This art icle was downloaded by: [ Aviad Rubin] On: 25 August 2015, At : 15: 30 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG Citizenship Studies Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ ccst 20 Democracy and distributiveness: patterns of transition from hegemony in divided societies a As'ad Ghanem & Aviad Rubin a a School of Polit ical Science, Universit y of Haif a, Haif a, Israel Published online: 25 Aug 2015. Click for updates To cite this article: As'ad Ghanem & Aviad Rubin (2015): Democracy and dist ribut iveness: pat t erns of t ransit ion f rom hegemony in divided societ ies, Cit izenship St udies, DOI: 10. 1080/ 13621025. 2015. 1023262 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 13621025. 2015. 1023262 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. 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Term s & Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions Citizenship Studies, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2015.1023262 Democracy and distributiveness: patterns of transition from hegemony in divided societies As’ad Ghanem1 and Aviad Rubin* School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 (Received 26 February 2014; accepted 7 September 2014) Many culturally heterogeneous societies with functioning democratic regimes nonetheless fail to grant equal status to different ethnic and cultural groups within their borders. To a great extent, scholars discuss such inequalities within the analytical boundaries of the discourse on democracy and democratization. We argue that such discussions overstretch the concept of democracy. In this research, we offer a novel axis of inquiry, namely distributiveness. We define distributiveness as the egalitarian distribution of resources – political, material, cultural-symbolic, institutional, and territorial – among different ethnic, religious, or cultural groups which self-identify as collectives within society. The aim of this new conceptualization is to (1) restore conceptual clarity to the literature on democracy, (2) enhance our capacity to assess the allocation of resources within a given polity, and (3) elucidate the processes that lead to change in patterns of allocation. Keywords: distributiveness; democracy; resource allocation; hegemony Introduction What is the conceptual relationship between democratic governance and the distribution of resources across society? Should the structure of resource allocation to groups within the state be included within the conceptual boundaries of the term democracy? Can ethnically dominant regimes be considered democratic? These and related questions are the subject of heated debate in the contemporary literature on democratic governance in multi-ethnic societies (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Smooha 2002; Yiftahel and Ghanem 2004; Peleg 2007). However, despite the growing importance of these issues, this field of research lacks conceptual clarity and workable analytical tools, and is thus to a large extent ill-equipped, in its current form, to facilitate accurate assessment and corresponding prescriptions for greater pluralism and egalitarianism in contemporary societies.2 Our goal in this article is to contribute to the vast literature on democracy and the allocation of resources in heterogeneous societies by (a) clarifying the boundaries of democracy as a concept, (b) illuminating the relationship between democracy and distributive practices, and (c) modelling the dynamic progression that leads to increased distributiveness in heterogeneous societies and their transition from hegemonic to more egalitarian allocation regimes. More specifically, we develop three independent yet closely related arguments: First, much of the recent literature on transitions to democracy and democratic governance in divided societies suggests a straightforward link between the allocation of resources to groups within the state and the democratic character of the regime. That is, *Corresponding author. Email: aviadrubin@poli.haifa.ac.il q 2015 Taylor & Francis Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 2 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin this literature conceives of social pluralism and the equal promotion of various cultures as necessary components of genuine democracy. We hold that issues of just distribution within society should be conceptually and practically disentangled from the evaluation of democratic regimes, and developed as a separate realm of measurement and analysis. Such a move will provide better conceptual clarity and avoid internal contradictions within mainstream democratic theory. Second, by way of advancing a solution to this problem, we introduce a complementary concept, distributiveness, which conceptualizes the allocation of resources in society along a scale anchored by complete hegemony on one side and complete egalitarianism on the other, with different resources potentially falling at different places along that scale. We thus offer a method of measuring distributiveness in political regimes whereby democratic procedures are but one dimension among many. In this respect, we criticize the common understanding of ethnic hegemonic regimes in binary terms (i.e., as either hegemonic or not) as too rigid. Third, the literature on ethnic power relations describes various ways in which multiethnic states may organize themselves so as to overcome ethnic hegemony. However, very little has been written about the specific mechanisms that promote or inhibit social and political transformation from hegemony towards greater distributiveness. This article fills this vacuum by suggesting a dynamic model that outlines the conditions and processes involved in the transformation from hegemonic distribution regimes towards greater distributiveness within heterogeneous societies. The primary goal of this article is to lay the foundations for an innovative operational framework that can reveal patterns of allocation in society outside the conceptual umbrella of the term democracy. At this stage, we therefore concentrate on developing the theoretical concept and its main components, and underlining its multifaceted connection with democratic governance.3 Our hope is that the current endeavour will draw clear conceptual boundaries between the transition to democracy and transitions in levels of distributiveness, and will facilitate a more precise categorization of political regimes in divided societies. We also hope that future research will further develop, apply and test the suggested framework using specific case studies. Democracy and distribution: recovering conceptual overstretch The meaning of the term democracy – and, consequentially, its logical extensions and political and policy implications – has always been complex and elusive. Indeed, given that the label ‘democracy’ endows political regimes with a stamp of legitimacy, this very elusiveness is often exploited for the purpose of legitimating regimes that are, de facto, very far from meaningful democratic governance. Likewise, when scholars and political activists seek to challenge the legitimacy of certain political regimes they frequently contest their democratic nature (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Zakaria 1997; Diamond 1999). What is the basis on which democracy should be defined? Huntington (1991) argues that democracy has been defined in the literature in three different ways: (1) as an accepted set of procedures; (2) according to its desired goals; and (3) according to its source of authority. The latter two have been found very problematic,4 and consequently the procedural definition is most commonly used. Of course, the procedural component of democracy can be examined in more than one way. While some, like Huntington, emphasize institutional and regulatory procedures enacted by the state, others, like Habermas and followers, emphasize communicative and deliberative procedures at the civil society level (Habermas 1998; Held 2006). Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Citizenship Studies 3 Robert Dahl (1971) was the first contemporary thinker to provide a sound definition of democracy (though he preferred the term polyarchy for modern democratic states, perceiving democracy as an ideal or archetype). Dahl’s definition is based on a number of criteria relating to competition and participation, including (among others) universal suffrage, freedom of association and expression, and accessibility of information; regimes that meet these conditions are considered polyarchic, or in our terms, democratic (Dahl 1971). Dahl’s definition has considerable advantages. It is relatively abstract and valid in different social and cultural contexts, while also being measurable. As such, it provides a universal standard for assessing the level of democratization in society, one that is applicable to almost every political context, allowing for comparison across cases (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Plattner 1998). Moreover, while this definition has been criticized as overly procedural, its elements imply important substantive rights, including equality, freedom of speech, freedom of association, universal applicability, and others. More recent definitions of democracy accentuate its liberal dimension, including more substantive elements of democracy, such as universal application of the rule of law and protection of civil rights, as a corrective to Dahl’s overly procedural definition (Linz and Stepan 1996; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997; Diamond 1999). What is striking, however, is that nowhere in either the ‘procedural’ or ‘liberal’ definitions of democracy is there any mention of the relationship among groups in society. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his writings on the tyranny of the majority (De Tocqueville 2003), took group rights as a focal point in his definition of a democratic regime; but in modern times, this perspective is found only in Arend Lijphart (1969, 1977) consociational democracy,5 where it is a deviation from, rather than part of, mainstream democratic theory. Indeed, until recently democratic theory was developed almost entirely within the liberal stream, or what May refers to as the ‘deethnicized view of liberal democracy’ (May 2008, 96). In this framework, collective rights and the relationship among groups in society have been given scarcely any consideration. Similarly, in two complementary strands of literature – on democratization (or the transition to democracy) and democratic consolidation – there has been no substantive discussion on equal promotion of different cultures or acknowledgement of different groups in the public sphere as essential ingredients of the democratization process, or one of its desired outcomes. Instead, scholars have emphasized attributes such as free and fair elections, impartial rule of law, an active civil society, and respect for property rights (Linz and Stepan 1996); broad legitimacy and efficiency (Diamond 1999); alternation of power among political rivals; widespread support of the system during periods of economic hardship; regime stability in the face of radical changes in the party system; the absence of a substantial anti-system movement (O’Donnell 1996); and the understanding of the most important political actors that democracy is the ‘only game in town’ (Przeworski 1991, 26). Beginning in the 1990s, however, voluminous work has advanced a different approach, one that, it may be said, overstretches the conceptual boundaries of the term democracy. For the purpose of the current work this school can be loosely labelled as the ‘democratic overstretch school’ (DOS). For the DOS, democratic regimes, especially in heterogeneous societies, are conditioned by equal allocation of resources and promotion of minority cultures. In contrast with the focus of democratic theory on individual rights, the DOS demands equal treatment for groups. This approach challenges what it considers as an overly liberal conception of individual citizenship as the dominant building bloc of democratic regimes. In the past, citizenship was tied to and conceived as overlapping with homogenizing national projects. Simply put, citizens comprised the nation-state. During the two recent decades, however, Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 4 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin a post-national trend evolved due to mass migration, especially to the developed world; transnational practices and affiliations; new demands for recognition by minority identity groups; and growing awareness to the diversified nature of most societies on the globe. This trend generated works that problematized the relationship between citizenship, identity groups, nations and states, and crated new linkages between citizenship and group identity, sub-state citizenship and cross territorial citizenship (Isin 2012; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Isin and Turner 2002). Within this growing field of research, the DOS represents concerns about a-symmetric power relationship between groups in contemporary societies and their impact on democratic governance. For Smooha (2002), ethnic dominance is inherently contradictory to democracy in its fullest sense. While the concentration of political power and resources in the hands of the dominant ethnos in the state might go hand in hand with democratic procedures, such a regime qualifies as a democracy only in some diminished sense. Likewise, Peleg (2007) contends that states which favour one ethnic group within their constitutional codes are flawed democracies at best, even if they fully exercise democratic procedure and protect the equality of all citizens as individuals. The title of Peleg’s recent book, Democratizing the Hegemonic State, also implies that hegemonic tendencies stand in stark opposition to democracy. Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel (1998) take an even more extreme position, according to which regimes that fail to ensure equal recognition and fair distribution of resources to all groups in society are not to be considered democratic. According to these authors, democratic features cannot compensate for a non-democratic structure. Such regimes should be termed not democracies, but ‘ethnocracies’ (Yiftachel 2006). This literature contributes profoundly to our understanding of divided societies, and the serious socio-political challenges they confront. It points towards injustices in the distribution of resources in democratic contexts. It justifiably criticises the dominant overliberal language of political theory, and the need to find a balance between individual and collective rights, and between citizenship and identity (Requejo 2010; Czergo and Deegan-Krause 2011). Further, this literature builds on a vibrant discourse in political theory and reflects the views of influential multicultural scholars such as Kymlicka (1995), Young (2000), Taylor (1994), Tamir (1993), and Gutmann (2003). Notwithstanding its contributions, however, the DOS suffers a serious shortcoming in that that it imposes distinct social goals, important though these might be, into the already very complex definition of democracy. In so doing, scholars affiliated with this school unjustifiably stretch the boundaries of the concept democracy, and treat democracy as a panacea for many of the ills that afflict contemporary societies. Consequently, the term democracy loses its analytical rigor and is exposed to excessive criticism, and its ability to serve as a useful concept in various socio-political contexts is gravely diminished. As Schmitter and Karl (1991, 85) convincingly argued: There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectations on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy a society will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative, and cultural problems. Unfortunately, ‘all good things do not necessarily go together’. Indeed, an overstretched conceptualization of ‘democracy’ creates terminological problems, conceptual ambiguity, and inconsistency with mainstream democratic theory. Smooha (2002), for instance, falls into a contradiction in terms when he argues that ‘ethnic democracy’ is a ‘diminished type of democracy’ (476), but at the same time that ‘the political system is democratic’ (478). Likewise, Peled criticizes the ethnic nature of the Jewish state, but at the same time refers to it as ‘one successful example of a democratic Citizenship Studies 5 yet deeply divided society’ (1992, 432). Similarly, Peleg (2007, 29– 30) admits that liberal democracy cannot comprehend issues of collective distribution and recognition: Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 If the majority group enjoys overwhelming superiority over the minority, as is often the case in ‘hegemonies,’ it can sustain its dominant position even if a full-fledged liberal democracy with all of its individual freedoms, rights, and liberties is established (emphasis added) Because the DOS too often evaluates the democratic character of political regimes based on factors that are irrelevant to what is commonly understood as democratic performance, there exists an unbridgeable discrepancy between the DOS and indexes commonly used to measure democratic performance, such as the Polity IV Project, the Economist’s Democratic Index, or the various reports published by Freedom House. For instance, while Polity IV and Freedom House rank heterogeneous states such as Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Israel as free and durable democracies (www.freedomhouse.org; http://www. systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), DOS scholars treat these states as flawed, partial, or inferior democracies, or even as non-democratic (Smooha 2002; Yiftachel 2006; Peleg 2007). The polemics around the concept make it inapplicable in comparative theoretical and empirical research. In contrast with the tendency of the DOS, other scholars are aware of the difference between democracy and other, related yet distinct social processes. In their now-classic Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) assert that democracy is achieved when the electoral procedure is institutionalized and practiced for determining the incumbent regime. They warn against over-high expectations regarding democracy, and stress that egalitarian allocation and pluralisation are desired outcomes of a much deeper social process which they label ‘socialization’, to distinguish it from democratization. Similarly, Glazer (2010, 7) argues that modern societies should be judged along two different criteria: first, ‘according to their degree of democracy’, and second, ‘according to their success in dealing with deep divisions’. Understanding political regimes as encompassing more than the minimum democratic criteria of respect for individual rights and liberties will have a profound impact on our ability to evaluate the degree of legitimacy of political regimes. According to the DOS, any violation of collective equality diminishes democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, decoupling and distinguishing democracy as a political system from other realms of distribution might result in a more sophisticate assessment of the legitimacy of political regimes. For example, the Catalonian population of Spain or the Arab population of Israel can legitimize the democratic system of their countries but at the same time object their system of collective recognition and resource allocation. Such an approach, therefore, might lead to a multidimensional understanding of political legitimacy and distinction between democratic legitimacy and related yet different concepts such as regime legitimacy or distributive legitimacy. Indeed, there exists a tension between the need to address systematically complex socio-political issues on the one hand, and the need to maintain the conceptual clarity of a key term such as democracy. This tension is an uncharted surface that screens immensely important socio-political issues. We contend that this tension can be resolved by dealing with these issues in the framework of a distinct conceptual realm – distributiveness. Distributiveness: definition and measurement Distributiveness refers to the way in which different types of resources are distributed across different groups in society at a given time. It is a way of assessing the state of the Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 6 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin dynamic socio-political mechanisms that lead towards a more egalitarian distribution of resources among different social groups. This socio-political process will be discussed in detail in the next section. We propose that distributiveness should be understood as a complex variable reflecting the distribution of particular types of resources within society. A higher value of distributiveness reflects a more egalitarian distribution of resources across groups, while a lower value reflects greater disparity in the allocation of resources.6 The term distributiveness differs from the more normatively loaded concept of distributive justice (and its accompanying concept procedural justice). The latter has been debated for at least two millennia and involves mainly normative debates in law, philosophy and theories of social sciences such as politics and economics (Rawls 1971; Nozick 1974; Sen 1973; Roemer 1998; Deutsch 1985) about the principles of just distribution and anticipated outcomes of different modes of distribution. Conversely, the concept we introduce in the current work serves mainly as an empirically based measurement of the level of distribution of resources among collectives in the society. Also noteworthy, while distributiveness measures allocation of resources, it has a direct impact on the structure of opportunities accessible to members of different identity groups in a given society. Hegemonic allocation of resources, namely discrimination of certain groups in comparison with others, leads to disparity in the ability of group members to exploit their citizenship rights. Basic elements of citizenship such as freedom from poverty, equal access to the political sphere, good quality education and decent wage employment, depend on allocation of resources. At this preliminary stage, we suggest that this complex variable should include five types of resources: political, material, cultural-symbolic, institutional, and territorial. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but to serve as a starting point for further elaboration. Political resources The term ‘political resources’ reflects the degree to which citizens enjoy fundamental rights and liberties regardless of their group background, including the right to participate in the political game – to vote, run for office, and be elected – and to voice their political opinions. This means that Dahlian or Shumpeterian democracy – a democracy grounded in universal suffrage and basic civil rights and liberties – is an important element of distributiveness. The conceptual relationship between these two concepts – i.e., democracy and distributiveness – merits further elaboration. We argue that distributiveness should be understood as incorporating democratic procedures in at least two respects. First, according to widely accepted definitions, a democratic system is one in which individual political rights are distributed equally across society. This aspect of democracy is reflected in the principles of universal suffrage and one man-one vote. Other principles of distribution encompassed within the concept of democracy include universal application of the rule of law, and checks on the powers of different branches of government. Notwithstanding, the allocation of other material and collective rights and resources should not be included within the conceptual boundaries of democracy, but rather belong to a separate, broader framework. Second, democratic mechanisms and procedures can be seen as a prerequisite for meaningful and sustainable distributiveness. As long as the political process is arbitrary and the political apparatus is not curtailed in any way, no sustainable distributive process can take place. This means that a democratic political system is, at one and the same time, both a prerequisite for and an integral ingredient of distributiveness.7 Citizenship Studies 7 Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Material resources ‘Material resources’ refers to the allocation of public resources (primarily financial) to different groups within society for public purposes – e.g., educational programs, cultural activities, municipal development, policing, etc. The simplest way to assess distributiveness in material resources is by measuring investment or expenditure per capita for such purposes among different groups. Importantly, the specific use to which such resources are put – e.g., the specific educational or cultural content of funded programs – is not relevant to the measure of distributiveness, which is based purely on the sums allocated.8 Cultural-symbolic resources This category refers to the recognition and/or promotion of culture-specific symbols and practices in the public sphere, as seen, for example, in the country’s official languages; in official symbols such as the state emblem, flag, and anthem; and in officially recognized holidays and days of rest. In measuring this component, attention should be paid to both official policy, as reflected in legal and constitutional arrangements (e.g., do the state’s flag and anthem represent all groups in society, or exclusively the dominant ethnos) and to everyday bureaucratic implementation (e.g., is formal recognition of a given language translated into practice in such realms as education, signage, or official forms). It is important to measure both official policy and everyday practice, as there may be a significant gap between them (May 2008; Harel-Shalev 2009). Institutional resources At issue here is access to the state apparatus. In integrative or unitary polities, this means the degree to which individuals from different groups hold positions in public institutions such as government ministries, the armed forces, the public education system, public corporations, or local municipalities. In consociational contexts, it means the existence of autonomous institutions for different groups in society, veto power over certain fundamental issues, and proportional representation in joint institutions (Lijphart 1969). Territorial resources Land is a primary resource of the state, and control over land is strongly correlated with social welfare and economic prosperity. Further, discrimination in the distribution of land resources based on group affiliation is often a character of hegemonic regimes (Yiftachel 2006). For these reasons, we contend that land distribution should be measured independently from distribution of other material resources. Territorial resources should be measured not merely by the proportion of land allocated to groups within the state, but also by the quality of this land (fertility, access to water, distance from urban and industrial centres, natural resources, etc.). To summarize, we argue that the distribution of each type of resource (political, material, cultural, institutional, and territorial) should be measured independently, with the combined overall evaluation representing the state’s overall level of distributiveness. This method facilitates an accurate and multidimensional evaluation of hegemonic/egalitarian propensities. In contrast with the dominant tendency in the literature to conceive of hegemonic regimes in binary terms, with the regime designated as either hegemonic or not (Lustick 1979; Smooha 2002; Yiftahel and Ghanem 2004; Peleg 2007), the current 8 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin proposal allows for low hegemonic tendencies in the distribution of certain types of resources, together with high hegemonic tendencies in the distribution of other types. It thus offers a more sophisticated analytical and methodological tool for the study of political regimes and the dynamism inherent in the transformation process (as will be discussed further below). Further, it helps identify whether certain types of resources are more important to the dominant group than others, and thus more resistant to change. Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 A model of transition from a hegemonic to distributive political regime An important contribution of the current work is its conception of the relationship between groups in ethnically divided regimes as an ongoing process involving the capacities and interests of the majority and minority groups in the state as well as external interventions. This process generates changes in the distribution of various resources within the regime. To reiterate, it is essential to distinguish between the hegemonic/distributive tendencies of a state and the degree to which it is democratic. Hegemonic states are those in which one dominant group controls a disproportionate share of resources and power. In its most radical form, a hegemonic state can allocate political resources only to members of the dominant ethno-cultural group but at the same time preserve a high level of procedural democracy. The apartheid regime in South Africa until 1994 is good instance of such a regime. But only once suffrage and access to politics are universal should the state be considered, at least in Dahlian terms, as democratic. The distinction between hegemony (or distributiveness) and democracy (or its absence) raises the question, why should hegemonic states be transformed? The answer involves both morality and stability. Morally, it can be argued that hegemonic states should not survive unchanged because inequality is inherently wrong. In such states, government agencies use group affiliation as the main criterion for determining the rights and entitlements of citizens, giving primacy to the dominant group and its members (Rouhana 1997; Smooha 2002; Yiftachel 2006; Peleg 2007; Kaufmann and Haklai 2008). Hegemonic systems are driven by a sense of collective entitlement among members of the majority group to control and benefit from ‘their’ state. Thus, belonging to the dominant group is key to acquiring resources of various types and a facilitator of upward mobility. With regard to stability, the structural privileges given to the dominant group often exacerbate, or even create, ethnic tensions and conflicts (Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Peleg 2007). It is in the tension between high levels of democratic procedure and low levels of distributiveness that conflicts typical of hegemonic states are harboured and fester (Rouhana 1997; Mann 1999; Yiftachel 2006). Given the tremendous negative impact of low levels of distributiveness on sustainable peaceful coexistence in politics, recent years have seen extensive discussions among scholars about the political arrangements that might cure the perils of hegemony. A nonexhaustive list of frameworks suggested as able to bring about peaceful coexistence among different groups in heterogeneous states includes liberal, neutrality-based, ethnic control, and various integrationist models, all well described and debated in contemporary research (Lustick 1979; Horowitz 1985; Smooha and Hanf 1992; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Peleg 2007; Benedikter 2008). Yet the existing scholarship suffers from two deficiencies: (1) it often operates within the boundaries of the debate about the democratic quality of a regime; and (2) it pays little attention to the conditions that support hegemonic regimes, nor does it attempt to model a process of transition toward higher levels of distributiveness. The rest of this article will introduce such a model. Citizenship Studies 9 At this preliminary stage in the development of the model, we shall articulate our arguments in a deductive manner, and frequently with anecdotal reference to existing cases. In the future, this framework should be tested in the form of full-scale case studies. We shall begin with the conditions that impede or enhance the process, and then discuss its typical stages. Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Factors affecting the transition from hegemony Based on the experiences of former hegemonic regimes, including Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Spain, Canada, and others, we argue that the interplay of three sets of factors determines the beginning, pace, and expected results of a process of transition towards higher levels of distributiveness. These are: (1) the majority’s concerns about the transformation process; (2) characteristics of the minority; and (3) the external (regional/ international) environment. These factors can balance, support, or contradict each other. The weight of each, and the interactions among them, thus produce an open-ended process with various possible results. The majority’s concerns Any transition from hegemony will by its nature entail considerable shifts in both power relations and patterns of resource allocation between groups within the state. The dominant group is a status quo player, which enjoys preferential status in the hegemonic order. As such, members of the dominant group can be expected to fear and oppose demands for any serious change. Some dominant-group members will oppose distributive reform simply because they do not want to lose their privileged status. Others may be willing to accept reform in principle, but may resist it because they fear that the process will not lead peacefully to a fairer system, but rather, will have unwanted consequences either for the state or for the group with which they affiliate. Bluntly put, members of the dominant group prefer the preservation of their preferential status in the state over equal allocation of resources, by this manifesting stronger affiliation with their particular group members and, at the same time, indifference towards discriminatory policies towards fellow citizens who are members of other groups. While acknowledging the citizenship status of out-group people, members of dominant groups do not necessarily understand let alone embrace citizenship as entailing an identical set of rights (and duties) vis-à-vis the state. Specifically, the dominant group is likely to anticipate that distributive reform will lead to one or more of three outcomes: destabilization of the political system; eruptions of political violence; and a toppling or even reversal of the political order, such that those formerly at the top will find themselves at the bottom. Any effort to alleviate the majority’s fears thus requires addressing these potential consequences. Destabilization of the political system The dominant group may fear that accommodating demands for distributive reform will destabilize the existing, functioning political system, weakening the mechanisms of control and possibly even threatening the territorial unity of the state (Gurr 1993). The Kurds in Turkey and the Palestinian citizens of Israel are good examples. These groups’ demands for political and/or territorial redistribution and for changes in the symbolic realm – e.g., in the country’s flag and anthem – have met with considerable resistance among Turks and Israeli Jews, respectively. 10 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Eruptions of violence The fear of violence may also influence the willingness of dominant-group members to accommodate minority-group demands. Notably, the threat of violence may come not only from the minority group, but from militant elements on both sides (Gurr 1993). Walzer (1996) suggests that violent conflict or even civil war should be taken seriously as potential outcomes of failure in the initial stages of bargaining over redistribution. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland is one example of how the fear of violence can influence the stance of the majority (O’Leary and Mcgarry 1996; Shirlow and Coulter 2007). Toppling of the political order Here, the fear of the dominant group is that changing patterns of distribution may lead not to a new and fairer equilibrium, but to a situation in which the formerly privileged ethnos finds itself in an underprivileged position. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa was accompanied by fears among the dominant white population that new political and social arrangements based on black supremacy would threaten their rights and property; only strong assurances by Nelson Mandela and the leaders of the African National Congress assuaged the white leadership and paved the way for the end of the regime. In Northern Ireland, the unionists worried that granting equal rights to the nationalists would constitute a first step towards re-unification of the island under the rule of the Republic of Ireland, and that unionists would have to decide between staying in the Republic as a minority and leaving for Britain (Morrissey and Smyth 2002). Another example is that of Macedonia, a small state with a considerable Albanian minority. The empowerment of minorities in Macedonia and their struggle against the primacy of the Macedonian majority raised fears among the latter that this campaign might lead eventually to secession of Albanian-dominated parts of the country, or to potential intervention by neighbouring states (Danforth 1995; Poulton 1995; Roudometof 2002; Daftary and Friedman 2008). Characteristics of the minority The second set of factors that will influence the transition from hegemony involve characteristics of the minority. These include the minority’s relative demographic weight, its internal cohesion, and the effectiveness of its leadership. Relative demographic weight The demographic weight of the minority vis-à-vis the majority is likely to have a decisive impact on changes in power relations and resource allocation within the polity. The greater the demographic weight of the minority, the greater its ability to exert pressure on the political system. Size is especially important in more ‘lenient’ or democratic hegemonies, in which the minority participates in the political process and has some influence over the course of events. In such regimes, a minority accounting for only a small proportion of the population will find it difficult to effect change; but once its proportion of the population is in double digits, its voice will begin to be heard. On the other hand, majority-group members are likely to be more fearful of a minority that is relatively large. Citizenship Studies 11 Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Internal cohesion This refers to the minority’s ability to function as a unitary body, despite any internal differences in approach and outlook. Cohesive minority groups are more likely to conduct a consensual campaign in favour of increased levels of distributiveness. Minorities in hegemonic regimes are sometimes subject to divisive policies by the hegemonic state in order to weaken their capacity for collective action (Lustick 1980). The success of such divide-and-rule policies depends on ideational and structural factors within the minority – such as differences in ideology, geographic or confessional affiliations, and the like – which make it impossible for the minority to consolidate its position and orient its struggle toward a clear goal. The Palestinian minority in Israel offers an example of such fractionalization, which impedes the minority’s ability to advance in its struggle towards greater distributiveness (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). The leadership’s performance The third important characteristic of the minority group is the effectiveness of its leadership. While a great deal has been written about the role of political elites (Putnam 1976; Higley and Gunther 1992; Rubin 2009), much less has been written about the political elites of minority groups. However, certain things are clear. The minority’s leadership must develop and implement a strategy of engagement with the hegemonic state. The contents of the minority’s demands, the manner in which they are presented, and the timing of their presentation are critical to the success of the process, and depend chiefly on leadership skills. Equally, the leaders of the minority group play a crucial role in preventing the factionalism and loss of focus that might otherwise reduce the minority’s bargaining power. In other words, the minority is unlikely to achieve its goals without effective performance by its political leadership, whether this leadership is manifested in a single person or a united leadership group. The cases of the nationalist Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Albanians in Macedonia illustrate the potency of effective leadership when combined with high levels of internal cohesion and demographic weight. In Northern Ireland, a number of factors combined to bring the Troubles to an end, including the high, and gradually rising, percentage of Catholics in the population, and the resistance to British control inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. However, resolution of the conflict, culminating in the Good Friday power-sharing agreement of 1998, would not have come about without effective leadership from both the political and armed nationalist organizations, which ensured that the movement laboured under a clear set of goals and intentions for the future (O’Leary and Mcgarry 1996). Likewise, several factors facilitated the 2001 agreement which ended the Albanian insurgency in Macedonia. These included the Albanians’ robust demographic presence (about 25 percent of the population); their geographic concentration in northwestern Macedonia; their strong consciousness as a national minority, which gained force in the shadow of other ethnic clashes in the Balkans; and strong internal solidarity, supported by vigorous political leadership (Ortakovski 2001). International and regional interventions The final set of factors that must be considered relate to the external environment, whether regional or global. These may come in the form of economic incentives by international organizations, such as the UN or the IMF; diplomatic intervention in the 12 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 form of mediation, sanctions, etc., by regional or global powers; and influence by diaspora groups. In the Turkish case, longstanding pressure by the EU to soften restrictions on the Kurdish minority became effective when presented as a precondition for Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey revised its policy towards the Kurds substantially in 2002, and again during the period from 2007 to 2010. The same holds true for the treatment of the Baltic States – Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania – towards their Russian minorities. In the case of Northern Ireland, the United States played a crucial role in mediating the settlement between nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants, through the diplomacy of Senator George Mitchell, President Clinton’s special envoy to Northern Ireland. Mitchell also received a high level of assistance from Dublin and London, with both the British and Irish governments showing their commitment to reconciliation of the Northern Ireland conflict within the framework of the European community (Mitchell 2000). Stages in the transition from hegemony Why is a discussion on the transition from hegemony, and particularly its dynamic elements, relatively absent from the literature? There are at least three reasons for this. First, as we demonstrated earlier, the recent literature is dominated by a tendency to explore this issue within the debate on democracy. In so doing, it neglects the distinct yet relatively common situation of democratic yet hegemonic societies with low levels of distributiveness. Take, for example, the cases of Turkey, Hungary, Macedonia, Estonia, and Israel, all of which combine functioning democratic systems with low levels of distributiveness. Second, discussions of majority –minority relationships tend to focus on conflict resolution. Usually, a conflict resolution process culminates in a single event that ends the violence and establishes a regulatory framework and power sharing mechanisms between the rival parties; examples include the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the 1995 Dayton Agreement on Bosnia, the 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians, and the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. In contrast, a transition from hegemony can be a long and continuous process without a clear termination point – for example, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, or the struggle of African-Americans for equality in the United States. Third, hegemonic or ethnic regimes are often conceived in the literature in binary terms, with the designation based on what are deemed to be a set of necessary structural characteristics: control over material and territorial resources, control over the state’s security apparatus, an exclusive public culture, etc. (see, e.g., Smooha 2002; Yiftahel and Ghanem 2004; Yiftachel 2006; Peleg 2007). Such an approach is blind to variation in the transition process and in types of hegemonic regimes. For Example, some regimes can maintain a tight grip over the armed forced and shape exclusively the public culture, but at the same time distribute material and territorial resources evenly. As we demonstrate below, we understand the transition from hegemony as a dynamic and multifaceted process that involves changes in levels of distributiveness over time. As such, our approach is not oriented towards mega-constitutional events (Peleg 2007). Further, under our approach, the transition from hegemony need not be subsumed within the debate over democracy and democratization. Examination of various hegemonic regimes reveals similar patterns of development through various stages of transformation. The table below schematizes these stages of change in the interface between the majority and minority groups, and in the level of 13 Citizenship Studies distributiveness within the system. These stages serve as the framework for a dynamic model describing the transformation of divided polities from hegemonic systems into systems with higher levels of distributiveness. Stages in the transformation of divided polities from hegemonic systems to higher levels of distributiveness. Stage I Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 II III IV Majority – minority Formal acknowledgement of members of the minority group. Universal citizenship, suffrage, and basic political rights. Members of the minority articulate demands for individual and collective rights. Level of distributiveness All citizens enjoy basic political rights. The regime becomes procedurally democratic. Extended individual rights are granted. Collective rights refused. Distributiveness improved in allocation of material resources to individual members. Public culture and control over state powers exclusively in the hands of the majority. Allocation of collective rights and resources The minority engages with the state in is debated in the public sphere. Fluctuations various forms of struggle to advance occur in levels of distributiveness depending acknowledgement of collective rights. Members of the dominant majority polarized on political configuration. between those favouring and those opposing higher level of distributiveness. Compromise that establishes higher levels of Control over state powers and access to distribution in the form of liberal neutrality or public resources are redistributed, through either liberal or consociational mechanisms. group allocation of resources. Exclusivity in the symbolic sphere and public culture is eliminated. The passage from hegemony to higher levels of distributiveness involves much effort and many risks (Walzer 1996). It therefore is likely to be a slow and gradual process, sometimes requiring many years or even decades, with periods of regression as well as forward movement. In principle, the majority and minority groups must undergo a process of change within themselves as well as in the relations between them. Taken together, these changes transform the hegemonic regime into a more egalitarian one. It should thus be clear that the process presented here is a continuum that is schematized into four stages for purposes of clarity and parsimony. Stage 1: Mutual recognition Transformation towards greater distributiveness requires mutual recognition as a basic precondition for any future change. On the majority’s side, it requires recognizing the right of minority-group members to be included as legitimate members of the polity. On the minority’s side, it requires recognition of the existing political system and expression of its willingness to conduct its struggle within the boundaries of that system. In other words, both sides, the majority and minority, must show their willingness to play the same game on the same court. In the various historical cases we are familiar with, the majority signalled this recognition of the minority by granting its members universal citizenship, and the minority signalled its recognition of the system by accepting the citizenship offered, and participating in the existing political system. Notably, this stage is often reached with external support. Examples include the international pressure on the apartheid regime in South Africa; UN pressure on Israel to lift martial law over the Arabs 14 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin within its borders in 1966; EU pressure on the Baltic states to grant citizenship to their Russian populations after 1991; involvement by the United States, Britain, and the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland (O’Leary 2002); and intervention by Greece, Albania, and the European Union in the case of Macedonia. In terms of distributiveness, at this stage individual political rights are allocated relatively equally, the state gives up some of its arbitrary powers vis-à-vis members of the minority, and the system becomes democratic. From this point on, the struggle is not for democratization, but rather for higher level of distributiveness. Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Stage 2: Individual rights This stage involves recognition by the majority of the minority’s entitlement to individual civil rights and greater access to material resources. At this stage, members of both the majority and minority still refrain from considering seriously the complexity of collective rights, especially with regard to control over state resources (including the institutional apparatus and armed forces) and exclusivity in the symbolic realm. The state and representatives of the majority refuse to recognize the minority as a national group, and correspondingly refuse to grant it rights as such; examples include Israel, Turkey, Northern Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, and elsewhere. This is accompanied by propaganda that recognition of group rights would pose a threat to the political system and disrupt the balance of power within the state, perhaps to the point of breaching public order and even the collapse of the state’s territorial unity. Such propaganda plays to deep-rooted majority concerns – for instance, the fear of Protestant unionists in Northern Ireland that granting group rights to Catholics would be a first step towards reunification with the Republic of Ireland, or qualms among Macedonians that granting collective rights to the Albanian minority would empower them to seek secession or, worse, incorporation into Albania, giving the latter a demographic advantage (Vickers and Pettifer 1997; Koppa 2001). In Turkey, the majority population similarly fears that accommodating Kurdish demands for collective rights will put the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic at risk. As for the minority, this stage is marked by growing awareness of the majority’s preferential status, along with internal debate among the minority’s intellectual and political elites over the meaning and implications of a strengthened collective identity. Instances of such process include the material and conscience empowerment of Francophones in Canada in the 1960s, the growing awareness of Palestinians in Israel of their inferior status in the Jewish state following the removal of the military regime in 1966, or the strengthening of the Kurdish population in Turkey during a period of rapid modernization in the 1970s and early 1980s. These ongoing developments within minority groups were prelude to reinforced collective conscience and behaviour that would manifest itself in future struggles. These developments are a precondition for advancing to the next stage. Stage 3: Collective demands In the third stage, the minority group strengthens its demands for collective rights, and calls for equal representation as a collective and not merely as individuals within the polity. The minority leadership plays an active role in shaping and introducing these demands in the domestic and international arenas, employing the forms of engagement they perceive will be effective in achieving their goals. These modes of engagement may be peaceful, or may include armed or semi-armed struggle and/or terrorism.9 In Northern Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Citizenship Studies 15 Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – the military branch of the nationalist Catholic political party, Sinn Fein – conducted a series of terrorist attacks against British and Protestant targets (Morrissey and Smyth 2002). In Turkey, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has engaged in a peaceful struggle in the parliamentary realm, but also in violent actions against state institutions and civilian targets. In Macedonia, the Albanian People’s Liberation Army (ONA) conducted a series of violent actions against state institutions, and threatened the stability of the new state (Koinova 2009). A similar pattern was followed in Spain by the Basque paramilitary movement (ETA) and in Canada by the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ). During this stage, the majority is likely to experience a cleavage between two segments of the population – one which supports the minority’s demands and expresses willingness to negotiate, and another which radicalizes and becomes more hardline in its defence of preferential status for the majority. The American experience during the civil rights movement and the Canadian Anglophone reaction to Francophone demands following the Quiet Revolution illustrate such divisions. Recently, some European societies, including the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, have experienced such processes in reaction to demands by new immigrants for cultural collective rights (Joppke 2007). What comes next depends on a variety of factors that may shape the form and intensity of the internal struggle between those in the majority who object to a movement toward greater egalitarianism, and those who are willing to accept the minority’s demands, or at least engage in negotiation. In cases where the former gain the upper hand, the result is likely to be further deterioration in relations between groups, and a reversal of the trend towards greater distributiveness. Due to space limitations, we shall not discuss this scenario in this article (for examples of such cases see: Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993). Suffice it to say that continuation of the transformation process requires that the moderate faction within the majority gain and maintain the upper hand. However, in many cases of long and effective violent struggles, it is the failure of the state to contain the violence and restore public order that prompts a search for compromise and reconciliation, as occurred in (for example) Northern Ireland and Spain (Brunnbauer 2002). Stage 4: Compromise At this stage, representatives of the majority and minority work together to find a mutually acceptable compromise. A successful compromise is likely to preserve at least part of the old regime and to maintain its preferential treatment of the majority in a number of respects, of which most important is the realm of symbolic resources (i.e., preferential acknowledgement of the majority’s culture in the public sphere). On the other hand, the minority acquires equality before the law, and its members receive a variety of fundamental collective rights that were denied them by the hegemonic regime, such as the right to use their language in official contexts and the allocation of material, institutional, territorial, and symbolic resources associated with their heritage, aspirations, and needs.10 Alternatively, the two sides may agree to create a more liberal neutral regime in which no group enjoys preferential status. At this stage, marginal elements within the minority or majority may continue to challenge the accord, but the greater part of the minority and broad segments of the majority form an alliance to stabilize the system, determine the structure of their relations, and fortify the new egalitarian arrangement. Contemporary examples of societies in transition from hegemony offer some cases where agreements have been reached, and others where the process remains ongoing. Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 16 A. Ghanem and A. Rubin The former include Macedonia and Northern Ireland, where the opposing groups were able to reach agreements for power sharing in the state apparatus and the public sphere. In these cases, the state agreed to grant collective rights to the minority, while the latter, in compensation, gave up their secessionist or irredentist aspirations and expressed their commitment to peaceful coexistence within the existing polity. Conversely, in other cases, such as Turkey, Estonia, and Israel, the process is far from over, and these states remain somewhere in the murky ground between stages 3 and 4. In many respects, levels of distributiveness in these nations still reflect the hegemonic control of the majority group (Peleg 2007). While the conflict between Kurds and Turks remains violent, the Russians in Estonia and Arabs in Israel conduct their struggle peacefully, mainly through legal channels. The notion of a dynamic process in changing levels of distributiveness opens conceptual alternatives to the dichotomy between hegemonic/ethnocratic and egalitarian/ liberal regimes. It makes it possible to conceive of mid-range, semi-hegemonic regimes in which, for instance, political, material, territorial, and non-coercive institutional resources are equally allocated, while cultural symbols and coercive capabilities are kept exclusively in the hands of the majority. Conclusion Many culturally heterogeneous societies with functioning democratic regimes nonetheless fail to grant equal status to different ethnic and cultural groups within their borders. To a great extent, scholars discuss such inequalities within the analytical boundaries of the discourse on democracy and democratization. We argue that such discussions overstretch the concept of democracy. In this research, we offer a novel axis of inquiry, namely distributiveness. The aim of this new conceptualization is to (1) restore conceptual clarity to the literature on democracy, (2) enhance our capacity to assess the allocation of resources within a given polity, and (3) elucidate the processes that lead to change in patterns of allocation. We define distributiveness as the egalitarian distribution of resources (political, material, cultural-symbolic, institutional, and territorial) among different ethnic, religious, or cultural groups which self-identify as collectives within society. As such, we argue that the transition towards greater distributiveness in hegemonic regimes is a precondition for peaceful coexistence between different groups in the state, for political stability, and perhaps even for preservation of the political entity. Failing such a transition, hegemonic states risk discord, violence, and potentially secessionism or irredentism. Indeed, as this work demonstrates, although hegemonic regimes, or what Ian Lustick (1979) calls control regimes, might maintain social and political stability in short and maybe medium terms, in the long run hegemonic systems of distribution are more vulnerable to political protest and instability than egalitarian ones. Can procedurally democratic states ever increase their political stability by seeking to perpetuate hegemony and low level of distributiveness? Existing examples suggest that such a path is likely to produce only short-term gains. Such measures typically involve reinforcing the majority group’s control over the state’s territorial, economic, cultural, legal, military, and administrative resources and apparatus (Lustick 1979). However, over the long term, such policies put into motion strong destabilizing forces, as per the experiences of Turkey, Israel, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia. In the latter two cases (i.e., Northern Ireland and Macedonia), restructuring the state as a more pluralist polity with higher levels of distributiveness – through power sharing and the granting of cultural, Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 Citizenship Studies 17 political, institutional, and territorial rights to minority groups – reduced inter-ethnic hostilities. In both cases, the transformation process was riddled with difficulties and crises, but the historical record points to far better results from moderating and managing ethnic conflicts than from strengthening ethnic hegemony, which tends to generate prolonged and often violent civil strife. A thorough analysis of the impact of various state policies on levels of distributiveness along ethnic lines is beyond the scope of this article. Such an analysis must consider a multitude of parameters, including characteristics of the majority and minority groups; the role of neighbouring states and ethnic diasporas; the role of the international community as a whole; the impact of globalization and its concomitant communication-related and economic realities; and the causes and consequences of ethnic demography. However, the current exploration reveals three important points. First, transformation is likely to take place gradually and over the long term. Achieving higher levels of distributiveness requires adjustments in the political culture and reorientation among majorities, minorities, and their leaderships. Second, this process demands great effort and sacrifice from both the majority and the minority. It therefore requires a high level of buy-in from the population on both sides. Third, the international/regional community has a role to play in the transformation of hegemonic systems. While foreign powers may use their influence to preserve the ethnic hegemony (e.g., by ascribing to it legitimacy), they may also confront the regime and take active measures to promote a transition from hegemony and higher levels of distributiveness. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Email: asadghanem@ymail.com Equal contribution. Importantly, the focus of the current work is on allocation regimes in domestic contexts, and not in the international arena. Discussing in detail the difficulties arising from the other two types of definitions is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to note that both are dependent on unique historical-cultural contexts and particular sets of values. For instance, there is wide disagreement among scholars as to the goals of democracy vis-à-vis vexing economic and social questions. Some believe that democratic regimes should be vehicles for alleviating socio-economic inequality, and thus should intervene in the market. In contrast, others argue that these regimes should remain detached from the market (Danforth 1995). Still others go further and argue that true democracy requires wide redistribution of resources and social equality. With regard to the source of authority, difficulties arise as well. While democracy is widely considered a system in which the people are sovereign, some argue that because of inherent deficiencies in the democratic system, the masses do not really have significant input into state policies. The consociational democracy school associated primarily with Lijphart (1969, 1977, Lustick 1979) is echoed in the literature on ethnically divided societies (McGarry and O’Leary 1993). For an opposing view of consociational theory see Horowitz (1985). To the best of our knowledge this term has not been introduced or has been in scholarly use in the social sciences. This is not to say that non-democratic societies will always score lower on measures of distributiveness than democratic states. Indeed, in the former the distribution of non-political resources may be more egalitarian. Cuba and Singapore serve as good examples in this regard. Yet when the process of allocation is arbitrary and determined solely from above, distributive decisions are not representative. 18 8. 9. 10. A. Ghanem and A. Rubin In a unitary system, the content is determined by the government. In a multicultural system, cultural subgroups will have some autonomy to determine the content of their own programs. It is important to note that this account attempts to portray such processes in the most accurate manner, without involving normative dimensions. In reality many minority groups choose an armed struggle or terroristic methods as means to advance their collective rights. This account, however, by no means intends to normatively justify or call for violent struggle as a vehicle to improve recognition or more egalitarian distribution. This process resembles, to a large extent, the transformation of post-colonial societies and their reassertion of authentic cultural content like holidays, language, rituals, etc. (Ashcroft 2001; Bhabha 1994). Downloaded by [Aviad Rubin] at 15:30 25 August 2015 References Ashcroft, B. 2001. Post Colonial Transformation. London: Routledge. Benedikter, T. 2008. Europe’s Ethnic Mosaic: A Short Guide to Minority Rights in Europe. Bolzano: Institute for Minority Rights, EURAC Research. Bhabha, H. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Bloemraad, I., A. Korteweg, and G. 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