7 Engaging with a Posttotalitarian State Buddhism Online in China1 André Laliberté Introduction Yang Guobin has argued that the Internet offers Chinese citizens an opportunity to circumvent the state and question authority when it is abusing power. The expectation that active netizens would make the government accountable has received validation over some remarkable cases, such as the train accident in Wenzhou or the mass mobilization in Wukan 乌坎. Moreover, the resilience of the Falun Gong despite more than a decade of persecution by the Chinese government has pointed to the potential of cybermobilization. The use of the Internet to create community of meaning is especially relevant to religious institutions whose raison d’être is precisely to promote a worldview that can sometimes clash with that of the state, even if only symbolically or metaphorically (Thornton 2002). Keeping in mind the efforts of the state to encourage the unification of Buddhism under a single organizational structure, the number of people who relate to that tradition and, as I will document in this chapter, the vitality of online Buddhism, we know very little about the political leanings of online Buddhism in China. In this chapter, I look beyond the structure of official Buddhism and offer a bird’s-eye view of the numerous Buddhist websites in China, asking to what extent they resist, reinforce or complement the party-state’s agenda? In addressing this issue, I will proceed as follows: I will first briefly address the issue of online religions and politics, make the case for a comparative perspective, underline the past and present activism of Buddhists in Chinese societies, introduce the broad contours of the Chinese Buddhist cyber-scape and proceed with a content analysis of a representative site before concluding about the politics of online Buddhism in China. Religion Online and Politics The literature on contentious politics, social change and democratization often assume that the Internet empowers civil society (Bohman 2005; Hague and Loader 2005; Held 1995; Papacharissi 2004; Poster 2001). In the context of China, Yang Guobin has shown that the use of social media and the 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 129 17-09-2016 14:49:50 130 André Laliberté Internet has increased the visibility for a number of issues and added significantly to the mobilization of people and resources in contentious politics (Yang 2009). Another literature, however, cautions that the modern authoritarian state, thanks to the support of corporate interests, has also proven capable of using the Internet to enhance its capacity to control citizens’ lives (McChesney 2013; MacKinnon and Schwartz 2010; Morozov 2011). As Rebecca MacKinnon and Bernard Schwartz wrote in the context of China, ‘networked authoritarianism’ emerges “(w)hen an authoritarian regime embraces and adjusts to the inevitable changes brought by digital communications technologies” (MacKinnon and Schwartz 2012). The study by Michael Best and Keegan Wade summed up well the Janus-faced dimension of the Internet: “as a tool for democratization as well as an instrument for authoritarianism” (Best and Wade 2009, 255). While admitting the Internet’s potential for netizens’ empowerment, Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Kate Merkel-Hess concurred in their writing about China that most Internet traffic serves corporate interests, the government, and can even be exploited to vent jingoistic sentiments that embarrass authority without posing any serious threat (Wasserstrom and Merkel-Hess 2011). In this chapter, I would like to draw from these arguments to frame my analysis of the political meaning of religions online in China’s cyberspace. In other words, what are religious voices online saying in the cacophony of contentious politics that is distinct from what monks, priests or imams preach in their temples, churches or mosques? What are the contributions of religions online to social change? Where do they stand in relation to the networked authoritarian state? As Brenda Brasher argued in her study of religion on the Internet, the increasing presence of religion online does not mean that technology has triumphed over faith (Brasher 2004). Quite the contrary: studies have shown since the 1990s that communication technology has increased the place of religion in our societies (Hojsgaard and Warburg 2005; Wertheim 1999; Zaleski 1997). However, there are too few studies on religion online in China. One of the few exceptions, by David Palmer, presents three important findings about the effects of the Internet on the Chinese religious cyberscape. First, he found in the new spaces opened for religious expression more individualized quest for meaning rather than expressions of collective rituals. He also found that religions online exist as poles of influence that accompany the undermining of orthodoxies supported by the state. Finally, and contrary to his initial expectation, he found that the Internet has not led to greater integration of the online communities in the mainland and overseas, and, surprisingly, he noted that “the potentialities of the Web [are] more fully exploited on the mainland than in Hong Kong and Taiwan” (Palmer 2004). Palmer’s conclusions, based on his case study of Taoism, are also relevant to Buddhism and other forms of religions, including some that the state does not recognize. Beatrice Leung, in her analysis of Falun Gong, had underlined the potential of religion to challenge state authority with 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 130 17-09-2016 14:49:50 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 131 her comparison of Falun Gong’s use of the Internet to the management of the Iranian revolution by Khomeini in France and the “elusiveness” of the Church of Scientology (Leung 2002: 783–784). These two latter comparisons should remind us that while the Internet can be a resource to challenge political authorities, it can also promote alternative forms of authority for which the concept of an open society is alien. We should not take for granted that those of the religious actors who are not collaborating with the state are promoters of a liberal or more democratic society. As we are learning in Western societies, both organized and informal kinds of religions can be promoters of intolerance, bigotry and antidemocratic politics. On the global stage, and in all traditions, the potential of religious fundamentalism stands out as a major challenge (Almond, Appleby and Sivan 2003; Emerson and Hartman 2006). As Heidi Campbell suggested, while religious fundamentalists see in the forces of globalization a silencing of their tradition, they also look to the Internet as a form of empowerment transcending the boundaries of nation-states (Campbell 2005, 313). It is not clear to what extent China faces a problem with religious fundamentalism, despite the denunciations of the ‘three evils’ of “religious extremism (zongjiao jiduanzhuyi 宗教极端主义), ethnic separatism (minzu fenliezhuyi 民族分裂主义) and terrorism (kongbuzhuyi 恐怖主义)” by its security apparatus. These denunciations often seem more an obvious effort to link the central government’s concerns over the border regions of Xinjiang and Tibet to the international concerns over violent Islamic fundamentalist groups than a religious phenomenon emerging within the Han majority. In these cases, online religions are often making claims about issues of ethnicity and national identity, and focus on the problems of self-determination and cultural preservation. Setting aside the issues of ‘separatism’ and ‘terrorism’ that the CCP associates with restive minorities, Chinese authorities still believe that the Han ethnic majority must oppose the danger of ‘religious extremism’ in its midst. The security apparatus sees that danger in what it labels as ‘evil cults’: those religions that are unrecognized by the state but practiced by an undetermined number of Han Chinese. As the intensity of the repression against it suggests, there is little doubt that the online activism of Falun Gong represents for the CCP one of the most alarming cases of contentious politics in cyberspace (Tong 2009). Protestants and Catholic Churches, in part because of their linkages with co-religionists outside of China, also represent a source of concerns for authorities worried about the consequences of mobilization via cyberspace (Wielander 2009). We know far less about the nature of online Buddhism, however, outside of China. This is somewhat surprising, considering that China’s largest officially recognized religious population is Buddhist and, moreover, that Buddhists have established an impressive presence in cyberspace, with over 120 Buddhist websites, as I will discuss. 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 131 17-09-2016 14:49:51 132 André Laliberté How much the world of Chinese Buddhism has taken advantage of the Internet to organize, protest and influence public opinion? There are many contentious issues in China for which we assume Buddhists could feel concerned: the exercise of capital punishment, for example, goes against one of the first precepts of the religion against killing living beings. The environmental degradation faced by China, which threatens the livelihood of people and endangers ecosystems, challenges Buddhists’ respect for sentient beings in an even broader scale. Finally, the ideal of selflessness promoted by Buddhists sits uneasily with the stress on materialism, in its MarxistLeninist and neo-liberal variants, in contemporary society. The questions presented earlier about the political leaning of online Buddhism deserve to be put in comparative perspective through comparisons with Buddhist communities outside China to get a sense of what Chinese Buddhists could plausibly vie for. Comparative Analysis Do Buddhists in China share some of the fundamental views of the world held by Buddhists in other countries, especially in Asia? Do they share their concerns with respect to issues such as public morality, social justice, poverty alleviation, to name a few? Some of these issues of interest to Buddhists the world over, which have inspired cyber-mobilization in many parts of the world, are universal; some are specific to China. While an international comparison should focus on the issues faced by Buddhists everywhere, it is important to keep in mind that different national situations and specific political conditions inspire different responses. We should not assume that all Buddhists agree about the remedies to the problems that they face everywhere, such as environmental degradation and social inequities, on the basis of shared values such as compassion and selflessness. Moreover, as recent developments in South and Southeast Asia reveal, we even need to question basic assumptions about Buddhists and their love of peace. Keeping this caveat in mind, the objective of this comparison is to propose a benchmark with which we can assess Chinese Buddhist activism online. One such benchmark is the trend known as ‘engaged Buddhism.’ An important literature on this aspect of contemporary Buddhism and the specific issues that it seeks to address, such as human rights and social justice, has grown over the years (Jones 2003; Keown et al. 1998; Queen et al. 2003). While ‘engaged Buddhism’ was primarily a concept used in scholarly literature to include a wide variety of movements and leaders promoting progressive causes, it has also acquired an institutionalized form and a presence online, thanks to the actions of Sulak Sivaraksa, a Thai lay Buddhist who has established the International Network of Engaged Buddhists (INEB) to connect like-minded organizations all over the world (Pistono 2013; Swearer 1996). Its advisory and executive committees comprise monks, nuns and laypeople from more than twenty countries, but 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 132 17-09-2016 14:49:51 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 133 no one from China (INEB 2014a). The network brings together fifty-nine organizations in twenty-three countries, but no partner organization is coming from China either (INEB 2014b). The INEB supports a large array of goals: a sustainable economic paradigm, climate change adaptation, international youth exchange, peace and reconciliation, women empowerment, inter-religious dialogue, human rights and social justice (INEB 2014c). The perception, mostly by Western scholars, that engaged Buddhism represents the future of that tradition worldwide may reflect the fact that Buddhism has spread in the United States (Coleman 2001; Ostrowsky 2006, 93; Seager 1999; Tanaka 1998) and Europe (Obadia 2001), and that as a result, Buddhism has been ‘contaminated’ by liberal democratic and egalitarian values. The fact that this was not always the case historically is debated in the Journal for Buddhist Ethics. The tragic events unfolding in Burma and Sri Lanka, societies where Buddhists represent a majority of the population, also invites us to guard against any naive essentialism that portrays Buddhism as inherently peaceful. To its credit, though, the INEB has taken a firm and courageous stance urging Buddhist leaders in Burma to act against those who have persecuted Muslims in that country (INEB 2004d). The presence online of ‘engaged Buddhism’ reveals the vitality of the movement but also the challenges faced by this confederation of like-minded organizations comprising many movements in different cultural contexts. The INEB connects to other networks, some of which serve a national constituency, others of which are international but focused on specific issues. For example, the INEB connects with the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, an activist association based in California that was founded in 1978 and that has branched out in Australia.2 Most of the partners associations are national in scope but most of them use English as one of the two languages on their site, and many of them are registered in the United States.3 Among the members of the INEB that fall into that category include the following: the network of Buddhist Solidarity for Reform, a South Korea lay association, promotes peaceful unification within the peninsula and reform within Korean Buddhist orders, which are beset by violence from within;4 the Bikalpa Gyan Kendra focuses on environmental issues in Nepal;5 the Adecom Network supports women’s empowerment and combats violence against them in South India;6 and the Sewalanka Foundation provides poverty alleviation in Sri Lanka.7 Other members of the INEB have a tenuous connection with Buddhism, such as the University for Peace based in Costa Rica8 and the Khmer Youth Association.9 Others have ceased to operate because of a lack of interest or too much fragmentation in their ranks. Other members of the INEB network have registered in their countries of origin. The Japan Network of Engaged Buddhism, which fosters Japanese-Korean cooperation against nuclear energy, provides help and support for disaster relief and offers chaplaincy for the dying;10 the Hikmahbudhi, based in Jakarta, promotes inter-faith dialogue in all of Southeast Asia;11 the Buddhist missionary 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 133 17-09-2016 14:49:51 134 André Laliberté Society Malaysia,12 founded in 1962, also engages in inter-faith dialogue, albeit mainly within the country. Another benchmark along which the Chinese Buddhists can measure up online is that of specific Buddhist institutions that have managed to gain an international following and remain independent of governments and international organizations such as the INEB or the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB) and the World Buddhist Sangha Council (WBSC). Many of these associations are larger in their worldwide reach and membership than the organizations belonging to the INEB. The largest among them, such as the Sokka Gakai International (SGI),13 an offshoot of the Nichiren Soshu sect, is a transnational organization that claims a membership of over twelve million in 192 countries. The SGI is famous for promoting peace education, but it is also considered controversial because of its intense form of proselytism (Seager 2006). The SGI is active politically, with its members supporting the Komeito, a party in the governing coalition in the Japanese Diet (Metraux). Its multi-lingual websites connect SGI members in all national chapters in their own language. The Rissho Kosei-kai (RK), another major Japanese Buddhist association, claims a membership of over two million households in Japan and abroad. Although the RK affirms a strict separation between religion and politics, it also holds a principled stance against the proposed revision of the constitutional amendment that commits Japan to renounce war. It affirms it does not want to form a party or create a new one, but it intervenes in public debates on issues such as organ transplants, reform of religious corporation laws, and visits by politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine.14 This is the model that Taiwanese Buddhist associations have followed, such as the Buddha Light International (BLIA) (guoji foguanghui 国际佛 光会),15 also known as Foguangshan 佛光山 (lit. the Buddha Light Mountain), and the Tzu Chi Merit Society (ciji gongdehui 慈济功德会).16 These are transnational organizations that both claim millions of followers in their countries of origin and hundreds of thousands or more abroad. Both of these associations are also using multi-language websites to reach out to their members and try to recruit new ones. These sites are noticeably apolitical and unengaged in issues such as social justice, gender equality and campaigns against violence. The Taiwanese Buddhist associations, in contrast to the SGI, but like the RK, prefer to avoid direct involvement in politics and have not founded a political party akin to the Komeito. Yet they have been active in Taiwanese politics. During the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, Xingyun 星雲 (b.1927) supported the candidacy of Chen Lu-an. Over the years, Xingyun has also expressed highly controversial views against Taiwanese independence and in favor of unification with China. In 2004, the monk Weijue 惟覺 (1928–2016), abbot of the Zhongtai Chan monastery (zhongtai chan si 中台禪寺), issued publicly a dire warning against voters if they elect Chen Shui-bian. Many Taiwanese disliked such public utterances by Buddhist leaders, or ignored them. The websites of their organizations barely echo the political stance of their leaders. The relations of Taiwanese 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 134 17-09-2016 14:49:51 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 135 Buddhists with their Chinese co-religionists can go a long way in explaining this cautious attitude. Finally, another benchmark against which Chinese Buddhists can measure themselves with, in contrast to the internationalism of the SGI, RK, BLIA or Tzu Chi is the cultural nationalism of other Buddhist associations. Some of them, such as the Dhammakaya17 and the Santi Asoke18, which both claim millions of followers, are important actors in Thai politics, and their views are very different from those of the INEB and their compatriot Sulak Sivaraksa. Both organizations have sided with regimes that have not hesitated to use the military to enforce rule (Mackenzie 2007). This cultural nationalism can be supportive of conservative policies. It can also be promoting narrower ethno-nationalist agendas. This is the case with an aggressive Sinhalese Sangha in Sri Lanka that has condoned the persecution of the Tamils and other ethnic and religious minorities. Another example is the ongoing ethnic cleansing instigated by bigoted clerical leaders against the Rohinga Muslim minority in Burma. These instances show that Buddhists can also embrace nationalistic, intolerant and violent views if they believe their tradition is threatened. We should not exclude the uncomfortable possibility that some Buddhist individuals in China could harbor similar insecurities toward the modern world and globalization, which can bring attitudes of intolerance toward other communities, or against variants of the established tradition. Yet such an attitude of cultural nationalism could easily translate into views that oppose the CCP. If there are Buddhist leaders with these views, they are well-hidden. There is no presence in Chinese Buddhist websites of animosities such as the ones we find on the sites of Sinhalese Buddhist extremist organizations such as the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddha Power Force),19 or their Burmese counterparts in the 969 movement.20 Although there is an important literature about political activism among engaged Buddhists and others, little is written about the more specific question of cyber-activism among them, whether they promote progressive or intolerant values. There are case studies about ritual practices online (Connelly 2012; Kim 2005; Ostrowsky 2006; Prebish 2013), but they do not broach the topic of politics online from a Buddhist perspective. This paucity of writing about Buddhist online politics arguably reflects the fact that, besides supporting the regime in the country where they live, there is little politics possible for Buddhists to start with in most countries where they represent the majority or a significant minority of the population. Most of these countries are either fragile democracies at best (Burma, Nepal and Cambodia), hybrid regimes under military rule (Thailand,21 Sri Lanka), quasi-absolute monarchies (Bhutan) or party-state regimes (Vietnam, North Korea, and Laos). In these cases, Buddhist expression of political dissent, like any form of political dissent, is perilous, and research on the expression of political dissidence in these countries is difficult. Mongolia, a democracy with a Buddhist majority, stands out as an exception as a country where Buddhists can express their concerns over issues of social justice, 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 135 17-09-2016 14:49:51 136 André Laliberté environmental protection, etc., without fear of reprisal, but the presence of online Buddhism in Mongolia is limited because the tradition has been almost totally wiped out after five decades of persecution, reports Michael Jerryson, in his study of Buddhism in Mongolia (Jerryson 2007). In the few liberal democracies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the expression of dissent online is possible, but it is the achievement of minorities among the minorities. Chinese Buddhists finds themselves in a situation similar to that of their co-religionists in Japan, Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan: they represent an important minority, but a minority nonetheless. We need to understand their activism online, real or imagined, in that context. Buddhist Political Activism in Chinese Society We are seeing the emergence of a lively Chinese Buddhist cyberspace but, as I will show, we see little contentious politics happening there. Before analyzing the political meaning of Chinese Buddhism online in greater depth, we need to clarify whether Chinese Buddhists are inherently likely to be submissive to the state or not. To start with, the formidable pluralization of Chinese Buddhism online suggests that Chinese Buddhists do not speak with the same voice. However, what should we infer from that diversity? Are Buddhist schools and institutions that have acquired an identity online taking the opportunity to make different claims and propose different perspectives from each other to address the issues faced by Chinese today? Are these Buddhist websites pushing for the promotion, if not the defense, of important Buddhist interests, such as the preservation or recovery of Buddhist heritage? Are they addressing issues of general interest in the name of their religious ideals? Where do they stand on the thorniest issues that directly affect them, such as the authority of the Dalai Lama and the issue of his succession, or the rise of new religious entrepreneurs who stand in a legal limbo between non-recognition and tolerance from different authorities? Before answering these questions, it would help to look into Buddhist activism in Chinese societies to provide some context. Buddhists were politically active in China during the late Qing and Republican period as studies by James Carter (2009), Hung-yok Ip (2009) and Yuan (2009) illustrate. Most importantly, lay Buddhists and clerics have been very active in working in favor of religious reform and China’s modernization. For this reason, many Buddhists leaders encouraged the Republican revolution against the decaying Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), and later on they became cautiously supportive of socialism after the failure of the KMT in China. As Xue Yu (2009) documented, Buddhist associations were sympathetic to the new regime in the PRC out of their commitment to ‘Buddhism for this world.’ The Cultural Revolution, by closing Buddhist institutions, however, has brought enormous harm to the Sangha and its supporters. In 1980, with the policy of reform and opening becoming entrenched, Buddhist institutions struggled to recover. To protect themselves against future 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 136 17-09-2016 14:49:52 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 137 attacks by authorities, Ji Zhe has showed that the Buddhist Association of China (zhongguo fojiao xiehui 中国佛教协会, hereafter BAC) adopted an internal directive known as ‘Combining Chan with agricultural work (nongchan bingzhong 农禅并重),’ whereby monastics strove to achieve selfsufficiency in order to pre-emptively fend off any accusation that they are living at the expense of society (Ji 2004, 3). Later on, as the policy of reform accelerated and as a newly emerging middle class grew in importance, the CCP, viewing the revival of the religion as an asset for tourism, sought to capitalize on the Buddhist heritage and supported the recovery of temples, and temples followed suit under a new strategy known as ‘cultivate the good earth (zhong futian 种富田)’ and ‘make merit (zuo gongde 做功德)’ (Ji 2004, 5). This co-dependence on government for the revival of their institutions, however, made Buddhist associations unlikely to challenge the authorities on many policies, even if they could have adverse effects on the development of the religion. In most of the upheavals experienced by China since 1982, when the Communist Party formally repudiated its previous policies on religion by issuing “The Basic Viewpoint on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period” and encouraged the reopening of Buddhist institutions, Buddhist associations in general have been quiet. Setting aside individuals and associations identifying with Tibetan Buddhism, there is little record of Buddhist activism or participation in contentious politics. A few brave individuals exist, such as the monk Shengguan 圣观 (b. 1961), who spoke publicly on behalf of those who perished in the June 4 crackdown, and the many unknown monks and nuns who have helped him over the years, or the monk Dengkuan 灯宽, the late abbot of the Guangyan temple (Guangyan chan si 光严禅寺) in Sichuan, who testifies to human rights activist Liao Yiwu 廖亦武 the fate that befell monastics who resist the attempts by corrupt CCP cadres to extort money from them (Liao 2008). These are exceptions, however. Most often, the defense of Buddhists’ interests, as an institution, coincides with the goals of the state. We can see this convergence of goals with respect to restoring heritage: local governments support the value of temples as tourist attractions, the abbot of temples appreciate the value of this state patronage for maintaining the continuation of the religion. It also matters for other dimensions of self-preservation that are more immaterial but nonetheless important— namely, warding off ‘superstitions’ (mixin 迷信) and ‘cults’ (xiejiao 邪教). For example, in the late 1990s, leaders of Buddhist associations in Northern China took sides against Falungong, which they saw as a cult that cast discredit on their tradition. In another case in which the interest of Buddhists and the state coincided is the relationship between Chinese and Taiwanese Buddhists. Chinese Buddhists have looked with admiration at the achievements of Buddhist institutions such as Tzu Chi, Foguangshan and Dharma Drum Mountain (or fagushan 法鼓山) in Taiwan. Conversely, leaders of the latter have looked with great expectation at their colleagues in China, 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 137 17-09-2016 14:49:52 138 André Laliberté hoping for invitations to expand their activities there for mutual benefits. This last development matters to the extent that in Taiwan, Buddhists have been active politically, but in a way that is acceptable to the CCP. From the perspective of Chinese authorities, this political participation, which is mostly supportive of the ruling establishment, provides a template for the objectives of the United Front Work Department’s own policy of coopting religious institutions in China. The exponential growth of social media and online activities represents another important development that has helped the development of Buddhist institutions. As I will describe in greater detail in this chapter, religious entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the Internet to create cyber-communities that transcend boundaries. Official Buddhist institutions, pre-empting or responding to these evolutions, have opened a variety of sites serving a wide variety of clienteles. Most of the Buddhist online activities consist of sites linked with government institutions and connect with other sites, many of which are based in Taiwan and Hong Kong, or abroad. Significantly, however, the Great Firewall ensures that these sites are sealed from those of the Dalai Lama, the Falungong and any movement that could connect with them. Beyond this obvious limitation, however, what are the trends we can observe on Buddhist websites? Should we infer that the institutional plurality of online Buddhism is merely the kind of diversity on offer in the marketplace, where suppliers compete with each other to offer different variants of the same product? Are online Buddhist actors just acting like corporate actors protecting their own niche markets against competitors? The survey of the different networks of Buddhist institutions, which often offer the same services, do not suggest that they behave as competitors, since their networks are interconnected, and sometimes complete each other’s offerings online. Looking at the large sites of ‘The Divine Eye Buddhist index’ (tianyan fojiao wangzhi daquan 天眼佛教网址大全, hereafter Tianyan)22, ‘China Buddhism online’ (zhongguo fojiaozaixian 佛教在线)23, ‘Chinese Buddhism Network’ (zhongguo fojiaowang 佛教网)24 and others, one is struck by the similarities between them, down to the organization of their opening pages. This focus on online Buddhism requires a caveat: conclusions about the cyber-activism of Chinese Buddhism do not represent the last word on the subject of Buddhist perspectives on the politics of China. There needs to be more investigation on the ground in temples and lay Buddhist lodges about the local politics of temples and associations, which can reveal tensions between temple administrations, lay believers and the broader society, caused by the deleterious effects of tourism (Fisher 2011). In addition, finegrained textual analysis of the online predication of overseas masters such as the monk Jingkong 净空 are likely to yield important insights and not necessarily lead us to the Chinese equivalents of the INEB, nor its polar opposite, the BBS.25 The analysis of Guillaume Dutournier and Ji Zhe about this particular master, for example, reveals that his predication is promoting 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 138 17-09-2016 14:49:52 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 139 a form of neo-Buddhism, encouraging the learning of Confucian ethics that mildly criticizes the regime for straying from traditional culture, not for being too authoritarian (Dutournier and Ji 2009). The survey that follows represents a first crack at the data to give us a sense of the extent to which Buddhism online is the most dynamic actor among the five religions. The Chinese Buddhist Cyber-scape: A Preliminary Survey For the moment, the Chinese Buddhist cyber-scape remains a self-enclosed universe, with a few exceptions in the last few years that are becoming important, as connections with Taiwanese, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese networks are increasing. These interactions are possible as long as they do not meddle with politics and stay away from controversies. As we have seen, the networks of Chinese Buddhism do not link with those of the INEB. In all likelihood, the fact that the latter includes as patron the Dalai Lama can explain why it is difficult for the Chinese Buddhist association to join that network. The efficient Internet police of China can monitor and prevent such connection from being made, but it is also quite likely that many Chinese Buddhist unofficial associations internalize the censorship and do not want to take the risk of linking with the INEB. The Chinese cyber-scape, in its linkages with those of Hong Kong and Taiwan, does project an identity that the CCP approves, but that predates its appearance: the trend known as ‘Buddhism for this world’ (renjian fojiao 人间佛教). This trend, progressive in its origin, can claim to represent an alternative if not a competitor to INEB. Over the years, Chinese Buddhists have worked hard to build their own international network on that basis, and recent events on the scene of global Buddhism suggest that China is about to overcome its status as an outlier and become one of the prime movers of the religion’s activities in the world.26 As we have seen before, between 1949 and 1980 Chinese Buddhists were weakened institutionally within China. But they were also isolated from international Buddhist organizations during the same period because of the context of the Cold War. The BAC, the only association authorized by the state to represent all Chinese Buddhists,27 could not join the WFB nor the WBSC, since the Taiwan-based Buddhist Association of the Republic of China (zhongguo fojiaohui 中国佛教会, hereafter BAROC) claimed to represent the interests of all Buddhists in China.28 The evolution among Taiwanese Buddhist associations during the process of democratization, however, gradually undermined this exclusion of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) from the WFB and the WBSC. The influence of the BAROC has diminished as the prominence of the Taiwan-based transnational Buddhist associations, such as the BLIA and the Tzu Chi Merit Society, grew in importance, thereby weakening the position of the BAROC within the WFB and the WBSC (Jones 1999; Laliberté 2004). The increased presence of Tzu Chi and Foguangshan in China and abroad, the efforts of Xingyun, the 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 139 17-09-2016 14:49:52 140 André Laliberté founder of the BLIA, to organize with the BAC and Chinese authorities, a World Buddhist Forum (WBF) concurrent to the WFB and the newly established International Buddhist Confederation in New Delhi,29 have signaled the arrival of Chinese Buddhists on the global stage. While the WBF’s three meetings in Hangzhou (2006), Wuxi (2009) and Hong Kong (2012) affirmed the international character of the organization and included delegates from Japan and other countries with significant numbers of Buddhists, it remained a primarily Chinese institution. Although it included Buddhists from Taiwan, not surprisingly, it did not send an invitation to the Dalai Lama and ignored the network of engaged Buddhism. In the different sessions held during its three successive meetings, the WBF participants did discuss publicly problems of common interest to all Buddhists worldwide such as environmental protection and world peace, but there were no discussions on other, more controversial issues such as social justice and human rights.30 The WBF turned out to showcase the ability of Chinese Buddhists worldwide to organize and promote Chinese perspectives, if not those of the state itself. This celebration of Chinese Buddhism is anything but a demonstration of contentious politics. The analysis of Chinese Buddhist websites reveals a plethora of organizations and networks, and a ‘noodle bowl’ of connections among them. The site of the official BAC,31 the window to Chinese Buddhism that the regime wants to present, does not represent at all the dynamism of the religion. The official site, which in principle expresses the views of the BAC and the concerns of affiliated provincial, municipal, and local Buddhist associations, does not represent the vitality of Buddhists online. The BAC site introduces regulations on religious affairs, presents existing institutions, the basics about the schools of Chinese Buddhism, important historical leaders, scriptures, e-journals and e-books. However, there are many lacunae in these data sets that suggest the information is vastly underreported and/or the site is not updated. For example, the list of Buddhist organizations does not acknowledge any of the other associations discussed earlier, even though the latter all provide a link to the BAC. The provincial and local branches of the BAC vary in importance. For example, the Zhejiang32 and Jiangsu Buddhist associations33 provide links to the State Administration for Religious Affairs, the BAC, the United Front Work Department of Provincial Party Committees, Provincial Bureaus for Ethnic and Religious Affairs, as well as Municipal and County Buddhist associations, and sites for Buddhists that are not operated by the official associations or temples, such as the Jianzhen Buddhist University in Yangzhou and the Club for the Propagation of the Dharma in Suzhou. The Guangdong34 and Jiangxi35 provincial Buddhist associations run their own websites, and their networking with the official and non-official organizations matches that of Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Other Chinese provinces have their own Buddhist associations, but if they run their own websites, these were not accessible at the time of this writing or they were not working.36 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 140 17-09-2016 14:49:53 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 141 Most cities and many counties have their own Buddhist associations but most do not run a website: only a few do, such as those of Guangzhou and Nanjing. The visibility online of official Buddhist institutions varies enormously throughout the country and does not reflect the location of Buddhist temples and activities in general. While official Buddhist institutions presence online is limited, private organizations more than compensate for that low profile. The ‘private sites’ with a national or regional scope present much livelier portraits of the religion, complete with an abundant iconography and interactive links, sometimes including music. A bewildering number of sites, linked to each other, serve as hubs to connect to temples, master’s speeches and writings, scriptures, blogs and online stores selling everything from religious paraphernalia to tea. One of the most important sources, Tianyan, gives an idea of the Buddhist presence online. It provides links to another seventy-two sites (see Table 7.1). Tianyan’s index counts forty-nine categories, each of which lists varying numbers of links. The most important categories, in terms of number of links are: 239 blogs by Buddhist masters (fashi boke 法师博客); 159 publications and writings by monastics (fashi wenji 法师文集; 150 indexes for the Theravada tradition); 110 links37 to local Buddhist sites (difang fojiao 地 方佛教); 88 Buddhist media 佛教视频, which include television, video links and blogs; 80 texts by noteworthy laypeople (jushilin 居士林); 76 vegetarian halls and discussion groups (sushi wangzhan 素食网站); 70 indexed to the Tibetan tradition; 61 blogs by scholars (foxue boke 佛学博客); 61 links to eminent temples (simiao 寺庙); 58 discussion groups (liaotian shi 聊天室); 47 associations and foundations (xiehui jijin 协会基金); 45 online stores for religious paraphernalia (fawu liutong 法物流通); 40 Buddhist journals (jikan zazhi 期刊杂志); 35 sutras; 32 overseas non-Chinese sites; 32 sites to Table 7.1 Buddhist Presence Online According to Tianyan 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 141 17-09-2016 14:49:53 142 André Laliberté support to students; 31 links to art; 24 links relevant to culture; 23 compilations of testimonials; and 18 addresses of Buddhist institutes. These sites vary in quality and reliability, but their numbers alone reveal that there is a considerable amount of activity and an impressive amount of organizations outside the sphere of the official Buddhist associations. In other words, there exist plenty of opportunities for the mobilization of people on issues that matter to Buddhists. Some of the sites that Tianyan refers to, such as the Chinese Buddhism Network and Chinese Buddhism Online, which both claim to be the most visited Buddhist websites in Baidu, are themselves indexes leading to other sites that provide updates on events of interest to Buddhists. Among the other sites, Buddhist World (fojiao tiandi 佛教天地),38 Immeasurable Glory (wuliang xiangguang 无量香光),39 Buddhist Navigator (fojiao daohang 佛 教导航)40 and the ‘Great Crossing’ Network (daduwang 大渡网)41 are also noteworthy because of their extensive links to other sites they connect to. I have found over twenty other such sites, most of which are based in Beijing, that are providing information nationwide. A few others are based in provincial capitals, such as the Chinese Zen Tea Network (huaxia chan chawang 华夏禅茶网) in Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan,42 or in important trading centers, such as the ‘Treasure House of Buddhist Scriptures’ (fodian baoku 佛典宝库) in the coastal city of Xiamen, one of the early special economic zones of China43 or the Buddhist studies online (foxue zaixian佛学在线) in Shantou, another important special economic zone.44 Others are installed in localities of importance for Buddhist heritage, such as the Jihuashan site (jiuhuashan fojiao zaixian 九华山佛教在线) in Anhui,45 the Mt. Emei (emeishan 峨嵋山) site in Sichuan,46 Emeishan or even in associations such as the ‘Society for Predication’ (honghua she 弘 化社) in Suzhou.47 Most of these sites share many characteristics with each other: their pages provide information on Buddhist events locally, temples, bios of famous monks, historical research, calendar of activities, discussion groups and, as I will discuss later is this chapter, they connect to philanthropic activities. Content Analysis The site that I discuss in this section, Buddhism Online (fojiao zaixian 佛教在 线),48 is presented by Baidu as one of the most visited Buddhist sites. Regardless of the veracity of that claim, it is nonetheless one of the first pages that comes up when one looks for news about Buddhism in China. The analysis of this site is bound to present an incomplete picture of Buddhism online, but it nevertheless reveals something about the orientations and desires of its visitors. Moreover, in light of the remarkable similarities with the other sites mentioned earlier, it is reasonable to assume that observing other sites would not provide conclusions that are very different. Such an examination can tell us how much or how little this popular Buddhist website provides 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 142 17-09-2016 14:49:53 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 143 opportunities, if not for airing views on contentious politics, at the very least to express in veiled form criticism of a social environment marked by anomie, competition and materialism, whose values allegedly differ from those of Buddhists. I have approached this website with the premise that given the self-professed allegiances of many Chinese Buddhists to the concept of ‘Buddhism for this world’ discussed earlier, visitors to this website may have some interest in the social issues of poverty, environmental degradation or insecurity in inter-ethnic relations. How much is this site responding to this expectation, and, more importantly, what are the avenues it can provide to express a Buddhist perspective that can challenge the dominant views? I have sought at the beginning of this investigation to focus on the discourse about the origins of poverty and the advocacy of specific means to tackle poverty alleviation in this site, by exploring the space devoted to social issues. I have given a close look to the different sections of the opening page of Chinese Buddhism Online (zhongguo fojiaowang 中国佛教网) on March 9 and looked at each of the twenty-six different features it presents, which are listed in Table 7.2. Among them, the most noteworthy sections for their content are ‘Buddhist News’ (fojiaoxinwen 佛教新闻),49 ‘Testimonials’ (gushi 故事),50 a directory for temples (siyuan 寺院), 51 a page to learn the basics for rituals (zhishitang 知识堂)52 and a page on Buddhist culture (wenhua 文化).53 Among the other noteworthy subdivisions, the ‘Pearls of Wisdom’ page (bore wenhai 般若文海)54 offers a repository of scriptures, sutras and commentaries. A page is devoted to the organization of ‘release of livings’ rituals (fangsheng 放生).55 Specific pages are devoted to the Zen56 and Pure Land schools,57 but what is noticeable is the absence of reference to the esoteric school or the Tibetan school. A page is titled ‘Buddhist Forum’ (fojiao luntan 论坛),58 but it is not used for debates as much as clarifying points of doctrines and answering questions over practical issues relevant to Buddhists. The other divisions include a directory of temples; a dictionary; a blog; online shops for religious paraphernalia, tea, books, scriptures, speeches, and films; and vegetarian recipes. Finally, the page ‘Chinese Buddhist Charity Net’ (zhongguo fojiao cishanwang 中国佛教慈善网),59 which deserves more discussion, is devoted to charity. The ‘Buddhist News’ page (fojiao xinwen 佛教新闻)60 is divided into eight sections: faxun 法讯 presents events of relevance to Buddhist practice; three sections on domestic, international and compatriots’ affairs (or ‘Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan’- gang’aotai 港澳台) offer news about monastics, institutions, and religious affairs in general, two other sections focus Table 7.2 Opening Page of Chinese Buddhism Online 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 143 17-09-2016 14:49:53 144 André Laliberté on cultural exchanges and charity.61 It is noteworthy that none of the news pages discuss much of substance beyond the affairs of Buddhism understood in the narrowest of sense. Most significantly, in the international section, I have found no mention of the conflicts involving Buddhists in Myanmar or Sri Lanka. To what extent this reflects the wish of readers to avoid upsetting news about that co-religionists who inflict atrocities on innocent people, or the actions of authorities that censor these unsettling news, is not clear. However, the absence of news about this particular kind of events prevents the expression of Buddhist compassion. Under the motto “enlightened wisdom and use the mind to gain knowledge” (qidi zhihui yongxin ganzhi 启迪智慧用心感知), the page ‘Buddhist Stories’ (fojiao gushi 佛教故事)62 offers a wide variety of testimonies. It is subdivided in a number of sections: cases of karmic retribution (yinguo baoying 因果报应); stories of induction for novices (ganying 感应); life stories (shenghuo 生活); success stories (chengbai 成败); ‘pearls of wisdom’ (zhihui 智慧); individual testimonies and experiences (shenbian 身边), on average twenty per month, which often are pleas for help or support; and a message board (geiwo liuyan 给我留言). Click to these stories and their replies are compiled: these stories are read by thousands of onlookers, but generate a handful of replies only. The page ‘Buddhist Knowledge’ (zhishi fojiaotang 知识佛教堂)63 provides answers to a series of questions organized along thematic themes such as Buddhist philosophy, esthetics, schools and Buddhist way of life (fojiao shenghuo 佛化生活). This last section deserves further commentary: it is subdivided in answers to questions about family matters (jiating wenti 家庭问题), which ranks first among issues of concern for visitors to that page, for more than one person out of four; problems at work (gongzuo wenti 工作问题); prostitution (jie xieyin 戒邪淫); academic problems (xueye wenti 学业问题); suicide and abortion (zisha duotai 自杀堕 胎); and issues with close friends (xinmi pengyou 亲密朋友). A large catchall category of other troubles range from existential concerns to care for the elderly. The stories in the pages ‘Buddhist Stories’ and the Q & A in the page ‘Buddhist Knowledge,’ by focusing on individuals’ responsibilities and the concept of karmic retribution, represent the opposite of an active engagement in society because they pre-empt the possibility that solutions to social evils, such as poverty, illness, injustice and corruption, could be addressed through collective actions. Finally, a standard feature of the sites mentioned before, the link to charities, appears on Buddhism Online as well. Many of the sites mentioned earlier link to the same URL of the site Chinese Buddhist Charity Online (zhongguo fojiao cishanwang 中国佛教慈善网),64 which serves as a call center in which donors can make a contribution through chat (fasong liuyan 发送留言). Visitors to that site can read reports on specific campaigns and projects (cishan xiemu 慈善项目), read news on charities nationwide (cishan xinwen 慈善新闻), leave their names as donors (gongde fangming 功德 芳名), follow-up with cases that provide documentation and photography 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 144 17-09-2016 14:49:53 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 145 (genzong huikui 跟踪回馈), make donations online though a virtual temple (gongde huixiang 功德回向), register their name (huiyuan zhuanqu 会员专 区) and make a donation through the recitation of sutra (songjing nianfo 诵 经念佛). Discussions about the origins of illness and poverty are avoided, and the possibility of linking the aggravation of misery to inadequate structure of governance is made difficult by the nature of the site, which encourages disclosure of donors’ identity rather than confidentiality. The link to charity represents the closest thing to social engagement, but it is still far from representing a critique of the established order. In fact, philanthropy is an important avenue for the state to gain legitimacy as it demonstrates that government officials care about the people. But philanthropy is also a matter of utmost importance to Buddhists: their involvement in charity demonstrates to the government, and a CCP that remains committed to a materialist philosophy of history, that they are indispensable in effective governance. Conclusion The hypothesis I mentioned at the beginning about the ability of China’s hundreds of millions of religious believers to use cyberspace to limit the regime’s efforts to contain religion needs to be qualified. On the one hand, there are numerous sites for Buddhists, which suggests that religion online is extremely visible in China’s cyber-scape. There is ample space on which to expose a diversity of views about the religion and its relevance to contemporary society. To borrow from Yang Fenggang’s terminology about China’s religious markets: there is an abundant supply in the ‘red market’ of the officially approved religions (Yang 2006). On the other hand, the Buddhist cyber-scape projects the image of a religion embracing the existing social and political order and its elites. It is tightly connected with government sites, public and private corporate interests; its news page celebrates close cooperation between monastic leaders, on the one hand, and government and party officials, on the other. This collaboration is visible most prominently in the performance of charity. There is no evidence in the pages of Buddhist websites suggesting, let alone showing, that the online activities of Buddhists subvert the CCP’s agenda of channeling religious practices to meet the goals of the regime. In fact, Buddhist online activities complement, if not reinforce these policies. The performances of charity are regularly depicted as instances of cooperation between local Buddhist associations and temples with their vis-à-vis in government, religious affairs bureaus, CP United Front Work Department, and CP secretaries. There is no critique of the conditions leading to the destitution and poverty meant to be addressed by philanthropy, no religiously based vision addressing the methods or means that could prevent these conditions from arising in the first place. If there are alternative visions to statesponsored narratives articulated in Buddhist websites and social media, they 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 145 17-09-2016 14:49:54 146 André Laliberté are buried deep under the mountain of celebratory news and testimonies about good deeds and karmic retribution. These cooperative relations, in the end, may empower Buddhist institutions as indispensable partners of the state. Buddhist sites online portray a community that is selfless, but strangely disconnected from the world. The Buddhist online presence suggests that official Buddhism in China’s cyberspace complements the regime agenda in two ways. First, links to charities in Buddhist websites represent the closest thing to social engagement, but they are still a far cry from a critique. Second, the promotion of a different lifestyle emphasizing meditation, sutra recitation, Dharma lectures, vegetarianism, and spiritual self-cultivation mingles with a celebration of late capitalism, with the commercialization of religious paraphernalia and the promotion of pilgrimage. By neglecting issues that are presumably important to Buddhists, such as environmental degradation, corruption among officials and a decline in public morality, the Buddhist online presence in China suggests that, officially, Buddhism plays a complementary, rather than a critical, role. This chapter has made one claim: There is no visible critique in the Buddhist cyber-scape to question the existing order. This does not mean that there are no Buddhist individuals critical of the prevailing economic, social and political conditions, nor that all Chinese Buddhists are ignorant of trends abroad such as engaged Buddhism. It suggests, arguably, that surveillance has been able so far to nip in the bud any credible challenge to the state. But it may also imply that the mainstream of online Buddhism prefers to look the other way and avoid the pain of confronting the problems the Chinese are facing in their daily lives. There is a lot to be said about the reasons behind this order of things, but the fact that Buddhist institutions should serve the market economy under a post-totalitarian regime should not surprise. After all, the prosperity of Buddhism today is conditional on the allegiance to the existing social and political arrangements. Notes 1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the panel “China’s Religions Online: The Politics of Buddhism, Protestant Christianity, and Islam in Cyberspace,” at the Association of Asian Studies annual meeting, March 27–30, 2014, in Philadelphia. I would like to thank the participants for their helpful comments. I also acknowledge the generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 2 < buddhistpeacefellowship.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 3 This is revealed by their URL, which ends with <org> rather than the country code of their location of origins. 4 < buddha21.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 5 < bikalpa.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 6 < adecomnetwork.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 7 < sevalanka.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 8 < upeace.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 9 < kya-cambodia.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 146 17-09-2016 14:49:54 Engaging with a Post-totalitarian State 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 147 < jneb.jp > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < hikmahbudhi.or.id > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < bmsm.org.my > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < sgi.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < rk-world.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < blia.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < tzuchi.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < dhammakaya.or.th > At the time of this writing, the English version of the site was unnavigable. < asoke.th > The site of the Santi Asoke was not operational at the time of this writing. < Bodubalasena.co > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < 969movement.org > The site was not accessible at the time of this writing. The movement of engaged Buddhism was headquartered in Bangkok, but many of its activities are conducted outside of Thailand. Many of the dominant Buddhist associations do not agree with its goals, and since the coup d’etat of 2014, the situation is unclear. < tianyan.goodweb.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjnet.com > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < chinkung.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). For the first time in its sixty-four-year history, the World Fellowship of Buddhists has convened its conference in China in 2014. This includes Tibetan Buddhists as well. Like the BAC, the BAROC also claims to represent Tibetan Buddhists. < baroc. com.tw > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). The original name was the International Buddhist Congregation but the RK had already chosen it as the official English name of its international center for foreigners living in Japan in 2001. See < ibc-rk.org >. The Delhi-based IBC was founded in 2013. < ibcworld.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). Colleagues in China kindly gave me the three tomes of the proceedings for the first meeting, and I attended the third one. I also had the opportunity to visit the site of the second WBF in Wuxi a few months after the event. < buddhism.com.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < zjfjxh.com > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < jsfj.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < gdbuddhism.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < jxfx.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). This was the case with the Fujian provincial Buddhist Association. Thrity-seven of these sites are in Taiwan. < ebud.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < goodweb.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjdh.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < dadunet.com > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < chancha.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fodian.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < foxue.org > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fo3656.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < emsfj.com > (Accessed on December 27, 2014); Mt. Jiuhua and Mt. Emei are two of the four sacred mountains (sida mingshan 四大名山) of Buddhism in China. < honghuashe.com > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjnet.com >. This page could not be opened at the time of this writing, although it used to be one of the most visited for years. < fjxw.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 15032-0180d-1pass-r02.indd 147 17-09-2016 14:49:54 148 André Laliberté 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 < story.zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjsy.net> (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < zhishi.zgfj.cn/ask/ > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < wh.zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < br.zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjfs.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < cz.zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < jt.zgfj.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjlt.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjcs.net.cn > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). < fjxw.net > (Accessed on December 27, 2014). 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