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My main claim in this article is that lawyers should make less use of the hermeneutical method than they do. The reasons that I will adduce to support this claim are the following: Law (tout court) is first and foremost an answer to the question of how to act, and more in particular, the question of which rules to enforce by collective means. As such, law does not coincide with positive law. Nevertheless, positive law determines the content of the law to a large extent. It does so for two reasons. The first reason is that positive law contributes to legal certainty, and that legal certainty is very important for the question concerning which rules should be enforced by collective means. The second reason is that respect for the positive law, which was created by democratic bodies, implies respect for democracy. However, positive law can only contribute to legal certainty if its application is predictable. If the positive law can be interpreted in more than one way, its application will not be predictable. In that case the positive law is not relevant for the content of the law tout court. Theories about the interpretation of positive law (hermeneutical theories) are particularly relevant where positive law can be interpreted in different ways, that is: where positive law is not relevant for the content of the law tout court. Therefore, hermeneutical theories are not relevant for the content of the law and lawyers should not waste their time on them. A similar argument can be given for the democratic legitimation of positive law.
Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review
Hermeneutics of the LawOne of the most ancient forms of thinking about law is what is today known as positivist or normativist. It focuses on the product presented in the name of the law, the textual representation which not only simply includes, but directly embodies the law. In other words, it is a corpus, whether it is a code, a properly issued rule or a set of ad-hoc decisions: this is the law itself. This represents a short-circuited ready form for cognition, which the conscious follower and the professional agent of the law will both use as a tool. In addition, however, presumably ages later, there emerges a completely different version of the idea of law, rooted in a culture that forecasts the hermeneutic way of thinking. If in the former an approach based on epistemology can be discerned, the latter takes a more ontological approach instead. This focuses, beyond the given text, upon its interpretation and on the understanding that may be drawn from the text, and thus ultimately on the content whic...
SHS Web of Conferences
To the problem of the hermeneutics of the legal foundations of philosophyIn a certain sense, law and philosophy equally claim to be the fundamental basis of human activity. The present paper examines the problem of possible common field of interpretation for philosophical and legal hermeneutics, where a situation of mutual convergence could overcome a potential “conflict of interpretations”. The interpretive nature of truth in hermeneutics reveals a multiplicity of possible foundations both in the principles of philosophy and in the concepts and norms of law. Hence, the main common task of philosophical and legal hermeneutics is the creation of a new sense of legality. The right is the establishment of some boundaries. But the philosophy is to put any boundaries and grounds in question, including the question of its own right. Therefore, the problem of legal philosophy inevitably leads us to questions about the right of philosophy and the right to philosophy.
Karina und Erich Schumann Centre for Advanced International Legal Studies Working Paper Series
A HermenEUtical Approach to Jurisidiction, Autonomy and Public Power (in progress2022 •
The answer of the CJEU to the question of the perimeter of its jurisdiction when EU law and a third law cooperate in a matter is not fully satisfactory. Departing from the traditional approach, both cases in which EU law is applied in close connection to international law, and also those in which it is applied in connection to national law should be considered because both are expressions of the same problem, namely: the trend of the Court to unionize third law, and on that ground to extend its jurisdiction beyond a straight reading of EU primary law and international law practice. The delimitation of its jurisdiction that the CJEU provides in these cases is neither precise, nor safe. Above all, the underlying assumption that EU law is just as autonomous as national law has to be accepted and needs to be re-explained as a law essentially interwoven with others. The challenge lies in reconciling its unity with its compound character. This attempt should shed light also on another aspect of legal protection: the exercise of power by different national administrations within the same procedure. The connection between the two issues is the fact that EU law and the exercise of EU power depend existentially on the contribution of national ones.
2015 •
Hermeneutics is a special branch of knowledge a new phenomenon in modernity agewhich has addressed “the process of understanding an effect” by scrutinizing methodology and looks for a way to “conceive phenomena” better. Hermeneutics is a knowledge which explores norms and principles of texts description and is in turn the rationality of dialogue which paves the ground to conceive the text correctly as well as norms to clarify ambiguous texts. The main paradigm of hermeneutics was a divine model which described holy texts. Simultaneous to dissemination and acceptance of Rome Laws in the middle age and the necessity of interpretations, legal hermeneutics was emerged as a way to describe laws. Since in criminal law field the persecutor looks for legal norms and meanings especially criminology and teachings for social defense, it describes them in order achieve to such comments. Such comments and descriptions are influenced by culture as well as time and place requirements as the focal ...
2018 •
In the dispute of civil cases filed to the judiciary, the justice seekers seeking justice through the court hope to be able to do it quickly and lawfully. However, in reality the process through the judiciary is not as hopeful, as the principle of justice should be done simply, quickly and costly. The purpose of this paper is to understand the application of the principle of justice done with a simple, quick and light cost with the method of approach used in this study is the normative-empirical law research is a combination of normative legal research with empirical law research. The principle of the judiciary set forth in Article 2 paragraph (4) of Act Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power, should be done simply, quickly and lightly and efficiently and effectively and not ruling out precision and accuracy in seeking truth and justice. The application of the principle of justice depends to a great extent on the legal officers of such bodies, especially in the courts and the supreme c...
2014 •
Foreword [1994] 1–4 LAW AS PRACTICE QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96 LAW AS TECHNIQUE DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}] LAW AS LOGIC MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308] LAW AS EXPERIENCE ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423 LAW AS HISTORY FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489 Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525
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