Discuss  the  view  that  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  does  not  take  sexual   freedom  sufficiently  seriously  in  its  jurisprudence  on  Article  8.   Kevin  Sachs     Introduction   Article  8  in  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  ensures  an  indi-­‐ vidual’s   right   to   respect   of   private   and   family   life.   Even   though   it   is   subject   to   proportionate  and  lawful  restrictions,  it  is  one  of  the  most  broad-­‐ranging  provi-­‐ sions  in  the  ECHR.  The  obligation  on  the  State  under  Article  8  is  to  refrain  from   interfering  with  the  right  for  private  and  family  life  itself  and  also  to  take  positive   measures,   for   example,   to   criminalise   breaches   of   the   right   to   a   private   life   by   private  individuals1.     As  the  concept  of  a  right  to  private  life  encompasses  the  importance  of  personal   dignity  and  autonomy  as  well  as  the  interaction  a  person  has  with  others,  both  in   private  and  in  public,  Article  8  of  the  ECHR  also  covers  a  respect  for  individual   sexuality.   Since   it   is   the   court’s   argument   that   interferences   with   the   sex   life   touch  upon  a  particularly  intimate  part  of  the  affected  person’s  life,  the  margin  of   appreciation  awarded  to  the  contracting  states  in  this  area  is  narrow.     There  is  however  a  certain  view  that  the  court  does  not  give  sexual  freedom  the   necessary  consideration,  when  deciding  on  cases  of  interference  based  on  Article   8  of  the  ECHR.  The  strategy  of  the  court  seems  to  be  that  it  does  not  wish  to  tres-­‐ pass  too  abruptly  on  areas  of  social,  political  and  religious  controversy,  where  a   wide   variety   of   national   and   cultural   traditions   are   in   play   and   different   political   and  legal  choices  have  been  made  by  the  member  states.     In  this  essay  I  will  investigate  the  claim,  that  the  court  is  not  giving  sexual  free-­‐ dom   its   due   consideration   when   deliberating   cases   under   Article   8.   Unfortunate-­‐ ly  I  will  only  be  able  to  scrutinize  this  claim  regarding  private  life  and  not  regard-­‐ ing  family  life,  due  to  the  extent  of  the  essay.                                                                                                                       1  Such  as  in  ‚Hatton  against  v.  United  Kingdom’     2  Dudgeon  v.  United  Kingdom  p.  21  para.  52       1   Article  8  –  a  right  to  respect  of  private  life     1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life,  his  home  and  his   correspondence.   2.  There  shall  be  no  interference  by  a  public  authority  with  the  exercise  of  this  right   except  such  as  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  is  necessary  in  a  democratic  socie-­‐ ty  in  the  interests  of  national  security,  public  safety  or  the  economic  well-­‐being  of   the  country,  for  the  prevention  of  disorder  or  crime,  for  the  protection  of  health  or   morals,  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  others.     In  short  the  provision  states  that  the  State  should  refrain  from  creating  laws  in-­‐ fringing  upon  the  private  life  of  its  citizen  and  should  prevent  private  institutions   from  doing  the  same,  as  long  as  national  security  or  public  health  and  morals  are   not  at  risk.     Privacy  can  be  understood  in  four  different  frameworks  and  all  of  them  can  be   related  to  the  issue  of  sexual  freedom.   -­‐ Spatial  privacy   Nowadays  spatial  privacy  is  connected  to  locational  data.  But  in  its  origin   spatial  privacy  was  understood  as  privacy  within  one’s  own  space.  What   happens  in  one’s  own  four  walls  should  not  be  of  any  concern  to  the  State.   This   is   causally   connected   to   sexual   freedom.   The   government   should   not   be  concerned  with  whom  its  citizens  share  a  bed  with.   -­‐ Relational  privacy   Relational   privacy   protects   personal   relationships.   In   essence   the   State   should  not  create  laws  that  discriminate  against  intentional  relationships   as  long  as  they  do  not  interfere  with  the  exceptions  in  paragraph  2.   -­‐ Decisional  privacy   Under   this   framework   an   individual’s   personal   autonomy   is   protected.   Decisions   such   as   choice   of   partner   is,   should   not   be   infringed   upon   by   any  law.         2   Article  8  and  homosexuality   One  of  the  landmark  cases  regarding  sexual  freedom  and  especially  LGBTQ  rights   in   Europe   was   “Dudgeon   v.   the   United   Kingdom”.   Jeffrey   Dudgeon   claimed   that   a   law  in  Northern  Ireland  prohibiting  homosexual  acts  between  consenting  adults   is   interfering   with   his   right   to   private   life.   The   Court   stated   that   the   very   exist-­‐ ence   of   legislation   sanctioning   homosexual   acts   amounted   to   an   interference   with  the  right  to  private  life,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  in  general  no  proceedings   were  initiated  against  consenting  adults  engaging  in  homosexual  activities.       By  the  same  token,  the  Court  found  in  Norris  v  Ireland  that  the  mere  existence  of   criminal   laws   prohibiting   homosexual   acts   amounted   to   an   interference   with   the   right   to   private   life.   The   Court   held   that   the   fact   that   the   applicant,   unlike   the   ap-­‐ plicant   in   Dudgeon   v   UK,   had   not   been   questioned   by   police   or   subjected   to   an   investigation  did  not  render  the  case  distinguishable.  It  reiterated  that  the  possi-­‐ bility   of   a   criminal   prosecution,   which   held   the   applicant   in   a   constant   state   of   fear,   amounted   to   an   interference   with   his   right   to   private   life.   Since   the   Court   was  unable  to  see  any  reasonable  justification  for  this  legislation,  it  found  a  viola-­‐ tion  of  article  8  ECHR.     In  both  cases  the  court  reiterated  that  sexual  life  was  not  only  a  part  of  private   life,  but  also  that  sexual  orientation  and  activity  concern  one  of  the  most  intimate   aspect   of   private   life2.   In   the   Dudgeon   judgement   however,   a   lot   of   weight   has   been   given   to   the   fact   that   Northern   Ireland   was   not   really   enforcing   the   19th   century   law   anymore.   The   sexual   freedom   or   autonomy   of   Dudgeon   was   given   relatively  little  concern.  The  court  even  believed  that  Northern  Ireland  was  act-­‐ ing  in  good  faith  when  banning  homosexual  activity  in  order  to  protect  the  moral   fabric  of  its  society.  Furthermore,  the  court  dismissed  Dudgeon’s  Article  14  dis-­‐ crimination   claim,   which   inferred   that   the   age   of   consent   for   homosexual   part-­‐ ners  in  Northern  Ireland  was  21,  while  the  age  of  consent  for  heterosexuals  was   17.                                                                                                                       2  Dudgeon  v.  United  Kingdom  p.  21  para.  52       3   In  Laskey,  Jaggard  and  Brown  v.  the  United  Kingdom,  a  case  discussing  the  legali-­‐ ty   of   sado-­‐masochistic   homosexual   orgies,   the   state   dismissed   the   applicants’   submission   that   the   case   should   be   tried   as   a   case   of   sexual   expression   rather   than   violence.   The   court   specified   though,   that   it   would   treat   a   similar   case   in-­‐ volving  heterosexual  partners  under  the  same  framework,  in  my  opinion  trying   to  distance  themselves  from  an  alleged  anti-­‐homosexual  bias  of  the  court.       This   alleged   bias   arose   for   me,   from   some   of   the   rhetoric   used   in   the   judges’   opinions  to  the  cases.  Judge  Zekia  described  homosexual  acts  in  Dudgeon  v.  UK   for  example  as  “unnatural  immoral  practices”  and  Judge  Pettiti  argued  in  Laskey,   Jaggard  and  Brown,  that  Article  8  ECHR  would  not  protect  a  person’s  baseness  or   the  promotion  of  criminal  immoralism,  referring  to  homosexual  group  sex.     Public  versus  private  morality   In  almost  all  cases  involving  sexuality  in  connection  with  Article  8,  the  court  has   the  difficult  task  to  balance  between  the  private  morality  of  the  applicant  against   the   public   morality   the   state   wants   to   defend.   In   Dudgeon   v.   the   United   Kingdom   the  court  stated  that  some  “degree  of  regulation  of  homosexual  conduct  can  be   justified   as   necessary   in   a   democratic   society   in   order   to   preserve   public   order   and  decency  and  to  protect  the  citizen  from  what  is  offensive  of  injurious”3.     The  court  defined  especially  minors,  physically  or  mentally  challenged  and  phys-­‐ ically   or   economically   dependent   individuals   as   a   special   class   of   citizens   that   have  to  be  protected  against  coercion,  exploitation  and  corruption.       The  margin  of  appreciation  granted  to  the  member  states  varies  under  Article  8   and   especially   in   cases   involving   sexual   freedom.   Whenever   the   state   claims   to   want   to   protect   the   moral   fabric   of   society,   the   margin   of   appreciation   will   be   more   extensive.   In   the   Handyside   v.   the   United   Kingdom   case   the   court   stated   that  morals  vary  from  time  to  time  and  from  place  to  place"  and  that  "by  reason   of   their   direct   and   continuous   contact   with   the   vital   forces   of   their   countries,                                                                                                                   3  Paragraph  49,  Dudgeon  v.  UK     4   State  authorities  are  in  principle  in  a  better  position  than  the  international  judge   to  give  an  opinion  on  the  exact  content  of  those  requirements"4.     In   my   opinion   the   court   is   convinced   that   the   majority   within   a   society   heavily   shapes   the   morals   of   that   society.   The   continuous   mentions   of   the   majority   in   Northern  Ireland  being  opposed  to  homosexual  activity  in  the  Dudgeon  case  as   well  as  the  four  dissenting  opinions  to  the  ruling  in  the  same  case  are  indicators   to   the   fact   that   the   court   often   values   public   opinion   over   sexual   autonomy.   Dudgeon,   in   my   opinion,   mainly   won   the   case   because   the   Irish   authorities   did   not   enforce   the   law   sufficiently   anymore   and   the   moral   fabric   had   not   deterio-­‐ rated   in   the   meantime.   Furthermore   public   opinions   on   homosexual   relation-­‐ ships  in  most  other  member  states  were  favouring  Dudgeon.  I  think  the  regard   for  sexual  autonomy  was  not  one  of  the  consequential  factors.       In   Judge   Zekia’s   dissenting   opinion   he   highlights   the   need   to   also   regard   the   rights  of  the  majority  in  a  society.  He  claims  that  it  is  the  courts  duty  to  balance   personal  freedoms  against  the  religious  and  philosophical  convictions  of  a  major-­‐ ity   in   a   democratic   society:   “It   seems   to   me   somewhat   odd   and   perplexing,   in   considering   the   necessity   of   respect   for   one’s   private   life,   to   underestimate   the   necessity  of  keeping  a  law  in  force  for  the  protection  of  morals  held  in  high  es-­‐ teem  by  the  majority  of  people”5.     Judge   Walsh   reaffirmed   Judge   Zekia’s   sentiment   and   disagreed   with   the   decision   in   Dudgeon   v.   UK   on   further   grounds.   He   argued,   that   not   everything   that   hap-­‐ pens   within   one’s   private   walls   should   be   left   outside   of   the   criminal   law,   con-­‐ necting   homosexual   relationships   with   other   private   morality   offences   such   as,   euthanasia,   incest   or   abortion.   Furthermore   he   claimed   that   sexual   behaviour   was  rather  determined  by  cultural  influences  than  by  instinctive  needs  and  that   those  influences  can  often  be  mistaken   as   intrinsic   urges.   That   is   why   the   state   should  have  a  wide  margin  of  appreciation  to  regulate  such  sexual  behaviour.                                                                                                                       4  pp.  22;  para.  48   5  Paragraph  3  in  Judge  Zekia’s  dissenting  opinion  (Dudgeon  v.  United  Kingdom)     5   This   wider   margin   of   appreciation   was   on   display   in   the   Laskey,   Jaggard   and   Brown   v.   UK   case.   Even   though   the   applicants   contended   that   their   case   was   one   of   private   morality,   which   should   be   protected   from   state   interference,   the   court   argued   that   this   case   was   distinguishable   from   other   cases   concerning   homosex-­‐ ual  behaviour  (inferring  Dudgeon  and  Norris).     The   concurring   opinion   of   Judge   Pettiti   stated   that   the   concept   of   private   life   could   not   be   stretched   indefinitely   and   that   not   all   of   private   life   automatically   qualifies  for  protection  under  Article  8  or  any  other  provision  in  the  ECHR.  She   goes  even  further  in  stating  towards  the  end  of  her  opinion,  that  the  “protection   of   private   life   means   the   protection   of   a   person’s   intimacy   and   dignity,   not   of   his   baseness  or  the  promotion  of  criminal  immoralism”.     Conclusion   The   aim   of   this   paper   was   to   discuss   the   court’s   approach   to   sexual   freedom   when  discussing  cases  involving  Article  8  ECHR.  A  common  view  is  that  the  court   does   not   make   sexual   freedom   a   sufficiently   serious   factor   in   its   judgements   and   I  tend  to  agree  with  that  notion.  Because  even  though  the  court  reaffirms  again   and  again  that  sexual  behaviour  is  one  of  the  most  intimate  parts  of  private  life   and  therefore  has  to  be  carefully  protected,  it  is  often  inferior  to  other  values.     It  is  my  belief  that  human  rights  have  a  certain  function  of  protecting  minorities   from  the  state  and  the  majority  in  society.  The  importance  the  court  ascribes  to   public  morality  or  the  morals  of  the  majority  often  trump  the  rights  of  the  indi-­‐ vidual.  Most  intimate  aspects  of  rights  should  be  protected  by  a  narrow  margin   of   appreciation   for   the   member   states.   In   sexual   freedom   cases   however   the   court  grants  a  wider  margin  in  order  to  protect  the  public  morality.       It  should  not  be  the  court’s  goal  to  make  people  evolve  on  certain  issues  of  mo-­‐ rality,   but   it   should   respect   and   protect   the   rights   of   the   individual   in   private   matters  such  as  sexuality,  as  long  as  there  is  no  unwanted  harm  to  the  involved   or  third  parties.     Word  count:  1988     6