The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions:The Peace Process in Context, By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman

AP PHOTO The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The Peace Process in Context By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman July 2014 W W W.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The Peace Process in Context By Michael Werz and Max Hoffman July 2014 Contents 1 Introduction and summary 7 The Turkish political context and the challenge of diversity 10 The recent history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey 17 The status of the peace process 23 The regional dimensions of the peace process 35 Regional Kurdish dynamics and Washington’s role 37 Recommendations 44 Endnotes Introduction and summary he past four years have swept away the old pillars of U.S. policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt, a traditional American security partner, is confronting a staggering political and economic crisis. Syria has descended into a horriic civil war with no resolution in sight. Lebanon is clinging to basic stability in the face of long-standing sectarian tensions and a massive refugee crisis. Jordan remains a strong U.S. ally but faces structural threats that stem from demographic trends and the war in Syria. Iraq is once again engulfed in a struggle against militancy stoked, in part, by perceptions that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his supporters have institutionalized their ascendancy in a way unacceptable to Iraq’s minorities. Of course, governments across the region are struggling to confront the rising inluence of violent Salai jihadists. he seizure of Mosul—Iraq’s secondlargest city and home to nearly 2 million people—by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, brought this reality into stark relief.1 In this context, the potential ramiications of recent developments in Turkey and along its borders have become critical to U.S. interests and the long-term trajectory of the Middle East as a whole. Political and military Kurdish actors have, separately, solidiied an autonomous government in northern Iraq and carved out a semi-independent stronghold in northern Syria. Indeed, Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and, to a lesser extent, northern Syria have become a bulwark against jihadi groups such as ISIS and a bastion of stability in a region fracturing along sectarian lines. his reality necessitates a re-evaluation of U.S. policy toward Kurdish political groups and a reinvigoration of Turkey’s peace process with its own Kurdish minority. A key NATO ally and a model of economic and political stability for many years, Turkey is in the throes of a deep political crisis that is distracting from its eforts to achieve a lasting peace setlement with its Kurdish minority, as well as mitigate the spillover efects of the Syrian conlict and counter the rise of violent groups in Iraq. Ater promising irst steps, the peace process seems to be stuck, with Kurdish insurgents halting their withdrawal from Turkey due to the Turkish government’s 1 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions failure to quickly provide more extensive political and language rights to Kurdish communities. But both the Turkish government and its Kurdish counterparts have come too far to back away; the political cost of a breakdown in negotiations may be prohibitive to both sides given the turmoil on Turkey’s borders and the threat of ISIS to Kurdish enclaves in Syria and Iraq. For the United States and Turkey, the rapidly changing political situation in Syria and Iraq underpins the need for new partners with whom to work toward regional stability and the provision of basic governance. his goal reaches beyond a narrow—albeit important—notion of national security, rooted in combating militancy and denying terrorist organizations space in which to operate. he efort should also be informed by the wider objective of allowing the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean to make political reforms and grow their economies—a goal that is crucial to peacefully accommodating the demographic wave reaching maturity this decade within pluralistic and accountable political institutions. he realities on the ground mean that this search for partners must include engagement with Kurdish political actors to encourage peaceful relations with their respective host countries, thus promoting regional stability and advancing U.S. interests. his peacebuilding process will take time, requiring long-term eforts to make and cultivate new contacts. Meanwhile, given the complexity and luidity of current events in the region, the United States and its allies cannot aford to be picky in their search for governance partners. he Syrian conlict has made it necessary for the United States to deal with Kurdish organizations that are helping deine the reality on the ground, such as the militant Democratic Union Party, or PYD, with which the United States does not have relations. Additionally, given Iraq’s fractured politics and the pressing security situation in the north of the country, the United States must set aside the concerns of Prime Minister al-Maliki and redouble its outreach to President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP, to bring it into a productive peacebuilding role. Indeed, this process inally began in earnest with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Erbil in June and Vice President Joe Biden’s “drop-by” with representatives of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, at the White House in July.2 Solving many of the region’s major problems will require Kurdish participation and consultation. Kurdish organizations have the potential to be constructive partners in providing stability in both Iraq and Syria. Given the pluralistic, secular rhetoric of many of these groups, the United States should re-evaluate its current policies, 2 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions which have largely bowed to the traditional Turkish strategy of decreasing Kurdish organizational capacities and shied away from engagement with the KRG for fear of undermining Iraqi national unity. With Iraq fractured, and with Turkey increasingly relying on Kurdish forces as a bufer to instability along its borders, these concerns about maintaining the writ of Baghdad are becoming less important. his analysis does not represent advocacy for Kurdish nationalism or independence, but rather acknowledges the realities on the ground. In northern Iraq, the KRG—a largely autonomous Kurdish-dominated administrative body—has demonstrated reasonably efective governance and economic growth. Most recently, following the collapse of the Iraqi Army’s presence in Mosul and other parts of northern Iraq, Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmerga, took control of Kirkuk, a major city and oil hub roughly 150 miles north of Baghdad.3 In northeastern Syria, a newly autonomous Kurdish-controlled region—sometimes called Rojava—has formed amid the turmoil of the civil war. Syrian Kurdish forces have also batled with radical Islamist militants, including ISIS, and occasionally fought alongside the Free Syrian Army as part of their eforts to protect local populations and maintain basic stability.4 In Turkey, the state’s long-standing eforts to assimilate Kurdish culture and suppress Kurdish political organizations—primarily the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which is also a militant armed group—through military force seem to have been abandoned. he Turkish government has undertaken a new set of political negotiations, accompanied by a soter rhetoric toward cultural diferences. Turkey’s approach toward the Kurds remains integral to the country’s process of democratization and the establishment of the efective rule of law, which is in turn important to Turkey’s role as a NATO ally and U.S. partner. It is in this longerterm context—alongside the urgent need to insulate against the further spread of violent groups such as ISIS—that the Kurdish question should be re-examined. Of course, the Kurds are not a coherent political group. Personal rivalries, national identiications, borders, economic interests, and political beliefs are diferentiating factors. But there are signs of a mutual cohering of the political agenda across much of the Kurdish-majority region, driven in part by the rise of Kurdish-language media and growing linguistic convergence.5 Regarding the Kurds as a loosely confederated group of political actors sharing a language, history of oppression, and—in some cases—aspirations for political autonomy, a number of questions arise: 3 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions • What is a realistic role for Kurdish political organizations in the new Middle East? • What are the various goals of these groups, and can they be accommodated within a stable regional model? • What is expected of these groups, and what should be ofered in return? • How should the United States and its NATO allies—including Turkey—interact with these subnational groups and political organizations? he Kurds’ place in the Middle East is not a new question. Neither, more broadly, is the question of how to incorporate subnational ethnic or religious groups within the national borders that emerged from World War I. By and large, most policymakers have concluded that it would be costlier to redraw those borders than to work within existing lines, problematic as they oten are. he national identiications based on these boundaries have taken root over the past century and should not be underestimated. his report does not dispute that core conclusion, nor does it advocate a de facto Kurdish nation-state. But the reality of two autonomous Kurdish regions and a third engaged in negotiations with its national government over greater self-determination—along with the efective collapse of central government authority in both Syria and Iraq—demands a re-examination of this question. Western policy circles should devote greater thought to the problem and undertake more frequent and nuanced outreach to Kurdish political actors. his report seeks to advance this policy conversation by outlining the political context in Turkey; summarizing the relevant history of the Kurdish regions; examining the current state of the peace process in Turkey; placing the issue in its regional context, particularly with regard to evolving autonomy in Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish areas in light of the rise of ISIS and the collapse of state authority; explaining the potential consequences of positive or negative outcomes with the Kurds; and evaluating U.S. policy in light of these challenges. 4 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions FIGURE 1 The Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran Erzurum 12–15 million TURKEY Malatya IRAN Diyarbakir Gaziantep Al Qamishli Zakho Dahuk Al Hasakah 7–8 million Mosul 1.5–2 million Irbil SYRIA Dayr az Zawr Approximate areas of Kurdish-majority settlement Abu Kamal Approximate Kurdish population Kirkuk 5–7 million IRAQ As Sulaymaniyah Tikrit Kermanshah Samarra Baqubah Note: Many of these areas are ethnically mixed, and reliable data are hard to obtain. The region has seen heavy migration and multiple government efforts at resettlement designed to alter the ethnic makeup. This map does not display areas of political or military control and should not be seen as a political statement. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last accessed July 2014). 5 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Glossary AKP: Turkey’s governing party, the conservative Justice and Development Party, founded in 2001. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül are both founding members. The party won 45.5 percent of the overall popular vote in the March local elections. BDP: The Peace and Democracy Party, the primary Turkish Kurdish political party. The party’s support is heavily concentrated in the majority-Kurdish regions of southeastern Anatolia. The recently formed sister party—the Peoples’ Democratic Party, or HDP—aims to attract urban liberals and non-Kurds to the broader BDP-HDP constituency. CHP: The Republican People’s Party, Turkey’s main opposition party. The party was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s irst president, and has a nationalist history but is in the process of rebranding itself as a social democratic alternative to the AKP. DTP: The Democratic Society Party, a pro-Kurdish Turkish political party, banned in 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court for alleged links to the PKK. ISIS: The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, an extremely violent jihadi militant group active in Syria and Iraq. The group has claimed large swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, proclaiming an Islamic caliphate. Recently, the group has started calling itself simply the Islamic State, or IS, but this report will continue to use the ISIS acronym. MHP: The Nationalist Movement Party, Turkey’s ultranationalist party, strongly opposed to Kurdish autonomy. 6 MIT: Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, the primary state intelligence service. KDP: The Kurdistan Democratic Party, founded by Mustafa Barzani and currently led by President Massoud Barzani, is the dominant political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. KRG: The Kurdistan Regional Government, the largely autonomous ruling structure of Iraqi Kurdistan, a federal region of Iraq. PJAK: The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, a militant Kurdish separatist group operating in Iran that is regarded as the PKK’s Iranian sister organization. PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a militant armed group that has waged an intermittent war against the Turkish state and is seeking Kurdish independence. Led by Abdullah Öcalan, now imprisoned by the Turkish government, the organization has softened its demands to greater Kurdish autonomy and cultural rights and has upheld a unilateral ceaseire for two years. PYD: The Democratic Union Party, a Syrian Kurdish political party and sister organization to the PKK that seeks Kurdish federal autonomy in the context of the Syrian state. The PYD has declared autonomy for three majority-Kurdish cantons in northern Syria. YPG: The People’s Protection Units, the military units ighting to defend Kurdish areas in northern Syria, widely regarded as the armed wing of the PYD. Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The Turkish political context and the challenge of diversity In the face of this regional turmoil, Turkey remains a crucial regional pillar and U.S. ally. As the regional power with the most at stake in the upheaval along its borders, Turkey is deeply invested in the outcomes of political and military struggles in both Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the porous nature of Turkey’s southern border, its economic interests in northern Iraq and its desire for Iraqi energy, and the presence of more than 800,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey mean the country is extremely vulnerable to spillover efects from the conlicts in both countries. hese interests and vulnerabilities underpin Turkey’s relations with Kurdish political actors in Syria and Iraq. Finally, Turkey is also conducting delicate negotiations with domestic Kurdish insurgents—the PKK. All of these trends get swept up into Turkey’s passionate domestic political debate, which is why it is important to place the regional picture in its Turkish political context. It is also equally important to analyze the regional implications of domestic Turkish political developments. Turkey’s ongoing transformation from a society in which cultural homogeneity trumps minority rights toward a more open, pluralist community capable of reconciling ethnic and religious diferences has contributed to the country’s heated political debate and is contributing to a recasting of Turkey’s relations with political actors in northern Iraq and Syria. he so-called Kurdish question lies at the center of this efort to recognize internal diversity. Since its victory in the 2002 elections, the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has driven the latest chapter in the process of recognizing the Kurds. Dubbed the “Kurdish opening” before being rebranded as the “democratic opening,” the AKP has atempted to temper conlict between Turkey’s Kurdish minority and the military while gradually extending more of the rights available to all Turks to Kurdish communities.6 At its core, the issue turns on many Turks’ acceptance that Kurds should enjoy equal rights as Turkish citizens but resentment of what they view as eforts to achieve special collective rights. At the same time, many Turkish Kurds believe that they need certain collective cultural and political rights due to historical repression and marginalization. 7 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Resolving this issue is not an easy task—the legacy of ierce, state-driven nationalism dates back to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Ater leading the nationalist revolution that succeeded the multiethnic Otoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the irst president of Turkey, spearheaded an accelerated process of secularization and modernization that implemented the Gregorian calendar and Latin alphabet, abolished religious courts and schools, and established a purely secular system of family law.7 Kemalism—Atatürk’s ideology—sought to aggressively build the power of the secular nation-state at the expense of acknowledging and integrating diversity. he perceived need to neutralize ethnic and religious diferences drove this efort in the wake of the national disintegration and retrenchment that followed World War I. Atatürk and many of his supporters felt that the Otoman Empire had been undermined, in part, by its diversity, which contributed to internal unrest that gave outside powers pretexts for territorial claims. Even today, Turkey’s constitution leaves no room for the linguistic and cultural diferences of minority communities, declaring, “he Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”8 he preamble is similarly categorical, stating, “No protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to … [the] historical and moral values of Turkishness.”9 his constitution, writen when Turkey was under military rule, has become largely unworkable in the face of the diversity of the Turkish people and the body politic, with litle explicit legal acknowledgement of this cultural and linguistic diversity. However, as economic standards improved ater the end of the Cold War, the efort to establish cultural pluralism and acknowledge Turkey’s sometimes violent history with minority groups has gained impetus. But traditional Turkish fears of national fragmentation have not subsided. he emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan following the irst Gulf War, as well as the militant PKK’s use of northern Iraq as a launching pad for atacks against the Turkish state, have contributed to these concerns. Indeed, American support for Iraqi Kurds has reinforced some Turks’ belief that the West wants to dismember Turkey, a fear that was used to justify the Turkish state’s ruthless campaign against the Kurds throughout the 1990s.10 But despite recent eforts to address Turkish diversity, Kemalism—with its narrow conception of nationhood and citizenship—has maintained a grip on Turkish society. A signiicant segment of the body politic continues to contest the very existence of ethnic and religious plurality in the country and fears any political assertiveness from Turkey’s minorities. Ater the decisive electoral success of the AKP in 2002, the government did take the positive steps of ending 8 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions martial law in the Kurdish regions and engaging in negotiations with representatives of Kurdish political groups. Even though this process has stalled, it represents an important move toward overcoming what political scientist Ümit Cizre describes as Turkey’s “chronic political insecurity.”11 hese are not abstract questions. hey underpin the deepening of democratic practices in Turkey and, therefore, its future role as a part of the NATO alliance, potential member of the European Union, and partner of the United States. he most aggressive and undemocratic portions of the existing constitution and the worst state excesses of the past century are linked to these questions of minority rights, fears of separatism, and challenges to state authority. he opportunity now exists for the Turkish state to permanently recast its relations with minority groups and peacefully incorporate them into the political system. Events in the region have only added urgency to this efort. But this goal cannot be achieved without concessions. Final resolution of the Kurdish question will be dictated by political realities shaping the negotiations and may ultimately require a new constitution shorn of ethnic deinitions of citizenship and the most problematic ultranationalist provisions and electoral reforms, such as lowering the threshold to parliamentary representation. Some observers believe this resolution could be achieved without a new constitution through a series of laws and amendments. Peace will also likely require a inal historical acknowledgement of the roughly 40,000 victims of the war in eastern Anatolia.12 With decades of delay, Turkish society is beginning to address these issues. To regain leverage in the region, it must acknowledge diversity as a strength instead of a weakness. he latest round of peace talks with the PKK launched in December 2012. his peace process is a critical component of moving Turkey toward a more inclusive society and a more conident regional role. 9 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The recent history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey In 1984, the PKK—established in the late 1970s—launched a full-scale separatist guerilla war in southeastern Turkey. he PKK was responding to the aggressive suppression of Kurdish language and cultural rights by the Turkish state and sought an independent—and, at the time, communist—state for the Kurds, who are still referred to as the largest ethnic group in the world without a state.13 he conlict quickly escalated, with insurgent atacks focused in the eastern region but not limited to the traditional Kurdish homeland in southeastern Turkey. At the height of the conlict in the early 1990s, the PKK was estimated to have up to 15,000 ighters and considerable infrastructure in the Iraqi Qandil Mountains, just across the border from Turkey, as well as tacit support from then-President Hafez al-Assad in Syria, where the organization had its headquarters and a number of training camps.14 Confronting the PKK threat became the key driver of Turkish regional policy and, alongside its role in the NATO alliance against the Soviet Union, the animating impulse of its overall foreign policy. he end of the Cold War let Turkey more conident and able to act beyond its borders on this regional goal of eradicating the PKK. Turkish troops entered the Iraqi safe havens with military ofensives of 20,000 troops in 1992 and 35,000 troops in 1995.15 Turkey threatened Syria with war over its support for the PKK in 1998, and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and much of the party infrastructure was forced to leave Syria.16 Öcalan was eventually captured in Kenya in 1999, brought to Turkey to face trial, and sentenced to death. His sentence, however, was later commuted to life imprisonment at the request of the European Union.17 he cost of the conlict was enormous. Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Department of Peace and Conlict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden estimates that there have been between 25,000 and 30,000 Kurdish fatalities, with the destruction of more than 2,000 villages.18 Other estimates put the total at as high as 40,000 or 44,000 dead.19 he International Crisis Group evaluated the economic cost at an estimated $300 billion to $450 billion.20 Nearly 7,000 members of Turkish security forces—military, police, and gendarmerie—are estimated to have been killed in the conlict, according to government sources.21 10 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions A Kurdish female member of the Popular Protection Units stands guard at a checkpoint near the northeastern city of Qamishli, Syria. Syria’s Kurds have dramatically strengthened their hold on the far northeast reaches of the country, carving out territory as they drive out Islamic militant ighters allied with the rebellion and declaring their own civil administration in areas under their control amid the chaos of the civil war. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO) he capture of Öcalan, the enormous inancial cost of the ighting, and the growing desire for democratization has led many Turks to ponder the government’s endgame for the Kurdish conlict. Following Öcalan’s capture, the PKK declared a unilateral ceaseire and sotened its demands for independence.22 Surely, as many began to argue in the late 1990s, it was time to recast the terms of the conlict from the strictly military framework used thus far by the Turkish state to a political negotiation and cultural dialogue.23 he Kurdish question started to become about more than the PKK—and an increasing number of Turkish political leaders recognized that the Kurds and the PKK are not one and the same. Liberal Turks and moderate religious groups who were chaing under aggressively secular state institutions recognized that a number of immediate domestic goals revolved around the necessity of establishing a more inclusive notion of Turkish citizenship. hese goals included the need for a new constitution to replace the existing document; the EU requirement to establish judicial independence and press freedom in line with European norms; and the abolition of draconian antiterror laws and special, secret courts. Indeed, it was this political alliance—bolstered by the rise of a new Anatolian middle class—that would transform Turkish politics in 2002 with the electoral victory of the AKP. 11 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions here were political considerations driving the process as well: An estimated 2 million to 4 million Kurds lived in Istanbul alone, and the group had become an important reservoir of voters.24 he leaders of the AKP tried to emphasize “brotherly unity” between Turks and Kurds, invoking Islamic tradition to avoid confronting the legacy of state violence and forced assimilation head on, a confrontation that would undoubtedly trigger a nationalist backlash.25 It became clear that a permanent solution would only be found if common political ground were established that acknowledged past crimes and reversed the nationalist Turkish heritage codiied in the constitution and reinforced by the state-dominated education system. Men with their faces covered by images of jailed Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan demonstrate during the Nowruz celebrations in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır, Turkey. The banner reads, “Negotiation or the war!” (PHOTO: AP PHOTO) he AKP’s decisive electoral victory in 2002 allowed the party to eschew coalitions and form a single-party government, the irst in more than a decade,26 and provided a solid political platform upon which to base reforms. his gave rise to hopes of a new era in minority relations and the abolition of bans on Kurdish education and broadcasting—part of a wider AKP push to open the political process to people beyond the traditional Kemalist elite, such as minorities and devout Muslims. he following year, the Turkish Parliament—eyeing EU membership—passed laws that eased restrictions on freedom of speech and Kurdish language rights and reduced the political role of the military. Turkish state television broadcasted the irst-ever Kurdish-language program in 2004, a sign of the AKP’s new openness and 12 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions the state’s acceptance of defeat in the efort to control Kurdish diaspora and unoficial communications. Kurdish-language media has grown since then, leading to several second-order efects, including an increased sense of a pan-Kurdish political dialogue and rising mutual intelligibility of Kurdish language and dialects.27 Evren Balta Paker, a professor of political science at Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul, describes this juncture: In this period, all political camps grew aware that the consolidation of [the] AKP’s political rule was contingent on the normalization of the Kurdish issue and the demilitarization of politics. Both proponents and opponents of [the] AKP started to view democratization as the ground for “strategic” trench warfare. Whereas both the military authority and the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) approached democracy through the lens of “secularism”, [the] AKP interpreted democracy through the lens of “civilian rule.” [he] period would be dominated by a conlict between these two perceptions of democracy. In fact, neither side had a comprehensive program of democracy; both expressed a strategic demand for ragmented democracy in order to consolidate its own power. Neither side would rerain rom recourse to non-democratic methods whenever this strategic demand for democracy failed to yield the desired results.28 In the absence of fundamental reforms, however, tensions lared, with a series of bloody PKK atacks on Turkish military and civilian targets in 2007. Nearly 50 Turkish soldiers were killed in October 2007 alone.29 In response, the Turkish military conducted operations along the Turkish-Iraqi border against Kurdish rebels. Turkish forces launched numerous air and ground raids into northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK ighters between October 2007 and February 2008. hese actions eventually led to improved intelligence sharing between American and Turkish forces, launched in an efort to halt Turkish military incursions that the United States felt threatened eforts to achieve stability in Iraq.30 To defuse the situation following the AKP’s second decisive electoral victory in 2007 and the show of military strength in late 2007 and early 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare meeting with Ahmet Turk, the leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party, or DTP, in August 2009. his meeting would provide the foundation for the so-called Kurdish opening, which tried to provide space for a negotiated setlement.31 hree months later, the government introduced measures in parliament to increase Kurdish language rights and reduce the military presence in the mainly Kurdish southeast. 13 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions he opening proved short lived, however, as the eforts to extend piecemeal rights to Kurds failed to alleviate grievances in the absence of fundamental reforms to anti-terrorism laws or the drating of a new constitution. he AKP government also failed to explain the details of the program and convince the public of its necessity before its announcement. When PKK ighters entered Turkey from Iraq following the announcement and were welcomed at a large rally by locals and oicials of the Kurdish-majority DTP, a predecessor to today’s Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP, in Turkey, the media coverage of the incident triggered a strong nationalist reaction and a hasty political retreat by the AKP, fearful of losing votes.32 While the PKK members entered Turkey at the invitation of the government and were processed by courts at the border, the AKP had not prepared the Turkish body politic for the image of PKK ighters openly celebrating on Turkish soil and gave in to ierce criticism. he failure of the opening resulted in escalating military confrontation and the banning of the DTP, subsequently succeeded by the BDP.33 he failure of the Kurdish opening in 2009 inaugurated another period of sharp violence between the Turkish state and the PKK, with persistent atacks on Turkish soldiers throughout 2010, 2011, and 2012. Despite ongoing secret negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, or MIT, in Norway from 2009 to 2011, the bloodshed continued.34 he collapse of these secret talks inaugurated the bloodiest period of the conlict since the capture of Öcalan: he International Crisis Group counted more than 900 deaths, including at least 304 Turkish security forces or police, 533 militants, and 91 civilians—34 of whom were killed by the Turkish Air Force in a single raid—from 2011 to 2013.35 In this context, it is important to recognize a more fundamental point about the Turkish state’s Kurdish policy: It is oten swept up in larger Turkish political debates or used in the service of broader strategic goals. In the early years of the AKP government, the Kurdish issue fell under the umbrella of facilitating EU membership, partly to open up politics to minorities and religious people—and thus to the AKP itself—and partly to weaken the military’s role in the political sphere. More recently, the peace process has become important in light of eforts to reduce energy shortfalls through outreach to the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Currently, Prime Minister Erdoğan has a vested interest in maintaining the process to hold together his political base in the face of corruption inquiries and growing international skepticism of his authoritarian tendencies. he process simultaneously neutralizes the pro-Kurdish BDP’s role as a progressive opposition party and maintains one of the last positive initiatives in the eyes of the international community. Another major motivation for Prime Minister Erdoğan is his need to secure Kurdish votes in his bid for the Turkish presidency in the elections scheduled for 14 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions August 10, 2014. he balance of motivation for the AKP’s engagement with the BDP—viewed by some as the political arm of the Kurdish nationalist movement— is open to debate, but the Turkish state has still never engaged with the issue in a comprehensive way with the sole goal of achieving a lasting peace. Prime Minister Erdoğan seemed to revive the peace process when he conirmed in December 2012 that the head of the MIT had been in contact with jailed PKK leader Öcalan in an efort to achieve a negotiated ceaseire and disarmament.36 But despite renewed mediation, the Turkish government continued to suspect the PKK’s intentions and refused to decrease military pressure on the organization. Although the PKK had been visibly withdrawing from Turkey into its Iraqi strongholds in the Qandil Mountains, Turkish armed forces—with American intelligence support—continued to operate atack helicopters and drones over areas of PKK activity. In Diyarbakır, Turkey’s largest Kurdish-majority city, Kurds still complained of governmental marginalization, judicial discrimination, political arrests, bans on public use of the Kurdish language, and economic strife—despite another symbolic and historic meeting of Prime Minister Erdoğan and Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, in the city.37 President Barzani—whose father Mustafa Barzani founded the KDP, which has dominated Iraqi Kurdish politics for years—had long been branded an insurgent by the Turkish state, so his reinvention as an ally of the conservative Turkish government came as a surprise. his event also demonstrated some of the inconsistencies inherent in Turkish treatment of diferent Kurdish political actors, as the PKK is still considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, and its leader Öcalan is in a Turkish prison. Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, center, Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, left, and Kurdish singer Sivan Perwer, right, attend a mass marriage ceremony for 400 couples in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır, Turkey. Barzani was in Turkey to support the Turkish government’s Kurdish peace process. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO) 15 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions But the most dramatic recent development in the Turkish-Kurdish story came in March 2013, when Öcalan publicly called for an end to the PKK’s armed struggle and lent his support to a delicate new efort at peace, a move welcomed by Prime Minister Erdoğan.38 With Öcalan, still lionized by many Kurds and apparently inluential at all levels of the PKK, working for peace, the prospects seem beter now than they have for decades. he increasing diversity of Turkish society, intermarriage, the shit away from strict Kemalist state ideology, and the costs of the violent struggle mean there is new political space for a negotiated setlement; twothirds of Turkish society favor the setlement, and many hard questions—including the personal future of Öcalan—are discussed openly, something that would have been strictly taboo just a decade ago. he details of a viable disarmament process and the reintegration of Kurdish insurgents into legal political structures remain to be hashed out, but a political solution seems possible. 16 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The status of the peace process he ceaseire between the Turkish government and the PKK remained in place throughout 2013 and has held for the irst part of this year, but the durability of the peace remains unknown. While previous breaks in the ighting have proved fragile, structural trends such as intermarriage, economic growth across Turkey, and overall integration—along with short-term political conditions such as Öcalan’s participation in the process—may make this particular instance diferent. he domestic political turmoil that has engulfed Turkey over the past year— including the June 2013 Gezi Park protests and the corruption scandal that broke in December 2013—has drawn public atention away from the peace process.39 But this domestic political distraction might be good for the process, allowing both sides room to politically maneuver. he rise of ISIS along Turkey’s southern border may also prompt Ankara to acquiesce on the PYD’s movement toward autonomy in Syria and increase the urgency of the PKK peace process. Beyond immediate security concerns, many in the AKP still recognize the opportunity to use a long-term peace arrangement as a bridge to a fresh start in the dysfunctional relationship with the Kurdish minority, along with the economic beneits that could accrue if a lasting peace is achieved. But the AKP has been focused on political damage control and preparation for the irst-ever popular presidential election in August. On July 10, the AKP passed a new bill granting legal protections to oicials negotiating with the PKK—which was previously illegal—and allowing the government to ofer amnesty to PKK ighters as part of a disarmament program.40 he new bill could be interpreted as another tangible step toward peace or as an election-year ploy to shore up support from Kurds— crucial if Prime Minister Erdoğan is to win the presidency in August. Despite the distraction of the impending election and Turkey’s domestic political crisis, the ultimate success or failure of the process will have implications for Kurdish regional dynamics, for Turkish relations with the United States and the European Union, and for U.S. interests in the region—particularly in Iraq and Syria. 17 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions One challenge facing the peace process is that it is diicult for those outside the Turkish government to assess its progress because information is so tightly held within AKP ranks. Indeed, it is diicult to even speak of a formal process, given the fact that the negotiations are taking place intermitently through unknown intermediaries, lacked a legal basis until the passage of the July 10 bill, and have not brought in acting commanders of PKK ield units or leaders of the Turkish opposition parties. Nonetheless, this informal process has achieved several obvious positive developments since the beginning of the latest peace initiative, most notably the beginning of a PKK withdrawal from Turkey to camps in northern Iraq and Syria and the lack of casualties over the past year.41 Many critics observe, however, that the process is essentially a “two-man show,”42 involving Prime Minster Erdoğan and Abdullah Öcalan, with only a small inner circle beyond these two principals having input and visibility. While there are advantages to having a streamlined process—including ease in decision making and fewer voices of dissent—stakeholders excluded from the process have begun to express concerns, and the AKP may be repeating the mistakes of the ill-fated Kurdish opening of 2009. Among them is a lack of outside expertise on useful precedents, such as relevant peace negotiations that have occurred elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, the AKP has sought to manage this important national process with only very limited participation of the opposition parties. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has repeatedly asked Prime Minister Erdoğan to include a wider range of Turkish elected oicials in the process and to diversify the stakeholders by establishing a reconciliation commission in parliament with all parties represented. At the same time, Kılıçdaroğlu has opposed the Turkish government’s direct engagement with PKK leader Öcalan, most likely due to pressure from nationalists within his own party.43 he absence of a clearly deined road map and the lack of transparency are limiting the broader discussion of the issue within Turkish society, which is crucial to building political consensus on such a controversial and emotional subject. A second challenge is the potential for the process to disintegrate if either principal pulls back from the process due to philosophical or personal disagreements or domestic political considerations. Prime Minister Erdoğan and Öcalan obviously do not have a history of partnership, and the 2014 elections—the nationwide local elections last March and the presidential election this August—have introduced an unpredictable element to the negotiations. Indeed, opposition politicians and some outside experts speculate that Prime Minister Erdoğan and the PKK are pursing the peace talks for political advantage and that motivation to continue working through a diicult process will wane ater the presidential 18 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions elections in August, when the prime minister will no longer need to reach out for Kurdish votes.44 Of course, there is a fundamental power imbalance with Öcalan imprisoned and at the mercy of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s government. Likewise, the two men are not siting down directly with each other, and—with all negotiations passing through interlocutors—the risk of misunderstandings is high. Another, more basic challenge is reason for concern—and possibly greater Western involvement. Turkey’s conservative political leadership began the peace process by emphasizing Islamic unity and values, drawing a strict distinction between the AKP and its Kemalist predecessors, who had stressed the concept of “Turkishness.”45 his transformation of the politics of the conlict was an important step away from the legacy of state repression of Kurdish language and culture, but it also exaggerated the cultural and religious dimensions of what is still largely a conlict over political economy and the right of self-determination within a diverse nation-state. To delect criticism of this cultural and religious outreach by nationalists, some AKP oicials framed the solution as a step toward a “Great Turkey” strategy to enhance Ankara’s inluence in the wider region.46 he political strategy to delect nationalist criticism while reaching out to Kurds seems to be working—at least for the time being. While the March local elections were primarily a referendum on Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP, the party also received support from Kurds in urban areas where the BDP did not ield competitive candidates, and the victory could be interpreted, in part, as demonstrating the political beneits of expending political capital on the peace process. Alternatively, despite claiming to support the process, it is unclear how commited to its conclusion or adept at managing its intricacies other political parties would be should they win power. Indeed, the CHP continues to rely on nationalist support, and the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP—another opposition group—is a devoted nationalist party. Even the moderate CHP elements might shy away from alienating the older, nationalist portion of their political coalition by pursuing the peace process. he AKP’s victory in the March nationwide local elections has bolstered Prime Minister Erdoğan’s perceived strength as a leader in further negotiations with the PKK. he AKP’s victory and fresh political capital have increased the chances that the Erdoğan-Öcalan dialogue will remain a feature of Turkish politics. In addition, the results of the March elections have made it clear that Prime Minister Erdoğan must maintain Kurdish support if he hopes to secure 19 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions election as Turkey’s irst directly elected president. Kurdish support for the AKP in the March elections eliminated the possibility that a defeat for Prime Minister Erdoğan could undermine the peace negotiations, causing the AKP to limit his freedom to pursue a Kurdish setlement. But clear Kurdish support for Prime Minister Erdoğan may also entrench CHP opposition to a setlement if opposition parties are given a more substantial role in the peace process. Hence, both the AKP and the BDP have taken a cautious approach; the BDP has named its own candidate and warned that Kurdish support should “not be taken for granted,”47 while Prime Minister Erdoğan has pledged to continue the peace process if elected president and has pushed through the bill to provide a path to amnesty and a legal framework for negotiations.48 While there have been signiicant public developments over the past year, none of them demonstrate much progress in permanently easing tensions. he AKP presented and passed reforms meant to advance the peace process in October 2013, including allowing Kurdish-language education in private schools and electoral campaigns and the repeal of the law that required Turkish students to recite a nationalist vow each week in school. But the package did not commit to lowering the 10 percent threshold for admission to parliament—a key limit on Kurdish representation in Ankara—or provide for Kurdish-language education in state schools.49 Öcalan made rare public comments reacting to the package, noting that while the process had eased social tensions, “mountainous problems” remained.50 In a writen statement released by the BDP, he remarked that he was “waiting for the state to respond with meaningful, deep negotiations,” and that while he remained hopeful, he was “repeating once again [his] historic call so that this hope does not turn into disillusionment.”51 hese comments were watched closely by PKK ighters in the mountains of northern Iraq, who have been considering whether to maintain the ceaseire ater what is, in their minds, a disappointing reform package.52 hese concerns about the lack of signiicant reform compounded the misgivings that led PKK units to suspend their pullout from southeastern Turkey in fall 2013 due to the AKP’s failure to make enough progress on democratization.53 20 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Another complication is that the desired areas of focus for the talks are not fully aligned between the PKK and the AKP at this juncture. he PKK expects Turkey to make signiicant progress in improving Kurdish rights, including dismantling the anti-terrorism law that has been used to jail thousands of individuals with alleged links to the PKK and allowing Kurdish youth to be educated in their own language in public schools. It accuses Ankara of building new dams and military posts in Kurdish areas and not properly consulting Kurds about reform plans. For its part, the AKP insists that the PKK must withdraw fully from Turkey and lay down its arms in order for peace talks to advance.54 he process remains deadlocked at this phase, with the PKK military withdrawal halted and the Turkish state unable or unwilling to go further without complete PKK disarmament. Several incidents in late 2013 and early 2014 indicate how delicate this stalemate could be, including PKK ighters’ blockades of highways near Diyarbakır; several kidnappings, including of Turkish soldiers, reportedly carried out by the PKK; and the ongoing construction of gendarmerie posts, which the PKK views as a provocation.55 he incentives for the Turkish government to get past these stumbling blocks and conclude a permanent peace are strong, with regional and international governmental stakeholders also poised to beneit. For the AKP, a successful resolution of the Kurdish issue could help neutralize one of the major obstacles to meaningful democratic reform in Turkey—if, indeed, that remains a goal of the party.56 In addition, a successful completion of the peace talks with the PKK and a political solution to the multidecade conlict with the PKK would be a major boon to Prime Minister Erdoğan in the months leading up to the presidential election in August.57 21 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions A masked man in a guerrilla outit holds a lag of the PKK during the Nowruz celebrations in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakır, Turkey. Nowruz, the Farsi-language word for “new year,” is an ancient Persian festival celebrated on the irst day of spring, March 21, in the Central Asian countries of Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO) It would help him solidify support among wavering or hostile constituencies such as the Kurdish population, urban liberals, young people, and the conlict-weary population of southeastern Turkey, most of whom are eager to move on from the PKK conlict and see their country focus on improving political freedom and economic development. his is the logic behind the July introduction and passage of the bill to legalize direct talks with the PKK and allow the government to take “all necessary measures” to create a path for PKK ighters to disarm and reintegrate.58 While a pathway to amnesty, disarmament, and dismantlement of Qandil Mountain camps will be crucial to the resolution of the conlict, the bill remains very vague at this point—leading to accusations that it is just an election-year ploy. To move forward, the AKP and its political leaders have to overcome several challenges. he party has no strong presence in Kurdish civil society and lacks trusted interlocutors.59 he AKP’s electoral presence is likewise limited—despite success in the 2014 local elections in provinces such as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Muş, Bingöl, Elazığ, and Malatya on the periphery of the Kurdish regions, the BDP won all the provinces in the Kurdish heartland.60 Also, despite some success bringing infrastructure investments such as irrigation projects to southeastern Anatolia,61 economic development and educational atainment in Kurdish-majority areas still lag behind the rest of Turkey, leading to anger and disillusionment.62 Most importantly, the current AKP discourse tends to limit the question of Kurdish self-determination to cultural issues and avoids the more pressing political steps that need to be taken. Kurds want a serious debate about new ways to administer local economies, provide local government, and decide on infrastructure plans in the Kurdish-majority regions. In essence, the Kurds want a higher degree of autonomy—a term that has taken on such symbolic value in Turkish political discourse that it has become almost meaningless. he Turkish state and many Turkish citizens view Kurdish autonomy as an anathema. he issue of public school education elicits particularly vehement opposition from many Turks. Dating back to Atatürk’s transformation of the country, control of public education has been a source of great political power and the root of many Turks’ political consciousness. herefore, education means the diference between, as they see it, Kurdish assimilation into Turkish society or a movement toward a Kurdish-Turkish federation. For nationalist Turks schooled in the vision of Atatürk, federation is tantamount to national breakup and decline, while for Kurds assimilation has historically meant shedding cultural freedom and ceding all political authority to Ankara. 22 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The regional dimensions of the peace process he peace process in Turkey cannot be seen in isolation from the regional dynamics that afect it, particularly the increasing leverage of Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq. he partitioning of the Otoman Empire completed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne split the region’s Kurdish population among four sovereign states—Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—administered by central governments based in distant cities. his historical split forced the Kurdish population to develop in diferent ways and at diferent rates, while occasionally working collectively across borders. Turkey may inally be starting to resolve its century-old Kurdish issue, buoyed by the PKK ceaseire. At the same time, Syrian Kurds are seeking autonomy while the country collapses. In Iraq, of course, the Kurds remain deeply divided from the country’s Arab population, an unfortunate legacy of the country’s history and especially of former President Saddam Hussein’s rule. Most recently, Kurdish Peshmerga have taken control of Kirkuk, providing security in the wake of ISIS’s rapid ofensive against central government forces, which sowed chaos through much of northern Iraq, thereby solidifying a de facto partitioning of the country. he Iranian Kurds remain under the control of Tehran, but are closely watching the changing circumstances of neighboring Kurdish minorities. he central governments of Syria, Iraq, and Iran are also monitoring the Turkish peace process closely and have stakes in its success or failure. Many Kurdish nationalists believe that the movement is poised for a signiicant breakthrough and have tried to capitalize on the regional chaos caused by the implosion of Syria, the hostile relations between Turkey and the Assad regime, and the collapse of Baghdad’s authority in northern Iraq.63 hese regional dynamics will afect the ultimate success or failure of the peace process. 23 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Syria he crisis in Syria has thrown the Middle East’s political future into lux and will continue to inluence the course of the Turkey-PKK peace process. Far from ending with the U.N. chemical weapons deal, the Syrian civil war has sent destabilizing currents through all of the country’s neighbors, though some Syrian Kurds believe they have a chance to build political capital and consolidate control of their territory. In particular, the PYD has taken control of parts of northern Syria along the borders with Turkey and Iraq.64 he PYD-led Syrian Kurdish Council unilaterally declared “self-rule” of three separate Kurdish cantons on November 12, 2013, an announcement condemned by some other Syrian Kurdish parties, the Turkish government, and President Barzani’s Iraqi KDP.65 he PYD’s forces control sizable swaths of territory and have fought jihadi and Al Qaeda-linked groups such as the al-Nusra Front and ISIS, and they have recently drawn ighters across the border from Turkey.66 he PYD has also occasionally cracked down on dissenting Kurdish groups—mostly younger and liberal Kurds who disagree with the PYD’s authoritarian tendencies and supporters of President Barzani’s KDP in Iraq, which is at odds with the PYD. Indeed, the PYD’s declaration of autonomy undermined previous eforts by President Barzani to mediate between the various Kurdish political groups in Syria and bring the PYD into a united Syrian Kurdish political alliance, eforts that culminated in the formation of the Supreme Kurdish Council in summer 2012.67 he Supreme Kurdish Council at least provided a venue for the Barzani-aligned Kurdish National Council68 and the PYD, along with other Syrian Kurdish groups, to air grievances and coordinate action, but the PYD’s batleield successes outpaced the Supreme Kurdish Council’s political progress. As the overall Syrian conlict moved into a purely military framework, the PYD’s military predominance made it the driving force in Syrian Kurdish-controlled areas, leading it to exert its authority over dissenting groups in areas under its control. Despite the PYD’s unilateral steps toward autonomy, the 2 million to 3 million Kurds in Syria—about 10 percent of the overall population—are fragmented, partly as a result of past repression by the Assad regime. Since the murder of Sheikh Mohammed Mashouq al-Khaznawi in 2005, apparently by Syrian intelligence operatives, Syrian Kurds have largely lacked a unifying leadership igure.69 Many Kurds support the PYD’s military gains and are happy to have a Kurdish enclave in Syria, even if they may disagree with aspects of the PYD’s political platform.70 Perhaps most importantly, the eforts of the PYD’s military arm—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG—to protect local populations from atacks by extremist groups such as ISIS have earned them a modicum of legitimacy. 24 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions he PYD’s stated goals include ensuring the right of Syrian Kurds to govern themselves and promoting democracy and equitable representation within the Syrian republic, but the group rejects Kurdish secession from Syria.71 he PYD was founded as a Syrian ofshoot of the PKK, and the Turkish and Syrian militant organizations have had close links—hence the similarity of the PYD’s position to Öcalan’s concept of “democratic autonomy”—dating back to the era of current President Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad. hen-President Hafez al-Assad, angered by Turkey’s damming of the Euphrates River in 1984, supported the PKK as a lever to pressure Turkey from time to time and to appease the Kurdish minorities in his own country, though he also had deep reservations about potential Kurdish separatism within Syria and oversaw atempts to resetle Kurdish areas with Arab setlers.72 Despite the PYD’s stated democratic goals, there have been abuses—for example, the PYD authorities’ violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Amuda, which let six people dead, dozens wounded, and 90 activists detained.73 Nevertheless, the YPG has emerged as a formidable force in the region. he YPG is said to have several thousand ighters, which would place it among the largest military organization in northern Syria.74 Unlike the PKK, however, neither the United States nor Turkey has ever oicially listed the PYD as a terrorist organization. he PYD seized control of many areas it now holds when the Assad regime withdrew its forces in July 2012—efectively ceding control without a ight. he PYD took advantage, illing the security vacuum and providing protection from jihadi forces. he regime’s withdrawal was part of a strategy to retaliate against Turkey for supporting the rebels and to split the Kurds from the majority-Arab rebel forces.75 Nonetheless, the circumstances of the Assad regime’s withdrawal from Kurdish areas of Syria and the lack of major ighting between the PYD and the regime have led many—including Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, President Barzani’s KDP in Iraq, and many among the majority-Arab rebels—to argue that the PYD has a tacit deal with the Assad regime, though there have been occasional, minor clashes between the PYD and Assad-regime forces.76 PYD leader Salih Muslim Muhammad, for his part, has repeatedly rejected this claim, arguing that YPG forces are the most efective forces confronting ISIS and that they only want to protect the population in their areas.77 25 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Kurdish female members of the Popular Protection Units stand guard at a checkpoint near the northeastern city of Qamishli, Syria. Syria’s Kurds have taken irst steps toward creating an autonomous region similar to the one across the border in Iraq, which is run as virtually a separate country. But the Kurds’ drive has angered rebels who are ighting to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO) he Kurdish forces’ batleield successes have been impressive since the Assad regime’s withdrawal. he YPG captured the town of Manajeer, near the Turkish border, and expelled all Al Qaeda-linked forces from the border province of Ras al-Ain in late 2013. Over the irst few months of this year, the YPG captured 19 towns and villages spanning Syria’s northeastern border. Just one week before capturing Manajeer, the YPG overtook the Iraqi border-crossing point in the town of Yarubiya.78 Despite the uneasy and sometimes violent relationship between the PYD and the patchwork of Sunni rebel groups in Syria, Kurdish forces have managed to preserve a modicum of stability in areas under their control. Fighting continues for control of key towns and border crossings, such as CeylanpinarSerekaniye, and the access to outside supplies that the crossings bring.79 With the consolidation of political control in northern Syria under the PYD, conditions have emerged that point to the creation of a viable transborder Kurdish nationalist movement, the irst of its kind since World War I. Indeed, the low of PKK ighters across the border to join the PYD’s ight in Syria can be seen, in part, as evidence of a consolidation of Kurdish self-perception. Even Kurdish supporters of President Barzani in Iraq—no friends of the PYD—may see their interests as more closely aligned with the PYD’s struggle against ISIS. hese developments have changed the regional power equilibrium, as some argue that Syrian Kurdish autonomy could strengthen the hand of hardline PKK elements in Turkey, which might atempt to operate outside Syria even if the peace in Turkey holds.80 On the 26 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions other hand, hardline Kurdish nationalists and PKK ighters are leaving Turkey to help secure autonomy in Syria, drawing potential violent actors away from confrontation with Turkey. Likewise, ighters for both the PYD and the PKK view the confrontation with ISIS as a more pressing ight. hey may increasingly see Turkey as a potential partner in that struggle, and vice versa. Meanwhile, the Assad regime has no reason to want a peaceful outcome to the PKK negotiations with Turkey, given Turkey’s support for the Arab rebels, and would likely seize any opportunity to derail the negotiations in order to cause a problem for Ankara. But the Syrian state is a shadow of its former self and has efectively ceded control of most of the northeast to the Kurds to focus on ighting the majority-Sunni Arab rebels elsewhere, meaning its leverage is limited. Barring a major turn in the momentum of the Syrian civil war in favor of the Assad regime or a major provocation by Turkey toward the PYD, it is hard to see a scenario in which President Assad has the ability to undermine the negotiations on his own. While the PYD has had success consolidating military control over regions in northern Syria and has declared autonomy,81 major challenges remain, including the continuing presence of the Syrian central government, serious disagreements between the PYD and Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, the exclusion of Syrian Kurds from the Geneva negotiations to achieve a political setlement, and basic questions about the form of political economy that will be established in the newly autonomous areas. he rise of ISIS has led to some rapprochement between the PYD and Barzani-ailiated groups in Syria and across the border in Iraq—for example, through the easing of the KRG’s “blockade” of certain border crossings to PYD-controlled areas.82 he PYD must still institute a more inclusive and accountable form of government and share power with all elements of society in the majority-Kurdish areas, including other ethnic groups, in order to gain access to sources of international support—but that is diicult to execute or to verify under the current circumstances. he United States should clearly convey the requirements for cooperation to the PYD, such as some form of political powersharing with other Kurdish political entities, including those with ties to the KDP. A political understanding among Syrian Kurds is still possible; there is room today for the PYD and the PKK to move past their Cold War revolutionary traditions and broaden their appeal to an expanded range of Kurdish actors. he threat of ISIS, now viewed as more immediate and serious than the ight against Turkish or Syrian state oppression, may precipitate such a political opening. Indeed, ideology only serves to marginalize both organizations today, undermining their ability to consolidate democratic autonomy and contribute to regional stability. 27 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Indeed, in his writings from prison, Öcalan has acknowledged that the PKK’s “theory, programme and praxis of the 1970s produced nothing but futile separatism and violence.”83 For Syrian Kurds, a political understanding could strengthen their position and unity, reassuring Turkey of their ideological openness, thereby removing a major outside opponent and paving the way for potential cooperation with the United States and other Western powers. Given the absence of any good options or morally unimpeachable actors in the Syrian conlict, a political conversation between PYD leaders and American oicials would be practical—Turkish oicials have already undertaken such meetings, despite their hostility toward the PYD. A recent analysis by former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford emphasized that the PYD will emerge “somewhat victorious” from the ongoing conlict.84 he United States and Turkey did litle to address Kurdish concerns as part of the early eforts to organize the overall Syrian opposition, meaning that both powers now face a long-term process to convince the PYD that its strategy of tactical alliances in pursuit of Kurdish autonomy should be subordinated to wider regional eforts at stability. Still, a political dialogue would begin this process, improve understanding of the situation on the ground, build personal relationships with Kurdish leaders, and help enhance political options in the region in the long term. Indeed, it is in the interest of the U.S. and European governments. Finally, the PYD’s consolidation of power in northern Syria raises the long-term stakes of the Turkish-PKK peace process, as any breakdown in negotiations and return to military conlict would see Turkey confronting a hardened and well-entrenched military force across the border in Syria that is able to aid PKK operations in Turkey. 28 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions A Kurdish Peshmerga ighter stands guard as new equipment arrives at Kalak reinery on the outskirts of Erbil, Iraq, as Kurdish authorities are trying to help ease the fuel shortage. Islamic militants have laid siege to Iraq’s largest oil reinery in the city of Baiji. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO) Iraq As the PKK negotiations continue in Turkey and as the PYD consolidates its autonomy in Syria, the Iraqi KRG remains the best-established Kurdish political entity. he KRG’s position has only been enhanced in the short term by the collapse of Baghdad’s authority in the north following ISIS’s advance and the fall of Mosul. he fall of Mosul placed Kurdish stability and the efectiveness of the Peshmerga in stark relief and allowed the KRG to take control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and its pipelines—a long-standing Kurdish goal—without provoking a direct clash with Baghdad. he KRG’s position was further boosted by the recent receipt of a $100 million payment for oil it piped through Turkey to international markets—a key step in the KRG’s quest for energy and economic independence.85 Because of its strong position, the KRG plays a crucial role in engaging Kurds across the Middle East and, for many Kurdish nationalists, raises immediate hopes for a Kurdish state. Massoud Barzani, president of the KRG and leader of the KDP, has worked diligently to solidify his political control over northern Iraq and to cultivate an image as the father of the broader Kurdish people. But while President Barzani is an important elected igure and is working hard to position himself as a representative of the Kurdish people as a whole, he does not represent the entire Kurdish community. Indeed, his cultivation of close ties with Prime Minister Erdoğan has cemented a split with the Syrian PYD, which has its roots in political disagreements 29 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions between the KDP and the PYD; rivalry for leadership of the pan-Kurdish political movement; and personal disputes between President Barzani, Öcalan, and Muslim Muhammad. Nonetheless, President Barzani’s personal ambitions and nationalist aspirations will be important in shaping the future of the Kurdish regions. President Barzani has reasons to be self-conident; northern Iraq represents an exceptional success given the troubled history of the country over the past two decades, though human rights challenges remain.86 he U.S.-led no-ly zone to protect Kurdish civilians in the wake of the irst Gulf War resulted in the return of many refugees and gave a degree of de facto autonomy to the region.87 In part since the 1991 Gulf War, but particularly since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan has been largely autonomous. Parliamentary democracy has produced two successive presidential elections, economic development, and some of Iraq’s lowest poverty rates. Economically, the KRG is easily the most impressive Kurdish case, exporting nearly 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day by the end of 201388 and receiving about 15 percent of the central Iraqi budget—though these payments are in arrears given the collapse of central government authority, disputes over Kurdish eforts to export oil independently, and the inability to form a consensus government in Baghdad.89 At the same time, the KRG relies heavily on the energy sector as a whole and its share of the central Iraqi oil revenues in particular.90 While this reliance has begun to change with the takeover of Kirkuk and the irst payment for independent oil shipments through Turkey, the legal basis for these sales is still unclear. he Supreme Court of Iraq has delayed its ruling—meaning the KRG’s ability to atract international loans to inance its budget is still in lux.91 his reliance on Baghdad—with which the Kurds have a deeply troubled relationship—has led President Barzani to cultivate deeper trade and energy ties with Turkey over the past two years. Indeed, the proceeds from the irst independent sale of Kurdish oil were deposited with Halkbank, Turkey’s state-owned lender.92 hese energy politics underpin the confrontation with Baghdad, inevitably pulling the United States into the conlict. he United States’ oicial position has been that all Iraqi oil must be exported through the State Oil Marketing Organization of Iraq, while the KRG believes it should be able to market its oil independently.93 A multibillion-dollar pipeline deal, solidiied in 2012 and designed to help meet Turkish demand by pumping oil directly from the KRG, has heightened the tensions. he pipelines, when inished, could export up to 1 million barrels of oil per day to Turkey, with much of it bypassing the central Iraqi oil network.94 30 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions he United States, concerned that these deals could tear the country apart, has continued to assert that the deals require Baghdad’s approval. Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki has repeatedly condemned the move and has threatened to sue Ankara for dealing directly with the KRG, as well as resorting to tactics such as closing Iraqi airspace to Turkey’s energy minister in an atempt to block negotiations with the KRG.95 Most recently, Baghdad stopped cargo lights to Erbil and Sulaimaniya in retaliation for independent oil exports and Kurdish ministers’ decision to boycot cabinet meetings in protest of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s accusations that the Kurds were aiding ISIS.96 he fall of Mosul and ISIS’s remarkable gains in northern Iraq have changed the overall strategic picture, dramatically strengthening the KRG’s hand and weakening Prime Minister al-Maliki. he need for Kurdish support in countering ISIS, forming a new Iraqi government, and holding the country together may mean that concessions to the Kurds on oil revenues and control of Kirkuk are necessary. President Barzani certainly believes so, declaring that Mosul’s fall has made a “new reality and a new Iraq,” a sign that the KRG may not relinquish control of Kirkuk to the central government if security in the north is restored.97 U.S. policy has only begun to react to this new reality, and there are signs that Washington may be acknowledging that its principled stance on revenue sharing may have been overtaken by events on the ground. Signs of a potential sotening of U.S. policy toward the KRG were visible in Secretary of State Kerry’s visit to Erbil in June98 and Vice President Biden’s meeting with KRG oicials at the White House in July.99 But despite Washington’s reservations and Baghdad’s protests, dynamics on the ground have continued largely unabated. Iraq was Turkey’s second-largest export market in 2012, accounting for $11 billion in trade, up from $8.3 billion in 2011, and Turkey was a primary source for crucial items such as machinery, cereals, produce, and inished metal products. Iraq, meanwhile, accounted for $3.1 billion in imports to Turkey in 2012, up from $2.5 billion in 2011.100 While trade to the KRG is not broken out from the overall Iraqi statistics, the geography means that the Kurdish regions are central to this bilateral trade. hese growing economic ties have brought closer political cooperation; President Barzani has efectively allied himself with Prime Minister Erdoğan. his new relationship was on display at a public rally in Diyarbakır in November 2013, at which the two men appeared on stage together and President Barzani ofered his full support to the TurkishKurdish peace process—an unthinkable sight just a few years ago.101 he rise of ISIS—and its targeting of Turkish diplomats and truck drivers102—may only cement this alliance, once again demonstrating to Ankara the beneits of having a reliable security partner in the KRG. 31 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions he KRG’s closer ties with Turkey have revealed fault lines in the regional Kurdish bloc, though the growing ISIS threat may prompt a rapprochement between the Kurdish parties. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s hostility toward the PYD in Syria and the PKK in Turkey—along with President Barzani’s political ambitions—have contributed to the confrontation between the KDP and the PYD. KRG authorities have periodically closed the border crossings between northern Iraq and Syria and have even begun construction of a trench to block the low of smugglers, militants, and—unfortunately—aid supplies.103 President Barzani also has mixed feelings about the emergence of the Syrian Kurds as an inluential political bloc, as it represents a positive development for the Kurds at the regional level but a threat to his personal leadership ambitions if it continues to be dominated by the PYD. President Barzani’s political coalition also espouses a more conservative, traditional political doctrine that is at odds with the radical letist ideology of the PKK and the PYD. hat said, the rise of ISIS—both the security threat it represents and the nationalist opportunity it has created— may lead to greater cooperation between the KRG and the PYD. Indeed, there are already indications that the Peshmerga and the YPG are seeking greater coordination to combat ISIS along the Syrian-Iraqi border.104 he personal relationship between President Barzani and PYD leader Muslim Muhammad has been tense, mirroring the regional maneuvering. President Barzani condemned the PYD in late 2013 for unilaterally declaring its autonomy and ignoring other Kurdish parties,105 and Muslim Muhammad was denied access to Iraqi Kurdistan as relations worsened.106 his rit between two prominent Kurdish leaders has escalated into a confrontation verging on a proxy war that has not been setled today, despite the shared ISIS threat. Many Kurdish nationalists lament the split as it undermines the potential to politically unify the Kurds by piting a “Baghdad-Damascus-PKK axis” against a “KRG-Ankara-Washington axis.”107 But this simplistic division—and the assumption behind it that the divide is maintained by outside powers—ignores the legitimate divides among the various Kurdish political actors. In particular, President Barzani’s hopes have been dampened by the PYD’s victories in Syria against forces ailiated with his own KDP, and he is mobilizing his political capital to try and recapture control of Kurdish nationalist forces in the region. It remains to be seen if the ISIS threat is suicient to cause Kurdish leaders to set aside political diferences and personal rivalries. 32 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Iran Iran’s main concern regarding the Kurdish issue is preventing PKK ighters from atempting to join forces with its Iranian sister organization the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, or PJAK. Tehran would also ideally want Iraqi Kurds to more actively join the ight against ISIS and agree to a political setlement that maintains Shia control in Baghdad, but Iranian oicials likely realize the improbability of this goal. In its current form, the PJAK does not present a threat to the Iranian state—it concluded a ceaseire with Tehran in 2011 and largely withdrew to the Qandil Mountains in Iraq108—but the group could become more dangerous with PKK reinforcements.109 Kurds in Iran have many of the same complaints as Kurds in Turkey and, indeed, as Iran’s other minorities: structural unemployment, discrimination in procuring government jobs, inadequate educational institutions, underdevelopment, and a lack of cultural representation in the media.110 In Syria, Iranian Kurdish ighters have joined the ight to secure an autonomous Kurdish-controlled region along the Turkish border. he PJAK—considered to be the Iranian branch of the PKK—reported that it would be sending ighters to its counterparts in northern Syria.111 But it is diicult to discern how concern about potential reinforcements for the PJAK will shape Iranian policy. Iran has supported the PKK in the past, using the organization as leverage against Turkey in much the same way that Syria has used the group.112 Iran may calculate that the peaceful resolution of the PKK conlict in Turkey could lead to the reinforcement of the PJAK and try to sabotage the peace process. Indeed, the acting military leader of the PKK, Murat Karayılan, has claimed that Iran ofered the organization material support, including heavy weaponry, if it derailed the peace process; the PKK rejected the ofer, according to Karayılan.113 Alternatively, Iran may see the prospect for closer cooperation with Turkey against violent Kurdish actors who threaten both governments as a worthy goal, as it has in the past when violence has lared up.114 While Iran and Turkey nominally share an interest in combating both Kurdish nationalist ambitions and the rise of ISIS, the countries’ regional rivalry means any real cooperation is very unlikely, unless the threat dramatically increases. Remarkably, Turkey and Iran have thus far managed to compartmentalize relations on a range of issues; the two countries are able to cooperate on individual tracks with litle regard for other issues on which they ind themselves in opposition. For example, they ind themselves on opposite sides of a biter proxy war in Syria, while simultaneously seeking to improve bilateral trade ties. his careful sectioning of interests has led to strange outcomes. Prime Minister Erdoğan, for instance, sat down in Tehran with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali 33 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani to negotiate bilateral trade and energy deals115 while Turkish-backed rebels clashed with Iranian-backed Hezbollah ighters in Syria.116 But the two countries rely on each other economically; Iran was Turkey’s third-largest export market in 2012, accounting for $10 billion in trade,117 while 39 percent of Turkey’s total crude oil imports—most of its supply—came from Iran.118 It is likely that the governments have decided to compartmentalize their shared Kurdish challenges in the context of wider strategic maneuvers and the realities of their extensive trade and energy ties. Iran has displayed how carefully it considers the burgeoning situation with the Kurds in the Middle East. It has countless safe houses throughout the KRG through which it both gathers information on the ground and establishes its stake in northern Iraq.119 Iran is also one of the most ruthless repressors of its own Kurdish population, regularly authorizing public executions and loggings that have continued under President Rouhani.120 With the political spotlight focused on the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the international community— largely relegating other facets of internal Iranian politics to secondary importance—it is unlikely there will be much movement on Iranian Kurdish issues in the near future. he negotiations only strengthen the current Iranian government, thus giving it more authority and public backing of its current policies. 34 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Regional Kurdish dynamics and Washington’s role In assessing the political implications of recent regional power shits, it is important to recognize the historical context. he Kurds constitute the largest ethnic group in the world without a nation-state in which they are the majority, though national borders, diferent sublanguages, tribes, politics, history, and sectarian orientation divide them. Because they are split between four countries and have diferent relations with each of those central governments, they present a fundamentally intermestic policy problem. While the Kurdish question remains centered in Turkey, where half of all Kurds live, the issues discussed in this report are deeply intertwined—what happens in one country will directly afect the internal politics of neighboring central governments and Kurdish political groups. he cross-border nature of Kurdish political organization forces central governments to address the issue through foreign policy, while they wish to relegate the Kurds to domestic status. he conlict in Syria and the legacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq have today placed the question of Kurdish autonomy in its varied forms at the center of each of these countries’ foreign and domestic policies. Despite internal divisions, Kurdish political actors are making strides in their quest for greater selfdetermination and cannot be ignored. he West has been understandably hesitant to engage with subnational groups for fear of upseting central governments. But for Washington, refusing to grapple with this conundrum for reasons of national sovereignty is becoming increasingly untenable. Certainly, there are serious concerns to be addressed, and the United States and Europeans should require Kurdish political leaders to do so. As mentioned earlier, the PYD has demonstrated authoritarian practices in Syria, and the PKK has not fully renounced violence and remains an oicial terrorist organization under U.S. and European law.121 Still, the United States and its allies will not get to choose perfect partners in a time of massive transformation and partial disintegration and must at least talk to those with the ability to inluence outcomes on the ground. Furthermore, the success or failure of the Turkish-PKK peace process will afect regional dynamics—particularly in neighboring Syria and Iraq—for years to come. 35 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Despite Kurdish frustration with many aspects of U.S. policy toward the region, Washington has not been explicitly positive or negative—nor even particularly consistent—toward the Kurds. he best example might be the United States’ relationship with the KRG; the American-led no-ly zone and subsequent invasion of Iraq essentially created the autonomous zone, but the relationship has grown tense due to independent KRG energy projects, which Washington fears will tear Iraq apart. In Turkey, Washington has pressed the government to resolve the conlict with the PKK in a peaceful fashion while simultaneously labeling the PKK a terrorist organization and sharing intelligence to direct Turkish air strikes, though strikes have been discontinued since the most recent ceaseire. Secretary of State Kerry’s visit and Vice President Biden’s call with President Barzani and meeting with representatives of the KRG during their White House visit demonstrate the growing realization that this distance is untenable. In Syria, the United States has distanced itself from the PYD, denying PYD leader Muslim Muhammad a visa while the PYD is engaged in ighting the most nihilistic and violent extremists in the conlict. Indeed, the PYD’s ight with ISIS and ailiated groups has drawn Kurdish ighters from across the border in Turkey. Ironically, this American policy is rooted in deference to the demands of the Turkish government, upon which the United States relies for security cooperation, including counterterrorism assistance in the face of a growing threat from extremists circulating back out of Syria. In other words, the United States has refused to talk to an armed group that is ighting Al Qaeda-linked extremists in order to preserve a counterterrorism relationship with Turkey to combat Al Qaeda-linked extremists. he United States’ reluctance to talk to the group is also likely rooted in the PYD’s close ties to the PKK and its ambivalent relationship with Damascus. But the PYD is trying to ensure its survival and has calculated that it must preserve some semblance of a relationship with the Assad regime, or at least not provoke the regime’s air force, as President Assad does not seem to be going away anytime soon. Indeed, even the Turkish government held discussions with Muslim Muhammad in Ankara in 2013 in an atempt to address concerns along the border, despite Turkey’s deep hostility toward the group and its objectives. Refusing to invite the PYD—one of the most powerful actors on the ground—to the Geneva talks, for example, when the Assad regime itself was represented, seems counterproductive. he United States’ ambivalent, nuanced, or confused policy—depending on your perspective—toward Kurdish political groups now provides an opportunity. As outlined in this report, Kurdish political actors can afect the trajectory of crucial regional trends, and the United States has much to ofer the Kurds in exchange for cooperation toward stability. 36 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Recommendations The peace process Turkish stakeholders in the peace process will ultimately determine whether the ceaseire grows into a long-term success, leading to a new era in Turkish-Kurdish relations. While a number of challenges and uncertainties lie ahead, there are reasons to be hopeful. Despite the conventional wisdom that the United States is hamstrung by Turkish anti-Americanism and thus has no constructive role to play in the peace process, there are helpful things the U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, could do over the coming months. Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. government and policy NGOs could help facilitate the sharing of expertise from those involved in other peace processes with AKP oicials overseeing the Turkish-PKK peace process. Experts involved in the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, could be particularly helpful, given the many similarities that exist between that conlict and the one in Turkey, including the strength of the rebels, the decades of failure in trying to reach an agreement, the disagreements over disarmament, the complicating factor of narcotics inancing on the PKK and FARC sides, and the desire of local populations for dialogue and resolution. Indeed, a dialogue with the PKK-dominated Kurdish nationalist movement at large might help encourage the transition from an armed movement to a political organization—a strategy that the conservative government of President Juan Manuel Santos is successfully using in Colombia to overcome its own decades-long guerilla war. While remaining outside the oicial negotiations, the U.S. government could funnel these expertise-sharing eforts through existing international visitor programs at the U.S. State Department that regularly bring together policy and security professionals to share best practices. U.S. policy NGOs with strong ties to Turkey and the U.S. State Department could be helpful intermediaries in identifying participants— which should include Turkish organizations with ties to the AKP—and U.S. legal and policy experts who have been involved in long-term reconciliation eforts in former Yugoslavia, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, among other places. 37 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Kurdish regional President Massoud Barzani, right, speaks during a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the presidential palace in Erbil, Iraq. Kerry arrived in Iraq’s Kurdish region in a U.S. diplomatic drive aimed at preventing the country from splitting apart in the face of militants pushing towards Baghdad. (PHOTO: AP PHOTO/BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI) he United States should also consider increased engagement with CHP oicials who are interested in being constructive in the peace process and privately encourage the AKP to open more lines of communication to receive CHP input. Such an engagement is a key aspect to generate broader support in Turkish society. First steps could consist of an ongoing dialogue with the social-democratic current and younger politicians within the CHP to encourage them to take a more active role when it comes to the peace process. While high-level CHP leaders have expressed a willingness to be helpful in the process and exasperation at being largely shut out, it is also important to remind the older, Kemalist elements of the party that nonengagement with what is arguably Turkey’s foremost longterm problem will doom the party to political irrelevance. Finally, the United States should consider developing stronger informal ties with the BDP in Turkey. While the BDP has perhaps lost some of its wider appeal in Turkey with its tactical decision to back the AKP during the corruption crisis, it is still the most inluential Kurdish political voice in the country and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Stronger ties could increase U.S. legitimacy among the Kurds, and more meetings with the BDP’s Washington representative would be a good way to start building this relationship. 38 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Wider Kurdish relations Regarding the future of the Kurds more broadly, the United States should continue to be clear about its concerns over backsliding on the human rights and democracy fronts in Turkey. President Barack Obama—to whom Prime Minister Erdoğan still listens—and Secretary of State Kerry should be more vocal. While it likely would be counterproductive for the United States to weigh in on the Kurdish issue speciically, more frequent and vigorous public calls for enhanced multiethnic tolerance and inclusion in Turkey from the highest levels would be an encouraging message for Kurdish civil society organizations, Turkish political parties, and populations throughout the region. In addition, the two U.S. State Department bureaus that cover the Kurdish regions—the Bureau of European and Eurasian Afairs, which covers Turkey, and the Bureau of Near Eastern Afairs, which covers Syria, Iraq, and Iran— should ensure that U.S. policy is properly coordinated and balanced between the understandable U.S. interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and other long-term strategic concerns. In his 1999 speech before the Turkish Parliament, then-President Bill Clinton outlined these core U.S. interests, noting that the “avenues are opening for Kurdish citizens of Turkey to reclaim that most basic of birth rights: a normal life.”122 A decade and a half later, the United States has decisions to make about two armed Kurdish groups—the PKK in Turkey and the PYD in Syria. he former is a longerterm dilemma, while the later requires immediate action. he United States has designated the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTO, since 1997 and has refused to grant support to the PYD in the Syrian conlict. However, the United States must consider whether, in refusing to interact with relevant forces in the region, it is undermining its long-term ability to shape outcomes. It might be time to acknowledge that the PKK, once a malicious terrorist organization guilty of targeting civilians and any challenger to Öcalan, has morphed into a militant political group during its leader’s decade-long incarceration and, if it engages fully in the peace process, could earn the removal of the terrorist designation.123 his would not happen immediately; a U.S. redesignation of the PKK is not likely or prudent at this time. It is still too early in the peace process for such a step—no disarmament and reintegration plan has been agreed to, too litle is known about the organization’s long-term goals and exact leadership structure, drug traicking and arms trading by PKK actors continues, and the Turkish government would 39 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions react very poorly. But there could be potential beneits if and when the PKK is eventually delisted—the oicial terrorism designation is a powerful bargaining chip, which could enable the United States to inluence the PKK’s behavior. he United States could achieve this leverage by seting out clear conditions for liting FTO status for the PKK. his would have to be done in coordination with Ankara. Although Turkey would almost certainly object, simply broaching the subject would send an important message to the Turkish government—that progress is needed on the peace process. But unlike terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or ISIS, the PKK has demonstrated with its recent moves that it could eventually evolve from a terrorist organization to a legitimate political actor. Indeed, it seems Öcalan is trying to oversee such a transition, and Turkey and the United States can incentivize and speed that process. he United States should more quickly shit its policy toward the PYD. he group was excluded from the Geneva negotiations to resolve the Syrian conlict due in part to U.S. objections. he United States also supported the Syrian Opposition Council and other rebel groups in their decision not to make guarantees that would grant special status to the Kurds, arguing that Kurdish concerns will be addressed ater President Assad is removed. Finally, U.S. oicials, including former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Ford, have raised objections to dealing with the PYD due to a potentially hostile Turkish reaction to such outreach.124 But neither the United States nor Turkey has ever oicially listed the PYD as a terrorist organization, meaning that there are no legal restrictions on communication. From a U.S. perspective, it is an armed Kurdish organization struggling to protect itself within the context of the brutal Syrian civil war. Its radical revolutionary past and links to the PKK should not prevent careful engagement if such cooperation could contribute to regional stability or the achievement of a political setlement in Syria, both key American interests. he PYD will be an important component of a future, post-crisis Syria and can positively or negatively afect the long-term viability of the Turkey-PKK peace process. he PYD—and, for that mater, the Kurdish National Council—has made it clear that without guarantees of autonomy and protection in a post-Assad Syria, it sees no reason to throw its lot in with the rest of the Syrian opposition. Given the history of violent repression directed against the Kurds in Syria and the wider region, such a position is not unreasonable. It seems clear that there can be no lasting political setlement in Syria without political concessions to the Kurds—likely some form of federalism. Since the PYD has never been oicially listed as a PKK ailiate, the United States is free to talk with the group.125 40 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Strategizing now about how to manage relations with the PYD—in a transparent way that does not surprise Turkey—would be prudent. If the highest U.S. policy priority is achieving a political transition in Syria and ending the bloodshed, incorporating the Kurds more fully into the anti-Assad coalition—with the concessions that will require—seems necessary. In addition, establishing regular communication with the Syrian PYD could allow the United States to more efectively inluence the organization. he PYD’s batleield victories and aggressive targeting of Al Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, and ISIS have conferred on it a degree of legitimacy on the ground. It has also gained political clout by serving as a de facto governing body in the wake of the collapse of the Syrian state.126 he Kurdish armed groups will be essential to any policy that both supports local populations’ right to self-determination and condemns the radical jihadi movement; engaging with these groups would allow the United States to clarify its position on the Middle East and tackle these two essential problems. he United States can do litle to shape the PYD leadership’s behavior if it does not have ties with the group. he United States should revisit Muslim Muhammad’s visa requests and atempt to extract political concessions from the PYD in exchange for informal relations. he international community also has things to ofer the Kurds. Syrian Kurdish groups lack the Gulf sponsors that back many factions within the Islamic Front and the opposition Supreme Military Council, and the Kurds are an efective and relatively cohesive force on the ground in Syria who could cooperate in a helpful way. As the International Crisis Group has argued, the PYD will need to take several steps in order to begin such cooperation, including decreasing its reliance on military force; severing its ties with the Assad regime; reaching out to Kurdish and non-Kurdish opponents, including a range of anti-Assad rebels; broadening access to basic services and resources; and reaching out to the international community in order to establish legitimacy over the long term.127 his process must include talks with Turkey to secure its acquiescence. All of these goals would be more easily achieved with U.S. cooperation and might prove impossible in the face of U.S. opposition. At the same time, the U.S. government should pursue its own interests more independently of possible Turkish concerns. If Prime Minister Erdoğan’s advisors can negotiate with jailed PKK leader Öcalan, the United States should be able to engage with the PYD for such practical purposes as enabling aid low to the Syrian Kurdish areas. Indeed, ensuring a modicum of stability in Kurdish-controlled parts of Syria should be in Turkey’s interest, avoiding more refugees and the potential radicalization of another generation of Kurdish ighters. Given the trajectory of 41 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions rapidly improving Turkish-KRG relations and the pragmatic cooperation between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Barzani, similar developments vis-à-vis northern Syria might be in the cards—and some movement in the direction of a rapprochement is already visible. his trend could help ameliorate the negative efects on U.S.-Turkish relations if the United States establishes an informal relationship with the PYD. It is also in the U.S. interest to promote dialogue between the KDP in Iraq and the PYD. he Syrian conlict ofers an opportunity to begin a conversation with the broader Kurdish nationalist movement in ways that can help encourage the PKK’s and the PYD’s transition from armed movements to political entities. here are more tangible beneits as well. he United States is already sending aid via the Iraqi Kurdish-controlled Semalka border crossing into Syria, and direct talks with the PYD and coordination between the PYD and the KDP would help facilitate these transfers. Such technical, humanitarian cooperation could pave the way for further PYD and KDP engagement. he United States must continue to remind Iraqi Kurdish leaders that ISIS is as much a long-term threat to Iraqi Kurdistan as it is to the PYD and Syrian Kurds—or, indeed, Baghdad. Considering Washington’s relationship with Ankara, particularly its absolute reliance on Turkish cooperation to deal with the low of ighters back out of Syria and Iraq to Europe and the West, the United States may not be able to immediately recast its policy toward the Kurds. Ironically, the Turkish government has shown signs of new openness toward Kurdish nationalist actors—demonstrating the efect of ISIS in changing the security calculus for Ankara. However, one of the obstacles to recasting Turkish policy is the perception of U.S. hostility toward greater Kurdish autonomy. But for the United States, ignoring the problem will not make it go away. It is time for proactive engagement to positively afect the trajectory of the Turkey-PKK peace process, the civil war in Syria, the security situation in Iraq, and the burgeoning Kurdish nationalist movement. 42 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions About the authors Michael Werz is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Max Hoffman is a Policy Analyst at the Center. Acknowledgements We would like to thank a number of esteemed experts for their comments on this report, including: • Alan Makovsky, former senior professional staf member, House Commitee on Foreign Afairs • Nuray Mert, political scientist and journalist for Hürriyet Daily News • Amberin Zaman, Istanbul correspondent for he Economist • Spencer Boyer, former deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian afairs at the U.S. Department of State • Hugh Pope, deputy program director for the International Crisis Group in Istanbul • Günther Seufert, senior researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Afairs in Berlin • Omar Hossino, independent researcher on Syrian Kurds Acknowledgements he Center for American Progress thanks the Heinrich Böll Stitung for its support of our national security programs and of this report. he views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the Center for American Progress and the authors and do not necessarily relect the position of Heinrich Böll Stitung. he Center for American Progress produces independent research and policy ideas driven by solutions that we believe will create a more equitable and just world. 43 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions Endnotes 1 The Economist, “Terror’s new headquarters,” June 14, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21604160-iraqs-second-city-has-fallen-groupwants-create-state-which-wage-jihad. 2 Jay Solomon, “John Kerry Urges Kurdish Leaders to Support Baghdad Against ISIS,” The Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/ john-kerry-to-meet-kurdish-leaders-1403590845. See also Oice of the Vice President, “Readout of Vice President Biden’s Drop-By with Visiting Delegation from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government,” Press release, July 3, 2014, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-oice/2014/07/03/readout-vice-presidentbidens-drop-visiting-delegation-iraq-s-kurdistan-. 3 Tim Arango, Suadad Al-Salhy, and Rick Gladstone, “Kurdish Fighters Take a Key Oil City as Militants Advance on Baghdad,” The New York Times, June 12, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/ world/middleeast/iraq.html. 4 Ben Hubbard, “Kurdish Struggle Blurs Syria’s Battle Lines,” The New York Times, August 1, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/syria.html?pagewanted=all. 5 There is extensive academic literature that details the fading of many disparate rural dialects and increasing dominance of Kurmanji, along with the efect of increased communications on mutual intelligibility. See, for example, Ergin Opengin, “Sociolinguistic Situation of Kurdish in Turkey: Sociopolitical Factors and Language Use Patterns,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 217 (2012): 151–180; David Romano, “Modern Communications Technology in Ethnic Nationalist Hands: The Case of the Kurds,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35 (1) (2002): 127–149; Nevzat Soguk, “Transversal Communication, Diaspora, and the Euro-Kurds,” Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 173–192; Kira Kosnick, “Exit and Voice Revisited: The Challenge of Migrant Media.” Working Paper 9 (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, 2008), p. 10; Mehmet Serif Derince, “A Break or Continuity? Turkey’s Politics of Kurdish Language in the New Millennium,” Dialectical Anthropology 37 (1) (2013): 145–152. 6 Henri Barkey, “Preventing Conlict over Kurdistan” (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), available at http://www.aina.org/reports/ pcok.pdf. 7 François Georgeon, “Changes of time: An aspect of Ottoman modernization,” New Perspectives on Turkey 44 (2011), available at http://www.newperspectivesonturkey.net/Journal/Lecture/8. 8 Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, “A Roadmap for a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Policy Proposals from the Region for the Government” (2008). 9 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” available at http://global. tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf (last accessed July 2014). 44 10 See, for example, Omer Taspinar, “Despite Warm Oicial Relations, Turks Remain Anti-American,” Brookings Institution, June 13, 2012, available at http://www. brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/13-turkeyamerica-taspinar. See also Eurasianet.org, “Troubled Turkey Looks to Conspiracy Theories for Answers,” February 20, 2014, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/68067; Oray Egin, “‘Homeland’ Is Sending Signals for the CIA, Say Conspiracy Theorists in Turkey,” The New Republic, January 14, 2014, available at http://www. newrepublic.com/article/116216/turkey-corruptionscandal-and-homeland-american-conspiracy. 11 Ümit Cizre, “The Emergence of the ‘Government’s Perspective on the Kurdish Issue,” Insight Turkey 11 (4) (2009): 1–2, available at http://iles.setav.org/uploads/ pdf/insight_turkey_2009_4_umit_cizre.pdf. 12 Today’s Zaman, “Turkish parliament approves military operations in N. Iraq,” October 5, 2013, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-258967-turkishparliament-approves-military-operations-in-niraq.html. 13 See, for example, J. Michael Kennedy, “Kurds Remain on the Sideline of Syria’s Uprising,” The New York Times, April 17, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes. com/2012/04/18/world/middleeast/kurds-remain-onsideline-in-syrias-uprising.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 14 See, for example, Michael M. Gunter and Andrew Rathmell, “Turkey: Kurdish Struggle, 1984–2000s,” Sharpe-Online Reference, available at http://www. sharpe-online.com/SOLR/a/showpersonalisedcontent/23/Book022-PART1-article196 (last accessed July 2014). See also Kennedy, “Kurds Remain on the Sideline of Syria’s Uprising.” 15 Ibid. 16 Michael M. Gunter, “The Syrian Kurds: out of nowhere to where?”, Turkish Review, January 2, 2014, available at http://www.turkishreview.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223532. 17 EurActiv, “Turkey commutes Öcalan’s death sentence to life imprisonment,” October 3, 2002, available at http:// www.euractiv.com/enlargement/turkey-commutes-ocalan-death-sentence-life-imprisonment/article-111070. Most recently, the European Court of Human Rights, or ECHR, reviewed Öcalan’s case in light of appeals by his lawyers and determined that, in order to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey would have to review the prospect of his release after 25 years of imprisonment, which will have elapsed in 2024. See Sedat Ergın, “Öcalan’s sentence needs to be reviewed in 2024,” Hürriyet Daily News, March 21, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ocalans-sentenceneeds-to-be-reviewed-in-2024.aspx?pageID=449&nID= 63872&NewsCatID=428. 18 Uppsala University, “Turkey,” available at http:// www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry. php?id=158&regionSelect=10-Middle_East# (last accessed July 2014). Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions 19 See, for example, Ömer Taşpinar and Gönül Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity” (Washington: Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, 2014), p. 1, available at http:// www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/iles/papers/2014/01/23%20turkey%20kurds%20predicament%20opportunity%20taspinar%20tol/turkey%20 and%20the%20kurds_predicament%20to%20opportunity.pdf. See also Miron Varouhakis, “Fiasco in Nairobi: Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999,” Studies in Intelligence 53 (1) (2009): 1–7, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/ csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/pdfs/U-%20VarouhakisThe%20Case%20of%20Ocalan.pdf. 20 International Crisis Group, “Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement” (2011), available at http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/ turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement. 21 Nedim Şener, “26 yılın kanlı bilançosu,” Milliyet, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.milliyet.com. tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/gundemdetay/24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm. Title translates as follows: “The bloody balance-sheet of the past 26 years.” 22 Soner Cagaptay and Emrullah Uslu, “Is the PKK Still a Threat to the United States and Turkey?” (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/is-the-pkk-still-a-threat-to-theunited-states-and-turkey. 23 Evren Balta Paker, “AKP’s Approach to the Kurdish Problem: One step forward, one step backward” (Washington: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2012), available at http:// www.academia.edu/2530138/AKP_-_Kurdish_Question. 24 Piotr Zalewski, “Istanbul: Big Trouble in Little Kurdistan,” TIME, January 9, 2012, available at http://content.time. com/time/world/article/0,8599,2104027,00.html. 25 Michael Werz and Sarah Jacobs, “Eternal Minorities? Turkish Politics and the Challenge of Diversity,” Center for American Progress, May 13, 2010, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/ news/2010/05/13/7778/eternal-minorities/. 26 Balta Paker, “AKP’s Approach to the Kurdish Problem.” 31 Soner Cagaptay, “‘Kurdish Opening’ Closed Shut,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2009, available at http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/28/kurdish_opening_closed_shut. 32 Balta Paker, “AKP’s Approach to the Kurdish Problem.” 33 See BBC News, ‘Turkish top court bans pro-Kurdish party,” December 11, 2009, available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8408903.stm. 34 Umut Uras, “Turkey continues peace talks with the PKK,” Al Jazeera, January 10, 2013, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/featur es/2013/01/2013110153318352861.html. 35 International Crisis Group, “Crying ‘Wolf’: Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Kurdish Reform” (2013), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/ turkey-cyprus/turkey/227-crying-wolf-why-turkishfears-need-not-block-kurdish-reform.pdf; Constanze Letsch, “Kurds dare to hope as PKK ighters’ ceaseire with Turkey takes hold,” The Guardian, May 7, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ may/07/kurds-pkk-turkey-peace-talks. 36 Tulin Daloglu, “Talks With Öcalan Ofer Slim Hope for Turkey-PKK Deal,” Al-Monitor, November 2013, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2013/01/kurds-pkk-ocalan.html. 37 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s Kurdish Impasse: The View from Diyarbakir,” November 30, 2013, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publicationtype/media-releases/2012/europe/turkey-s-kurdishimpasse-the-view-from-diyarbakir.aspx. 38 BBC News, “Turkey Kurds: PKK chief Ocalan calls for ceaseire,” March 21, 2013, available at http://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-21874427. 39 The peace process is also referred to as the Imrali Process, named after the island prison where Öcalan is completing a life sentence. See Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds.” 40 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish Parliament adopts Kurdish reform bill,” July 10, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-adopts-kurdishreform-bill.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68973&NewsCat ID=338. 27 See, for example, Opengin, “Sociolinguistic Situation of Kurdish in Turkey”; Romano, “Modern Communications Technology in Ethnic Nationalist Hands”; Soguk, “Transversal Communication, Diaspora, and the Euro-Kurds”; Kosnick, “Exit and Voice Revisited”; Serif Derince, “A Break or Continuity?” 41 Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds,” p. 4. 28 Balta Paker, “AKP’s Approach to the Kurdish Problem.” 43 Hürriyet Daily News, “Kılıçdaroğlu rules out talks with Öcalan,” October 25, 2012, available at http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/kilicdaroglu-rules-out-talkswith-ocalan.aspx?pageID=238&nid=33212. 29 BBC News, “US declares PKK ‘a common enemy’,” November 2, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/7074361.stm. 30 Prime Minister Erdoğan secured the real-time intelligence sharing in a November 2007 visit to Washington, D.C. See, for example, BBC News, “Turkish raids along Iraqi border,” October 24, 2007, available at http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7059721.stm; BBC News, “Turkish MPs back attacks in Iraq,” October 18, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7049348.stm; Reuters, “Rice pushes ‘roadmap’ as Turkish troops enter Iraq,” December 19, 2007, available at http://www. reuters.com/article/2007/12/19/us-iraq-idUSL08647786 20071219?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0. 45 42 This assessment was visible in numerous meetings with government and opposition politicians and academics during the authors’ fact-inding trips to Turkey in January and March 2014. 44 See Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds,” p. 3. These sentiments were also on display in a number of meetings with opposition politicians and academics during the authors’ fact-inding trips to Turkey in January and March of 2014. 45 Emrullah Uslu, “Toward a Historical Peace Between Turks and Kurds?”, The Jamestown Foundation, April 8, 2013, available at http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40705&no_ cache=1#.U9KmKYBdXfY. Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions 46 Nuray Mert, “The idea of ‘empire and peace’,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 8, 2013, available at http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/the-idea-of-empire-and-peace. aspx?pageID=238&nid=44437; Ihsan Dagi, “To build a ‘greater Turkey’ with the Kurds,” Today’s Zaman, April 7, 2013, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnists/ihsan-dagi_311981-to-build-a-greaterturkey-with-the-kurds.html. 47 Hürriyet Daily News, “Kurdish support to AKP in presidential elections should not be taken for granted: BDP,” April 3, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-support-to-akp-in-presidentialelections-should-not-be-taken-for-granted-bdp-.aspx? pageID=238&nID=64521&NewsCatID=338. 48 Hürriyet Daily News, “Erdoğan unveils ‘strong’ presidency vision, promises new Constitution,” July 11, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ erdogan-unveils-strong-presidency-vision-promisesnew-constitution.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69010&News CatID=338. 49 Jonathon Burch and Gülsen Solaker, “Turkey presents reforms aimed at pressing Kurdish peace process,” Reuters, September 30, 2013, available at http://www. reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/us-turkey-reformidUSBRE98T09D20130930. 50 Today’s Zaman, “PKK chief urges ‘meaningful’ peace talks,” October 14, 2013, available at http://www. todayszaman.com/news-329049-pkk-chief-urgesmeaningful-peace-talks.html. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 BBC News, “Kurdish PKK rebels ‘halt Turkey pull-out’,” September 8, 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-24013837. 54 Ibid. 55 Tulin Daloglu, “PKK risks peace process with kidnappings,” Al-Monitor, April 28, 2014, available at http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/turkeypkk-abductions-soldiers-schoolchildren-peace-process. html. 56 Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds,” p. 5. 57 Ibid. 58 See, for example, Today’s Zaman, “Settlement reform bill passes parliamentary commission,” July 4, 2014, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/national_settlement-reform-bill-passes-parliamentarycommission_352157.html. See also Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish Parliament adopts Kurdish reform bill,” July 10, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ turkish-parliament-adopts-kurdish-reform-bill.aspx?pa geID=238&nID=68973&NewsCatID=338. 59 The AKP has sought an ideological workaround to circumvent its limited presence in Kurdish civil society and the national democratic deicit. AKP and the Kurdistan Communities Union, or KCK, leaders have recently—though separately—tried to reframe the peace process as an Islamic national reconciliation project to strengthen the country against foreign conspiracies to weaken Turkey, a persistent misconception among AKP leadership that its with the PKK’s ideological outlook. Earlier this year, for example, Bese Hozat, the executive council president of the KCK, decried “the Israeli lobby, nationalist Armenians and Greek lobbies,” arguing that they were part of a “parallel state” in Turkey—a favorite delusion of the AKP leadership. This convergence of dogmatic anti-imperialism and political Islam is troubling and could undermine the usefulness of the peace process as a means to secure democratic freedoms and freedom of expression for minority groups. See, for example, Al-Monitor, “Öcalan extends hand to Armenians,” February 17, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2014/02/ocalan-armenians-genocide-kurds-acknowledgement-relationship.html. See also Hürriyet Daily News, “Jailed PKK leader pens letter urging support from Armenian community,” January 30, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ jailed-pkk-leader-pens-letter-urging-support-fromarmenian-community.aspx?pageID=238&nID=61766& NewsCatID=338. 60 Hürriyet Daily News, “Overall Local Poll Election Results in Turkey,” April 7, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/election2014/election.html. 61 Justin Vela, “Turkey: Can GAP Project Plug an Economic Hole in Kurdish Southeast?”, Eurasianet.org, July 21, 2011, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/63928. 62 The Economist, “Anchors aweigh,” October 21, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/ node/17276440?story_id=17276440. For a more complete picture, see Temel Taskin, “GDP Growth in Turkey: Inclusive or Not?”, Central Bank Review 14 (2014): 31–64, available at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/research/cbreview/ May14-3.pdf. 63 Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds,” p. 4. 64 Hubbard, “Kurdish Struggle Blurs Syria’s Battle Lines.” 65 Erika Solomon, “Syrian Kurds make fresh military gains after declaring self-rule,” Reuters, November 13, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/11/13/us-syria-crisis-kurds-idUSBRE9AC0JZ20131113. 66 Tom Perry and Seyhmus Cakan, “Kurds go to Syria from Turkey to ight Islamists,” Reuters, July 14, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/ us-syria-crisis-kurds-idUSKBN0FJ2A820140714. 67 Hazal Altes, “Barzani Unites Syrian Kurds Against Assad,” Al-Monitor, July 16, 2014, available at http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/07/barzani-grabsassads-kurdish-car.html. 68 The Kurdish National Council was intended to serve as a uniied leadership structure for Kurdish political groups opposing Assad, but it has largely been sidelined by the PYD, which mistrusts the council’s ties to President Barzani, as it was founded under his sponsorship. The PYD wants to dominate the Syrian Kurdish political movement itself. See Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Kurdish National Council in Syria,” February 15, 2012, available at http://carnegie-mec. org/publications/?fa=48502. 46 Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions 69 Nicholas Blanford, “A murder stirs Kurds in Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0616/p01s03-wome. html. 83 Carl Drott, “The Syrian Experiment with ‘Apoism’,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 20, 2014, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ syriaincrisis/?fa=55650. 70 This sentiment was widely shared in the authors’ fact-inding trips to Turkey. See, for example, Sakar Abdullazada, “Now Kurds are in charge of their fate,” Kurd.net, July 29, 2012, available at http://www.ekurd. net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/syriakurd563.htm. 84 Robert Ford, “Syria’s ‘third force’ Kurds may emerge stronger from conlict,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Security-Watch/Under-the-Radar/2014/0304/ Syria-s-third-force-Kurds-may-emerge-stronger-fromconlict. 71 Turkish Democratic Union Party, “The Democratic Union Party (PYD),” available at http:// www.pydrojava.net/en/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=78:the-democratic-unionparty-pyd&catid=37:about-us&Itemid=28 (last accessed July 2014). 72 Jordi Tejel, “Syria’s Kurds: Troubled Past, Uncertain Future,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/16/syria-s-kurds-troubled-pastuncertain-future/e2nt. 73 U.S. State Department, “Situation in Amuda, Syria,” Press release, July 1, 2013, available at http://www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211430.htm. 74 Amed Dicle, “The Final Stage: Rojava,” Jadaliyya, September 7, 2013, available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/ pages/index/14050/the-inal-stage_rojava. 75 See, for example, Roy Gutman, “Assad hands control of Syria’s Kurdish areas to PKK, sparking outrage in Turkey,” McClatchyDC, July 26, 2012, available at http://www. mcclatchydc.com/2012/07/26/157943/assad-handscontrol-of-syrias.html#storylink=cpy. 76 Solomon, “Syrian Kurds make fresh military gains after declaring self-rule.” 77 Timur Goksel, “Syrian Kurdish leader: Turkey turns blind eye to ISIS,” Al-Monitor, June 23, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/ zaman-salih-muslim-turkey-blind-eye-isis-mosul-syriairaq.html#ixzz375V7qKBO. 78 Solomon, “Syrian Kurds make fresh military gains after declaring self-rule.” See also Hürriyet Daily News, “Syria Kurds oust jihadists from Turkey border area,” November 6, 2013, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/syria-kurds-oust-jihadists-from-turkey-borderarea.aspx?pageID=238&nid=57449. 79 See, for example, Amberin Zaman, “Turkey’s Syria Border on Edge,” Al-Monitor, September 13, 2013, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/ turkey-danger-syria-border-rebels-kurds.html. 80 Taşpinar and Tol, “Turkey and the Kurds,” p. 4. 81 Namo Abdulla, “The rise of Syria’s Kurds,” Al Jazeera, January 23, 2014, available at http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/rise-syriakurds-201412353941189707.html. 82 On the blockade, see for example, Isabel Coles, “Iraqi Kurds entrench political faultline with Syria border ditch,” Reuters, April 17, 2014, available at http:// uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/uk-kurds-iraq-syriaidUKBREA3G1I020140417. Or see Fehim Taştekin, “KRG trench divides Syrian, Iraqi Kurds,” Al-Monitor, April 21, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2014/04/krg-trench-divides-syrian-iraqikurds.html. On the possibility of a rapprochement, see Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Iraqi Kurds seize control of key Syria border crossing,” Al-Monitor, June 19, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/iraq-mosul-isis-pyd-pkk-kurds-barzanikdp-Peshmerga.html. The situation remains very luid. 47 85 Emre Peker, “Iraqi Kurdistan Gets Around $100 Million for First Major Oil Export,” The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/ iraqs-kurdish-region-gets-around-100-million-for-irstmajor-oil-export-1403521403. 86 See, as one example, Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Journalists Under Threat,” October 20, 2010, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/10/28/ iraqi-kurdistan-journalists-under-threat. 87 Peter W. Galbraith, “Refugees from War in Iraq,” Migration Policy Institute 2 (2003): 2–11, available at http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIPolicyBriefIraq.pdf. 88 Energy Information Administration, Iraq: Overview (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013), available at http://www. eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?ips=IZ. 89 Reuters, “Sunnis, Kurds abandon Iraq parliament after no replacement for Maliki named,” July 2, 2014, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/iraqsecurity-idINKBN0F50RK20140701. 90 Humeyra Pamuk, “Iraqi Kurdistan plans second oil export line as output rises,” Reuters, October 31, 2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/31/ uk-iraq-kurdistan-oil-idUKBRE99U0DV20131031. 91 Peker, “Iraqi Kurdistan Gets Around $100 Million for First Major Oil Export.” 92 Ibid. 93 Michael Knights, “Meeting Maliki: A Chance to Reset U.S. Policy on Iraq,” The Washington Institute, October 30, 2013, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/meeting-maliki-a-chance-toreset-u.s.-policy-on-iraq. 94 See, for example, Metin Can, “Gas Reserves, Pipeline to Change Energy Reality for Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, July 4, 2012, available at http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/tr/business/2012/07/new-energy-player. html. See also International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit” (2012), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20 Lebanon/Iraq/120-iraq-and-the-kurds-the-high-stakeshydrocarbons-gambit.pdf. 95 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish Energy Minister Denies Selling Kurdish Oil Without Baghdad’s Consent,“ February 17, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/turkish-energy-minister-denies-selling-kurdishoil-without-baghdads-consent.aspx?pageID=238&nID= 62604&NewsCatID=348. 96 Reuters, “Baghdad halts Kurdish cargo lights after ministers’ boycott,” July 10, 2014, available at http:// www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/us-iraq-securityidUSKBN0FF14V20140710. 97 Solomon, “John Kerry Urges Kurdish Leaders to Support Baghdad Against ISIS.” See also Cengiz Candar, “Does Turkey still support a uniied Iraq?”, Al-Monitor, June 25, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2014/06/candar-kurdistan-independentturkey-barzani-iraq-kerry-krg.html#ixzz36QzCN1aE. Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions 98 Solomon, “John Kerry Urges Kurdish Leaders to Support Baghdad Against ISIS.” 99 Oice of the Vice President, “Readout of Vice President Biden’s Drop-By with Visiting Delegation from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government.” 100 Data for calculations are sourced from European Commission, “European Union, Trade in goods with Turkey” (2013), p. 9, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf. 101 Hürriyet Daily News, “Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani urges support for peace process in Diyarbakır rally with Turkish PM,” November 16, 2013, available at http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-kurdish-leader-barzaniurges-support-for-peace-process-in-diyarbakir-rallywith-turkish-pm.aspx?PageID=238&NID=58028&News CatID=338. 102 Ayla Albayrak, “Jihadists Free Over 30 Turkish Truck Drivers,” The Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/jihadists-free-over30-turkish-truck-drivers-1404390282. 103 Hürriyet Daily News, “Kurds at odds over Syrian border moat,” April 16, 2014, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurds-at-odds-over-syrian-bordermoat.aspx?pageID=238&nID=65155&NewsCatID=352. See also, for example, Jamie Dettmer, “Syrian Kurds Want Iraqi Border Crossing Opened,” Voice of America, December 3, 2013, available at http://www.voanews. com/content/syrian-kurds-want-iraqi-border-crossingopened/1802539.html. 104 Deniz Arslan, “ISIL’s headway in Iraq may embolden Kurds in region strategically,” Today’s Zaman, June 11, 2014, available at www.todayszaman.com/news350135-isils-headway-in-iraq-may-embolden-kurds-inregion-strategically.html. 105 Hürriyet Daily News, “PYD has authority only on regions ‘given by the al-Assad regime’: Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani,” November 14, 2013, available at http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/pyd-has-authority-only-onregions-given-by-the-al-assad-regime-iraqi-kurdishleader-barzani-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57956&NewsC atID=352. 106 Today’s Zaman, “At Turkey’s doorstep, rift between PYD and Barzani deepens,” November 10, 2013, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-330888-atturkeys-doorstep-rift-between-pyd-and-barzani-deepens.html. This was conirmed in multiple conversations during the authors’ recent fact-inding trips to Turkey. 107 Today’s Zaman, “At Turkey’s Doorstep, Rift Between PYD and Barzani Deepens.” 108 Reuters, “Iran Rejects PJAK’s ceaseire, demands withdrawal,” September 5, 2011, available at http:// uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/05/uk-iran-pjak-ceaseire-idUKTRE7841MM20110905. 109 BBC News, “PKK Kurdish deal with Turkey may worry Iran and Syria’,” May 10, 2013, available at http://www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24013837. 110 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2013 Human Rights Reports: Iran (U.S. Department of State, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/220564.pdf. 48 111 See, for example, Sherzad Shekhani, “Kurdish organization in Iran is prepared to send ighters to Syria,” Asharq Al-Awsat, August 5, 2013, available at http://www. aawsat.net/2013/08/article55312452. See also Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Iranian Kurdish parties prefer dialogue with government,” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/iranian-kurdish-parties-waning-supportexiles-pkk-turkey.html. 112 Uppsala University, “Turkey.” 113 Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “Iran’dan Kandil’e ‘Cekilmeyin’ Baskisi,” Milliyet, April 29, 2013, available at http://siyaset. milliyet.com.tr/iran-dan-kandil-e-cekilmeyin-baskisi/ siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/29.04.2013/1699964/default. htm. Title translates as follows: “Iran to Qandil: ‘Don’t Withdraw Pressure’.” 114 See, for example, Al Jazeera, “Turkey and Iran to cooperate against PKK,” October 21, 2011, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/10/2011102110531537867.html. See also Human Rights Watch, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Cross-Border Attacks Should Spare Iraqi Civilians,” September 9, 2011, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/02/ iraqi-kurdistan-cross-border-attacks-should-spareiraqi-civilians. For a discussion of the Iranian position, see van Wilgenburg, “Iranian Kurdish parties prefer dialogue with government.” 115 Parisa Hafezi, “Turkey’s Erdogan visits Iran to improve ties after split over Syria,” Reuters, January 29, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/01/29/us-iran-turkey-erdogan-idUSBREA0S11T20140129. 116 These ties are the subject of extensive reporting. See, for example, Dominic Evans, “Syrian rebels launch ierce ofensive against al Qaeda ighters,” Reuters, January 4, 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/ article/2014/01/04/uk-syria-crisis-ighting-idUKBREA0307Z20140104. 117 Data sourced from Turkish Ministry of Economy. 118 International Energy Agency, “Oil and Gas Security: Turkey” (2013), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterinal_with_last_page.pdf. 119 Matea Šafar and Felia Boerwinkel, “The Security Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan.” In Bas van der Berg and others, eds., “Democratization in Iraqi Kurdistan” (Amsterdam, Netherlands: VU University Amsterdam and University of Amsterdam, 2010): 43–44, available at http://www. zeytun.org/sites/default/iles/doc/iraq/iraq0910research.pdf#page=39. 120 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2013 Human Rights Reports: Iran. 121 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm (last accessed July 2014). 122 President William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara (November 15, 1999),” available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=56935 (last accessed July 2014). 123 Michael Rubin, “Why U.S. Should Rethink Policy Over Syria’s Kurds,” Global Public Square, November 27, 2012, available at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn. com/2012/11/27/why-u-s-should-rethink-policy-oversyrias-kurds/. Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions 124 Ariel Zirulnick, “Syria’s ‘third force’ Kurds may emerge stronger from conlict,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Security-Watch/Under-the-Radar/2014/0304/ Syria-s-third-force-Kurds-may-emerge-stronger-fromconlict. 125 Ibid. 126 Basma Atassi, “Qaeda Chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger,” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2013, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html. 49 127 The authors highly recommend the International Crisis Group’s recent reports, including the following: International Crisis Group, “Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle” (2013), available at http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/ Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-astruggle-within-a-struggle.pdf. Also see the update: International Crisis Group, “Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria” (2014), available at http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20 North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151light-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf. Center for American Progress | The United States, Turkey, and the Kurdish Regions The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values. We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” 1333 H STREET, NW, 10TH FLOOR, WASHINGTON, DC 20005 • TEL: 202-682-1611 • FAX: 202-682-1867 • WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG