Mejor_ATMAN_ver.2010.pdf

Communication & Cognition, Vol. 32: 1-2, 1999: 97-126. "There is no self" (nâtmâsti) – Some observations from Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Yuktidīpikā ṅ Marek Mejor (Warsaw) Introduction § 1. Denial of a self (or a soul, person, individual, etc.)1 is one of the main tenets of the Buddhist doctrine. No wonder than that the problem of a self was so vigorously discussed by the Buddhist thinkers. What is more, there were also followers of Buddhism who claimed existence of some kind of a person (pudgala), the so-called pudgalav dins. 2 No original text of these Buddhistspersonalists has been preserved, except the short polemics included into early Buddhist works like Kath vatthu and Vijñ nak ya. However, it is the Pudgalavini caya, being the ninth chapter of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako a (ca. 450 A.D.), which is regarded as the basic detailed critical exposition of the heresy of pudgalav dins. 3 A criticism of their positions contains also ntarakita's Tattvasaṃgraha, together with Kamala la's Pajik thereon (ca. 750 A.D.).4 A critical examination of the notion of a self one can find in Candrak rti's Prasannapad and Madhyamakâvat ra (ca. 650 A.D.), in ntideva's Bodhicary vat ra (with Praj karamati's 5 Pajik ) (ca. 750 A.D.), and in other works. The present paper aims at pointing out some textual coincidences between Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako a (with occasional references to other texts) and the Yuktid pik , which prove that the Yuktid pik -k ra used the former. It consists of two parts: first, the main positions of Vasubandhu concerning the problem of a self are analyzed (the passages from AKBh ad III.1820, and the beginning of AKBh IX are given in translation from the Sanskrit), then the relevant parts of the YD are examined (here too, the passages are translated) in juxtaposition to the passages from AKBh. Additional references are given in the Appendix. Acknowledgements 1 Cf. M nu yakasūtra quoted in AKBh IX (Pradhan, 465.13-14; Shastri, 1202.2-3): atreya saṃjñ , sattvo naro manu yo m nava ca po aḥ puru aḥ pudgalo j vo jantur iti. Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 245. 2 AKBh IX (Pradhan, 461.13; Shastri, 1191.3): v ts putr y ḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti. Ya omitra identifies the Vts putr yas with the S mat yas, AKVy (Wogihara, 699.3; Shastri, 1191.24): v ts putr y ryas ṃmat y ḥ. Cf. also Bcar-ṭ k ad IX.60 (ed. LVP, 297.8-10): pudgalav dinas tu punar anta carat rthik ḥ skandhebhyas tattv nyatv bhy m av cyaṃ pudgalan m nam tm nam icchanti /. 3 LVP, Ko a, IX, pp. 227-229: Notes préliminaires; see Cousins 1994 for a detailed study of the school of personalists, with bibliography. 4 See Schayer 1934: 433f.(68f.) for the references. The tma-par k chapter of TS(P) is especially rich in the critical expositions of the views of different schools on the problem of a self. It contains the following sub-chapters: 1. naiy yika-vai e ika-parikalpitâtmapar k , 2. m m ṃsaka--, 3. k pila--, 4. digambara--, 5. aupani atka--, 6. v ts putr ya-- [transl. by Schayer, ibid.]. 5 The so-called tman-controversy in the Buddhist and Brahmanic sources has been studied by Claus Oetke (Oetke 1988). 1 The author would like to express his most sincere thanks to Professor Albrecht Wezler who generously offered him a copy of the new edition of the Yuktid pik and suggested a number of improvements to the typescript of earlier version of the paper. Thanks are also due to Mr Piotr Balcerowicz who gave constructive criticism of a draft of the paper, and to Ms Monika Nowakowska for her corrections of the final version. I. Abhidharmakośa § 2. There are two places in the AKBh where Vasubandhu rejected the view claiming the real existence of a self ( tmav da). First Vasubandhu included his refutation of tman in the third chapter of the AKBh (ad AK III.18).6 It is inserted here into the explanation of the process of transmigration and the concept of the intermediate being (antar bhava). A vital question for the Buddhists was who (or what) does actually transmigrate from one life into another, provided that there is no separate permanent entity subject to rebirth. Vasubandhu's answer to the query by the "outsiders" (b hyaka) is unequivocal – there is no self. The AK III.18 says: "There is no self ( tman) and it is only [the continuum of] the aggregates formed/stimulated by the [previously accumulated] afflictions and actions which, by means of a stream of intermediate being, enters [mother's] womb; like the light". In the following commentary Vasubandhu's argument is based on the scriptural authority. The relevant passage is quoted from the Param rtha ūnyat sūtra of the Saṃyukta gama.7 It is interesting to observe that the Buddha allows the interpretation of the notion of a self as a mere verbal convention applied to the dharma theory, i.e. the theory of ultimate factors of existence. The notion of a self as a separate permanent entity, a carrier or conveyor of personality which passes from one life into another future life, is strongly rejected. However, one is allowed to speak about a self in terms of the dharma convention (dharmasaṃketa).8 It is then possible to apply metaphorically the notion of a self to the stream of factors, which are formed by the sum of defilements and actions by means of a series of intermediate states of existence. Such a continuous series of intermediate states of existence is regarded as the dependent origination (prat tyasamutp da), which is spread over three consecutive lifetimes: past, present and future. Vasubandhu's argument is related to the question whether the aggregates (skandha) are identical with a self, or separate from it. 9 The doctrine of non-existence of a self (nair tmya) is, as it were, conjoined with the doctrine of dependent origination (see also Vasubandhu's PSVy, Appendix). § 3. Next, in the ninth chapter of his AKBh (Pudgalavini caya), Vasubandhu pursued a systematic criticism of the notion of a person (pudgala) or a self ( tman). Here, first the argument is based on logical premises. 10 There is no self, there is no person, etc., because such 6 Not analyzed in Oetke 1988. Cf. Abhidharmad pa, p. 266ff. where the passage from that Scripture is used in an argument against the S ṃkhya (see below). 8 See below n. 17. 9 Cf. N g rjuna, MMK XVIII.1: "If the self were to be identical with the aggregates, it will partake of uprising and ceasing. If it were to be different from the aggregates, it would have the characteristics of the non-aggregates." (tr. Kalupahana, p. 263). See also the quotation from the *N gasenabhik usūtra in Vasubandhu's AKBh IX (Sanskrit text: Pradhan 469.13-24; Shastri 1209.10-1210.13. Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 263 & n. 3; Pasadika, No. 522). 10 A detailed analysis is found in Oetke 1988: 195-242: "Der Reduktionismus des Abhidharmako a" [A) Der 7 2 thing is not subject to cognition by any of the accepted means of valid cognition (pram ṇa). Vasubandhu's argument is directed mostly against the Buddhists-personalists (pudgalav din), who accepted existence of a certain form of being which underlies the human personality. But it is also directed against the S ṃkhya followers who accepted the possibility of cognition of a spirit (a self) by means of a special type of inference, the so-called s m nyato dṛ ṭam anum nam (see Wezler 1969; Nenninger 1994). Several questions raised by the opponent(s) 11 in the AKBh IX refer to and develop the short explanation in the AKBh III.18ff., and may also reflect the exposition of the SK 17.12 Vasubandhu argues that a self does not exist, because it is not perceived by any means of valid cognition. A polemics against this argument is found in the Yuktid pik . From the Buddhist scriptural quotations inserted into the Yuktid pik it follows that the Yuktid pik -k ra must have referred to Vasubandhu's AKBh IX where we find the same passages (see the Appendix). Abhidharmakośa III.18-20 [Ed. Pradhan 129.5ff.; Shastri 432.8ff.; P Tanjur, Gu., fol. 142bff.] Translation: "Now here, in that matter, the non-Buddhists13, considering the doctrine [of the existence] of a self ( tmav da)14, raise [the following] objection: „If it is admitted that a sentient being passes over into another life, then it proves that a self does exist.‟ That one is driven away [with the following statement:] There is no self. 15 What kind of a self? – That one which is supposed (parikalpyate) to cast down these [aggregates] and to put on again those aggregates (skandha); such one does not exist, a spirit, an internal agent (antarvy p rapuru a)16. And thus it was said by the Blessed One [in the Param rtha ūnyat dharmapary ya]: «There is action, there is result, but the doer is not perceived who casts down these aggregates and puts on again other aggregates, except the dharma-convention (dharmasaṃketa)17. Here, this Argumentationsgang des neunten Buches des Abhidharmako a (pp. 195-209); -- B) Vasubandhu's Theorie des Erfahrungssubjektes (pp. 209-240); -- Nachbemerkung (pp. 241-242).] 11 It has been rightly observed by Stcherbatsky (Stcherbatsky 1988: 95 n. 49) that the V tsiputr ya, the main adversary of Vasubandhu, "may start questions not only in accordance with his own views (svamatena), but also from the standpoint of another system (paramatam ritya)." 12 Cf. e.g. AKBh, ed. Pradhan, 471.24 (cf. Oetke 1988: 203): yadi tarhi pudgalo n sti ka e a saṃsarati /; 472.3f.: yadi skandham tram idam...; 472.16f. (cf. also Ny yav rttika ad 1.1.10; Oetke 1988: 344ff.): yadi tarhi sarvath pi n sty tm kathaṃ k aṇike u citte u cir nubhūtasy rthasya smaraṇaṃ bhavati pratyabhij naṃ v /; 476.4: tmany asati kimarthaḥ karm rambhaḥ /; 476.13f.: yady tm n sti kasy yam ahaṃk raḥ /; 476.16 (cf. Ny yav rttika, ibid.): asaty tmani ka e a sukhito duḥkhito v /; 476.19 (cf. Oetke 1988: 209): asaty tmani ka e ṃ karmaṇ ṃ kart ka ca phal n ṃ bhokt bhavati /. 13 Lit. "those who are external [to the Buddhist doctrine], outsiders", see BHSD p. 400: b hyaka, and p. 399: b hiraka. 14 Cf. AKBh (Pradhan, 140.14-15; Shastri, 461.12): tmav daḥ punar tmabh vaḥ / tmeti v do 'sminn ity tmav daḥ /. Cf. Ya omitra, AKVy (Wogihara, 300.12-14; Shastri, loc. cit.). Cf. Triṃ ik -bh ya (Lévi, 23.12)Ś up d naskandhe v tmeti dar anam tmadṛ ṭiḥ satk yadṛ ṭir ity arthaḥ /. 15 The k rik is quoted in Bcar ad IX.73 (ed. LVP, 306.21-22). 16 Tib. nang gi byed pa'i skyes bu. LVP, Ko a, III, p. 57Ś "un agent intérieur, un Puruṣa". 17 anyatra dharmasaṃket t, cf. LVP, Ko a, III, p. 57Ś "indépendamment de la relation causale des dharmas"; id., IX, p. 260 & n. 2: "en dehors de la production causale des dharmas [qui donne l'impression d'un agent permanent]"; Lamotte 1973Ś 314 & n. 8 (with full references)Ś "sauf s'il s'agit là d'une métaphore sur la Loi". Tib. chos su brdar 3 dharma-convention means: when this exists, that exists too, i.e. in full – the dependent origination (prat tyasamutp da).»18 Then, what kind of a self is not rejected? But [it is] the aggregates only... When the aggregates as such (skandham tram)19 are metaphorically regarded (upacaryate)20 as a self, [in such case] there is no objection. 21 Thus, in that case it follows that only the aggregates (skandh eva) pass over to another world (life). But the aggregates as such (skandham tram) do not pass over there. [In answer to that objection it is said:] Formed by defilements (kle a) and actions (karman), by means of a continuous series of intermediate existences, [the aggregates] go into [a mother's] womb, like a flame [of a lamp]. For the aggregates are momentary and they have no power (potency) ( akti) [of their own] to pass over [to the next existence]. But it is [the mental] defilements as such (kle am tram), completely pervaded (paribh vita, BHSD p. 328) both by the defilements and actions, which go into a mother's womb as a continuous series (saṃtati) under the appellation of the intermediate state of existence (antar bhava, BHSD p. 39). As for example the flame [of a lamp], even though it is momentary (k aṇika), [it goes] into a different place [= changes its position each and every moment] by means of a continuous series [of flashes]; therefore there is no fault [in our argument]. 22 Therefore, it is proved that even when there is no self, a continuous series of the aggregates, which is formed by the [totality of] defilements and actions, enters the mother's womb. (129.21) Moreover, that [continuous series of the momentary aggregates,] According to the projecting force ( k epa), gradually grown up, the continuous series (sant na) again goes into another life by means of defilements and actions; thus the wheel of existence(s) is beginningless. (AK III.19) For each continuous series of the aggregates has unequal projecting force ( k epa), because of different sum of actions (karman) relating to [a particular] life.23 Therefore, as much one has [his] projecting force, that much, by degrees, has [his] growth (longevity). (...) (130.24) In such manner life (origin) (janman) has defilements and actions as [its] causes b(r)tags pa ma gtogs pa. 18 See Lamotte 1973: 313-316; Mejor 1991: 65-66. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 259 n. 5; 260 nn. 1, 2, 3. Quoted in Bcar, ed. LVP, 307.7-10. Cf. also Lalitavistara: "There is no self, no person, no one who transmigrates (na ca tma puṅgala na saṃkramako 'sti ka cit)" (see the reference in BHSD sub saṃkramaka). 19 Cf. Speijer 1886, § 228ś §229.4 Ś "Compounds in -m tram are bahuvr his, used as substantives of the neuter, and properly have the meaning «the exact measure of which is -». Yet, as a rule they are used as if their latter member were some limitative particle and -m tram may be translated by «but, only»." To these Hartmann (1955: 55) adds: "als solches" (I am obliged to A. Wezler for this information). According to Sthiramati, the word "only" has the meaning of accurate determination (avadh raṇa), P Tho, fol. 35b3f.: nyid kyi sgra ni nges par gzung ba'i don du ste /. 20 AKBh (Pradhan, p. 129 n. 4): "MS. seems to correct ucyate into upacaryate". Cf. AKBh, Tib. P Gu, fol. 143a1-2: gal te phung po tsam kho na la bdag ces 'dogs na de la ni dgag pa med do /. Tib. 'dogs pa = (Jäschke) "to bind, fasten, fix attach; (sub)join, affix." 21 The question whether the skandhas are identical or different from the tman is discussed in MMK XVIII.1, with Prasannapad ad loc., p. 341ff.; Madhyamak vat ra VI.127-128 quoted in: Prasannapad , p. 342.5-12. 22 Ya omitra explains that the five aggregates move by way of continuous series because of momentariness, like a lamp (AKVy, Wogihara 283.10-12). 23 Ya omitra explains that projecting force means continuance of time, which distinguishes the lifetime, because of difference of the sum of deeds conducive to longevity ( yuḥsaṃvartan ya) (AKVy, Wogihara 283.13-15). 4 (kle akarmahetuka), then the defilements and actions have it [= life] as [their] cause, then in turn a new life [originates] from them – so the beginningless wheel of existence is to be known. (130.25) If [you] admit [falsely] (imagine) a beginning, then it would follow that it [= life (birth)] is without cause in relation to these [defilements and actions]. And if it had no causal relation [to them], [analogically] all this would appear to be without cause. Yet it is observed [commonly] that there is efficacy (s marthya) of seeds, etc. in relation to sprouts, etc., due to the determination by place and time (de ak lapratiniyama), or, [one can see the efficacy of] fire, etc. in relation to what is produced by cooking (by warmth) (p kaja), etc. Therefore there is no appearance (manifestation) (pr durbh va) without cause (nirhetuka). And the theory [maintaining] the existence of eternal cause (nityak raṇ stitvav da) was previously rejected [= AK II.64d]. Therefore, there is no beginning of [the wheel of] transmigration. But it is right [to speak about] the end (anta) [of the wheel of existence], on account of destruction of [its] cause (hetuk aya), because of subjection of life (origin) to the cause (hetvadh natva), like that of a sprout, on account of destruction of the seed. (131.3) This continuous stream of aggregates which was specified to be (specified as) a state of the three existences (lifetimes) (janmatray vastha): It is the dependent origination (prat tyasamutp da), consisting of three parts and twelve members: in the first and the posterior [parts] there are two [members in each], in the middle [there are] eight [members]; [this refers only to the person who has] completed (accomplished fully) (paripūrin)24 [the states of existence in the sphere of desire (k m vac ra)]." (AK III.20) Accordingly, it is explained in the AKBh (Pradhan, 131.5ff.) that the first two members, ignorance and formations, belong to the prior part, i.e. the past life; the following eight members of the chain, viz. consciousness, name and form, six bases [of cognition], contact, feeling, desire, attachment, and existence, belong to the middle part, i.e. the present life; and the remaining two [members], birth and old age and death, belong to the posterior part, i.e. the future life. 25 AKBh IX: Pudgalaviniścaya [AKBh IX, ed. Pradhan, 461.1-12; Shastri, 1189.1-1191.2; P Tanjur, Ngu., fol. 93b7-94a5. Ejima 1987: 10. – See LVP, Ko a, IX, pp. 230-232; Stcherbatsky 1988: 10-12. Cf. Oetke 1988: 195.] Translation: "Is there, indeed, no other means of salvation from that [declared by the Buddhists]? – No, there is not. – Why? – Because [each one] is characterized by [its] sticking to (resting upon) the erroneous view of [the real existence of] a self (vitathâtmadṛ ṭi). For they [= its adherents] do not regard the conventional notion of a self ( tmaprajñapti) as a mere continuous series of the aggregates (skandhasaṃt na), but they assume (imagine falsely) (parikalpayanti, BHSD p. 320f.) a self as an independent real substance (dravyântara). And <all>26 the impurities (kle a) have their origin in [the idea of] accepting [existence of] a self ( tmagrahaprabh va). But what is meant [by the statement that] the term "self" refers to the continuous series of the aggregates only and not to [any] other object of designation (abhidheya)? – Because of Cf. BHSD sub paripūrayati, paripūri( ). Cf. Mejor 1991: 96f. on the Vaibh ṣikas' explanation of the prat tyasamutp da in AKBh ad III.28ab (Pradhan, 139.25-140.25). 26 Pradhan 461 n. 3: "Y[a omitra] omits sarva". Tib. reads: nyon mongs rnams ni (P Ngu, fol. 93b8). 24 25 5 absence of [the means of valid cognition, viz.] perception and inference (pratyak ânum nâbh v t) [which could prove its existence]. For the factors which are existing are cognized by perception, provided that there is no obstacle (antar ya), as for instance [cognition] of the six objects and of the mind, and [they are cognized by] inference, as for instance [cognition] of the five sense faculties. Here, [their] inference is as follows: When the [general] cause is present and the other [= special] cause is absent, absence of the result is observed; and when it is present, [the result] is present [too]. As for instance [in the case of] a sprout. Or27, when [both] the object has become manifest, and the attention of the mind as the [general] cause, are present28, [in one case] the absence of grasping of the object is observed, and then, [in other case, its] presence is observed; as in the case of a blind, a deaf, etc., and as in the case of not blind, not deaf, etc., [respectively]. Hence, here too, the absence and presence of the other cause is ascertained. And the other [= special] cause it is the sense faculty – this is the inference. But it is not so in relation to a self, [its existence cannot be proved in such a way, i.e. by perception or inference]. Thus, [the conclusion is:] a self does not exist." II. Yuktidīpikā § 4. The Yuktid pik , an anonymous commentary on the S ṃkhyak rik of varakṛṣṇa, is one of the most important texts in the S ṃkhya tradition. 29 Its great importance for the history of Indian philosophy in general has been acknowledged since long. 30 It was E. Frauwallner (Frauwallner 1959; cf. Oberhammer 1960) who has shown its dependence on the earlier lost S ṃkhya treatise, the a ṭitantra. The Yuktid pik contains many explicit references to the Buddhist views and bears clear evidence to its author's acquaintance with the Buddhists scriptures.31 On the basis of the reference to Dign ga's definition of pratyak a (YD 35.1), and the lack of a reference to Dharmak rti's definition who gave it its final form, which was then accepted by the Buddhists, it was suggested that the Yuktid pik may come from the period between Dign ga (480-540 A.D., Frauwallner) and Dharmak rti (600-660 A.D., Frauwallner). Wezler and Motegi assign its date to the period ca. 680-720 A.D.32 From the textual references in the Yuktid pik it clearly follows that its author must have known also the works of Vasubandhu on the vijaptim trat doctrine, i.e. the Viṃ atik and Triṃ ik , In the following the relevant passages from the Yuktid pik will be translated and analyzed, with Pradhan 461 n. 4: "Ya[ omitra] v ." Tib. P Ngu, fol. 94a3: yul snang bar gyur pa dang / rgyu yid la byed pa yod kyang... 29 According to A. Wezler (Wezler 1974: 446, 450), the Yuktid pik is "not a commentary on the S[ ṃkhya]K[ rik ], but on a V rttika on the SK just as Patajali's Mah bh ṣya is primarily not a commentary on the Aṣṭ dhy y , but a supertext on K ty yana's V rttika on the Sūtra of P ṇini. (...) 'R jav rttika' is the name of the V rttika on the SK that is preserved only in the YD, forming as it were its skeleton." 30 Wezler 1974: 455 n. 47; Wezler 1990: 127 n. 1; Wezler 1993: 282 n. 3. First edited by P. Chakravarti in 1938 (based on a single Ms), then it was edited by R.C. Pandeya in 1967 (based on two Mss); a new critical edition by Wezler-Motegi (based on five Mss) was published in 1998. *On the date of the YD see *Mejor 2002. 31 See *Mejor 2002: 404ff. 32 YD, ed. Wezler-Motegi, Introduction § 6 "Title of the Text, Authorship and Date". 27 28 6 references to the AKBh and other texts. Yuktidīpikā ad SK 17 § 5. The SK 17 establishes the existence of the spirit (puru a), as distinct from the nature (pradh na). It offers five arguments in support of that thesis. In its commentary on SK 17, the Yuktid pik -k ra introduced an objection raised by the Buddhists, in which one can recognize the general argument put forth by Vasubandhu in his AKBh IX (see above): there is no self, because it is not cognizable by any means of valid cognition. 33 The most interesting is, however, the fact that the Yuktid pik -k ra not only referred to that argument, but also quoted the same Buddhist scriptural authorities, following Vasubandhu himself in his Pudgalavini caya (see the Appendix). In the following an annotated translation from the Yuktid pik (ed. Wezler-Motegi) will show that dependence. Translation: (167.2) "[The author] says, – The nature (pradh na) has been explained. Now, it will be demonstrated (pratip dya) that there exists a spirit (puru a) which is different from cause and effect (k ryak raṇavyatirikta). Wherefore there may occur a doubt? – It was said [in the other place, cf. supra, YD 89.19ff.]: because that which is not being apprehended (anupalabhyam na) can be experienced in both ways (ubhayath ), [as existent or non-existent (sadbhūta, asadbhūta)]. Moreover, [the doubt may arise] on account of the opposing views of the teachers ( c ryavipratipatti). The followers of the Buddha ( kyaputr ya) are of the opinion (pratipanna) that there is no such thing (n sti ka cid artha) [like a self, soul, or spirit, etc.] which is different from the aggregate of consciousness (vijñ naskandhavyatirikta). Why? – Because of [its] non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) by any means of valid cognition (pram ṇa).34 Here, [in this world] whatever exists, is cognized by one of the means of valid cognition: perception, etc. As for instance visible [object], etc. (rūpâdi). Then, to start with, that [kind of a] self is not cognized by perception. 35 Why? – Because it is not characterized by a sound, etc. (a abdâdilak aṇatv t).36 Nor [it is cognized] by inner perception (antaḥpratyak a). Why? – Because that what is contrary to the three constituents/qualities (tri-guṇavipar ta), and the rest, is not its object (the object of inner perception). Neither [it is cognized by inference (anum na)37] "as [observed] before" (pūrvavat) nor 33 Cf. Ui 1917: 86ff. who refers to *Piṅgala's commentary (Taisho 1564: Zhonglun) on N g rjuna's M dhyamakastra (chapter XVIII: tma-par k ). See Wezler 1969: 199ff. 34 Cf. AKBh IX, Pudgalavini caya. The Budhists accept two pram ṇas: perception (pratyak a) and inference (anum na), the S ṃkhyas add to these two the third, verbal testimony ( ptavacana) (SK 4). Moreover, they accept threefold inference (SK 5): pūrvavat, e avat, and s m nyato dṛ ṭam. 35 Cf. Gauḍap da ad SK 7 (p. 57): atra ka cid ha – pradh naṃ puru o v nopalabhyate / yac ca nopalabhyate loke tan n sti / tasm t t v api na staḥ /. Vasubandhu, Viṃ atik -vṛtti ad 16 (ed. Lévi 8.22f.): pram ṇava d astitvaṃ n stitvaṃ v nirdh ryate /. Cf. also AKBh V.27 (Pradhan 301.1-3): vārṣagaṇyavādaś caivaṃ dyotito bhavati / yad asty asty eva tat / yan n sti n sty eva tat / asato n sti saṃbhavaḥ / sato n sti vin a iti /. 36 Cf. discussion on Bcar IX.61ff. 37 Cf. the definitions of anum na in the YD p. 38.6ff. 7 [by inference] "as the rest" ( e avat). [Why?] – Because the relation of cause and effect is inapplicable (anupapatti) [in this case]. And [it is] not [cognized] by "cognition on the basis of a common character" (inference by analogy) (s m nyato dṛ ṭa).38 [Why?] – Because of absence (non-existence) of a common element in form of a quality (dharmas m nyâbh va). And also [it is] not [cognized] by verbal authority ( ptavacana). [Why?] – Because of lack of assent (anabhyupagama). Since the Buddhists do not acknowledge Vedic texts ( ruti), tradition (smṛti), old history (pur ṇa), and legend (itih sa) as the means of valid cognition, and their Scripture ( gama) [= K udraka gama] says as follows: (167.13) «For a self does not exist as a [real] self – it is [only] falsely imagined [to exist as a such]. [Such entity like] a sentient being, and/or a self, does not exist here; there are but the factors which are conditioned by causes. There are only twelve parts of the state of existence, [which are classified as] [five] aggregates, [twelve] bases of cognition, and [eighteen] elements. Having considered all these [factors], [one must come to the conclusion that] a person (an individual) is not perceived [among them]. Behold as void the internal, behold as void the external. Even that one who meditates upon voidness, whoever he may be, is not perceived.»39 (167.21) And again [it (the Scripture)] says: [Moreover, it was said in the Param rtha unyat dharmapary ya §6:]40 «There is action, there is result, but the doer is not perceived which casts down these aggregates and puts on again another aggregates, except the dharma convention (dharmasaṃketa).» Therefore [the conclusion of the Buddhists is:] a self does not exist (nâsty tmêti), because it is not apprehended by any of the means of valid cognition. 41 (168.1) [Rejoinder:] As far as [your] statement is concerned, viz. that a self is not apprehended by [direct] perception nor by [two kinds of inference, viz.] "as [observed] before" (pūrvavat) and "as the rest" ( e avat), it is true. But, as regards the statement that there is no "cognition on the basis of a common character" (inference by analogy) (s m nyato dṛ ṭa), this is not reasonable (does not conform to correct reasoning) (ayukta)42, because the common [quality] in the form of a self ( tmas m nya) is inapplicable (anupapatti). Why? – (...)" 38 YD ad SK 5b (ed. Wezler-Motegi, p. 82ff.): trividham anum nam khy tam. Cf. Ui 1917: 86ff.; Wezler 1969; Nenninger 1994. 39 See the Appendix for the details. 40 YD 77.15-16: punar apy ha – asti karm sti vip kaḥ k rakas tu nopalabhyate ya im n sv n dharm n k ipati / any ṃ ca pratisandadhati, anyatra dharmasaṃket t / tasm t sarvapram ṇ nupalabdher n sty tmeti /. See the Appendix. Cf. TSP 215.17-19 with some variant readings: asti karmâsti phalam k rakas tu nopalabhyate ya im n skandh n nik ipati, any ca skandh n up datte, anyatra dharmasaket t / tatrâyaṃ dharmasaketaḥ, yadutâsmin sat daṃ bhavati, asyotp d d idam utpadyate, iti /. 41 The S ṃkhyas prove just the opposite arguing that the soul (spirit) exists because there is no counter-proof of its non-existence (cf. SPrBh ad VI.1: asty tm n stitvas dhanâbh v t /). 42 SK 6 says that the knowledge of objects which are beyond the reach of the senses (at ndriya) is achieved through the inference from analogy. Cf. M ṭharavṛtti (10.21f.): atra pradh napuru v at ndriyau tayoḥ s m nyato dṛ ṭ d anum n t siddhiḥ. 8 § 6. To that question the answer brings the S ṃkhyak rik 17, where the five arguments to establish the existence of a spirit (self) are put forward.43 «Spirit as distinct from matter exists, since an assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since this other must be the reverse of everything composed of the three constituents; since there must be superintendence and control; since there must be some one to enjoy and since there is the activity for the purpose of liberation.» 44 The five arguments which speak in favour of the existence of puru a are discussed by the Yuktid pik -k ra at length. 45 Here will be extracted from the Yuktid pik the relevant passages which bear on the question of the relationship to Vasubandhu‟s AKBh. A summary of the discussion between the S ṃkhyas and the Buddhists is also found in ntideva's Bodhicary vat ra IX.60d-62, with Prajñ karamati's Pañjik thereon. The arguments of the SK 17 are as follows: (a) [YD 168.4] saṃgh ta-par rthatv t; (b) [YD 169.17] triguṇâdi-viparyay t; (c) [YD 169.22] adhi ṭh n t; (d) [YD 170.4] puru o 'sti bhoktṛ-bh v t: (e) [YD 173.20] kaivalyârthaṃ pravṛtte ca. Ad (d) puru o 'sti bhoktṛ-bh v t Translation: (YD 170.5ff.) "Here [it is admitted that both] manifest (vyakta) and unmanifest (avyakta) are without intelligence (acetana), because they are pleasure, pain, delusion in their nature. Therefore, since they are not capable to enjoy themselves, it is necessary to postulate one who enjoys (bhoktṛ). That one who enjoys (enjoyer) is a spirit (puru a). [Question:] Now, what is this "enjoyment" (bhoga)? [Answer:] "Enjoyment" [is] (...)46 Cf. Garbe 1917: 356ff. (IV.i.2Ś „Beweise für die Existenz der Seele‟). Ed. Wezler-Motegi, p. 279: saṃgh taparârthatv t triguṇâdiviparyay d adhi ṭh n t / puru o 'sti bhoktṛbh v t kaivalyârthaṃ pravṛtte ca // . Cf. Mainkar, SK, Gauḍap da, p. 93. 45 Cf. Prasannapad , LVP 344.2-8 & n. 3: nanu ca t rthik ḥ skandhebhyo vyatiriktam tm naṃ pratipann bhinnalak aṇam cak ate, tasm t te m ab dhaka ev yaṃ vidhir iti / yath ca t rthik tmano bhinnalak aṇam cak ate tathoktaṃ Madhyamak vat re [= VI.121, Tibetan text, ed. LVP 235.4-8] / tm t rthyaiḥ kalpyate nityarūpo 'kart bhokt nirguṇo ni kriya ca / kaṃcit kaṃcid bhedam ritya tasya bhedaṃ y t prakriy t rthik n m // ity anena //. Translation (de Jong, p. 5 & n. 16): "Mais dira-t-on. – Les hérétiques croient à l'existence d'un moi distinct des agrégats et parlent de son caractère spécial. Par conséquent votre démonstration ne vaut pas contre eux. – Sur la façon dont les hérétiques parlent du caractère spécial du moi, le Madhyamak vat ra s'exprime de la manière suivanteŚ Le moi est conçu par les infidèles comme éternel, inactif, jouisseur, sans qualités et sans activité. Et selon qu'ils s'attachent à telle ou telle particularité du moi, les systèmes des hérétiques se diversifient." 46 Here there is a lacuna in the text. Pandeya reads (79.5): ucyate – bhoga upalabdhisadbh v t /; Wezler-Motegi read (170.9): ucyate: bhoga <...> (170.10) < ha: na vijñ ne> upalabdhisadbh v t /. The underlined passage is a v rttika, according to Wezler-Motegi. My translation is tentative. Perhaps, in the context of the discussion in YD, one should refer to SPrBh (ed. Garbe, p. 51, 63) ad I.104: cid-avas no bhogaḥ; I.105: akartur api phalopabhogo 'nn dyavat; I.143: bhoktṛ-bh v t. 43 44 9 [Objection:] No, because of the real existence of cognition in the consciousness. For it is just the consciousness which is capable of cognizing objects (vi ayopalabdhisamartha), hence it suffices to accept [the consciousness] as that much only. What is the use of inventing (parikalpita) a spirit (puru a)? [Reply:] What is then that "consciousness"? [Answer:] It is thought, mind, consciousness. 47 It is the sixfold cognition (jñ na)48 – the eye consciousness, the ear consciousness, the nose consciousness, the tongue consciousness, the body consciousness, and the mind consciousness. 49 Here, in dependence on the visible and the eye arises the eye consciousness. And similarly, the sound and the ear, the smell and the nose, the taste and the tongue, [the tangible and the body] 50, the mental factors and the mind, bring forward [the proper type of] thought (consciousness) (citta). Its [general] factors are [the following]: feeling, perception, will, contact, attention, etc.51 [Conclusion:] Therefore, because just the aggregate of consciousness has the capacity of enjoying (upabhogas marthya) [the proper objects], a self does not exist.52 (170.21) [Rejoinder:] No, [it is not true,] because the non-intelligent product (acetanavik ra) cannot be applied to intelligence (cetan nupapatteḥ). But now, what concerns [your] assumption that "the eye consciousness arises in dependence on the eye and the visible object, etc.", it 47 Cf. AK II.34a (Pradhan, 61.22; Shastri, 208.2): citta mano 'tha vijñ nam ek rtham. Cf. Bcar IX.60d and commentary thereon (LVP, 294.6, 19-10) where the identification of the six kinds of consciousness with a notion of "I" is strongly rejected (... ahaṃ n pi aḍvijñ n ni sarvath // ... aṭ cak uḥ- rotraghr ṇa-jihv -k ya-manovijñ n ni t ny api n haṃ bhavanti /). See below n. 73. 49 Cf. AKBh ad III.28 (Pradhan, 140.4; Shastri, 460.8: vijñ naṃ katamat / aḍvijñ nak y iti /; AKBh ad I.16a (Pradhan, 11.6-8; Shastri, 50.4-6) vijñ naṃ prativijñaptiḥ / vi ayaṃ vi ayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñ naskandha ity ucyate / sa punaḥ aḍ vijñ nak y ḥ cak urvijñ naṃ y van manovijñ nam iti /. Cf. Pasadika 1989, no. 207. 50 Omitted in the YD. 51 Text: *tatra rūpaṃ prat tya cak u cotpadyate cak urvijñ nam / evaṃ rotra- abda-ghr ṇa-gandha-jihv -rasamanodharm cittam utp dayanti / **tasya dharm vedan saṃjñ cetan spar o <manask ra>*** evam dayaḥ / Comments: *) AKBh IX: M nu yaka-sūtra, Pradhan, 465.11-13; Shastri, 1201.12-1202.8: cak uḥ prat tya rūp ṇi cotpadyate cak urvijñ naṃ tray ṇ ṃ (1202.1) sannip taḥ spar aḥ spar asahaj t vedan saṃjñ cetan it me catv ro rūpiṇaḥ skandh cak urindriyaṃ ca rūpam, etav n manu yatvam ucyate / ... Cf. TSP ad 307-310 (K pilaparikalpitâtmapar k ) 149.19-20: cak uḥ prat tya rūp ṇi cotpadyate cak urvijñ naṃ y vat k ya prat tya spra ṭavy ni cotpadyate k yavijñ nam, iti vacan t /. Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 245 n. 1, 2; cf. idem, III, p. 105 n. 4; Pasadika 1988: 124, no. 505 (cf. nos. 200, 223); Dharmaskandhaka (Dietz, p. 90 = 5.1:4): cak uḥ prat tya rūp ṇi cotpadyate.../ . Cf. also AKBh IX (Pradhan, 464.11-12; Shastri, 1199.4-8) = Pasadika 1988, no. 500. **) This is a list of the ten mental factors (caitasik dharm ḥ) coexisting with the every moment of the thought (cittak aṇa), the so-called mah bhūmikas, AK II.24 (Pradhan, 54.17-18; Shastri, 186.13-14): vedan cetan saṃjñ cchandaḥ spar o matiḥ smṛtiḥ / manask ro 'dhimok a ca sam dhiḥ sarvacetasi // . See LVP, Ko a, II, p. 153 n. 1 A.: Vasubandhu in his Pañcaskandhaka (Dantinne 1980: 7f. & n. 86) distinguished five universal (sarvaga) factors: spar a, manask ra, vedan , saṃjñ , cetan , and five particular (pratiniyatavi aya) factors: chanda, adhimukti, smṛti, sam dhi, prajñ . ***) manaḥ saṃsk ra – thus read all the Mss of YD, according to Wezler-Motegi, p. 170 n. 7 ad 170.18. Yet one should read instead of the YD-k ra's ***manaḥ saṃsk ra, the Abhidharmic manask ra (thus Wezler-Motegi). Cf. Arthavini cayasūtra (Samtani, 8.4): tasm c cetan manaḥ saṃsk ra ity ucyate /. Cf. also AKBh ad II.24 (Pradhan 54.20; Shastri 187.2f.): cetan citt bhisaṃsk ro manaskarma /. 52 Pañjik on Bcar IX.61 (LVP, 297.15f.): saṃprati citsvabh v tmav dinaḥ s ṃkhy dayaḥ aḍvij n n m tmani edham asahi ṇavaḥ pr huḥ / abd dij naṃ cid tmakam tmaiv sm bhir abhidh yate /. "Now, the expounders of the doctrine of a self which, in its own nature, is a spirit – the S ṃkhya followers and others – unable to endure the denial of a self of the six kinds of consciousness, say – «We designate the 'self' the sound consciousness and the rest which are, in their own nature, a spirit»." 48 10 follows that because of non-intelligency of a product (acetanavik ratv t) it is without intelligence (acetana), like a jar and the like [things]. Henceforth, it is only a wishful thinking that the intelligence (cetan ) is a quality of mind (manodharma)." Ad (e) kaivalyârthaṃ pravṛtte ca Here, the author of the Yuktid pik rejects the objection that puru a does not exist because it is not cognized by any of the means of valid cognition, and once more refers to the Buddhist scriptural passages quoted by him earlier [YD 167.18f.]: Translation: (174.6) "What has been said thereŚ «Because it is not apprehended by any means of valid cognition, puruṣa does not exist», this is not reasonable (not appropriate) (ayuktam). And also [in relation to] what was said: ūnyam dhy tmikaṃ pa ya..., this [statement] we shall refute later (pa c t prati edhaṃ vak y maḥ).53 (174.9) Now, what concerns [the statement, YD 167.21ff.:] asti karmâsti vip kaḥ k rakas tu nopalabhyate... – [the Yuktid pik -k ra says:] it is true, because we [also] claim that puru a is not an agent, neither when the aggregates [of a person] (skandha) are cast down, nor [when they are] put on again, nor with regard to anything else (anyatra). Therefore those who are striving for bliss ( reyo'rthin) should obtain the highest immortal permanent state which is an antidote to all calamities [of existence], like rebirth, death, etc., due to recognition of the true nature of Spirit (puru asattva) only, after having excluded (removed) (apohya) the improper (asamajasa) error (bhr nti) of assuming falsely the doctrine of non-existence of a self (nair tmyav da), which is contrary to all scriptures and reason ( gamatarka)54." Yuktidīpikā ad SK 20: Vasubandhu's Paramārthasaptatikā §7. It is known from Param rtha's Life of Vasubandhu and other sources that, admittedly, Vasubandhu composed a short versified treatise Param rthasaptatik in order to refute the S ṃkhya doctrine.55 Perhaps the earliest document we possess is a list of Vasubandhu's works appended to Param rtha's Life of Vasubandhu, which was compiled probably in 563-569 A.D.56 The works are listed under three headings. In the first division are listed: Param rthasaptati(k )57, Abhidharmako a-k rik together with bh ya (transl. by Param rtha, Nanjio 1269 = Taisho 1559), and, without a title, a refutation of Vasur ta's Vy karaṇa-treatise. Xuanzang's list of Vasubandhu's works, which is found in his Buddhist Records of the Western Countries (Siyuji) is much smaller than that of Param rtha58. Only four titles are mentioned, viz. Abhidharmako a, Param rtha stra, Vijñaptim trasiddhi, and Madhy ntavibh ga. The Param rthasaptatik , together with the Abhidharmako a, was mentioned by Kamala la in his Pañjik on TS as the work by Vasubandhu. Probably a stanza from the Param rthasaptatik 53 Wezler-Motegi refer to the YD commentary on SK 19. For the references where "'reason' and 'scripture' appear side by side, often in dvandva compounds," see Halbfass 1991: 145 and n. 76. 55 Cf. Frauwallner 1959: 133(809) & n. 89, 90Ś "Bekannt ist dessen Param rthasaptatik , in welcher er den S ṃkhya-Lehrer Vindhyavas bekämpfte. Antworten von seiten des S ṃkhya klingen in der Yuktid pik nach." Cf. Larson 1979: 141-149 on Vasubandhu and the S ṃkhya. 56 Takakusu 1904a; Takakusu 1904b; Takakusu 1904: 40-50. 57 Qishizhenshilun (also Shengyiqishilun, *Diyiyidilun), Takakusu 1904a: 286 n. 77. *) di, read after Takakusu 1904b: 464 n. 14. 58 Beal I:172, 193, 226, 236; Watters I:210, 357, 359, 370. 54 11 is quoted in Kamala la's Pañjik and in Ya omitra's Vy khy . It was even suggested by Jaini (ADV, p. 225 n. 2) that the author of the Abhidharmad pa wrote a treatise Tattvasaptati which was modelled on Vasubandhu's Param rthasaptati.59 A few stanzas which have been preserved scattered in the texts the scholars tried to ascribe to Vasubandhu. The material at our disposal is, however, very scarce and thus it is insufficient to draw a positive conclusion. § 8. A verse of unknown authorship is quoted in the YD ad SK 20. It is also known from Ya omitra's AKVy ad AKBh IX (Wogihara, 699.25ś Shastri, 1192.26-27).60 It was suggested that the stanza may come from Vasubandhu's lost work, the Param rthasaptati(k ).61 According to Stcherbatsky and de La Vallée Poussin, the stanza was composed by Dharmak rti. However, judging from its Tibetan version which has been preserved in the Tibetan translation of Ya omitra's AKVy (P Chu, fol. 381b5 = Mejor 1991Ś 12 n. 35), it is not found among Dharmak rti's works (see the Verse-Index of Dharmak rti's Works (Tibetan Versions), ed. E. Steinkellner). For the testimony of the later non-Buddhist texts, see the references in LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 233 n. 1. (YD 181.33ff.:) ha ca – muṣṭir yathā vikīrṇaḥ sūcyagre sarṣapādīnām / tiṣṭhati na sūkṣmabhāvāt tadvad dvandvāni sarvajñe // iti / cetan aktiyog t tu dra ṭṛtvam asya sv bh vikam / evaṃ ced yad uktam – varṣātapābhyāṃ kiṃ vyomnaś carmaṇy asti tayoḥ phalam / carmopamaś cet so 'nityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatsamaḥ* // iti tad ayuktam / kiṃ k raṇam / yasm d <yath > avik ryarūpasy k asya sannidh nam tr n megh tapa-62rajodhūmaprabhṛtibhir abhinnade atv d atyanta uddhasy pi malinam iva rūpam upalak y<eta> na ca vik ryatvam evam tmano 'pi sy t / tad yuktam etat puru asaṃyog t karaṇasya pratyayopac raḥ, puru asya ca guṇasaṃyog t kartṛtvopac ra iti / *) YD: asatsamaḥ = lokav rttika; AKVy: asatphalaḥ. Translation: "Says [the Buddhist (?)], – «Like a scattered handful of the mustard-seeds, etc. cannot stay on the top of a needle, because of its smallness, so the pairs of opposites at the omniscient.»63 But his [= puruṣa's] character of a spectator is natural (i.e. belonging to his own nature) due to the association with the force (potency) of intelligence. Were so, [what] has been said, [viz.] – «What is [the efficacy] of rain and sunshine with regard to the air? Their effect is [seen only] on the skin. ADV 225.1: uktam atra karmacint y m uttaraṃ tattvasaptatau ca /. See LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 233 n. 1; Stcherbatsky 1988: 83 n. 9 [= 1920: 952 n. 2]; Mejor 1991: 12 n. 35. 61 Frauwallner 1951: 150f.(639f.)Ś "In diesem Zusammenhang gehört der oft angeführte Vers, der meiner Vermutung nach aus Vasubandhu's Param rthasaptatik stammtŚ Was gehen Regen und Sonnenschein den Raum an. Auf der Haut kommen sie zur Geltung. Ist nun (die Seele) der Haut gleich, dann ist sie vergänglich. Ist sie dem Raum gleich, dann unterliegt sie keiner Einwirkung." 62 Pandeya: megha-payo-. 63 Not identified. 59 60 12 If it [= tman] were similar to the skin, it would be temporal; if it were similar to the air, it would be inefficient (* asatsamaḥ = equal to non-being).» – is incorrect. Why? – Because, similarly as the ether/space ( k a), which has a form not liable to change, from the mere presence (vicinity), [and] due to occurrence in the same place together with the clouds, sunshine, mist, smoke, etc., even though it is very pure, would be seen in (distinguished by) a form as it were impure, and the property of changeability of a self ( tman) too, could not be [distinguished] in like manner. Therefore it is correct [to say] that from the association with puru a, the instrument (karaṇa) is metaphorically assigned (figuratively applied) to intelligence (pratyayopac ra)64, and from the association with the qualities (guṇa), agency (kartṛtvopac ra) of puru a is metaphorically ascribed [to it]."65 § 9. Kamala la in his Pañjik , after having quoted a verse (TSP 164.15-16), makes an explicit reference to both the Abhidharmako a and the Param rthasaptatik as the works of Vasubandhu (TSP, ed. Shastri 164.17f.): dṛṣṭi-daṃṣṭrâvabhedaṃ* ca bhraṃśaṃ cāpekṣya** karmaṇām / deśayanti jinā dharmaṃ vyāghrīpotāpahāravat // iti / evam c rya-Vasubandhuprabhṛtibhiḥ ko a-param rthsaptatik di v abhipr yaprak an t par kr ntam.../ * -dra travabhedaṃ, ** c vek ya. The author of the two (or more ?) stanzas, the first of which was reproduced by Kamala la, and which are known already from the AKBh IX (Pradhan 470.7-8; Shastri 1210.1-5), was identified by Ya omitra as a Sautr ntika master, bhadanta Kum ral ta (AKVy, Wogihara 708.16-709.10; Shastri, 1210.30).66 The stanza(s), however, has (have) been not found among the existing Sanskrit fragments published by H. Lüders (Lüders 1926), nor in the first chapter of the Tibetan version, as edited by M. Hahn (Hahn 1982). § 10. Schayer 1932Ś 93(1988: 458) and Liebenthal 1933: 22 n. 1; 96 n. 65, following Bhattacharyya, the author of the lengthy Introduction to Krishnamacharya's editio princeps of the TSP, called attention to the fact that Kamala la in his Pañjik quotes another stanza which may also come from the lost Param rthasaptatik , ascribed to Vasubandhu: ha ca – yad eva dadhi tat kṣīraṃ yat kṣīraṃ tad dadhīti ca / vadatā Rudrilenaiva *khyāpinā Vindhyavāsinā* // iti / *--*) TSP, ed. Shastri 29.11(12): khy pit Vindhyav sit . "Was Quark ist, eben das ist Milch, und was Milch ist, ist Quark – so ist von dem Sprecher Rudrila Vindhyav sin verkündet worden." (Liebenthal, p. 96.) 64 Cf. LVP, Siddhi, p. 84ff. on upac ra. In the following (YD 182.13ff.) the eight types of association of purua and the guas are enumerated: anyatarakarmaja, ubhayakarmaja, saṃyogaja, sv bh vika, aktinimitta, yogyat lak aṇa, y dṛcchika, vi ayavi ayinimitta. See also the M haravtti ad SK 20: anekavidho hi saṃyogaḥ, where the five kinds only are listed: anyatarakarmaja, samp taja, sv bh vika, aktihetuka, y dṛcchika. Cf. SK, ed. Mainkar, Notes, p. 100f. 66 The other stanza is: tm stitvaṃ hy upagato bhinnaḥ sy d dṛ ṭidaṃ ṭray / bhraṃ aṃ ku alapotasya kury d apr pya saṃvṛtim // . Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, 265 n. 3, 266 n. 1 (& Additions); LVP, Siddhi, p. 223; Pasadika 1988, no. 524. 65 13 The same stanza is quoted also by Abhayadevasūri, a Jaina commentator on the Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (STP, p. 296.21-22), with the reading: vadat Vindhyav sitvaṃ khy pitaṃ Vindhyav sin in the second line. The quotation is anonymous (uktaṃ ca). Most probably it was simply taken out from the TSP since there are many quotations from that text in Abhayadevasūri's commentary. Wezler 1992: 292 n. 13 remarked: "The distinction between the two modes of being has most probably been overlooked, or deliberately ignored, by the unknown author of the famous satirical verse quoted by Kamala la (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjik 29.10-11) yad eva dadhi tat k raṃ yat k raṃ tad dadh ti ca / vadat rūdrilenaiva khy pit vindhyav sit ." Wezler also mentioned the Abhidharmad pa passage which refers to the S ṃkhya position (ADV 273.29f.): "The S ṃkhya observesŚ «Only existing thing arises, as for instance curd which is [already] existent in milk, due to the identity of cause and effect»." [ – translation is mine, M.M.]67 The Yuktid pik -k ra refers to Vindhyav sin (and/or his followers) several times. 68 A sharp polemics against Vindhyav sin is found in the Abhidharmad pa ad I.47cd. Jaini observed (ADV, p. 38 n. 1) that the refutation of Vindhyav sin's opinion is not found in the AKBh. We should add that his name does not appear in Vasubandhu's work either. 69 The question is whether the sense organs get in touch with their objects, or not. The Abhidharmad pa-k ra says (AD 46cd) that three sense organs, viz. the mind, the eye, and the ear, do not enter into contact with their respective objects, and the other three, viz. the nose, the taste, and the body, do enter into contact with their objects. Translation: "Now again, in this matter, Vindhyav sin regards the sense organs as allpervading/omnipresent (sarvagata). Against that [the author of the treatise] says this: (47cd) «If [it is said that] there is no fault, because of all-pervasion, [we answer:] – No, because of lack of connection, like [in the case of] sesamum oil». For who would say, not being insane, that the oil is all-pervading in the sesamum seeds? And similarly (tadvat [Jaini: tadvak]), who would think/imagine, not being foolish, that the sense organs are apart (bahir) from the bases of the eye, the ear, and the rest? (Or perhaps: the external sense organs (bahirindriy ṇi) are from the bases...?)". III. Appendix 1. Vasubandhu, AKBh IX, Pudgalaviniścaya The Yuktid pik (vide supra) contains a passage from a Buddhist gama which is also found in the 9th chapter of AKBh. Below are given both fragments, first from the YD, and then from the AKBh. s ṃkhyaḥ pa yati / vidyam nam eva j yate / tadyath k re vidyam naṃ dadhi, k ryak raṇayor ekatv t /. Cf. in this connection a discussion on the S ṃkhya concept of pariṇ ma in the AKBh ad III.50a (cf. Bronkhorst 1997), together with the explanations of the commentators Ya omitra, Pūrṇavardhana and Sthiramati. See also Appendix. 68 The following references are to YD, Wezler-Motegi ed. (Pandeya ed. in brackets): 5.8 (3.18); 187.9,12,13,14,15 (91.6,8,9,10,11); 230.6 (121.12); 233.20 (123.30). The subject matter of the passages do not, however, coincide with the reference given in the next footnote. On Vindhyav sin see Garbe 1917: 76ff.; Frauwallner 1958: 253f., 269f. 69 ADV (ed. Jaini, 35.8ff.): atra punar vindhyav s pa yati sarvagatatvam indriy ṇ m / taṃ prat dam ucyate / (10) [47cd] sarvagatv d ado a cen n yog t tilatailavat // ko hy anunmatto brūy t tile u tailaṃ sarvagatam ast ti / tadvac* cak uḥ rotr dyadhi ṭh nebhyo bahir indriy ṇi kaḥ kalpayed amūḍhacet ḥ / . *) Jaini reads: tadvak-ca-. 67 14 (a) YD, Pandeya 77.8-14; Wezler-Motegi 167.11-19: na hi bauddh n ṃ rutismṛtipur ṇetih s ḥ pram ṇam / ya cai m gamaḥ sa evam ha – tmaiva hy tmano n sti vipar tena kalpyate / naiveha sattvam tm sti dharm s tv ete sahetuk ḥ // dv da aiva tav ṅg ni skandh yatanadh tavaḥ / vicintya sarv ṇy et ni pudgalo nopalabhyate // ūnyam adhy tmikaṃ viddhi ūnyaṃ pa ya bahirgatam / na dṛ yate so 'pi ka cid yo bh vayati ūnyat m // (b) AKBh IX, ed. Pradhan, p. 466.5-13; ed. Shastri, p. 1202.22-1203.6 (with Ya omitra's AKVy); P Tanjur, Ngu, fol. 98b5-8. Ejima 1987: 16. Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 249 & nn. 3-5, p. 250 & nn. 1-3 (and Additions); Pasadika 1988, no. 509 (with further details); Honjō 1984: 118, no. 15. [Underlined is the text in common with the YD.] K udrake'pi c game *daridra-br hmaṇam adhikṛtyoktaṃ – ṛṇu tvaṃ **sv dare dharmaṃ sarvagranthipramocanam / yath saṃkli yate cittaṃ yath cittaṃ vi udhyati // tmaiva hy tmano n sti vipar tena kalpyate / ***n st ha sattva tm v (1) dharm s tv ete sahetuk ḥ //*** dv da aiva bhav ṅg ni skandh yatanadh tavaḥ / vicintya sarv ṇy et ni pudgalo nopalabhyate // ūnyam adhy tmakaṃ pa ya ūnyaṃ pa ya bahirgatam / na labhyate (2) so 'pi ka cid yo bh vayati ūnyat m // iti.70 Comments: *) Ms.: daridra-br hmaṇam. Read: b dari-br hmaṇam (Ejima 1987: 16). Honjō 1984: 118, no. 15 reads: b dariṃ. Tib. bram ze rgya shug gi bu. Cf. Mvy 5809: rgya shug gi 'bru = badaraphalam. **) Ms.: tvaṃm b dare. Read: b dare (Ejima, loc. cit.; cf. Pasadika, loc. cit.). ***---***) Quoted in TSP ad 3319-20 (ed. Shastri, 1048.9); MMK p. 355.4; Viṃ atik -vṛtti ad 8 (ed. Lévi p. 5.22). 70 P Tanjur, Ngu, fol. 98b5-8: lung phran tshegs las kyang / bram ze rgya shug gi bu'i dbang du byas nas / ji ltar sems ni kun nyon mongs / ji ltar sems ni rnam byang dang / mdud pa thams cad 'jig byed pa'i / (6) chos ni rga shug bu khyod on / bdag id kyis na bdag med de / phyin ci log gis rtog par byed / 'di la bdag gam sems can med / chos 'di dag ni rgyu dang bcas / srid pa'i yan lag bcu gis dang / phung po skye (7) mched khams rnams te / rnam par bsams na 'di kun la / gang zag dmigs pa ma yin no / nang gi stong pa yin par ltos / phyi rol gnas pa stong par ltos / gang zhig stong pa id sgom pa / de yang 'ga' yang (8) mi dmigs so <//> zhes gsungs so //. 15 (1) Ya omitra, AKVy: ca (cf. Pasadika, loc. cit.). (2) Ya omitra, AKVy: vidyate (cf. Pasadika, loc. cit.). Translation:71 "As it was said in the Kṣudraka gama with reference to brahmin B dari: «Listen, B dari, about the Dharma which liberates from all ties – how the thought becomes defiled, and how the thought becomes purified. For a self does not exist as a [real] self – it is [only] falsely imagined [to exist as such]. [Such entity like] a sentient being and/or a self does not exist here, [in this world]; there are but the factors which are conditioned by causes. 72 There are only twelve parts of the state of existence, [which are classified as] [five] aggregates, [twelve] bases of cognition, [and eighteen] elements. Having considered all these [factors], [one must come to a conclusion that] a person (an individual) is not perceived [among them]. Behold as void the internal, behold as void the external. 73 Even that one who meditates upon voidness, whoever he may be, is not perceived.»74" 2. Paramārthaśūnyatādharmaparyāya Tibetan text according to amathadeva, P Tanjur, Tu, fol. 155b3-156a8, ed. in Mejor 1991: 6566; Sanskrit text reconstructed and translated in Lamotte 1973: 313-316 (with copious comparative notes); cf. Pasadika 1988, no. 179; Honjō 1984: 120, no. 27. (Translated below are only the relevant paragraphs.) Translation: "§ 4. [And, monks,] which is the «Discourse on the voidness in the highest sense»? The eye which is arising, comes from nowhere, and [the eye] which is vanishing, nowhere accumulates [again]. § 5. Therefore, monks, the eye, having not existed [before], [now] exists, and having existed [it] perishes (pratigacchati, goes back). § 6. There is action, there is result, but the doer is not perceived which casts down these aggregates and puts on again another aggregates, except the dharma convention (dharmasaṃketa). § 7. The same should be said about the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind. [Tib. omits this paragraph.] § 8. Here, that dharma convention means: when this exists, that exists too; when this arises, that arises too, i.e. conditioned by ignorance are formations, conditioned by formations is consciousness, [... etc.], conditioned by birth is old age and death, [... etc.]. In this way, there comes about nothing but (kevala) this great mass of suffering. Cf. LVP, Ko a, IX, p. 249f.; Stcherbatsky 1988: 28f. MMK p. 355.4, with Prasannapad , p. 355.5-6, n. 4. 73 AKBh ad I.39a (Pradhan, 27.5-7; Shastri, 104.5-8): aḍ vijñ n ni aḍ ray ity ete dv da a dh tava dhy tmik ḥ / rūp dayas tu aḍ vi ayadh tavo b hy ḥ / tmany asati katham dhy tmikaṃ b hyaṃ v / ahaṃk rasanni rayatv c cittam tmety upacaryate /. 74 Cf. Prasannapad (ed. LVP, 347.11) on MMK XVIII.2: ata eva c tm tm y nupalambh t param rthadar anasam pastho yog niyataṃ bhavati /. "Par conséquent, c'est par la non-perception du moi et du mien que le Yogin s'approche certainement de la vue de l'absolu." (Tr. de Jong, p. 8.) 71 72 16 § 9. Similarly, when this does not exists, that does not exist too; when this does not arise, that does not arise too, i.e. through cessation of ignorance cease formations, through cessation of formations ceases consciousness, [... etc.] In this way, this great mass of suffering alone comes to cessation." 2.1. Abhidharmadīpa A passage from the Param rtha ūnyat sūtra [henceforth abbr. PA S] was used by the author of the Abhidharmad pa commentary in the refutation of the S ṃkhya.75 The discussion concerns the problem of existence or non-existence of the future and the past time. Translation: (ADV 266.5) "If from the PA S the non-existence [is to be concluded, we answer:] – No, because of not understanding its meaning. For that reason and because of the demonstration of existence of the future and the rest. Here it would be [like this:] – The Blessed One would clearly indicate in the PA S the non-existence of the future and the rest. Yet it was said thereŚ «The eye which is arising, comes from nowhere, and [the eye] which is vanishing, nowhere accumulates [again].»76 If the future and the past really existed, it would result in admitting (assenting to) the fault of not going and going. That [argument] is also not [acceptable]. – Why? – Because of not understanding the meaning of the Sūtra. For that reason and because of demonstration of the existence of the future and the rest. This indeed is the meaning of the Sūtra. – [The words] which [the Buddha] expressed, viz. «The eye...[etc.]», are for the sake of denial of the rules of dispute which are contained in the Veda (vedoktav davidhi), and in order to reject the opinion of the S ṃkhya(s). (...) (268.1) The S ṃkhyas declare: – «The eye arises from the nature (pradh na) and also ceases in it.» In order to refute this, the Blessed One saidŚ «The eye which is arising...» The factors (dharma) under the appellation of 'future', 'past', 'atom', 'non-information', are indeed not situated in any kind of a spot/locus (ade aprade astha), and therefore [such notions as] their coming or going cannot be applied. (...) (268.10) Or, for the sake of rejecting the opinion of the S ṃkhya. The S ṃkhyas [accept] one permanent cause which abandoned its own birth (production) (sv ṃ j tim ajahat), and after having assumed such and such a different form, it transforms (pariṇamati) itself into such and such a different aspect. And for the sake of denial of that [opinion] the Blessed One saidŚ «The eye...» The eye, not having existed, and in the present [time] for one moment only having taken the form of an action, and [then] having abandoned [it], disappears (vanishes) [again]. 77" 3. Vasubandhu's Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā78 75 Cf. also ADV 254.4-6. ADV 267.1-2: cak ur utpadyam naṃ na kuta cid gacchati nirudhyam naṃ na kvacit saṃnicayaṃ gacchati, iti vistaraḥ /. Cf. Lamotte, § 4, p. 314 n. 6. 77 ADV 268.13f.: cak ur abhūtv vartam ne 'dhvani k aṇam traṃ kriy rūpam d ya tyaktv punar adar anaṃ gacchati /. 78 Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa = Tanjur Peking 5496, vol. Chi. fol. 171a8; Derge 3995, Chi. 1b1-61a7. Author: Vasubandhu (Dbyig gnyen); transl. by Surendr karaprabha and Nam mkha'. Commentary: Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par 'byed pa bstan pa'i rgya cher bshad pa = 76 17 Finally, a passage from Vasubandhu‟s Prat tyasamutp davy khy is cited in which the author explains the true purpose of the Sūtra commented upon. Translation: "§1. Which Sūtra79 [will be investigated]? [AnswerŚ] The one which states «I shall preach to you, monks, the beginning ( di) of the dependent origination (prat tyasamutp da) and the explanation (vibhaṅga)». §2. Why explain this? [Answer:] In order to show that «In this way, there comes about nothing but (kevala) this great mass of suffering». §3. And [in answer to the questionŚ] «What is that teaching for?» someone might say that it has the purpose to remove ignorance (avidy ), doubt (vicikits ), and false knowledge (mithy jñ na) [of those people who sayŚ] «If there is no soul then in what manner does one transmigrate?» 80 §4. But as for me [i.e. Vasubandhu] 81, I regard it as an antidote (pratipak a) to the opinion [upholding the existence] of a self ( tmadṛ ṭi)82 and to desire (tṛ ṇ ). Thus in presenting selflessness and the emergence of suffering [the teaching] is in conformity with voidness ( ūnyat )83 and the absence of intention (apraṇihita)84. Tanjur Peking 5497, vol. Chi, fol. 71a8-283b6; Derge 3996. Author: Guṇamati (Yon tan blo gros); the same translators as above. The following fragment comes from my forthcoming book “The Buddhist Doctrine of Dependent Origination. Vasubandhu's Prat tyasamutp davy khy , Chapter I: On Ignorance.” 79 Guṇamati (fol. 80b4-82a6) quotes in extenso the Prat tyasamutp da-sūtra. 80 The answer to this question is offered by AK III.18. 81 Guṇamati fol. 83a2: slob dpon rang gi bsam pa ston par byed do //. 82 AKBh ad V.9a, Pradhan p. 283.11: tm nam eva tatra [= Ya omitra, AKVy: pañcop d naskandhe u] va inaṃ pa yann tm yaṃ pa yat ty tmadṛ ṭiḥ; cf. AKBh ad V.12, p. 287.5: yatrâtmadṛ ṭis tatrâtmatṛ ṇ [= Ya omitra, AKVy: pañcop d naskandhe u]. 83 See AK VIII.24b-c, Pradhan p. 449.15 [LVP, Ko a, VIII, p. 184, 188]: an tma ūnyat k r bhy ṃ saṃprayuktaḥ ūnyat sam dhidvy k raḥ /. 84 See AK VIII.24c-d, Pradhan p. 449.16 and ff. [= LVP, Ko a, VIII, p. 185, 189]: apraṇihitaḥ saty k rair ataḥ paraiḥ //. 18 Bibliography Texts ADV Abhidharmad pa with Vibh prabh vṛtti. 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