ARTICLE IN PRESS
Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman
Is adaptive co-management ethical?
David Fennella, Ryan Plummerb,, Melissa Marschkec
a
Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, Ont., Canada L2S 3A1
Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, Ont., Canada L2S 3A1
c
York Centre for Asian Research, 270 York Lanes, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ont., Canada M3J 1P3
b
Received 25 March 2006; received in revised form 17 January 2007; accepted 26 January 2007
Available online 27 March 2007
Abstract
‘Good’ governance and adaptive co-management hold broad appeal due to their positive connotations and ‘noble ethical claims’. This
paper poses a fundamental question: is adaptive co-management ethical? In pursuing an answer to this question, the concept of adaptive
co-management is succinctly summarized and three ethical perspectives (deontology, teleology and existentialism) are explored. The case
of adaptive co-management in Cambodia is described and subsequently considered through the lens of ethical triangulation. The case
illuminates important ethical considerations and directs attention towards the need for meditative thinking which increases the value of
tradition, ecology, and culture. Giving ethics a central position makes clear the potential for adaptive co-management to be an agent for
governance, which is good, right and authentic as well as an arena to embrace uncertainty.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Ethics; Adaptive co-management; Collaboration; Environmental governance; Cambodia; Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Governance, and especially environmental governance,
has gained recognition during the past 15 years. Governance emerges from the interactions of actors (e.g., state,
civil), encompasses the structures and processes through
which societal decisions and the manner that power is
exercised, and may be formally expressed through institutions or more subtly articulated by norms (Weiss, 2000;
Sampford, 2002; Lebel et al., 2006). Kofi Annan declared
that, ‘‘good governance is perhaps the single most
important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting
development’’ (as cited in Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). With
such a powerful statement, there is little wonder that good
governance has gained considerable currency and is central
to many international donors such as the Canadian
Corresponding author. Tel.: +(905) 688 5550x4782;
fax: +905 984 4843.
E-mail addresses: dfennell@brocku.ca (D. Fennell),
rplummer@brocku.ca (R. Plummer), marschke@yorku.ca
(M. Marschke).
0301-4797/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2007.01.020
International Development Agency, the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (Woods, 2000). Saner
and Wilson (2003, p. 6) explain that positive connotations
are inherent in the concept of (good) governance because it
offers ‘noble ethical claims’. Lebel et al. further observe
that this notion of ‘good’ includes attributes of ‘‘yparticipation, representation, deliberation, accountability, empowerment, social justice, and organizational features such
as being multilayered and polycentric’’ (2006, online).
Co-management is strongly connected to the notion of
governance and similarly reflects strong positive connotations (see Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Considering
co-management as a governance system consisting of
relational webs or networks among heterogeneous sets of
actors challenges the presumption of formal (and often
dualistic) power sharing agreements and directs attention
to the process of problem-solving indicative of adaptive
management (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Berkes (in press)
subsequently identifies ‘good governance’ as one of the
seven faces of adaptive co-management.
Embedded in the discourse of environmental governance
and the approach of adaptive co-management is an
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D. Fennell et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
important question for environmental policy makers and
resource managers: is adaptive co-management ethical?
In this paper we pursue answers to this question by
summarizing and critiquing adaptive co-management
and examining the connections between it and ethics
in grappling with uncertainty. Major ethical perspectives
(deontology, teleology and existentialism) are presented and the potential role for ethics in adaptive comanagement is developed through the perspective of
ethical triangulation and the approach of comprehensive
ethical decision-making. The case of adaptive co-management in Cambodia is considered through this integrative
lens to illuminate important considerations and direct
attention to the need for meditative thinking. In the
conclusions we reflect upon the potential for adaptive comanagement to act as a mechanism for governance (good,
right and authentic) as well as an arena to embrace
uncertainty.
2. Adaptive co-management
Adaptive co-management combines multiple stakeholders (e.g., the State, civil society, industry), the
cooperative spirit required to address environmental
challenges, and the complex systems view of the world
(Berkes, 2004). Attention is directed at management that is
adaptive. Adaptive management considers policies as
experiments from which knowledge is incrementally gained
through the feedback mechanism of social learning (cycles
of action and reflection); consequently flexibility to respond
to changes is enhanced (Lee, 1993; Berkes and Folke, 1998;
Jiggens and Röling, 2000; Folke et al., 2002). Armitage,
Berkes and Doubleday (in press, p. 2) observe that ‘‘as an
emergent outcome of these conceptual frameworks, adaptive co-management represents a potentially important
innovation in natural resource governance under conditions of change, uncertainty and complexity’’.
Adaptive co-management is an evolving process that
responds to feedback from socio-ecological systems. It
occurs when responsibilities for a resource are shared by
actors who participate in a process which is flexible,
dynamic, and oriented towards social learning (Ruitenbeek
and Catier, 2001; Folke et al., 2002; Berkes, 2004; Olsson
et al., 2004). According to Plummer and FitzGibbon
(in press), adaptive co-management is a process characterized by:
Pluralism and linkages. Multiple types of actors
(government, resource users, industry) represent diverse
interests and perspectives on the issue or task across
various scales.
Communication and negotiation. Shared understand
and/or agreement develops via information sharing in
which perspectives are exchanged and modified.
Transactive decision-making. Decisions are reached
through dialogue among diverse inputs and/or claims
to multiple knowledge systems.
63
Social learning. Actors undertake actions together and
share the consequences of those actions (experimentation). Modifications (responses) are made as part of an
ongoing and active process of reflection and reflexivity.
Learning consequently may correct errors in routines
(single loop), prompt examination of values and policies
responsible for those routines (double loop), and bring
about critical questioning of governing norms and
protocols (triple loop). Knowledge accumulates and
becomes engrained as part of social memory.
Enthusiasm surrounding adaptive co-management stems
from the predominately positive expectations of comanagement. Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004) synthesize
these outcomes to include: enhanced decision-making
which encourages efficiency and promotes equity, especially through the integration of multiple knowledge
systems; greater legitimization and credibility of objectives;
and, enhanced capacity and empowerment at the local
level. Carlsson and Berkes (2005) ask the question, what is
co-management good for? While not a panacea, they assert
that co-management is useful for allocating tasks, exchanging resources, linking different types and levels of
organization, reducing transaction costs, sharing risks, and
resolving conflict and sharing power. Adaptive co-management further increases expectations as it aims to orientate
socio-ecological systems towards sustainable trajectories
(Folke et al., 2002) and increase their robustness (Olsson
et al., 2004).
Caution has also been expressed regarding the (over)
optimism of co-management as such agreements may fail
to promote efficiency or equity (see Jentoft, 2000; Castro
and Nielsen, 2001; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004), not
result in greater compliance and actually exacerbate
potential conflicts (Jentoft, 2000; Zimmerer, 2000), and
contribute to further social and economic marginalization
which results in little power sharing (Berkes, 1994; Keller
et al., 2000; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Bryan, 2004). In a
critical examination of co-management involving the
Kluane First Nation, Nadasdy (2003) draws attention to
subtle and non-coercive exertion of state power using
Foucault’s concept of ‘‘power/knowledge’’. Nadasdy argues that land claims, and resulting co-management
processes, are inherently biased because of the manner in
which knowledge (largely through language) is generated
and how such processes are framed or politically contextualized. His subsequent commentary cautions that if we
are to take seriously the merits of adaptive management we
must critically question the broader socio-political context,
the stakes involved, and whose interests are being served
(Nadasdy, in press, p. 16).
3. Ethics
While the field of adaptive co-management has made
great strides in a very short period of time, we argue that
there is a critical absence of a conceptual/theoretical core
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D. Fennell et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
that ought to serve as a foundation for the nexus of theory
and practice in this area. What has tended to obstruct the
realization of this core has been the propensity to search
for new innovative terms in natural resource management
that mitigate the gamut of human interaction dilemmas.
Such terms include management, complexity, negotiation,
prevention, mandates, consultation, homogenization, restoration, rights, rules, regulations, and the list goes on.
Commenting on the manufacturing of new terminology in
academe, Saul (1995) points to the creation of countless
impenetrable and defensive dialects in the social sciences
that suggest obscurity and importance.
In cutting through the vernacular of adaptive comanagement, we argued in a companion paper (see
Plummer and Fennell, in press) that at its most basic level
adaptive co-management is based on a continuum of
cooperation and self-interest. In constructing a metatheoretical or foundational explanation of co-management,
we make a case through the sociobiological theory of
reciprocal altruism that ‘‘y adaptive co-management is an
evolutionary strategy tied to the very foundation of who we
are, not just in terms of the organization of socially derived
systems like economics’’ (Plummer and Fennell, in press).
This means that cooperation, and by extension adaptive
co-management, is an evolutionary strategy to insure
individual fitness, as theorized by Trivers (1971) via the
theory of reciprocal altruism, based on the work of
Hamilton (1964).
Ethics are a function of human nature. Employing the
theory of reciprocal altruism, Pinker (2002) writes that
emotions such as sympathy, trust, gratitude, loyalty, guilt,
shame, anger, and contempt all evolved to make us both
social and moral—observations not lost on Mayr (1988)
who noted that reciprocal altruism is the basis of both
emotions and ethics. And yet biology (nature) is only part
of the dialogue when seeking to explain human behaviour.
Keiffer argues that ‘‘systems of ethics are the product of
human wisdom and experience of human beings living
together and not the expression of genes. Though a
rational system of ethics cannot be independent of
evolution, neither can a system of ethics be derived directly
from evolution (1979, p. 21). It is knowledge from the new
sciences (e.g., evolutionary psychology, behavioural genetics) that have established the intricate link between genes
and culture and therefore the need to recast the debate in
terms of nature via nurture (Ridley, 2003; Fennell, 2006).
Both cooperation and ethics are fundamental to human
nature. Therefore we explore the close connection between
adaptive co-management and ethics as we grapple with the
contemporary realities of environmental management.
Rapid change, inherent complexity, substantial uncertainty, and frequent conflict are pervasive realities of the
environmental management domain (Gunderson, 2003;
Mitchell, 2004, 2005). Dealing with complexity and
uncertainty (as outlined by Gunderson, 2003) is the raison
d’être for adaptive co-management. It aims to address
different types of uncertainty (e.g., social uncertainty,
technical uncertainty) by dynamic learning, foster collaboration among groups that usually tackle each type (e.g.,
technical and expert, political, stakeholder-citizen) and
integrate their activities via cooperative management
(Olsson et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2005; Armitage et al., in
press). Adaptive co-management therefore offers an arena
in which uncertainty might be successfully embraced, as
called for by Gunderson (2003).
Despite these attempts to address uncertainty, serious
dilemmas remain in adaptive co-management. Should
dynamic learning be fostered through active and careful
experimentation (Garaway and Arthur, 2004; Walker
et al., 2006), permitted to emerge from complex systems
(Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001) meaningfully attempted at
less then ecosystem scales (Schindler, 1998), or risked in the
absence of institutional memory (Olsson et al., 2004)? The
social and cultural settings in which heterogeneous actors
are embedded prompts questions about multiple knowledge systems, varied institutions, underlying means of
communication and so on (Nadasdy, 2003; Olsson et al.,
2004; Natcher et al., 2005). As opposed to conventional or
state centered resource management, adaptive co-management stresses the sharing of power (vertically and
horizontally) and can therefore be considered as governance (Folke et al., 2005; Berkes, in press). Folke, Hahn,
Olsson and Norberg emphasize that ‘‘issues of legitimacy
and accountability are stressed in the literature on
governance, and good governance of ecosystems has be
interpreted as solving the trilemma characterized by
tensions between effectiveness, participation, and legitimacy (2005, p. 449).
Ethics is central to dealing with uncertainty because it
demands that we live with uncertainty, even though it is
often thought to be difficult and inconvenient. This was
identified by Saul (2001), who observed that corporatist
societies have managed to marginalize ethics through the
certainty that what they have or what they offer is correct.
It is helpful to live in this comfortable existence, and the
associated certainty that all is well, because it is convenient
to live within the walls of conformity. Social systems
concerned with the management of natural resources are
not immune from this marginalization of ethics. Gunderson provides a compelling account of the inflexibility of
institutions because ‘‘ythey utilize (directly or indirectly)
ambiguities and uncertainties of resource issues to maintain
a status quo’’ (2003, p. 42). He also documents how
influential social and political interests utilize, and even
manipulate, uncertainty to influence policy prescriptions.
Understanding without ethics, therefore, is both a destructive and demobilizing force.
If adaptive co-management is to successfully embrace
uncertainty it must move beyond understanding its root
dilemmas to accept and examine their inherent ambiguities.
Ethics provides a pro-active mechanism for navigating the
often uneasy tensions that exist between policy and
application on the one hand, and various autonomous,
self-interested groups on the other. To form this argument
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we summarize three ethical domains and discuss how
ethical triangulation and comprehensive decision-making
can be incorporated into adaptive co-management.
3.1. Deontology: right behaviour
Deontological or non-consequentialist theories of ethics
are those which are based upon following duties, rules, or
principles—the means—as opposed to the ends, consequences or outcomes. The chief advantage of the deontological perspective is that it gives us guidance in reference
to how we should behave, i.e., effective moral reasoning is
founded on a sense of obligation tied strongly to such
duties. It is therefore the moral principle (not necessarily
the weighting that goes into moral value and non-moral
value) and the importance of upholding these rules that is
most important to the deontologist. Three main perspectives of the deontological domain include religious sources
of ethical behaviour, secular ones, and intuition. In the case
of the first, the Bible and the Koran, for example, provide
followers with the guidance needed to live morally
successful lives. Secular sources of deontological guidance
come in the form of social contracts and include codes of
ethics and various Charters and Bills of Rights, all of which
exist as norms that can be adopted by the group. The
adoption of these societal norms is premised on the
requirement of the citizenry to do so in a voluntaristic
and consentual way, and by individuals who are acting in
rational ways. Reasoned intuition was championed by
Immanuel Kant, who argued that ethical rules should be
rendered universal. By following well founded rules or
‘imperatives’, good outcomes would quite naturally unfurl.
As rational beings, Kant argued, we have the ‘intuitive’
ability to reason and perform complex tasks, along side the
need to do what is deemed best for society on the whole.
The disadvantages of following a uniquely deontological
pathway are that rules, principles, and duties may simply
be outdated or wrong. This leads to the question of the
origination of the rules and what these rules are intended to
accomplish. For example, norms adopted by corrupt
regimes may serve the aims of those in charge (e.g., Hitler
and Stalin), but these rules fail to have the best interests of
society at large. Also, restricting behaviour only to the
letter of the law removes the ability to act for the purpose
of achieving desired ends. Laws and rules, therefore, are
not uniformly based on what is moral or ethical, but merely
a function of special rules or guidelines that serve specific
individuals or rather restricted purposes.
3.2. Teleology: good behaviour
While deontology focuses on the proper means in
achieving ethically ‘right’ decisions, teleology, stemming
from the Greek word for goal or completion, focuses on
the ends of our actions. While the deontologist elects to
follow pre-established rules for determining what is
ethically right the teleologist chooses to act according to
65
what would lead to the best (‘good’) consequences.1 Two
main approaches have emerged in teleology categorized as
objective and subjective.
Objective teleology or virtue ethics is based on behaviour
that seeks good ends through the pursuit of excellence of a
number of virtues (e.g., generosity, courage, and justice). In
striving to be virtuous we enhance our capacity to flourish,
what Aristotle termed eudaimonia. When we flourish we are
not simply satisfying basic pleasures such as sex or eating
desired foods, drives we share with lower animals, but
rather attempting to realize our full potential as rational
beings. This element of rationality was important to
Aristotle, who argued that our ability to reason allows us
not only to make decisions but also to make good decisions
that lead to the establishment of excellence in character.
Bad decisions take away from our ability to flourish.
The subjectivist realm of teleology, or the pursuit of
happiness as an end, is based on decisions that maximize
pleasure for the individual (hedonism) as well as for the
group (utilitarianism). In the case of the former, individuals strive to maximize pleasure or happiness (defined in
many different capacities) and minimize pain or unhappiness. As such, the choice to participate in one activity over
others, therefore, becomes a function of the level of
happiness (as an end) that may be derived by comparison.
In contrast, utilitarianism seeks the greatest amount of
pleasure for the greatest number of people. How this group
pleasure is measured is the subject of much debate. Jeremy
Bentham argued that group happiness should be measured
not on the basis of quality but rather quantity. Options
were thus selected for the group on the basis of some
hedonistic cost-benefit calculus consistent with our contemporary rational decision-making processes, where
alternatives get weighed against selected criteria. Alternatives that maximize the intended goal (i.e., the greatest
good for the greatest number) are those that represent the
best choice (Fennell and Malloy, in press). Conversely,
John Stuart Mill argued that decisions for the collective
could not be morally ‘good’ unless they were based on a
consideration of a broader social value. Two tourist
attractions could be compared on the basis of the amount
of pleasure they generated. Distinguishing between quantities of pleasure was left to those who were able to
appreciate the value of both places.
Teleological theories have been criticized by theorists on
the basis of the vagueness of the ends sought. What
represents the greatest good and for whom? If happiness is
maximized for the majority, it must be done so in the face
of minorities. This means the mild happiness of the
majority may exist in the face of the severe misery of a
few. Focussing too much on the ends instead of the means
1
The polarity of ‘good’ and ‘right’ is derived from the question of
whether moral goodness and praiseworthiness can be understood in
the context of what is right or wrong. The former is a function of the
achievement of the good (e.g., through virtuous behaviour); while the
latter as function of obligation. Both concepts, therefore, are said to work
in opposite directions.
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D. Fennell et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
places us in a position of treating people in ways that
eliminate their rights.
3.3. Existentialism: authentic behaviour
Being true to oneself (authentic behaviour) is the
principal concern of existentialists. Although being true
to oneself is arguably a subjective way of approaching the
world, existentialism has broader appeal in the sense that in
making decisions for ourselves we often do so for humanity
and the natural world in general too. Subjectivity provides
us with the ability to be free to choose outside the bounds
of entrenched reason and intellect, as noted by Guignon
(1986), who observes that existentialists are, ‘better
equipped to evaluate different ethical standpoints and
applicability to different contexts of action than the slavish
rule-follower [deontologist] or the cool cost-benefit calculator [teleologist]’ (p. 88). Important in this discussion is
the relevance of adhering to our own authentic beliefs in
good faith and as a function of good will, instead of from
some other extrinsic rationale.
In this way existentialism stands apart from deontological decision making which is based on the following of
rules and teleological decision making which is only
concerned with the ends of consequences of actions. So
in deciding to save someone who is caught in a burning
building the deontologist may do so only in response to
fulfilling a duty; the teleologist may do so in order to be
recognized as a hero; whereas the existentialist acts in order
not to violate a personal notion of human welfare.
Standing outside the realm of normative ethics means that
individuals can make no excuses for their own personal
conduct. This means that the individual needs to be armed
with sufficient knowledge in acting authentically.
Existentialism has been criticized on the basis of this
radical freedom. Decisions made without any tie to
normative conventions suggests that the agent has little
guidance in making the best choice. We are free to choose,
but we might not have the necessary knowledge or
information in order to choose correctly. There is also
the belief that in choosing wrongly, we fail to take
responsibility for our actions; an unfortunate reality that
continues to pervade society.
Hodgkinson (1996) stresses that existentialism has not
been favoured by decision makers in business and
government for fear that it breeds chaos and individualism
in climates which demand solidarity, efficiency, and
productivity. Agency theory posits that centrally positioned decision makers mould the preferences of employees
over time. What has been characterized as ‘moulding’
includes cheating, deception, withholding information, and
bounded rationality. In this regard, Jos (1988) argues that
organisations erode an individual’s ability to think
independently. What is at stake is the worker’s autonomy
and status, independent of the mindset of the organization
itself, as a chooser. Being authentic within the organization
involves the willingness to act morally on the basis of one’s
own beliefs. In this way, Fennell and Malloy (in press)
argue that room should be made for existentialism in
institutions because even though rules and procedures are
necessary components of the organization, what matters,
especially to the existentialist, is if they are followed in
good faith as a function of an individual’s good will.
3.4. Ethical triangulation
Precedence has long been set for the integration of
traditionally segregated normative ethical theories. Those
who commit purely to one theoretical approach over others
rule out the acceptance of decision-making that is premised
on multiple perspectives. As Reidenbach and Robin (1990)
have demonstrated, decision making rarely takes place
from one ethical domain. It is more likely that agents
employ a diverse mix of ethical views in deciding on what is
the ethically correct path to follow. This perspective
corroborates other research claiming that the nature and
degree of contemporary interpersonal stress on individuals
demands complex ethical strategies for survival (Best and
Kellner, 1991). The following few examples serve to
emphasize the importance of ethical integration.
Not surprisingly, integration of ethical theories has
tended to include deontological and teleological approaches where comprehensively ethical decisions are those
which seek the best means as well as the best ends.
Examples in the literature include Denhardt (1988), Hitt
(1990), Guy, (1991), Chandler (1994), and Frederickson
(1997). Increasingly, however, researchers have diversified
attempts to arrive at truly ethical decision making by
incorporating other ethical theories into models of
integrated moral action. Grofalo and Geuras (1999)
propose a model of comprehensive ethical decision making
based on deontology (means), teleology (ends), with
emphasis on virtue ethics (character) and intuitionism
(humans sharing an intuitive moral sense). Their framework is designed to help practitioners unravel the moral
mysteries of their environment and detect ethical clues that
lead to superior policy and management clarity. Schumann
(2001) has devised a moral principles framework based on
five ethical theories, including utilitarianism, rights, distributive justice, an ethic of care, and virtue theory. Each
theoretical perspective affords the agent an opportunity to
examine ethical dilemmas from a different perspective for
the purpose of arriving at morally acceptable outcomes.
Although people may be generally unaware of these
various theoretical domains, people quite naturally use
these approaches in their day-to-day practices in seeking
fair and equitable exchanges with others (Schumann,
2001). (See Fennell, 2006, for a detailed account of why
sex tourism is morally wrong, through the Schumann
framework.)
In this paper we adopt the ethical triangulation
perspective of Fennell and Malloy (1995) and the
comprehensive ethical decision-making approach of Malloy
et al. (2000) to adaptive co-management. As illustrated
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in Fig. 1, the outermost portion of the model is designed to
stress the importance of a dynamic tension between the
normative theories of deontology and teleology as well as the
more introspective existentialism. In this way it is essential for
decision makers to acknowledge the importance of following
universal principles and duty, in addition to cultural and
ecological norms. This would occur in accordance with the
ability to express behaviour that seeks good ends through the
pursuit of excellence in character (virtues), for the greatest
good for the greatest number (utilitarianism), and for the
greatest good for the individual agent (hedonism). At the
same time, however, notions of what is ethical should be
examined by the agent against a backdrop of what is morally
correct based on one’s own beliefs. So while rules and
procedures and good ends for the collective are important,
decisions must be made in good faith and as a function of
good will. This freedom to choose, however, must come
packaged with self-awareness and knowledge, as it is essential
that existentialists take responsibility for their actions or
inactions.
67
The comprehensive approach to ethical decision-making
recognizes the importance of moderators (Malloy et al.,
2000; Fennell, 2006). Moderators intercede the three ethical
perspectives outlined above, present an array of influences
that act on the decision making process of individuals, and
highlight the cognitive process of moral reasoning (Fennell,
2006). As illustrated in Fig. 1, moderators include: external
contextual factors which frame the situation; organizational
surroundings and climate in which the individual participates; significant other moderators (e.g., family, friends,
etc.) which hold meaning to the individual; issue-specific
considerations which temper the severity to the individual
(e.g., magnitude and immediacy of consequences, distance,
normative consensus); and, individual characteristics and
values (Malloy et al., 2000; Fennell, 2006).
In adapting the comprehensive ethical decision-making
approach to adaptive co-management it is important to
recognize that the three ethical perspectives and the nested
moderators apply uniquely to all actors involved in
the adaptive co-management agreement. For this reason,
External moderators
Organization moderators
Significant other moderators
Issue-specific moderators
de
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Individual moderators
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Adaptive Co-management
Responsibility for action
Existentialism
Fig. 1. Incroporating ethics into adaptive co-management. Adapted from Fennell and Malloy (1995), Malloy et al. (2000) and Carlsson and Berkes (2005).
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D. Fennell et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
Fig. 1 incorporates the conceptualization of adaptive comanagement as a governance system involving networks of
multiple heterogeneous actors across various scales which
solve problems, make decisions and initiate actions (see
Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). In following the conventions
established by Carlsson and Berkes (2005), we use different
lines (solid, dashed, dotted) to illustrate how actors (several
actors within one type and multiple types) may be
connected to one or more of the central features of
adaptive co-management (experimentation, collaboration,
power sharing), the potential for each actor to play a
different role or function at specific times within the
network, and the possibility for the content and intensity of
these relations to vary. It is through the process of
interaction that actors involved in the governance system
may consider each of the ethical perspectives, the specific
circumstances surrounding the issue and ultimately gain an
appreciation for ambiguities from experimentation, collaboration and power sharing.
4. Adaptive co-management in Cambodia through the Lens
of Ethics
In this section of the paper we present experiences with
adaptive co-management in Cambodia as a reflective
narrative and examine ethical considerations therein.
Specifically, we focus on the decisions and actions
associated with adaptive co-management made within a
governance system, and the situational circumstances
surrounding those involved. We then employ the lens of
ethical triangulation to examine the Cambodian case study
from the perspectives of deontology, teleology, and
existentialism. This case highlights the challenge of
employing just one ethical perspective and the need to
foster reflective thinking.
4.1. Adaptive co-management in Cambodia
Cambodia is a (post)conflict society, transitioning
towards a market-based economy (EIC, 2005). Its relatively tumultuous history is punctuated by the Khmer
Rouge regime in the 1970s and the Vietnamese occupation
in the 1980s. Cambodians continue to be impacted by these
events, including living with disabilities resulting from
landmines and other weapons (de Walque, 2006) and
experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder. The Cambodian government began working on state reconstruction
after the first democratic election in 1993. Nonetheless,
only 20 years after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge
have administrative reforms began to emphasize decentralized, local democracy (Blunt and Turner, 2005).
Ranked 130 (of 177) on the Human Development Index
(HDI, 2005), the latest (2004) national household survey
found that approximately 35% of Cambodian’s live under
the poverty line, with the highest poverty rates occurring in
rural areas (World Bank, 2006). Just over 70% of the
population over 15 years old pursues agricultural activities
which include forestry and fisheries-related activities (MoP,
2002) that are critical livelihood strategies for most rural
Cambodians (Marschke, 2005). Cambodia’s once plentiful
natural resources have drastically declined during this
‘transition phase’ due to government policies of ‘extracting
maximum economic rent’, exploiting timber and fish
exports, and often converting forests for agriculture (rice
or rubber) production (Sunderlin, 2006; Ratner, 2006).
Rice, fish, timber and rubber are among Cambodia’s few
major exports.
Partially in response to such declines (by 1997 only
450,000 ha of flooded forest habitat remained compared
with one million ha of flooded forest found in 1973), a
handful of donors and non-governmental organizers
(NGOs) worked with government departments and villagers to introduce resource management pilot projects in the
1990s (Marschke, 2005; Sunderlin, 2006). By 2000 the
notion of community based management (initially with an
emphasis on forests) appeared to be a ‘good idea’ (perhaps
a combination of technical and budgetary constraints
confronting government departments, the emergence of
protests over resource loss, and a pervasive donor culture
that emphasizes ‘the local’) (Marschke, 2005; Ratner, 2006;
Sunderlin, 2006). Other than through project documents,
the successes and failures of these initial pilot projects were
never carefully monitored by government agencies, NGOs
or researchers.
In addition to other reforms, the Royal Government of
Cambodia initiated substantial policy reforms aimed at
community-based approaches in forestry, fisheries and
protected areas. In a series of subsequent decisions
(acknowledging that existing codes were outdated), community fishery and forestry policies were approved (2005
and 2003 respectively). Under these policy decisions
degraded forest areas were designated to communities;
the 2001 Fisheries Reform lead to the release of 56% of
fishing lots in the Tonle Sap Lake for community
management (Sunderlin, 2006; Evans, 2002); and technical
departments were to be restructured. In the case of the
Department of Fisheries, a Community Fisheries Development Office was created along with provincial Community Fisheries Units (Levinson, 2002; Ratner, 2006). There
has also been a proliferation of community-based initiatives that have taken form, e.g., from a handful of local
fisheries committees in the 1990s to more than 500 in 2006.
Community based approaches fit within an overall
development context that supports good governance,
decentralization and poverty reduction processes. For
example, while the fisheries reform resulted from a directive
from the PM rather than wider fisheries policy dialogues
(Sokhem and Sunada, 2006), this directive was in line with
other administrative reforms. In Cambodia, processes
involving multiple actors including community members
and state agencies are given various names i.e., community
fisheries, community based management, or co-management (Ratner, 2006; Marschke and Berkes, 2006; Resurreccion, 2006). We argue that the Cambodian experience with
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community-based management can be understood within
the rubric of adaptive co-management.
Our argument follows from Marschke and Nong (2003)
whose analysis of one community-based resource management project suggests that the ability to be adaptive may be
a key ingredient in successful resource management
practice. Resource management processes may include
cross-scale governance (both horizontal and vertical), and
include various community strategies to deal with dynamic
resource issues. This is particularly true for those resource
management committees that are deemed ‘successful’: they
have connections to provincial and national organizations
(technical departments and/or NGOs) (Marschke and
Berkes, 2006).
Throughout Cambodia, villagers and technical staff do
negotiate and work on a variety of resource management
issues, although experiences and practices vary greatly.
Lessons from one inter-governmental team working within
mangrove estuary communities for nearly a decade on the
Thai-Cambodian border shed insights into the practice of
resource management2 This team supports villagers in
addressing their resource management issues—villagers
began in the late 1990s by discussing key problems,
considering various options, and formulating tentative
management plans. Formal elections at the village level
lead to the selection of managerial committees, who
subsequently facilitate (initially with outside support, now
on their own) a more refined discussion of the management
plan (Marschke and Nong, 2003). Specific plans lead to
implementation of actions: a strategy was adopted to start
with less controversial activities to garner broader community acceptance (e.g., mangrove replanting, mangrove
nursery, environmental education-related activities). Mangrove replanting takes place annually, and areas have been
selected to protect critical breeding grounds for aquatic
species and to protect sea grass beds. In addition, older
committees are in the process of working with other
villages in the area to solve resource conflicts through
various ecosystem management approaches (for detailed
information on this approach, see Marschke (2005)).
More controversial actions (e.g., patrolling activities,
lessening illegal harvesting, changing waste management
practices) were slowly introduced by committee members.
In the case of patrolling and lessening illegal harvesting
activities near a village, the committee has asked those
partaking in these illegal activities to shift their livelihood
strategies. This takes time, and is sometimes met with
resistance by government officials supporting illegal
activities through rent-seeking. Instituting a new system
of waste management—in essence changing the norms of
the community—has also been a function of time, but also
innovation through the implementation of an environmental education campaign (Marschke and Sinclair, under
2
Canada’s International Development Research Center has supported
this inter-governmental team through three project phases. This is quite
rare, and most likely contributes significantly to the success of this work.
69
review). Fuelled by ever-declining resources and a successful mangrove replanting campaign that has resulted in an
increase in crabs in the area, it appears that ‘buy-in’ for this
approach from many villagers, local officials and police is
mounting (Marschke and Berkes, 2006). It also helps that
Cambodia’s shifting policy context supports decentralization and local resource management work.3
Longer-term analysis of this process suggests that
resource management committees, local officials and
government counterparts need to have a degree of
autonomy and flexibility in deciding how to implement
their work if it is to be successful4 (Marschke, 2005). For
example, according to management regulations, committee
members need to stand for re-election every three years. In
the case of the aforementioned committee (the most active
committee in the area), it has been argued that they could
not afford to risk holding a village-wide election as rentseeking officials and villagers partaking in illegal activities
would nominate and elect villagers with less of an
environmental ethic. Elders and villagers concerned about
village enhancement currently sit on this committee (this
committee is seen as the ‘big brother’ in the area since they
are able to resolve inter and intra village conflict)
(Marschke field notes, 2006). An open-forum village
meeting was held, with committee members explaining
their rationale and asking for objections. Of the seven
committee members, two were replaced through a nomination and election process, while the rest continued on for
another term (the village head approved this process)
(Marschke field notes, 2006).
Examples of ‘practice’ that differ from the rules and
regulations found in management plans are abundant.
Committee members are faced with this dilemma time and
time again when working on resource management issues.
Rather than being concerned with the violation of blueprint plans and programme rules of fisheries management,
a more iterative way of implementation has been developed
to work within existing capacities and balance the need for
authority (Resurreccion, 2006). In the case of fishers, there
is often a rule related to how much thieves should be fined
for steeling gear. Consider how the committee solved the
following problem:
3
Most of these committees fall within a protected area, yet the
community-based protected areas sub-decree is only in draft form. For
now, these committees are connected to provincial and national actors
which secure them informal rights to local resource management (the
Provincial Governor and Minister of Environment have signed off on
local management plans). Nonetheless, these are fishing communities so
while they fall outside of the fisheries domain, they tend to loosely adhere
to community fisheries regulations and network with other fishing
communities (and in this sense take advantage of the 2001 Fisheries
Reform).
4
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present an analysis of why this
one area has been afforded such autonomy. Three factors include strong
local leadership, strong technical support within the national Ministry of
Environment, and consistent funding.
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A fisher lost traps, on the other side of the estuary
[mangrove area across from the village]. We tried to
solve this with the police. The person who stole the traps
lived outside the community. We wanted to fine this
person but they did not have any money. So, we went to
their home and brought back some luggage and some
cups since he is a thief. Everyone agreed that this was
fair (Committee Member, April 2004 as noted in
Marschke and Sinclair, under review).
According to local norms, the decision to take a few
belongings from the thief was more ethical than the
regulations which stated that the thief should be fined
500 B (USD 12.5) per trap. Committee members felt that
the thief could not afford to pay the entire fine as this
would significantly increase their debt. Taking a few
belongings was felt to be the right punishment by all.
It appears that committees that are actively negotiating
their resource management practices may be the
exception rather than the rule. We suggest this given the
mounting critique of community based management
practices in Cambodia (e.g., Ratner, 2006; Resurreccion,
2006; Sunderlin, 2006). While there is no doubt that many
paper committees exist, it is also possible that many
examples of committees resolving resource management
issues remain undocumented or discussed in formal texts.
The examples presented in this paper illustrate how
complex reality is, and why negotiation is necessary (by all
stakeholders involved). Policy often becomes managerial
(Mosse, 2005) and engages in simplifications (Li, 1999,
2002). In Cambodia, as elsewhere, community based
management practices have been translated into legal
frameworks and program initiatives which make rights
conditional upon particular forms of social organization
(i.e., a formal resource management committee, management plans, managing a bounded area) and conservation
outcomes (i.e., creating fish sanctuaries, tree replanting).
There is an assumption that people will observe ‘rules and
regulations’ once these are articulated and approved
despite existing practices and norms (Resurreccion, 2006).
Moreover, cultural dimensions are often glossed over in
the name of good governance and participation. Social
relations in Cambodia occur within an authoritarian and
hierarchical power structure where social stratification
remains an important basic cultural value (Ebihara, 1968;
Marston, 1997; Ayres, 2000). In this sense, planning may
be meaningless if people do not believe that their plans are
supported by a neak thom (big person), regardless of the
quality of the plan or what the law says (Marschke, 2005).
Recent commentaries on the Cambodian experience question the utility of such policy reforms for solving resource
issues without appropriate support at provincial or local
levels (Sunderlin, 2006). This suggests that (although critics
continue to argue that if the policy context is ‘right’ the rest
will follow) key actors at multiple levels need to ‘buy in’ to
supporting resource management practices, as the case of
the mangrove-estuary committee illustrates.
Some critics argue that the Cambodian government is not
genuinely committed to supporting local resource management practices, lacking administrative capacity and political
will (Sunderlin, 2006; Ratner, 2006). Blunt and Turner
(2005) go further and observe that decentralization in
Cambodia is often pragmatically motivated to procure
short-term gains by responding to the agenda of donors. An
intricate set of rules, roles and rights with competing sets of
claims exists in fisheries management (Resurreccion, 2006),
not only in the Tonle Sap with its significant commercial
interests but also in coastal waters. This is true in forest
areas too. Unless the ‘adaptive’ part is integrated more
often, resource governance as often practiced in Cambodia
may remain blind to the nature of complex, social dynamics
and conditions in resource allocations (Resurreccion, 2006).
Given the lack of systematic analysis of local resource
management practices, it remains unclear if policy reforms
and associated processes are enhancing livelihoods or
addressing resource issues. In the case of mangrove-estuary
communities, the general perception of most community
members in this process is that working on resource
management issues does enhance daily life (Marschke and
Berkes, 2006). Yet, for other communities the introduction
of resource management rules and regulations has created
confusion and challenged ongoing ‘norms’ and ‘rules-inuse’ (both in terms of drawing on local ecological knowledge or the continuation of rent-seeking and illegal
practices). Some argue that policy reforms have lead to a
proliferation of illegal activities (Ratner, 2006), although it
is nearly impossible to trace this.
Outcomes of decentralized resource policies and experiences with adaptive co-management experiences in Cambodia are just beginning to emerge. In addition to the few
detailed papers focused on committee practices (e.g.,
Marschke and Berkes, 2005; Marschke and Sinclair, under
review), analysis of community based management appears
to be policy oriented (granted there is plenty to critique
here), drawing on short field visits or reports (e.g., Ratner,
2006; Sunderlin, 2006; Resurreccion, 2006), practitioner
focused (e.g., CBNRM LI case studies; GTZ reports;
FAO-Siem Reap material) or ‘quick and dirty’ evaluations
(e.g., FACT, 2002; Oxfam reports). However, what is never
questioned is if such a policy approach could ever meet its
intended outcomes and really support local practice
(Mosse, 2005). This is where practitioner reports and
ethnographic research could be insightful.
4.2. Ethical perspectives of adaptive co-management in
Cambodia
The purpose of implementing adaptive co-management
is presumably to increase the well-being of people in
association with the communities in which they live, and
secondarily to conserve natural resources. Here we examine
the above case of adaptive co-management in Cambodia
from the ethical perspectives of deontology, teleology and
existentialism.
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Right behaviour in Fig. 1 is characterized as action that
is subject to universal principles and duty, cultural and
ecological norms, as well as law. In Cambodia there is a
strong reliance on policy largely to the exclusion of other
deontological perspectives. Policies, often influenced by
international donors, are enacted without an appreciation
for the varied social-ecological characteristics found
throughout Cambodia. In part, this is because of security
issues which, until the late 1990s, made it nearly impossible
for policy-makers to travel around much of the country. As
such, newly created resource management policies tend to
be managerial and too simplified to adequately handle the
‘on the ground’ reality of overlapping rules and responsibilities found in many social-ecological systems (e.g., Tonle
Sap, coastal waters, and forested regions).
Especially pronounced in the Cambodian case is the
disjuncture between formal laws and cultural norms; a
disjuncture found throughout the Global South. While
policy directions are aimed at fostering decentralization,
social relationships in Cambodia remain authoritarian and
hierarchical (this is not to suggest that culture is static;
culture is constantly being (re)negotiated and (re)imagined).
All moderators (external, organizational, significant other,
issue-specific, individual) appear to hold influence as
appropriate support is critical for adaptive co-management
practices, such as in the example of the mangrove-estuary
committee. Consequently, practice differs considerably
from the rules and regulations set forth. The propensity
to subscribe to local norms is illustrated in the case of stolen
fishing gear. Here, committee members subscribed to local
norms (ignoring the rules and regulations) and tailored
consequences to the specific situation with an appreciation
for the reality of the individual (thief) in question.
We should also recognize that policies, and the fetish
behind an over-reliance on policy, are merely documents that
have no memory; while the people who must live by them do
(Saul, 2001; Fennell, 2006). This is a rather blunt way of
suggesting that laws and policies are not always moral, and
why ethics needs to stand apart as a benchmark for what is
deemed morally acceptable in society. Questions should also
be raised here about relativistic notions of morality. It might
also be that there are universal rights that must be considered
in the development of regional policies in ensuring the best
for the people these directives supposedly serve. The UN’s
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a social contract,
provides clear leadership in this area5
The necessity of an examination of rights at the outset of
human socio-economic interactions is discussed by Schu5
Rights can be discussed in the context of a duty owed, from an intrinsic
standpoint, to an agent (the right-holder) in supporting the agent’s
important interests. Rights are often supported by social contracts, where
there is a duty or burden that should be assumed by a duty-bearer (e.g.,
such as government). Rights may also be considered from a utilitarian
perspective where duties are owed to individuals not necessarily from an
intrinsic standpoint, but rather from an extrinsic perspective in maximizing group utility (happiness), where rights may be ignored or rejected
depending on the desired consequences of institutional action.
71
mann (2001), who poses the following key question: What
action does one have the moral right to take that protects
the rights of others, and that furthers the rights of others?
This is further broken down into the following subquestions: (1) Do you have the moral right to take the
action in question? (2) What moral rights do other
stakeholders have? (3) Are there conflicts between your
moral rights and others? (4) Which take precedence?
Clearly there may be conflicts between the rights of outside
influencers and the rights of local people. Even if policies
developed by the former have been implemented with
concern for the protection of the latter, they may actually
be harmful.
An intriguing example is how the resource management
committee is not willing to hold elections after their threeyear term is complete, as mandated in their management
regulations. An issue-specific moderator (the risk of
electing individuals who would support illegal activities)
influenced the committee to forego the agreed upon
management regulations and in turn limit the rights of
others to stand for election. Approval for this process by
the head of the village (along with the fact that other
moderators chose to turn a blind eye to the committee not
following their own regulations (e.g., the government team
working with this committee)), further underscores the
challenges of adaptive co-management in Cambodia from
the deontological standpoint. A dedicated approach to the
examination of the spectrum of principles and norms
would prove useful in helping to decide which policies are
appropriate for adaptive co-management in Cambodia.
The second dimension of Fig. 1, teleology, suggests that
good behaviour is a function of virtue, the greatest good
for the greatest number, and the greatest good for the
individual—all of which lead to the supposed best
consequences. In deciding what is the most virtuous (i.e.,
the pursuit of excellence manifested through decision
making that allows us to flourish) course of action,
decision makers must ask: what actions display the most
virtuous character traits over others? In this regard, the
virtuous decision maker would, for example, take policy
actions that are seen to be more benevolent than
malevolent, or based on the interests of the public good
rather than themselves or their colleagues.
This case study is illustrative of a situation whereby the
achievement of the greatest good for the greatest number
and the greatest good for the individual may be both
supported and seriously challenged. The substantial policy
reforms and experimental program initiatives undertaken
by the Royal Government of Cambodia may represent a
genuine commitment to emphasizing local democracy and
a concerted attempt to foster decentralization. Here the
greatest good for the individual could be strengthened as
individuals have a greater amount of influence (power)
over resources via participation in the resource management committee, such as in the example of the mangrove
estuary community. Placing a strong emphasis on conservation (not preservation) outcomes (e.g., fish sanctu-
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D. Fennell et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 88 (2008) 62–75
aries, tree replanting, considering various livelihood
options) is vitally important for the majority of Cambodians who pursue livelihood strategies involving these
resources, the nation in terms of exporting capacities of
these products, and the ecosystem functions to which they
contribute.
However, compelling evidence from the case study
seriously challenges the idea that adaptive co-management
in Cambodia increases the greatest good because attempts
at decentralization and conservation have come packaged
with the wrong set of values and motives. If we are to
achieve something close to the proper ends from the
utilitarian perspective, Schumann (2001) argues that
the following questions must be examined: (1) Who are
the stakeholders? (2) What are the alternative courses of
action? (3) For each alternative, what are the benefits and
costs? (4) Which alternative creates the greatest level of
benefit and least costs? The truth behind these questions
may be constrained by the deep-rooted powers that decide
on alternatives, the weighting of costs and benefits, along
with the methods of evaluation. As foreshadowed in the
synopsis of this case, what is fronted as the greatest good
for the greatest number in practice might simply be a
guise—over the short term—for the purposes of covering
past practices (extracting maximizing economic rent),
overcoming technical and budgetary shortfalls and procuring more international support. Paramount among external moderators appears to be the influence of donor
support on policy decisions by the Cambodian government. Organizational moderators also appear to hold
considerable sway.
Despite the restructuring of technical agencies described
in the case, the capacity and political will therein has been
critically questioned (Ratner, 2006; Sunderlin, 2006). The
climate within the government itself is uncertain towards
this end; as illustrated in the example of officials rentseeking via illegal activities. Considering the low salaries of
government workers, US$ 40 per month, it is hardly
surprising that rent seeking is nearly an accepted norm!
Further challenges arise from the teleological perspective as
these experimental policies do not create the greatest good
for the individual. For example, Ratner (2006) documents
the frustrations of a local village leader who explained that
under the old lot system he knew who to pay to fish but
the new community system has lead to a proliferation of
rent seekers with questionable legitimacy. In some cases,
power has shifted to new actors through such policies (i.e.,
a resource management committee) leading to frustration
for certain individuals (i.e., those whose power has been
diminished or those that are marginalized by such
processes).
The third ethical perspective in Fig. 1, existentialism, has
important implications for adaptive co-management in
Cambodia because practice has tended to proceed in an
iterative fashion which displaces authority for authenticity.
Throughout the above case study examples are given (e.g.,
election processes, punishment for lost traps) where
self-determination prevails and serves an important adaptive and learning function. Organizational moderators
(committee members, in this case) are critical here in terms
of their ideology (environmental ethic) as well as subscription to local ethical norms. This also raises cautions about
the ability of individuals to exercise free-will within such
resource committees. Perhaps the one person to potentially
exercise free-will is the committee leader whose vision and
leadership qualities appear to make the difference of a
committee that is seen as doing the right thing compared to
a committee that is not accepted by villagers (Marschke,
2005).
Policy reforms and the accompanying proliferation of
regulations are challenged from the existential standpoint
because they restrict an individual’s right or freedom to
choose. In translating management practices into laws and
programs, free choice fades and rights become a provision
of prescribed organizational forms (e.g., resource management committee) and outcomes (e.g., conservation measures). In the example of the mangrove estuary community
attempts to control behaviours are overt and include
patrolling and educational campaigns. Concerted efforts to
shift livelihood strategies raise questions about the denial
of free will.
The decision to accept or abide by policies and laws can
be made in good or bad faith. In good faith, the individual
will consider the policies or norms, assess both their
validity and resonance by their own value set, and follow
them if s/he can: (1) be true to her- or himself, and (2) act as
an agent of the body who has set forth these directives.
Reflecting upon the lessons from the mangrove estuary
adaptive co-management experience, we see that accepting
actions (e.g., replanting, changing waste management
practices) and changing norms takes time (Marschke and
Sinclair, under review). Significant other, issue-specific and
individual moderators influence the extent to which
individuals are willing to act as agents for the resource
committee; reinforced in this example by increases in the
amount of crabs, reductions in illegal activities and
resolution of conflicts. In bad faith, however, an individual
may abide by the directives outside the authentic self, but
only because they have been instructed to do so. It is
conceivable, therefore, that individuals may have chosen to
follow the guidelines in bad faith or simply elected not to
follow them at all, because of incongruence with the
authentic self. This is evidenced by the fact that illegal
fishing continues, with the justification around maintaining
or improving the well being of one’s family (Ratner, 2006).
To be true to oneself (and family), therefore, it is necessary
to fish illegally. Poverty sometimes forces choices that
would otherwise not be made.
The problem with adhering to just one ethical perspective, and thus ignoring the possibility of triangulating
ethical thought, is that it creates the false illusion of
certainty. Ethical triangulation helps us to think in more of
a meditative fashion through the examination of an issue
from many different perspectives. Heidegger (1966, as
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discussed in Fennell and Malloy, in press) contrasted
meditative or reflective thinking (perceived to be less
functional—not so obsessed with productivity and the end
product—and more difficult, demanding that we look
outside the very narrow and flattened options that are
possible within an agency), with calculative thinking (based
on efficiency, logic, productivity, functionality, and science).
By thinking reflectively, we open the possibility of appreciating the importance of tradition, ecology, and culture beyond
the immediate short-term cost-benefit calculation inherent in
utilitarian thought. The tool becomes even that much more
powerful in the hands of several stakeholders working
together towards a desired goal.
In comprehensive ethical decision-making actors who
constitute the governance system identify the dilemmas of
adaptive co-management (policy experiments, power sharing, and collaboration), discuss their different perspectives on
these issues, and ultimately arrive at informed actions. The
comprehensiveness and interactive nature of this process is
the critical hinge because it assures consideration of multiple
perspectives and situational circumstances (Malloy et al.,
2000; Fennell, 2006). Experiences gleaned from Cambodia
provide evidence that this process takes time, but when the
consortium of actors who constitute the governance system
incorporate ethics into their approach to decision-making
(e.g., the mangrove estuary communities along the ThaiCambodian border) governance that is good, right and
authentic can be achieved. Experiences documented in the
case study (Section 4) also demonstrate that in the absence of
such consideration, the ambiguities and tensions between
policy and autonomous groups remain extensible and the
effectiveness of adaptive co-management as a resource
strategy remains unclear. Ultimately, adaptive co-management as a system of governance is richly textured and caution
should be exercised in arriving at a priori judgements about
its goodness, rightness or authenticity.
5. Conclusions
In looking beyond the vernacular of adaptive comanagement we come to understand that human nature
(biology and culture) compels us to cooperate and to be
ethical (Plummer and Fennell, in press). Politics and
economics are, to use Aldo Leopold’s phrase, formats of
‘‘advanced symbiosis’’ because they add ethical content to
cooperative undertakings. Leopold (1966) astutely predicted that cooperative mechanisms would increase in
complexity with greater population density and efficiencies,
a point which Saul (2001) reinforces on a considerably
grander scale. Adaptive co-management is receiving considerable attention because it purports to deal with
complexity and uncertainty by learning from experimentation, fostering collaboration and sharing power. And yet,
much uncertainty remains (as outlined in Section 3) around
each of these root dilemmas.
The implicit and limited treatment of ethics in comanagement is perplexing given that governance is a
73
function of human nature, and de facto subject to a wide
range of ethical considerations. Nadasdy (2003, in press), a
noteworthy exception in this dearth of literature, starts to
ask important questions concerning the social-political
context in which co-management operates and the specific
interests being served. In this article we have extended the
breath and depth of this discourse by clarifying the
connection between adaptive co-management and ethics
and conceptually integrating their functions, as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Applying the lens of ethics to the case of adaptive comanagement in Cambodia illuminated numerous specific
challenges. It also highlighted the problem of adhering to
only one ethical perspective. In this particular case
utilitarian, i.e., ‘good’ reasoning, which is also highly
democratic, might simply contribute more to the calculative thinking mindset and an overemphasis on legalized
mechanisms in the absence of a genuine commitment to
proper means and the free will (authenticity) of individuals.
Consequently, adaptive co-management, without ethics,
may simply be window dressing for well-established
dilemmas of power and ultimately livelihoods.
Gunderson (2003) asserts that few arenas exist that appear
to successfully embrace uncertainty. Adaptive co-management has the potential to be such an arena if the ambiguities
inherent in the approach are acknowledged and examined by
the actors involved. Our main assertion in this paper is that
ethics needs to be a fundamental concern for adaptive comanagement. Arriving at a proper (ethical) decision or
action requires examining various perspectives and making
an informed choice in light of the alternatives and situational
circumstances. As a governance system, adaptive co-management provides a promising mechanism by which multiple
perspectives (ethical triangulation) could be considered by
many different actors. As participants discuss these fundamental ethical questions through meditative or reflective
thinking, adaptive co-management becomes an agent of
governance which is good, right, and authentic as well as an
arena in which uncertainty can be embraced.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the three anonymous
reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Marschke’s research began at the NRI, University of
Manitoba and is supported by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the Challenges of the
Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia project (SSHRCMCRI).
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