“With God on our Side”: a Focus on Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, a Sui Somali Paramilitary Group Giulio Di Domenicantonio University of Salento Suism in Somalia: a Historical Perspective of Sui preachers (Wadaad). Such an approach deined their functional role within sections of For more than eight hundred years, the Sunni tribes “as acting in the capacity of unoficial qadis doctrine of the Shai’i rite1has been a constitutive (judge) administering the Shari’a to the extent element of Somali society. This practice was to which its competence is recognized by tribal introduced to the hinterlands authorities (..).’’4 during the twelfth and Nevertheless, this equili[C]olonialism contributed to produce thirteenth centuries and brium had to take into account the a rhetoric of occupation which was integrated tribal customs while passage of time: the nineteenth intercepted by Sufi communities and limiting the power of religious century was a transitional interwoven with dreams of setting-up leaders. In line with such a period for ideological debate an umma with nationalistic features practice, tariqas2 (Sui orders) on Islam, between colonialism against clan affiliations. were made under the guidance and Wahhabism. Moreover, of shaykhs and khalifas in colonialism contributed to order to establish their legitimacy; they claimed produce a rhetoric of occupation which was to have personal genealogies tracing descent intercepted by Sui communities and interwoven from ancestors connected with Muhammad and with dreams of setting-up an umma with the Quraysh tribe, and started spreading their nationalistic features against clan afiliations. message over Somali territory, reaching the apex There was a perceived need for more clan during the ifteenth century.3 cooperation, irst in developing the economy of Three prominent tariqas in Somalia emerged: the Southern Somalia and later, in ighting the various Qadiriya was the oldest one, then the Ahmadiyya, colonial incursions into Somalia. All of this, and her branch the Salihiya. The search for the combined with the rise of pan-Islamic movements ‘Path’ became not only a mere inward exercise but in the Islamic world, contributed to the new was also translated into a speciic social purpose. power of the wadaad.5 This in turn led to friction The creation of agricultural religious communities between tariqas in assuming different attitudes (jama’a), with the irst one being formed in 1819 on toward colonizers. One notable example included the Jubba River, embodied such purposes. Thus, a the political struggles between the Uwaysiyya, a pedagogical intent characterized the modus agendi branch of the Qadiriya in the south of Somalia, 64 The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 “wiTh God on ouR side” which brought together various classes and ethnic which aimed to set up a new model for Somali groups and representing a political symptom of the society – the so-called ‘Scientiic Socialism’ – detribalization process, arising from a revitalized was fading out. Scientiic Socialism was based on and collaborative economy with colonizers. Also, three pillars: anti-tribalism, a renewed Islam and one can cite the example of the Salihiya, whose nationalism. In short, a resized Islam stood for leader Sayid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan aiming at state supremacy.9 Ulama were directly concerned: the construction of a Dervish state by means of the government organized training courses for a militarization process of tariqas. Joining the religious scholars in Scientiic Socialism. In Siad daraawiish movement also became a means of Barre’s view, “(...) it is impossible to build a solid social revolution and a way of subverting the state when one does not think and act in terms of 6 traditional authority. The original trait d’union the common good, and the welfare of all (...).’’10 between Sayid’s theory and praxis materialized The segmentary Somali society was producing into military actions having a ‘liberatory function’ its own system of antibodies which enabled against inidels. The Jihad led by Sayid against the Muslim communities to play a greater role: thus, colonial and Ethiopian powers was based almost the activism of Arab state-funded NGOs or Islamic exclusively on clan afiliation. Ideological rifts charities found fertile ground among young urban within the Salihiya and razzias weakened the Muslims. Although the military dictatorship Dervish movement. However, Sayid gave life to a strictly controlled Islamic charities, the seeds renewed Suism, born in response to colonialism. of Islamic discord were nevertheless sown. This The neo-Sui reforms included a reassertion of process created ruptures within Somali society the importance of Islamic law, social activism in both in terms of political solutions and doctrinal the cause of moral reform and hierarchical mass outcomes: the activities of these NGOs also gave organizations. rise to a rival, Arabic-speaking elite that compete The distinguishing feature of neo-Suism is with the traditional Sui leadership.11 Moreover, not so much abrupt doctrinal shifts from their Barre borrowed nationalistic language from predecessors, whether independent or in response tariqas and Sui orders that were seen as Barre’s to Wahhabi ınluence; rather it is a gradual supporters such as Al-Ittihad, a Salai group, and accommodation, at once complex and local, to the Al-Islah, a hub of Muslim brotherhood. 7 multiple challenges of a colonial order. It included new transregional mobility, new local institutions, Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a between new multilingual forms of education and also Integration and Secession new print networks.8 If, during the process of Ahlu Sunna WalJama’a (ASWJ) originated late in decolonization, neo-Sui ideas materialized into 1992 around the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiyya, a political formation with nationalistic purposes, dominated by sub-clans of the Hawiye clan. This such as the Somali Youth League, one could state was in response to a request for co-operation from that clan balance was not considered. After the Siad Mohamed Farah Aideed to counter Islamist groups. Barre take-over, clan balance In this context the creation of changed again. The crisis of ASWJ was an attempt to avoid a Ahlu Sunna WalJama’a (ASWJ) Siad Barre consensus dates back vacuum and organize religious originated late in 1992 around to the Ogaden War (July 1977clerics who were supporting the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiyya, March 1978), which ushered him, against those who were dominated by sub-clans of the Hawiye Somalia into a repressive phase inclined towards Islamist clan. This was in response to a request mixed with a poor and corrupt movements or who wanted for co-operation from Mohamed Farah economy, famine and drought. to limit his power.12 However, Aideed to counter Islamist groups. The ‘revolutionary’ thrust Aideed stopped the process of The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 65 focus: somAliA militarization but ASWJ remained active as an to committed jihadists in the shabaab militia.’’15 umbrella group for politically motivated Sheikhs In 2006, Ethiopia’s invasion defeated the Islamic from the Sui orders. The legitimization of Islamist courts but did not manage to stabilize Somalia movements, exploited by the United Nations politically and militarily. Operation in Somalia and seen as operating In late 2008, al-Shabaab expanded across the against Aideed, had the consequence of setting up central regions16 inhabited by ASWJ: supported Islamist NGOs acting as relay masts, or hubs of Gulf by Ethiopia, the latter organized themselves to States’ money. With an economic fabric in shreds, defend Sui practices after al-Shabaab attacks accentuated by the withdrawal against their sacred places. of UN contingents, small subASWJ conigures itself as being In late 2008, al-Shabaab expanded clans started orbiting around predominantly a clan alliance across the central regions inhabited Islamist movements such as Althat brings together major by ASWJ: supported by Ethiopia, the Itihaad. Hawiye sub-clans inhabiting the latter organized themselves to defend Moreover, because of the central regions; in particular, Sufi practices after al-Shabaab attacks disintegration of the judicial it includes the main sub-clan against their sacred places. system, the jurisdiction of Haber Gedir (the Ayr, Suliman, customary law (xeer) expanded: Sa’ad). If ASWJ is animated by this trend resulted from a delicate balance an aversion to al-Shabaab, however, “it remains between three distinct legal traditions (civil law, deeply divide[d] along clan lines.”17 ASWJ brings common law, Islamic law) in the colonial era together other sub-clans: the Abgaal Wa’eysle although it was undermined during the Siad Barre of Hawiye (Galguddud, Middle Shabelle) and the dictatorship. The outcome was the rise of sharia Marehaan of the Darood clan (Gedo region).18 This courts. However, authority was vested in those implies fragmented diplomatic initiatives because courts by the decision of the lineage elders who of lack of a uniied chain of command. ASWJ established them, and so they derive primarily participation was the response against the Alliance 13 from Somali customary law (xeer). for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), an Islamist The privatization of public services and the organization whose cadres (in particular, the militias characterized the post-UN intervention Agbal sub-clans) stemmed from the radical wing landscape. This process applied to ASWJ of the Islamic Courts Union: ASWJ wanted to shape and, according to a clannish logic, caused a the political environment facing a TFG/ARS unity fragmentation of Sui communities. However, the government viewed as the enemy.19 ASWJ kept a legitimist approach and always urged However, the TFG and in particular the Prime people to maintain unity and work with whatever Minister, Sharmanke, worried that ASWJ, with government they had, for the sake of the public Ethiopia’s help, could become a competitor of 14 interest. The Arta peace process started in 2000 the TFG and, potentially, a destabilizing factor and led to the creation, in 2004,of a Transitional in Somalia. It could do so by trying to master the National Government (TNG) which included all process of channeling Ethiopian support and, in the Somali stakeholders; the purpose was to integrate case of the ASWJ from the central regions, acting Islamic courts into a Union. The pro-Ethiopian as a splinter group moving towards Mogadishu.20 stance of the TFG prompted a debate within On 21 June 2009, a declaration of co-operation was Islamic Courts under the guidance of Hawiye subsigned between the TFG and ASWJ.21 In doing so, clans, especially the Haber Gedir/Ayr. The Islamic ASWJ was “considered a legitimate local security courts embodied different visions of political sector institution (…) and therefore eligible for Islam, “ranging from traditional sui igures like external assistance.”22 This implies that ASWJ Sheikh Sharif, to hardline salaists like Aweys, would become a relevant political actor. However, 66 The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 “wiTh God on ouR side” according to the Somalia Unit of the US Embassy stressed that they did not fully endorse the TFG in Nairobi, the problem of requests for military and that the delegation representing them in the assistance mirrored ASWJ’s fragmentation: talks was ineffective: this led to the constitution representatives from Galgudud asked the US to of the Jubba Resistance Movement, under the provide military assistance, directly. However, auspices of Kenya. Following the Kenyan military representatives from Mogadishu wished the TFG intervention in 2011, fractures continued; one 23 to play an intermediary role. Any ASWJ approach reason was that ASWJ forces from the Gedo and had to deal with the willingness of the main Jubaland regions were excluded from participating powers: the US considered ASWJ to be an essential in the Joint Security Committee, which was a intelligence collector, and it advocated the TFG decision-making mechanism for security sector to implement the June 21 agreement, giving it reform. credibility on the ground. However the TFG, At this point, security challenges shaped supported by Ethiopia, tried to broaden its support institutional challenges: a vision shared by Kenya base to include other clans, especially Hawiye suband Ethiopia was supposed to set up several buffer clans. Ethiopia’s motive is to use ASWJ to create a zones by means of a decentralization process. buffer region hostile to al-Shabaab, but it is also The practical implication was the constitution of keen to prevent the rise of a formidable future the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) as an adversary, which is perhaps why it is seeking an architype for future integration of local forces, 24 ASWJ-TFG merger. A statewhere a Technical Committee, building process would be responsible for implementing ASWJ is part of the Somali problem and helped through the constitution security reform, is established not the solution. The Somali problem of a smaller but more effective jointly with the TFG and ASWJ. principally results from a weak and and well-equipped multi-clan However, the integration blurred legal framework and a security Somali military. However, the process must be nuanced sector reform, trapped by clannish June 21 agreement has gone because of clannish issues, attitudes and customs. partially or wholly unfulilled, typically exploited in order aggravated by unpaid salaries. to gain territory: this applies Torn between ASWJ dissatisfaction and an especially in the Gedo Region, a part of the IJA, alliance of necessity, the TFG chose to restrain where ASWJ ighters from the Dir sub-clans are ASWJ forces through their institutionalization: nominally part of the Somali National Armed new talks led to the March15, 2010 agreement Forces (SNAF).26 It also applies to the Galgudud which aimed to assign ive ministerial seats, region where ASWJ militia from the Hawiye/Habr diplomatic posts and in particular three deputy Gedir/Suleiman and Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Sa’ad, commanders of the National Army, Police and are employed by the 21st Division of SNAF.27 Security Forces. In particular, Art. 3 of that The process of state formation between the agreement stated that the TFG must recognize Galgadud Region and parts of the Mudug Region, administrations under ASWJ control. Also, ASWJ known as the Interim Galmudug Administration committed to establish local police militia with (IGA), was initiated in July 2014 under the guidance the support of TFG, and accepted that “ASWJ of the Haber Gedir sub-clans. Clashes erupted forces shall be an integral part of the TFG forces between ASWJ from Darood sub-clans and SNAF and be deployed by the central command of the in the regional capital of Galgadud, Dhusamareb; 25 TFG.’’ However this agreement became a source these incidents relected competition for inluence of discord because no other factions, especially in within the process of member state formation. south and east Somalia, were consulted. Senior There was always a need to mitigate conlict ASWJ leaders from Kenya (Darood sub-clans) between ASWJ and the SNA early on in the process The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 67 focus: somAliA and to ensure the interests of all inluential stakeholders were at least nominally represented in it; failure to meet this need compromises the future legitimacy of the IGA unless signiicant political, and probably also inancial, capital is spent securing full ASWJ buy-in.28 Conclusion ASWJ is part of the Somali problem and not the solution. The Somali problem principally results from a weak and blurred legal framework and a security sector reform, trapped by clannish attitudes and customs. The leader of the ASWJ section in the Banadir region, Sheikh Shuqul, highlights the future stakes: “the government is oficial. But the constitution is provisional. (…) For how long can a provisional constitution guide an oficial government? The constitution itself is needed. It needs to be built. It does not yet address many questions which arise from the current political situation in Somalia.’’29 That being said, the purpose of ASWJ is to establish itself as a relevant political actor in Somalia by creating a stable and well-administered region. In short, ASWJ factions push to safeguard militia control on the ground as this represents a symbol of their own power. If ASWJ factions are searching for a political identity, then this will develop through the institution of interim administrations. However, the interim administrations will need to control security issues, so that the future challenge of Somali security sector reform will be the constitutionalisation of local militias via a new federal architecture, and, in doing so, they shall directly want to broker security issues (bottom-up approach). Notes 1 The Shai`i madhab (doctrine) is one of the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. It relies upon ive sources: Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet, Ijma’ (the consensus of the scholars), the individual opinions of the Prophet’s companions, and qiyas (analogy). 2 Tariqa means ‘path’ in the sense of the way to follow in the search for righteousness and the way to God. 68 The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA 3 Concerning the concept of ‘total Somali genealogy’ as a symbolic construction and in particular linked to Arabization and Islamization, consult: Ioan M. Lewis, The Somali Lineage System and the Total Genealogy: A General Introduction to the Basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1982); Abdirahman Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History, (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1977); Mohammed Haji Mukhtar, ‘’Islam in Somali history: Fact and iction,’’ in The Invention of Somalia, ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995), pp. 1-28 and Lee Vincent Cassanelli, “Speculations on the historical origins of the ‘Total Somali Genealogy,’” in Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics-Essays in Honour of I.M. Lewis, eds. Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), pp. 53-66. 4 Ioan M. Lewis, “Suism in Somaliland: A study in tribal Islam I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 17, 3 (1955): 581-602, p. 594. 5 Christine Choi Ahmed, “God, Anti-Colonialism and Drums: Sheikh Uways and the Uwaysiyya,” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 17, 2 (1989): 96-117, p. 104; Consult Scott S. Reese, Renewers of the Age: Holy Men and Social Discourse in Colonial Benaadir (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 6 Federico Battera, “Le confraternite islamiche somale di fronte al colonialismo (1890-1920): tra contrapposizione e collaborazione,” Africa: rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione, 53, 2 (1998): 155-184, p. 169. 7 Bruce B. Lawrence, “Suism and Neo-Suism,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam Volume 6: Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society since 1800, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 355384. On arguments for and against the term ‘neo-Suism,’ consult Rex S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, “Neo-Suism reconsidered,’’ Der Islam, 70, 1 (1973): 52–87 and John O. Voll, “Neo-Suism: Reconsidered Again,’’ Canadian Journal of African Studies, 42, 2/3 (2008): 314-330. 8 Ibid. 9 “As far as socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but a mere system for regulating the relations between man and his utilization of the means of production in this world. If we decide to regulate our national wealth, it is not against the essence of Islam. God has created man and has given him the faculty of mind to choose between good and bad, between virtue and vice. We have choose social justice instead of exploitation of man by man and this is how we can practically help the individual Muslim and direct him to [a] virtuous life. However, the reactionaries wanted to create a rift between socialism and Islam because socialism is not in their interest,’’ Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). 10 Siad Barre, “Let us follow Islam’s way,” (http://www. jaallesiyaad.com/english/president-siad-barre-speechlet-us-follow-islam-s-way-1979). • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 “wiTh God on ouR side” 11 Angel Rabasa, Radical Islam in East Africa (Rand Corporation, 2009) 42. 12 Roland Marchal & Zakariya M. Sheikh. “Ahlu Sunna wa l-Jama’a in Somalia,” in Muslim Ethiopia. The Christian legacy, identity politics and Islamic reformism, ed. Patrick Desplat and Terje Østebø (New York: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 215-239, p. 224. 13 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Islamists,” (Africa Report Nr. 100, 12 December 2005), 19. 14 Roland Marchal and Zakariya M. Sheikh, “Ahlu Sunna wa l-Jama’a in Somalia,’’ 227. 15 Kenneth Menkhaus, “The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in ive acts,” African Affairs, 106, 424, (2007): 357-390, p. 370. 16 Hiiraan, Mudug, Galgudud, Middle Shebelle. 17 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s divided Islamists” (Africa Brieing, 74, 18 May 2010), 4. 18 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, S/2010/91,p.13(http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91). 19 US Embassy Addis Ababa, “ASWJ seeking US help to defeat al-Shabaab,” 26 January 2009, (https://www.wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA202_a.html). 20 US Embassy, Nairobi, “Somalia – TFG prime minister reports on efforts with government Opponents,” 21 April 2009 (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NAIROBI784_a. html). 21 “This cooperation will cover the political, security, humanitarian, and development areas affecting the country.” (http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ta bid=9737&currentpage=2&language=en-US). The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA 22 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, S/2010/91,p.13(http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91). 23 US Embassy, Nairobi, ‘’Somalia – Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma groups request military assistance,’’ 26 June 2009 (https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NAIROBI1297_a.html). 24 ICG, “Somalia’s divided Islamists,” p.14. 25 Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, 15 March 2010, Addis Ababa, (http://unpos.unmissions.org/ Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/100315%20%20 Agreement%20bet%20TFG%20&%20ASWJ.pdf). 26 Somalia CEWERU, From the bottom up: Southern Regions – Perspectives through conlict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle, September 2013, 19-21 (http://www.cewarn. org/attachments/article/214/Somalia%20CEWERU%20 Report%20Final.pdf). 27 Sabahionline, Somalia revives army division in step towards greater security, 12 September 2013 (http:// sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/%20 features/2013/09/12/feature-01). 28 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2015/801, p. 57 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801). 29 Life & Peace Institute, “Alternatives for Conlict Transformation in Somalia,’’ 23 May 2014, p. 21 (http:// www.life-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/The-ACTSReport.pdf). • issue no. 12/13 • 2015-2016 69