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Francois-Marie Arouet was a historian, writer, and philosopher known by his pseudonym Voltaire. As being a major contributor of the Enlightenment period, he advocated for freedoms many fellow Frenchmen did not dare, such as freedom of religion, speech, and separating church and state. He was such a key to the French Enlightenment, the period has been called “The Age of Voltaire.” This essay will introduce the main criticisms Voltaire had for the philosophical work by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz brought up in his satirical book Candide. The criticisms are against Leibniz’s stances of organized religion, class hierarchies, politics and power, and optimism as an ideal on the basis that this is the best of all possible worlds. Voltaire, in contrast with Leibniz, was against organized religion, class hierarchy, abuse of power in politics, and optimism as a philosophy. I will also provide my support and contentions.
Forum Philosophicum 15 (2010), 17-35.
False optimism? Leibniz, evil, and the best of all possible worldsLeibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds has been subject to numerous criticisms, both from his contemporaries and ours. In this paper I investigate a cluster of such criticisms based on the existence, abundance or character of worldly evil. As several Leibniz-inspired versions of optimism have been advanced in recent years, the aim of my investigation is to assess not just how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against these criticisms, but also whether optimism as a philosophy has the resources to meet these challenges. I show that none of the criticisms considered has sufficient force to pose a threat to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it.
Oxford Bibliographies
Leibniz2017 •
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was a universal genius, making original contributions to law, mathematics, philosophy, politics, languages, and many areas of science, including what we would now call physics, biology, chemistry, and geology. By profession he was a court counselor, librarian and historian, and thus much of his intellectual activity had to be fit around his professional duties. Leibniz’s fame and reputation among his contemporaries rested largely on his innovations in the field of mathematics, in particular his discovery of the calculus in 1675. Another of his enduring mathematical contributions was his invention of binary arithmetic, though the significance of this was not recognized until the twentieth century. These days, a good proportion of scholarly interest in Leibniz is focused on his philosophy. Among his signature philosophical doctrines are the pre-established harmony, the theory of monads, and the claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds, which forms the central plank of his theodicy. For Leibniz, philosophy was not the discovery of deep truths of interest only to other philosophers, but a practical discipline with the means to increase happiness and well-being. Philosophical truths, he believed, revealed the beauty and rational order of the universe, and the justice and wisdom of its creator, and accordingly could inspire contentment and peace of mind. Leibniz’s other intellectual projects were likewise geared towards the improvement of the human condition. He lobbied tirelessly for the establishment of scientific societies, devised measures to improve public health, and was actively engaged in projects to unite the churches and so end the religious strife that marred the Europe of his day. He was also engaged in politics for much of his career, and often took on a diplomatic role, sometimes officially and other times not. In the political sphere, Leibniz did not wield true power but was a man with influence, obtained in no small part by his cultivation of relationships with leaders and sovereigns both inside and outside Germany. The sheer range of Leibniz’s interests, projects and activities can make him a difficult figure to study, and the vast quantity of his writings only compounds the problem (around 50,000 of his writings survive). Nevertheless, even a sampling of Leibniz’s work is enough to get a sense of his vision, originality and intellectual depth, and good secondary literature will only enhance this. The items in this bibliography were chosen with this in mind.
Chapter [preprint version, do not cite] for upcoming collection on Rethinking the Enlightenment, edited by M. Lloyd and G. Boucher [draft form]. Part 1 reframes the enlightenment, looking forwards from the early modern context (in light of the scientific revolution, reformation, renaissance, and discovery of the new worlds), rather than backwards, in light of the enlightenment's alleged effects in the short 20th century. Part 2 looks at Montesquieu's Persian Letters, Diderot's Letter on the Blind, and Candide, as bearing out Peter Gay's depiction of the enlightenment as a "revolt against rationalism" as much as an "age of reason". The chapter contends that these classic enlightenment texts-a million miles from postmodern endoxa about "the Enilghtenment project"-- involve artful exercises in confronting and working through the loss of Europe’s providential sense of its own uniqueness and cosmic centrality, central to the Christian epos: philosophical exercises prompting their readers to relook at their beliefs, customs and society critically, comparatively and ironically, as if from the outside: or as we might say today, “cross-cultural dialogues” pointing the way towards “a world united by its celebration of diversity, a cosmopolitan harmony orchestrated in free individuality; an open world, not of absolutes or of persecution, but of pacific and continuous dialogue".
The New Atlantis
The Optimistic Science of Leibniz2014 •
The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is chiefly remembered today, when he is remembered at all, for two reasons. First, he invented the calculus — independently, most scholars now agree, of its other inventor Newton. And second, he authored the provocative statement that this world is “the best of all possible worlds.” This claim was famously lampooned in Voltaire’s 1759 satire Candide, in which the title character, “stunned, stupefied, despairing, bleeding, trembling, said to himself: — If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like?” Leibniz’s posthumous reputation, already marred by the accusation he had plagiarized Newton’s calculus, never recovered from Voltaire’s mockery. Yet Leibniz is one of the most impressive figures in the history of modern science, mathematics, and philosophy. It seems impossible that one individual could accomplish all that he did. The diversity of Leibniz’s interests and undertakings is dizzying. How are we to make sense of a man who contributed prominently to so many fields, including both religion and science? In our day, it is common to think especially of religion and science as either pulling in opposing directions in their respective understandings of the world, or as parallel but different domains. How did they hang together for Leibniz?
Evil and human suffering seem to be a perennial problem. Final answers to the enigma may be impossible, but we can endeavour to structure the debate and avoid increasing suffering by "wrong" ways of thinking – our theories merely exacerbate the suffering. The question of evil, suffering and theodicy was dealt with extensively in the 18th century. This article revisits the ideas of Hume and Voltaire, representing much of 18th century thought on the subject, in order to determine its relevance to present-day thinking. Voltaire's Candide ridicules Lessing's idea that we have the best of all possible worlds. Thinking about evil and suffering is always causal: Why did it happen? Who/what caused it? In this regard Hume indicated that the 'necessary' connection we make between cause and effect is no more than a custom (operation) of mind, and often wrong. We establish causal patterns over a period of time and apply them uncritically and unscientifically in our daily explanation of events. This seems to be analogous to the naturalistic fallacy (Moore) of deriving an ethical 'ought' from an empirical 'is' (fact). Causal operation on a physical level is transposed to the moral level of human conduct. We establish a causal link between ethical conduct and what 'consequently' transpires in our lives. This explains why we attribute much of what happens in our lives to either God or the devil. The article challenges theology to engage with science and the natural explanations it offers, in a manner that maintains vistas of the transcendent, including the experience of awe, wonderment, respect and worship.
Written as a term paper for a Post Grad. 1st sem course on Early Modern Literature, unpublished (2017)
The philosophy of doubt: is skepticism the redeemer?2014 •