http://www.sehepunkte.de/2016/12/28885.html
Sehepunkte 16 (2016), Nr. 12
Mischa Meier: Der Völkerwanderung ins Auge blicken
This slim (just over 100 pp.) volume presents the Vortrag given by Mischa Meier,
Ordinarius für Alte Geschichte at the Universität Tübingen, in his capacity as the
Preisträger of the 2015 Karl-Christ-Preis für Alte Geschichte. It commences with a
laudatio (13-21) delivered by Uwe Walter and concludes with a voluminous catalog (75102) of the prize-winner's publications. The meat of the discussion comes in the middle
(22-74).
Few topics have excited as much scholarly and popular fascination as the end of the
western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE, which often is seen as representing an
archetypical conflict between barbarians and barbarism on the one hand and Romans
and civilization on the other. Against this background, Meier investigates the
interrelationship between influential individuals and the historical order in which they were
embedded, and considers what agency ("Handlungsmacht"), what room to maneuver
("Handlungsspielraum"), powerful persons had (26). Were they able to influence such a
complex process as the 'Fall of the Roman Empire'?
Meier commences with a survey of some of the continuing debates over the end of the
Roman Empire and the significance of the "sogennante Völkerwanderung" (24), which
often are interpreted from the perspectives either of "catastrophe," promoted by such as
Brian Ward-Perkins and Peter Heather, or of "transformation," represented by the
European-sponsored "Transformation of the Roman World Project" (1997-2004), not to
mention other works. [1] More than before, Meier suggests, international scholarship
struggles to find an adequate evaluation of the Völkerwanderung, a concept that, Meier
notes, is not found in any contemporary text.
Meier rejects the commonplace polarized perception of decadent, passive, victimized
Romans being overcome by energetic, active Germans; concludes that the boundaries
between Romans and barbarians cannot be sharply drawn; and suggests that the
barbarian groups of the Völkerwanderung were not ethnically homogeneous or stable. In
his quest for examples of Handlungsspielraum, Meier chooses to study four paradigmatic
"central protagonists" as representatives of the "long fifth century": three barbarians,
Alaric the Goth, Gaiseric the Vandal, and Attila the Hun; and one Roman, the Patrician
and Master of Soldiers Flavius Aëtius (33).
Meier makes the point that Alaric's band arose on Roman territory, was commanded by a
general in Roman service who had been born on Roman territory, saw action in both the
eastern and western empires, and remained inside the empire up to and after the death
of Alaric. It thus was virtually a Roman creation (37). Meier concludes that Alaric's
primary policies were to secure Roman office for himself and loot and plunder for his
Verband (a useful term used to signify a generic armed force). In particular, plundering
and extortion were essential means of gaining political influence (37). As a means of
creating cohesion in his group, Alaric took the title of "rex". Alaric gradually formed what
in ancient texts is called a "gens" or "natio". (38) Ultimately, Meier posits, Alaric failed to
achieve large-scale success because of his indecisiveness about being integrated into
the Roman sphere, which would have required him to give up his royal title, or opting for
the barbarian world, which was incompatible with a Roman title (39). Ultimately, wedged
between the interests of the Roman courts in west and east (41), Alaric was unable to
free himself from his Roman context and lacked creative agency.
Gaiseric, Meier indicates, was in a different situation from Alaric, and eventually
represented political power in his own right. Nevertheless, his actions largely were
conditioned by Roman contexts that gave him little freedom of action (46). Thus, he
survived threatened Roman attacks only by first crossing to North Africa in 429 and then
seizing Carthage in 439. By 442, Vandal territory was recognized as an independent
kingdom (45). Along with the usual plundering expeditions, Gaiseric also extorted money
by selling grain to Rome. At first glance, this appears to be the successful implementation
of a plan. Gaiseric's ambitions even included a dynastic connection with Valentinian III,
and the western empire appeared to be a client state of the Vandals. (46). But this
independence, Meier suggests, also created problems because Gaiseric still operated
within a Roman framework (47). Vandal foreign policies always were geared toward
Rome, there were clashes with the Berber kingdoms, and there was no long term solution
for dealing with the majority Roman population, which was kept separate from the
Vandals. At the same time that Gaiseric allied himself with the Roman imperial family he
also cut ties with the old Vandal nobility and was forced to dig deeper into the Vandal
social structure for support. For a small group, this was a serious handicap.
Then Attila. At the beginning of the fifth century, the dominion of a Hunnic warrior
confederation, centered on the Hungarian plain, extended from the Black Sea to Gaul.
Attila ruled this Verband since 434, first with his brother Bleda and then alone after 445,
by which time the Huns were exerting great pressure on the eastern Roman Empire. As
in the case of the bands of Alaric and Gaiseric, the Hun economy was based largely on
plundering expeditions and extortion from the Roman government on an even grander
scale. The Hun leader also united under himself a growing number of subject individual
Verbände. Like Gaiseric, Attila attempted to preserve cohesiveness within his Verbände
and maintain his own control by keeping Huns separated from Romans; he even
compelled the Roman government to return Hunnic refugees (55). Attila's authority began
to crumble, Meier argues, when Attila himself penetrated this firewall between Romans
and Huns by demanding the western princess Honoria as his bride and even, when in
451 he invaded Gaul, by claiming to be the supporter of the Romans (57). Doing so
weakened his position among the Huns, and it was the progressive intertwining with the
Roman Empire into which Attila was driven that finally carried him to doom (57).
Finally, Fl. Aëtius, the putative "last of the Romans," who, even if he was not a barbarian,
acted in the same frame of reference and was confronted by the same issues as
barbarian leaders whose position was dependent on their control of armies. Meier argues
that Aëtius operated strictly for the sake of his own personal gains as opposed to the
interests of the empire, and that he shaped Gaul as the focus of his activities (59). Even if
he was not able to reverse the decline of the west Roman Empire, for a few years he was
able to reduce the speed of the disintegration process (59). He fought not as a Roman
against barbarians but essentially for his own interests, supported by both Roman or
barbarian troops. Once he had achieved the highest military office, Meier argues, there
remained for him no other option than to proceed on the accepted path. Attila's effort to
disable Aëtius by invading Gaul backfired when it gave Aëtius the opportunity to create a
multi-ethnic confederation to oppose him (60). Aëtius' victory enabled him to counteract,
for a time, the instability of his own position,
Following Leo Tolstoy, Meier decisively rejects the "great man" theory of history and
concludes that none of these protagonists was able to create lasting effects on the
Völkerwanderung period. All of these individuals acted in frameworks whose overall order
was defined by the Roman Empire (62). Alaric, for example, flitted about aimlessly
between the barbarian and Roman worlds and was crushed between the conflicting
interests of both imperial courts (61). Even though Gaiseric at first appeared to be an
energetic actor, his sphere of influence (Gestaltungsspielraum) remained limited because
he was not able to rise out of the shadow of Rome, and the Vandal kingdom collapsed
with Belisarius' invasion in 533. Attila, in spite of his warlike successes, like Alaric should
be judged more as being externally driven than as a visionary creator (57). After Attila's
death, the powerful Hunnic warrior confederation swiftly broke apart (52). And when
Aëtius attempted to interfere in the dynastic succession with the betrothal of his son to
the princess Placidia, he aroused the opposition of Valentinian III and was murdered (61).
A leader's authority, Meier suggests, was based on prestige that came from successful
military expeditions. Warrior bands did not produce any products themselves so their
economies were based on plundering. This created an ancient version of the Ponzi
scheme: the more successful a leader was at acquiring loot, the larger the warrior
Verband grew, and the more plunder that was needed to sustain it. A leader like Attila
was condemned to have continual military success in order to obtain the requisite booty
(52). Ultimately, the need for booty no longer could be met, and after two or three
generations, Maier proposes, these gigantic coalitions overextended themselves and
could collapse very quickly (51). The need for these protagonists to pursue short-term
goals in order to ensure their own survival precluded looking for long-term solutions that
would either create alternatives to Roman rule or ensure the survival of the empire.
In sum, this very concise and cogent study not only avoids the pursuit of extreme
agendas that characterizes some current scholarship but also offers a framework that
can help to create a "unified model" for understanding the role of powerful generals in the
collapse of the western Roman Empire. The inclusion of Aëtius in the discussion in
particular makes an emphatic point that it was not just barbarians who created their own
warrior bands and carved out their own local spheres of influence; Romans could play
that game too.
Note:
[1] E.g. R. Mathisen / D.R. Shanzer (eds.): Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation
of the Roman World. Cultural Interaction and the Creation of Identity in Late Antiquity,
Aldershot 2011.
Rezension über:
Mischa Meier: Der Völkerwanderung ins Auge blicken. Individuelle Handlungsspielräume
im 5. Jahrhundert n. Ch. (= Karl-Christ-Preis für Alte Geschichte; Bd. 2), Heidelberg:
Verlag Antike 2016, 102 S., ISBN 978-3-938032-99-2, EUR 19,90
Rezension von:
Ralph W. Mathisen
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Empfohlene Zitierweise:
Ralph W. Mathisen: Rezension von: Mischa Meier: Der Völkerwanderung ins Auge
blicken. Individuelle Handlungsspielräume im 5. Jahrhundert n. Ch., Heidelberg: Verlag
Antike 2016, in: sehepunkte 16 (2016), Nr. 12 [15.12.2016], URL:
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