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J7ournal of medical ethics, 1995; 21: 345-349
The ethics of surrogacy: women's
reproductive labour
Anton van Niekerk and Liezl van Zyl University of Stellenbosch, South Afca
Abstract
The aim of this article is to establish whether there is
anything intrinsically immoral about surrogacy
arrangements from the perspective of the surrogate
mother herself. Specific attention is paid to the claim
that surrogacy is similar to prostitution in that it reduces
women 's reproductive labour to a form of alienated
and/or dehumanised labour.
Introduction
The word 'surrogate' literally means 'substitute' or
'replacement'. A 'surrogate mother' is therefore a
'substitute mother': she is a woman who, for financial and/or compassionate reasons, agrees to bear a
child for another woman who is incapable or, less
often, unwilling to do so herself. In other words, she
is a substitute or 'tentative' mother in that she conceives, gestates and delivers a baby on behalf of
another woman who is subsequently to be seen as
the 'real' (social and legal) mother of the child.
The most common kind of surrogacy is where a
woman's egg, either through artificial insemination
or, less often, natural intercourse, is fertilised by the
sperm of the male partner of the couple desiring a
child (the commissioning father). Here the surrogate
is the genetic mother of the child that she promises
to give up, while the role of social and legal mother is
taken over by another woman (the commissioning
mother). To denote the genetic link between the surrogate and the child she bears, we shall call this type
of surrogacy 'genetic surrogacy', although it is more
often referred to as 'partial surrogacy'. It is also
possible, if the commissioning father is infertile or
wishes not to pass on a defective gene, to fertilise the
surrogate's egg with the sperm of a donor or with
that of her husband, which is referred to as 'total
surrogacy'.
Another form of surrogacy utilises the process of
in vitro fertilisation where the egg and semen are
Key words
Surrogacy; prostitution; reproduction; alienated labour;
dehumanisation.
obtained from the commissioning couple (or from
anonymous donors), the resultant embryo subsequently being implanted into the surrogate or
carrying mother. We shall refer to this as 'gestatory
surrogacy', since the surrogate only performs the
function of gestation for the commissioning couple,
without having a genetic link with the child. This
type of surrogacy is sometimes called 'full surrogacy'.
The aim of this article is to establish whether there
is anything intrinsically immoral about surrogacy
arrangements from the perspective of the surrogate
mother herself. Specific attention is paid to the claim
that surrogacy is similar to prostitution in that it
reduces women's reproductive labour to a form of
alienated and/or dehumanised labour. We deal elsewhere with the question surrounding the moral
acceptability of surrogacy from the perspective of the
child, where more attention is paid to the issue of
commodification of children and the morality of
surrogacy contracts (1).
Surrogacy and prostitution
Opponents of surrogacy are fond of pointing out that
an analogy exists between commercial surrogacy and
prostitution. Mary Wamock cites a similar objection, supposedly expressed by a doctor: surrogacy is
described as 'a form of exploitation similar to prostitution' (2). Andrea Dworkin, the well-known
American feminist, states that: '[[m] otherhood is
becoming a new branch of female prostitution with
the help of scientists who want access to the womb
for experimentation and power .... Women can sell
reproductive capacities the same way old-time
prostitutes sold sexual ones but without the stigma
of whoring because there is no penile intrusion. It is
the womb, not the vagina, that is being bought' (3).
It is not difficult to detect certain similarities
between prostitution and surrogacy. Prokopijevic
notices the following: 'In both cases one's physical
service is being offered, in both instances a deep
personal or emotional relationship is not required for
the transaction to be completed, in both cases
material compensation is offered for the physical
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346 The ethics of surrogacy: women 's reproductive labour
services provided' (4). These similarities are, as
Prokopijevic rightly points out, superficial and relatively unimportant compared to the differences
between the two cases. They are also characteristic
features of most transactions where physical labour
is traded for material compensation. It happens
every day that we trade money for services without
forming a 'deep personal or emotional relationship'
with each other. Those who claim that surrogacy is
similar to prostitution on these grounds (and that it
is therefore immoral), must be living in a society
of 'prostitutes', and feeling very unhappy about the
situation.
but only to act in the way specified by the contract
(6).
With these remarks Ameson completely misses
the point that Anderson tries to make. Everybody
knows that 'alienated labor is not forbidden in a
liberal society', and that it would be inappropriate
(or at least unasked for) for me to develop a personal
and emotional relationship with every baker before I
buy his bread, or with every electrician before I
employ his services. I use these people as nothing
more than means to an end, and no one complains
that my treatment of them is similar to prostitution.
But Anderson's point is not that surrogacy is
immoral because it is a form of alienated labour, but
because pregnancy should not become an act of alienated
Alienated labour
labour. Being denied the legitimacy of one's perspecDrawing an analogy between surrogacy and prosti- tive on one's labour, being alienated from your
tution is hardly adequate to show that surrogacy is feelings and having to act against one's emotions is
immoral. Anderson makes an attempt at a more not wrong per se, but only wrong if the labour in
in-depth discussion of the objection that surrogacy is question is women's reproductive labour (or another
wrong because it commodifies women's reproduc- special form of labour). It is in this sense that surrotive labour. She writes that the application of gacy is similar to prostitution: not that both are
economic norms to the sphere of women's labour forms of alienated labour, but that in both cases a
violates their claim to respect and consideration. physical capacity (sexual intercourse and gestation)
First, 'by requiring the surrogate mother to repress that should be afforded special respect, is degraded
whatever parental love she feels for the child, these to a form of alienated labour. What lies at the heart
norms convert women's labour into a form of of the objection that surrogacy is similar to prostitualienated labor'. ('Alienated labour' here is under- tion, is that women's reproductive labour, like their
stood in the twofold Hegelian sense, ie, as 1. the sexuality, should not be compared to and treated in
situation when the product of labour is separated the same way as other forms of physical labour.
from its producer, but 2. where it is separated Anderson says that '[p] regnancy is not simply a biofrom the producer precisely because the producer logical process but also a social practice. Many social
surrendered it to someone else and, more generally, expectations and considerations surround women's
to the market). Secondly, Anderson continues, 'by gestational labor, marking it off as an occasion for
manipulating and denying legitimacy to the surro- the parents to prepare themselves to welcome a new
gate mother's evolving perspective on her own preg- life into their family' (5).
We shall call the thesis that women's reproductive
nancy, the norms of the market degrade her' (5).
Ameson's reply to the first objection is simply that labour is intrinsically different from other forms of
the contract 'does not require the surrogate mother labour the 'asymmetry thesis', following Debra Satz
to feel in certain ways, but rather to act in certain (7). But is this thesis true? Is there anything intrinsic
ways'. He acknowledges that the contract may to women's reproductive labour that should keep us
require her to act against her feelings to fulfil its from commodifying it or turning it into a form of
terms, and that to this extent her labour might turn 'alienated labour'?
Satz cites a few versions of the 'essentialist thesis'
out to be alienated labour. 'But in a liberal society',
Arneson continues, 'alienated labor is not forbidden' that focus on the biological or naturalistic features of
women's reproductive labour, for instance that
(6).
His reply to the second objection (that the many of the phases of the reproductive process are
contract denies legitimacy to the surrogate's own involuntary, while other forms of labour are volunevolving perspective on her pregnancy) can be sum- tary at virtually every step; that reproductive labour
marized as follows. Any contract determines one's extends over a period of approximately nine months,
future behaviour to some extent. Signing a contract while other forms of labour do not typically necessidoes not deny that one's views and feelings might tate a long-term commitment, and that reproductive
change in the interim. But undergoing a change of labour involves significant restrictions of a woman's
one's perspective, of one's views or feelings, does not behaviour during pregnancy, while other forms of
change the terms of the contract, for this would defy labour are less invasive with respect to the worker's
the purpose of the contract, ie, to provide mutual body (7).
Satz is right to reject the argument that these
assurances of how the parties to the contract would
act in future. In short, Ameson's point is again that characteristics of reproductive labour can be used to
the contract does not require the surrogate to deny establish the asymmetry thesis. It is not difficult to
or suppress her feelings and changing perspective, name other forms of labour that have the same
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Anton van Niekerk and Liezl van Zyl 347
characteristics as those pointed out by the essentialist even labour pains.) Thus human reproductive
thesis as the distinguishing features of reproductive labour is not only physical labour or a biochemical
labour. Satz is also right to reject Pateman's claim state, but may also be a social and psychological
that a woman's reproductive labour is more 'integral' process in which a bond is established with the fetus
to her identity than her other productive capacities, in expectation of its birth.
and that therefore it should not be treated as an alienable commodity (8). We shall not attempt to criticize
Pateman's view - we leave that to those feminists 'Change of perspective'
who decided not to have children, to infertile women This also explains the 'change of perspective' that
and to postmenopausal women (all of whom should, many surrogates experience as their pregnancy
in Pateman's view, be suffering from a serious develops: whereas at first they might feel that pregidentity crisis). Instead, we shall focus on an aspect of nancy is simply a form of physical labour, that they
reproductive labour that is overlooked by the essen- will have no difficulty giving up the child, and that
tialist thesis and that of Pateman: the obvious fact they are simply performing a service for an infertile
that a pregnant woman is carrying a fetus to which couple, these women often realize as the time of
she will eventually give birth.
delivery nears, that they are expecting a child, in the
The essentialist thesis analyses the characteristics full social and psychological sense of knowing that
of reproductive labour independently from, and they are going to give birth to a human being that is
without ever mentioning, the resultant child(ren). closely tied to themselves.
Similarly, Pateman finds reproductive labour to be an
The problem with surrogacy arrangements is
integral part of a woman's identity, without referring therefore that it causes a woman to be pregnant
to the resulting child, which certainly is the most while expecting her not to acknowledge the fact that
important part of pregnancy. And this is exactly what she is expecting her child. It tries to divorce pregdistinguishes women's reproductive labour from nancy from the conscious knowledge that you are
other forms of labour, namely that the product of going to give birth to your child. In this way the surtheir labour is not something but someone. The rela- rogate becomes a mere 'environment' or 'human
tionship between a pregnant woman and her unborn incubator' for someone else's child.
Satz tries to bypass this criticism by saying that we
fetus is essentially different from that between a
worker and his or her material product. This could be are not really sure which emotions pregnancy
explained in many ways. We rest with the Buberian 'normally' involves. She points at the fact that many
remark that a person's relationship to material things women fail to bond with their fetuses (some abort
is instrumentalist; things are means to an end, but them), and that some even fail to bond with their
not ends in themselves. People's relationships to babies after they deliver them (7).
other people, and mothers' relationships to their
The implication of this seems to be that we should
infants in particular, are manifestly different. not object to the institution of surrogacy as such, but
Children are not means, but ends in the relationships only to those cases in which the surrogate does bond
with their mothers; mothers regard the relationship with the fetus but is nevertheless forced to give up
as a meaningful end in itself, and not (if the relation- the child against her will. In these cases the objection
ship is authentic) as a means to some other end. that the surrogate is performing alienated labour
Thus, instead of saying that reproductive labour is does hold, since she is forced to act against her
the most integral part of the female identity (as feelings. But this problem could perhaps be
Pateman does), one can rather claim that the bond overcome by not legally forcing surrogates to hand
between a pregnant woman and her child is usually over the babies to whom they gave birth. The surrogate would thereby not be compelled to act against
(or should be) an integral part of her pregnancy.
her feelings, and the legitimacy of her changing
perspective on her pregnancy would not be denied.
Social process
She would be free to fulfil the terms of the contract
To illustrate this point one can analyze the term by handing over the child, or, if she felt unable to do
'pregnancy' in more detail. On one level 'pregnancy' that, to keep the child.
Prokopijevic gives a similar solution to this
refers to the biological and physiological process of
'having developing child(ren) in the womb'. In this problem, which he describes as a 'repercussion of a
sense female animals can be said to be pregnant, non-moral nature'. He states that 'the surrogate
while no male can ever be pregnant. But the word mother might be allotted a certain period of time in
can also be taken to mean 'expecting a child', ie, the which she could change her mind and keep the
conscious knowledge that one is going to have a newly-born child, with corresponding compensation
child. Female animals cannot be said to be pregnant being paid to the other party, including the expenses
in this sense, while it is not uncommon to say that arising as a result of hospital care and the breaking of
the male partner of a pregnant woman is expecting a the contract' (4).
But to this the defenders of the rights of the comchild. (It is not uncommon for the male partner of a
pregnant woman to experience morning sickness or missioning couple would object that, although the
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348 The ethics of surrogacy: women 's reproductive labour
female partner was not physically pregnant, they
were both 'pregnant' in the social and psychological
sense of 'expecting a child', preparing for its birth as
any expectant couple might do. The child may even
be their genetic child. To deny their desire to raise
the child would thus be to deny the legitimacy of
their perspective on 'their' pregnancy, to alienate
them from their evolving emotions concerning the
child that they have come to accept as their child.
And this is anything but a 'repercussion of a nonmoral nature'!
Prokopijevic completely fails to take this into consideration when he says that, if one supposes that the
number of surrogate mothers who change their
minds is about ten per cent, this does not mean that
the institution of surrogacy would be seriously
endangered, for '[a]s far as the persons who order
the baby in those ten per cent of cases are concerned,
it is unlikely that they will have such bad luck the
next time'. He calculates the chances 'to have such
bad luck the next time' as 1/100, and says that 'we
should neglect such a slight probability' (4).
Prokopijevic's attitude towards the commissioning parents' feelings and their desire to have a child
is similar to the attitude of some defenders of
surrogacy arrangements towards the surrogate's
feelings. It is for the very reason that pregnancy is
much more than a mere biological and physical
process that we should not neglect the commissioning parents' growing perspective on their pregnancy.
Just as adoptive parents may come to love a child as
they would love their 'own' (read 'genetic') child,
the commissioning parents may come to view the
surrogate's pregnancy as 'their' pregnancy, as their
expectation of a child. One cannot expect them to be
satisfied simply to 'try again later' if the first attempt
turns out to be unsuccessful.
Those cases in which a dispute arises about who
the social parents of the child should be, could be
sorted out by considering the well-being of the child
itself. Instead of asking who the 'real' parents of the
child are one should rather consider who would be
best able to care for the child.
From the perspective of those who compete for
the status of legal parents, however, there is no easy
solution. For, if the surrogate is forced to hand over
the child against her will, her labour would turn out
to be alienated labour, since she is asked to separate
herself from the fruit of her womb and to surrender
that fruit to someone else. If, on the other hand, it is
decided that the surrogate (and her husband, if she
has one) should be the legal parent(s), the commissioning parents would be denied the legitimacy of
their evolving perspective on their pregnancy and
their child (which is usually also genetically related
to at least one of them). In cases where the surrogate
decided to keep the child, surrogacy could therefore
be said to be immoral, since whatever happens,
some moral and psychological harm (or at least
disappointment) may come to one of the parties.
But what if the surrogate does not change her
mind about handing over the child? Some surrogacy
agencies have reported a high percentage of successful transactions. It is said that in these cases all the
parties to the contract are better off than before:
the commissioning parents are somewhat poorer
financially, but with their much desired child, while
the surrogate is well compensated materially for her
labour, without feeling that she has performed
alienated labour. Does any moral harm result from
these instances of surrogacy?
Dehumanising labour
The most one can object to in these cases is that the
surrogate's labour is 'dehumanising'. As we have
indicated above, the distinguishing feature of human
pregnancies is that they may also entail a conscious
knowledge of the significance of this physiological
state and an active expectation of, and preparation
for, the birth of a child. Although it is hardly
'natural' or 'normal' for a person to develop this kind
of perspective on her (or his) pregnancy, we can all
recognize that it is good. Yet contract pregnancies
are geared towards keeping the surrogate from
experiencing pregnancy and childbirth in this way.
Instead, it asks the surrogate to relinquish her ability
to interpret and control the meaning or significance
of her reproductive labour.
To this one can again reply that it is not true of all
surrogacy arrangements. If the surrogate is a relative
or close friend, doing it for purely altruistic or
compassionate reasons, it is not clear that we can
describe her reproductive labour as 'alienating' or
'dehumanising'. The conscious knowledge that she
is going to have a child is then not denied, but
intensified, since she knows that she is doing it for a
higher purpose than solely (or mostly) for her own
benefit - the aim of bringing a child into the life of a
childless couple with whom she also has a close relationship. If she continues to play an active role in the
child's life as a 'second mother', there could be no
way in which her labour could be described as
'alienating' or 'dehumanising'. Only in such a situation will the surrogate's important role in the
existence of the child and the legitimacy of her claim
that it is her child be recognized.
Conclusion
Because surrogacy arrangements by definition involve
more than two people, all of whom can legitimately
claim that s/he is the parent of the child, a conflict can
in principle always arise about who should assume
parental rights and responsibilities towards the child.
It seems that this is a problem inherent to surrogacy
arrangements, since one can never be certain that
such a conflict will not arise. It is easy to praise a successful arrangement in retrospect, but the danger
always exists that an arrangement one is planning
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Anton van Niekerk and Liezl van Zyl 349
would cause moral harm to the surrogate and/or the
commissioning parents. The ideal would be for the
surrogate to be a close friend or relative of the commissioning parents who is also deemed psychologically and medically fit to undertake such a venture,
but again there is no guarantee that problems would
not arise. A couple usually prefer a surrogate who is
(and will remain) a total stranger to them, for the very
reason that they do not want a 'second mother' to
interfere with the upbringing of their child. This preference cannot, in the light of what we have argued, be
defended. Unless one can ensure the legitimacy of the
surrogate's bond with the child and her perspective on
her pregnancy without thereby denying that of the
commissioning couple, the surrogacy arrangement
can always be said to be dehumanising or alienating.
Professor Anton van Niekerk, MA (Philosophy), BTh,
DPhil (Philosophy), is Head of Department of
Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Applied Ethics
at the University of Stellenbosch. Liezl van Zyl, MA
(Philosophy), is a Researcherfor the Unit for Bioethics at
the same university.
References
(1) Van Niekerk A A, Van Zyl L L. Commercial surrogacy
and the commodification of children: an ethical perspective. Medicine and law 1995 [forthcoming].
(2) Wamock M. A question of life: the Warnock report on
human fertilisation and embryology. Oxford and New
York: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
(3) Dworkin A. Right-wing women: the politics of domesticated females. London: The Women's Press, 1983.
(4) Prokopijevic M. Surrogate motherhood. Journal of
applied philosophy 1990; 7, 2: 169-181.
(5) Anderson E S. Is women's labor a commodity?
Philosophy and public affairs 1990; 19, 1: 71-92.
(6) Arneson R J. Commodification and commercial surrogacy. Philosophy and public affairs 1992; 21,2: 132-164.
(7) Satz D. Markets in women's reproductive labor.
Philosophy and public affairs 1992; 21, 2: 107-131.
(8) Pateman C. The sexual contract. Cambridge: Polity
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The ethics of surrogacy:
women's reproductive
labour.
A van Niekerk and L van Zyl
J Med Ethics 1995 21: 345-349
doi: 10.1136/jme.21.6.345
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