Tanada v Tuvera Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Non-publication means violation of the due process clause guaranteed by the Constitution. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws or laws that name a public place in favor of a favored individual or laws that exempt an individual from certain prohibitions or requirement, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. EO 200 allows the publication of laws in a newspaper of general circulation due to erratic releases of the Official Gazette and of its limited readership. The word “LAW” in Article 2 of the NCC includes CIRCULARS and REGULATIONS which prescribe penalties. Publication is required to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. De Roy v CA There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court. Atienza v Brilliantes Exception to Art 4 - when laws are remedial in nature Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Article 256 of the same Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40. Carlos v Sandoval Expressly provides for prospectivity despite being a rule of procedure The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in application. Cheng v Sy The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. Carolino v Senga Principles of article 4 of NCC also applies to amendments of statutes. Every case must be resolved against the retrospective effect. VESTED RIGHT - the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. Fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy Famanila v CA There was no clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement were unconscionable on its face. To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. Guy v CA To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. Otamias v Republic Waiver the voluntary abandonment/surrender by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit. Such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right, or intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it Silverio v Republic It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Miranda v Imperial Only the decisions of Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in the jurisdiction. However, this does not prevent that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which covers a point of law still undecided in our jurisprudence may serve as juridical guide to the inferior courts, and that such conclusion or pronouncement be raised as a doctrine if, after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis and revision, this Supreme Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its consecration as a rule of jurisprudence. Del Socorro v Wilsem The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since respondent is a citizen of Holland, he is subject to the laws of his country - both to the obligation to support and consequences of failure to do so. It is incumbent upon the alien to plead and prove that his country's national law does not impose obligations to parents to support children - either before, during or after divorce. In view of his failure to prove foreign law in his favor, DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION SHALL GOVERN. If foreign law is not pleaded, or if pleaded not proved, courts will presume that foreign law is the same as local/domestic law. Van Dorn v Romillo - @ time of divorce, Alien and Filipino Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. Upon the alien spouse obtaining a valid divorce decree, the Filipina spouse is no longer bound to her marital obligations to the respondent by virtue of her nationality laws (Family Code Art 26 ). She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served. Tenchavez v Escano - @ time of divorce, both Filipinos Tenchavez and Escano were validly married to each other, under the civil law. The valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escano remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the divorce obtained from the Court of Nevada. At the time the divorce was issued, Escano, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. Thus, she was then subject to Philippine law. Art. 15 of the Civil Code (Nationality rule): Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philppines, even though living abroad. The Civil code of the Philippines does not allow absolute divorce. It only allows legal separation. The Philippine courts cannot recognize a foreign decree of absolute divorce. Art. 17 of Civil Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the State, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code. The policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties, hence Escano’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid. Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically “intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint of Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery.” Pilapil v Ibay Somera - Reiterated the Van Dorn decision. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of status of persons. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Recio v Recio A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Respondent became an Australian citizen after the divorce decree Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In mixed marriages, such as an alien and a Filipino citizen, the Family Code allows such Filipino citizen to contract a subsequent marriage provided that the one who secured the decree of the divorce was the alien spouse or husband and it is allowed under his/her national law. However, decree is not enough; it must be alleged and proven as a fact. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be proven as public record of a foreign country by either (1) Official publication of the writing or document or (2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be accompanied by (a) Certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippines stationed in the country where such copy was obtained (b) Authenticated by the seal of his office Quita v CA Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse. The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her 1st divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. But if she was still a Filipino citizen during divorce proceeding, Tenchavez ruling applies. Elmar Perez v CA Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily. Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter in litigation that was granted by the lower court. Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant. The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. San Luis v San Luis Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. 1st marriage was terminated when his wife died leaving behind 6 children. 2nd marriage to Mary Lee, an American citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was granted in December 1973. 3rd marriage with Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo’s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of the NCC in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative. In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Lavadia v Heirs of Luna Divorce between Filipinos obtained in a foreign country is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the 1st marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. Under the national law of both spouses, approval of the agreement by a competent court is required. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage. The 2nd marriage contracted was bigamous therefore making the marriage void ab initio. Under the Civil Code, properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by rules on co-ownership. The fact that titles for properties were in the name of “Juan Luces, married to Soledad” was no proof of co-ownership, rather it is merely descriptive of his civil status. Noveras v Noveras David and Leticia resided in California, USA after their marriage on December 3, 1988 in Quezon City. They eventually acquired American citizenship. Leticia filed for divorce that was granted by the California court plus custody of their 2 children and all their properties in California. On August 8, 2005, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. And since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law re. the spouses’ property regime, in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, then Philippine law shall apply. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court stated that: “The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our laws do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.” Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. As stated in Recio v Recio, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. It may be noted that in Bayot v. CA, the Court relaxed the requirement on certification where the Court held that “petitioner therein was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorced is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.” In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the decree was obtained. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. Tanedo v Manalo The Court of Appeals, however, overturned the lower court's decision, saying Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if it was the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce against the foreign spouse because the decree obtained makes the foreigner no longer married to the Filipino, enabling the foreigner to remarry. Orion Savings Bank v Suzuki Orion contended that the deed of sale executed by Kang, a Korean national, in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses. In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact. In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent. Far East Bank v Pacilan The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It refers to a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. Uypitching v Quiamco The corporation, acting thru Uypitching blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. This basic principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Also known as the “principle of abuse of rights”, it prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. Cebu Country Club v Elizagaque Obviously, the board has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions. In rejecting respondent’s application for membership, the petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. Petitioners’ committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s application. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. At the very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved. The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts. As to petitioners’ reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. Calatagan Gold Club v Clemente Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his failure to pay his monthly dues for more than 60 days. The demand letters that were sent to his mailing address were returned with the postal note that the address had been closed. A 3rd and final demand was again sent to Clemente in the same postal address were the 1st 2 demand letters were sent. Clemente’s share was later sold through auction. Bad faith on Calatagan’s part is palpable. As found by the CA, Calatagan very well knew that Clemente’s postal box to which it sent its previous letters had been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box. It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along with residence and office telephone numbers. The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under the law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be the charter of dehumanization. Ardiente v Javier Water disconnection by Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) at the instance of the former owner Ardiente without notice to the buyer Pastorfide due to failure of the latter to pay the water bill and also the transfer of the COWD account in their name in violation of their Memorandum of Agreement. It is true that it is within petitioner’s right to ask and even require Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former’s account with COWD to the latter’s name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the spouse’s water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the present case, the intention to harm was evident on the part of the petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent’s water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Sesbreno v CA, VECO Sesbreno was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service contract they had entered into in March 1982. One of the stipulations found in paragraph 9 of the contract is the continuing authority from its clients as consumers of the violation of contract (VOC) inspectors employed by VECO to enter their premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling. On May 11, 1989, the VOC inspectors conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village including that of Sesbreno. The inspectors found Sesbreno’s meter, which was located at the garage, turned upside down. They took photographs of it and in the presence of Sebreno’s maid Baledio, one Chuchie Garcia and one Peter Sebreno, they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. Plaintiff was in his office at that time and no one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC team then asked and received Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light and fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load. Sesbreno sued VECO and VOC inspectors for damages contending that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was unreasonable search for being carried out without a search warrant and for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith. The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended to as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. In People v. Marti (193 S 57,67) it said: If the search is made upon the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of the private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only after finding the meter turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main premises as a continuation of the authorized entry. Balicha’s (a member of the Philippine Constabulary) presence and participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of the guaranty. He was part of the team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its routine inspection. The CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreno’s residence because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine inspection. This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith. Clearly, Sesbreno did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. Saldaga v Astorga Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable. When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to “obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.” If only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.” Coca cola Bottlers v Bernardo According to the SC, the petitioner shall liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as follows: This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses, and in [respondents'] case, laid of a number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers including small-scale stores. It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold. Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the above provisions of law, an act that causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona: The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and Capitant. According to the latter, the act of "a merchant [who] puts up a store near the store of another and in this way attracts some of the latter's patrons" is not an abuse of a right. The scenario in the present case is vastly different: the merchant was also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its distributor, knocked on the doors of the latter's customers and offered the products at a substantially lower price. Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold its products at a preferential rate to another store within the vicinity. Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of business, in order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a wanton wrong. Buenaventura v CA Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity of the other spouse entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil Code? It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. Filinvest v Ngilay The sale of a homestead before the expiration of the 5-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void. The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. Allowing respondents to keep the amount received from the petitioner is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when 1) a person is unjustly benefited, and 2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. Gonzalo v Tarnate Both parties were found to be in pari delicto by the court when they knowingly entered into a void contract and as such no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other. Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction public policy is defined as “that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has the tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc. (532 S 74), when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State. It is well to note that Article 22 “is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.” Castro v People The SC however, enunciated that “At most Castro could have been liable for damages under Article 26 (3) of the Civil Code. As an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and honesty and good faith.” Ledesma v CA and Delmo Ledesma, then President of the West Visayas College, was adjudged liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors. Ledesma’s behavior relative to Miss Delmo’s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal that was brought about by Ledesma’s neglect of duty and callousness. Campugan v Tolentino People v Bayotas (Art 30, dependent civil actions) In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of. Where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided that death supervenes before final judgement. Frias v San Diego (Art 31) Although petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by respondent against her. Madeja v Caro (Art 33) The court allowed the prosecution of the civil action for damages arising from homicide with reckless imprudence independently of the criminal action. Tuanda v Sandiganbayan Two essential elements of prejudicial question 1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action 2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed Beltran v People For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to the criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issus raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage. PASI v Lichauco The civil case against Lichauco involves three causes of action:first, injunction of awarding the orbital slot, second declaration of nullity of award and damages arising from Lichauco’s questioned acts. There is a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder is declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority, there would be no prohibited act to speak of and no basis for damages, therefore freeing her from liability. Yap v Cabales If the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. Dreamwork v Janiola The civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a prejudicial question to exist. “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” – motion to suspend may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or during the trial with the court hearing the case. The second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question is absent in this case. Even if the trial court declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void, this would not affect the prosecution of the private respondent in the criminal case. Pimentel v Pimentel Whether the decision in the civil case of declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case of parricide wherein the relationship of the offender and the victim is a key element for such crim. There is no prejudicial question because the declaration of nullity of the marriage is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Capili v People Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy. No prejudicial question because the crime of bigamy was already consummated prior to the declaration of nullity. Under the law, a marriage, whether void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if the petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, both the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. All that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the second marriage was contracted while the first marriage was still subsisting. Consing Jr v People Whether or not the civil action for injunctive relief and damages and attachment, is a prejudicial question of the proceedings in the criminal case of estafa through falsification of public document. There is no prejudicial question if the civil and criminal action can proceed independently of one another. (Art 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176) Quimiging v Icao Whether or not the unborn child is entitled to support A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. Even if the child is only just conceived and unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Art 742 of the Civil Code. Donations made to conceived or unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article” (i.e. that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would entirely useless and ineffective.” Continental Steel v Montano Whether or not Hortillano can claim paternity leave, bereavement leave and death and accident insurance for his unborn child who died in the maternal womb in the 38th week of pregnancy. While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who acquired juridical personality could die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before she/he could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental avers. Without such qualification then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. Hortillano is entitled to all the benefits Mayor v Tiu Artificial persons include 1. a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation and 2. a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The estate of a deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by operation of law. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. Dee v People Pilipinas Shell v Duque The rule is that juridical entities have personalities separate and distinct from its officers and the persons composing it. Generally, the stockholders and officers are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here. Hence, respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the checks issued in payment for FCI’s obligation. Caterpillar v Samson The civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair competition — civil and criminal —was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.