state had invited the air strikes but not so in Serbia. The UN Security Council decision no doubt offered legitimacy to the act, but then scores of UN decisions in Cyprus had been ignored throughout the past twenty-four years. The humanitarian principle would have been an undisputed legitimiser if the bombing of states perpetrating atrocities against their citizens had occurred consistently against friend and foe, weak and strong, alike. The Serbian authorities (although in the wrong) were a convenient target. They had no friends in the West and they represented a weak state so that attacking them did not bear much risk for NATO. A serious factor, which inhibited western military action until March 1999, was FYROM. Christopher Hill, the, U.S. Ambassador to Skopje, who authored the various versions of the Interim Accord, was preoccupied with the impact of any forced Kosovo solution on FYROM. The e e e fea s that Koso o s independence could activate a process of fusion between its people and the western part of FYROM which is populated mostly by Albanian-Macedonians. The Kosovar Albanians nurtured a just cause but their leader's peaceful resistance since 1989 when their autonomous status was abolished, failed to attract western attention. The KLA introduced tactics, which, on other occasions, were identified by western governments as acts of terrorism. Such acts predictably attracted both massive Serb reprisals and western attention. Even Richard Holbrooke appeared in a photograph with KLA 234 representatives and by doing so acknowledged its role in the solution of the Kosovo problem.272 The 13 October 1998 agreement between Holbrooke and Miloše ić that averted NATO strikes in Kosovo was yet another reminder to the European onlookers that they had once again remained on the sidelines of Balkan developments.273 As with Bosnia, Kosovo sharpened tensions between the US and the EU over security issues and many Europeans felt that the American envoy did not even take the trouble to send them a copy of the agreement with the Serb Leader. (The Germans waited for two days before a copy of the accord was obtained through the Embassy of the FRY in Bonn). To add insult to injury, Holbrooke failed to attend a meeting of the Contact Group on 15 October, two days after the agreement had been concluded in Belgrade. It was, after all, that group - made up of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States, that had given him his mandate to speak with the Yugoslav president.274 With the withdrawal of the Serb forces the KLA predictably made progress in resuming control of Kosovo. By mid-November 1998 approximately one third of the countryside was patrolled and policed by the guerrilla forces. KLA soldiers secured passage to travellers or arrested and detained Serbs. The President of the FRY threatened the Albanians with renewed hostilities if free ‘i ha d Capla , International Diplomacy and the isis i Koso o , International Affairs, Vol. 74, No 4., October 1998, p.759 273 Tall i g the Koso o Deal , International Herald Tribune, 1 November 1998 274 ‘oge Cohe , Kosovo Crisis Strains Relations Between the US and Eu ope , The New York Times, November 10, 1998. 272 235 movement within Kosovo was not restored according to the provisions of his accord with Holbrooke. The cleavage between the autonomy, that the international community was willing to offer the Kosovar Albanians, and the full independence they demanded, could have been bridged by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Poli (ELIAMEP) proposal of June 1998. Evangelos Kofos, who was responsible for drafting it275, introduced a time - frame that would allow a careful transition from one phase to another with a minimum of friction. The pacification of the region and the solution of the problem, according to the proposal, evolved in four phases: Phase One. During the first phase, to be concluded on a predetermined time limit, the parties would agree on the reorganisation of the province as an Autonomous Region, composed of Albanian and Serb cantons. The Serb cantons would include areas of strong symbolic value to the Serbs. Percentages of land distribution would be an issue of mutual agreement, but it could not surpass the limit of 30 per cent for the Serb cantons. Some minor movement of population on a voluntary basis--with strong incentives for those moving--might be necessary to ensure that the respective ethnic groups--Albanians and Serbs-- would enjoy relative majority in their respective cantons. Phase Two. Upon finalisation of the arrangements agreed upon, the second phase of the agreement would come into force the ad itta e of the Auto o ous Koso o ‘egio (AKR), as a 275 The ELIAMEP is a Greek independent think tank. For a detailed expose of the proposal see, E. Kofos a d T. Ve e is, Kosovo: Efforts to Solve the I passe , The International Spectator, Vol.33, No.2, Rome, April-June 1998, pp.131-146 236 self-ruled administrative entity within the Republic of Serbia. There would be three layers of administration: cantonal, regional and republican. Specific lines of self-rule would be drawn by negotiations. The AKR and its cantons would enjoy extensive selfrule in all domains, including public order, with the exception of national defence and foreign policy. Phase Three. In phase three, the AKR would be allowed, following a period of up to 10 years, to decide to join the Yugoslav Fede atio as a fede ated ‘epu li of Koso o , (RK) sharing equal rights with Serbia and Montenegro, which do not include the right of secession. Phase Four. After an additional period of 10-15 years, phase four would come into effect, whereby the cantons of the Republic of Kosovo could exercise by plebiscite the right of selfdetermination for establishing an independent state. Those cantons deciding against independence could choose to join one or the other remaining constituent states of the Yugoslav federation. Constitutional provisions, reinforced by international guarantees, would ensure that the putative independent state would commit itself not to opt for union with another state. Understandably, the provisions of such an agreement would require the solemn and binding guarantee of an international treaty, endorsed either by the Security Council of the United Nations, or by other relevant international bodies. If this proposal had been adopted then, (in some miraculous way), the subsequent trials and tribulations of Serbia, Kosovo and the USA, would perhaps not have taken place. The negotiations over the Rambouillet accord in February and March 1999 were eminently successful with the Kosovar Albanians because their leaders, and more specifically, Veton Surroi, grasped the opportunity of an autonomy guaranteed by the 237 West to overcome the deadly stalemate. Their hope, according to a talk with Surroi, was that a recovery of functional autonomy for Kosovo would generate a quantum leap in Serbo-Albanian relations and would establish new rules of the game in the region. Although their serve was masterful, the Kosovar Albanians failed to anticipate the combination of responses by Miloše ić and their NATO supporters. The outcome was more in keeping with a Quentin Tarantino script rather than the Dayton accord. The prospect of a form of autonomy for Kosovo that would allow the Albanians to prosper within Serbia and even acquire a demographic edge in a few decades was certainly not an option welcome to the Serbs. Miloše ić s p io it appears to have been either to dominate Kosovo, or partition it276 and preserve for Serbia whatever could be salvaged of the Serb heritage. His chance to evade this likelihood was provided by NATO and the US with their insistence that the ground troops of the implementation force in Kosovo would be provided by the Atlantic Alliance, rather than any other institution involving Russia. In fact the make-up of the implementation forces was less important than the substance of the accord: the autonomous status of Kosovo that would preclude partition and independence for the Albanian part. The protracted NATO bombing of Yugoslavia speeded up the process that the alliance professed it would bring to an end. In fa t P eside t Cli to s se o d a d thi d ai the fi st ei g, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO s pu pose ) namely to prevent further violence against the Kosovan population and to preserve regional stability, e e ot se ed NATO s a tio . Miloše ić was prepared to take the punishment while proceeding 276 For an early view on the partition of Kosovo see B. Kristić, Kosovo Between the Historical and Ethnic Rights, Belgrade, 1995. 238 to cleanse ethnically North Western Kosovo, while at the same time consolidating his authority at home. His view that the West tricked him into signing the Dayto a o d ith a gua a tee of Yugosla ia s territorial integrity became common currency in Serbia. Western governments have used various arguments to justify NATO action in legal terms. The most credible is that Miloše ić had violated a Security Council resolution adopted in October 1998 that imposed a cease-fire in Kosovo and set limits on the Yugoslav forces in the province. The resolution threatened action if Belgrade resisted and invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter, which calls for the use of force to uphold international peace and security.277 When the West decided to intervene in Kosovo its NATO protagonists were drawing lessons from their Bosnian experience. They believed that a limited bombardment of Serb military targets would freeze the crisis and disentangle Miloše ić s fo es f o their clash with the KLA rebels. With the two adversaries back to their benches, NATO could then begin to supervise an agreement modelled on the Dayton Accord precedent. The 78 days bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), however, altered the situation on the ground. The KLA was established in the Albanian political scene as a new powerful variable while an old one, the Serb presence in Kosovo, was hounded out of the picture. The West failed to acknowledge this change of variables and continued to treat the future of the region as though its military intervention had merely restored the status Paul Ta lo , NATO Action ‘ests o Du ious Legal G ou ds , Athens News, 25 March 1999. See also Ch istophe G ee ood, Yes, but is the war legal? , Observer, Ma h , . A o i i g legal a gu e t agai st NATO s o i g as ade ‘i ha d Falk, ‘efle tio s o the Koso o Wa , Global Dialogue, Vol. 1, No 2, Autumn 1999 pp.91-98. 277 239 quo ante in the Serb-Albanian antagonism.278 The outcome of the intervention was therefore unexpected and perplexing. New developments had narrowed the options for future solutions to either an indefinite continuation of the protectorate status as defined by the UNSC Resolution 1244, or the granting to Kosovo of independence from Serb sovereignty.279 The Serb government that ensued from the December 2000 elections was constrained by its public opinion in negotiating the future of its virtual province, but did ot ha e to o a out p o idi g food a d o de to Koso o s inhabitants. As of June 1999 these tasks had become the responsibility of the United Nations. Would an independent Kosovo constitute the beginning of stabilisation of the Western Balkans and the end of western worries in the region? The Prizren Declaration of 1878 and the subsequent attempts of the Kosovo Albanians to prevent Montenegro from acquiring its Adriatic outlet and later the march of Albanian forces into Skopje in 1912, might question the optimism of considering Kosovar independence as the end of history and therefore of irredentism in the region. A cost-benefit analysis of policy choices presupposes a ie of the West s egio al p io ities. Weste age das ha e a ied before and after the bombing. Before the bombing, the EU had lent moral support to Ibrahim Rugova and his non-violent protestations, while the United States had issued warnings to Slobodan Miloše ić to desist from unleashing his army against the Kosovo Albanian 278 A different version of this chapter appeared in Chaillot Papers No. 50, (Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2001). 279 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. An example of bad timing. 240 parallel state. There was, however, a consensus among western i te lo uto s that the F‘Y s e te al borders were not to be altered and that therefore autonomy appeared to be the only possibility the Albanians could expect from their western friends. The e as a ti e efo e the o i g he a spe ial egi e , as opposed to the dis edited auto o , ight still have gone a long way during the negotiations between the two sides. 280 Although Rugova had declared he would not consider anything short of independence, the main procedural problem for western mediators was how to overcome his reluctance to talk with Miloše ić without the presence of a third party, while the latter insisted that outsiders had no business in the domestic affairs of Serbia. In the tug-of-war between the two, the West had opted for a version of autonomy that would significantly improve the rights of the Kosovo Albanians. The bombing changed all that because violence of such magnitude created new dynamics in the field and established new rules of engagement. The West committed itself to the underdog with an extraordinary use of force that surpassed all predictions. The Kosovo Albanians, after suffering atrocities and dislocation, were granted, in fact, their old dream of emancipation from Serb rule. Although in theory a part of Serbia, the UN-NATO protectorate, did not return to the status quo ante. Along with a 92-year-old dream came an even older Albanian vision of irredentism, which included Tetovo, parts of Montenegro, P eše o valley, and, of course, Albania. 280 Feh i Aga i, ‘ugo a s se o d i o a d ho as assassi ated during the Kosovo war, explained this in a 1996, ELIAMEP, Rhodes conference to this author. 241 Throughout the Kosovo crisis Moscow provided the Serbs with little more than o al a ki g. ‘ussia s e al ha d li e however gave Belgrade a false signal to resist NATO demands. The anti-western outburst in Moscow after the bombing began and Russian denunciations of the use of force without UN Security Council authorisation, receded slowly when realist Victor Chernomyrdin was appointed by President Yeltsin as special envoy for Kosovo281. Soon Russian diplomacy indicated that the country was neither capable nor willing to play power politics in the region. From the outset of the establishment of the protectorate, the time was ripe for, in a rapid granting of independence to Kosovo especially while the prestige and popularity of KFOR were still considerable. An independence granted by the benefactors of Kosovo rather than one that came as the inevitable result of a messy KLA struggle, would spare the area grief, and a future democratic Serb regime the cost of recognising a fait accompli, as well as the Kosovars the hardship of political cohabitation with their armed patriots. It would also allow western mediators to impose strict conditions and guarantees on the constitution of the new state prohibiting an alteration of borders at the expense of its eigh ou s te ito ial i teg it . Much has changed since. The political structure of the former parallel state has been eroded by the administration of the protectorate, while the objective of the KLA was to keep the irredentist appetite of its followers alive. More important is the fact that the democratic regime in Belgrade made the Serb position more credible. Oleg Levitin, I side Mos o s Koso o Muddle , Survival, vol. 42, no1. Spring 2000, p.137. 281 242 The September 2000 elections for the FRY President and the December parliamentary elections in Serbia were a setback for Kosovo s bid for independence. Wary of losing western attention, an offshoot of the KLA, the Liberation Army of P eše o, Med eđa and Bujanovac (UCPMB), holding a few square kilometres inside the south eastern corner of Serbia around the village of Dobrosin since mid-1999, began to resume violence against the Serb police units in the district. Inhabited by an ethnic Albanian minority, the municipalities of P eše o, Med eđa and Bujanovac are situated on “e ia s o de ith oth Koso o a d FY‘OM. If this passage is denied to Serbia, FYROM will be deprived of territorial contact with its Yugoslav neighbours282. British and US soldiers responsible for patrolling the porous south eastern border of Kosovo with Serbia had been unable to prevent UCPMB infiltration and random killings of Serbs in the demilitarised zone283. This area, within Serb territory, was demilitarised in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) of 9 June 1999. The MTA banned the Yugoslav Army from the 5 km-wide ground separation zone and only police units of the Serb Interior Ministry (MUP) were allowed to maintain order there.284 Following UCPMB attacks against the MUP police early in 2000, KFOR urged the politi al leade of the dis a ded KLA, Hashim Thaçi, to counsel restraint. The change of regime in Belgrade and the disintegration of the MUP command structure 285 gave the UCPMB the opportunity to step up its attacks against the Serbs in the region. On 22 November the UCPMB leader, Shefket )o a Kuso a , Ne KFO‘ Ale t , Θa e s Defe e Weekly (JDW), 3 January 2001. 283 JDW, 25 October 2000. 284 JDW, 3 January 2001. 285 JDW, 25 October 2000. 282 243 Myslui, ordered an attack on MUP forces, killing four policemen and sparking off an official Serb ultimatum to KFOR to remove the insurgents from the demilitarised zone or the Yugoslav Army would be deployed in breach of the MTA. Caution, however, prevailed in the Yugoslav government and the ultimatum was quietly revoked. The FRY President, Vojislav Koštu i a, pressed by the Serb population of Preševo valley, insisted that the demilitarised zone be narrowed to just 1 km, allowing the Yugoslav Army to dislodge the rebels. NATO initially showed little readiness to renegotiate the treaty, but on 27 February 2001, US Secretary of State Colin Powell with the Secretary-General of NATO standing beside him, said that NATO as p epa ed to a out a phased a d o ti ued edu tio of the g ou d safet zo e a d etu the a ea to “e ia authorities. The significance of this revision of the original demilitarised zone was that it allowed Serbian soldiers back into the three-mile (5 km) wide buffer zone along the Kosovo border.286 All sides to the conflict appeared to be drawing lessons from the last war. The Albanian UCPMB attempted a repetition of the KLA s su essful strategy that had made the Kosovo war possible, by provoking the Serbs into excessive countermeasures that would trigger another western intervention. The Serbs, having learned from past blunders, showed unusual restraint. The Serb government produced a peace plan that ruled out autonomy for the P eše o valley but proposed demilitarisation of the region and reinstatement of civil rights for the ethnic Albanians that had been stripped away from them by the Miloše ić regime. The Serb Deputy Prime Minister, Ne ojša Čo ić, included the integration of Ja e Pe lez, U“ a d NATO Ba k A ess fo “e ia to Koso o Buffe , The New York Times, 28 February 2001 286 244 Albanians into the Serbian police forces of the P eše o region.287 The UCPMB initially appeared unwilling to give up its goal of li e ati g the P eše o region and uniting it with Kosovo. For a hile the e els o t olled the uffe zo e alo g “e ia s o de with Kosovo and held positions within a mile of the town of Buja o a a d “e ia s ai high a to the south. The all as i NATO s ou t a d its “ecretary-General, Lord Robertson, took the opportunity to initiate a policy that contributed to the o ga isatio s t a sitio f o a ilita allia e i to a isismanagement institution. The Secretary-General named his own peace emissary to Southe “e ia, i a lea depa tu e f o NATO s Cold Wa disregard for human and civil rights violations, committed even by its own members in the past, (Portugal, Greece and Turkey). The emissary, Pieter Fieth, held the first round of talks with Albanian and Serb leaders in a bid to bring the two together over the border incidents and perhaps to a future arrangement of wider scope. Although Fieth ould ot ode ate a deal o NATO s ehalf, he was trying to facilitate talks between the two sides. The SecretaryGeneral also dispatched a NATO delegation to FYROM, a state that had begun to suffer repeated attacks by the National Liberation Army (NLA), another KLA offshoot, since January 2001. Clashes with KLA forces seeking a safe haven in the Albanian border villages in the north of FYROM have cost the lives of several Slav-Macedonian soldiers. The constant traffic of rebels and weapons into FYROM forced the Government to close its borders with Kosovo. FYROM President Boris Trajkovski met with the KFOR Commander and the new head of UNMIK, Hans Haekkerup, to discuss the danger that Ca lotta Gall, “e s Offe Pea e Pla i Atte pt to E d Al a ia ‘e ellio , The New York Times, 12 February 2001. Also see Perlez, op. cit. 287 245 continued KLA provocations posed to the fragile ethnic relations of his state. Although KFOR has had a back-up logistical mission in Skopje, it had no authorisation to take any military action there. It was KFOR troops in Kosovo that opened fire on rebel gunmen infiltrating FYROM territory in early March. The predicament that US troops found themselves facing, however, was that to carry out their mission as peacekeepers regardless of cost would have meant disobeying orders from Washington not to expose themselves to danger. The solution they opted for in the P eše o instance was to leave the mopping-up operations to Serb forces after dismantling most of the demilitarised zone that the rebels had used for cover.288 The signing of a border demarcation agreement between FRY and FYROM, which was pending for years, was perhaps indicative of Serbian concern over its P eše o valley dispute. Al a ia s Fo eig Mi iste Pas al Milo, ho p aised the agreement, added his hopes for a representation of the Albanian minority in South Serbia in future negotiations. An ongoing flash point has been the town of Mitrovica (40 km north of Pristina), one of the few that maintain significant Albanian and Serb populations. Each ethnic group has its own sector, divided by the river Ibar. The segregation of the two communities had been safeguarded by KFOR troops whose daily task was to prevent bloodshed. What makes the domination of Mitrovica important is the presence of the Št p e mines that lie beneath the town. The late Rugova had placed high hopes on the Matthe Ka i ski, NATO Takes o the ‘ole of Balka Pea e B oke , The Wall Street Journal, Ma h . Ca lotta Gall, NATO “oldie s Fi e o Koso o Al a ia s , The New York Times, 8 March 2001. 288 246 reopening of the mines, and presented his visitors with pieces of Št p e ore as souvenirs. Although the importance of the mines has been questioned by western experts, some Albanians consider them a national asset. Mitrovica and its Serb hinterland were, according to Serb sources, given by Tito to Kosovo as part of a technique that would discourage future secessionist tendencies. The return of Mitrovica under Kosovar control however, does not appear to be an Albanian option. French riot troops have long struggled to maintain the status quo in the town.289 After a year of Albanian-instigated violence in the region, western policy planners were faced with the possible repercussions of a adi al ha ge i Koso o s status o the e ti e eigh ou hood, and were less willing to contemplate independence. In the 4 th Balkan Summit that took place in Skopje on 24 February 2001, Balkan leaders reiterated their support for UN Security Council Resolution 1244 which provided that Kosovo remains under Serbian sovereignty until a final settlement of its status. An old hand in Balkan issues, Evangelos Kofos streamlined his proposal of a Weste T usteeship hi h ould epla e the Protectorate as an internationally recognised institution that would acculturate Koso o to the a s of the EU. Ma of the p o isio s a d p a ti al applications of Resolution 1244 could be incorporated into the new text. UNMIK and KFOR could continue to operate under a different name. States granted mandate could include European Union or UN Security Council membe states . . . B joi i g the T usteeship Kosovo could move gradually toward self-government or independence, according to article 76b of the Cha te . A C p us lause banning unification with third countries without the Ni holas Wood, F e h T oops i Koso o Clashes , The Guardian, 31 January 2001. 289 247 consent of the signatories of the Kosovo Trusteeship Accord, would serve as a ode ati g fa to . 290 On 15 May 2001 Hans Haekkerup a ou ed the Co stitutio al F a e o k fo the Provisional SelfGo e e t of Koso o a d p o lai ed atio al ele tio s fo the No e e , to dete i e the seats of Koso o s Assembly. Although Kosovo Albanians were given a front seat in thei ou t s ad i ist atio , Haekke up ai tai ed his right to exercise his veto, so that full independence was postponed. Most Albanians, including Rugova, Thaçi and former KLA warrior-turnedpolitician and businessman, Haradinaj, have complained that the F a e o k ig o ed the ‘a ouillet p o isio fo a e isio of the interim government after three years. Yet few Albanians abstained from the elections – a position adopted by the Serb representatives ho o side the F a e o k a offi ial e pulsio of the “e element from Kosovo.291 UNSC Resolution 1244 called for the withdrawal of all FRY military, police and paramilitary forces from the province and the deployment of an international civil and security presence under the command of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led KFOR. The Resolution also envisaged the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to administer Kosovo and to ensure that UNMIK and KFOR would work towards the same goals. Regulation No. 1 of Jul stated that all legislati e a d e e uti e autho it ith respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of E a gelos Kofos, ια ια ιαφο ι ή Π οσέ ιση σ ο Π όβ η α ο Κοσσ φο ίο (For a Different Approach to the Kosovo Problem), Kathimerini, 17 February 2001. 291 Ti Judah, Koso o s Fo eseea le Futu e De ided , Balkan Crisis Report, no. 248, 18 May 2001. 290 248 the Secretary General (SRSG). The UN was to become the interim government of Kosovo and the SRSG its interim international administrator. Resolution 1244 mandated UNMIK to establish a functioning interim administration, to develop provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government and to fa ilitate a politi al p o ess desig ed to dete i e Koso o s future status. UNMIK advocated freezing the status of Kosovo, pointed to the victory of anti-Miloše ić forces in Serbia and the su ess of ode ate Al a ia s i Koso o s u i ipal ele tio s as favourable developments towards a mutually acceptable solution. What a e eeded , a o di g to Ale a de Ya is, a fo e UNMIK offi ial, a e ti e, a lo al o se sus fo the i ple e tatio of Resolution 1244 that provides a road map to meet the minimum objectives of both Kosovar Albanians and Serbs and the maximum of neither, as well as a long-term commitment by the international com u it .292 Were there, however, indications that, despite favourable electoral developments in Serbia and Kosovo, time did favour a peaceful solution? Was there any sign that a local consensus over implementation of Resolution 1244 was building up between Albanians and the remnants of the Serb community? There is little doubt that independence and irredentism have in the past gone hand in hand for most Kosovo Albanians, and that the image of the armed patriot is still popular among a younger segment of the populatio . Yet ‘ugo a s pea eful resistance to Serb rule in the 1990s and the experiment of the Al a ia pa allel state p o ided the fou datio s fo the 292 Alexandros Yannis, Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict, Athens: ELIAMEP and PSIS, 2001. 249 construction of a future civil society. However, without the rule of law and public security legitimate leaders will never survive the rough and tumble introduced into lo al politi s. Veto “u oi s, three-step approach to the problem has been the most insightful. The fi st ould e to a i te atio all ag eed self-rule that would give democratic content to the Kosovar shell. The second would be an inclusive decision-making on the permanent status of Kosova . . . the day after needs to include the third step, relations with the EU 293. Another consequence of the war was that the UNMIK administration employed some of the better-qualified people of the parallel state with high (by Kosovar standards) salaries. The further demand for such people by the plethora of NGOs and international organisations dismantled the apparatus of the Albanian authorities and deprived public agencies of their most experienced employees. “u oi s o ept of pol e t is Al a ia o u ities in the Balkans will communicate freely between states where Albanians traditionally live) would certainly offer the best remedy to irredentism if only the concept were systematically promoted by lites a d politi ia s of these o u ities. NATO s espo si ilit is to ensure the inviolability of these borders before they revert to the flexible regime of a polycentric world.294 A solution that views the Western Balkans as an economic unit, whose long-standing Veto “u oi, Te Co epts that Will Defi e the Futu e of Koso a , Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2002. 294 Ja e Pe lez, U“ Wo t “e d its Koso o G.I. s o Pea ekeepi g Pat ol i “e ia , The New York Times, Ma h . At the ou da etween Koso o a d “e ia p ope , there is a pretty profound disagreement betwee the U ited “tates a d B itai , o e offi ial said. We have consistently said we do not see a role for KFOR troops in the sovereign te ito of “e ia . 293 250 social and political ills will not improve if they are not jointly addressed, was also aired. The resolve, after Dayton, of the international community to set the Balkans on the road to recovery waned, only to be revived by the war in Kosovo. Some innovative remedies were necessary to gradually replace the irredentist agendas with a project of regional reconstruction and development.295 The West was saddled with many responsibilities after the spring of its humanitarian intervention. In the discussion of hethe NATO s a tio eated a p e ede t fo the futu e, opinions vary. There are those, nonetheless, who believe that regardless of the soundness of the decision to bomb FRY, the deed has established a strong precedent for responding to all similar, or worse violations of human rights committed by sovereign states against their own citizens. If NATO fails to make humanitarian intervention a concept of universal application, the war against the FRY will become an act of selective justice against a target with little cost to western economic and political interests.296 The prudence displayed by the post-Miloše ić Serbian leadership in the P eše o valley conflict deprived the KLA of its ability to bait the Serbs into a repetition of 1999. On 21 May, the Albanian guerrillas came to terms with this reality and agreed to 295 “ee, i pa ti ula , Laza Kekić, Aid to the Balka s: Addi ts a d Pushe s , Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.1, No 1, January 2001, p.20-40 296Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000). 251 disarm under KFOR supervision.297 A new KLA incarnation, the NLA, made FYROM the target of its baiting strategy. Throughout April and May 2001 the Albanian rebels launched their operations against the north west of FYROM with the agenda of alleviating the hardships of their kin under Slav rule. The American demand that Miloše ić be tried by the Hague Tribunal for his crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo was inconsistent with the US refusal to agree with the creation of an International Crime Court.298 Fu the o e NATO s a tio as e e submitted to the UN Security Council for authorisation, despite the requirement set out in Article 53 of the UN Charter, which makes it clear that any regional enforcement action needs such authorisation. Whe the a paig e ded … ho e e , the Security Council did implicitly endorse the fait accompli by creating an international security force to govern Kosovo until its final status could be determined. 299 The discussions between Kosovar Albanians and representatives of Serbia in the negotiations over the future status of Kosovo, were in the grip of that same spectre of nationalism that has haunted Serb-Albanian relations throughout the previous century. The Albanians live under the 1878 Prizren star, while the Serbs have been in a state of mind that mourns a greater Serbia that is still being curtailed and may remain the only part of former The document of disa a e t as sig ed the ilitia s leade , Shefket Musliu, and NATO envoy Shawn Sullivan. 298 Alberto R. Coll, Kosovo and the Moral Burdens of Power , in Andrew J. Bacevich & Elliot A. Choen (eds.), War Over Kosovo, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p.148. 299 Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum , The Fletcher Forum, Winter/spring 2003, p.31. 297 252 Yugoslavia which is not ethnically cleansed or segregated. Serb insistence that the Kosovar Albanians never get their independent state is akin to Israeli reluctance to allow the creation of an independent Palestinian entity. The disgruntled nationalism of the Serbs varies in degree from one party to another, but Serb voters have proved to be capable of self-destruction in order to spite a world allegedly conspiring against them. The Albanians have seen the heyday of international support in 1999. Following the attacks of Kosovar Albanians against the Serb minority in 2004, the formers credibility diminished significantly. Old victims rarely acquire empathy towards the plight of the weak, nor a generosity that would allow them to show compassion for the predicament of the new victims. The best hope for future reconciliation lies in a change of mentalities by the two ethnic rivals that will allow them to admit to past a d p ese t e o s. Veto “u oi s uasi-fictional Memoires 300 is one such rare instance of looking at the problem with both empathy and detachment. He begins with his self-confinement in Prishtina when NATO was bombing the city and Serb gangs were roaming the streets in search for wayward Albanians. We flushed the toilets only when the bombs were falling. But there were days he the o s ould t fall… Fea sti ks of piss. 301 The narrator floats with his memories back and forth. His participation in the negotiations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, for the final status of Kosovo under the Stability Pact, offers an idiosyncratic personal experience. He also voices his predictions on future de elop e ts. …the e e tual e a uatio of “e s f o e t al Veton Surroi, Aze Prishtina: Koha, 2005. 301 Ibid, p.14 300 Berisha s O e a d O ly Flight to the Castle, 253 and Eastern Kosova to the north would create a reality in the field and the possibility for the territorial division of Kosova as a solution fo the status. 302 The “e s asked fo te ito ial auto o fo Mit o i a s northern half and the Albanians refused. The latter do not consider a federal status now that Kosovo is more or less in their hands. If majority-minority relations are not of similar moulds in the region, no lasting settlement will ever result from negotiations based on perceived positions of advantage. The northern part of Kosovo, the Serb-inhabited Mitrovica and north of the city up to the borders of Serbia, were relegated to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Northern Kosovo (UNTANK) for a temporary regime under the Stability Pact. However this status is over and needs updating. In a more confessional mood Surroi recounts western foreign ministers telling him, … ou Koso o politi ia s p etended you were nowhere, especially when minorities were being persecuted. When the whole Roma neighbourhood was being burned in Pristina, you would say it was caused by electricity. When the Serb neighbourhood in Prizren was being torched, you again blamed it on short-circuits. Then you should have been political leade s a d ot a ateu ele t i ia s. …Do ou elie e a responsible international community will leave everything in your hands? 303 Surroi takes upon himself the burden of responsibility of having gained a state th ough fo eig i te e tio but we left it abandoned so we could take something more tangible, a cheap house from an ousted Serb, a restaurant becoming property by the 302 303 Ibid, p.42 Surroi, p.62 254 fo e of the ha e that eaks the lo k… 304 Surroi attempts to empathise with the Serb Foreign Minister by imagining his lonely soliloquy: …let the joke a out ooks, state e ts a d gesti ulatio s… the should at least espe t the fa t that I as a e du i g ad e sa of o u ist di tato ship…he ould sa to himself, feeling that a layer of anger was piling on top of the deep feeling of solitude. 305 Nation building will always look for evidence of cultural primogeniture. According to an Albanian Kosovar interviewed by an ethnographer: The Albanians are the oldest. They are ancient. So we have all the rights to Kosovo as Illyrians and as the majority that has always been oppressed. 306 The Serbs could not compete with the Albanians in anteriority, as the Palestinians cannot compete with the Israelis in producing evidence of relative antiquity. As Surroi notes, the flag day in Israel also commemorates, not just the creation of the state, but the carnage of Jews in Massada under the Romans. The Israelis of all political colours were listening to me; on Flag Day we climbed the castle that symbolises the resistance of Hebraic people, when the foundation of the state by war started in fact some 2000 years ago. 307Surroi s concluding remark constitutes a paradigm of discourse in a new way of looking at local history. One hundred years ago, Serbs wrote poems. To them Kosova was the cradle of the nation, a sort of Jerusalem full of churches and o aste ies… The o fli t et ee ou Al a ia e al lite atu e 304 Ibid, p.161 Surroi, op.cit. p. 83 See also Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996 p. 174 306 )d a ko i )d a ko ić, op. it.pp. -99 307 Surroi, p.102 305 255 and their written literature has been ongoing. And it is because of one topic: the meaning Kosova has to both of us. 308 I the sa e ei ith “u oi s o k, although less spontaneous, are the extracts form a corpus of ethnographic interviews that anthropologist Helena Zdravković collected in Kosovo from June to August 2002.309 The views that each side holds against the other practically defines their identities. Both lay claims to victimisation as an experience that justifies any form of retribution. The Serb Kosovar about the Albanians: They always sided with the strongest and the ruthless - the Turks, Italians Nazi… o the A e i a s, a d he these lea e the ll fi d someone else. 310 The Albanian Kosovar: The “e s e e t the oppressed rayas i the Tu kish e pi e. Do t elie e a thi g they say, because Serbian history is a big lie. 311 The Martti Ahtisaari operation to grant Kosovo independence in 2007, created more problems than it solved. Given his distance from Balkan affairs, the former Prime Minister of Finland appeared to be a good choice as mediator between Albanians and Serbs. His reliance however on American approval and his total disregard of Russia312, were counterproductive. The 308 Surroi, op.cit.p.156 )d a ko ić, op. it.p. 310 Ibid, p.105 311 Ibid, p.97 312 James Ker-Lindsay in his, Kosovo. The Path of Contested Statehood in the Balkans, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, notes the following: …o the uestio of Koso o, ‘ussia s positio as a tuall fa o e i tu e ith long-standing principles of international relations and international law than the position adopted by those states that were pushing independence for purely political reaso s . p.115. See also, Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy OF Counter Secession, Oxford University Press, pp. 184-186. 309 256 2007 Troika consisting of senior diplomats from the EU, Russia and the United States, unlike the impatient Ahtisaari mission, proved insightful and obliged the two sides in the dispute to confront the long-term implications of their obstinacy. The Serbs produced some case-studies to back their views, as was the Aland Islands model where Swedes enjoy autonomy within Finland. The Albanian Kosovars were equally forced to ponder on a status of quasiindependence that would deny them access to international organisations. Romania, Slovakia, Greece, Spain and Cyprus, were sceptical about the consequences an unqualified recognition would bear on other similar cases in the globe of which some were very close to home. The December 2007 report of the Troika confirmed the role of the EU as the only effective future of the troubled region. Since February 2008 the EU assumed the main responsibility for Koso o s sta ilit , but it did not manage to attach to its policies the incentives or sanctions that would render effective the use of the i st u e t of o ditio alit .313 In the meantime Belgrade organised, especially in the Kosovo north, a network of parallel structures in education, health, welfare and encouraged the Serb Kosovars to boycott the institutions of the state.314 Be that as it may EU influence has risen mainly because of its role in the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue of March 2011. Follo i g Koso o s u ilate al de la atio of i depe de e o Fe ua , A e i a s insistence that this is a special case among entities seeking self-determination has Nikolas Tzifakis, EU Policy Towards Kosovo: Reflecting on Strategic Defi its , Defensor Pacis, No. 25 (2010). 314 Ibid. 313 257 prodded most EU states to fall in line. If however Kosovo does not manage to secure UN admission by overcoming Russian objections, its success will be incomplete. The five EU states that have not recognised (2010) Kosovo argue precisely about the necessity of UNSC recognition. Their positions vary on a number of legal and political points. Kosovo s ase is in no sense unique. There are similarities with other entities, including Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno Karabakh of Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia of Georgia, the West Bank under Israel, Kashmir in India and a host of others. Europeans willing to consider Kosovo a special case are perhaps trying to make amends for having failed to take concerted action during the Bosnian carnage. Favouring victims of past aggression may soothe a guilty European conscience, but if applied universally could cause a major rupture in the international system. EU s failure to produce a common foreign and security policy in the nineties invited the US to implement its decisive military action into the region. Championing the cause of the underdogs in the Yugoslav struggle for territory, the Americans hoped that they would promote multicultural democracies in the Western Balkans. They succeeded in setting up two western protectorates, run and financed by the EU, that have hardly achieved the aims of multiculturalism. This double failure of the West has sti ed ‘ussia s ea tio s afte ei g sideli ed th oughout the ea s of the Yugosla dissolutio . U de Puti s leadership the Russians resisted western unilateralism affecting their own vital interests.315 Despite dire predictions about Serb reactions to western attitudes towards Koso o s i depe de e, the Presidential 315 James Headley, Russia and the Balkans. Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin. London: Hurst & Co, 2008, pp. 419-422, 475, 497. 258 elections of March 2008 and the outcome of parliamentary elections, proved otherwise. The inflammatory pronouncements of the outgoing Koštu i a government and mass demonstrations in February 2008, threatened the EU prospects of Serbia and promised a new round of self-destructive isolationism. Yet voters elected Boris Tadić to a second term as president and gave a plurality to his Democratic Party in the parliamentary elections of May. The EU was quick to respond to these unexpected developments and signed a Stabilisation and Association agreement with Serbia which was ratified by the Serb parliament on 9 September 2008. Be that as it may, the problem of Kosovo will not go away soon but the pill of its independence could be sugarcoated for the Serbs if the Northern Mitrovica was to follow the route of self-determination afforded to the Albanian Kosovars. 316 It would be a small price to pay for the majority of Kosovars if this would mean a better future in their neighbourhood. The European Commission progress report as well as the section on Kosovo in the Commissions Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-12, indicated that Kosovo was lagging behind politically, economically and in terms of justice. Yet by the start of 2011 Independent Kosovo was recognised by 75 states which amounted to a third of the membership of the UN. The EU s performance in Kosovo was impeded by the intransigence of the two sides. The EU deployed the European Union Rule of Law “ee p o eedi gs of The ‘etu of the Balka s? , conference organised by EKEM in Delphi, 11-13 Sept. . Also see follo i g: Thus far the international community has found it difficult to engage with the issue of Northern Kosovo – a issue … i tuall u add essed i the Ahtisaari Comprehensive P oposal . Marc Weller, Contested Statehood, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 283. See also Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo…, op. it, pp. 120-121. 316 259 Mission (EULEX) as well as the EU Special Representative in Kosovo (EUSR), in conjunction with its EC Liaison Officer there. The outcome in the rule of law sector however was modest. Administering the law remains subject to political interference but what is worse is that overlapping jurisdictions (KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, ICO etc.) have confused the operation of a variety of legal frameworks. The integration of EU policies with effective incentives and sanctions would greatly improve the picture. 317 The Serbian parliamentary, presidential and local elections of 6 May 2012, o stituted a set a k fo “e ia s Eu opea p oje t. Tomislav Nikolić, an extreme nationalist, was elected President and his SNS party won 73 seats over Boris Tadić s D“ with 67. The plan of Nikolić o e i g “e ia s positio vis-à-vis Kosovo, released in early Ja ua , is e te ed i the auto o ous Serb-inhabited regions of Kosovo. This plan, according to the Albanian Kosovars, is a non-starter and could lead the discussions to an impasse. 318 On the other hand, the No the “e s fea a u ita state where their small numbers may not warrant sufficient p ote tio .319 “p os E o o ides, The Making of a Failed “tate: The Case of Koso o , European View, Springer, Vol. 10, No 2, December 2011, pp. 193-200. See also Nikolaos Tzifakis, The European Union in Kosovo. Reflecting on the Credi ilit a d Effi ie Defi it , Problems of Post- Communism, JanuaryFebruary 2013, pp. 43-51. 318 Yet, even the lop-sided in its pro-Albanian position, International Crisis G oup, has ade a state e t to the effe t that a self-governing Serb community in No the Koso o ill e a histo i a hie e e t… . “e ia a d Koso o: The Path to No alisatio , Report No 223/18 Feb 2013. International Crisis Group, p.26. 319 Leo Malazogu et al., I teg atio o Isolatio ? CEPI, Ce t al Eu opea Policy Institute, December 2013. 317 260 In spite of pessimistic predictions concerning the future of the discussions between Serbia and Kosovo under the EU aegis, on 19 April 2013 the two sides heralded an agreement that would safeguard Serb autonomy in Northern Kosovo. The agreement was presented by Prime Ministers Thaçi and Dačić as an event of historical significance. 261 Chapter 3: Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Intractable Problem? The case of Bosnia – Herzegovina constitutes an unusual international commitment to the integrity of a state which exhibits little willingness to keep its constituent ethnicities mixed. There are two possible explanations for this tenacious effort to finance and maintain an unwieldy state system of reluctant partners. The United States and the EU have been determined to create a multicultural entity in the wake of a fratricidal war, perhaps to make-up for their indecisiveness when the Bosnian Muslims were being slaughtered by Serbs and Croats. It is now estimated that Bosnia suffered some 100.000 dead and some 2.3 million displaced people. Since guilty conscience is rarely a sustained motive for policy decisions, especially in the field of international relations, one might adopt Ja es Go s asse tio o h Bos ia a d Koso o have been the two Balkan territories to receive the greatest outside material attention. Both have been crucibles of multi – ethnic confrontation but more significantly western nations have been eager to protect their Muslim communities from human rights abuses. These two countries therefore became the primary laboratories of change after the collapse of Yugoslavia. In James Go s o ds: Because of this heritage, both were key icons of how the EU, with partners and allies could handle questions of community cohesion and multicultural policy, as well as symbolically ensuring that Muslim communities with secular 262 ha a te a d e tu ies old t aditio s ooted in Europe were not excluded .320 The epo t of the International Commission of the Balka s attempted to explain why the fate of Islam in Bosnia was a weste p io it for reasons going beyond the country or even the Balka s .321 The authors of the report were perhaps trying to imply that western empathy for the plight of the Bosnian Muslims could offset the lack of progress in the Palestinian impasse. Be that as it may, the rights of Muslim communities in Europe acquired a special significance in the post – 9/11 world. The EU and the USA sought to embrace the secular Muslims of Europe as part of a positive strategy in the Global War on Terror and produce a showpiece of multiculturalism that would convince the Middle – Eastern states that the West did not discriminate between Muslim and nonMuslim victims of aggression. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the sole Federated Republic of Tito s Yugosla ia that as ot esta lished o eth i p e ises. According to the census of 1991, out of a population of 4,364,570, there were 43.7% Muslims (Bosniaks), 31.3% Serbs, 17.3% Croats and 5.5% Yugoslavs. Given that no ethnic group has an absolute majority this can never become a state dominated by one people.322 Ja es Go , Europe and the Muslim World: European Union Enlargement and the Western Balka s , Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.7, No.3, Sept. 2007 p.470 321 Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Washington DC, 1996, p.18 322 Dze al “okolo i , Bosnia – Herzegovina: A Matter of Sur i al i Wi van Meurs (ed.), Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement. South 320 263 The term of Paddy Ashdown as High Representative (HR) of the international community, generated high hopes that Bosnia would soon find its own rhythm. Ashdown imposed a series of reforms directed at strengthening the central authorities but disregarded the ethnic substrate entities and came at loggerheads with local nationalist leaders. He was criticised for authoritarian tactics and for contributing to the dependence of the locals on the Kindness of strange s . It took less than two years, the mismanagement of the police reform and an inactive successor to Ashdown to lead the Bosnian system to a deadlock .323 As a protectorate, Bosnia has settled its security concerns because of the international peacekeepers of SFOR and EUROFOR since November 2004. The sustained aid Bosnia has received since the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 has made the economy incapable of surviving without foreign fixes. Early on Laza Kekić coined the te aid addiction to des i e Bos ia s e o o i condition and poi ted out that growth regressions indicate that external aid has had a very weak positive impact on the performance of transition ou t ies .324 Te ea s afte Da to , the ou t s G oss Do esti Product (GDP) amounted to 60% of its pre-war level and unemployment fluctuated between 37-40%.325 The national budget was bedevilled by the structural inefficiencies of a complex system Eastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2003, p.172 323 Ioa is A akolas, South Easte Eu ope at the C oss oads , Hellenic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 2010, p. 46. 324 Laza Kekić, Aid to the Balkans: Addi ts a d Pushe s in T.Veremis & D.Daianu (eds.), Balkan Reconstruction, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p.20 325 Flo ia Bie e , Bosnia-Herzegovina: Slow Progress Towards a Fu tio al “tate , South Eastern European & Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, No.1, March 2006, p.43 264 of regions and entities that keep the three constituent ethnicities apart. The Da to A o d g a ted the “e ‘epu li , covering 49% of the entire territory of Bosnia – Herzegovina, far-reaching autonomy. The Federated Bosnia-Herzegovina, (a loose federation of Croats and Bosniaks) was decentralised into ten regions, five Bosniak, three Croat and two with a mixed population. The central government is weak and its authority has in fact been wielded by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) who has replaced members of the elected Bosnian authorities, has annulled laws voted in parliament and even dissolved political parties. Voters do ot ep ese t a de os but rather their three ethnic groups. Some of the key executive posts are ethnically determined. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only state to emerge from Yugoslavia that has not managed yet to overcome its domestic problems. It constitutes an example of how a state, which is managed entirely by outside forces, cannot find its own way to economic recovery and self-governance. After fifteen years as a protectorate of the West, Bosnia has developed aid-addiction and is reliant on the international community for its governance and management. In order to understand the present inertia in Bosnia it would be necessary to examine the role of foreign institutions in the operation of the state. The EU has had the main responsibility for civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement through its control of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The latter must formally answer to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 326 326 The PIC consists of 45 members states and several international agencies. Its Steering Board, which meets several times annually at the level of the political directors and weekly at the ambassadorial level 265 although in fact, the choice of the High Representative (HR) is with the EU and the approval of the US. The office of the HR was a bone of contention between the US and the EU at Dayton, but the Europeans argued convincingly that since they footed most of the reconstruction bill they should also have the last word in running Bosnia. Of the seven individuals to have held the office, only three nominees were opposed by the US. The OHR is a creation of Dayton, and functions in Bosnia as an integral part of the Peace Agreement of 1995. 327 The OHR, under the Bonn Powers 328 has made over 900 decisions in the course of the past fourteen years. These involve mostly law enactment and removal of undesirable elected officials. The HR has sacked officials, even Ministers of Bosnia, because they were found in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement. The UN Security Council has endorsed the authority of the HR under the Dayton Agreement.329 Bosnian actors have not done much to reclaim their self-determination. In April 2006, a vital reform drive failed because of the decision of the Republika Srpska Party of Independent Social-Democrats (SNSD), as well as Haris “ilajdžić (Bosniak member of the State Presidency), to block it. After includes, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the USA, the President of the EU Commission, and Turkey. 327 Ba t M. J. “ze z k, The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Powers, De isio s a d Legiti a , European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 83, March 2010, Paris, pp. 7-10, 29-34. 328 The Bonn Powers were recognised to be within the authority of the HR under the Dayton Agreement by the PIC at its Bonn Conference in De e e , Szewczyk, op. cit. p. 30. 329 UN Security Resolution 1174 (S/Res / 1174), 15 June 1998. 266 this abortive attempt by the international community to establish a comprehensive reform package, the economy declined rapidly.330 On 9-10 October 2009, the EU and the US held talks at the EU Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) military headquarters, but failed to reach an agreement of discontinuing the OHR. The International Crisis Group in its November 2009 report advised closing the OH‘ a d ai tai i g a EU“‘ without Bonn Powers per se but with the authority to declare a party in breach of the Da to Ag ee e t .331 As we have noted, Bosnia and Herzegovina is managed by foreign authorities as a protectorate, a state government and those of the two entities, run by parties deeply entrenched in ethnically based politics that often impede mutually beneficial reform. Reforms at the state level, such as the introduction of a state command over the armed forces of the entities and the establishment of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and of the judiciary have been all instigated by international a to s ost p o i e tl the OH‘ .332 Given this relucta t e tit s slow progress and the resistance of at least two of its three constituent parts to a joint existence, the rationale of any state based on the willingness of its people to live together, acquires secondary importance in western priorities.333 One may wonder if 330 Armakolas, op. cit., pp. 46-47. For a detailed account of the failure of the April 2007 reform pa kage, see “ofia “e astia , Leaving Dayton Behind: Constitutional Reform in Bos ia a d He zego i a , FRIDE, Working Paper 46, November 2007, pp. 1-20. 331 ICG, Bos ia s Dual C isis , Europe Briefing, no. 57, 12 November 2009. 332 Bieber, op. cit. p.57 333 Political community is the basic requirement for statehood, without an agreed political community, then any state is likely to be subject to internal 267 the right of self-determination exercised by Montenegro and seriously considered for Kosovo, would not produce a beneficial effect in the settlement of frozen conflicts, if extended to the Bosnian entities. Since the end of the carnage, fifteen years ago, Bosnia has remained a virtual state with its constituent ethnicities, Serb, Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims), opting for a segregated existence in separate federal borders, rather than in multicultural unity. Foreign aid has failed to revive their respective economies and trickled down a maze of overlapping administrations. Aiddependency has become a syndrome, which supports the inertia of a state that commands little affection by its own citizens. On 27 March 2009, former High Representative in Bosnia, Slovak Miroslav Lajčák, held a party for his Austrian successor, Valentin Inzko, who would operate until the end of 2009 when his powerful office expired. After that Mr. Inzko was expected to remain in his capacity as EU special representative, with no legal powers. This change has worried those who believe that the EU is the o l edi le gua a to of Bos ia s i teg it . Out of the ,000 strong NATO peacekeepers of 1995, only 200 EU soldiers have remained in 2010. Bosniak President, Haris “ilajdžić nevertheless wanted Republika Srpska abolished, while his opposite number in the Bosnian Serb entity, Milorad Dodik, threatened with a referendum on secession. His tactic to block legislation in the federal parliament was on the same lines with the example offered by Montenegrin President, Milo Đukanović who did just that in order to prove that the federation of Serbia-Montenegro was unworkable.334 Although armed conflict between Serbs, Croats and pressures, with politics focused on the nature and essence of the polity rather than on decisions over day-to da life , Gow, op.cit., p.474 334 Bos ia s Futu e. A Tea i g “ou d , The Economist, April 4, 2009, p.27. 268 Bosnians, appears unlikely today, Bosnian leaders are nervous over thei ou t s futu e, espe iall si e the C oat-Bosniak federation is in financial dire straits. The October 2010 elections allotted the Bosniak seat to a moderate, Bakir Izet ego ić (son of the former president Alija), who promised to cooperate with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Haris “ilajdžić s pa t , “BiH, ill ot e in government, belatedly pe alised fo its leade s egati e sta e to a d the efo package of 2006. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) appealed mainly to Bosniaks and Croats who believe in a unified Bosnia. The SDP presented strong references to its Socialist background and managed to re-elect Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Presidency. Ko šić had a large Bosniak support and was probably the most popular political figure among the Bosniaks. The Croats produced victory for the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) while the Republika Srpska gave Milorad Dodik (SNSD) a clear victory.335 By the i te of the “e seat o Bos ia s t ipa tite presidency was occupied by Ne ojša ‘ad a o ić. Although a poll by the National Democratic Institute indicates that all Bosnians, irrespective of ethnic and religious allegiances, are o ied a out thei ou t s futu e, it is ‘epu lika Srpska that will ultimately decide the outcome.336 Bosnia and Herzegovina has become an example of what not to do when setting up a state from scratch. Of all the 335 Armakolas, op. cit., p. 49. Joa a Kakissis, Is Bosnia One Step Closer to Unity-o Collapse? , Time in partnership with CNN, October 4, 2010. 336 269 unfinished business in the Western Balkans, the solution for this problem appears to be the most intractable. 270 EPILOGUE: The Chances of Post-Modernity in the Balkans Throughout the account of close to two centuries of Balkan history in this book, we have followed the process of transformation of identities, political cohesion and national creeds. From 19th century attempts of statecraft aiming at homogenous and unitary entities, to the 20th century dismantling of federal Yugoslavia into a microcosm of ethnically cleansed, or segregated communities and the rest of the Balkans, consisting of states that they have either attained accession to the EU or aspire to do so in the future. Those, such as Romania and Bulgaria, that became members of a supranational community, or Greece that has been bailed out of its current economic predicament by the Eurozone and the IMF, all have more or less abdicated from some of their sovereignty in order to secure their economic stability, development and democratic institutions. As is the case in the rest of Europe, cultural syncretism in the Balkans permeates all aspects of life. Culinary preferences, education, even politics, attest to that. In our global world, nation – states coexist at different stages of development. Far from having attained uniformity, states still in a pre-modern phase, live side by side with modern states as well as with post-modern entities. If pre-modernity is characterised by devotion to religion and transcendental imperatives, modernity is about centralised nation states and their secular priorities. Post-modernity is best depicted by the influence of supranational organisations such as the EU with multicultural goals and transnational partners. 271 What in the EU distinguishes post-modern society from modernity is the fo e s uest fo plu alis , de e t alisation of state power and symbiotic, rather than confrontational security policies. As increase in wealth is the outcome of a technical innovation rather than the produce of the earth (agricultural and mineral), the dependence of states on territorial aggrandisement for power and riches, is diminished. Our societies are on the whole less bellicose and irredentist than those of our fathers. Our future nevertheless depends on the outcome of a clash, not between civilisations, but between pre-modernist fundamentalisms on the one hand, and modernist and post-modernist ideologies, on the other. The former consist of suicidal Islamists, who seek to revive theocratic states, Evangelical crusaders receiving commands from above and religious Jews striving to recreate a state that thrived thousands of years ago. The post-modernists in their ranks include European Union members and those who aspire to join it. A kind of madness drives a segment of mankind that makes certain Balkan anachronistic pursuits seem trivial disorders by comparison. Yet in view of the gradual transition of the neighbourhood into a uniform post – modernity, we must consider the pockets of anachronism that do remain. But first a few words about the major agent of post-modernity in the Balkans. The EU s ea l failu es du i g the dissolutio of Yugosla ia proved a learning process once Javier Solana was appointed High Representative in 1999. Along with Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations, he was instrumental in i gi g the EU s atte tio i to the egio a d de elopi g a military commitment of 60.000 troops in the field for crisis management. The democratic transition in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 facilitated the renewed stabilising task of the EU. Its role, in 272 collaboration with the USA, in the Ohrid agreement of 2001, that defused the crisis between the two larger ethnic groups of FYROM, was pivotal. Throughout the last ten years three of the seven European Special Representatives were occupied with Balkan issues. In spring 2003 the EU assumed from the UN the police operation in Bosnia. In the summer of that year it took over from NATO its responsibilities in FYROM, followed by a police function in December. In 2004 an EU force of 7.000 men replaced the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia. The major task of this force has been to deter organised crime337. Despite the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) deployments in Bosnia and FYROM, the EU has not superseded NATO in securit issues, o i the latte s Pa t e ship fo Pea e function. The EU, however, holds the most stabilising regional promise – future membership in an organisation that will act as a locomotive for development and democratisation. No other state or institution can compete with the EU in this respect. The stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) gave the Western Balkan states a route of integration into EU structures. SAP entailed the conclusion of comprehensive treaties with each state and deployed important policy instruments, in particular in the areas of trade and assistance. 338 The prospect of Croatian EU membership run on the hard times of economic gloom. The hopes of an early in 2011 accession F ase Ca e o , The Europea U io s ‘ole i the Balka s , in Brad Blitz (ed.) War & Change in the Balkans, Cambridge Un. Press 2006, p.100101 338 F ase Ca e o , The EU and the Balkans – Looking Back, Looking Fo a d in Johanna Deimel & Wim van Meurs (eds.), The Balkan Prism, München: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2007, p.399 337 273 were frustrated by Slovene demands of settlement of a border dispute concerning a small bay named Piran. Faced with a plethora of i pedi e ts to C oatia s EU p ospe ts, its P i e Mi iste , I o Sanader pursued better relations with Serbia, once the best client of Croat tourism.339 C oatia s a essio is now an accomplished fact. The Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003 made it clear that the future of Balkan states lay with the EU and gave hope of membership to Albania, Bosnia, FYROM and Serbia. Setting benchmarks for membership involved progress in establishing democratic institutions and improving administrative functions. The perspective of EU membership linked to the step-by-step implementation of the SAP has become the major source of the EU s i flue e i the egio .340 Former High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, proposed that the EU should move on from stabilisation and Association Agreements, towards a multilateral arrangement that would make the whole region of the Western Balkans part of a customs union and other associated policies.341 Yet the biggest question mark on the future of EU efforts in the Balkans lies within Europe itself. The failure of the constitutional treaty to go through the French and Dutch referenda in 2005, betrayed the enlargement fatigue that had overtaken some EU members. If however the EU ceases to widen, its reformist pledge will lose its impetus in the Balkans. On the other hand, the current economic crisis in Europe has diminished the Croatia in Eu ope. A Balka “tate i Balk , The Economist, April 18, 2009, p.31. 340 Ibid, p.400 341 Ca l Bildt, Eu ope s Thi d Cha e to get it ‘ight in the Balkans May be its Last , Europe s World, Autumn 2005, p.112-112 339 274 EU s attraction as a prototype of modernisation and reform. Although the U“A a ot at h Eu ope s regional promise, it will certainly regain its virtual monopoly of influence if the EU fails to deliver membership in a relatively foreseeable future.342 The fiscal turmoil in the Eurozone undermines its credibility in the outside world. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) established a common currency in a single market without following-up it s o e tu ith the eatio of a Eu opea finance ministry, which could streamline national policies and even dete i e the a epta le size of the e e s pu li se to s. The hybrid creature of the Eurozone emerged partly as a single market and currency and partly as the sum total of national policies of member-states. Whereas the USA is expected to bail out California, the Eurozone treats its indebted members with derision. It would be unthinkable for Germany to heap abuse on a former eastern Land for failing to keep up with their western brethren. The paradox becomes even larger when German policy affects the ability of states that have been clients of German products, to o ti ue o t i uti g to Ge a s positi e t ade ala e. Would the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, propose harsh fiscal measures for the Land of Mecklenburg with 27% of its population below the poverty line? The Eurozone might survive this crisis if three conditions are met: 1) The creation of a crisis resolution mechanism, 2) a procedure to deal with internal imbalances and 3) the establishment of a common banking supervisor. This of course would amount to a deepening of the 342 For better insight on the regional dilemma of the EU, see Ivan Krastev, European Union and the Balka s: E la ge e t o E pi e? in Deimel & van Meurs (op.cit) pp.93-100. See also Heather Grabbe in The European Future of the Western Balkans. Thessaloniki@10 (2003-2013), Paris, EUISS, 2013, pp. 109-113. 275 institution beyond all expectations.343 This might leave new Balkan candidates for accession in the waiting room for a very long time. Koso o s fo ed sepa atio f o “e ule as i keepi g with the will of the overwhelming majority in the province. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) that set the rules of postbombardment Kosovo, placed the administration of the entity in international hands but the official relationship of Kosovo with Serbia was never annulled. In the meantime the only interethnic collaboration in Kosovo is between Serb and Albanian mafias. The October 2006 Serbian referendum on the new constitution des i ed Koso o as a i teg al pa t of Serbia. Furthermore new fa to s a e e te i g the Koso o e uatio ith Puti s ‘ussia asserting its regional and international weight and invoking the breakaway entity as a precedent for the recognition of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Follo i g the u ilate al de la atio of Koso o s independence the Serbs of North Mitrovica rallied to support the de fa to pa titio that has e isted si e . Koso o s independence had in fact created two new entities, an Albanian as well as a Serbian. In the meantime UN Resolution 1244 remains in place and UNMIK although diminished, is still present. It seems that, as Ti Judah put it, (some believe that) a conference harking back to the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which redrew the map of the Balka s…should e alled to e-examine and redraw Balkan f o tie s .344 Wolfgang Münchau, Gaps Widen in the Eu ozo e Foot all League , Financial Times, 22 March, 2010. 344 Tim Judah, Kosovo. What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.126. 343 276 Serb insistence that the Kosovar Albanians should never be pe itted to a ui e thei i depe de e is si ila to Is ael s reluctance to allow for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The separate treatment of Serbia and Israel in western (especially American) policies is not difficult to explain. It is nevertheless impossible to assert a policy that uses different measuring sticks in its attempt to confer justice. The independence of Kosovo will be legitimate once it is based on universally applied principles. I spite of “e ia s seesaw politics between nationalism and Europeanisation, the country has made steady progress towards the latter choice. Throughout the last fifteen years it appears that internal democratisation and EU influence constitute the prevailing forces in Serbia. The 19 April 2013 agreement between Serbia and Kosovo that will safeguard Serb autonomy in Northern Kosovo, constitutes a prerequisite for the progress of Serbian accession to the EU. G ee e s s ua les ith FY‘OM o e the desig atio of the latter refer to a period of irredentist antagonisms and a regional habit to deny the burial of dead ideas.345 The appropriation of vilayets in the European realm of the Ottoman empire was (more or less) settled during the 1912-13 wars, first by the assault of the Balkan allies against the Ottomans and then by a clash between the former allies. The Macedonian segment of the territorial gains, which varied in size and location since antiquity, became the apple of discord between Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs and then the site of a new ethnogenesis. The 1944 proclamation of the Communist 345 See the pertinent quotation of H.N. Brailsford, Macedonia. Its Races and its Futures, London, 1906, p.1 277 ASNOM (Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) established the post-war irredentist credo according to which the federated Socialist Republic of Macedonia is a rump state with its irredenta under Bulgarian and Greek occupation. To this day, schoolbooks of FYROM reproduce the three fragments of the larger Macedonia into one indivisible whole and describe the present country as a littoral state. G ee e s u easo a le sta e i the he da of the name issue in the early nineties was that the unmentionable state should never use a designation that contains a Greek copyright. Reasonable Greeks then protested this claim, although occasional firebrand prelates reminded their flocks that a name could be as sacred as a soul. As of 2008 the Greek foreign minister insists on names that would simply exclude irredentist claims. Skopje can use the te Makedontsi as an ethnic appellation, while Athens can refer to the G eeks of the o th as Makedo es . If each state adopts its own language to define itself internationally, there will be no threat to the integrity or dignity of either. 346 Many new states write their own history by partially appropriating that of their neighbours. However bringing nationalist agendas into Academies of Science may unduly prolong the life of undead ideas well into European post-modernity. The attempt of the Academy of Science at Skopje to prove that the Egyptian demotic script on the Rosetta stone at the British Museum This is the basi p oposal of E a gelos Kofos The Co t o e O e the Te s Ma edo ia s a d Ma edo ia . A P o a le E it “ e a io , Southeast European & Black Sea Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 2005, p. 129-33, reiterated at a recent (24 April 2010) debate in Ohrid. 346 278 is in fact akin to the modern Macedonian language, is a sad sample of constructing identity at all rational cost.347 Although post-modern multiculturalism appears to be a major option of the supra-national EU, this option cannot be forcefed to a people who resist acting as a showpiece of western policy. Post-modern nation states after all, follow the maxim of the popular will, often at the expense of central authorities. Should the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina be given the right of selfdetermination, then the breakaway Kosovo will become palatable to Serbia. A package agreement that will however rid the Western Balkans from two sources of tension and discontent vis-à-vis the West, causes vexation to those Westerners who have done their utmost to maintain the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Post-modernity as the main ideological EU export into the Western Balkans is a welcome item in the conflict-ravaged region. However, as the example of Bosnia may illustrate, the principle of multicultural symbiosis cannot be enforced but only cultivated. Furthermore American multiculturalism covers all aspects of life except political creed. The choice of the Americans between versions of Lockean Liberalism cannot serve as a prototype for EU te ito ies o the Balka s. The pe di g issues of Koso o s fi al status, the settlement of the name issue between FYROM and Greece, the future of the three Albanian populated territories: of Albania proper, Kosovo and Tetovo in FYROM 348, Serbia s t a sitio 347 See Tome Bosevski, Aristotel Tentov, Tracing the Script and the Language of the Ancient Macedonians, Sec. Math. Tech. Sci., MANU, XXVI, 2 (2005) p.7-122. 348 A o di g to Veto “u oi Al a ia s… a e te pted the uestio whether they will unite territorially due to a historical accident or due to a historically determined project within a wider European context. Or 279 into post-modernity and the segregated state of BosniaHerzegovina, require a flexible strategy that will not depend entirely on foreign priorities. Self-determination is a powerful medicine that should be applied equitably. To attain postmodernity states must first resolve their modern conflicts. perhaps even neo-Otto a ? , Regressio of Th ee Al a ia “o ieties , Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, April 2011, p. 17. 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A History of Interwar Yugoslavia, London: Hurst, 2008 “p os E o o ides, Balka Eu ope , i A. “epos & K. Dyson(eds.), Whose Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration, Basinstoke, London: Palgrave, 2010 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) third quarter 1999. Jonathan Eyal (ed.), The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans. Mos o s Souther Fla k, London: Macmillan, RUSI, 1989. Bernd J. Fischer, Balkan Strongmen Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe, London: Hurst & Co 2007. Tobias, Flessenkemper and Damien Helly (eds.), Ten Years After: Lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 – 2012, Joint Report, January 2013, European Union, Paris, Institute for Security Studies. 283           Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars, Toronto: Stoddart, 2001. Basil Gounaris & Iakovos Michailidis (eds.), Refugees in the Balkans. Memory and Incorporation (in Greek), Athens, Patakis, 2004. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Random House, 1998 Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans, from Constantinople to Communism, London: Palgrave, 2002. Institute for Regional & International Studies, Security and Reconstruction of South Eastern Europe. Sofia, 2000 International Spectator, Issue on the Changing Picture in the Balkans, Vol. XXXIII, No.2. April - June 1998. Dušan Janjić & Shkelzen Maliqi (eds.), Conflict or Dialogue, Serbian-Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans: Studies & Essays, Subotika: Open University European Civil Centre for Conflict Resolutions, 1994. Tim Judah, Kosovo. What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press, 2008. Basil Kontis and Eleftheria Manda (eds.), The Greek Minority in Albania, A Documentary Record (1921-1993), Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies – 258. 1994. Kostas P. Kostis (ed.), Modern Banking in the Balkans and West-European Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Aldershot: Ashgate,1999. 284           John R. Lampe & Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982 Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question. Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939-1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 Julie Mertus, Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, New York: Random House, 2000. Robin Okey, Eastern Europe 1740-1985. Feudalism to Communism, London: Routledge, 1992. Kerem Okten, Turkey Since 1989. Angry Nation, London: Zed Books, 2011. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945, London: Granta Books, 1999. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia. The History Behind the Name, London: Hurst & Co, 2002. James Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army, Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001, London: Hurst & Co, 2012. 285           James Pettifer (ed.) The New Macedonian Question. London: Macmillan, 1999. John Phillips, Macedonia. Warlords & Rebels in the Balkans, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Paula M. Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The view from the Ground Floor, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Eviola Prifti (ed.), The European Future of the Western Balkans. Thessaloniki@10 (2003-2013), Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013. Antoinette Primatarova & Johanna Deimel, Bridge Over Troubled Waters? The Role of the Internationals in Albania, Sofia: Centre for Liberal Strategies, 2012. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1996. Gilles de Rapper, Crisis in Kosovo: Reactions in Albania and Macedonia at the Local Level, Rome: CSSCEMES, 1998. Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, Bosnia 1994, London: The Harvill Press, 1998. Michel Roux, Les Albanais en Yugoslavie: Minorité nationale, territoire et developpement. Paris : Editions de la aiso des s ie es de l ho e, . Martin Sletzinger, Kosovo and NATO. Impending Challenges. Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson 286 International Center for Scholars, East European Studies, 1999.          Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford:Blackwell, 1994. The Southeast European YEARBOOK, 1990-99, Athens: ELIAMEP. Lejla Starčević-Srkalović, The Democratisation Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Role of the EU, Hamburg, Nomos, 2010. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.) Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969. Bato Tomašević, Life and Death in the Balkans. A Family Saga in a Century of Conflict, London: Hurst, 2008. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (ed.), What Status for Kosovo? Chaillot Papers, No. 50, October 2001. Paris, Institute for Security Studies. Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-98, ECMI Working Paper #1, May 1998. Aristotle Tziampiris, Greece, European Cooperation and the Macedonian Question, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Thanos Veremis & Daniel Daianu (eds.), Balkan Reconstruction, London: Frank Cass, 2001. 287    Thanos Veremis & Evangelos Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War, ELIAMEP, University of Athens, 1998. Miranda Vickers, Between Serb & Albania, A History of Kosovo, London: Hurst, 1998. Marc Weller, Contested Statehood. Koso o s Struggle for Independence, Oxford University Press, 2009. 288 CHRONOLOGY 1774: Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji forces the Ottomans to surrender part of the Black Sea coast and grant the Russians access to the straits. 1783: Russia annexes Crimea. 1804: Ka ađo đe Pet o ićh leads the uprising of the Serbs against the Ottoman garrison in Belgrade. 1805-1807: Sultan Selim III attempts to westernise the Ottoman army with French support. 1806: On 30 November Ka ađo đe defeats the Ottoman forces with some Russian help and takes possession of Belgrade. 1807-1814: France occupies the Ionian Islands. Napoleonic code applied. Selim III is deposed by rebellious Janissaries and murdered. 1808-1839: The reign of Mahmud II as Sultan. 1812: The Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Bucharest. 1813: The Ottomans recapture Belgrade. 1815: The Treaty of Vienna determines the influence of the Habsburg Empire in Northern Italy, Istria and Dalmatia. Bessarabia is given to Russia and the Ionian islands become a British protectorate. On Palm Sunday Milos O e o ić raises the banner of revolt in Serbia. In 1830 he achieves the autonomy of his state. 1817: The assassination of Ka ađo đe constitutes the beginning of a long rivalry between the families of the Ka ađo đe ić and the O e o ić. 1821-1830: The outbreak of the Greek war of independence occurs simultaneously in the Daubian principalities and the Peloponnese. The rough terrain of the hinterland gives the Greek irregulars an advantage. The naval battle of Navarino in October 1827 between a joint English, French and Russian squadron and the OttomanEgyptian force, ends with the destruction of the latter. The Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 obliges the Sultan to recognise the autonomy of Greece which is transformed into independence with the London Protocol of 3 February 1830. 1826: With the Treaty of Akkerman between Russia and the Ottomans, the former is recognised as a protecting power of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. 1828: Count Kapodistrias becomes the first President of Greece. 1830: Serbia becomes an autonomous and hereditary hegemony. 1832: Under Russian supervision the Danubian Principalities are administered by the Organic Statutes. Otto of Bavaria becomes the first King of Greece. 1833: The Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi is signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which gives the former predominance in Balkan affairs and the latter safety from the Egyptian threat. 290 1839: The decree known as Hati Sherif of Gulhane (3 November) is the first of a series of Ottoman laws that constitute the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms are mostly instigated by England and are linked to the Eastern Question –the future of the Ottoman Empire. Milos O e o ić abdicates refusing to accept constitutional limitations on his absolute rule. He is replaced by Alexander Karađo đe ić, the choice of the Constitutionalist opposition to Milos. 1839-1861: Abdul Mejid reigns as Sultan. 1844: King Otto grants his subjects a Constitution after popular demonstration in Athens. 1848: Uprising in the Danubian Principalities is put down by Russian and Ottoman troops. The revolt nevertheless produces a generation of political figures that will mark developments in Romania. 1853-56: The Crimean War of England and France against Russia, is a European war to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. ‘ussia s defeat a ks a e a of E glish po e i the Eastern Mediterranean and an eclipse of Russian influence in the Balkans. 1856: T eat of Pa is puts a e d to ‘ussia s p ote to ate i the Danubian principalities. 1857-1859: Unification of Moldavia and Wallachia under Prince Alexander Cuza marks the emergence of Romania as a unified entity. 1858: Alexander Ka ađo đe ić is deposed by the Serbian Assembly and the O e o ić dynasty is back in power. 291 1861-1876: Abdul Aziz as Sultan continues the Tanzimat reforms. 1862-1863: Otto of Greece is deposed and George of Denmark becomes the King of the Hellenes (1863-1913). 1864: New Constitution of Greece proclaims its regime as a C o ed ‘epu li . Co stitutio adopted. 1866: Cuza is overthrown and replaced by Charles Hohenzollern as hegemon of Romania. 1868-1889: Milos O e o ić becomes Prince of Serbia and after 1882, King. 1870: The Sultan recognises the Bulgarian autocephalous church. The Bulgarian Exarchate Church breaks links with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 1875: Bulgarian uprising is suppressed by Ottoman irregulars with great violence. 1876-1909: Abdul Hamid II begins his long reign. The Ottoman reforms come to an end. 1877: Russo-Ottoman war. 1878: The Treaty of San Stefano establishing a great Bulgaria is replaced by the Treaty of Berlin that determines the status quo in the Balkans and grants Serbia and Romania independence of Ottoman suzerainty. 1878: The League of P iz e in Kosovo declares that Albanians will fight to keep their lands in the Ottoman Empire and ask to be united in one province. 292 1879: Alexander Battenberg becomes Prince of Bulgaria. The Tirno o Constitution is adopted. 1881: Greece acquires Thessaly and parts of Epirus. 1885: Alexander Battenberg annexes the province of Eastern Rumelia. Bulgaria wards off a Serb attack and almost conquers Belgrade. 1887: Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg becomes Prince of Bulgaria. 1889-1903: Ale a de A O e o ić King of Serbia. He and his wife are assassinated by a secret society of rebellious officers. 1903: Peter Ka ađo đe ić the new King of Serbia. 1903-1908: An undeclared war fought mostly between Greek and Bulgarian irregulars for the future annexation of Ottoman Macedonia rages throughout this period. 1908: Young Turk revolt in Thessaloniki against the Ottoman ancien régime. Austria annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is founded by Bishop Fan Noli. 1909: Abdul Hamid attempts a counter revolution and is deposed by the Young Turks. Show of force by the Greek military against the crown. Demands for reform are granted. Eleftherios Venizelos summoned from Crete to become the adviser of the Greek military. 1910: Venizelos elected Prime Minister. The beginning of his important reforms. 1912: First Balkan War. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro defeat the Ottoman forces in land and sea battles. Most of the 293 Ottoman territories in Europe divided between the victors. Birth of Albania as a nation state. 1913: Second Balkan War. Bulgaria declares war against Greece and Serbia and is defeated. Ottoman and Romanian forces gain territories won by Bulgaria during the First Balkan War. Treaties of London and Bucharest determine the territorial status of the winners and the vanquished. 1914-1918: The First World War divides the Balkan states in two camps: Those such as Serbia, Greece and Romania who side with the triple Entente and those that fight on the side of the Triple Alliance (Germany and Austro-Hungary), such as Bulgaria and Turkey. 1915-1918: The beginning of a political rift between the head of the Greek state, King Constantine and the pro-entente Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos. The latter stages a coup in Thessaloniki and brings Greece into WWI on the side of France and England. 1918: September: Revolt of the Bulgarian armed forces. Republic of Radomir. October: Ferdinand abdicates in favor of his son Boris (1918-1943). December: Birth of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Transylvania becomes part of RomaniaRomania. 1919: During the Paris Peace Conference the Balkan states acquire their final territorial configuration. In the summer Romanian troops enter Budapest and overthrow the Bela Kun Bolshevik government. The Treaty of Neuilly (27 November) determines the fate of Bulgaria. 1920: Under the Treaty of Sevres (10 August) Greece acquires Western and Eastern Thrace and a mandate to administer Smyrna. The royalists win the elections and restore Constantine to his 294 throne. Alexander Stamboliyski becomes Prime Minister of Bulgaria and his Agrarian Party dominates the political life of that country. 1922: Greek forces defeated in Turkey and the ethnic population flees to Greece. Constantine abdicates. Beginning of conflict between Fan Noli and Ahmet Zogu in Albania. 1923: The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July) fixes the Greek-Turkish boundaries and imposes an exchange of populations between the two countries. On 9 June the Bulgarian military with the help of IMRO activists, overthrow Stamboliyski and assassinate him. The belated rebellion of the communist party and its violent suppression banishes the left from interwar Bulgarian politics. 1924: The Communist party is outlawed in Romania. Noli s government collapses in Tirana as Ahmet Zogu invades Albania with Yugoslav help. 1925: Zogu becomes President of Albania and in 1928-1939 reigns as King Zog. 1927: Ki g Fe di a d s death auses o fusio i Romania because his successor, Michael (his grandson), is a minor. 1929: Following parliamentary assassinations and political upheaval, King Alexander suspends the Yugoslav constitution and imposes a royal dictatorship. 1930: A Greek-Turkish Treaty of friendship signed between Prime Minister Venizelos and Turkish President Kemal Atatürk, settles outstanding issues between the two states. 1934: Colo el Da ia Vel he a d the ) e o society stage a coup and takes over the Bulgarian government. They abolish political 295 parties, trade unions and suppress the VMRO. Although this Bulgarian dictatorship lasts for only a year, King Boris maintains the state of emergency throughout his rule. King Alexander of Yugoslavia is assassinated by a combination of forces between the Croatian Fascist, Ustasha and the Bulgarian VMRO. The Balkan pact is signed between Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Some even talk of a Federation of Balkan states. 1935: Following a failed military coup of liberal officers to prevent the return of the monarchy, George II is restored as King of the Hellenes. 1936-1941: King George suspends articles of the constitution and proclaims another yet royal dictatorship in the Balkans. His political front is dictator Ioannis Metaxas. 1938: King Carol of Romania suspends parliament and executes the Fas ist leade of the I o Gua d , Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. 1939: Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, invades Albania. 1940: Greek rebuff of Italian Fascist attack from Albanian soil, is the first allied victory in the Second World War. 1940: German-Soviet relations become strained over Romania. Germany offers the Romanian guarantees against Russian territorial demands. 1941 (25 March): Serbian officers launch a coup against Regent Paul and proclaim the eighteen year old Peter, King. The new government declares the German-Yugoslav pact null and void. Without declaring war Hitler bombs Belgrade and invades Yugoslavia. By the end of May Hitler captures Greece. 296 1944 (30 August): The Red Army enters Bucharest. (8 September) The Red Army enters Sofia, followed by a pro-communist coup. (20 “epte e Tito s Pa tisa s a d the ‘ed A f ee Belg ade. November) Enver Hoxha liberates Tirana. Churchill and Stalin divide the Balkans into Western and Soviet spheres. 1946: Yalta Conference. Europe divided by the victors in spheres of influence. 1946-1949: The Greek civil war rages. 1947: Bled Agreement of Tito and Dimitrov and Treaty of friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, are signed in Varna. 1948: Tito-Stalin break. 1959: Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement. 1952: Greece and Turkey become NATO members. 1953: (28 February) Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece sign a five-year Treaty of Friendship and coope atio in Ankara. 1954: (9 August) Same states sign a treaty of military alliance in Bled. 1955: Establishment of the Warsaw Pact. Members from the Balkans are, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. 1956: The Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising causes much soul searching among Communist states. The subsequent see-saw of Soviet-Yugosla elatio s dete i es Tito s sta e towards Bulgaria and Greece. Georghe Gheorghiu- Dez, leader of Romania, realises that he can exchange his ideological loyalty to the Soviet Union with a certain flexibility in domestic politics. 297 Hoxha purges his party with accusations of treason against his fo e asso iates as Tito s age ts. 1958: Dissolution of the Balkan Pact with Yugoslav initiative. 1959: Trilatelar Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 1961: First nonaligned conference in Belgrade. 1962: Rift between Tirana and Moscow. 1963: Ap il A e o stitutio of Yugosla ia dee s it a “o ialist as opposed to a Peoples Fede al ‘epu li . De e t alisatio is see as the a s e to atio alis . “elf- a age e t esta lished as the social and economic doctrine of the state. 1965: Nicolas Ceaușes u becomes First Secretary of the Romanian Communist party following the death of Gheorghiu-Dez. In 1974 Ceaușes u becomes President. 1966: Ho ha a ou es his cultural revolutio . 1967: The Albanians of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia demand the unification of Tetovo with Kosovo. 1967-1974: Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Slovenes at different times uphold their claims vis-á-vis the Federal Yugoslavia. 1968: The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw Pact Forces causes strong reactions from Yugoslavia and Romania. 1974: A new Yugoslav constitution (the longest in existence) promotes further decentralisation of the Federal state and grants Kosovo and Vojvodina rights of veto. The constitution advocates a 298 complicated relationship between territorial units and interest groups. Ten years later many argue that it destroyed the unity of the Yugoslav market and ultimately the Federal state itself. 1974: Collapse of Greek military regime following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 1976-1990: A series of multilateral conferences and meetings between Balkan states imply willingness of reviving a kind of Balkan Pact. 1978: Rift between Tirana and Beijing. 1980: Death of Tito at 87. 1983: Greek-Soviet détente. Agreement of economic cooperation is signed in Athens. 1985: Michail Gorbachev in power. 1986: Slobovan Miloše ić leader of Serbian Communist Party. 1987: Greece and Albania remove the state of war between them, in force since 1940. 1989: Miloše ić a olishes Koso o s auto o overthrown and executed on Christmas day. . Ceaușes u 1990: Meeting of Balkan Foreign Ministers in Tirana. 1991: Albania becomes a full member of OSCE. In March Croatia begins its war of secession from Yugoslavia. 299 1992: Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised as independent states. Serbia and Montenegro form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 1993: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) becomes a member of UN. 1992-1996: The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fratricidal war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is followed by atrocities that the European continent had not seen since the Second World War. 1995 (21 November): The Dayton Accord, masterminded by the Americans freezes the bloody conflict in Bosnia. The segregated parts of the supervised state continue their separate existence to this day. 1996: Intra-Balkan meeting in Athens prompted by the Royaumont initiative. 1997: Inter-Balkan conference in Crete as part of the South East Cooperation Process-SEECP. The first meeting between the leaders of Yugoslavia and Albania (Miloše ić and Nano) since 1948. 1998: Agreement between Holbrooke and Miloše ić for an armistice in Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army continues its struggle against the Serbs. The Rambouillet conference sends an ultimatum to Serbia. 1999: From March to June Serbia is constantly bombed by NATO aircraft. KFOR takes over Kosovo which officially remains under Serbian sovereignty according to UN resolution 1244. In fact Kosovo becomes a UN Protectorate. The Security Pact for the Balkans is decided in the Sarajevo conference. 300 2000 (September): Miloše ić is defeated in the presidential elections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Vojislav Koštu i a. 2001: The Li e atio A (Kin to the Kosovo Liberation Army) launches attacks against the government forces of FYROM. The Ochrid agreement between the two major ethnic groups of FYROM stops the conflict of Slavs against Albanians. On 29 June Miloše ić is send to the Hague Tribunal. Croatia sings the Stability and Association Pact with the EU. 2002 (February): Inter-Balkan Conference in Tirana (SEECP). (November) Romania and Bulgaria become NATO members. Summit meeting in Prague. 2003 (February): The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is renamed “e ia-Mo te eg o . Peace-keeping forces of the EU in FYROM replace the expeditionary troops of the UN and NATO (12 March) Assassination of Serb Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. (April) InterBalkan conference in Belgrade. The Thessaloniki Summit declares that the future of the Balkans is in the EU. 2004: Albanian Kosovars attack Serb Kosovars. (June) Boris Tadić elected President of Serbia. 2006: Following a referendum Montenegro declares independence on 3 June. Miloše ić dies in his cell at the Hague. 2007: Bulgaria and Romania become full members of the EU on the first day of the new year. 2008: Unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. 301 2010: The I te atio al Cou t of Justi e de ides agai st “e ia s appeal o e Koso o s iolatio of UN ‘esolutio . The ou t s ruling finds no breach of international law in the 2008 declaration of independence by Kosovo. 2012: In the May 6 elections in Serbia the nationalist candidate Tomislav Nikolić is elected President and his SNS party wins 73 seats in parliament over former President Tadić s D“ hi h i s . 2013: On 19 April the two sides to the Kosovo dispute sign an agreement that will safeguard Serb autonomy in Northern Kosovo. The agreement is presented by Prime Ministers Dačić and Thaçi as a ground-breaking event. 302 ABBREVIATIONS AKR ASNOM BANU BCP CARDS CFSP COMECON COMINTERN COMINFORM CPY CSCE CSDP CUP EAM Autonomous Kosovo Party Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia Bulgarian Agrarian National Union Bulgarian Communist Party Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation Common Foreign and Security Policy Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Communist (Third) International (1919-1943) Communist Information Bureau (1947-56) Communist Party of Yugoslavia Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (developed into OSCE) Common Security and Defence Policy (Young Turk) Committee for Union and Progress National Liberation Front (Greece) 303 EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ELIAMEP Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy ESDP European Security and Defence Policy European Union Institute for Security Studies European Union European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Special Representative in Kosovo Federation Implementation Council Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia International Criminal Court International Civilian Representative in Kosovo International Civilian Office International Criminal Tribunal fo the Fo e Yugosla ia s Appeals Chamber NATO Implementation Force Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Peoples A EUISS EU EULEX EUSR FIC FRY FYROM ICC ICR ICO ICTY IFOR JNA 304 KFOR KPC KVM KLA (UCK) HDZ HR MTA NATO NLA ND OECD OHR OSCE PASOK PIC PfP SAA SAP SEECP SFOR SRM SRSG Kosovo Protection Force Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Verification Mission Kosovo Liberation Army Croatian Democratic Union High Representative Military Technical Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Liberation Army New Democracy party (Greece) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Office of the UN High Representative Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Panhellenic Socialist Movement Peace Implementation Council Partnership for Peace Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association Process South-East Cooperation Process NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina Socialist Republic of Macedonia Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN) 305 SSR TO UCPMB UN UNMIBH UNMIK UN UNSCR VJ VMRO VMRO-DPMNE Security Sector Reform Teritorijalna Odbrana (Territorial Defence) Liberation A of P eše o, Med eđa a d Buja o a United Nations United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Security Resolution Vojska Jugoslavije (Army of Yugoslavia) Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization Right-wing political party of FYROM 306