“With God on our Side”: a Focus
on Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, a Sui
Somali Paramilitary Group
Giulio Di Domenicantonio
University of Salento
Suism in Somalia: a Historical
Perspective
of Sui preachers (Wadaad). Such an approach
deined their functional role within sections of
For more than eight hundred years, the Sunni
tribes “as acting in the capacity of unoficial qadis
doctrine of the Shai’i rite1has been a constitutive
(judge) administering the Shari’a to the extent
element of Somali society. This practice was
to which its competence is recognized by tribal
introduced to the hinterlands
authorities (..).’’4
during the twelfth and
Nevertheless, this equili[C]olonialism contributed to produce
thirteenth
centuries
and
brium had to take into account the
a rhetoric of occupation which was
integrated tribal customs while
passage of time: the nineteenth
intercepted by Sufi communities and
limiting the power of religious
century was a transitional
interwoven with dreams of setting-up
leaders. In line with such a
period for ideological debate
an umma with nationalistic features
practice, tariqas2 (Sui orders)
on Islam, between colonialism
against clan affiliations.
were made under the guidance
and Wahhabism. Moreover,
of shaykhs and khalifas in
colonialism contributed to
order to establish their legitimacy; they claimed
produce a rhetoric of occupation which was
to have personal genealogies tracing descent
intercepted by Sui communities and interwoven
from ancestors connected with Muhammad and
with dreams of setting-up an umma with
the Quraysh tribe, and started spreading their
nationalistic features against clan afiliations.
message over Somali territory, reaching the apex
There was a perceived need for more clan
during the ifteenth century.3
cooperation, irst in developing the economy of
Three prominent tariqas in Somalia emerged: the
Southern Somalia and later, in ighting the various
Qadiriya was the oldest one, then the Ahmadiyya,
colonial incursions into Somalia. All of this,
and her branch the Salihiya. The search for the
combined with the rise of pan-Islamic movements
‘Path’ became not only a mere inward exercise but
in the Islamic world, contributed to the new
was also translated into a speciic social purpose.
power of the wadaad.5 This in turn led to friction
The creation of agricultural religious communities
between tariqas in assuming different attitudes
(jama’a), with the irst one being formed in 1819 on
toward colonizers. One notable example included
the Jubba River, embodied such purposes. Thus, a
the political struggles between the Uwaysiyya, a
pedagogical intent characterized the modus agendi
branch of the Qadiriya in the south of Somalia,
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“wiTh God on ouR side”
which brought together various classes and ethnic
which aimed to set up a new model for Somali
groups and representing a political symptom of the
society – the so-called ‘Scientiic Socialism’ –
detribalization process, arising from a revitalized
was fading out. Scientiic Socialism was based on
and collaborative economy with colonizers. Also,
three pillars: anti-tribalism, a renewed Islam and
one can cite the example of the Salihiya, whose
nationalism. In short, a resized Islam stood for
leader Sayid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan aiming at
state supremacy.9 Ulama were directly concerned:
the construction of a Dervish state by means of
the government organized training courses for
a militarization process of tariqas. Joining the
religious scholars in Scientiic Socialism. In Siad
daraawiish movement also became a means of
Barre’s view, “(...) it is impossible to build a solid
social revolution and a way of subverting the
state when one does not think and act in terms of
6
traditional authority. The original trait d’union
the common good, and the welfare of all (...).’’10
between Sayid’s theory and praxis materialized
The segmentary Somali society was producing
into military actions having a ‘liberatory function’
its own system of antibodies which enabled
against inidels. The Jihad led by Sayid against the
Muslim communities to play a greater role: thus,
colonial and Ethiopian powers was based almost
the activism of Arab state-funded NGOs or Islamic
exclusively on clan afiliation. Ideological rifts
charities found fertile ground among young urban
within the Salihiya and razzias weakened the
Muslims. Although the military dictatorship
Dervish movement. However, Sayid gave life to a
strictly controlled Islamic charities, the seeds
renewed Suism, born in response to colonialism.
of Islamic discord were nevertheless sown. This
The neo-Sui reforms included a reassertion of
process created ruptures within Somali society
the importance of Islamic law, social activism in
both in terms of political solutions and doctrinal
the cause of moral reform and hierarchical mass
outcomes: the activities of these NGOs also gave
organizations.
rise to a rival, Arabic-speaking elite that compete
The distinguishing feature of neo-Suism is
with the traditional Sui leadership.11 Moreover,
not so much abrupt doctrinal shifts from their
Barre borrowed nationalistic language from
predecessors, whether independent or in response
tariqas and Sui orders that were seen as Barre’s
to Wahhabi ınluence; rather it is a gradual
supporters such as Al-Ittihad, a Salai group, and
accommodation, at once complex and local, to the
Al-Islah, a hub of Muslim brotherhood.
7
multiple challenges of a colonial order. It included
new transregional mobility, new local institutions,
Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a between
new multilingual forms of education and also
Integration and Secession
new print networks.8 If, during the process of
Ahlu Sunna WalJama’a (ASWJ) originated late in
decolonization, neo-Sui ideas materialized into
1992 around the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiyya,
a political formation with nationalistic purposes,
dominated by sub-clans of the Hawiye clan. This
such as the Somali Youth League, one could state
was in response to a request for co-operation from
that clan balance was not considered. After the Siad
Mohamed Farah Aideed to counter Islamist groups.
Barre take-over, clan balance
In this context the creation of
changed again. The crisis of
ASWJ was an attempt to avoid a
Ahlu Sunna WalJama’a (ASWJ)
Siad Barre consensus dates back
vacuum and organize religious
originated late in 1992 around
to the Ogaden War (July 1977clerics who were supporting
the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiyya,
March 1978), which ushered
him, against those who were
dominated by sub-clans of the Hawiye
Somalia into a repressive phase
inclined
towards
Islamist
clan. This was in response to a request
mixed with a poor and corrupt
movements or who wanted
for co-operation from Mohamed Farah
economy, famine and drought.
to limit his power.12 However,
Aideed to counter Islamist groups.
The ‘revolutionary’ thrust
Aideed stopped the process of
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focus: somAliA
militarization but ASWJ remained active as an
to committed jihadists in the shabaab militia.’’15
umbrella group for politically motivated Sheikhs
In 2006, Ethiopia’s invasion defeated the Islamic
from the Sui orders. The legitimization of Islamist
courts but did not manage to stabilize Somalia
movements, exploited by the United Nations
politically and militarily.
Operation in Somalia and seen as operating
In late 2008, al-Shabaab expanded across the
against Aideed, had the consequence of setting up
central regions16 inhabited by ASWJ: supported
Islamist NGOs acting as relay masts, or hubs of Gulf
by Ethiopia, the latter organized themselves to
States’ money. With an economic fabric in shreds,
defend Sui practices after al-Shabaab attacks
accentuated by the withdrawal
against their sacred places.
of UN contingents, small subASWJ conigures itself as being
In
late
2008,
al-Shabaab
expanded
clans started orbiting around
predominantly a clan alliance
across the central regions inhabited
Islamist movements such as Althat brings together major
by
ASWJ:
supported
by
Ethiopia,
the
Itihaad.
Hawiye sub-clans inhabiting the
latter
organized
themselves
to
defend
Moreover, because of the
central regions; in particular,
Sufi
practices
after
al-Shabaab
attacks
disintegration of the judicial
it includes the main sub-clan
against their sacred places.
system, the jurisdiction of
Haber Gedir (the Ayr, Suliman,
customary law (xeer) expanded:
Sa’ad). If ASWJ is animated by
this trend resulted from a delicate balance
an aversion to al-Shabaab, however, “it remains
between three distinct legal traditions (civil law,
deeply divide[d] along clan lines.”17 ASWJ brings
common law, Islamic law) in the colonial era
together other sub-clans: the Abgaal Wa’eysle
although it was undermined during the Siad Barre
of Hawiye (Galguddud, Middle Shabelle) and the
dictatorship. The outcome was the rise of sharia
Marehaan of the Darood clan (Gedo region).18 This
courts. However, authority was vested in those
implies fragmented diplomatic initiatives because
courts by the decision of the lineage elders who
of lack of a uniied chain of command. ASWJ
established them, and so they derive primarily
participation was the response against the Alliance
13
from Somali customary law (xeer).
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), an Islamist
The privatization of public services and the
organization whose cadres (in particular, the
militias characterized the post-UN intervention
Agbal sub-clans) stemmed from the radical wing
landscape. This process applied to ASWJ
of the Islamic Courts Union: ASWJ wanted to shape
and, according to a clannish logic, caused a
the political environment facing a TFG/ARS unity
fragmentation of Sui communities. However, the
government viewed as the enemy.19
ASWJ kept a legitimist approach and always urged
However, the TFG and in particular the Prime
people to maintain unity and work with whatever
Minister, Sharmanke, worried that ASWJ, with
government they had, for the sake of the public
Ethiopia’s help, could become a competitor of
14
interest. The Arta peace process started in 2000
the TFG and, potentially, a destabilizing factor
and led to the creation, in 2004,of a Transitional
in Somalia. It could do so by trying to master the
National Government (TNG) which included all
process of channeling Ethiopian support and, in the
Somali stakeholders; the purpose was to integrate
case of the ASWJ from the central regions, acting
Islamic courts into a Union. The pro-Ethiopian
as a splinter group moving towards Mogadishu.20
stance of the TFG prompted a debate within
On 21 June 2009, a declaration of co-operation was
Islamic Courts under the guidance of Hawiye subsigned between the TFG and ASWJ.21 In doing so,
clans, especially the Haber Gedir/Ayr. The Islamic
ASWJ was “considered a legitimate local security
courts embodied different visions of political
sector institution (…) and therefore eligible for
Islam, “ranging from traditional sui igures like
external assistance.”22 This implies that ASWJ
Sheikh Sharif, to hardline salaists like Aweys,
would become a relevant political actor. However,
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“wiTh God on ouR side”
according to the Somalia Unit of the US Embassy
stressed that they did not fully endorse the TFG
in Nairobi, the problem of requests for military
and that the delegation representing them in the
assistance mirrored ASWJ’s fragmentation:
talks was ineffective: this led to the constitution
representatives from Galgudud asked the US to
of the Jubba Resistance Movement, under the
provide military assistance, directly. However,
auspices of Kenya. Following the Kenyan military
representatives from Mogadishu wished the TFG
intervention in 2011, fractures continued; one
23
to play an intermediary role. Any ASWJ approach
reason was that ASWJ forces from the Gedo and
had to deal with the willingness of the main
Jubaland regions were excluded from participating
powers: the US considered ASWJ to be an essential
in the Joint Security Committee, which was a
intelligence collector, and it advocated the TFG
decision-making mechanism for security sector
to implement the June 21 agreement, giving it
reform.
credibility on the ground. However the TFG,
At this point, security challenges shaped
supported by Ethiopia, tried to broaden its support
institutional challenges: a vision shared by Kenya
base to include other clans, especially Hawiye suband Ethiopia was supposed to set up several buffer
clans. Ethiopia’s motive is to use ASWJ to create a
zones by means of a decentralization process.
buffer region hostile to al-Shabaab, but it is also
The practical implication was the constitution of
keen to prevent the rise of a formidable future
the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) as an
adversary, which is perhaps why it is seeking an
architype for future integration of local forces,
24
ASWJ-TFG merger. A statewhere a Technical Committee,
building process would be
responsible for implementing
ASWJ
is
part
of
the
Somali
problem
and
helped through the constitution
security reform, is established
not
the
solution.
The
Somali
problem
of a smaller but more effective
jointly with the TFG and ASWJ.
principally
results
from
a
weak
and
and well-equipped multi-clan
However, the integration
blurred legal framework and a security
Somali military. However, the
process must be nuanced
sector reform, trapped by clannish
June 21 agreement has gone
because of clannish issues,
attitudes
and
customs.
partially or wholly unfulilled,
typically exploited in order
aggravated by unpaid salaries.
to gain territory: this applies
Torn between ASWJ dissatisfaction and an
especially in the Gedo Region, a part of the IJA,
alliance of necessity, the TFG chose to restrain
where ASWJ ighters from the Dir sub-clans are
ASWJ forces through their institutionalization:
nominally part of the Somali National Armed
new talks led to the March15, 2010 agreement
Forces (SNAF).26 It also applies to the Galgudud
which aimed to assign ive ministerial seats,
region where ASWJ militia from the Hawiye/Habr
diplomatic posts and in particular three deputy
Gedir/Suleiman and Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Sa’ad,
commanders of the National Army, Police and
are employed by the 21st Division of SNAF.27
Security Forces. In particular, Art. 3 of that
The process of state formation between the
agreement stated that the TFG must recognize
Galgadud Region and parts of the Mudug Region,
administrations under ASWJ control. Also, ASWJ
known as the Interim Galmudug Administration
committed to establish local police militia with
(IGA), was initiated in July 2014 under the guidance
the support of TFG, and accepted that “ASWJ
of the Haber Gedir sub-clans. Clashes erupted
forces shall be an integral part of the TFG forces
between ASWJ from Darood sub-clans and SNAF
and be deployed by the central command of the
in the regional capital of Galgadud, Dhusamareb;
25
TFG.’’ However this agreement became a source
these incidents relected competition for inluence
of discord because no other factions, especially in
within the process of member state formation.
south and east Somalia, were consulted. Senior
There was always a need to mitigate conlict
ASWJ leaders from Kenya (Darood sub-clans)
between ASWJ and the SNA early on in the process
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focus: somAliA
and to ensure the interests of all inluential
stakeholders were at least nominally represented
in it; failure to meet this need compromises the
future legitimacy of the IGA unless signiicant
political, and probably also inancial, capital is
spent securing full ASWJ buy-in.28
Conclusion
ASWJ is part of the Somali problem and not the
solution. The Somali problem principally results
from a weak and blurred legal framework and
a security sector reform, trapped by clannish
attitudes and customs. The leader of the ASWJ
section in the Banadir region, Sheikh Shuqul,
highlights the future stakes: “the government is
oficial. But the constitution is provisional. (…)
For how long can a provisional constitution guide
an oficial government? The constitution itself is
needed. It needs to be built. It does not yet address
many questions which arise from the current
political situation in Somalia.’’29 That being said,
the purpose of ASWJ is to establish itself as a
relevant political actor in Somalia by creating
a stable and well-administered region. In short,
ASWJ factions push to safeguard militia control
on the ground as this represents a symbol of their
own power. If ASWJ factions are searching for a
political identity, then this will develop through
the institution of interim administrations.
However, the interim administrations will need
to control security issues, so that the future
challenge of Somali security sector reform will be
the constitutionalisation of local militias via a new
federal architecture, and, in doing so, they shall
directly want to broker security issues (bottom-up
approach).
Notes
1 The Shai`i madhab (doctrine) is one of the four schools of
Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. It relies upon ive sources:
Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet, Ijma’ (the consensus
of the scholars), the individual opinions of the Prophet’s
companions, and qiyas (analogy).
2 Tariqa means ‘path’ in the sense of the way to follow in
the search for righteousness and the way to God.
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3 Concerning the concept of ‘total Somali genealogy’ as
a symbolic construction and in particular linked to
Arabization and Islamization, consult: Ioan M. Lewis, The
Somali Lineage System and the Total Genealogy: A General
Introduction to the Basic Principles of Somali Political
Institutions (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1982);
Abdirahman Ali Hersi, The Arab Factor in Somali History,
(Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1977); Mohammed
Haji Mukhtar, ‘’Islam in Somali history: Fact and
iction,’’ in The Invention of Somalia, ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995), pp. 1-28 and Lee
Vincent Cassanelli, “Speculations on the historical origins
of the ‘Total Somali Genealogy,’” in Peace and Milk, Drought
and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics-Essays in Honour
of I.M. Lewis, eds. Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling
(London: Hurst & Company, 2010), pp. 53-66.
4 Ioan M. Lewis, “Suism in Somaliland: A study in tribal
Islam I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
17, 3 (1955): 581-602, p. 594.
5 Christine Choi Ahmed, “God, Anti-Colonialism and Drums:
Sheikh Uways and the Uwaysiyya,” Ufahamu: A Journal of
African Studies, 17, 2 (1989): 96-117, p. 104; Consult Scott S.
Reese, Renewers of the Age: Holy Men and Social Discourse in
Colonial Benaadir (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
6 Federico Battera, “Le confraternite islamiche somale di
fronte al colonialismo (1890-1920): tra contrapposizione
e collaborazione,” Africa: rivista trimestrale di studi e
documentazione, 53, 2 (1998): 155-184, p. 169.
7 Bruce B. Lawrence, “Suism and Neo-Suism,” in The New
Cambridge History of Islam Volume 6: Muslims and Modernity:
Culture and Society since 1800, ed. Robert W. Hefner
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 355384. On arguments for and against the term ‘neo-Suism,’
consult Rex S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, “Neo-Suism
reconsidered,’’ Der Islam, 70, 1 (1973): 52–87 and John O.
Voll, “Neo-Suism: Reconsidered Again,’’ Canadian Journal
of African Studies, 42, 2/3 (2008): 314-330.
8 Ibid.
9 “As far as socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly
message like Islam but a mere system for regulating the
relations between man and his utilization of the means
of production in this world. If we decide to regulate our
national wealth, it is not against the essence of Islam. God
has created man and has given him the faculty of mind
to choose between good and bad, between virtue and
vice. We have choose social justice instead of exploitation
of man by man and this is how we can practically help
the individual Muslim and direct him to [a] virtuous
life. However, the reactionaries wanted to create a rift
between socialism and Islam because socialism is not in
their interest,’’ Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia:
Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1988).
10 Siad Barre, “Let us follow Islam’s way,” (http://www.
jaallesiyaad.com/english/president-siad-barre-speechlet-us-follow-islam-s-way-1979).
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“wiTh God on ouR side”
11 Angel Rabasa, Radical Islam in East Africa (Rand Corporation,
2009) 42.
12 Roland Marchal & Zakariya M. Sheikh. “Ahlu Sunna wa
l-Jama’a in Somalia,” in Muslim Ethiopia. The Christian
legacy, identity politics and Islamic reformism, ed. Patrick
Desplat and Terje Østebø (New York: Palgrave, 2013), pp.
215-239, p. 224.
13 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Islamists,” (Africa
Report Nr. 100, 12 December 2005), 19.
14 Roland Marchal and Zakariya M. Sheikh, “Ahlu Sunna wa
l-Jama’a in Somalia,’’ 227.
15 Kenneth Menkhaus, “The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in
ive acts,” African Affairs, 106, 424, (2007): 357-390, p. 370.
16 Hiiraan, Mudug, Galgudud, Middle Shebelle.
17 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s divided Islamists”
(Africa Brieing, 74, 18 May 2010), 4.
18 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia,
S/2010/91,p.13(http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91).
19 US Embassy Addis Ababa, “ASWJ seeking US help to defeat
al-Shabaab,” 26 January 2009, (https://www.wikileaks.
org/plusd/cables/09ADDISABABA202_a.html).
20 US Embassy, Nairobi, “Somalia – TFG prime minister reports
on efforts with government Opponents,” 21 April 2009
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NAIROBI784_a.
html).
21 “This cooperation will cover the political, security,
humanitarian, and development areas affecting the
country.” (http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ta
bid=9737¤tpage=2&language=en-US).
The AnnuAl Review of islAm in AfRicA
22 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia,
S/2010/91,p.13(http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91).
23 US Embassy, Nairobi, ‘’Somalia – Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma
groups request military assistance,’’ 26 June 2009 (https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NAIROBI1297_a.html).
24 ICG, “Somalia’s divided Islamists,” p.14.
25 Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a, 15 March
2010, Addis Ababa, (http://unpos.unmissions.org/
Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/100315%20%20
Agreement%20bet%20TFG%20&%20ASWJ.pdf).
26 Somalia CEWERU, From the bottom up: Southern Regions
– Perspectives through conlict analysis and key political
actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower
Shabelle, September 2013, 19-21 (http://www.cewarn.
org/attachments/article/214/Somalia%20CEWERU%20
Report%20Final.pdf).
27 Sabahionline, Somalia revives army division in step
towards greater security, 12 September 2013 (http://
sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/%20
features/2013/09/12/feature-01).
28 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,
S/2015/801, p. 57 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801).
29 Life & Peace Institute, “Alternatives for Conlict
Transformation in Somalia,’’ 23 May 2014, p. 21 (http://
www.life-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/The-ACTSReport.pdf).
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