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978-1-107-03170-8 - Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity
Sacha Golob
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I N T RODUC T ION
The aim of this book is to provide a new account of the fundamental
concepts and arguments that deine Heidegger’s early work; speciically, my focus will be on the period from 1919 to 1935. I am interested
in three sets of issues in particular, and in the interaction between
them. The irst concerns the interpretation and validity of the various
philosophical theses which Heidegger advances. How, for example,
should we understand his theory of intentionality? In what sense, if
any, does he regard linguistic or propositional meaning as a secondary
phenomenon or even a distorting one? What exactly is Heideggerian
“understanding” or “anxiety” and what, if anything, do these ideas
imply for current debates over conceptualism or ‘know how’ or normativity? How do his views on these and other topics relate to those of
other phenomenologists, or to contemporary analytic research? The
second set of issues concerns the complex links between Heidegger’s
own thought and his extensive and vastly detailed commentaries
on the philosophical canon. Why, for example, does he place such
emphasis on Kant’s Schematism? How does the role of society in texts
such as SZ mirror or diverge from its role in Heidegger’s predecessors
such as Hegel? Why are Heidegger’s remarks on Plato, whether pages
or years apart, so often deeply conlicted, hedged, alternately hesitant
and overplayed? I will place particular stress on Kant, an author whom
Heidegger knew in huge detail and to whom he devoted more than
a thousand pages of intricate commentary: examining the tripartite
relationship between Heidegger himself, his reading of Kant and an
orthodox view of the Critical system will prove an important exegetical tool, one which throws into relief many of the unspoken assumptions that underpin Heidegger’s own thought. The third set of issues
1
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978-1-107-03170-8 - Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity
Sacha Golob
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Introduction
concerns Heidegger’s distinctive conceptual apparatus and its connection to the development of his philosophy. What exactly does he mean
by “being” and what are the implications of that answer for doctrines
such as the ontological difference? What is the distinction between
discoveredness [Entdecktheit] and disclosedness [Erschlossenheit], or
between the different senses of temporality marked by “Zeitlichkeit ”
and “Temporalität ”? What work is being done by those distinctions?
Could they be articulated in another philosophical vocabulary – if
not, why not? Similarly, what does he mean by “freedom” and how does
he ultimately come to see it as “prior even to being and time”?1
My plan is to look in detail both at the core questions within each of
these three sets of issues and at the interaction between them. I argue
that the picture of Heidegger which emerges is radically different
from that currently dominant, especially within the Anglo-American
literature. To take a single case, I deny that Dasein’s primary level of
experience is nonconceptual: I defend this view against the widespread
treatment of Heidegger as a pioneering nonconceptualist. I also argue,
however, that the picture of Heidegger which emerges from my reading captures what is distinctive in his thought, what sets his theory
apart from any other philosophical position. To stick with the same
case, for example, I contend that whilst Dasein’s primary intentionality is conceptual, it is nevertheless nonpropositional. I thus present
Heidegger as attempting to mark out a distinctive logical space, one
missed by both conceptualists and nonconceptualists in so far as they
equate the conceptual and the propositional. Further, I show how his
attempt to defend this move is closely tied to the uninished, and I suggest uninishable, project of SZ , and I chronicle his attempts to shore
up that project in the years after 1927.
The structure of the book is as follows. I begin in Chapter 1
with Heidegger’s theory of intentionality. I argue that this is best
approached via two claims: that propositional intentionality is in
some sense explanatorily derivative, and that propositional intentionality is in some sense linked to a particular ontology, that of the
“present-at-hand”. I canvas ten existing accounts of these two claims
as defended by Dreyfus, Carman, Wrathall and others. I argue that
despite their sophistication no existing account meets the twin criteria of exegetical and philosophical plausibility. In Chapter 2, I
therefore offer a new interpretation of the supposed link between
1 Ga31: 134.
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Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-03170-8 - Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity
Sacha Golob
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Introduction
3
the propositional and the present-at-hand as sketched in texts such
as SZ §33. Locating Heidegger in relation to Russell and Frege, I
claim that his point does not concern propositional intentionality
itself, but rather only a subset of propositions, those that have been
subjected to a particular meta-linguistic analysis. I contrast my view
with those of Blattner, Dahlstrom, Carman, Wrathall and others
and argue for its advantages. In Chapter 3, I turn to the other claim
through which I approached Heideggerian intentionality, the claim
that propositional content is in some sense explanatorily derivative.
This chapter is the longest in the book, and it is the most complex.
The key to Heidegger’s position, I suggest, lies with his idea of understanding ‘something as something’, or, as he puts it, understanding
‘a as b’. To grasp his argument one needs to look closely at each component here: the ‘as’ and the a and b variables. After discussing the
‘as’ in relation to Heidegger’s work on meaning and on the idea of
a context, I address the a variable: I distinguish several distinct representationalist theories of intentionality and I contrast Heidegger’s
position with those, with the West and East Coast readings of Husserl
and with contemporary analytic disjunctivism and relationalism. My
main focus, however, is on the b variable, which I argue plays a foundational role in Heidegger’s system, determining his understanding
of concepts such as meaning, the ontological difference and the a
priori. I support these claims by looking closely at Heidegger’s work
on Kant and on Plato: in both cases, I provide a new interpretation of
the relevant texts. My conclusion is a novel one: propositional intentionality is derivative for Heidegger on a mode of experience with
a unique grammar, a mode of experience that is conceptual and yet
nonpropositional. I show, further, how his thinking on this issue is
decisively inluenced by, and indeed constitutes a “repetition of”, in
SZ ’s distinctive sense of that phrase, Kant’s Schematism and Plato’s
doctrine of ideas.
In Chapter 4, I shift from intentionality to metaphysics in the broadest sense. I contend that Heidegger’s work on truth and his deinition
of “being” both mesh with my approach. I also argue for a realist
interpretation of his work and contrast my views on this with those of
Blattner, Carman and Lafont. But the results of this chapter do not, I
warn, change the fact that the underlying position which Heidegger
defends, the position set out in Chapter 3, faces signiicant philosophical problems. I propose, in Chapter 5, that we thus see a development in Heidegger’s thinking as he attempts to work through these
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978-1-107-03170-8 - Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity
Sacha Golob
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Introduction
problems in the late 1920s and early 1930s.2 This shift culminates in an
increased emphasis on freedom: I argue that this emphasis is designed
to articulate the central role of normativity within Heidegger’s system
and I show how this both leshes out and extends strands present in
SZ . I support my claims here by looking closely at Heidegger’s work on
Kant’s philosophy of action: I stress the importance for both philosophers of the link between normativity and the irst-person perspective.
I close in Chapter 6, by showing how those questions of freedom, of
the irst person and of “mineness” link to authenticity. I contend that
for Heidegger authentic agents possess a distinctive awareness of the
limitations of normative space, of the “space of reasons” to use the
Sellarsian metaphor. Heidegger refers to those limitations as Dasein’s
“initude” and unpacks them through discussion of existential concepts
such as death and guilt. I explain and critically assess the way in which
Heidegger connects those discussions to issues such as perfectionism,
phronesis and ‘the one’: I contrast Heidegger’s position with Hegel’s,
and my account with those advanced by contemporary commentators
such as Crowell and Carman. I end by indicating how the various lines
of argument I have sketched might be brought together to overcome
the problems which ultimately undermine texts such as SZ .
Heidegger’s philosophy, as I see it, is an innovative and highly
unusual one. My goal in this book is to try to set out and assess some
of the distinctive inferences, assumptions, inluences and errors that
drive it.
2 I regard claims about this shift as independent from more familiar debates about the
Kehre as it is usually understood; for example, I make little appeal to texts such as Ga65.
Generally, the time frame on which I focus means that I take no particular view on
either the existence or nature of a ‘later Heidegger’, although I i nd any suggestion of
a binary change extremely implausible. Where my arguments support or clash with
some speciic thesis regarding texts or terms after 1935 I will note this (see especially
p. 254).
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