South Africa

10 SOUTH AFRIC A Dr Collette Schulz-Herzenberg Introducion The ordinariness of South Africa’s past few elections, and the general decline in political violence since 1994, signiies a shift away from conlict-based to ballot-based politics and a general maturing of electoral politics. This achievement is due partly to the sterling work of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Set up in 1993 as an interim body to preside over the historic 1994 elections, the IEC has since become a permanent institutional pillar of the new democratic state, overseeing the administration and management of ive credible national and provincial elections and three municipal elections. The IEC is widely regarded as an eicient and independent body, and remains one of the most trusted national institutions. It also provides a role model for similar bodies in post-conlict societies and is often invited to share its expertise with other electoral management bodies (EMBs) and to assist with election processes. Building a functioning election commission entails a number of institutional, organisational and technical details. There are, however, several key aspects which are critical. An electoral commission should preferably be a permanent body; it should not be part of government, nor should appointments of its senior members be the sole prerogative of government; the body should also have suicient funding, staf and technology.1 The South African electoral commission surpasses all these criteria. More than that, however, electoral integrity depends on the character of governance leading up to an election, the quality of the process on the day, and mediated eforts to manage conlicts over contested outcomes. Electoral integrity also presupposes a degree of political competition and a level playing ield during the campaign period so that political parties can freely contest an election. While the IEC has been widely credited with the implementation of free and fair elections, the institution is central to several major debates to level the electoral playing ield, including party funding, electoral reform and the misuse of state resources during election campaigns. 1 Kuhne W (2010) The Role of Elecions in Emerging Democracies and Post-Conlict Countries: Key Issues, Lessons Learned and Dilemmas. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Situng. Available at htp://library.fes.de/pdf-iles/ iez/07416.pdf [accessed 30 June 2016]. 259 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA This chapter probes the afore-mentioned issues. It starts with the political imperatives that gave way to South Africa’s particular electoral regime and institutions. Thereafter, the chapter provides a review of the existing legal framework. The third section examines diferent aspects of institutional design and performance and concludes with insights and recommendations that can assist the IEC and other key actors to institute changes to improve electoral integrity and public conidence in election outcomes. Historical, socioeconomic and poliical context South Africa is a divided and pluralistic society. Its social and political divisions are attributed to the legacy of colonialism and later, apartheid, which was institutionalised in 1948 under the National Party (NP). While colonialism reinforced ethnic identity, the apartheid system continued its legacy by building on racial divisions.2 Today, the diversity of the society is captured in the constitution which recognises 11 oicial languages. Moreover, prominent social cleavages, such as class and race, reinforce each other, producing a highly polarised citizenry. It was against this backdrop that the move towards democracy commenced in the early 1990s.3 Negotiations paved the way for the historic 1994 elections and the establishment of a democratic constitutional state. The democratisation process opted for a highly representative electoral system to ensure free and fair elections. South Africa’s interim constitution required that the electoral system must be based on a system of proportional representation (PR) at the national and provincial-levels.4 The PR voting system is well-suited to South African politics due to its inherent qualities of representivity and inclusivity, fairness and simplicity.5 The low threshold (0.25%) produces near perfect proportionality and ensures a highly representative outcome that can appease minority interests in the context of majority rule. The closed-list PR system obliges voters to elect parties by voting for the entire list shown by each political party, and not individual candidates. Parties are allocated a proportion of seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures according to the percentage of votes won during the elections. The simplicity of the closed-list system maximises voter participation, ensuring the highest level of inclusiveness.6 These features have bestowed a degree of credibility and legitimacy on the new democratic government since 1994. The choice of PR has allowed for the emergence of multiparty politics within the context of 2 Mamdani M (1996) Ciizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 109-137. 3 Lodge T (2002) South Africa. In: T Lodge, D Kadima & D Poie (eds) Compendium of Elecions in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Insitute of Southern Africa (EISA). p. 72. 4 Consituion of the Republic of South Africa, 108/1996. Secion 46 (1)(d). 5 Lijphart A (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 6 Faure M (1996) The electoral system. In: M Faure and J-E Lane (eds) South Africa: Designing New Poliical Insituions. London: Sage. p. 97; De Ville J & Steytler N (eds) (1996) Voing in 1999: Choosing an Electoral System. Human Rights and Consituional Law Series of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. Durban: Buterworths. p. 67. 260 SOUTH AFRICA a dominant party system by producing a strong majority government with an abundance of minority party representation. A highly representative system was critical to alleviating further conlict. The African National Congress (ANC), the majority party in South Africa, had maintained a principled objective of the inclusion and representation of all racial and other political groups.7 The PR system was also a pragmatic choice made by political actors whose electoral fortunes remained uncertain following an inaugural democratic election which was likely to result in dramatic political changes. Consituional and legal framework The inception of the inaugural IEC in December 1993 was preceded by the passing of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 20/1993; the Electoral Act, 202/1993; and the Independent Electoral Commission Act, 150/1993. These provided a regulatory framework for setting up the IEC as well as running the subsequent independence elections.8 During the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, there was initial disagreement about the role of an electoral commission, with the apartheid-era National Party calling for the election to be run by the Department of Home Afairs, while the ANC and others called for an impartial, independent body. Ultimately, parties decided upon a well-established international model for the commission: one that was independent from government, that would oversee the electoral process and administer, adjudicate and monitor elections.9 It was hoped that this model would infuse impartiality and credibility in the inal results, vital ingredients for a society with low levels of trust.10 The subsequent permanent constitution, adopted in 1996, reairmed the primacy of electoral democracy. The founding provisions state that South Africa is founded on a set of basic values, including ‘universal adult sufrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections and a multiparty system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness’.11 Section 19 in the Bill of Rights states that every citizen is free to make political choices, including the right to form a political party, to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party, and to campaign for a political party. Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections. Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any of the oicial legislative bodies. Citizens also have the right to stand for public oice and to hold oice. Sections 46 and 47 stipulate that the electoral system has to be determined by national legislation and it must be based on 7 Lodge T (2003) How the South African electoral system was negoiated. Journal of African Elecions 2(1): 2. 8 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 88. 9 Ibid. 10 Lodge T (2003) How the South African electoral system was negoiated. Journal of African Elecions 2(1): 73. 11 Consituion of the Republic of South Africa, 108/1996. Secion 1(d). 261 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA a common voters’ roll, a minimum voting age of 18 years, and a system that results, in general, in proportional representation. Elections must be overseen by an electoral commission whose independence is guaranteed by section 181 of the constitution. It lists the electoral commission as one of six state institutions that strengthen constitutional democracy, and speciies that these institutions are independent, and subject only to the constitution and the law. They must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. The ‘Chapter 9’ institutions should ensure the accountability of government, and should contribute to the formation of a society ‘based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.12 The responsibilities of the IEC, as deined in the constitution (section 190), are to: (a) Manage elecions of naional, provincial and municipal legislaive bodies in accordance with naional legislaion; (b) Ensure that those elecions are free and fair; and (c) Declare the results of those elecions within a period that must be prescribed by naional legislaion and that is as short as reasonably possible. A number of pieces of legislation have since followed giving speciic expression to constitutional provisions. The IEC manages national, provincial and municipal elections in accordance with national legislation. The relevant statues governing elections are set out in Table 1. They regulate a series of election related issues, including: the composition and operation of the IEC; logistical arrangements for elections; the registration of parties and voters; funding of political parties and their code of conduct; and the resolution of electoral disputes. Table 1: Consituional and legal framework Source Law Secion 1 Secion 2 Consituional provisions Secion 19 Secion 42(3) Secion 181 Secions 190 – 194 The Consituion of the Republic of South Africa, 200/1993 The 1994 elecions The Electoral Act, 202/1993 The Independent Electoral Commission Act, 150/1993 12 Consituion of the Republic of South Africa, 108/1996. Chapter 9. 262 SOUTH AFRICA Source Law Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996 (amendments in 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2004) Electoral Act, 73/1998 (amendments in 2000 and 2003) Public Funding of Represented Poliical Paries Act, 103/1997 (amended in 2005) Legislaion for the 1999 and subsequent elecions Electoral Laws Amendment Act, 34/2003 Electoral Laws Second Amendment Act, 40/2003 Electoral Commission Amendment Act, 14/2004 Electoral Amendment Act, 18/2013 Public Finance Management Act, 1/1999 Independent Broadcasing Authority Act, 153/1993 Determinaion of Remuneraion of Members of Consituional Insituions Maters Amendment Act, 22/2014 Local Government Municipal Structures Act, 117/1998 Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Act, 20/2002 Local government elecions Local Government Municipal Electoral Act, 27/2000 Local Government Municipal Electoral Amendment Act, 14/2010 Local Government Municipal Demarcaion Act, 27/1998 (amended in 2002) Regulaions contained in legislaion Electoral Act, 73/1998 Electoral Code of Conduct Regulaions on the Accreditaion of Voter Educaion Providers Voter Registraion Regulaions, 1998 Regulaions on the Accreditaion of Observers, 1999 Elecion Regulaions, 2004 Regulaions Concerning the Submission of Candidate Lists, 2004 Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996 Regulaions on Party Liaison Commitees, 1998 Regulaions for the Registraion of Poliical Paries, 2004 Regulaions relaing to aciviies permissible outside voing staions on voing day Local Government Municipal Electoral Act, 27/2000 Local government: Municipal Electoral Regulaions Local government: Municipal Electoral Regulaions, 2011 amendment Public Funding of Represented Poliical Paries Act, 103/1997 Public Funding of Represented Poliical Paries Regulaions Noice to Deregister Poliical Paries 263 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Compliance with treaies and convenions South Africa’s legislative framework conforms to international continental and regional treaties and conventions on elections. The country itself is a signatory to a number of these documents. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 was signed by South Africa in 1994 and ratiied in 1998. The optional protocol to the covenant was ratiied in 2002.13 The 1981 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was signed and ratiied by South Africa in 1996.14 The Constitutive Act of the African Union was later signed by South Africa in 2000 and ratiied in 2001.15 This Act promotes popular participation and good governance, non-interference in internal afairs and respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.16 In 2002, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union (OAU/AU), which includes South Africa, adopted the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa.17 Its principles state that, ‘Democratic elections are the basis of the authority of any representative government’, and that ‘regular elections constitute a key element of the democratisation process and therefore, are essential ingredients for good governance, the rule of law, the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, stability and development’; and that ‘the holding of democratic elections is an important dimension in conlict prevention, management and resolution’.18 The declaration includes the African Union (AU) Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring.19 13 See the Status of Raiicaion Interacive Dashboard. Available at htp://indicators.ohchr.org/ [accessed 4 August 2016]. 14 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, available at htp://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr [accessed 4 August; Insitute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Internaional IDEA) (2002) Internaional Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elecions. Stockholm: Internaional IDEA. p. 104. Available at htp://www.idea.int/publicaions/ies/upload/electoral_guidelines. pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 15 Consituive Act of the African Union, available at htp://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-consituive-act and htp://www.achpr.org/states/south-africa/raiicaions/ [accessed 4 August 2016]. 16 Goodwin-Gill G (2006) Free and Fair Elecions. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. p. 38. Available at: htp://www.ipu.org/pdf/publicaions/free&fair06-e.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 17 Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organisaion of African Unity, 8 July 2002, Durban, South Africa, AHG/ Decisions 171–184 (XXXVIII), AHG/Decl. 1–2 (XXXVIII), Decisions and Declaraions. Available at htp://www. achpr.org/instruments/guide-elecions/ [accessed 4 August 2016]. 18 OAU/AU (2002) Declaraion on the Principles Governing Democraic Elecions in Africa 2002, II.4.; GoodwinGill G (2006) Free and Fair Elecions. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. pp. 38–41. Available at htp:// www.ipu.org/pdf/publicaions/free&fair06-e.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016}. 19 OAU/AU (2004) Declaraion on the Principles Governing Democraic Elecions in Africa 2002, Annex II. 2004; Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observaion and Monitoring Missions, available at htp:// www.achpr.org/iles/instruments/guide-elcions/au_instr_guide_elecions_eng.pdf [accessed 4 August 2016]. 264 SOUTH AFRICA At the sub-regional level, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Election in September 2004.20 This document emphasises citizen participation in the political process, as well as the impartiality of the electoral institutions, voter education, and acceptance and respect of the election results. Guidelines also include the rights and obligations of SADC observers, and the responsibilities of the state to ensure the civil and political rights of individuals and parties and to implement logistical operations essential to a successful election. This SADC initiative formed the basis of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted by member states on 30 June 2007 in Addis Ababa and ratiied by South Africa in 2010.21 The charter entered into force in February 2012. Its key objective is to promote democracy, human rights and good governance on the African continent. It seeks to: establish the shared values, standards and norms of the African Union and its member states within democracy, elections and governance; promote adherence to democratic principles, rule of law and human rights; reject unconstitutional change of governments; and encourage the strengthening of a culture of democracy and peace in member countries. The IEC was instrumental in the development of both the two abovementioned doctrines.22 The IEC participates as a member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the Commonwealth Electoral Network, the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies (ICPS), the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC countries (EFC-SADC), the Association of African Election Authorities, the Association of European Electoral Oicials, and the Association of World Election Management Bodies (A-WEB).23 The IEC also has strong ties with electoral management bodies in other African countries and beyond, regularly sending delegations to observe elections and staf to provide assistance with, and learn about, the management of elections. The IEC also receives delegations from other countries to observe elections, and share best practice.24 The IEC has signed memoranda of understanding with counterparts in India, Mexico, Palestine and Russia to benchmark against international best practice.25 20 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democraic Elecions, available at htp://www2.ohchr.org/ english/law/compilaion_democracy/sadcprinc.htm [accessed 4 August; Gill G (2006) Free and Fair Elecions. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. p. 38. Available at: htp://www.ipu.org/pdf/publicaions/ free&fair06-e.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 21 Raiicaion Table: African Charter on Democracy, Elecions and Governance. Available at htp://www. achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/raiicaion/ [accessed 4 August 2016]. 22 Interview (telephonic/email) Mr Mlungisi Kelembe, Manager: Commission Services, IEC, 29 October 2015. 23 Interview (telephonic) with Ms Ilona Tip, Operaions Director, EISA, 12 October 2015; Interview (telephonic/email) Mr Mlungisi Kelembe, Manager: Commission Services, IEC, 29 October 2015. 24 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 3. Available at htp://www.elecions.org. za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 25 Interview (telephonic/email) Mr Mlungisi Kelembe, Manager: Commission Services, IEC, 29 October 2015. 265 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Insituional framework The Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, provides for the establishment of a permanent ive-member electoral commission, of whom one must be a judge. Commissioners must not have a high political proile, may serve for seven years, and may only serve two terms.26 The president may extend tenure only on recommendation of the National Assembly (Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, 7[1]). The president appoints commissioners on recommendation of parliament. At least eight commissioners are nominated and interviewed by a panel consisting of the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, representatives of the Human Rights Commission, the Commission on Gender Equality, and the Public Protector, as required by the Electoral Commission Act 51/1996, 6(2). The interview panel recommends eight candidates to an inter-party committee of the National Assembly. The parliamentary committee submits preferred candidates to the National Assembly for approval. A candidate is only conirmed by a majority resolution of the National Assembly. Names of successful candidates are submitted to the president for appointment.27 The appointment process is regarded as highly inclusive, non-partisan and transparent, and promotes the impartiality of the commission and the conidence of all actors.28 Commissioners embody the institution’s mandate to support and promote constitutional democracy, and play a pivotal role in ensuring its independence. They are bound by the constitution and the Electoral Act to act impartially, to show no bias, and perform duties and functions without any favour. Commissioners are not allowed to hold political oice or outside positions; they can only be removed by ‘the president on the grounds of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, after a inding to that efect by a committee of the National Assembly on the recommendations of the Electoral Court and the majority vote of the National Assembly on a resolution for removal’.29 Moreover, the judge whilst employed as a commissioner does not receive remuneration from the IEC so that s/he can ofer critical commentary without fear of reprisal or dismissal.30 Only the Electoral Court can preside over a dispute concerning a commissioner and recommend a penalty to the president. A recent case involving allegations of unethical conduct by former IEC chief electoral oicer (CEO), Pansy Tlakula (see later section) presented a quandary for the jurisdiction of the court. Parliamentary hearings raised 26 Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, A7. 27 Lodge T (2003) How the South African electoral system was negoiated. Journal of African Elecions 2(1): 71. 28 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89; Fakir E & Holland W (2014) Legal framework. In: Elecions Update South Africa 2014. Johannesburg: EISA. p. 25. Available at htps://www.eisa.org.za/eu/pdf/elecionupdate2014.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 29 Lodge T (2004) Handbook of South African Electoral Laws and Regulaions 2004. Johannesburg: Electoral Insitute of Southern Africa (EISA). p. 12. 30 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: Piombo J & Nijzink L (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 90. 266 SOUTH AFRICA the issue of whether the Electoral Court had jurisdiction over a commissioner whilst employed as CEO of the electoral body.31 However, the court set a precedent by inding that commissioners are not only held accountable for their behaviour while they act as commissioners, their prior conduct is also taken into account.32 In other words, as Ndletyana asserts, ‘the Electoral Court has raised the moral standards to which commissioners are held. This will go a long way towards ensuring that the commission is stafed with individuals of unquestionable moral standing and will thus enhance the integrity of the IEC.’33 Commissioners In terms of the constitution (section 193.3), the composition of the electoral commission should ‘relect broadly the race and gender composition of South Africa’. The IEC has made laudable eforts to prioritise gender and racial representivity in the selection of commissioners and senior staf. The permanent IEC was chaired by a woman, Brigalia Bam, a year after it was set up. In 2004 Bam was joined at the helm by Pansy Tlakula, as CEO.34 Racial representivity has also been a prominent feature of the commission since inception, until recently.35 Following the resignation of Raenette Taljaard, who has still not been replaced, the IEC is without a non-African. Execuive oicers Commissioners appoint the chief electoral oicer (CEO), who heads the IEC’S administration and serves as its accounting oicer (Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, section 12). The current CEO is Mosotho Moeypa, preceded by Pansy Tlakula. The CEO, in turn, appoints other oicers and employees, in consultation with commissioners.36 The IEC has three deputy chief executive oicers who manage the divisions of Corporate Services, Outreach and Electoral Operations. Their race and gender proiles are highly representative. 31 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 176-177. 32 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 186. 33 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 186. 34 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89. 35 Quintal G (2015, 15 June) IEC interviews: No women commissioners at moment. News24. Available at htp://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/IEC-interviews-no-women-commissioners-atthe-moment-20150615; htp://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Search-back-on-for-IECcommissioner-20150922 [accessed 5 August 2016]. 36 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89. 267 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Powers, funcions and responsibiliies Compared to other regional EMBs, the IEC has a broad mandate.37 Section 5(1) of the Electoral Commission Act outlines the IEC’s functions, which are to: • Manage any election; • Ensure that any election is free and fair; • Promote conditions for free and fair elections; • Promote knowledge of sound and democratic electoral processes; • Register eligible voters and compile a voters’ roll; • Compile and maintain a register of political parties; • Establish and maintain liaison and cooperation with political parties; • Undertake and promote electoral research; • Develop electoral expertise and technology in all spheres of government; • Review electoral legislation and make recommendations; • Promote voter education; • Promote cooperation with and between persons, institutions, governments and administrations for the achievement of its objectives; • Declare election results for national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies within seven days; • Adjudicate disputes which may arise from the organisation, administration or conducting of elections, which are of an administrative nature; and • Appoint appropriate public administrations in any sphere of government to conduct elections when necessary. Programmes The IEC has three programmes, headed by three deputy chief executive oicers, through which it implements its mandate. These programmes are: • Administration and Corporate Services; • Electoral Operations; and • Outreach. Each programme develops and deines strategic objectives, performance indicators and targets. These are linked to a inancial year and the respective budget allocation. In addition, during the election period the IEC develops a project plan with milestones. The plan provides details of activities, start and end dates, and progress.38 37 Interview (telephonic) with Ilona Tip, Operaions Director, EISA, 12 October 2015. 38 Interview (telephonic/email) Mr Mlungisi Kelembe, Manager: Commission Services, IEC, 29 October 2015. 268 SOUTH AFRICA The division functions are as follows:39 • Administration and Corporate Services manages the support functions of the IEC, including human resources, skills development and training, support services, inancial management, legal services, and information communication technology (ICT). • Electoral Operations houses the core of the IEC’s operations. This division deals with voting district delimitation; the registration and deregistration of political parties; the registration of voters; the compilation and administration of the voters’ roll; political party liaison; candidate nomination and the management of proportional representation lists; election day operation; and results compilation. It is also responsible for the IEC’s logistics and infrastructure. • Outreach informs and educates the public on democracy and electoral processes with a view to strengthening participation; conducts research on the latest developments in elections and democracy; actively supports eforts to strengthen electoral democracy and ensure free and fair elections, and works to enhance the image of the IEC through strategic communication with stakeholders, including political parties. Under the stewardship of the CEO are nine provincial oices and their respective provincial electoral oicers (PEOs) and support staf responsible for election-related activities of each province. The IEC’s national headquarters in Pretoria functions as a policy making and management unit, while the supporting provincial oices and 441 municipal oices attend to core activities such as voter registration, polling stations and liaison with security and political parties. Thus, the delivery of elections is largely through provincial and local IEC structures.40 Informaion technology operaions Technology forms a dominant part of IEC operations. The IEC provides equipment for its entire operation (e.g. networks, servers, workstations, printers, licenses) at the national oice, nine provincial oices and 300 municipal centres. The IEC’s data centre is hosted internally and managed and monitored from its national oice. All electoral systems are 39 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]; Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 9. Available at htp://www.elecions.org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-AnnualReports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 40 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 89. 269 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA web-based, ‘thin-client’ applications which are custom-built and supported by internal teams.41 ICT innovations continue to support various processes and are discussed below.42 Programmable barcode scanner unit leet Procured in 2008, for the 2009 election, the IEC enhanced their information technology (IT) infrastructure with the roll-out of handheld programmable barcode scanners units (PBSUs) with modern technology and now boasts a leet of 32 130 PBSUs, also known as ‘zip-zips’. Their primary function is the capture of voter registration information. PBSUs are updated with the names of all registered voters allowing oicials to more eiciently locate names on the voters’ roll during the voting procedure to capture and record voter participation. While the scanners are innovative, user-friendly machines which help to speed up registration and voting processes, several voting stations experienced past challenges due to malfunctioning equipment.43 To ensure sustained operational efectiveness, the IEC has entered into a maintenance contract with a specialised technical service provider to ensure regular testing, servicing and maintenance. However, the leet of zip-zips will soon need replacement. Results operations centres During elections the ICT team provides and supports results operations centres (ROCs) at national, provincial and municipal-level. Each election has a national ROC and nine provincial ROCs, which are commissioned prior to elections. Each ROC has its own data centre and networks, and provides visual information on results and seat allocation. Additional infrastructure is installed to accommodate the needs of political parties and the media. The national results centre is a model adopted by other countries on the continent.44 Voting station infrastructure Voting stations provide an essential platform for the delivery of elections. For the 2014 national and provincial elections, the voting station network consisted of 22 263 voting stations, an overall 6.5% increase compared to the 20 895 stations available in the 2011 election. Population growth, new settlement patterns, the requirement of improving voter accessibility, as well as the revised municipal demarcation data, continue to be the primary contributing factors to the increased voting station footprint. One voting station is located in each voting district and operational details are recorded and regularly updated. The voting station monitoring system reports on the status of voting stations (open or closed) and the estimated throughput of voters at speciied times during election day. 41 Interview (telephonic/email) Mr Mlungisi Kelembe, Manager: Commission Services, IEC, 29 October 2015; Ongoing correspondence with Ms Melanie du Plessis. 42 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 19. Available at htp://www.elecions. org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 43 Maphunye KJ (2009) Evaluaing elecion management in South Africa’s 2009 elecions. Journal of African Elecions: South Africa, Elecions 2009, Special Issue 9(2): 69. 44 Interview (telephonic) with Ilona Tip, Operaions Director, EISA, 12 October 2015. 270 SOUTH AFRICA Additional ICT features • Voting station inder: This is used on the website, and at the IEC call centre to provide support to voters. • Results website: This provides the public with a dashboard of pertinent results information. • Mobile application: This disseminates data to the media and voters in an easily accessible format. The mobile application was developed shortly before the 2014 elections and provides features such as realtime voter registration, voting station information (including mapping), election results data and other generic information. It was very well-received by voters, the media and political parties, with 90 000 downloads and 12 million hits recorded over the ive days of the 2014 elections. • Atlas of Results – 2014 National and Provincial Elections: since 1999, an Atlas of Results has been compiled following national and provincial elections. This condenses election data in a clear, concise, visual format with geospatial referencing. Comparisons are provided with elections held since 1999, making the atlas a valuable planning and analysis tool for political parties and political scientists. Various themes are included, such as delimitation, voter registration, leading party maps, party support, voter participation and party support variance across the two latest elections. • The IEC also provides other platforms to manage the elections, including the ability of voters to log onto its website (www.elections. org.za) and to visit its call centre (0800 11 8000) or send a short text message to verify their registration details. A number of measures are in place to ensure the security of data, such as irewalls, network segmentation, patch management and anti-virus software solutions. Stringent backup procedures are in place and data is replicated to a disaster recovery site. Ahead of general elections, external audits are commissioned by the IEC to perform penetration and other security tests. The results system is also externally audited to ensure data and architectural integrity.45 Safeguards are also implemented to ensure fraud and tampering cannot occur with ballots. Following the closure of voting stations, ballots are counted and results announced on site. The party agents present sign the results slip. The results are also posted outside the venue, so that people can view the outcome. The results slip is photocopied and keyed into the electronic system so that those present at voting stations 45 Ongoing email correspondence with IEC staf Melanie du Plessis, Simon Boyle, and Jake Pretorius, 3 November 2015. 271 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA can view the slip, and ensure that the igures tally with system igures. The IEC stated that it continued to improve these systems in the lead up to the 2016 elections.46 Financial and legislaive independence The commission is an independent, autonomous body and subject only to the constitution and the law. Several aspects of the IEC’s structure and operating principles facilitate its independence and deepen trust. First, the institution’s independence is guaranteed by the constitution (Article 190–191) and the Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, 3 (1–2). This obliges government and any other actor to refrain from interference. Where interference is suspected, the IEC has recourse to the courts.47 Second, while it remains accountable to parliament it has sole discretion over its expenditure. This allows the IEC to discharge its duties with impartiality, separate from government. Third, the proile of the commissioners is pivotal to the IEC’s independence, expressly the stipulations that they must possess high moral standing, and may not have a prominent political proile. Moreover, with at least one commissioner being a judge, they bring to the IEC the non-partisan values associated with an independent judiciary.48 Finally, their selection process by an independent panel, chaired by the chief justice, and made up of the six independent state institutions tasked with supporting constitutional democracy further strengthens the body’s independence.49 The IEC’s funding process is managed in an efective and transparent manner. The commission drafts its own budget, and then presents it to parliament for consideration and approval. The IEC, in turn, reports annually to parliament by submitting audited inancial reports for each inancial year (Electoral Commission Act 51/1996, 14[1]). The Auditor-General (AG) audits all the IEC’s inancial records (Electoral Commission Act 51/1996, 12[2][b], 13). However, neither parliament nor the executive controls the nature of the expenditure, allowing the IEC to act independently in terms of managing its funds.50 The budget of the IEC for the period 2014 to 2017 was approximately ZAR 1.6 billion.51 In addition to inancial reports, the president may require reports on the IEC’s activities. The IEC must also publish a report after each election and may also, on its own initiative, 46 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 47 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 181. 48 Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 90. 49 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 181. 50 Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, secion 13; Kabemba C (2005) Electoral administraion: Achievements and coninuing challenges. In: J Piombo & L Nijzink (eds) Electoral Poliics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democraic Decade. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 90. 51 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 272 SOUTH AFRICA publish a report on the likelihood or otherwise that it will be able to ensure that any pending election will be free and fair (Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, 14[2]–[4]). The IEC also reports to the portfolio committee on home afairs on a regular basis on numerous other matters, including its annual performance plans, and annual reports, which detail past activities, and the budgetary review and recommendations report (BRRR), where an evaluation of the IEC’s work is presented to the committee.52 Providing an electoral commission with suicient funds can be a challenge, particularly in developing countries where public funds are limited.53 Moreover, the running of elections are expensive undertakings. In recent elections, costs especially relating to the procurement of resources such as ballot papers, ballot boxes, electronic equipment, stationery and so on, had a tremendous inluence on the management of the elections.54 Overall, the IEC has succeeded in maintaining its spending within budget. The body received an unqualiied audit in 2013/2014 with no matters of emphasis and is expected to do so again in the 2014/2015 inancial year.55 Besides its own expenditure, the commission also accounts for the use of funds by political parties. According to the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 103/1997, parties receive funding from a represented political parties fund (RPPF). Payments are made to parties that are represented in parliament on a quarterly basis, commencing within four weeks of the start of each inancial year. Funding may be used for any purpose compatible with the functioning of a political party in a modern democracy, for example, civic education, voter registration or ensuring continued contact between government and citizens.56 In terms of Section 4(1) of the Public Funding Act the chief electoral oicer is responsible for the management and administration of the fund. In efect, the fund is administered through the IEC, which keeps parties informed of the relevant rules and regulations. The administration of the fund forms an integral part of the electoral commission’s systems, policies, procedures and internal controls. The IEC must keep accurate inancial records of all funds received by or accruing to the RPPF, all payments made from the fund, all expenditures arising from allocating the fund, and all assets and liabilities pertaining to the fund. At the end of the inancial year, the audit committee of the IEC must report to parliament’s portfolio committee on home afairs on: income and expenditure, disbursements to political parties, the amounts spent by political parties, how the funds are spent, and the balance of the fund. The accounts are audited by the auditor general 52 Ibid. 53 Kuhne W (2010) The Role of Elecions in Emerging Democracies and Post-Conlict Countries: Key issues, Lessons Learned and Dilemmas. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Situng. Available at htp://library.fes.de/pdf-iles/ iez/07416.pdf; htp://www.fes-globalizaion.org/dog_publicaions/human_rights.htm [accessed 30 June 2016]. 54 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 5. Available at htp://www.elecions.org. za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 55 Ibid. 56 See Party Funding. Available at htp://www.elecions.org.za/content/Paries/Party-funding/ [accessed 5 August 2016]. 273 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA and the AG’s report and related documentation must be submitted to parliament (Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 103/1997, 8[2][3]). The IEC may suspend allocations to a political party if it is satisied, on reasonable grounds, that the party has not complied with the Act. Prior to doing so it must inform the party of the intended suspension and give it thirty days to motivate why its funding should not be stopped. The IEC may terminate the suspension once it is satisied that it is no longer justiied. Political parties must account for their public funding. The Act requires that political parties hold the funds in a separate bank account. An accounting oicer must be appointed by each political party to manage and account for the fund, and ensure compliance with the spending requirements as set out by the Funding Act. The accounting oicer must also prepare a statement within two months of the iscal year on amounts received and used, the purposes for which the funds were used, and audit the accounts to evaluate whether the funds were used for purposes other than those allowed by the Act. The auditor’s report and audited statement must be submitted to the IEC within three months after the end of the inancial year. If money from the fund is spent irregularly, the accounting oicer may be liable for the misspent funds. The IEC can recover the funds through a civil claim against the accounting oicer or by setting it of against future payments to the party. The IEC publishes an annual report on the RPPF that includes extracts from the audited statements political parties submit to the IEC.57 These reports contain basic information about the number of parties that complied with the rules governing the administration and use of public funding for political parties, and contain an overview of the number of parties that violate speciic rules. The IEC’s report on the fund includes a report by the Auditor-General of South Africa on his audit of the fund. The report is tabled in parliament in September each year, and is made available on the IEC’s website. However, these reports do not necessarily contain information about why parties violate the rules or how violations are sanctioned. Moreover, there is little comprehensive information on speciic political parties’ use of public funding. Political parties have shown reluctance to disclose their inancial statements of how they spent their public funds.58 Recruitment and staf Staf are recruited and appointed in terms of a Recruitment and Selection Policy approved by the commission. Commissioners are appointed in terms of Section 7(2) of the Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996, and the IEC have drafted regulations based on this clause for the terms and conditions of service of staf, which are published in the Government Gazette from time to time. Electoral staf is recruited in terms of the Electoral Act, 73/1998, for all national and provincial elections and in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act, 27/2000. 57 Ibid. 58 Merton M (2011, 11 July) MPs coy on party allowances. IOL News. Available at htp://www.iol.co.za/news/ poliics/mps-coy-on-party-allowances-1.1096590?%20ot=inmsa [accessed 5 August 2016]. 274 SOUTH AFRICA During election periods, the IEC employs some 211 000 temporary staf members in various capacities to assist at voting stations in the election period, supplemented by 4 656 area managers. Legal safeguards in the Electoral Act, 73/1998 underwrite the vetting and veriication processes used by the IEC to recruit staf. Chapter 6, part 4 ss. 72–83 sets out criteria concerning the temporary appointments of presiding oicers, voting oicers and counting oicers for each voting station. These oicers must exclude candidates contesting the election, party agents, as well as individuals holding political oice in a registered political party. The Act also obliges oicials to take a declaration of secrecy as well as a prescribed oath. Thus, the oversight, transparency and accountability mechanisms within both the law and regulatory frameworks appear to be suiciently robust to ensure the credible management and administration of the elections.59 However, repeated concerns have been raised about the impartiality of temporary election staf, many of whom are teachers that belong to the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), an ailiate of the Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU) which has previously urged its ailiates to vote for the governing African National Congress.60 Moreover, concerns were raised during the 2014 elections about declining standards, particularly with regard to staf training, some of whose decisions on occasion appeared in conlict with legislation or regulations, especially at voting stations.61 However, Fakir and Holland have pointed out that the number of complaints made against electoral oicials, as a proportion of the number of actual electoral oicials, is miniscule. In addition, the fact that all parties are entitled to place party agents in every voting station should allay fears of widespread irregular behaviour among IEC oicials.62 Also, election observers have not noted excessive problems with IEC staf, inding them to be generally well-trained.63 Public interacions and stakeholders The IEC has a number of stakeholders. In addition to the obvious state institutions, they include the media, civil society organisations, political parties and traditional leaders; and are managed primarily through the IEC’s Administration and Corporate Services Division. For ease of interactions, stakeholders are organised into issues-based target 59 Fakir E & Holland W (2014) Legal framework. In: Elecions Update South Africa 2014. Johannesburg: EISA. p. 26. Available at htps://www.eisa.org.za/eu/pdf/elecionupdate2014.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 60 Maphunye KJ (2009) Evaluaing elecion management in South Africa’s 2009 elecions. Journal of African Elecions: South Africa, Elecions 2009, Special Issue 9(2): 56–78; Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps://pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 61 Interview (Skype/email) Professor Jørgen Elklit, Department of Poliical Science, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2015; Kotze D (2014) Elecions in 2014: A barometer of South African poliics and society?’ In: Elecions Update South Africa 2014. Johannesburg: EISA. p. 11. Available at htps://www.eisa. org.za/eu/pdf/elecionupdate2014.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 62 Fakir E & Holland W (2014) Legal framework. In: Elecions Update South Africa 2014. Johannesburg: EISA. p. 26. htps://www.eisa.org.za/eu/pdf/elecionupdate2014.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 63 Interview (telephonic) with Ilona Tip, Operaions Director, EISA, 12 October 2015. 275 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA audiences, and are managed through programmes located in the Outreach Division, as follows: 64 • Youth; • Women; • Disabled persons; • Minority groups; and • Farming communities. Arguably, political parties, the media and voters comprise the most important of all IEC stakeholders. Political parties are key stakeholders in an election. A political party that intends to contest an election for a legislative body must be registered with the IEC in terms of section 15 of the Electoral Commission Act (51/1996). During the 2014 national and provincial elections, 45 political parties registered to take part in the elections, compared to 40 in the 2009 national and provincial elections. The IEC has established party liaison committees to conduct communications and relationship building with political parties (see later section on dispute resolution). The communications division actively works to protect and enhance the image of the commission through strategic communication with the commission’s stakeholders, including political parties. In addition, the stakeholder engagement and liaison unit liaises with national and international stakeholders to promote knowledge of and adherence to democratic electoral principles and promote collaboration.65 On a regular basis, the IEC produces publications as part of its knowledge management, communication and education activities. A key publication is an election guide, aimed primarily at members of the media, political parties and interested stakeholders attending ROCs during elections. Its purpose is to ensure accurate and regular reporting by the media on election results, and to empower political parties with the necessary election information. The publication provides a detailed overview of the commission’s mandate, structure and operational procedures; a detailed overview of the commission‘s preparations for the respective elections, including logistics and infrastructure, civic and voter education, the national voters’ roll and political party liaison, among others; an overview of past election results.66 Dispute resoluion mechanisms The vibrancy of the foregoing interactions with stakeholders has made it possible to create an elaborate and efective dispute resolution mechanism. Section 103(a) of the Electoral Act empowers the commission to resolve electoral disputes or complaints through conciliation. Provincial coordinators for conlict management are appointed to coordinate initiatives 64 Ongoing email correspondence with Dr Nomsa Masuku, 3 November 2015. 65 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 66 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 42. Available at htp://www.elecions. org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 276 SOUTH AFRICA for the creation of conditions for free and fair elections, intervene in disputes and ensure stakeholders adhere to the electoral code of conduct. The role of the provincial coordinator is to: • Coordinate the conlict management programme in the province; • Recruit conlict management panellists; • Monitor, evaluate and report on existing or potential conlict situations in the province; • Liaise with provincial stakeholders; • Facilitate access to legal recourse; and • Mediate and resolve conlicts by deploying a conlict panellist to afected areas. In addition to the IEC’s provincial coordinator conlict management programme, there are two other important dispute resolution mechanisms. Party liaison committees Political parties are key stakeholders in an election. The Electoral Commission Act determines that one of the IEC’s functions is to ‘establish and maintain liaison and cooperation with parties’ (section 5.1[g]). To achieve this objective, the IEC has established party liaison committees (PLCs) with parties represented at national, provincial and municipal levels of government. A strategic objective of the electoral operations unit is to ‘provide consultative and cooperative liaison platforms between the IEC and political parties to facilitate free and fair elections’.67 Political parties have free access to the voters’ rolls, and can have no more than two representatives on the committees, which are chaired by IEC representatives.68 Annual performance indicators for 2013/2014 (an election year) show regular political parties meetings to prepare for the 2014 general elections with a total of 2 060 liaison sessions held (12 national; 77 provincial and 1971 local). PLCs were consulted on the following aspects of the 2014 electoral programme:69 • Amendments to the Electoral Act; • The delimitation of voting districts and establishment of voting stations; • The vetting of electoral staf; • The appointment of municipal electoral oicers; • The roll-out of targeted communication and registration; • The identiication of potential hot spots and conlict resolution; • Ballot paper sign-of; and • Candidate nomination processes, etc. 67 Ibid.: 25. 68 Lodge T (2004) Handbook of South African Electoral Laws and Regulaions 2004. Johannesburg: Electoral Insitute of Southern Africa (EISA). p. 17. 69 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 25. Available at htp://www.elecions. org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 277 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA During the 2014/2015 year, in preparation for the forthcoming 2016 local elections, the number of PLC meetings held at national, provincial and municipal-levels totalled 1 748 meetings (17 national; 69 provincial; and 1662 local). This exceeded the IECs own target of 1 400 sessions.70 In past elections the IEC’s dealings were restricted to represented parties in the PLCs. The institution has since realised that unrepresented parties and, increasingly, independent candidates often contest elections, sometimes at the last moment, which results in a situation where they are deprived of the consultative and informative processes that take place with represented parties. As a result, the IEC has resolved to strengthen liaison with unrepresented political parties.71 As such, PLC meetings held before the 2014 national and provincial elections were extended to allow new and unrepresented parties (including the Economic Freedom Fighters and Agang) the opportunity to participate.72 The IEC believes that their working relationship with parties is largely constructive.73 Where serious legal diferences are experienced with political parties, legal and constitutional means are used to resolve them. The PLCs are widely recognised as one of the most important mechanisms for political conlict management in the post-apartheid era and their success has meant that the PLC model has been exported to other countries for application elsewhere. Electoral Court The Electoral Court is established by the Electoral Commission Act, 51/1996 (sections 18–20). Under section 20 the Electoral Court may review any IEC decision concerning an electoral matter; consider an appeal against a decision by the commission; investigate any allegation of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence of a member of the commission. Section 96 of the Electoral Act gives the court inal jurisdiction in respect of all electoral disputes and complaints about infringements of the code of conduct. Appeals against commission decisions may only be heard with the prior approval of the Electoral Court chair. Verdicts by the Electoral Court can be appealed at the Constitutional Court. The chief electoral oicer may institute or intervene in civil proceedings before a court to enforce the Electoral Act and its codes of conduct. Penalties are broad and includes ines, and in some instances, imprisonment (Electoral Act, sections 97–98). Its members are appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. They must include a chairperson, who should be a judge of the Supreme Court, two 70 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 25. Available at htp://www.elecions. org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 71 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 72 Independent Electoral Commission (2015) Annual Report 2015. p. 11. Available at htp://www.elecions. org.za/content/About-Us/IEC-Annual-Reports/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 73 Ibid.: 2. 278 SOUTH AFRICA additional judges, and two other South African citizens. The court is supported inancially by the Department of Justice.74 Only the Electoral Court can preside over a dispute concerning a commissioner and recommend penalties. The recent Tlakula case revealed a quandary and a litmus test for the jurisdiction of the court. Parliamentary hearings raised the issue of whether the Electoral Court had jurisdiction over a commissioner whilst employed as CEO of the electoral body.75 However, the court set a precedent by inding that commissioners are not only held accountable for their behaviour whilst they act as commissioners; their prior conduct is also taken into account.76 Generally, objections and disputes have been minimal in recent elections. The IEC received 22 objections relating to the 2014 national and provincial elections. Three of these were withdrawn by the objectors and the remaining 19 were dismissed by the IEC. Most of the submissions were rejected for non-compliance with the provisions of section 55 of the Electoral Act. None of the IEC’s decisions were appealed.77 Assessment and evaluaion Relaionship with the governing party The IEC has been called on to do more to realise its legislated mandate in section 5(1) of the Electoral Commission Act to ‘ensure that elections are free and fair’, and to ‘promote conditions for free and fair elections’. Several behaviours that violate the international standards of the pre-election environment include: the improper use of public funds and unfair use of government resources; restrictions to freedom of association and political expression, in particular disruption and obstruction of party meetings; and various forms of intimidation and manipulation, especially of poorer voters. The ANC has been accused of extensive targeting of state resources, including public infrastructure, budgets and state goods for campaigning purposes to support its campaign, creating an undue advantage over opposition parties.78 74 Lodge T (2002) South Africa. In: T Lodge, D Kadima & D Poie (eds) Compendium of Elecions in Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Insitute of Southern Africa (EISA). p. 15. 75 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 176-177. 76 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 186. 77 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Naional and Provincial Elecions 2014. Ensuring Free and Fair Elecions: Celebraing 20 Years of Democracy. Pretoria: Independent Electoral Commission. p. 49. Available at ile:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/2014%20Naional%20and%20Provincial%20Elecions%20Report.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]. 78 Schulz-Herzenberg C (2014) The South African 2014 naional and provincial elecions: The Integrity of the electoral process. Insitute for Security Studies Policy Brief 62, August 2014. pp. 4–5. Available at htps:// www.issafrica.org/publicaions/policy-brief/the-south-african-2014-elecions-the-integrity-of-theelectoral-process [accessed 29 June 2016]. 279 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Opposition parties have called up the IEC to take a strong stance on these transgressions during election campaigns, arguing that they pose a threat to free and fair elections and that the IEC cannot, in principle, conine the checks on free and fair elections to the process at the voting stations alone.79 The IEC has responded by arguing that these are political issues to be resolved through judicial courts. Opposition parties believe the IEC is ‘passing the buck’ and that the misuse of state resources undermines the commission’s work by directly afecting the integrity of the electoral process. As political competition increases policy-makers, including the IEC, will need to explore new regulatory mechanisms to manage new forms of manipulation and intimidation that curb freedom of political association and expression in the campaign period. The IEC’s ability to conduct impartial and transparent elections also came under scrutiny during two separate incidents. The irst controversy involved the IEC’s former chief electoral oicer, Advocate Pansy Tlakula. She was found to have unfairly inluenced the awarding of a lease contract, for IEC oices, to a company that is partially owned by her business partner, Thaba Mufamadi. Mufamadi also happened to be an ANC member of parliament.80 This raised concerns that the CEO could have used her inluence over the commission to the beneit of the ANC and caused smaller opposition parties to call for Tlakula’s immediate resignation.81 In fact, some opposition party leaders went further and warned of the ANC’s potential for rigging the elections through ‘rogue elements’ within the IEC.82 In June 2014, following the election, the Electoral Court recommended that Pansy Tlakula be removed from her post. The Constitutional Court rejected her plea, and she was eventually dismissed from the IEC. The second incident involved by-elections in 2013 in the Tlokwe Municipality (North West Province) that involved candidates that had been expelled by the ANC. The IEC disqualiied six independent candidates (all former ANC councillors) on the grounds that they did not meet the required threshold of nominations. Upon appeal, the Electoral Court overturned the qualiication. ANC candidates won the subsequent by-elections held in December 2013, but independent candidates alleged that they were rigged. The Constitutional Court is currently hearing the matter.83 79 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps:// pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016] 80 Schulz-Herzenberg C (2014) The South African 2014 naional and provincial elecions: The Integrity of the electoral process. Insitute for Security Studies Policy Brief 62, August 2014. p. 2. Available at htps://www. issafrica.org/publicaions/policy-brief/the-south-african-2014-elecions-the-integrity-of-the-electoralprocess [accessed 29 June 2016]. 81 Ndletyana M (2015) The IEC and the 2014 elecions: A mark of insituional maturity? Journal of African Elecions, Special Issue, South Africa’s 2014 Elecions 14(1): 172. 82 Forde F (2014) ANC ploing to rig elecions: Holomisa. The Sunday Independent. p. 8. Available at htp:// www.bdlive.co.za/naional/poliics/2014/04/01/opposiion-paries-say-iec-chief-must-resign-withinseven-days [accessed 26 July 216]. 83 Fakir E & Holland W (2014) Legal framework. In: Elecions Update South Africa 2014. Johannesburg: EISA. p. 26. Available at htps://www.eisa.org.za/eu/pdf/elecionupdate2014.pdf [accessed 29 June 2016]; Khuthala N (2015) IEC credibility in quesion ater Tlokwe judgment. Mail and Guardian Online. Available at htp:// 280 SOUTH AFRICA Both incidents raise the question of whether pressure from the governing party can act to undermine the IEC’s impartial conduct. These events also threatened the public’s trust in the institution. As such, the IEC must give greater consideration to protecting the institution’s credibility by prioritising non-partisan and impartial behaviour among its staf, introducing greater transparency and accountability through and ethics framework, and managing conlicts of interests among senior oicials. Registraion process Voter registration is the cornerstone of an electoral democracy. An inclusive and transparent registration process allows for the broad participation of all eligible voters, which lends credibility to the electoral process and election results. The IEC makes a concerted efort to ensure that information about the voting process is suiciently accessible to everyone. It runs a series of voter education campaigns using radio, television and print media. Voters can check whether they are registered online or via text message, and can ind the location of their voting station online. Voter registration statistics for the 2014 national and provincial elections indicated that the IEC had registered a total of 25 390 150 voters out of a voting age population of about 32.7 million people. This was an increase in registered voters of 2.2 million from the 2009 elections which then had registered 23 181 997 voters. The increasing gap between the size of the eligible population and registered voters turns our attention to the legal setting and the impact of registration processes. The introduction of an automatic registration process, where the state takes the initiative to register eligible citizens, may lessen the costs of registration for some groups. The current use of voluntary registration procedures might reduce voter participation among those who lack the relevant identiication documents to register, voters who are migrant workers, or those based in rural areas and lack the means to complete the registration process.84 Comparative studies suggest turnout is higher in countries with automatic registration.85 Party funding Finally, the concerns over whether political parties have equitable access to public funds have led to calls for the IEC to revisit the 90:10 allocation formula of public funds to ensure more equitable distribution. The IEC is tasked with dispensing public funds to political parties that have representation in provincial legislatures or the national legislature.86 The bulk of public funding (90%) is allocated on the basis of the proportion of seats a party already has in the legislatures, while 10% is allocated equitably among parties. Thus, larger parties receive a larger proportion of public funding, and have more resources with which mg.co.za/aricle/2013-09-18-00-ieccredibility-quesioned-atertlokwe-judgment [accessed 26 July 2016]. 84 Schulz-Herzenberg C (2014) Trends in electoral paricipaion, 1994–2014. In: C Schulz-Herzenberg & R Southall (eds) Elecion 2014 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects. Johannesburg: Jacana Media & Konrad Adenauer Situng. p. 24. 85 Norris P (2000) A Virtuous Circle: Poliical Communicaions in Posindustrial Socieies. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 255. 86 Public Funding of Represented Poliical Paries Act, 103/1997. 281 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA to shape political discourse and contest elections. Smaller parties argue that it undermines the capacity of new and local-level political parties to participate in the electoral process and unfairly favours the ruling ANC by supporting incumbency rather than ‘multiparty democracy’, which is the stated objective of the constitution. A more equitable distribution of public monies would aford smaller parties an opportunity to utilise more expensive but efective media-based adverts to reach a national audience, better inform voters and thereby strengthen competition at elections. In 2007 the IEC noted that ‘the formula used in the funding of political parties was identiied as allegedly limiting the capacity of smaller parties to mobilise membership and sustain themselves’.87 Indeed, some analysts question whether the dominant proportionality principle in public funding is unconstitutional.88 Arguably, section 236 of the constitution, which states that funding must be provided ‘on an equitable and proportional basis’, may have intended more weight to equity over proportionality. The private funding of political parties remains entirely unregulated in South Africa. Public funding comprises a fraction of the total funding to political parties. The rest, which amounts to hundreds of millions of rand per year, comes in undisclosed amounts from private sources.89 However, given the absence of regulation of private funding for political parties, or any transparency or reporting requirements, deinitive igures from private sources are unknown. The lack of party funding regulation and disclosure, combined with parties’ increasing demand for funds, has created an unhealthy alliance between government and private interests that is ripe for increased corruption.90 Several civil society groups – including the Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa), which brought a court challenge case in 2004 aimed at compelling political parties to disclose their sources of funds in the absence of disclosure legislation – have long campaigned for both disclosure and regulation of private funding.91 More recently, in 2015 the My Vote Counts (MVC) campaign launched a constitutional court case to compel parliament to pass legislation to regulate private funding to political parties and called on the IEC to support calls for a new regulatory system.92 87 IEC Muli-Stakeholder Conference (2007) Relecions on Democracy in South Africa. Pretoria: Electoral Commission. p. 5; Maphunye KJ (2009) Evaluaing elecion management in South Africa’s 2009 elecions. Journal of African Elecions: South Africa, Elecions 2009, Special Issue 9(2): 62. 88 February J (2015) My Vote Counts Conference. University of Cape Town, Friday 28 August 2015. 89 Money and Poliics Project (2011) Money and poliics in South Africa: Meeing our next democraic challenge. Policy Paper October 2011. Funded by the OSF-SA with Wallace Global Fund. 90 Ibid; and see htp://www.bdlive.co.za/naional/poliics/2014/03/18/secret-party-funding-fuels-electoratessuspicion [accessed 26 July 2016]. 91 Money and Poliics Project (2011) Money and poliics in South Africa: Meeing our next democraic challenge. Policy Paper October 2011. Funded by the OSF-SA with Wallace Global Fund. p. 7. 92 Evans S (2015, 9 September) Sources of party funding to remain private. Mail & Guardian Online, available at htp://mg.co.za/aricle/2015-09-30-sources-of-party-funding-to-remain-private [accessed 12 October 2015]; Vuka Z (2013, 16 January) MVC Leter to the Chief electoral Oicer of the IEC, available at htp:// www.myvotecounts.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Leter-to-IEC-16-January-2013.pdf [accessed 5 August 2016]. 282 SOUTH AFRICA Although a majority of the Constitutional Court dismissed the MVC’s application, the case invited attention towards possible institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of future regulations. The IEC has been identiied as a potential regulatory body for private donations, based on the view that the electoral body has a critical role to play not only in terms of advocacy and shaping future legislation, but also as a key institution to implement and manage the regulation of private donations. This model would see the IEC receive private donations at a central point and would then reallocate funds to parties. The Open Society Foundation’s (OSF) Money in Politics Project argued that the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act, 103/1997, already makes allowance for ‘contributions and donations to the Fund originating from any sources, whether within or outside the Republic’ and can therefore be logically extended to private sources of funds which could be administered by the IEC to ensure ethical management of public and private funds alike.93 However, the IEC has refused to take a position on the regulation of private funds.94 Moreover, election specialists caution that the regulation of private funding is not within the ambit of the IEC and would create an unnecessary burden. Many believe it wiser to introduce a separate independent institution to regulate and manage private funding to political parties.95 This will help to insulate the IEC from inevitable conlicts with political parties, a key stakeholder, should it become a regulatory body obliged to act punitively towards parties if they transgress funding regulations. The ANC’s response to the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of the MVC case suggests it is likely that a new body will implement the regulations of private funds. The ANC issued a statement immediately after the ruling stating that its own party resolutions called for the introduction of ‘an efective regulatory architecture for private funding of political parties and civil society groups to enhance accountability and transparency to the citizenry’.96 Expert and observer evaluaions Since the inaugural election of 1994, commentators including political parties, observer missions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the media laud the administration of elections in South Africa.97 The IEC is considered a well-functioning and capable election 93 Money and Poliics Project (2011) Money and poliics in South Africa: Meeing our next democraic challenge. Policy Paper MVC. Available October 2011. Funded by the OSF-SA with Wallace Global Fund. p. 7. 94 Moepya MS (2013, 4 February) Leter from the Chief electoral Oicer of the IEC to MVC, available at htp:// www.myvotecounts.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Leter-from-IEC-4-February-2013.pdf [accessed 5 August 2016]. 95 Interview (telephonic), Ilona Tip, Operaions Director, EISA, 12 October 2015; Interview (telephonic) Mr Gregory Solik, Board of Directors, My Vote Counts, 21 October 2015. 96 ANC Press Release (2015, 30 September) Concourt ruling regarding private party funding, Issued by the Oice of the Chief Whip. Available at htp://www.anc.org.za/caucus/show.php?ID=4224 [accessed 29 October 2015]. 97 Piper L (ed.) (2005) South Africa 10 years later: A consolidated electoral system but not democracy. EISA Research Report No. 11. Johannesburg: EISA; February J (2009) The electoral system and electoral administraion, 1994–2009 In: R Southall & J Daniel (eds) Zunami! The 2009 South African Elecions. Johannesburg: Jacana Media and Konrad-Adenauer-Situng. p. 63. 283 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA management body that delivers elections at global standards.98 The IEC is praised for its logistical preparedness, its management of elections and the counting process. Generally, observers conclude that South Africa’s elections are free, fair, transparent and credible. A recent Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) report rated South Africa’s elections as some of the best in Africa (ranked fourth among African countries and 40th globally), with high integrity across most dimensions of the electoral cycle.99 The African Union’s Election Observation Mission (AU EOM) to South Africa to observe the 7 May 2014 national and provincial elections reported that the political and electoral environment was generally peaceful across the country with voters being able to exercise their right to vote. Its 2014 election report found that the institution and legal framework of election in South Africa largely complied with international best practices and standards for the conduct of democratic elections, and based on its overall assessment of the elections, concluded that ‘the general elections held in South Africa on 7 May 2014 were conducted in a transparent, peaceful and credible manner and, in general, relected the will of South African voters’.100 South Africa has a well-established culture of allowing independent observers access to polls. The accreditation of international observers is regulated by a code of conduct issued by the IEC.101 The presence of international observers in recent elections has decreased based on the premise that South Africa’s elections are largely peaceful, free and fair events. Yet, the most recent 2014 election still attracted approximately 90 international observer organisations. The IEC has also launched an initiative with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a US-based institute that will help the IEC to coordinate observer missions in South Africa, showcasing the country as a best-practice model.102 The South African Civil Society Election Coalition (SACSEC), a national initiative of over 40 nongovernmental and faith-based organisations committed to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections, ield approximately 2 000 observers at polling and counting stations.103 98 Interview (Skype/email) Professor Jørgen Elklit, Department of Poliical Science, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2015. 99 Gromping M & Marinez i Coma F (2015) Electoral Integrity in Africa. Johannesburg: The Electoral Integrity Project and Hanns Seidel Foundaion. p. 24, 26. Available at htps://www.dropbox.com/s/ix56hatvgwyk1lc/ Electoral%20Integrity%20in%20Africa%20-%20uniofsyd_v5.1.pdf?dl=0 [accessed 29 June 2016]. 100 African Union Elecion Observaion Mission (2014) 7 May 2014 Naional and Provincial Elecions in the Republic of South Africa. Final Report. p. 2. Available at htp://pa.au.int/en/sites/default/iles/FINAL%20 AUEOM%20SOUTH%20AFRICA%202014.pdf [accessed 9 September 2015]. 101 Regulaions on the Accreditaion of Observers, 1999. Available at htp://www.elecions.org.za/content/ WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdeniier=id&ItemID=1395 [accessed 26 July 2016]. 102 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps://pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 103 Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) at the Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town (2012) The Open Society Monitoring Index Round 2 2012. Cape Town: Open Society Foundaion for South Africa. Available at htp://osf.org.za/wp/publicaions/OpenSocietyMonitoringIndexRound2_2012. pdf [accessed 30 June 2016]. 284 SOUTH AFRICA The IEC also publish an assessment report on each election with recommendations for improvements. This report is usually made available to those who participate in party liaison committees.104 Ciizen evaluaions Electoral authorities should be widely regarded as credible by their electorates. While electoral integrity is central to ensuring that the results relect the general will, and that citizens can exercise their right to change their government and hold incumbents accountable, citizen perceptions about the freeness and fairness of elections are also crucial to democratic legitimacy. Research shows that citizen perceptions of the integrity of their elections have an efect on their perceptions about the supply of, and satisfaction with democracy in countries like Kenya and South Africa.105 In this regard, EMBs can play a vital role in building public trust in electoral processes. This in turn, generates support and legitimacy for the political system. The IEC is widely regarded as an eicient and independent body and remains one of the most trusted national institutions. Voters have provided exceptionally favourable evaluations of the IEC’s performance and the conduct of oicials at voting stations over the past few elections. An IEC/Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 2014 voting day survey found that an overwhelming 97% voiced satisfaction with the quality of services rendered by IEC oicials, while 70% reported that they took fewer than 15 minutes to reach their voting stations, and 98% found the voting procedures inside the voting station easy to understand.106 Results from the voter participation survey (VPS) and an election satisfaction survey (ESS) also show an overwhelming endorsement of the electoral commission by voters over the past local government elections.107 While the IEC enjoys a solid public reputation, two separate public opinion surveys found that the institution has experienced a decline in public conidence in recent years; a likely consequence of the Tlokwe municipality leasing scandals that confronted the electoral body in the years before the 2014 elections. Both events had raised questions about the IECs ability to conduct impartial and transparent elections. An IEC/HSRC survey found that trust had declined from 72% in 2009 to 63% in 2015.108 The Comparative National 104 Independent Electoral Commission (2014) Roles, Mandates and Challenges. IEC presentaion to the Porfolio Commitee on Home Afairs, Naional Parliament, Cape Town, 19 August 2014. Available at htps://pmg.org.za/commitee-meeing/17384/ [accessed 29 June 2016]. 105 Schulz-Herzenberg C, Peter Aling’o P & Gaimu S (2015) The 2013 general elecions in Kenya: The integrity of the electoral process. Insitute for Security Studies Policy Brief 74. Pretoria: Insitute for Security Studies; Schulz-Herzenberg C (2015) South African ciizen percepions of electoral integrity across three elecions: 2004, 2009, 2014. Presentaion at the Electoral Integrity Conference 2015, hosted by the Hanns Seidel Foundaion and the Electoral Integrity Project, Cape Town, 22–24 June 2015. 106 Struwig J, Roberts BJ, Gordon SL, Davids YD & Marco J (2014) Elecion Saisfacion Survey (ESS). Report by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) Research Programme. Pretoria: HSRC. 107 Struwig J, Roberts S & Vivier E (2011) A vote of conidence: Elecion management and public percepions of electoral processes in South Africa. Journal of Public Administraion 1(46): 1122–1138. 108 Roberts B, Struwig J, Gordon S, Davids YD & Marco JL (2014) IEC Voter Paricipaion Survey 2013/14: 285 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA Elections Project (CNEP) public opinion post-election surveys shows a decline in positive trust ratings for the IEC dropped from 58% in 2004, to 53% in 2015. Citizen perceptions about the freeness and fairness of elections are also crucial to democratic legitimacy. When asked by CNEP surveys to rate the freeness and fairness of the most recent national election, an overwhelming majority of respondents across past three general elections agreed ‘the election was free and fair’, or with just minor problems. However, the data shows a decline in a ‘free and fair’ verdict from 81% in 2004 to 71% in the 2009 elections and dropping again to 68% in the 2014 elections. That over 68% of South Africans still rates the conduct of the elections favourably, and felt them to be free and fair, relects a positive performance by the IEC and provides a constructive platform upon which to address lowering levels of institutional trust. When asked ‘How accurately did the announced results of the election relect the way the people of this country actually voted?’, we see similar declines in accuracy ratings. In 2004, 80% of respondents thought the election results to be accurate, which declined to 74% in the 2009 elections and to 71% in the 2014 elections. The integrity of the electoral process also depends on the ability of voters to exercise their right to vote in the absence of manipulation or intimidation. Generally, political party members adhere to the strict rules that prohibit party campaigning or materials around election polling stations. The data shows little evidence of voter experiences of political coercion. The CNEP survey asks respondents a battery of questions about their personal experiences during the elections. Respondents are asked if they or someone they know personally was prevented from: • Registering to vote; • Attending an election event such as a campaign rally; • Voting because their name was not on the voters’ roll; • Voting due to fear or intimidation; • Ofered reward or compensation; and • Pressured to support a particular party. The data shows no more than 5% of respondents ever reporting on any of these incidents across the past three general elections. This suggests that the declines in integrity perceptions regarding trust, ratings of freeness and fairness and the accuracy of results cannot be easily attributed to negative incidents experienced by voters personally during the electoral process. Key Findings. Report prepared for the Electoral Commission of South Africa. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. 286 SOUTH AFRICA Recommendaions An assessment of the available evidence suggests that the IEC’s successful performance since its inception in 1993 is attributable in large part to the well-deined and detailed constitutional and legislative framework within which it operates. It is also due, however, to the noticeable improvements in the implementation of election management over the years. The IEC can boast several laudable achievements. For example, its numerous dispute resolution mechanisms, including the party liaison committees, the code of conduct, voting station party agents, and the Electoral Court, have all proved critical to ensuring low levels of political conlict and free and fair elections. The IEC should continue to ind ways to support and strengthen these mechanisms, especially as elections become increasingly contested. The IEC should also strive to preserve its institutional independence and impartiality in forthcoming years. In doing so it can also simultaneously address its weakened credibility brought about by a decline in public trust. First, the independent selection committee must expedite the commissioner appointment process to ensure full representivity and constitutionality amongst its ive commissioners. Second, the selection of commissioners must remain independent, and the recommendations of both the multiparty parliamentary committee and independent selection committee must remain central to the inal decisionmaking process. The IEC can also further protect its institutional credibility by prioritising non-partisan and impartial behaviour among its senior oicials. This should be reinforced through a transparent and accountable ethics framework to manage conlicts of interests; not dissimilar to those that govern elected oicials. In terms of election administration, the IEC should explore the beneits of introducing automatic registration in South Africa. While automatic registration does not oblige voters to participate at the polls, it will likely lessen the costs of registration for many, and ultimately, can encourage an increase in voter turnout. The IEC should continue to prioritise addressing the infrastructural disparities in voting stations found in many rural areas across South Africa. The commission will also need to grapple with the potential costs and beneits of introducing electronic voting migration in future elections; to be weighted against other priorities that compete for the national budget. Furthermore, the IEC will need to urgently address a growing perception that temporary election staf particularly union members recruited to voting stations, are not adequately trained. A comprehensive training programme must be implemented for all temporary election staf, and must emphasise their statutory responsibilities. Moreover, the IEC must expedite, and make public, its recommendations in its anticipated report on the thorny issue of the employment of union members as temporary IEC staf at elections. Electoral integrity also presupposes a degree of political competition and a level playing ield during the campaign period. It is during this time that many voters make up their minds about which party to support. Before the 2016 municipal elections commence, the IEC must actively consider new regulatory mechanisms to manage new forms of voter 287 ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA manipulation and intimidation that curb freedom of political association and expression in South Africa. These regulations can be communicated and promoted through the party liaison committees to ensure political parties subscribe to the principles of the voter’s right to non-interference and freedom of political association and expression. In line with the principle of openness and transparency, the IEC can also provide far more public information on public funding to political parties to ensure voters are kept informed of how parties use and spend their funds, and any violations and subsequent sanctions. Finally, the IEC is suitably positioned to provide a unique and informed perspective on several complex debates that all pivotal to the fairness of electoral politics in the country. The commission can, and should, bring to bear its considerable intellectual resources to inform contemporary discourses on the current 90% proportional 10% equitable ratio allocation of public funds; the future regulation of private party funding; and the possible consequences of electoral reform. 288