Nikolaidis _ Virtues for the People.pdf

Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press virtues for the people aspects of plutarchan ethics Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press PLUTARCHEA HYPOMNEMATA Editorial Board Jan Opsomer (K.U.Leuven) Geert Roskam (K.U.Leuven) Frances Titchener (Utah State University, Logan) Luc Van der Stockt (K.U.Leuven) Advisory Board F. Alesse (ILIESI-CNR, Roma) M. Beck (University of South Carolina, Columbia) J. Beneker (University of Wisconsin, Madison) H.-G. Ingenkamp (Universität Bonn) A.G. Nikolaidis (University of Crete, Rethymno) Chr. Pelling (Christ Church, Oxford) A. Pérez Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga) Th. Schmidt (Université de Fribourg) P.A. Stadter (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press VIRTUES FOR THE PEOPLE ASPECTS OF PLUTARCHAN ETHICS Edited by GEERT ROSKAM and LUC VAN DER STOCKT Leuven University Press Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press © 2011 Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire Pers Leuven. Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 D/2011/1869/3 NUR: 735-732 Design cover: Joke Klaassen Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press Contents Efficiency and Effectiveness of Plutarch’s Broadcasting Ethics G. Roskam – L. Van der Stockt 7 1. Virtues for the people Semper duo, numquam tres? Plutarch’s Popularphilosophie on Friendship and Virtue in On having many friends L. Van der Stockt 19 What is Popular about Plutarch’s ‘Popular Philosophy’? Chr. Pelling 41 Plutarch’s Lives and the Critical Reader T.E. Duff 59 Greek Poleis and the Roman Empire: Nature and Features of Political Virtues in an Autocratic System P. Desideri 83 Del Satiro che voleva baciare il fuoco (o Come trarre vantaggio dai nemici) J.C. Capriglione 99 Plutarch’s ‘Diet-Ethics’. Precepts of Healthcare Between Diet and Ethics L. Van Hoof 109 2. Some theoretical questions on ethical praxis Plutarchan Morality: Arete, Tyche, and Non-Consequentialism H.M. Martin 133 Virtue, Fortune, and Happiness in Theory and Practice J. Opsomer 151 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 6 contents Plutarch Against Epicurus on Affection for Offspring. A Reading of De amore prolis G. Roskam 175 3. Virtues and vices Plutarch’s ‘Minor’ Ethics: Some Remarks on De garrulitate, De curiositate, and De vitioso pudore A.G. Nikolaidis 205 Plutarchs Schrift gegen das Borgen (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν δανείζεσθαι): Adressaten, Lehrziele und Genos H.G. Ingenkamp 223 Competition and its Costs: Φιλονικία in Plutarch’s Society and Heroes Ph.A. Stadter 237 4. ‘Popular philosophy’ in context Astrometeorología y creencias sobre los astros en Plutarco A. Pérez Jiménez 259 Bitch is Not a Four-Letter Word. Animal Reason and Human Passion in Plutarch J. Mossman – F. Titchener 273 Autour du miroir. Les miroitements d’une image dans l’œuvre de Plutarque F. Frazier 297 Bibliography 327 Index Locorum 351 Abstracts 377 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press Plutarch’s ‘Minor’ Ethics: Some Remarks on De garrulitate, De curiositate, and De vitioso pudore A.G. Nikolaidis According to Ziegler’s classification, the largest category (twenty-three titles) of the Moralia treatises comprises those which Ziegler (1964) labels as “Die popularphilosophisch-ethischen Schriften” (coll. 1, 66, 131ff.), a category which can accommodate even more titles, in my opinion, because some essays classified as “rhetorisch-epideiktischen” are in essence, despite their declamatory nature, fully fledged ethical tracts: An virtus doceri possit, for example, or An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat, or Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores. In any case, if we attempt to subdivide Plutarch’s writings on popular ethical philosophy into smaller and more homogeneous groups, we will probably create five subclasses. One would include, for instance, the essays dealing with virtue and vice (and their manifestations) in general and at a more or less theoretical level, notably De virtute morali, De virtute et vitio, De invidia et odio, etc.1. A second category would include essays that contain practical advice with direct bearing on our daily association with our fellow men. Here I would list De adulatore et amico, De amicorum multitudine, De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, and even De laude ipsius. A third subclass consists, I think, of essays pertaining to family relations and values: De fraterno amore and De amore prolis2, but also Coniugalia praecepta3. The fourth category is 1 In this category we may also include De profectibus in virtute and De cupiditate divitiarum. 2 Ziegler (1964), col. 1 lists this declamatory essay under the heading “Die tierpsychologischen Schriften”. 3 But I would be disinclined to include here the Consolatio ad uxorem or the Amatorius, both also belonging to Plutarch’s popular ethical philosophy according to Ziegler. Yet, consolatory literature is a category on its own (let alone that this is a private and personal letter rather than a rhetorical piece with the usual stock themes and motifs; contrast the spurious letter to Apollonius, and note that the Lamprias Catalogue features two more consolatory epistles, nos. 111 and 157), and its contents often go beyond, I think, popular ethics. And so do several lofty pronouncements and Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 206 a.g. nikolaidis comprised of De tranquillitate animi and De tuenda sanitate praecepta – that is, two treatises which are concerned with living happily at large, and therefore furnish us with ample advice on how to achieve and maintain an appropriate state of mind and body4. Finally, the fifth subclass would include the treatises which discuss certain faults and foibles and suggest ways to help us get rid of them. Here belong De cohibenda ira, De garrulitate, De curiositate, De vitioso pudore, and, perhaps, De vitando aere alieno. This paper will discuss the manner with which Plutarch treats the minor foibles of ἀδολεσχία (garrulity, talkativeness), πολυπραγμοσύνη (indiscreet curiosity, inquisitiveness, meddlesomeness)5, and δυσωπία (compliancy, excessive shyness or modesty, overscrupulousness)6. The reason for which I am leaving out De cohibenda ira and De vitando aere alieno from this discussion is that irascibility is commonly regarded as a very grave fault and not a minor shortcoming7, whereas, by contrast, borrowing is a dangerous habit rather than an actual moral failing. Plutarch himself, after all, nowhere in his essay calls borrowing an affection (πάθος) or a disease (νόσημα)8, as he repeatedly does so in the case of the other foibles above. For adoleschia see 502E (disease), 504F (affection and disease), 510CD (affect./dis.), 511E (dis.), 513D (dis.); for polypragmosynē 515C (affect.), 518C (affect.), 519C (dis.), 520D (affect.), 522CD ideas of the Amatorius, of course. One might further object that affections such as love and grief are not easily susceptible to moral assessment and regulation. 4 The desired balance between the two was proverbial (Νοῦς ὑγιὴς ἐν σώματι ὑγιεῖ). Cf. Pl., Ti. 88bc. It is worth remembering here that for Plutarch the end of good health is to enable man to obtain and practise virtue (cf. De tuenda 135C and 137E). 5 As our discussion will make clear, polypragmosynē in Plutarch’s essay means something different from its well-known (and mostly political; cf. Adkins [1976]) connotations ‘occupation or interference with many things’, ‘propensity for intrigue’, ‘over-activity and restlessness’. Cf. Van Hoof (2008), 297 n. 6 and 300-303; see also p. 208 below. 6 Despite its clear etymology (δύσ- + ὤψ [ὄπωπα]), this word lends itself to various (albeit kindred) senses and nuances and is difficult to translate into any language. See the pertinent remarks of De Lacy – Einarson (1959), 42 and 46 n. a; Klaerr (1974), 178 n. 4; and, above all, Zucchelli (1965), who provides an excellent survey of the meaning and usage of δυσωπία/δυσωποῦμαι in earlier Greek literature (pp. 215-20). 7 See, e.g., [Arist.], MM 1202b11: ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν οὖσα ἀκρασία ψεκτοτάτη. Cf. also Ingenkamp (1971), 80, 92ff., 125. 8 Yet, in 829C, being in debt (τὸ ὀφείλειν) is characterized (if through Herodotus and the Persians) as a serious error (ἁμάρτημα); and in 829Ε it is recognized that borrowing brings along αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ . . . τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀφροσύνης καὶ μαλακίας ἐστίν (cf. also 830B). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 207 (affect./dis.); for dysōpia 528D (affect.), 529E (affect.), 530E (dis.), 532D (affect./dis.), 533D (affect.), 535F (affect.), 536C (affect.). By calling the above foibles affections and maladies of the soul, Plutarch can open the war against them more easily; first, because affections in general are directly linked with vice (cf. Animine an corp. 500E: . . . ἡ κακία πολύχυτος καὶ δαψιλὴς οὖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν), and, secondly, because the affections of the soul are far worse than those of the body, as the latter are at least perceived by the reason, whereas the former escape notice, since reason is part of the afflicted soul (ibid.: τῶν μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσημάτων ἐρρωμένος ὁ λογισμὸς αἰσθάνεται, τοῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς συννοσῶν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει κρίσιν ἐν οἷς πάσχει, πάσχει γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει). Cf. De vit. pud. 531E. For the close relationship between pathos and nosēma, cf. also De ad. et am. 60D, the relevant references above (affection/disease – see nn. 30-31 and p. 220), and Pettine (1992), 129 n. 16. To begin with, the structure of our three essays is fairly uniform9. One part includes the definition of the foible and a brief discussion of its main features; another consists of examples – taken from real daily life but mainly from history and literature – illustrating the behaviour of the character concerned as well as the consequences of this behaviour (dangers, ridicule, etc.); and a third part deals with the therapy of the ailment by means of suggestions and advice on the steps which one has to take in order to cure oneself. The above structure, however, is not as distinct and clear-cut as it sounds (see Appendix). Plutarch is a good prose artist and, as such, far from allowing himself to become monotonous, he is always after variatio and multiplicity in presenting his material (cf. Klaerr’s remark in n. 16). De garrulitate, for example, starts off with the observation that ἀδολεσχία, subsequently depicted as one of the maladies of the soul (502E: . . . νοσήμασι τῆς ψυχῆς), is very difficult to cure; for while its remedy requires listening, the garrulous always talk and never listen (502C: οἱ δ᾿ ἀδόλεσχοι οὐδενὸς ἀκούουσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ λαλοῦσι)10. Thus, we also understand what adoleschia is, since no proper definition is ever given in the treatise. De curiositate, by contrast, begins with an exhortation to the inquisitive: if you cannot uproot your πολυπραγμοσύνη (two definitions of the pathos [515C] are given in this case, at 515D 9 For a diagram of this structure, see my Appendix. For a comprehensive analysis of their subject matter see Ingenkamp (1971), 44-62. 10 From this we may gather that Plutarch derived ἀδολεσχία from ἄδην + λέσχη (= ‘talk to satiety’), and not from ἀηδολεσχία (α-privative + ἁδὴς + λέσχη, namely, ‘unpleasant talk’). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 208 a.g. nikolaidis [ p. 215] and 518C [n. 42]), shift its direction and make it look inwards, instead of outwards. In other words, make your inquisitiveness investigate your inside, your inner self, and your own affairs, instead of the affairs and troubles of others. As for the beginning of De vitioso pudore, compliancy is introduced as a bad outgrowth of a good nature (528D: χρηστῆς δὲ φύσεως . . . [ἐξάνθημα])11, although immediately afterwards (and throughout this essay), δυσωπία is treated in Aristotelian terms, as one of the two vicious extremes around the quality of proper modesty (αἰδώς)12. Our treatises differ in their central parts too. In De garrulitate Plutarch, on the one hand, underscores what a tedious and irksome fellow man the ἀδολέσχης makes (worse than the drunkard, for he talks foolishness when he is sober too – 504B) and, on the other, points out with many examples the capital dangers he is liable to bring upon himself on account of his talkativeness. These examples, however, at the same time – and perhaps primarily – illustrate and glorify the unique value and usefulness of the opposite conduct: remaining silent and being reticent. The central part of De curiositate is not clearly demarcated. Besides, unlike adoleschia, which is illustrated with examples mostly taken from history and literature, the apparent lack of such examples of polypragmosynē obliges Plutarch to illustrate the behaviour of the inquisitive by means of instances from contemporary daily life, a welcome boon for us, indeed, because some of his examples allow us to take glimpses at contemporary social conditions and mores (see, e.g., 516E or 522A). But several of his pertinent remarks here in fact belong to the other parts of the treatise, namely, to the definition and therapy sections (cf. 517C, 518BC, 519C, and see Appendix). The words πολυπράγμων, πολυπραγμοσύνη, πολυπραγμονεῖν do occur in the Lives, but mostly denote what their etymology suggests: to busy oneself about many things (cf. Van Hoof [2008], 300-303). Van Hoof suggests that one reason for which Plutarch’s heroes are free from polypragmosynē “as understood in On Curiosity” should 11 Hence the treatment of this foible requires delicate handling; for, unlike garrulity and meddlesomeness, which cannot be mistaken for some good character trait, compliancy is not very far from the commendable qualities of modesty, self-respect, and decency. In trying, therefore, to drive out one’s immoderate shyness, one ought to be careful enough so as not to eradicate one’s sense of decency along with it. 12 Aristotle’s attributes are ἀναίσχυντος, καταπλήξ, αἰδήμων (cf. EN 1108a33-35, EE 1221a1, MM 1193a1-2). Instead of κατάπληξις and καταπλήξ (the extremes on the side of excess), Plutarch has δυσωπία and εὐδυσώπητος (De vit. pud. 528D). Note, however, that for Aristotle αἰδώς, although a commendable quality, is not a proper virtue (EN 1108a32: ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δέ; cf. also ibid. 1128b10). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 209 be ascribed to the narrative character of the Lives, which “makes polypragmosynē not so suited as an affection for the protagonists” (p. 307). This is not very convincing, because the same narrativity does not prevent Plutarch from imputing so many other affections and failings – also unsuitable for a protagonist – to his heroes; see, e.g., Nicias’ superstition or Alcibiades’ frivolity. Polypragmosynē is absent from the Lives simply because Plutarch’s worthies were not polypragmones (in the sense in which the term is used in the essay), as Van Hoof herself rightly observes (ibid.). For other discussions of Plutarch’s concept of polypragmosynē, see Volpe Cacciatore (1987) and the commentaries of Pettine (1977) and Inglese (1996). Finally, the central part of De vitioso pudore is the shortest of all (only one chapter). And what Plutarch’s scant literary/historical examples of dysōpia actually demonstrate, is, as in the case of adoleschia (see p. 208 and, e.g., 504F), the devastating consequences of this weakness (see below)13. The third part of our essays, which is devoted to the treatment of the respective foibles, is the longest and most uniform (see Appendix). But even here Plutarch’s regimens are set out in various ways. In De garrulitate we are first required to diagnose and admit our failing, and subsequently to muse upon its shameful and painful effects, which moreover constitute the very antithesis of our expectations14. Then we must consider the opposite behaviour and bring to our minds the mysterious and solemn character of silence as well as the praises bestowed on reticence or on pithy and aphoristic speech. Garrulity is not checked by reins, but can be controlled by habituation (511E: . . . ἔθει δεῖ κρατῆσαι τοῦ νοσήματος). Accordingly, accustom yourself to remain silent in various situations; practise answering not hastily, but thoughtfully and succinctly; avoid speaking and dilating on your favourite subjects15; and a last tip, albeit of rather doubtful usefulness: turn your garrulity into writing, for written adoleschia is less unpleasant (514C: ἧττον γὰρ ἀηδὲς ἔσται τὸ λάλον ἐν τῷ φιλολόγῳ πλεονάζον). The gist, then, of Plutarch’s psychotherapy is: first ponder on the disadvantages of your ailment, and then take up exercises intended to habituate you out of it. 13 Literary/historical examples of resisting dysōpia are appropriately discussed in the third part of the essay, where Plutarch invigorates his suggested psychotherapy by providing models for imitation as well. 14 Cf. 510D: . . . φιλεῖσθαι βουλόμενοι μισοῦνται, χαρίζεσθαι θέλοντες ἐνοχλοῦσι, θαυμάζεσθαι δοκοῦντες καταγελῶνται . . . ὥστε τοῦτο πρῶτον ἴαμα καὶ φάρμακόν ἐστι τοῦ πάθους, ὁ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γινομένων αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν ἐπιλογισμός. 15 Cf. 514AB: an interesting psychological insight, for whoever is inclined to dilate on familiar subjects discloses his being φίλαυτος . . . καὶ φιλόδοξος. See also 513E. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 210 a.g. nikolaidis The therapy of polypragmosynē is already adumbrated in the first part of De curiositate. And later, chapter 5 expands the idea of turning one’s inquisitiveness inwards, by suggesting its further diverting to the marvels and secrets of nature or even to the countless evildoings and crimes of history, given that polypragmosynē is inclined to search out evil (see p. 215 below). But Plutarch’s psychotherapy proper comprises again two things: a) reflection on the fault (dangers involved, the futility and uselessness of one’s indiscreet inquiries), and b) acquiring habits which overpower (in fact undermine) one’s inquisitiveness (520D: μέγιστον μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἐθισμός). Some examples: refrain from reading the incriptions on tombs or walls, accustom yourself not to look inside another’s house as you walk past it, refrain from attending a street brawl, get accustomed to ignore useless shows and spectacles, exercise to check even normal curiosity (take your time to read the letters you receive). Remember, finally, that by being inquisitive you resemble a detested informer (cf. Arist., Rh. 1382a7: . . . μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας). But this last item, which concludes the whole essay (523AB), belongs to the province of reflection, of course (cf. n. 14). Some of the above features of a polypragmōn appear to sustain Van Hoof’s view that the meaning and treatment of polypragmosynē in Plutarch’s essay may have its roots in comedy (cf. p. 303 and nn. 28 and 34). But I would not go so far as to say that Plutarch’s portrait of the polypragmōn is unrealistic and caricatural (p. 305), because this would defeat the serious ethical purpose of the treatise (cf. also pp. 215-16 below). In De vitioso pudore, however, reflection and exercise (or Krisis und Askesis, to use Ingenkamp’s terminology; [1971], 6 and 74-124), the two pivots on which Plutarch’s suggested psychotherapy revolves, are presented in a reverse order16. First come some new habits and attitudes we ought to adopt – in other words, the training and practice we need in order to overcome our weakness (chapters 5-8)17 – and then fol- 16 This reversal is probably deliberate, because Plutarch, regarding dysōpia as a dangerous malady that causes many evils, makes haste to advise how it may be cured (530E: Ὡς οὖν πολῶν κακῶν αἴτιον τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο ὂν πειρατέον ἀποβιάζεσθαι τῇ ἀσκήσει); note also that he mostly calls dysōpia a pathos (see p. 207 above). Klaerr (1974), however, sees this reversal as “la manifestation de la liberté de Plutarque”, who nowhere in his writings applies with rigour a particular plan, but “s’abandonne volontiers aux détours de l’inspiration” (p. 24). Generally speaking, however, this remark is right on the mark. See also ibid. p. 24 n. 2. 17 The exercises suggested are gradated (cf. also De cur. 520D). By not yielding to usual social pressures (e.g., to keep on drinking against your will or to praise Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 211 lows the reflection part, namely, a number of thoughts accompanied by historical examples18, which, if borne in mind and taken into due account, are also expected to facilitate our endeavour to resist dysōpia (chapters 9-19). One salutary reflection, for example, is to remember that affections often involve us in situations contrary to those we desire and strive after. Thus, as philodoxia may lead to disgrace, philēdonia to distress, philonikia to defeat, and so on, dysōpia, by fearing ill repute, may involve us in outright disrepute (532D; cf. p. 220)19. What is peculiar to the third part – that is, to the advice section of De vitioso pudore – is the great number of historical and literary examples, which, however, also pervade the central parts of the other two essays. But, whereas there Plutarch appeals to history and literature to illustrate the foibles concerned and exemplify the behaviour of the garrulous and the inquisitive, here he finds it more fitting to use historical examples in order to validate his advice on how dysōpia can be resisted. Let us now concentrate on each one of our treatises in turn. In Theophrastus’ Characters, there are four human types representing foibles related to speaking: the ἀδολέσχης wears out his interlocutor, whom he often does not know, with his trivial, incoherent, and foolish talk that concerns, more or less, himself and his affairs. The λάλος is not a simpleton (as the ἀδολέσχης seems to be), but suffers from real incontinence of speech (ἀκρασία λόγου)20; he is unable to keep his mouth shut, and thus he either exasperates others or makes them doze off by someone out of politeness; cf. 530F-531C), you will gradually be able to reject all unlawful requests. Cf. 532C: Ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἐθισθεὶς καὶ ἀσκήσας δυσάλωτος ἔσται, μᾶλον δὲ ὅλως ἀνεπιχείρητος, ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι. 18 These are mostly clever repartees of illustrious men towards those who importuned them with unlawful requests. We are called to bear them in mind and somehow imitate them (533A ff.). 19 As a matter of fact, we are often aware that the petitioner is a scoundrel and that our complying with his request out of bashfulness will damage us; this is why, in the case of dysōpia, regret is present right from the start (533D: Διὸ τῶν παθῶν μάλιστα τῷ δυσωπεῖσθαι τὸ μετανοεῖν οὐχ ὕστερον, ἀλ᾿ εὐθὺς ἐν οἷς πράττει πάρεστι; cf. also 535D). Another reflection: if the wicked do not abandon their vices for our sake (tell a miser to lend money without a bond, or an ambitious man to step down from office), why should we abandon our virtue for their sake (535BC)? A final one: we ought to remember our previous regrets and the damage suffered because of our dysōpia (536CD). Cf. De cur., chapter 10 ad init. 20 But this ‘Theophrastean’ definition (as well as most of the definitions of the Characters) is a later addition (cf. Rusten [19932], 30-32 and 73 n. 1). In Plutarch τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀκρατὲς καὶ ἀόριστον emblematizes drunkenness, which is linked with adoleschia on account of this very characteristic (503E); cf. also 508B. It is worth noting here that, for Plutarch, polypragmosynē is also a form of incontinence (519E: ἀκρασίας γὰρ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 212 a.g. nikolaidis his incessant talk. The λογοποιός is the newsmaker, the rumourmonger who invents untrue reports or events; and, finally, the κακολόγος is the evil-speaker, the person who enjoys disseminating bad news, relishes slanderous and malicious gossip, and is generally bent towards presenting everything in the worst possible light. Plutarch’s ἀδολέσχης (invariably called λάλος and φλύαρος as well)21 combines all the characteristics of the Theophrastean types22, except, perhaps, those of the newsmaker23. But he also has an important particularity that is missing from the portraits of Theophrastos: sometimes because of his inability to control his tongue and keep his mouth shut, but more often out of frivolity, thoughtlessness, or misjudgement, the Plutarchean adoleschēs divulges secrets that incur his ruin24. Yet, its consequences aside, why is garrulity per se an affection (πάθος) and a malady (νόσημα) of the soul (cf. pp. 206-207 above), comparable moreover to such diseases as avarice (φιλαργυρία), ambition (φιλοδοξία), and lasciviousness (φιληδονία)? The more so, since the garrulous is well-intentioned, his aim being, as we are told, to gratify others and gain their love and admiration (see n. 14). Be that as it may, wherever we encounter examples of passions or affections or emotions in both Plutarch and other authors, we usually hear of anger, envy, malice, pity, cowardice, ambition, contentiousness, avarice, hatred, spitefulness, insolence, sexual desire, profligacy, etc.25. In Aristotle, for instance, ἀκρασία (with no qualifier) denotes incontinence or self-indulgence only in bodily pleasures26, whereas the qualified akrasia (e.g., incontinence in anger, honour, gain – but never in speech) is an error (ἁμαρτία) and not a vice proper27. In any case, outside Plutarch’s essay, talkativeness, 21 Especially for lalos, cf. 502F, 503D, 509A, 514C; for phluaros, 508C, 510C, 511D. Other synonyms are μωρολογία (504B) and γλωσσαλγία (510A). 22 For lalos, see 502F, 507C-E; for kakologos, 504F, 505B, 509A-C. 23 Yet 507D ( . . . προσέθηκε τὸν κοινὸν ἁπάσης ἀδολεσχίας ἐπῳδόν, τὸ ‘ταῦτα μηδενὶ φράσῃς ἀλὰ σιώπα’) does bring to mind Theophr. Char. 8,9 (Δεῖ δ᾿ αὐτόν σε μόνον εἰδέναι). 24 Inability to control his tongue and keep his mouth shut: 508AB (for he knew it was a secret, as 508B makes clear). Frivolity/thoughtlessness: 505B, 505CD, 508F, 509F. Misjudgement: 505CD, 508D-F, 509DE. 25 As far as Plutarch is concerned, see, e.g., the affections mentioned in Animine an corp., esp. 501A-D. 26 Cf. Arist., EN 1147b22-24; 1149b25-26 (καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον); 1150a13; MM 1202b3-4. Cf. also Ps.-Pl., Def. 416a. 27 Cf. Arist., EN 1145b20; 1148a3 ff.; 1148b10; MM 1202b7-9 (τιμὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ ὅσα ἄλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσὶν ψεκτά, αἱ δ᾿ ἡδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταί). From another viewpoint, even the unqualified akrasia is not a real vice, because the akratēs resists his passion before succumbing to it (cf. EN 1151a5- Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 213 however incessant or foolish or harassing, is nowhere else described, to my knowledge at least, as an affection or a disease of the soul28. Plutarch himself gives two indirect reasons for this characterization, but neither is plausible, let alone convincing. The first is because garrulity is dangerous, ridiculous, and detestable, which all are supposed to be features of passions at large29, and the second because it can be combated by proper training and exercise like, again, all the other affections of the soul30. Why then does Plutarch call adoleschia an affection and treat it as such? I would suggest two reasons, which, as will be seen, are equally valid in the case of the other foibles. One is philosophical, as it were, and the other peculiar to Plutarch’s idiosyncracy. The philosophical reason is that, in Plutarch’s eyes, controlling one’s tongue manifests in fact the overall control of reason – in other words, the preponderance of the rational part of the psyche. Accordingly, incontinence of speech indicates lack of this control, which in turn suggests a disarrayed psyche governed, or at least influenced, by the irrational element31, a situation to be strongly condemned, of course, by a faithful follower of Plato. Plutarch adroitly proves his point with the most suitable example of Odysseus sitting admirably composed beside Penelope only a few days before the slaughter of the suitors. Odysseus controlled, Plutarch tells us after quoting the relevant Homeric lines (Od. XIX, 210-212), every limb of his body, with all parts in perfect obedience and submission, his eyes ordered not to weep, his tongue not to utter a sound, his heart not to tremble; for his reason extended even to his irrational or involuntary movements and made everything amenable and subservient 8: ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλὰ πῇ ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν). For the Stoics also, akrasia is not a primary, but a subordinate (to akolasia) vice (cf. SVF III, 265 [ p. 65.19]). 28 With the exception, perhaps, of the slanderous talkativeness (διαβολή), which betrays hatred (cf. Arist., Rh. 1382a1ff.). On the other hand, among other lovable characters one also finds καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους (ibid. 1381b5-7). The Stoic lists of affections (πάθη) feature no term akin to adoleschia either (cf. SVF III, 391ff. [ p. 95-100]). 29 Cf. 504F: Τῶν δ’ ἄλων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι ἐπικίνδυνα τὰ δὲ μισητὰ τὰ δὲ καταγέλαστα, τῇ δ’ ἀδολεσχίᾳ πάντα συμβέβηκε. 30 510C: τῶν γὰρ παθῶν κρίσει καὶ ἀσκήσει περιγινόμεθα. Cf. Ingenkamp (1971), 74ff.; Pettine (1992), 151 s.f.; Klaerr (1974), 4 and 23. Also 511E: . . . ἀλ᾿ ἔθει δεῖ κρατῆσαι τοῦ νοσήματος. 31 For the composition of psyche, see, conveniently, De virtute morali, esp. 441F-442E. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 214 a.g. nikolaidis to itself (Helmbold’s LCL translation)32. And, further below, Plutarch propounds that reason should be a permanent barrier in the tongue’s way33. As a matter of fact, if reason had played its role as such a barrier, many characters of his historical examples would not have perished as they did (see p. 212 with n. 24 above). As for the idiosyncratic reason, it is linked with a fundamental characteristic of Plutarch’s nature and personality, namely, his practical spirit combined with his loyalty to common sense34. I have discussed this aspect of Plutarch elsewhere (see (1991), 175-86), but here suffice it to say that the very titles of several of his essays, and the amount of practical advice or perspective contained in nearly all his Moralia, clearly demonstrate his pragmatic ethics35. It can hardly be doubted that Plutarch’s moral essays mainly aimed at two things: individual ethical improvement and harmonious human relationships. In other words, Plutarch was chiefly interested in helping people to lead good lives both as individuals and as members of a wider society36. Accordingly, apart from appreciating individual moral conduct, he attributes equal importance to one’s performance as a social being, for he also believes that moral excellence is tried and proven continually in our daily intercourse with our fellow men. He is, moreover, aware that the desired harmony in human relationships is best secured and maintained not (so much) by such cardinal virtues as courage (andreia) and temperance (sōphrosyne), for example, but 506AB: . . . οὕτω τὸ σῶμα μεστὸν ἦν αὐτῷ πανταχόθεν ἐγκρατείας, καὶ πάντ᾿ ἔχων ὁ λόγος εὐπειθῆ καὶ ὑποχείρια προσέταττε τοῖς ὄμμασι μὴ δακρύειν, τῇ γλώττῃ μὴ φθέγεσθαι, τῇ καρδίᾳ μὴ τρέμειν . . . μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων κινημάτων διήκοντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα πεποιημένου κατήκοον ἑαυτῷ καὶ χειρόηθες (cf. also De virt. mor. 442DE and De tranq. an. 475A). 33 Cf. 510A: διὸ δεῖ πεφράχθαι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς πρόβολον ἐμποδὼν ἀεὶ τῇ γλώττῃ κείμενον ἐπισχεῖν τὸ ῥεῦμα καὶ τὸν ὄλισθον αὐτῆς. Cf. also how Socrates controlled his thirst: he would drink only after he had drawn up and poured out the first bucketful, so that his irrational part (τὸ ἄλογον) might acquire the habit of τὸν τοῦ λόγου καιρὸν ἀναμένειν (512F). 34 Or “le bon sens est sa règle”, as Gréard (1874), 382 puts it. Cf. Russell (1973), 85, and Trench (1873), 130 (cf. n. 63). 35 Titles: How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend, How to Profit by One’s Enemies, How the Young Should Study Poetry, How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue, How to Praise Oneself Inoffensively, How to Control One’s Anger, How to Keep One’s Peace of Mind, etc. Advice: besides the essays discussed in this paper, see also the practical perspective of his Health Precepts, Marital Precepts, and Political Precepts. Cf. also his attacks on the Stoics and the Epicureans: the dogmatism of the former not only militates against common sense, but also renders their teachings useless; on the other hand, the tenets of the latter condemn man to inactivity. 36 Cf. Hartman (1916), 668: “altiora spectavit [sc. P.] nihilque magni fecit quod non ad aeternam hominum pertineret salutem et felicitatem”. 32 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 215 rather through less pretentious qualities, such as considerateness, kindness, moderation, tolerance. And the glorification of praotes and philanthropia in his Lives is directly related, I would argue, to these very beliefs. Similarly, he also observes that people are not alienated from each other only by acts of injustice or a display of malice, but perhaps more often through the impact of minor failings such as garrulity or indiscreet curiosity. Finally, Plutarch assumed morality to be one, undivided and unchangeable (cf. Russell [1966], 142), and did not make a sharp distinction between major and minor ethics. He believed that such a distinction was superficial and that a person susceptible to the weaknesses of avarice, inquisitiveness, hot temper, or immoderate bashfulness could never attain ethical fulfilment. He agreed, then, with the Stoics that moral excellence was one and undivided, but, contrary to them, he also saw it from a progressive perspective (cf. his De profectibus in virtute). This ethical fulfilment is not given by nature or fortune, but has to be conquered step by step through the most personal efforts of the moral agent, the whole human being. Hence the importance which Plutarch attaches to denouncing those minor foibles (cf. Gréard [1874], 204). On the other hand, the characterization of polypragmosynē 37 as a disease appears to be more justified, since, according to Plutarch’s definition, inquisitiveness is free from neither envy nor malice (515D: φιλομάθειά τις ἐστιν ἀλοτρίων κακῶν, οὔτε φθόνου δοκοῦσα καθαρεύειν νόσος οὔτε κακοηθείας)38. As a matter of fact, it is Plutarch’s psychological interpretation of polypragmosynē that dissociates it from mere meddlesomeness and renders it a vice. The Plutarchean πολυπράγμων is an illwilled person (516A: τῇ κακονοίᾳ τὴν περιεργίαν ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸν ἐντίθησι), and therefore interested in inquiring about nothing except whatever is 37 As a synonym to polypragmosynē, Plutarch occasionally uses the words περιεργία (516A, 519A), τὸ περίεργον (517E), and τὸ φιλοπευθὲς . . . καὶ φιλόπραγμον (515F). It is worth noting that the Theophrastean περίεργος (the officious, the overzealous) has nothing to do with the Plutarchean one. Lamprias Catalogue 151 features a Περὶ περιεργίας, “conceivably an alternative title for Περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης”, according to Sandbach (1969), 22, or the title of a non-extant separate essay, according to Volpe Cacciatore (in Van Hoof [2008], 302 n. 22). 38 Cf. also 518C, where inquisitiveness is described as fondness of prying into whatever is hidden (φιλοπευστία τῶν ἐν ἀποκρύψει καὶ λανθανόντων); and what is hidden, Plutarch implies, must be something bad, since nobody conceals a good possession (οὐδεὶς δ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀποκρύπτει κεκτημένος). See also 519C and E, where inquisitiveness is compared with adultery but also with evil speaking (see n. 53 below). Cf. also nn. 15 and 22 above. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 216 a.g. nikolaidis evil, contains evil, or smacks of evil39, provided, however, that this evil always concerns the other and never himself. In reality, the inquisitive is so wicked, and his soul so full of all kinds of vices, that he simply cannot bear to face them. Thus, shuddering and frightened at what is within, the inquisitive feeds his malice on the evil he finds without, more specifically on the troubles of others40. In other words, prying into the affairs of others is in fact a way of escaping from oneself, a very unphilosophical attitude indeed, given that the aim of philosophy, according to Socrates at least, was first to recognize one’s own faults and then try to get rid of them (516C: ἐπιγνῶναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κακὰ καὶ ἀπαλαγῆναι)41. This is why our polypragmōn has no curiosity about the movements of the heavenly bodies or about the ways by which the plants grow and bloom (p. 210 above); because he can find no evil (οὐθὲν κακὸν) in those things (517E). Yet, by desiring to search out the troubles of others, the inquisitive reveals his malice, a brother affection of envy and jealousy, offspring of his own vicious nature42. As far as dysōpia is concerned43, although Plutarch almost exclusively describes it as a pathos (see p. 207), he is at the same time careful to point out a peculiarity of this affection (namely its affinity with modesty), which of necessity requires special treatment (see n. 11). For, unlike indiscreet curiosity, which springs from a malicious nature, excessive bashfulness is a blemish of a good nature (528D; p. 208) or, to use Plutarch’s own words in the proem of the Life of Cimon, a deficiency of virtue rather than a base product of vice44. In fact, what makes dysōpia 39 Cf. 517E: ἀλ᾿ εἰ δεῖ πάντως τὸ περίεργον ἐν φαύλοις τισίν . . . ἀεὶ νέμεσθαι καὶ διατρίβειν . . . For the association of polypragmosynē with evil, cf. also 517F, 518B (τὰ τῶν πολυπραγμόνων ὦτα τοὺς φαυλοτάτους λόγους ἐπισπᾶται). See also previous note. 40 Cf. 516D: . . . ἀλ᾿ ἡ ψυχὴ γέμουσα κακῶν παντοδαπῶν καὶ φρίττουσα καὶ φοβουμένη τὰ ἔνδον ἐκπηδᾷ θύραζε καὶ πλανᾶται περὶ τἀλότρια, βόσκουσα καὶ πιαίνουσα τὸ κακόηθες . . . ; and 516E: τὰ κρυπτόμενα καὶ λανθάνοντα κακὰ πάσης οἰκίας ἐκλέγουσι. Cf. also 519F. 41 For everyone is full of faults, according to Democritus (cf. Animine an corp. 500D: ἂν δὲ σαυτὸν ἔνδοθεν ἀνοίξῃς, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαθὲς κακῶν ταμιεῖον εὑρήσεις καὶ θησαύρισμα). What is important, though, is to examine your inside and recognize this fact (515E: οὕτω σοι τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀπὸ φθόνου κακὰ κείμενα, τὰ δ᾿ ἀπὸ ζηλοτυπίας, τὰ δ᾿ ἀπὸ δειλίας, τὰ δ᾿ ἀπὸ μικρολογίας· ταῦτα ἔπελθε, ταῦτα ἀναθεώρησον); this is the first step towards one’s cure, as we have already seen (De gar. 510CD, p. 209 with n. 14 above). 42 518C: κακῶν οὖν ἱστορίας ὁ πολυπράγμων ὀρεγόμενος, ἐπιχαιρεκακίας συνέχεται πάθει, φθόνου καὶ βασκανίας ἀδελφῷ . . . ἀμφότερα δ᾿ ἐκ πάθους ἀνημέρου καὶ θηριώδους γεγένηται τῆς κακοηθείας. 43 Zucchelli (1965), 215 rightly observes that Plutarch’s essay constitutes the very first treatment of this notion (and the only one, as Ziegler [1964/1951], 146/782 had already ascertained), which presupposes a rich personal experience of this phenomenon (cf. also ibid. pp. 224-25 and 229). Hence, in agreement with De Lacy – Einarson (1959), 45, he plausibly regards this treatise as belonging to Plutarch’s maturity (p. 216). 44 Cim. 2.5: . . . ἐλείμματα μᾶλον ἀρετῆς τινος ἢ κακίας πονηρεύματα. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 217 an undesirable character trait is the element of the excess involved (528E: ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸ δυσωπεῖσθαι . . . [τὴν] αἰσχυντηλίαν μέχρι τοῦ μηδ᾿ ἀντιβλέπειν τοῖς δεομένοις ὑπείκουσαν [δυσωπίαν ὠνόμασαν]), on account of which shyness drifts into undue submission and compliance with any request (unlawful ones included), and as such it becomes the cause of bad behaviour (528D: αἰτίαν . . . μοχθηρίας) and many evils (see n. 16); for those who are too shy and comply with every petition make the same mistakes as the shameless, the only difference being that the former rue their errors and grieve over them, while the latter take pleasure in theirs45. Dysōpia, therefore, is a negative quality only because of its consequences. And this Plutarch aptly demonstrates by observing that when Homer says that modesty greatly harms and benefits men, he puts its harmfulness first46. Appropriately so, Plutarch comments, for modesty “becomes helpful and profitable to men, only when reason removes its overplus and leaves us with the right amount” (LCL transl.); in other words, when reason transforms it from dysōpia to proper modesty. This once again brings to the fore the important role of reason, by the directives of which Plutarch weighs and assesses moral conduct47. Thus, as the therapy of garrulity is ultimately effected with the help of reason (see pp. 213-14), so in the case of dysōpia it is reason again that will treat one’s excessive shyness or overscrupulousness and render it harmless; for a good nature (and dysōpia, as we saw [ p. 208], is a blemish of such a nature) responds well to the cultivation of its rational part48. Similarly, as excessive talkativeness betrays a lack of the control of reason (see p. 213), so immoderate bashfulness prevents us from using our reason (532AB: . . . ἡ δυσωπία . . . περὶ τὰ μείζονα παραιρεῖται τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ λογισμοῦ); for we often act contrary to our better judgement, sometimes lest we should appear offensive49, and sometimes because we allow the shamelessness of the petitioner (although we loathe and resent it) to bring down and overpower our reason (533D: . . . ἀλὰ δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ βαρυνόμενοι τὴν ἀναίδειαν ἀνατρέπουσαν ἡμῶν καὶ καταβιαζομένην τὸν λογισμόν). 528D: τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἀναισχύντοις οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι πολάκις ἁμαρτάνουσι, πλὴν ὅτι τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀλγεῖν ἐφ᾿ οἷς διαμαρτάνουσι τούτοις πρόσεστιν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκείνοις τὸ ἥδεσθαι. 46 529D: ‘αἰδώς, ἥτ᾿ ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἠδ᾿ ὀνίνησι’. This line comes in fact from Hesiod, Op. 318, but Plutarch apparently believed that he had taken it from Iliad XXIV, 44-45. 47 See mainly his De virtute morali and cf. Zucchelli (1965), 226. 48 528D: . . . καὶ λόγῳ παρασχεῖν ἐργάσιμον ἑαυτὴν ἐπιεικῶς δυναμένης [sc. χρηστῆς φύσεως]. 49 Some examples: when ill, we call in our family doctor and not the specialist; instead of choosing competent teachers for our children, we use those who beg for employment; instead of hiring the best lawyer for our case, we commit it to the unskilled son of a friend or relative in order to do him a favour, etc. Cf. also 531E. 45 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 218 a.g. nikolaidis This and 532AB above eloquently illustrate the motivation underlying dysōpia. We yield to a request, now because we are flattered and wish to be obliging and agreeable, and now because we are timorous of the brazen importunity of the petitioner (cf. also 535D-536C). Yet we ought to make a firm stand against both and yield neither to intimidation nor to flattery (535EF). Modesty (αἰδώς) is also some fear of disrepute (cf. Arist., EN 1128b12: φόβος τις ἀδοξίας) but the αἰδήμων (who shows proper modesty) is interested only in the opinions of the right people, not in those of everyone, as the καταπλήξ (cf. n. 12) is (cf. EN 1108a35: ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος; EE 1233b28-30: . . . ὁ δὲ πάσης [sc. δόξης] ὁμοίως [sc. φροντίζων] καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων). The Stoics made a distinction between αἰσχύνη (SVF III, 409 [ p. 99.1]: φόβος ἀδοξίας) and αἰδώς (SVF III, 432 [ p. 105.40]: εὐλάβεια ὀρθοῦ ψόγου). Cf. Zucchelli (1965), 220 and notes ibid. But reason intervenes correctively also in the case of polypragmosynē. Since inquisitiveness is linked with information supplied by the senses, the more we use our minds, the less we need our senses (521D: τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀλίγιστα κινοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστα τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενοι). It follows, then, that our inquisitiveness will drastically be curtailed if it is trained to obey reason (521E: μεγάλα δ᾿ ὠφεληθήσῃ τὸ πολύπραγμον . . . ὑπακούειν τῷ λογισμῷ συνεθιζόμενον)50. Despite their essential differences, adoleschia and polypragmosynē share common aspects too51. Perhaps the most apparent one is that both foibles prevent those involved in them from fulfilling their desires. The garrulous man, for instance, yearns for listeners, but whenever he approaches a company, people either run away or remain silent to avoid furnishing him a hold (502EF). Similarly, when a snooper turns up, people stop talking about their affairs or some confidential matter, so that they may not give the polypragmōn food for gossip (519D). Further, there is also a certain interrelation between garrulity and inquisitiveness. In De garrulitate we see that garrulity may also give rise to inquisitiveness, for the garrulous wish to hear many things 50 As a matter of fact, the role of reason in combating one’s faults is self-evident. See generally the reflection sections of our treatises, and esp. De gar. 510D: to get rid of our passions (and faults), we must first realize, with the help of reason, their harmfulness and shamefulness (Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθίζεται φεύγειν καὶ ἀποτρίβεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ μὴ δυσχεραίνει. δυσχεραίνομεν δὲ τὰ πάθη, ὅταν τὰς βλάβας καὶ τὰς αἰσχύνας τὰς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ κατανοήσωμεν). See also n. 14 and pp. 213-14 with nn. 32-33 above. Cf. also Ingenkamp (1971), 74-80. 51 As Helmbold (1939) observes, the respective essays “are akin in many ways; portions of the later treatise [which he takes to be De garrulitate] are merely a reshaping of ideas and commonplaces which the earlier had adumbrated” (p. 471). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 219 so that they may have many things to tell52. In De curiositate, however, the same phenomenon is viewed from the opposite side, and garrulity, in the form of evil-speaking, is here presented not as the starting point, but as a necessary concomitant of indiscreet curiosity; for, what the inquisitive zealously search out they delight to tell everybody else53. In the former essay garrulity is the primary fault, while inquisitiveness is presented as a spin-off or side effect54; in the latter, however, the primary fault is inquisitiveness, which naturally engenders evilspeaking, given that indiscreet curiosity arises from one’s malignity (see above pp. 215-16)55. All in all, Plutarch’s moral treatises are well organized: his argumentation is clear and coherent, his various observations (and here I include his comments on the historical/literary examples which he adduces) are more or less judicious and on the mark, and his psychological insights perceptive and remarkable56. Yet, his zeal to substantiate his points with multiple arguments and as many practical examples as possible occasionally leads him to some unfortunate comparisons, and even contradictions or far-fetched and groundless assertions (see also p. 213). In the second chapter of De garrulitate, for instance, Plutarch remarks that, contrary to other maladies of the soul, such as philargyria, philodoxia, and philēdonia, where those affected may fulfil their desires all the same (502E: τὸ γοῦν τυγχάνειν ὧν ἐφίενται περίεστι), the garrulous man can hardly be as successful, because his prospective listeners tend 52 508C: τῇ δ᾿ ἀδολεσχίᾳ καὶ ἡ περιεργία κακὸν οὐκ ἔλαττον πρόσεστι· πολὰ γὰρ ἀκούειν θέλουσιν, ἵνα πολὰ λέγειν ἔχωσι. 53 Cf. 519C: τῇ δὲ περιεργίᾳ τὴν κακολογίαν ἀνάγκη συνακολουθεῖν· ἃ γὰρ ἡδέως ἀκούουσιν ἡδέως λαλοῦσι, καὶ ἃ παρ’ ἄλων σπουδῇ συλέγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους μετὰ χαρᾶς ἐκφέρουσιν. 54 But the circle is vicious; garrulity gives rise to inquisitiveness, but inquisitiveness will furnish the garrulous with material to rattle on. 55 The interrelation between adoleschia and polypragmosynē can also be seen in that they both constitute a form of incontinence (see n. 20), and, moreover, in that aspects of the behaviour of the polypragmōn (519AB) bring to mind the behaviour of the Theophrastean λογοποιός (cf. Characters 8,2-3 and n. 23 above). 56 See, for instance, 512C (adoleschia as impertinence), 520E (the harm from reading useless things), 533E (dysōpia makes us promise things beyond our power), 534B (it is easy to say ‘no’ to obscure or humble people). Cf. also n. 15. Mounard (1959) may indeed exaggerate when she calls Plutarch “un théoricien de l’âme” (see Zucchelli [1965], 225 n. 46, and Klaerr [1974], 23 n. 3), but only if we understand this statement in Aristotelian terms; for, Aristotle aside, she rightly affirms that Plutarch was “plus qu’un observateur” (ibid.), since several of his psychological judgements have gone through the filter of philosophy, if they do not directly emanate from philosophical premises (see also p. 213 above). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 220 a.g. nikolaidis to avoid him (p. 218)57. Common experience would not agree with Plutarch here, because although the garrulous often get the opposite of what they expect from their audience (see n. 14), their propensity and desire for chattering is nevertheless fulfilled. Besides, whereas in De garrulitate the lovers of money, pleasure, and glory may fulfil their desires, in De vitioso pudore we are told that the same characters find themselves in situations which are the exact opposite of what they are seeking (532CD: πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τοῖς νοσήμασιν ἃ φεύγειν δι’ αὐτῶν δοκοῦμεν, ἀδοξίαι φιλοδοξίαις καὶ λῦπαι φιληδονίαις καὶ πόνοι μαλακίαις καὶ φιλονικίαις ἧτται καὶ καταδίκαι. See also p. 211). Plutarch’s essay on talkativeness is at the same time a eulogy of silence and reticence. As a matter of fact, half of De garrulitate (chapters 7-18) is a comparative consideration of the advantages of reticence vis-à-vis the utmost perils of adoleschia. All appear to revolve around the motto οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω λόγος ὠφέλησε ῥηθεὶς ὡς πολοὶ σιωπηθέντες (505F)58. This being so, Plutarch’s attack on garrulity occasionally takes extreme forms. Here is a comparison with drunkenness (μέθη) and madness (μανία): madness (which, by implication, is worse than anger) is a bad thing and certainly to be avoided; drunkenness is madness of short duration, but more culpable than madness, because it is voluntary. The worst and most dangerous aspect of drunkenness is the incontinence of speech it involves; it follows, then, that garrulity, being incontinence of speech par excellence, is far worse and far more dangerous than drunkenness and madness (503D-F)59. Many men of letters, before and after Plutarch, devoted their lives to studying, reviewing, and exploiting in various ways the bulk of classical literature. Plutarch, however, differs from most of them in that he did not indulge in the study of antiquity for professional reasons, or antiquarian and scientific interest only, or out of a desire to be wise, or even an inner yearning for truth; he did so in view of a practical purpose, namely, in order to glean from Greek and Roman authors as many moral lessons as he could, and effect through them the ethical improvement of himself and his contemporaries60. And he tried to accomplish this by strongly emphasizing the importance of 57 A similar observation is also made in De cur. 519D with regard to the inquisitive (see p. 218). 58 Cf. also De gar. 515A; De tuenda 125D; and [De lib. educ.] 10F: καὶ γὰρ αὖ σιωπήσας μὲν οὐδεὶς μετενόησε, λαλήσαντες δὲ παμπληθεῖς. Further, Pettine (1992), 141 n. 81 reminds us here of Hor., Ars poet. 390: nescit vox missa reverti. 59 Somewhat far-fetched (if only because it is hard to observe it) is also the following exhortation in the therapy section of polypragmosynē: “Refuse to hear even words that have supposedly been spoken about yourself” (522B). 60 See the proem to Aem.-Tim. (1-3) and cf. n. 36. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics 221 virtuous conduct and skilfully connecting it with the great men and achievements of the two races. Plutarch indeed aims at man’s moral edification, but he is not the typical moralist, who, the whip of moral law in his hand, sermonizes ex cathedra and terrorizes his audience with the threat of the predominance of evil. Nor does he ever set up unbending rules or entirely perfect – and therefore unreal – models of ethical behaviour. Plutarch is convinced that perfect and absolute virtue is unattainable61, and so his admonitions are always within the capabilities of human nature, which has produced no character absolutely good and indisputably virtuous62. This is why the majority of his works have always appealed to ordinary people and to common sense63. If all the above are taken into due account, we will perhaps be more indulgent towards Plutarch and his treatises on popular moral philosophy. Despite the ethical preoccupations and the relevant didacticism of the author, and regardless of the overabundance of practical advice and some hackneyed arguments, these writings, far from being simply a manual of commonplaces64, perhaps constitute, if compared with other similar works of later and more modern times, the best specimen of the essay genre. 61 Cf. Cim. 2.4: . . . ἐπεὶ χαλεπόν ἐστι, μᾶλον δ᾿ ἴσως ἀμήχανον, ἀμεμφῆ καὶ καθαρὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐπιδεῖξαι βίον. Cf. Russell (1973), 85: “He did not believe in the perfectibility of human nature”. 62 Cf. Cim. 2.5: . . . καλὸν οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδ᾿ ἀναμφισβήτητον εἰς ἀρετὴν ἦθος γεγονὸς ἀποδίδωσιν (sc. human nature). See also previous note. 63 As Trench (1873), 130 aptly put it, “Plutarch’s advices are both practical and practicable. Practical because they bear directly on the matter in hand and are well adapted to bring about the result desired. And practicable for they make no too difficult demand on men and are fairly within reach of all who are seeking in earnest to shun evil”. 64 See esp. Gréard’s (1874) judicious criticism of this view (pp. 217 and 409 ff.). Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 222 a.g. nikolaidis APPENDIX Essay division De garrulitate Part I: 1-6: 502B-504E Definition and earmarks De curiositate De vitioso pudore 1-2: 515B-516C 4 (partly) 6-9: 518A-519F 1-3: 528D-530B Part II: Illustrative examples 7-15: 504F-510C 3-4: 516D-517C 6-9 (partly) 3 (partly) 4: 530B-E Part III: Advice for therapy 16-23: 510C-515A 5: 517C-F 10-16: 520A-523B 5-19: 530E-536D (+ examples of resisting dysōpia) Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press Bibliography List of abbreviations ANRW BT CCAG CPM CUF DK HCT KG LCL LSJ OCD PG RE SR SVF TrGF Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin – New York, 1972-. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum Corpus Plutarchi Moralium Collection des Universités de France H. Diels – W. 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Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press Index locorum Aelian NA IX, 63 191 Aeschines 1.52 284 Aeschylus A. 838-40 Prom. 110-111 Sept. 830 Alcinous Did. 181.19-26 Alexander of Aphrodisias Fat. 11, p. 179.30-31 Antiphon fr. [B.-Th.] 72 73 74 76 Apuleius Apol. 15.4-9 Plat. 2,2 p. 222 2,16 p. 242 Aratus Phaen. 151 298 103 Aristides, Aelius 11-15 26.19 26.23 26.29 26.31 26.36 26.38 26.52 26.58 26.59 26.60 26.64 78 87 87 87 87 88 88 87 87 89 88 89 241 155 194 180 179 180 180 311 188 188 263 Aristophanes Av. 757-759 1344-1352 Nu. 349 1427-1429 1430-1431 189 189 284 189 189 Aristotle (and Corpus Aristotelicum) Ath. 5.1 47 5.3 47; 243 6.2 47 11.2 47 13.4 243 28.2 47 de An. 415a26-b2 198 EE 1214a15-21 193 1220a38-1120b7 156 1221a1 208 1233b28-30 218 1234a28-30 193 EN 1097a30-b21 154 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 352 1099b9-11 1103a11-b25 1103a14-26 1107b27 ff. 1108a32 1108a33-35 1108a35 1112a21-22 1112b3 1125b 1128b10 1128b12 1140a24-1142a30 1144b3-6 1144b6-9 1144b13-17 1145b 1145b20 1147b22-24 1148a3 ff 1148b10 1149b25-26 1149b35-1150a1 1150a13 1151a5-8 1151a18-19 1152a29-30 1152a30-33 1155a16-19 1161b18-29 1166a32 1168a21-26 1169b6 1169b28 1169b33-1170a4 1170b6 1171a15 1172a10-14 1176b3-5 1176b30-31 1177a12-18 1177a27-b1 1177b24-34 1179b20-21 GA 753a7-15 GC 333b4-7 index locorum 193 156 193 240 208 208 218 157 157 240 208 218 157 193 193 193 108 212 212 212 212 212 171 212 212-213 193 170 169 185 198 25 196 25 314 313 25 25 313 154 154 154 154 154 193 185 157 HA 542a20-32 573a29-32 611a11-12 616a14-29 621a29-30 Metaph. 1025a14-21 1126b27-33 MM 1185b38-1186a8 1193a1-2 1197a33-35 1197b8 1202b3-4 1202b7-9 1202b11 1213a10-26 Ph. II, 5 II, 8 Phgn. 809b35-36 Pol. 1253a9 1256b15-22 1256b20-21 1282a26 1305b23 1306b1 1308a31 1319a24-25 1332a38-40 1332b6-8 Rh. 1363b1 1368b21 1370b33 1371b24-25 1381a31 1381b5-7 1382a1ff. 1382a7 1389a12 Arrian Cyn. 7.6 190 190 180 191 180 157 157 156 208 157 157 212 212 206 312 157 157 180 194 192 194 49 243 243 243 49 193 190 240 240 240 198 243 213 213 210 240; 243 281 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum Athenaeus IX, 393AB XIII, 555CD Augustinus c. acad. 3,41 civ. 19,3 180 180 188 188 Basilius De div. et paup. PG 31, 1168 232 Cato agr. 37.3 268 CCAG III, 32-9 III, 35 IV (1903), 142-5 VIII 1, 179-81 VIII 4, 102-4 VIII 4, 105-7 VIII 4, 251 X, 121-6 X, 196-201 X, 243-7 XI1, 134-44 XI2, 157-62 264 264; 267 264 264 264 264 267 264 264 264 264 264 Celsus De med. Proem. 45-64 Proem. 74-75 113 113 Cicero ac. 2,67 2,69 2,132 2,137 Att. 7,2,4 13,9,1 15,17,2 div. 2,33-34 188 188 188 188 185; 186; 194 179 179 268 fin. 1,30 1,71 2,32 2,33 2,82 2,84 3,15 3,16 3,17 3,62-64 3,62 5,24 5,28-29 5.29 Mur. 75-76 nat. deor. 2,37 2.154-162 off. 1,11-12 1,12 rep. II, 69.7 Tusc. 5,83 Clearchus fr. [W.] 3 73 Clement of Alexandria Paed. I, 6, 35.3 I, 6, 39.2 I, 6, 41.3 I, 11, 97.2 II, 10, 93.1 III, 12, 96.4 Protr. 10, 94.1 Strom. II, 9, 41.6 II, 16, 75.2 II, 23, 138.3 IV, 19, 121.1 IV, 20, 125.3 353 189 189 189 189 186 186 178 186 187 187 186; 187; 195 187 198 198 230 192 192 186 186 308 170 180 180 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 181 184 185 184 184 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 354 Corpus Hippocraticum Nat. Hom. 3 4 Vict. 1.3-5 VM 20 Critias fr. 6 index locorum 118 118 118 113 I, 71.4 III, 58.3 III, 59.1 IV, 38.1 IV, 44.1 IV, 61.5 XIX, 33.1 XXXI, 19.3 XXXIV/XXXV, 4.2 XXXIV/XXXV, 11 XXXI, 2a 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 31 Demetrius Eloc. 222 78 Democritus fr. [DK] 68 B 237 68 B 275 68 B 276 68 B 277 68 B 278 241 185 185 185 185 Ps.-Demosthenes Eroticus 4 107 Dio of Prusa 3 31.111 31.112 34.4 34.9 34.16 34.19 34.25 34.26 34.27-37 34.38-39 34.42 34.49 34.51 38.36-37 38.38 30 91 91 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 94 93 94 94 92 92 Diodorus of Sicily I, 64.14 179 Diogenes Laertius I, 26 II, 33 II, 122-123 VI, 105 VII, 55 VII, 85-86 VII, 85 VII, 120 VII, 127 VII, 168 X, 19 X, 21 X, 119 X, 120 185 311 8 154 287 187 186; 195 181; 186 152 8 186 186 185; 186 186 Donatus Vita Verg. 22 191 Epictetus I, 6.18 I, 11 I, 11.1-5 I, 11.9-15 I, 11.17 I, 11.17-19 I, 11.20 I, 11.21-26 I, 11.27-33 I, 11.34-40 I, 16.1-5 I, 17.25-26 I, 23.3 I, 25.28 II, 8.6-8 II, 14.21 192 181 181 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 192 182 185 182 192 319 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum II, 16.24 II, 16.40 II, 17.37-38 II, 20.25 III, 3.18-19 III, 7.19 III, 15.8 III, 18.5 III, 22.51 III, 22.82 III, 22.97 III, 23.37 III, 24.58 III, 24.59 III, 24.60 III, 24.83 III, 24.85-88 III, 24.105 III, 24.110-114 IV, 2 IV, 5.28 IV, 8.17 IV, 8.30-32 Encheiridion 5 16 20 Epicurus fr. [Us.] 19 217 256 397 398 511 523 525 527 528 540 541 RS 31 33 SV 23 182 182 182 185 182 185 317 182 314 317 317 310 182 182 183 182 182 182 317 126 182 317 317 182 182 182 185; 186 186 189 189 189 185 186 185 185 185 186 186 186 186 186 355 Euripides Bacch. 430-431 fr. 473 783a 1086 Ion 834-835 49 Eusebius Chron. 2 (p. 164) 99 Fronto p. 111,17-20 p. 173,15-16 179 179 Galenus De san. tuend. 1.1 1.6 118 118 Gellius, Aulus XII, 5.6 XII, 5.7 XVI, 3 XX, 8 188 188 122 265; 267 Gnom. Vat. 509 185 Gregorius of Nyssa PG 46, 434ff PG 46, 452 232 232 Hecataeus FGrHist 3a 264 F 25 179 Heraclitus fr. [DK] 22 B 94 248 Herodotus I, 29.1 I, 32.1 I, 32.2 48 42 45 49 49 44 105 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 356 index locorum I, 32.5 VII, 139 VII, 143 43 52 52 Hesiod Op. 11 318 814-816 248 217 264 Hierocles col. 1.1-8.60 col. 6.40-43 col. 9.1-9.10 col. 11.14-11.21 186 195 187 187 Homer Il. VI, 208 IX, 482 XVI, 34 XXIV, 44-45 Od. VIII, 77 X, 325 XVI, 19 XIX, 210-212 Horace Ars poet. 390 Iamblichus Myst. 5.8 Inscriptions IC III, 4, no. 9 III, 4, no. 12 III, 4, no. 36 IG IX 1 200 XII, Suppl. no. 142, frag. A, 7 IMagnesia no. 90, 12-13 237 25 284 217 248 291 25 213 220 265 245 245 245 275 245 245 Mylasa I, no. 101, 41 I, no. 141, 2 245 245 In Theaet. 5.18-7.14 7.14-19 187 188 Isocrates fr. 12 240 Johannes Chrysostomus Hom. in Matth. 61 PG 58, 591 232 Lactantius inst. III, 17.42 186 Lexica Segueriana p. 78,6-7 179 Livy XXII, 40.3 55 Lucianus Vit. Auct. 10 189 Lucretius I, 10-20 V, 222-234 190 195 Lydus Mens. 3.11 Ost. Proem. 7 Marcus Aurelius I, 9.3 I, 11 I, 17.7 II, 5 V, 16 VI, 30.1 XI, 18.9 266 266 181 179 181 181 194 181 181 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum Maximus of Tyre XVI, 3 XXVIII, 4 XXXV, 2 XXXV, 3 XXXV, 4-5 XXXV, 8 7 113 38 38 38 38 Menander II, 743 [K.] 26; 27 Musonius Rufus fr. XV 191 fr. XV A, p. 78.14-18 198 fr. XV B, p. 80.4-7 199 Nepos Eum. 8.2 Oppian Cyn. I, 376-392 Hal. I, 473-478 Spec. II, 240 III, 153-157 III, 154 III, 157 Virt. 91 128-132 128 192 183 194 183 183 Philodemus De lib. dic. frg. 26,6-10 168 183 183 183 183 Photius Bibl. codex 161, 104a23-36 176 61 191 191 Origen Cels. IV, 54 192 Ovid met. XV, 379-381 191 Philo of Alexandria Abr. 168 198 de anim. 48-49 Ios. 87 Legat. 36 Mos. I, 150 Praem. 158 357 183 183 190-191 308 183 183 183 Pindar fr. [Snell] 229.1 Nem. VII, 20-24 Ol. VI, 19 105 298 241 Plato (and Corpus Platonicum) Alc. 1, 255c4-7 323 Ap. 29de 152 30cd 152 36bc 152 39b 152 Cri. 49a-e 146 Def. 411a3 153 412e10-11 153 413e10 153 416a 212 Ep. 321b 167 362e8 167 Grg. 479b-e 146 483d 189 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 358 491d 509c-e 526a1-d2 Lg. 626e 636de 690b 710a 711b 731a 792e1-2 796a 820a 823d-824a 824a5 834a 836c 840a 840de 844b 860d 907b 927b 935c 938b 963e Men. 70a 71e Phd. 81a7 99d3-100b9 Phdr. 248c3-249d3 250b7-8 252c3-253c2 269d Phlb. 20d 60c 67a 67b Plt. 277d sqq Prt. 321c 322b 325d index locorum 108 146 161 108 107 189 193 308 243 156 243 243 285 286 243 189 243 190 224 243 243 180 243 243 193 193 23 284 303 161 161 161 193 153 153 153 189 314 195 278 313 R. 369b6-7 387d4-e1 403c-412b 407bc 423e 430e 501b 519c-521b 545a 545b-586c 547b-551a 548c 550b 555a 581c 582e 586c 596d 617d7-618b6 Smp. 201d-205a 207a-208b 208b Sph. 240a8 Tht. 174a 176bc 176b2-3 176e3-4 177a1-33 177a2-3 206d Ti. 30b 33d2-3 41d4-42d3 41d7 41e3-4 42e2-3 68e3-4 88bc 90a 90b Plautus Epidicus 381-385 153 153 119 119 308 104 308 82 242 242 249 242; 243 242; 243 242 242 242 242; 243 316 161 146 198 185 312 8 155 165 165 165 166 298 139 153 161 161 161 161 153 206 139 243 313 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum Pliny the Elder nat. II, 109-110 VII, 1-5 VIII, 126 XI, 196 265 195 191 266 Pliny the Younger epist. I, 5 237 Plutarch (and Corpus Plutarcheum) MORALIA De lib. educ. 2A-C 8B 8E 10F 14A De aud. poet. 15F 16A-17F 17F-18F 19A 19F 20C-21D 21D-22A 25E ff 26B 27A-C 28D 28F-29A 29C-30C 30C-F 32C 35C 37B De aud. 37C 39B 39D 42A 42B 43D De ad. et am. 49AB 49C-E 193 165 199 220 298 82 80 80 80 262 80 80 80 80 80 81 81 81 81 248 248 82 301 196 245 310 298; 310 284 320 31 50B 51BC 51E-52F 52F 53A 53E 55BC 56C 57E 59C 59D 60D 61B 61D 65F 66AB 66B 66D 66E 67B 68E 69A 69B 69F-70A 70E 70F 71A 71E 71F 72C 72D 72E 73A 73F 74D 74E De prof. in virt. 76AB 79B 79F-80A 80A 80B 83C 84B-85B 84D 84E 85AB 85B 85E-86A 359 168 35 35 165 298; 320 168 168 183 248 168 168 207 168 166 321 167 166 167 168 168 168 71 168 167; 168 168 168 245 104; 168 168 168 245 168 168 245 168 168 175 163 175 191 246 229 175 316 246; 316 137; 314 298; 315 197 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 360 De cap. ex inim. 86C 86D 86E 87C 87DE 87F 88AB 88A 88BC 88B 88DE 89BC 89B 89E 91D 91E 92BC 92D-F De am. mult. 93AB 93C-94A 93C 93EF 93E 93F-94A 93F 94A 94B-D 94B 94CD 94C 94D 94E 94F-95B 94F 95B-96D 95B 95E 96C 96D-97B 96D 96EF 96E 96F 97A 97B index locorum 246 103 102-103 229 104 104 104 104 105 105 105 106 106 106 246 246 246 108 21 26-27 23; 24 24 23; 24; 32 24; 28; 28; 33; 31 26; 28; 29; 33 29 29 30 32 29 32 29 33 31 35 30; 32; 33; 35 30 30; 35; 30; 35 21; 35; 30 32 36; 37 29; 32 36 36 36 De fort. 97C-100A 98C 100A Cons. ad Apoll. 106B De tuenda 122B-E 122B 122C 122E 122F 123B 123C 123DE 123D 123E 124BC 124B 124C 124D 124E 124F 125B 125C 125D 125F 126BC 126B 126C 126D 126E 126F 127D 127E 128A 128B 128C 128E 129B 129D 129E 129F 131AB 131A 131B 132D 145 190 159 183 111 115 112; 118 112 122; 124 125 123 126 126 124; 123; 127 124 124 124 122; 123; 115; 119 124 124 124 123; 115 123; 122; 124 117 119; 124 124 122; 124 124 123 124 124; 115; 114; 118 124; 129 127 127 124 220 118 124 124 124 124 124; 129 129 124 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 132E 133CD 133E 134A 134B 134CD 134D 134E 135AB 135BC 135B 135C 135D 135E 136A 136B 136D 136E 136F 137C 137DE 137D 137E Con. praec. 138D 139A 139EF 139F 140A 140DE 140D 141A 141D 142F-143A 143D 144F 145C Sept. sap. conv. 149A 164C De sup. 164E 164F 169AB 169A 171A Reg. et imp. apophth. 172D 115; 124 116 129 124 124 292 115 124 119 120 120; 121; 124 121; 206 124 123 124 124 124 124 124 122 119 122 206 245 291 321 298 321 322 183 322 298; 311 181 248 183 261 262 248 192 194 261 50 260 298; 316; 325 172F 176F-177A 188A 193A 193BC Apophth. Lac. 221F Mul. virt. 243B-D 246C 258D Quaest. Rom. 274DE Quaest. Graec. 301D De fort. Rom. 316C-326C De Al. Magn. fort. 326D-345B 326D 333C 340E De glor. Ath. 345F De Is. et Os. 351CD 353E 354A 359C 365F-366A 367CD 370DE 370E 372D 376EF 376E 382A 384A De E 386A De Pyth. or. 404C 408C De def. or. 410B 412E-413B 416CD 416D 361 71 172 229 197 229 229 72 248 184 116 293 144 144 79 71 79 298; 316; 325 138 267 266 262 263 263 248 248 263 265 265 298; 306 298 262 298 230 82 275 262 261 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 362 417A 418D-419A 433DE De virt. mor. 440D 440E-441B 440F 441A 441B-D 441D-442C 441D-442A 441F-442E 441F 442C 442DE 443CD 443D 443F 444A 444B 444C 444DE 444D 445D 446D 446EF 447C 447D 447F 448AB 449B 451A 451B-F 451DE 451E-452B 451E 452AB 452B De coh. ira 452D-453E 453A 455E-456B 456B 456F 462EF 463D 464B-D De tranq. an. 465A index locorum 261 275 306 309 156 157 166 156 156 139 213 162 156 214 155; 156 156 158 157 155; 158; 166 155 158; 165 155 162 155 162 162 243-244 162 155 155 155 154 154 154 184 244 155; 247 57 318 76 298; 310 9 9 182 47 44 465C 467E 471D-473A 472C 473A 474D 475A De frat. am. 478D-479D 478D 478E 479F-480A 481D 481F-482C 482A 482B 482C 483A 483C 483E 484B 487F 488A 488B 489C De am. prol. 493A-E 493A-C 493B 493C-E 493C 493E-495B 493E-494A 493E 494A-F 494A-C 494A 494C-E 494EF 494F-495A 495AB 495A 495BC 495B 495C-496C 495CD 495C 495D-496A 495D 120 62 315 315 315 182 214 26-27 195 27; 190 197 244 31 31 31 9 244 184 244 322 244 240; 244 244 184 200 188 188 190 188 200 190 190 191 191 191 191 191 192 192 185 193; 200 192; 229 200 194 194 195 195 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 496A 496BC 496B 496C-E 496C 496E-497A 497A-C 497A 497C-E 497CD 497D 497E Animine an corp. 500D 500E 501A-D De gar. 502B-504E 502C 502EF 502E 502F 503C 503D-F 503D 503E 504B 504F-510C 504F 505B 505CD 505F 506AB 507C-E 507D 508AB 508B 508C 508D-F 508F 509A-C 509A 509DE 509F 510A 510C-515A 510CD 510C 510D 195 195 195 196; 196 197; 197; 197 200 170; 198 199 200 200 200 198 216 207 212 222 207 218 206; 212 195 220 212 211 208; 222 206; 212 212 220 214 212 212 212 211; 212; 212 212 212 212 212 212 212; 222 166; 212; 209; 207; 219 212 209; 212; 213 212 219 214 206; 216 213 218 511D 511E 512C 512F 513D 513E 514AB 514C 515A De cur. 515B-516C 515C 515DE 515D 515E 515F 516A 516C 516D-517C 516D 516E 517C-F 517C 517E 517F 518A-519F 518BC 518B 518C 519AB 519A 519C 519D 519E 519F 520A-523B 520D 520E 521D 521E 522A 522B 522CD 522DE 523AB De cup. div. 523F 524D 524F 363 212 206; 209; 213 219 214 206 209 209 209; 212 220 222 206; 166 207; 216 215 215 216 222 216 208; 222 208 215; 216 222 208 216 206; 219 215 206; 218; 211; 216 222 206; 219 218 218 208 220 206 137 210 207 215 216 216 208; 215; 216 208; 215; 219 220 215 210 229 234; 235 234 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 364 525D 231 526F-527A 234 527A 234 527F 234 De vit. pud. 528D-530B 222 528D 207; 528E 217 529D 217 529E 207 530B-E 222 530C 172 530E-536D 222 530E 207; 530F-531C 211 531E 207; 532AB 218 532CD 220 532C 211 532D 207; 533Aff 211 533A 229 533D 207; 533E 219 534B 219 535BC 211 535D-536C 218 535D 211 535EF 218 535F 207 536C 207 536CD 211 De se ipsum laud. 547F 175 De sera num. 549EF 139 550DE 139; 550D 139 551E 156 De fato 572A 161 572F 262 De genio Socr. 575BC 316 575C 158; 580A 50 591DE 139 591E 298; index locorum 208; 216; 217 210 217 211; 244 211; 217 141; 155; 158 159 306 De exilio 599A-C Cons. ad ux. 608C 608EF 608E 609A 609E 610E 611D-612B Quaest. conv. 617E 622B 629A 634E 642F 646C 653B-E 670B 672E 683E 693E-694A 698B 706B 713F 716A 718C 718E 719A 720C 724B 729EF 736E Amatorius 755D 758A 763EF 763F 765AB 765B 765F-766A 765F 766A 766B 767C 767D 769F 771C 318 175; 201 138 175; 175; 175; 140 245 239; 239; 184; 100 194 195 265 298; 263 100 194; 229 245 245 303 298; 304 304 240; 196 245 184; 201 184 184 201 245 245 187 306 196 304 245 138 195 323 323 304 298 305 298 323 323 192 322 181 62 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum Maxime cum principibus 776CD 776C 777A 778E Ad princ. iner. 780D 781F-782A 781F An seni 784F 786D 787F 788E 794A 795A 795F 796C-E 796EF Praec. ger. reip. 798C 799A 799B-800A 799B-E 799C-E 800AB 800C 800E-801C 801BC 801EF 802B 802C 802D 804A 805A 805B 805F-806F 807A 808EF 809B-810A 809E-810C 809F 810B 811BC 811D 812B 813A-C 813B 142 7 8; 156 8 262 307 298 84 197 245 245 245 245 230 21 101 245 104 50; 52 55 51 52 97 97 50 108 96 88; 97 54; 97 51 84; 85 85 85 49; 245 37 62 52 62 241 100 240; 245 102 50 96 813C 813D-816E 813D-F 813EF 814A-C 814C 814D 815AB 815A 815B 816D 816EF 816F 817A 817C 817DE 817D 817E 817F-819B 817F 818A 818D 819B 819C 821F 822B 822C-823E 822DE 824B 824C 824DE 824E 824EF 825A 825D 825E De vit. aer. 827D-832A 829C 829E 830A 830B De facie 920F-921A 926E 939F 940A 942F-945D 943A 365 238 227 90; 96 95 90 84 86 91 239; 246 95; 246 85 50; 96 97 97 97 97 254 254 50 254 98; 246 54; 96 246 246 54 96 54 229 192 84; 96 94 84 91 246 95 244; 246 223 206 206 230 206 137 248 263 263 139 139 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 366 index locorum De prim. frig. 952B De soll. an. 959CD 959C 959D 959E 960A-965B 960AB 960A 960B-D 960B 960E 961D 961EF 961F-962A 962A 962C 962DE 962D 962E 962F-963A 963BC 963B 963C 963E 964A 964B 964C 964D 964E 964F 965A 965B 965C 965D 965EF 965E 966A 966B 966D 966E 966F 967C 967D 968B 968C 248 276 277 276; 284 138 278 278 138 276 194 278 280 139; 184; 193 278 280; 193; 279 278 281; 276 281 281 281 281 275 281 281; 276 282 275 278; 285 275; 286 282; 283 282 283 282 282; 309 286 276 284 193; 279 187 282; 283 198 287 284; 286 279 278; 285; 289 285; 286 283; 286; 298; 969B 969E 970BC 970CD 970C 970E 971A 971C 972A 972BC 972B 972C 972F-973E 972F 973A 973E-974A 974A-975C 974D 974EF 975C 975EF 975E 975F 976C-E 976C 976DE 977B 977D 977E 978D 978F-979A 979AB 980E 980F-981B 982A 982C 982D 983C 983D 983E-984C 984CD 984C 985C Gryllus 985D-992E 985E 985F 986F-987A 283 288 284 286 283; 184; 240; 184 282; 270 283; 283; 286 184 280; 276 282 286 269 287 282 288 288 288 288 289 288 276; 283; 283 289 288 283; 283 184 283; 194 283 283 288 289 284 79 284 282; 286 286 283 284; 288 284 287 288 288 288 288 290 290 290 193 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 987CD 989B 990CD 990EF 990E 991A 992E De esu 993C-994B 994F-995B 995D Quaest. Plat. 1001C 1002A 1009B De an. procr. 1013A 1014C 1024B 1025A 1026B 1026C De Stoic. rep. 1033AB 1038B 1044F-1045A 1045AB 1045B 1046D De comm. not. 1075D Non posse 1096C 1098AB 1100D 1100E-1103E Adv. Colot. 1112C 1119EF 1123A De lat. viv. 1128E Fr. 13 14 89 101 102 190 294 190 190 199 294 293 196 195 189 155 298; 303 155 155 155 158 155 248 171 175 187; 198 189 189 189 152; 158 262 277 197 185 194 194 194 185 196 263 263 195 265; 266 267 367 103 266 104 267 105 264; 267 111 264 136 318 Lamprias catalogue 58 260 66 260 71 260 80 135 99 260 111 205 118 260 119 260 129 135 133 135 143 135 148 135 150 260 151 215 157 205 159 135 200a 260 212 260 LIVES Aem. 1-3 1 1.1-5 1.1-4 1.1 1.6 2.6 4.7 12.2 13.2 14.3-4 17.7-13 17.10 24.8 26.7 38 Ages. 2.1 2.2 4.4 5.5-7 220 59; 76 149 137 76; 298; 314; 315 77 54; 65 230 71 64 195 261 50 71 65 241 243 247 247; 248 248 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 368 5.5 5.7 7.4 8.4 8.5-7 11.6 15.4 18.2 18.4 22 23.6 23.11 26.3 26.5 26.6 33.2 33.4 34.2 Agis 2.9 10.1 17.2 Alc. 2.1 4.1 6.1 8.6 10.1-2 16 16.2 16.3-5 23.6-9 30.7 35.1 Alex. 1.1-3 1.2 6.8 11-13 13.3-4 14.6-7 15 26.14 29.3 31.3 42.6-10 52.9 index locorum 247; 249 247 247; 248 62 248 247; 248 63 243 247; 249 249 64; 249 247 243 249 247; 249 247; 249 249 247; 249 59; 77 246 183 252; 254 71 71 64 51 71 71 71 43 252; 254 72 76 65; 68 70 70 70 69 67 243; 253 253 253 66 253 Ant. 4.4-6 6 9 9.2 14.4 15.5 17.4-6 19.4 20.4 43.6 63 Arat. 3.3 3.4 19.2 51.4 Arist. 2.2 2.4 3.3 4 5.3 6 8.3 13 13.2 20.2 25.1-8 25.1 25.2 25.3 Art. 17.5 Brut. 1.3 13.3 36-37 36.7 37.6 47.5 49.7 Caes. 7.3 8.6-7 17 42.2 66 44 67 67 63 63 63 63 63 66 70 63 246 229 169 250 250 250 250 250 62 251 148 148 251 148 148 148 148 246 161 183 145 145 145 162 71 230 54 66 253 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 44.9-12 253 58.4-5 253 69.2-5 270 Cam. 1.4 65 40.1 251 Ca. Ma. 5.2 281 5.6 63 7.1 251 21.6 229 Ca. Mi. 11.1-3 184 26.1 54 30.9-10 56 33.3 246 46.8 54 49.6 54 CG 17.9 250 19.4 250 Cic. 4.2 188 6.1 66 12.4 229 Cim. 2.3-5 64; 171 2.4 221 2.5 148; 216; 221 3.3 77 4.5 49 8.8 246 Cleom. 1.2 183 5.2 63 16.3 63 Comp. Ages. et Pomp. 1.2 74 1.4 243 1.7 247; 249 2.5-6 74 Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch. 5.7 75; 76; 77 Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma. 3.3 76 5.4 251 Comp. Cim. et Luc. 3.6 Comp. Cor. et Alc. 2.5 3.3 5.2 Comp. Dem. et Cic. 1.2 3.7 Comp. Dion. et Brut. 2 2.2 4.8 Comp. Lyc. et Num. 1.4 1.10 2.6 3.6 4.12-13 4.15 Comp. Lys. et Sull. 5.1 5.6 Comp. Nic. et Crass. 2.3 4 4.3 4.4 5.3 Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1.8 1.11 3.6 Comp. Per. et Fab. 1.1 3.2-4 Comp. Phil. et Flam. 1.4 1.7 3.4 3.5 Comp. Sert. et Eum. 2.1 Comp. Sol. et Publ. 1 1.2-4 1.3 369 75 252 167 75 76 229 172 164 172 76 247 76 76 247 247 76 75; 76 76 149 149 149 49; 50 76 247 71 76 238 252 252 252 75; 76; 253 246 42 42 76 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 370 index locorum 1.6 49 1.7 47 2 47; 48 2.6 49 4.1 76 Comp. Thes. et Rom. 1.6 76 3.3 75 6.1-5 147 6.1-2 147 6.2 147 6.3-5 147 Cor. 1.3-5 55 1.4 243; 252 4.3 197 6 53 14.6 62 15.5 67 17-18 53 17.1-4 53 17.7-8 53 18.1 53 18.2 53 18.4 53 18.5-9 53 21.6 252 29.4 252 32.5-8 142 32.5 142 32.7-8 142 32.8 142 Crass. 29.4 269 Dem. 1 164; 173 3.3-5 145 3.5 77 12.7-13.6 133 12.7-8 133 13.1 133 13.2 133 13.3-4 133 13.5 133; 140; 147 13.6 134; 140; 146; 147 20.2 143 22.2 184 22.4-7 63 22.4 22.5 Demetr. 1 1.1-5 1.1 5.1 23.5-24.1 24.1 30 40.3 42.8-11 42.11 Dion 1.1-2 1.2-3 1.3 2.1-2 2.1 2.2 2.3-6 2.4 2.5 2.6 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.5 7.4 8.1 8.2-5 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 9.8 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.5 11.3 184 101 59 76 76 248 43 63 62 246 62 62 144 159 144 144 160 167 160 145 166 145 161; 162 162 162 162 162; 165 168 163 162; 166 162; 168 167 167 168 163 161; 166 163 165 164; 165 165 166 166 168 168 163 165 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 13.3 13.4 13.6 14.3 16.1 16.2 16.3 17.1 17.3 17.6 18.2-4 18.5 18.7 21 21.8 21.9 22.2 24.1-3 26.4 29.4 30.3 30.9 32.1 32.5 34.1 34.5 36.2 36.4 37.6 37.7 39.1 40 41 42.3 43.5 47.2 47.4 47.5-6 47.7 47.8 49.2 50.4 51.2 51.3 52.1-4 52.1 52.2 52.3 166 165 161 165 166 161 163 167 166 166 163 162; 163 167 167 166 168 168 260 162 167 167 166 167 167; 168 162; 168 162; 168 167 167 167 164 166 162 162 71 167 166 166; 243; 244; 246 2166 166 166 162 167 167 183 167 166 166; 167 167 52.5 53 53.4 54.4 55 56.3 Eum. 13.4 13.12-13 16.3 16.10 Fab. 4.3 5.7 14.7 17.7-18.1 17.7 18.4-5 21.1 24.1-4 25-26 Flam. 11 11.6 13.2 Luc. 1.3 11.2 Lyc. 16.1-2 16.8-9 16.9 Lys. 2.4 13.9 23.3 Mar. 2.2-4 29.9 34.6 42.7-8 46.1-2 Marc. 21.6 21.7 Nic. 1.1 3.1-2 371 167; 246 162 162; 165 168 145 172 246 230 230 71 54 54 55 52 52 52 184 54 55 252 252 252 246 246 199 247 247 64; 247 247 62 55 49 67 269 164 49 49 76 54 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 372 14.1-2 22.3 23 23.1 23.2-6 23.7-8 Num. 3.2 8.21 12.3 17.2 20.8 sqq. 20.11 Otho 2.1-2 Pel. 5.2 8.2 19.5 Per. 1-2 1.1-2 1.1 1.2-4 1.2-3 1.2 1.3-4 1.4-2.1 1.4-6 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.2-4 2.4 2.5 4.6 7.3 7.6 9.1 15 15.1 29 31.1 35.2 38.2 39.4 Phil. 1.7 index locorum 63 55 49; 261 49 50 50 247 247 248 247 309 309 63 48 247 247 59; 135; 137; 138; 140; 141 136 184 140 141 136; 141 136 33 136 140 136 136 136; 140 140; 141; 142; 147 65; 77 54 54 54 53 238 54 252 252 50; 260 171 54 253 3-4 3.1-2 17.7 18.2 Phoc. 1.4-6 3.1-5 3.2-3 3.2 3.5-9 4.2 5.1 7 7.4 9 9.2 9.3-7 12.3 14.1 20 24 24.1-5 30 31-38 32.1-9 32.4-5 32.4 32.6 32.7 34-37 38 38.1-2 Pomp. 14.3 23.5-6 31.2 35.2 43.1-5 67.4 67.9 70.1-2 70.1 Publ. 1.2 2.3-4 2.4 3.1-4 8.1 10.5 55 252 252 252 144 144 73 55 144 146 144 68 69 69 229 69 69 144 69 69 69 69 69 146 146 146 146 146; 147 144 69 144 247; 62 247; 247; 74 63 247; 249; 247 249 249; 250 249; 250 249; 250 250; 253 47 49 48 47 47 251 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum 10.8 11-12 11-12.1 11.1 12.1 12.3-4 14.3 15.5-6 19.9-10 21.4 21.6 21.7-10 22.1 23.1 23.2 23.4-5 Pyrrh. 13.2 14 14.14 Rom. 12 Sert. 1.1-3 10.2 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 Sol. 2.13-14 3.2-3 5.4-6 5.5 5.6 6-7 6.1-3 7.1-2 7.2-4 7.2 7.3 14.3 14.6 15 16.1 16.2 17.3 18.5 48 48 47 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 49 49 49 49 48 49 67 44 44 269 160 71; 169 169 169 169; 170 170 48 47 48 51 51 56 185 170 184 171; 184 192 47 47 48 47; 48 238 47 47 18.6-7 19.1 19.2 20.3 21.1-2 21.4 24.5 27.1 27.2 27.6 27.7-9 27.8 27.9 28.4 28.5 29.1 29.3-4 29.3 29.4 30.1-3 30.1 30.4 31.2-3 Sull. 5.5 14.5-7 30.5 37.1 TG 9.3 10.5 10.7 16.1 Them. 3.2-5 3.5-4.4 4.2 4.4-5 4.4 4.5-6 5.1-2 10.10 11.1 Tim. 31.4 Pollux VI, 143 373 47 48 48 48 47 47 47 42 48 42 151 42; 43 42; 43 43; 48 43 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 269 68 169 269 250 250 250 250 251 147 251; 252 51 147 147 68 53 53 247 180 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 374 Porphyry Abst. II, 32.1 III, 20.1-2 III, 21-22 Posidonius fr. [Th.] 139 144 192b index locorum 180 192 278 179 179 179 Proclus in Ti. I, 197,28-29 158 Ps.-Ptolemaeus Fruct. 61 264 Seneca clem. I, 1.1 de matrimonio fr. 45 dial. IV, 16.2 IV, 36.3 epist. 7,12 8,3-5 25,5-6 90,44 90,46 121 121,6 124,7 124,20 Q.N. I, 17.1-5 318 185; 186 Solon fr. [W2] 5 6 47 49 Sopater 5.55.2 5.92.28 78 78 Soranus I, 41.1 265 Stobaeus I, 17.4 II, 7.3f II, 7.13 III, 21.11 IV, 22a.25 IV, 22d.103 IV, 24b.29 IV, 24b.31 IV, 24b.32 IV, 24b.33 IV, 26.20 IV, 27.23 181 155 188 311 181 181 185 185 185 185 185 187 189 311 Suda 232 232 317 193 193 186 195 193 193 SVF 321 Sextus Empiricus P. I, 235 188 Simonides fr. [Page] 36.11 241 IV, 150.27-29 99 I, 187 I, 382 II, 471 II, 1140 II, 1152 II, 1153 II, 1155 III, 49-67 III, 49 III, 51 III, 53 III, 154 III, 178 III, 179 III, 182 III, 184 III, 208 III, 218 152 7 181 194 192 192 192 152 152 158 152; 158 187 186; 187 187; 198 186 186 152 193 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press index locorum III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, III, 265 292 340 391ff. 397 401 409 432 731 753 754 Ant. 62 Ant. 63 Terentius Ad. 414-416 428-429 Testamentum Novum 1 Ep. Cor. 11.16 Ep. Rom. 1.18-2.16 1.18-21 2.14-15 12.10 Ev. Jo. 14.4-11 Ev. Marc. 9.37 Ev. Matt. 10.20 25.31-46 213 181 186; 187 213 235 235 218; 235 218 181; 186 189 189 181 181 313 313 243 138 140 138 184 140 140 140 140 Testamentum Vetus Gen. 15 17 21.1-8 22.1-18 150 150 150 150 Thales fr. [DK] 11 A 1 185 375 Themistius Or. XXII, 267a-271b XXIII, 295cd 32 8 Theodoretus Graec. aff. cur. XII, 74 185 Theophrastus Char. 8,2-3 8,9 De pietate fr. 19 (= L91) fr. [Fortenbaugh] 696 219 212 180 78 Thucydides I, 41.3 I, 43 II, 65.9 III, 82.8 IV, 64.1 V, 32.4 V, 43.2 V, 111.4 VII, 28 VII, 28.3 VII, 48.4 VII, 70.7 VII, 71.1 VIII, 76.1 242 242 53; 88 242 242 242 242; 254 242 52 242 55 241; 242 241; 242 242 Xenophanes fr. [DK] 21 B 18 103 Xenophon Ages. 2.8 5 8.1 Cyn. 1.1 1.2 1.11 242 107 180 286 277 277 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 376 1.18 6.13 6.15 9.1-10 12 12.1-5 12.9 12.10-11 12.10 12.15-21 13 13.4-5 13.9 13.15 13.16-18 Cyr. I, 3.2 I, 4.3 index locorum 277 286 281 282 286; 295 277 277 287 277 287 295 286 284 277 286 180 180 Ger. 7 Hell. V, 1.4 V, 3.7 V, 4.1 Lac. 4.2 Mem. I, 2.6 I, 2.15 I, 4.4-4.14 I, 6.1-6.15 II, 2.5 II, 6.1-5 III, 9.1-3 IV, 3.3-3.14 IV, 3.9-10 107 60 61 61 242 233 233 195 180 196 107 193 195 192 Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press Abstracts 1. Virtues for the people L. Van der Stockt, Semper duo, numquam tres? Plutarch’s Popularphilosophie on friendship and virtue in On Having Many Friends De amicorum multitudine (On Having Many Friends) is a short text that starts ‘playfully’ with a witty anecdote, treats the practical problem of the role of friendship in daily life, and ends with a clear-cut summary of the communicated instruction. K. Ziegler classified Plutarch’s On Having Many Friends as ‘Popularphilosophie’ for good reasons. The contribution at hand first sketches the goals and procedures of eighteenthcentury German ‘Popularphilosophie’, and then explores the interaction of philosophical tenets with rhetorical invasiveness in this particular Plutarchan ‘lecture’. It makes it clear that Plutarch’s rhetorical techniques (as they are also discernible in his hypomnemata) as well as his partial representation of traditional philosophical tenets (especially Aristotle) create a positive and stimulating pedagogy. More than Themistius’ On Friendship (Or. 22), the lecture seems to address a youthful audience, appealing to its self-esteem; more than Maximus’ Friendship and Virtue (Or. 35), it testifies to the confidence that the (idealized) friendship is within reach. Chr. Pelling, What is popular about Plutarch’s ‘popular philosophy’? This paper addresses two questions: what is popular philosophy, that is, does Plutarch conceive of it as different from other sorts of ethics, and, if so, whom is this philosophy for? It approaches these issues obliquely through the Lives, and concentrates particularly on questions of politics. Some passages, especially the encounter of Solon and Croesus, suggest that there are particular occupational hazards which the rich and famous face; Plutarch’s adaptation of Herodotus there highlights a sort of wisdom that is ‘reasonable’ and ‘popular’ (metrios and demotikos). However, there is no idealisation of ‘simple things’, no suggestion that ordinary people have an instinctive understanding which their leaders may lack, and ‘popular wisdom’ certainly does not involve doing whatever the demos wants. The demos needs leadership, in Solon-Publicola as, for instance, in Pericles, Nicias, and the Praecepta Rei Publicae Gerendae. So the ethics of leadership may be different from those of the people themselves; the people’s prejudices and lack of insight may have to be manipulated and exploited, and that may even mean that different behaviour is right for politicians in different cities. Where the demos is praised, as in its reaction to the disaster of Cannae in Fabius, it is for responding to the right lead. Proper paideia is necessary for such leadership, but the philosophical face occupational hazards too, and men like Dion, Cato, and Thales may lose contact with the need for compromise that lesser intellects may grasp; it may also be part of Plutarch’s own self-characterisation that he projects his ability to strike different notes at different times and in different works. Such ‘popular philosophy’ is certainly open to the good and great, who may be helped to avoid occupational hazards; but the Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 378 abstracts more regular target audience is probably, as so often in literature of this period, the elite pepaideumenos, who himself has to prepare to give the leadership that ordinary people require. T.E. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives and the critical reader This paper analyses the kind of reader constructed in the Lives and the response expected of that reader. It begins by attempting a typology of moralising in the Lives. Plutarch does sometimes make general ‘gnomic’ statements about right and wrong, and occasionally passes explicit judgement on a subject’s behaviour. In addition, the language with which Plutarch describes character is inherently moralistic; and even when he does not pass explicit judgement, Plutarch can rely on a common set of notions about what makes behaviour virtuous or vicious. The application of any moral lessons, however, is left to the reader’s own judgement. Furthermore, Plutarch’s use of multiple focalisations means that the reader is sometimes presented with varying ways of looking at the same individual or the same historical situation. In addition, many incidents or anecdotes are marked by ‘multivalence’; that is, they resist reduction to a single moral message or lesson. In such cases, the reader is encouraged to exercise his or her own critical faculties. Indeed, the prologues which precede many pairs of Lives and the synkriseis which follow them sometimes explicitly invite the reader’s participation in the work of judging. The syncritic structure of the Parallel Lives also invites the reader’s participation, as do the varying perspectives provided by a corpus of overlapping Lives. In fact, the presence of a critical, engaged reader is presupposed by the agonistic nature of much of Greek literature, and of several texts in the Moralia which stage opposing viewpoints or arguments. Plutarch himself argues for such a reader in his How the Young Man Should Listen to Poems. P. Desideri, Greek poleis and the Roman Empire: nature and features of political virtues in an autocratic system This contribution aims at assessing the particular features which mark Plutarch’s idea of the perfect statesman: better said, of the perfect Greek statesman in a situation of autocratic external control of the city-state, i.e., in the context of the Roman imperial age in which Plutarch himself lived. Plutarch is well aware of the great differences which exist between contemporary and past conditions of political life in Greece, and strongly recommends his readers not to forget them. The main point, as one can easily recollect from the author’s Praecepta rei publicae gerendae, is that there is no foreign political activity any longer to be carried out by the Greek poleis of present times; as a consequence, the politician’s job is confined just to finding the best way to ensure his community’s loyalty to the Roman Empire, guaranteeing its internal order and safety. This is not to say that this is an easy job. First of all, the modern Greek statesman cannot be allowed to emphasise, in order to strengthen the political feelings of his community, or, incidentally, to promote his own career, the great military accomplishments and virtues of the glorious Greek past; on the contrary, he will carefully stress episodes of friendly behaviour inside the polis and among different poleis: much less exciting models, indeed, to be proposed to the masses. In these conditions it is difficult to emerge suddenly as a great leader, and it is much safer to grow slowly, prefer- Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press abstracts 379 ably in the shadow of some successful politician of a former generation, which means, uncomfortably, to arrive at the most important political positions in old age. But apart from anything else, governing Greek poleis at that time implied steady confrontation with the symbols of the Roman central government in one’s region: that is, with the Roman governors who in fixed times followed one another in the single provinces of the Empire, supervising the correct working of the Roman administrative system therein. The problems which came out of this situation are keenly felt by Plutarch, as well as by other Greek political writers of the period (such as Dio). Plutarch strongly underlines that the Greek statesman must absolutely reaffirm his own and his polis’ dignity in any circumstance, but at the same time he is fully convinced that only concord among the well-to-do can really be a good solution for such problems. J.C. Capriglione, Del satiro che voleva baciare il fuoco (o Come trarre vantaggio dai nemici) Plutarch was himself thoroughly familiar with political praxis as well as with so many politicians whose experience he took into account when addressing various writings to them. The little pamphlet How to profit from one’s enemies explores and promotes the art of taking advantage of the wickedness and the malevolence of our enemies. Those enemies offer the best possible motive for leading an irreproachable life, a life guided by sophrosynè, that makes the other virtues instrumental. Indeed, Plutarch’s pragmatic advice is not only about our control over our own passions, but also about controlling our enemies, about making them silent and impotent. Plutarch’s advice is thus ethical and at the same time social: he has in mind an ethos that makes us moral subjects capable of assessing the margins of transgression in the varying circumstances, and of moving into the direction of what is best in a given situation. It is not so much an abstract Idea of the Good that inspires Plutarch’s advice, but an uncertain code that is always in fieri. L. Van Hoof, Plutarch’s ‘Diet-ethics’. Precepts of Healthcare between diet and ethics In antiquity, the question of what constitutes a healthy regimen was the object of a fierce debate among doctors, athletic trainers, and philosophers. When writing his Precepts of Healthcare (De tuenda sanitate praecepta), Plutarch’s authority was therefore far from self-evident. As the opening dialogue of the text makes clear, the author not only reveals himself to be acutely aware of this challenge, but also eager to take it up. This article examines the nature of Plutarch’s healthcare programme, and analyses some important strategies used in order to promote this ‘diet-ethical’ advice in dialogue with competing views on healthcare. 2. Some theoretical questions on ethical praxis H.M. Martin, Plutarchan morality: arete, tyche, and non-consequentialism This essay begins with an examination of Demosthenes 12.7-13.6, where Plutarch extols Demosthenes for consistently advocating in his public policy the principle that Athens should do what is right (to kalon), regardless of the consequences. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 380 abstracts This moral position is then contrasted with consequentialism, ‘the view that all actions are right or wrong in virtue of the value of their consequences’. Various passages in the Lives and the Moralia are successively analysed in order to present the Platonic essence of the morality extolled in the Demosthenes and to emphasise the non-consequentialism of such morality: Pericles 1-2, De Iside et Osiride 351CD, De sollertia animalium 960A-965B, De facie 942F-945D, De sera numinis vindicta 550DE, Phocion 1.4-6, Dion 1.1-2. Special attention is paid to to kalon as the term and concept that stands at the heart of Plutarch’s moral thought and links it inextricably to Plato’s. The essay then shifts to an array of passages in the Lives in which Plutarch assumes a consequentialist position, in that he advocates or approves the notion that expediency (to sympheron) must have precedence over what is right (to dikaion) when the welfare of one’s country is at stake: Phocion 32.1-9, Theseus-Romulus 6.1-5, Themistocles 3.5-4.4, Aristides 13.2 and 25.1-3, Cimon 2.5, Nicias-Crassus 4.3-4. Finally, this inconsistency in Plutarch’s moral thought is explained as the expression of something that is actually a common feature of human experience, and as a reflection of his unguarded reaction to the moral dilemmas he personally faced when he gazed into the mirror of history and evaluated the conduct of the subjects of the Lives. J. Opsomer, Virtue, fortune, and happiness in theory and practice This contribution explores the relations between (good and bad) luck, character, and happiness, primarily in the Life of Dion, but also in other works. In order to examine this issue, it is possible to make abstraction of theological and cosmological issues, though they were important to Plutarch. The question whether virtue is conducive to, or even sufficient for, happiness was of great concern to ancient philosophers. As a Platonist, Plutarch is committed to the view that virtue, which consists in the rule of reason over the passions so that the latter are moderated (metriopatheia), is strongly conducive to happiness. He is even attracted by the view that virtue constitutes a sufficient condition to that end. Yet he distances himself from the view that luck plays no role at all towards happiness. In De virtute morali Plutarch takes into account the role of luck when he is discussing prudence, an intellectual virtue that is exercised in the realm of contingency. The relationship between virtue and luck is central to the Life of Dion. Upbringing and education, but also our individual innate nature, are a matter of constitutive moral luck. Dion had a good nature, grew up under adverse circumstances, and was lucky to meet Plato. Dionysius the Younger also met Plato, but, unfortunately for him, he did not have an equally good innate predisposition toward virtue. Once virtue is achieved, it is its own reward, although it does not guarantee worldly success. Even a rather virtuous person such as Dion has to worry about contingencies. Adversity is also a test for character. In the Life of Sertorius Plutarch comes close to the Stoic view that virtue cannot be lost due to ill-fortune. Yet he allows for less than perfect forms of virtue, which are not incorruptible. In the Life of Solon he claims that a virtuous disposition can be destroyed by drugs or disease. I argue there is no inconsistency between these claims. Plutarch accepts the existence and moral relevance of pure luck, for this is where practical virtues and prudence become relevant. He also accepts constitutive moral luck as a given. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press abstracts 381 G. Roskam, Plutarch against Epicurus on affection for offspring. A reading of De amore prolis This paper contains a full discussion of Plutarch’s De amore prolis (Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔγονα φιλοστοργίας), a fairly brief but problematic text about the natural character of love for one’s children. A correct understanding of Plutarch’s position presupposes a good insight in the previous philosophical tradition about the concept of φιλοστοργία in general, and particularly about the previous debate between Stoics and Epicureans on the issue of parental love for children. A concise survey of this rich tradition is then followed by a systematic interpretation of Plutarch’s argument in De amore prolis, which throws a new light on the argumentative, cumulative structure of the work and points to several interesting parallels from other Plutarchan works and from the works of other authors. This analysis also shows that the text should be understood as an anti-Epicurean polemic and that overemphasising the importance of the topic of animal psychology or family ethics risks misrepresenting the true scope of the work. 3. Virtues and vices A.G. Nikolaidis, Plutarch’s ‘minor’ ethics: some remarks on De garrulitate, De curiositate, and De vitioso pudore This paper discusses the manner with which Plutarch treats the minor foibles of ἀδολεσχία (garrulity), πολυπραγμοσύνη (indiscreet curiosity, meddlesomeness) and δυσωπία (excessive shyness, compliancy), which he regards as affections (pathē) or diseases (nosēmata) of the soul. The relevant essays comprise three distinct parts: definition and main features of the foible, examples illustrating the behaviour of the character concerned, and advice for therapy. Plutarch’s treatment of polypragmosynē and dysōpia makes it easy for one to understand why these foibles are described as affections and maladies of the soul, but for adoleschia this is not so clear and the reasons offered are hardly satisfactory or convincing. This paper attempts to give an explanation for this and proceeds to suggest some reasons. The worst of the three foibles is polypragmosynē, since it springs from a malicious nature, whereas dysōpia, irrespective of the disastrous consequences it often entails, is a blemish of good nature. In fact, what makes dysōpia an undesirable character trait is the element of excess it involves. As for adoleschia, its treatment is at the same time a eulogy of silence and reticence. Despite certain exaggerations, unfortunate comparisons, and far-fetched assertions, Plutarch’s treatises are well organized: his argumentation is clear and coherent, most of his observations judicious and on the mark, and some of his psychological insights perceptive and remarkable. Finally, the common denominator among the three essays is that the suggested therapy is effected with the aid of reason, which will not only help us to perceive both the cause and their catastrophic results of our failings, but will also dictate the proper measures (acquirement of certain habits and practices) by means of which we may minimize and ultimately get rid of them. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 382 abstracts H.G. Ingenkamp, Plutarchs Schrift gegen das Borgen (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν δανείζεσθαι): Adressaten, Lehrziele und Genos Plutarch’s treatise forms a group with (at least) two other essays, De cupiditate divitiarum and De tranquillitate animi. The theoretical base of this section of Plutarch’s writings is De cup. div., ch. 3f. Plutarch says there that the person whom the essay is going to help needs an explanation why she or he is sick (and not a therapy via ἄσκησις that consists of meditation and practice). Plutarch, in this essay, is not a psychotherapist, but an educator. More specifically, (1) he writes for a group of cultured people. This may be inferred from some ‘springboard arguments’. Springboard-arguments begin with a quotation, a metaphor, an anecdote, or a simple statement, only to lead the reader in a different direction afterwards. Springboards are lost on an audience that is too uneducated to discover the joke lying in the gap. This essay (2) teaches αὐτάρκεια or ἐλευθερία. According to the treatise, a person disposes of αὐτάρκεια or ἐλευθερία, if she or he is in the state of σχολή while being ready to live on what she or he already possesses (χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν). It is this concept of σχολή that is remarkable here. Plutarch says, on the one hand, that in order to avoid the money lender’s harsh command ‘ἀποδός’, we should try to make friends with powerful (and rich) people. This, of course, is quite in tune with what the Greek upper class thought, whose σχολή had its base in prosperity. But, on the other hand, Plutarch also suggests earning one’s living as a teacher, or a paedagogus or a baker or a doorkeeper or a sailor or a sailing merchant’s clerk. Thus we may conclude that the notion of σχολή in Plutarch’s text can be taken as a purely mental attitude. His audience may have been educated, as has been said, and, at least partly, poor. It seems to resemble that of the sermons on the same subject of Basilius (who depends on Plutarch), Gregory of Nyssa (who depends on Basilius), and John Chrysostomus. Ph.A. Stadter, Competition and its costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch’s society and heroes In his Moralia and Parallel Lives, Plutarch explores the positive and negative aspects of competitiveness, philonikia (literally, ‘love of victory’). After establishing that the correct form and derivation of the stem is from nik- (‘victory’), not neik- (‘strife’), this paper examines Plutarch’s use of words formed from the philonik- stem. Like classical authors, notably Plato and Aristotle, he recognizes both good and bad aspects of competition. Philonikia is a passion that can be directed positively or negatively. In the Moralia, on the one hand, Plutarch adopts a hortatory position, warning against the dangers of competitiveness within the family (On Brotherly Love), among friends (Table Talks), and in politics (Rules for Politicians, Old Men in Politics). In effect, the philonikia described is always undesirable. In the Parallel Lives, on the other hand, he recognizes that competition can on occasion spur a political figure to greatness, but can also be destructive, as is shown by an analysis of four pairs of Lives (Lycurgus-Numa, Agesilaus-Pompey, Aristides-Cato the Elder, Philopoemen-Flamininus). Lycurgus encouraged competitiveness among the Spartan youth, whereas Numa sought to soothe the Romans’ martial spirit. Agesilaus carried competitiveness too far, and Sparta suffered for it; likewise, Pompey’s insistence on being first led to Rome’s civil war and his own death. For both, philonikia was a passion they could not control. In the latter two pairs, philonikia shows a more positive aspect. Plutarch’s philosophy of civic harmony has no real place for Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press abstracts 383 competition, but pragmatically he recognises its usefulness when directed towards what is just and profitable for the state, as in Aristides’ case. Therefore he regularly praises his protagonists’ self-control in managing their philonikia, and urges it for his contemporaries. 4. ‘Popular philosophy’ in context A. Pérez Jiménez, Astrometeorología y creencias sobre los astros en Plutarco This contribution shows that Plutarch, who was highly interested in contemporary religious and scientific issues, was familiar with certain popular beliefs about the stars. This concern is evident in the titles of some lost works, in some Table Talks of which only the titles remain, and in several passages of the Lives where Plutarch echoes the activity of the astrologers. In this contribution I pay attention to Plutarch’s beliefs on astral mysticism as they appear in De Iside, as well as to his interpretation of astrometeorological phenomena concerning the behaviour of animals and plants under the influence of the sun and moon. Sufficient information about this theme can be found in the above mentioned De Iside, in the Comment on Hesiod’s Works and Days, and in the Table Talks. A closer analysis also shows that Plutarch’s beliefs concerning this influence are in line with other literary testimonies of Imperial times and, in particular, with some prescriptions in astrological lunar calendars of late antiquity. J. Mossman – F. Titchener, Bitch is not a four-letter word. Animal reason and human passion in Plutarch It is no surprise to the authors that a humane, compassionate, tolerant, and wise human like Plutarch wrote several essays specifically about animals, notably Terrestriane an aquatilia animalia sint callidiora (De sollertia animalium), Bruta animalia ratione uti, and De esu carnium orationes ii. These essays were used by philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as early evidence of the so-called ‘theriophilic paradox, the notion that while the human being occupies a higher rung in the universal hierarchy than the beast, as indicated by human power over the animal world, human behaviour justifies the claim that human morality is on a lower level than that of the beasts’. In modern times, classical scholarship has tended to use these essays as ammunition for an animal rights movement, which of course can be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment interest in theriophily. Yet although these ‘animal’ essays are grouped with Plutarch’s other ‘scientific’ essays in Loeb vol. xii (De facie, De primo frigido, Aquane an ignis sit utilior), our interest in Plutarch’s animals is not particularly scientific – rather, we are focusing on rhetoric. We hope that analysis of De sollertia animalium (and, to a lesser extent, Bruta animalia ratione uti) will provide insight into Plutarch’s own attitudes about virtues, arguing that the use of animals provides a kind of surrogacy or a place for Plutarch to argue his points at a safe remove. We also hope to show that there is more to these charming dialogues in terms of rhetorical skill and subtlety than may immediately be apparent, or has traditionally been assumed. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press 384 abstracts F. Frazier, Autour du miroir. Les miroitements d’une image dans l’œuvre de Plutarque This paper aims at an exhaustive reconsideration of the simile of the mirror in Plutarch’s works. Generally speaking, the comparison enables drawing nearer something that is far away (e.g., knowledge or virtue) and shows what deserves to be sought or imitated. More precisely, the vast range of uses of this ‘mirror’ may be classified under two headings, ontology (with its epistemological sequel) and ethics. In the epistemological field, the mirror imagery appears in relation to mathematics – especially geometry – and reminds us of the necessity for human knowledge to lean on sensible images that only reflect intelligible beings and may be deceptive as well as initiatory, as is shown by the ambiguous action of the sun. In the ethical field, Plutarch insists on self-knowledge and emulation of the glorious models of the past, but he also takes into account the demands of particular circumstances. In everyday life friends can contribute to moral improvement, but Plutarch does not use the simile of the mirror for them – as the Stoics, Seneca, or Epictetus do for the philosophers. Instead, only wives or flatterers are called ‘mirrors’, denoting either conjugal harmony or contemptible servility. The analysis finally raises the (still open) question of the respective roles which interiority and the example of other people have in moral life. Reprint from Virtues for the People. Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics - ISBN 978 90 5867 858 4 - Leuven University Press