Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy 14 David Chai Editor Dao Companion to Xuanxue玄學 (Neo-Daoism) David Chai Editor Dao Companion to Xuanxue 玄學 (Neo-Daoism) Editor David Chai Department of Philosophy Chinese University of Hong Kong Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong ISSN 2211-0275 ISSN 2542-8780 (electronic) Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy ISBN 978-3-030-49227-4 ISBN 978-3-030-49228-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49228-1 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. 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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Chapter 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” David Chai Ji Kang 嵇康 (224–263 CE) was born into a world dominated by the Cao 曹 family. Though their ancestral name was Xi 奚, Ji Kang’s family took the surname name Ji 嵇 after moving from their home (present-day Anhui province) to Mount Ji 嵇山 (present-day Zhejiang province) to avoid being caught-up in the political intrigues that were rampant at the time. Raised by his mother and brother, Ji Kang showed tremendous talent in poetry, philosophical argumentation, and music from a young age. Having married the daughter of Cao Pi 曹丕—also known as Emperor Wen 魏 文帝 (r. 220–226 CE)—Ji Kang would find himself affiliated with a family under attack when Sima Yi 司馬懿 (179–251 CE) usurped the throne in 249 and launched a purge of the Cao clan and its allies. Though Sima Yi died a few years later, his son Sima Zhao 司馬昭 (211–265 CE), followed by his grandson Sima Yan 司馬炎 (236–290 CE)—who would become Emperor Jin Wudi 晉武帝 (r. 265–290 CE)— continued the purge, resulting in Ji Kang’s execution. Ji Kang’s 嵇康 essay “On Dispelling Self-Interest”1 (Shisi lun 釋私論) (hereafter, Essay) is a straightforward piece of argumentation. Lacking the literary flourishes seen in his essays on music and life-nourishment, the purpose of this text is to make a case for the moral openness of the sage. Being morally unbiased, that is, subscribing to the morality of non-morality, is not a form of escapism; rather, Ji Kang believes it is the only way to grasp the essential nature of things while conforming to Dao 道. Those who follow Dao are thus great, while those having selfish goals are small and live in opposition to Dao. If feelings of right and wrong are revealed, Ji Kang says, the person who is morally good will be blame-free should 1 Translations of Ji Kang’s essays, including the present one, are available in Henricks 1983. D. Chai (*) Department of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong e-mail: davidchai@cuhk.edu.hk © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 D. Chai (ed.), Dao Companion to Xuanxue 玄學 (Neo-Daoism), Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49228-1_12 229 230 D. Chai these feelings be concealed; if the morally good person happens to be wrong, they cannot be blamed so long as they are aware of their error and work to fix it. In other words, being without self-interest (wusi 無私) is enriching and liberating in that, according to Ji Kang, it is the praxis of complete goodness while simultaneously stimulating those who are not to become so. 1 The Concepts of Public and Private in Classical Daoism For Ji Kang, the concepts of public (gong 公) and private (si 私) were well-worn ideas from antiquity.2 Used by Confucians and Daoists alike, Ji Kang was certainly influenced by the masters of old. However, classical Daoism tended to paint gong and si in metaphysical colors, as testimony of the generosity of heaven and Dao, while Confucianism took these terms as speaking to the moral character of the gentleman (junzi 君子) and his emulation of heaven’s virtue (tiande 天德). Ji Kang combined these two uses to create a metaphysically grounded ethics that remained faithful to the principles of Daoism while attacking those of Confucianism. Before we turn to Ji Kang’s Essay, a brief look at some textual examples from classical Daoism will help give his take on the matter some context.3 We can begin with chapter 1 (tianrui 天瑞) of the Liezi 列子, where gong and si are akin to the virtue of heaven and earth: Master Dongguo said: Have you not already stolen your body? You have stolen the harmony of Yin and Yang to achieve life and sustain your form. How much more so are you stealing the things that are outside you? Indeed, the myriad things cannot be separated from heaven and earth, and to claim any as your own will only lead to confusion. Master Guo’s stealing is common throughout the world and so he escaped calamity; your stealing is out of selfinterest and so you are accused of wrongdoing. To possess what is public or private is stealing; to not possess what is public or private is also stealing. It is owing to the virtue of heaven and earth that the public stays public, and the private stays private. For one who knows the virtue of heaven and earth, what is there to steal? What is there not to steal? 東郭先生曰: 若一身庸非盜乎? 盜陰陽之和以成若生, 載若形; 況外物而非盜哉? 誠然, 天地萬物不相離也; 仞而有之, 皆惑也。國氏之盜, 公道也, 故亡殃; 若之盜, 私心也, 故得罪。有公私者, 亦盜也; 亡公私者, 亦盜也。公公私私, 天地之德。知 天地之德者, 孰為盜邪? 孰為不盜邪 (Yang 2007: 37–38). In chapter 1 (daoyuan 道原) of the Wenzi 文子 we read: There is nothing in the world softer than water … Whether in surplus or deficiency, the world relies on receiving what it is given. Shared by the myriad things, water does not decide who is first and who is last. Being neither private nor public, its vastness is identical to that of heaven and earth. This is known as ultimate virtue. 天下莫柔弱於水 ⋯⋯ 有餘不足, 任天下取與, 稟受萬物而無所先後, 無私無公, 與 天地洪同, 是謂至德 (Wang 2009: 37). 2 3 For more on these terms in the pre-Han period, see Brindley 2013. All translations are my own unless stated otherwise. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 231 There are quite a number of examples in the Zhuangzi 莊子 but here are three: The four seasons have their different qi but it is not bestowed to them by heaven, thus the year is fulfilled … The myriad things have their different ordering but Dao does not do so out of self-interest, thus it is nameless. Being nameless it acts without purpose, and by not acting purposely, there is nothing it does not do. 四時殊氣, 天不賜, 故歲成 ⋯⋯ 萬物殊理, 道不私, 故無名。無名故無為, 無為而 無不為 (Chapter 25 “zeyang 則陽”; Guo 1985: 909). Heaven covers things without self-interest; earth supports things without self-interest. How is it that heaven and earth make me poor out of self-interest? 天無私覆, 地無私載, 天地豈私貧我哉? (Chapter 6 “dazongshi 大宗師”; Guo 1985: 286). Confucius said: To take joy in things in one’s heart-mind is to care for them without selfinterest, and this is the condition of humaneness and righteousness. Laozi replied: Ah! Such words nearly revealed how inferior you are! In caring for things, is this not excessive? Being without self-interest, this is to be self-interested! 孔子曰: 中心物愷, 兼愛無私, 此仁義之情也。老聃曰:意!幾乎後言!夫兼愛, 不亦 迂乎!無私焉, 乃私也 (Chapter 13 “tiandao 天道”; Guo 1985: 479). Finally, there is this passage from chapter 7 of the Daodejing 道德經: Heaven is long-enduring and so is earth. The reason why heaven and earth are able to endure is because they do not live for themselves, thus their life is long-enduring. This is why the sage puts his person behind himself yet it remains in front, puts his person outside himself yet it remains present. Is it not because he lacks self-interest? In this way, he can fulfill his self-interests. 天長地久。天地所以能長且久者, 以其不自生, 故能長生。是以聖人後其身, 而 身先, 外其身, 而身存。非以其無私邪。故能成其私 (Lou 2008: 19). The first thing that comes to mind in reading the above passages is the ontological generosity of Dao. Dao enables the lives of the myriad things to arise, but the manner of said arising is without bias or classification; it is a constant act of nameless spontaneity. We are things comprised of qi 氣 and Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, however, these primal elements take Dao as their source, the implication of which is that the myriad things do nothing but borrow them. We can no more reconstitute their inner properties than we can rid ourselves of their presence; it becomes a matter of refining or dispersing, balancing or favoring. Unable to claim Dao as our own, we are in no position to do the same for our personhood. The reason the sage, according to Laozi, puts his self in the rear but still appears in front is twofold: the sage does not distinguish between his self and the selves of others but conjoins all selves into the non-self of Dao; second, the sage views time circularly which allows him to transcend designations of before and after, and space as a borderless continuum wherein being and non-being penetrate one another such that they become inseparable. This is how Yin selflessly gives way to Yang, and Yang reciprocates to Yin.4 4 For a detailed study of how this unfolds in the Zhuangzi, see Chai 2019. 232 D. Chai The Liezi’s statement that stealing is both having and not having what is public or private is perhaps the most interesting of those cited above. In order to understand why Guo of Qi’s 齊之國氏 stealing is acceptable while Xiang of Song’s 宋之向氏 is not, we need to read what comes before the quoted passage. Guo of Qi says: I rob heaven and earth of their seasonal benefits, the clouds and rain of their irrigating floods, the mountains and marshes of their products in order to grow my crops, plant my seeds, raise my walls, and build my house. I steal birds and animals from the land, and fish and turtles from the water. All this is stealing. As for crops and seeds, clay and wood, birds and animals, fish and turtles, all are begotten by heaven; how is it they belong to me? And yet, I suffer no retribution for robbing heaven. On the other hand, precious things such as gold and jade, and commodities such as grain and silk, are collected by men; how can we claim it is heaven that provides them? 吾盜天地之時利, 雲雨之滂潤, 山澤之產育, 以生吾禾, 殖吾稼, 築吾垣, 建吾舍。 陸盜禽獸, 水盜魚鱉, 亡非盜也。夫禾稼、土木、禽獸、魚鱉, 皆天之所生, 豈吾之所有?然吾盜天而亡殃。夫金玉珍寶穀帛財貨, 人之所聚, 豈天之所與 (Yang 2007: 36-37). Clearly Liezi is using the term “steal” atypically. Common sense tells us that what is of Nature is there for the pleasure of all beings, though modern humans have pushed our “pleasure” to the extreme. The truth, however, is quite different. Heaven nourishes earth, which in turn produces a bounty reaped by all who live in its midst. This bounty is equal in purpose and distribution and so lacks self-interest, however, it is not identical in kind. As the myriad things of the world, and the world itself, have specific needs to maintain their lives, the resources of heaven and earth must be such that the needs of one does not deprive those of the other. Just as we need the qi and Yin and Yang of Dao to secure our life, is it really stealing when these elements are essential to our being? Water is provided by heaven to nourish earth, and the multitude of things dependent on it; it is thus public in its availability. By making private what is inherently public, Xiang of Song is artificially disrupting the relationship between a thing and its sphere of existence. On the other hand, by not making private what is inherently public, we leave a thing in the public domain thereby creating an opportunity for others to covet it privately. Said differently, when something such as water appears in the world with the purpose of nourishing all that comes across it, to appropriate it for one’s own self-interest is to injure Dao by denying it access to its own creative potential. Regarding the Zhuangzi’s statement that heaven and earth do not deliberately make people poor, this is not to say that they are altruistic, for both are beholden to Dao. In spontaneously creating things, animate or otherwise, Dao ensures they are imbued with the traits and skills required to conduct their lives. That a thing should become impoverished during its lifetime is not because Dao has chosen to neglect or punish it—this is the argument of Confucius and Mencius—instead, a thing’s decline in health or fortune is due to its neglect of Dao resulting in the corruption of its own inborn nature. Both Zhuangzi and Ji Kang recognize that self-corruption not only impacts one’s well-being but, ultimately, the length of one’s life. To be refrained in speech and action hence handicaps one’s ability to live naturally insofar as the worry that comes about when one doubts oneself restricts one’s life-potential out of 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 233 fear of being wrong. When self-questioning festers and hesitation lingers in one’s heart-mind, one no longer follows Dao but is guided by the artificial norms of human society. This, in turn, makes the desire to live for oneself even stronger, resulting in greater separation between one’s original inborn nature and that molded by the needs and views of others. Knowing such dangers await the unprepared, Ji Kang argues for a morality capable of transcending the divisiveness of right and wrong whereby the will no longer pursues what is external to one’s body, and the heart-mind desires nothing other than maintaining its oneness with Dao. Only then, Ji Kang says, can the common people emulate the arts of the sage and learn to grasp the essential nature of things. 2 Establishing the Need to be without Self-Interest Ji Kang’s Essay is not a particularly long piece. Written in the form of a monologue and divided into three argumentative clusters, it is an open attack on Confucian moral values and refers to a variety of historical figures from the Shang-Zhou epoch, as well as textual references to the Analects 論語, Daodejing, Xunzi 荀子, Lunheng 論衡, and so forth. The principle aim of the Essay is to establish a platform for moral openness whereby people are no longer guided by self-interest to do good or avoid bad, but sweep away said notions in order to restore their inborn nature to its Dao-given state of transparent luminosity. The Essay opens with a description of the gentleman (junzi 君子). Ji Kang’s gentleman, however, is not that envisioned by Confucius but “transcends the teaching of names and relies on naturalness 越名教而任自然.” In his own words, the junzi “is someone whose heart-mind does not employ5 right and wrong, and whose actions do not oppose Dao 心無措乎是非, 而行不違乎道者也” (Dai 2014: 402). Although the term wucuo 無措 appears in chapter 50 of the Daodejing and chapter 21 (tianzifang 田子方) of the Zhuangzi, its usage in those cases is not the same as Ji Kang’s. To find examples that match Ji Kang’s, we must turn to chapter 18 (nengtian 能天) of the Heguanzi 鶡冠子6 or chapter 7 (weiming 微明) of the Wenzi 文子.7 As for the phrase shifei 是非, the Zhuangzi is replete with examples,8 and there are Robert Henricks uses two different translations of cuo 措: in his Ph.D. Dissertation (1976: 323) it is “dwell on” while in his later translation (1983: 107) it is “concern.” Both are too passive in meaning; cuo means “to arrange, manage, or place,” which is why I have translated it as “employ.” 6 “It is due to motion and quietude that life comes together, and that heaven and earth can take their natural form; this cannot be altered 因動靜而結生, 能天地而舉措自然形也, 不可改也.” Huang 2004: 375–376. 7 “Knowing human nature, one can develop oneself without oppostion; knowing how to manage affairs, one can conduct them out without confusion 知人之性則自養不悖, 知事之制則其舉措 不亂.” Wang 2009: 315–316. 8 See chapters 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31, and 33. 5 234 D. Chai multiple occurrences in the Liezi 列子 too.9 One whose movement is not opposed to Dao is a person who sees the concepts of right and wrong as obstacles to conjoining with Dao insofar as both are absolutist notions lacking partiality. The only way to overcome their dividedness is to merge them into a complimentary dyad. Right cannot exist without wrong, just as wrong cannot exist without right; in the words of Zhuangzi, only the clarity (ming 明) of Dao can remove the shadow of confusion surrounding the relativity of these terms. What is also apparent from this opening line of the Essay is that Ji Kang’s critique will not be knowledge-based, but centered upon our metaphysical experience of Dao. To use words as ammunition in his attack on Confucius will not cast the junzi in a new, more ethically open light; rather, Ji Kang focusses on the inexpressible factors that influence his words and actions. We are told as much in the sentence immediately following the opening line of the Essay: “For one whose qi is tranquil and spirit empty, neither arrogance nor self-praise will exist in his heart-mind 夫氣 靜神虛者, 心不存於矜尚” (Dai 2014: 402). Tranquil qi and an empty spirit are not the characteristics of a Confucian sage but those belonging to the ultimate person (zhiren 至人) of Daoism. Indeed, Ji Kang will mention said person a few lines later, but for the time being, he is quite content to employ the term junzi. Qi 氣 (breath, vitality) and spirit (shen 神) exist in a relationship of mutual-nourishment: when the former is dense and healthy, so too is the latter; when the former is dispersed and weak, so too is the latter. The sage thus cultivates his qi in order to preserve his spirit, for should he neglect one, the other will cease shortly thereafter. Not only this, but when the heart-mind (xin 心) is occupied by unnecessary thoughts and schemes, its neglect of qi and spirit grows with each passing day. To concentrate on the needs of the heart-mind is to neglect those of the body, and when one overlooks the essentials of good health and longevity of life,10 suffering a premature death becomes an uncomfortably close reality. Such is why Ji Kang describes the sage as having a heart-mind that does not contain arrogance (jin 矜) or self-praise (shang 尚). Indeed, this is the central thesis of the Essay. By avoiding the ornamental lifestyle of the nobility and Ru 儒 class, together with their wisdom-based ethics, the authentic person of Daoism sets their heart-mind on the penetrating and far-reaching nature of Dao. Arrogance and self-praise not only impede one’s pursuit of Dao, they are one of the first aspects to be eliminated from the sage’s worldview. The heartmind must thus emulate the conditions of qi (i.e., tranquility) and spirit (i.e., emptiness) if it is to transcend the teachings of names and follow naturalness. Only in such a state will “one whose body is bright and heart-mind profound have feelings not attached to all that is desired 體亮心逹者, 情不繫於所欲” (Dai 2014: 402). Having discussed the primary characteristics required to be without self-interest, Ji Kang tells us about those of a secondary level: “As arrogance and self-praise do not exist in his heart-mind, he can thus transcend the teaching of names and rely on what is natural; with feelings not attached to all that is desired, he can thus examine 9 See chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. For more on Ji Kang’s philosophy of self-cultivation, see Chai 2017a. 10 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 235 the precious and worthless, and penetrate the true state of things 矜尚不存乎心, 故 能越名教而任自然; 情不繫於所欲, 故能審貴賤而通物情” (Dai 2014: 402). Grounding himself in empty tranquility, Ji Kang’s gentleman makes Dao his place of abode. Embodying its mindlessness, there is not only no need for notions pertaining to selfhood, but said notions vanish in the process of becoming selfless. Pride and flattery become the tools of those without Dao, while names and titles become the weapons of those unable to escape self-interest. This is what is meant by naturalness (ziran 自然), a praxis whereby the moral and epistemological norms of humanity fall by the wayside, replaced by the cyclical patterns and elemental changes of the non-human world. Such being the case, the gentleman qua sage clings to no particular feeling and longs for no particular desire, thus he is said to be without emotion. Clear-sighted and empty-minded, he can penetrate the true state of things by examining (shen 審) what the world takes to be precious (gui 貴) and worthless (jian 賤). To be precious is to be great, and there is nothing greater than Dao; the treasured is esteemed by things the world over, and nothing can surpass Dao in this regard. However, the precious does not view itself as great or esteem-worthy and so it is also low and humble. Being low, it persists unnoticed; due to its humbleness, it is accessible to all. Only still, quiet emptiness can embody such potentiality, hence they originate with Dao. In light of the fact that Dao penetrates all things in the world, the person who follows it will come to penetrate said things too. The thoroughfare of possibility and transformation, Dao opposes nothing for it envelops and enfolds all things. Letting things be as they are and create their own path in life, Dao selflessly accompanies things without interference. Thus, in mirroring the genuine way of Dao, the sage transcends human artificiality, abandoning right and wrong in the process. Having established the reasons for critiquing Confucianism, Ji Kang’s first concluding observation in the Essay is this: The state of things obeys that which penetrates it, hence the great Dao is not opposed; to transcend names is to rely on the heart-mind, hence right and wrong are not employed. 物情順通, 故大道無違; 越名任心, 故是非無措也 (Dai 2014: 402). Had Ji Kang argued that to be without self-interest merely requires one refrain from distinguishing right and wrong, potential opponents would have easily disproved him, hence he qualifies his stance with the following explanation: To speak of the gentleman, not employing things is his priority while penetrating things is his goodness. To speak of the petty person, concealing his feelings is his error while opposing Dao is his flaw. Why? Concealing his feelings, arrogance, and stinginess, these are the greatest wrongdoings of the petty person; having a heart-mind that is empty and does not employ things, this is the genuine action of the gentleman. This is why the [book of] Great Dao says: “If I am without a body, what will I have to fear?” [and] “To not take life as precious, this is better than treasuring life.”11 11 These passages are, respectively, from chapters 13 and 75 of the Daodejing. See Lou 1999: 29; 184. 236 D. Chai 是故言君子, 則以無措爲主, 以通物爲美。言小人, 則以匿情爲非, 以違道爲闕。 何者? 匿情矜吝, 小人之至惡; 虛心無措, 君子之篤行也。是以大道言及吾無身, 吾又何患。無以生爲貴者, 是賢於貴生也 (Dai 2014: 402). Whereas the gentleman qua sage adheres to the natural principle of things and so stands alongside Dao, the petty person takes shelter in his emotions and ends up opposing Dao. When emotions take hold of the heart-mind and serve as one’s guide in life, how is encountering misfortune not inevitable? To be without emotions, having a heart-mind that is quiescent and silent, how is conjoining with Dao not inevitable? When the heart-mind is empty, said emptiness becomes the cloak enveloping the sage’s personhood; when the opposite is true, emptiness becomes the worst fear of the petty person. Pride and stinginess are thus the perils of the selfish individual insofar as they prevent Dao from taking hold of said person’s spirit, uplifting them to the level of all-inclusiveness and ontological generosity. Emptiness is akin to sincerity because emptiness can be nothing other than its true self, whereas fullness demands a prior emptiness to reach a state of completion. In this way, the sage accompanies Dao in emptily penetrating things—that is, their engagement with the myriad things of the world does not alter their inborn nature—and nothing surpasses the beauty of such invisible touching. To further emphasize this fact, Ji Kang quoted the above two chapters from the Daodejing; however, even doing this might not be enough to dislodge the doctrines of Confucianism from people’s minds. Given this, Ji Kang restates his conclusion, only now he refers to persons from antiquity: To speak on account of this, when the ultimate person uses his heart-mind, there is absolutely no trace of his employing things. Hence Yi Yin did not employ his worth [when serving] Tang of Yin,12 and so the whole world benefitted and revealed his name. Dan of Zhou did not tend to his worthiness and hiding his actions, assumed the role of regent, and all was transformed and prospered. Yi Wu did not conceal his feelings from Huan of Qi, and although the state was hegemonic, its ruler was revered.13 How can we say, regarding the use of their heart-mind, that these individuals acted for themselves and were attached to self-interest? Thus, the Guanzi says: “The gentleman who acts according to Dao forgets his personhood.” These words are true indeed! 由斯而言: 夫至人之用心, 固不存有措矣。是故伊尹不借賢於殷湯, 故世濟而名 顯; 周旦不顧賢而隱行, 故假攝而化隆; 夷吾不匿情於齊桓, 故國霸而主尊。其用 心, 豈爲身而繫乎私哉? 故管子曰:君子行道, 忘其爲身。斯言是矣 (Dai 2014: 402-403). The point being made here is that China’s beginning would have been disastrous if not for the lack of self-interest of those assisting the ruler to lead the people down a path of openness. That Ji Kang cites the Guanzi 管子,14 as opposed to the Zhuangzi, does not weaken his case; rather, it strengthens it by demonstrating that even Yi Yin 伊尹 was a minister in the court of Tang 湯, who founded the Shang (Yin 殷) dynasty. Duke Huan of Qi 齊桓公 (716–643 BCE) ascended the throne with help of his minister Yi Wu 夷吾 (Guan Zhong 管仲). For more, see chapter 62 “Biographies of Guan and Yan 管晏列传” of the Shiji 史記. 14 The passage cited by Ji Kang does not appear in the Guanzi as it exists today. 12 13 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 237 non-Daoist thinkers recognized the merits of cosmological collectivism. Of course, the argument could be made that the Guanzi’s Dao differs from that of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and indeed it does, but the premise behind the quoted line is common to them all: conjoining with Dao necessitates releasement of self and when one is selfless, self-interest becomes redundant. With this, we conclude the first section of the Essay. 3 Lacking Self-Interest and Pursuing the Good The second section of Ji Kang’s Essay opens with the following premise: when the gentleman forgets his personhood, and lacks self-interest as a result, his affairs accord with what is good. Here are the reasons why: Since the gentleman’s actions are worthy, he does not first examine their measure [of benefit] and then act. Relying on his heart-mind without exhausting it, he does not first discuss its goodness and then decide what is correct. Making clear his feelings without employing them, he does not first discuss their rightness and then act. 君子之行賢也, 不察於有度而後行也。任心無邪, 不議於善而後正也。顯情無措, 不論於是而後爲也 (Dai 2014: 403). In being a sage, Ji Kang’s gentleman does nothing that is unworthy of his namesake. To act for the sake of worthiness is to be selfish and disconnected from the holistic reality of Dao. As he has harmonized with the world, the sage does not examine his words before speaking, does not consider the benefit of his affairs before acting; rather, he lets his heart-mind wander with Dao and so never exhausts it. In other words, the sage refrains from using his heart-mind to pursue what lies outside himself, and refrains from using it to plunge the depths of knowledge in search of answers to questions that are unanswerable. Instead, he accepts things as they are, as possessing a nature that is true and proper to them alone. Such being the case, the sage’s emotional constitution lacks concern for the views of others and because of this, the benefit his words bring to the world are directly tied to and follow from his deeds. Such is why Ji Kang goes on to say: Thus, he proudly forgets the worthy, and worthiness and its measure coincide. He indifferently relies on his heart-mind, and his heart-mind and the good meet. Baffled, he employs nothing, and his affairs and the right come together.15 是故傲然忘賢, 而賢與度會; 忽然任心, 而心與善遇; 儻然無措, 而事與是俱也 (Dai 2014: 403). The phrase tangran 儻然 is from chapter 14 (tianyun 天運) of the Zhuangzi: “You looked for it but could not see it, pursued it but could not reach it. Baffled, you stood in the apex of the four directions, leaned against a withered dryandra tree and sang 望之而不能見也, 逐之而不能及也, 儻然立於四虛之道, 倚於槁梧而吟.” Guo 1985: 504. 15 238 D. Chai This is the first time Ji Kang associates dispelling self-interest with good fortune.16 What does it mean to be worthy (xian 賢)? Obviously, it is not the moral worth spoken of in Confucianism, nor is it the worthiness of one’s post spoken of in Legalism; rather, genuine goodness is to have an affinity with the myriad things of the world by way of returning to Dao. The good is placid, empty, and silent; it is qi and Yin and Yang, the sustenance of life and enabler of death; it is darkly mysterious, a canyon to the world’s valley; the good, in other words, is everything humanity takes for granted and is why it can be obtained only after it has been forgotten. It is as Zhuangzi says in chapter 5 (dechongfu 德充符): “When men do not forget the things they ought to forget, and forget the things they should not forget, this is a case of forgetting that which is real 人不忘其所忘, 而忘其所不忘, 此謂誠忘.”17 To forget oneself is to forget being concerned with self-interest, and when one lacks self-interest, one lives in alignment with the good. Having established the grounds for his second premise, Ji Kang promptly offers an elaboration in the form of three justifications. Before we turn to these, however, there are four points we need to discuss. First and foremost is Ji Kang’s argument that “in discussing openness and self-interest, although one’s will is set on Dao, and it preserves the good, acting without wickedness and evil, though nothing in their breast is concealed, this cannot be said to be lacking self-interest 故論公私者, 雖云 志道存善, ●無凶邪, 無所懷而不匿者, 不可謂無私” (Dai 2014: 403).18 This point, and the three that follow, argue for openness (gong 公) above all else. Any inkling of selfishness (si 私) is seen by Ji Kang as an obstacle to harmonizing with Dao, even though one is not engaged in acts of impropriety. In other words, the seed of selfishness is already planted in the heart-mind of one who, despite being keen on the arts of Dao, is unwilling to share with others what they conceal (ni 匿) within. If not sharing the cherishment of the heart-mind is considered bad, Ji Kang’s second point speaks to the inverse: “Although one wishes to boast of their goodness, and their feelings oppose Dao, if there is nothing they embrace that is not made clear, this cannot be called lacking openness 雖欲之伐善, 情之違道, 無所抱而不顯者, 不可 謂不公” (Dai 2014: 403). Whereas in the first case we could not definitively declare someone to be without self-interest, here we cannot definitively say they have selfinterest. Though their heart-mind is colored by feelings that distance them from Dao, and because they openly share said feelings with others, such an individual does not qualify as selfish. The third point—“now to hold to the principle that one must be open and restrain feelings that are not, this means that although one acts out of goodness they are still not separated from self-interest 今執必公之理, 以繩不公之情, 使 夫雖爲善者, 不離於有私” (Dai 2014: 403)—as well as the fourth—“although one wishes to boast of their goodness, they might not be beguiled by self-interest. If one 16 For a different take on the relationship between good fortune and harmonizing one’s inner and outer realms, see Ruan Kan’s 阮侃 “Residences Lack Good or Bad Fortune: One must Preserve Life 宅無吉凶攝生論” along with Ji Kang’s refutation and own explication, in Ji Kang’s collected works. 17 Guo 1985: 216–217. 18 The character before 無凶 is corrupted. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 239 values their name and treasures their heart-mind, then they must make clear their feelings of right and wrong 雖欲之伐善, 。重其名而貴其心, 則是非之 情, 不得不顯矣” (Dai 2014: 403)—are but variations on the first two points. Based upon the aforementioned, Ji Kang surmises: When right and wrong must be made clear, one who is good will not conceal his feelings that are not, and one who is wrong will not add to it the greater wrong of not being open. If one lacks the first wrong, the good will be obtained; if one lacks the greater wrong, he will have nothing but his wrongness, which he can then correct. Not only is this the way to be completely good, it motivates others to be good too. 是非必顯, 有善者無匿情之不是, 有非者不加不公之大非。無不是則善莫不得, 無大非則莫過其非, 乃所以救其非也。非徒盡善, 亦所以厲不善也 (Dai 2014: 403). Moral openness of the kind described above is not about pursuing an absolute good over and above an absolute bad. Indeed, Ji Kang more often than not contrasts the good (shan 善) and not-good (bushan 不善), while the bad (e 惡) is contrasted with the lesser meaning of mei 美 (beautiful), i.e., to be good or pleasing.19 Semantics aside, Ji Kang’s interest in the good and bad is framed by a need to restore people’s inborn nature to their equidistant state and avoid being trapped at its outer fringes. In this way, moral openness unlocks the door to good fortune, be it in terms of health, feelings, longevity, and so forth, while privation opens the door to misfortune. The purpose of achieving goodness, however, is not simply to be good, for that does not exclude the possibility of faults remaining; rather, Ji Kang is arguing that one has to recognize one’s faults as faults, and the act of doing so leads to goodness. Our faults, moreover, are not external to our being but are constitutive of it; in other words, all things have their inherent faults, which are neither good nor bad in their own right, but are seen externally as differing from the norm and in need of correction. Ji Kang is simply making the case that differences are just that; when left to their own devices, differences are no longer seen as different but part of the inborn nature 19 In book 39 (yaoyue 堯曰) of the Analects, Confucius lists five goods (wu mei 五美): to be generous without paying a price 惠而不費; work hard without complaint 勞而不怨; be modest with one’s desires 欲而不貪; be great without arrogance 泰而不驕; and, be powerful but not fiercely so 威而不猛. Confucius also mentions four evils (si e 四惡): killing without first reforming不教而 殺; expect success without first warning 不戒視成; impose a time limit yet delay in giving orders 慢令致期; and, be stingy in giving to others when called upon to do so 猶之與人也, 出納之吝. See Cheng 1997: 1370–1373. Confucius was not the only one to create such a list however; chapter 31 (yufu 漁父) of the Zhuangzi has eight flaws (ba ci 八疵): make the affairs of others one’s own 非其事而事之; move forward without permission 莫之顧而進之; strive after another’s views yet stretch-out his words 希意道言; speak without regard for right and wrong 不擇是非而言; enjoy speaking about other’s failings 好言人之惡; damage friendships and split-apart families 析交離 親; feign praise in order to viciously defeat others 稱譽詐偽以敗惡人; and, to look in two directions without regarding right and wrong in order to catch sight of other’s desires 不擇善否, 兩容 頰適, 偷拔其所欲. Zhuangzi also speaks of four harms (si huan 四患): enjoy undertaking great affairs but changing long-standing practices simply to enhance one’s merit and fame 好經大事, 變 更易常, 以挂功名; claiming to know everything and things must be done your way, yet you snatch from others and make it your own 專知擅事, 侵人自用; see one’s errors yet do not change, and listen to the advice of others yet do things even worse 見過不更, 聞諫愈甚; and, when others agree with you they are approved of, but when they disgree with you they are disapproved of no matter how good they are 人同於己則可, 不同於己, 雖善不善, 謂之矜. See Guo 1985: 1029. 240 D. Chai of the individual.20 Such being the case, to accept a fault on its own terms is to transform it into something naturally beneficial (i.e., good). Ji Kang offers three justifications for this claim, the first of which is: As the good is wholly good, and the wrong can be corrected, how much more so will this be the case when right and wrong are at their extreme? 夫善以盡善, 非以救非, 而況乎以是非之至者 (Dai 2014: 403). The second reads: Thus, good and bad are the extreme of things. If one is located between these two, then whatever one does, openness will result in success and self-interest in failure. Since both use the same vessel, some will succeed and others will fail. As for openness and selfinterest, they pave the way to success and failure and are the gates to auspicious and ominous fortune. 故善之與不善, 物之至者也。若處二物之間, 所徃者, 必以公成而私敗。同用一 器, 而有成有敗。夫公私者, 成敗之途, 而吉凶之門乎 (Dai 2014: 403). The third justification is: Thus, things at the extreme which do not change are few,21 while those that are not and use what is at hand, are many. It is like the embodied nature of the average person;22 their fortune depends on how this nature is used. If their heart-mind dwells upon the upright and outspoken figures of antiquity, and if they intend to walk the path of openness, directly speaking what is in their heart-mind, then all of their words will be right. If they act as their feelings are touched, then all their affairs will be auspicious. 故物至而不移者寡, 不至而在用者衆。若質乎中人之體, 運乎在用之質, 而栖心 古烈, 擬足公塗, 值心而言, 則言無不是; 觸情而行, 則事無不吉 (Dai 2014: 403). The above rationalizations are working towards a point Ji Kang will make shortly; his present goal, however, is to demonstrate that the average person can just as easily be without self-interest as the gentleman, and that doing so will benefit their lives in a similar manner too. All that is required are the few simple steps outlined above. Walking the path of openness can be seen as walking two paths (liangxing 兩行), to 20 Ji Kang, in a later section of the Essay, makes this precise point: “To be overly concerned with goodness, this is the cause of trouble. When one is aware of trouble, it is no longer troublesome 措 善之情, 其所病也。唯病病, 是以不病.” The term “bingbing 病病” is from chapter 71 of the Daodejing: “To know yet claim not to know is supreme; not to know yet claim to know will result in trouble. When one is aware of trouble, it is no longer troublesome. Thus, the sage is without trouble, for in being aware of it, no trouble finds him 知不知上; 不知知病。夫唯病病, 是以不 病。聖人不病, 以其病病, 是以不病.” Lou 1999: 178. 21 This is a reference to book 34 (yang huo 陽貨) of the Analects: “The Master said: Men are by nature close to one another, it in their actions that they become far apart 子曰:性相近也, 習相遠 也.” Cheng 1997: 1177. 22 The “average person” (zhongren 中人) is mentioned by Confucius in book 11 (yong ye 雍也) of the Analects: “The Master said: For the average person and above, the highest subjects may be discussed; for those below the average person, the highest subjects may not be discussed 子曰:中 人以上, 可以語上也; 中人以下, 不可以語上也.” Cheng 1997: 1177. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 241 quote the Zhuangzi23; it could also be read as a precursor to the more advanced openness that is wuwei 無為 (non-deliberate action). As for why the average person should coach their heart-mind to dwell upon the words and actions of the morally strong persons of antiquity, as opposed to freely following their natural inclinations, is unclear. It would appear Ji Kang is yet again showing the inescapable hold Confucianism had over the intelligentsia of his day and that the virtuous and unscrupulous persons of the Shang-Zhou epoch remain embedded in the psyche of all who wish to improve the moral standing of the world in which they live. However, Ji Kang is referring to such individuals not out of flattery, but to demonstrate that being without self-interest is an idea that stretches back to the very beginning of Chinese civilization, yet has become muddied or altogether forgotten with the passage of time. This message, which Ji Kang offers in the form of a preliminary conclusion to this section of the Essay, reads thusly: As a result, what others employ is not what he [the junzi] employs; what others desire out of self-interest is not what he sees as self-interest. His words are not calculated according to success and failure yet he encounters the good; his actions are not guided according to right and wrong yet his fortune is auspicious. How is this not due to the standards of successful openness and failed self-interest? Such being the case, what need is there to employ anything else? 於是乎向之所措者, 乃非所措也; 欲之所私者, 乃非所私也。言不計乎得失而遇 善, 行不準乎是非而遇吉, 豈非公成私敗之數乎? 夫如是也, 又何措之有哉 (Dai 2014: 403). Since the meaning of this passage is self-evident, Ji Kang proceeds to provide historical evidence for, and further elaboration of,24 this preliminary conclusion before arriving at his final summation for this section of the text: Thus, what is actually right appears temporarily wrong and is only made clear later; what is actually wrong appears temporarily right and is only made clear later. If openness and selfinterest are mutually made evident, then to act out of self-interest will prove hopeless, yet the person who is good and bright will be free of such burden. To act out of self-interest and have no hope, one cannot but consider changing their faults. If one stands in openness and has nothing to fear, their actions will have no doubts. This is the way of great order. Thus, the head concubine spilled the [poisoned] wine and was shamed for her crime;25 Wang Ling made objections at court but Chen Ping obeyed the royal edict.26 When looked at in this way, are these not cases where something appeared wrong but was later shown not to be the case? 23 Zhuangzi chapter 2 (qiwulun 齊物論) writes: “It is because the sage harmonizes right and wrong, resting in the heavenly measure of things, that this is called walking two paths 是以聖人和之以是 非, 而休乎天鈞, 是之謂兩行.” Guo 1985: 70. 24 I have skipped this section of the text due to limitations of space. 25 This refers to a story in the Zhanguo Ce 戰國策 where a cheating wife attempted to poison her husband but was stopped by his concubine. 26 Wang Ling 王陵 and Chen Ping 陳平 served in the court of Empress Dowager Lü 呂太后 (r. 187–179 BCE). See chapters 9 and 56 of the Shiji 史記 for more. 242 D. Chai 故實是以暫非而後顯, 實非以暫是而後明。公私交顯, 則行私者無所冀, 而淑亮 者無所負矣。行私者無所冀, 則思改其非; 立公者無所忌, 則行之無疑, 此大治之 道也。故主妾覆醴, 以罪受戮; 王陵庭爭, 而陳平順旨。於是觀之, 非似非而非非 者乎 (Dai 2014: 404). Recall that Ji Kang began this section of the Essay with the claim that by forgetting the self, the words and actions of the gentleman qua sage are open and attuned with the good (i.e., Dao). Having seen the reasoning behind this claim, we can understand why Ji Kang would arrive at the conclusion he does. What is surprising about his remarks is the turn to a form of relativism commonly seen in pre-Qin Daoism.27 Regardless of the period, Daoism sees right and wrong as having their own perspective, however, it this is not inherent to the words themselves but depends upon the stance of the subject using them. What is right is never truly right and what is wrong is never truly wrong; right and wrong are but temporary inferences derived from the plenum of constant incompleteness that is the world of the sage. In being incomplete, the world completes itself; in its self-completion, it becomes empty. To be empty is to forget, and to forget is to stand in the pivot of Dao. Thus, when Ji Kang speaks of a great order (da zhi 大治), a phrase derived from the Zhuangzi,28 the mode of such ordering is the abolishment of any distinction between right and wrong, leaving behind only that which is natural. To blame someone for doing wrong, such as the concubine or Wang Ling in the passage quoted above, who were simply trying to do good, is to wield selfishness as a weapon. By limiting morality to a spectrum of right and wrong, the negative repercussions for the world become inescapable. As we shall see, Ji Kang makes it very clear that self-interestedness bears upon one’s spirit, body, heart-mind, and feelings. To neglect the effects closed-mindedness has on these aspects of life is to surely bring about misfortune, if not outright disaster.29 Indeed, the next section of the Essay is devoted to explicating the importance of spirit when it comes to being without self-interest, and why this hidden aspect of morality is more important to one’s endeavor than anything one’s words or actions can convey. 27 Chapter 2 (qiwulun 齊物論) of the Zhuangzi writes: “Even this is a way of that and that is a way of this. However, that has its right and wrong, and this has its right and wrong. Is there, in fact, a distinction between that and this, or is there no distinguishing between them? Where that and this cease to be in opposition, one takes Dao as the pivot 是亦彼也, 彼亦是也。彼亦一是非, 此亦一 是非。果且有彼是乎哉? 果且無彼是乎哉? 彼是莫得其偶, 謂之道樞.” Guo 1985: 66. 28 See chapter 11 (zaiyou 在宥): “Abandon the sage and reject knowledge, and the world will have great order 絕聖棄知而天下大治.” Guo 1985: 377. 29 Ji Kang also speaks about the need to pay attention to hidden symptoms of bad fortune in his essay “On Nourishing Life” (Yangsheng lun 養生論). For more, see Chai 2017a. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 4 Dispelling Self-Interest to be Pure in Body and Upright in Spirit 243 In this section of the Essay, Ji Kang lays forth his core message: Self-interest is dispelled when the will stops treasuring things and the heart-mind lacks desire. In order to reach such a state, one must first grasp the nature of Dao and act in accordance with its naturalism. To comprehend the nature of Dao and follow its course is, Ji Kang argues, the reason why the gentleman is revered by everyone in the court and on its outer steps (hetang yingjie 闔堂盈階)—i.e., officials of all manner of rank—proclaiming him to be a good person (shanren 善人). However, if an individual decides to refrain from openly expressing their feelings, choosing to do so in the sanctity of privacy, they will be accused of acting out of self-interest and be perceived quite differently from the gentleman (bufu tonger 不復同耳). Ji Kang describes the reasons for this disparity thusly: To embrace [the will] and not change while hiding one’s feelings, this is to truly lose one’s spirit to all that is confusing, to drown one’s body in the fixity of names, to control one’s heart-mind by all that is fearful, and to attach one’s feelings to all that is desired. 抱●而匿情不改者, 誠神以喪於所惑, 而體以溺於常名, 心以制於所慴, 而情有繫 於所欲 (Dai 2014: 404-405).30 We have, in the above, both a warning and an encouragement. One who cherishes the will cannot be open with their feelings, hence they hide them; conversely, one who is no longer susceptible to the whims of the will openly embraces the collectivity of the things of the world. From this, should we stubbornly hold to the artificial authority ascribed to the will, our spirit will be expelled to the external world of ideologies and sentimentalities. The sage, however, knows that Dao makes emptiness its abode; in still quietude, he protects his spirit by not subjecting it to the vicissitudes and vacillations of the heart-mind. If anything, it is the spirit that guides us through life, informs our knowledge of the world, and allows us to remain without self-interest. Subservience to the will not only effects the spirit but the body too. The will drowns the body in names, names whose fixity prevents the body from being carried by the winds of Dao. With a spirit tied down by the will, and a body suffocated by an over-abundance and application of concepts (i.e., names), the heart-mind cannot but be controlled by the things it fears, and when the heart-mind fears anything other than being separated from Dao, our feelings take comfort in the object of our desire. Ji Kang sarcastically describes such people as “thinking themselves to be right with none more worthy than they 咸自以爲有是而莫賢乎已” (Dai 2014: 405). Not knowing the downtrodden state of their spirit, body, and heart-mind, they allow self-interest to consume and corrupt their inborn nature, forcing their gaze outwards instead of inwards towards their Dao-self: “Having yet to know the cruelty of an attack on the flesh, or a disaster that terrifies the heart-mind, they cannot gather 30 The character after 抱 is corrupted. 244 D. Chai their feelings and reflect on them, nor reject names and rely on reality 未有攻肌之 慘, 駭心之禍, 遂莫能收情以自反, 棄名以任實” (Dai 2014: 405).31 Ji Kang’s ethics of openness is taking a unique turn here; not bound by abstract norms, he is trying to awaken in his reader the desperate need for something that transcends an ethics attached to and limited by words: spirit. To directly encounter the weakness of the flesh and fragility of the heart-mind is to acknowledge their dependency on something altogether greater: spirit. Not to belabor the point but spirit and its ability to naturally harmonize with Nature is one of the central themes of Ji Kang’s philosophy. His ethics is not limited to humans alone but applies to all living things; however, since most of us would be loath to follow a non-human species, the gentleman qua sage serves as our paradigmatic model. Once we realize how fallible we truly are, how susceptible we are to moral and epistemological deception, our questioning of reality can turn away from the shadowy domain of names and adopt the clarity of Dao to perceive things on their own wordless terms. Ji Kang’s justification for the above requires close to a dozen lines of text, which are as follows: Their heart-mind has its right but it is concealed out of self-interest; their will has its good but employing it makes it bad. They do not employ what should be employed and employ what should not be employed. They do not search for the principle of what should not be employed but search for the way to use what they employ. Thus, in knowing what they employ they are kept in the dark by such employment, taking what they do not employ as crude and what they employ as skillful. Their only fear is that the hidden is not profound; their only worry is that the concealed is not secret. Thus, with an arrogant, uncongenial appearance, they look down on the common people and with overbearing, ornamental speech, they crave vulgar fame. Of all the good practices to date, they say, none are greater than this; though they over-use their heart-mind to the end of their days, they fail to catch sight of what lies beyond. Thus, they might be able to perfect their selfish selves but they will lose their naturally-given nature. That their feelings are hidden and concealed, they certainly exist in their heart-mind; what is more, machinations of falsity and negligence shape their affairs. In this way, when their discussion of right and wrong are made clear, the reality of reward and punishment also becomes true. Not knowing that one can brave the shade without a shadow, they fear their shadow is not hidden; not knowing one cannot employ things without harm, they fear their employment is not skillful enough. How sad! 乃心有是焉, 匿之以私; 志有善焉, 措之爲惡。不措所措, 而措所不措。不求所以 不措之理, 而求所以爲措之道。故明爲措, 而闇於措, 是以不措爲拙, 措爲工。唯 懼隱之不微, 唯患匿之不宻。故有矜忤之容, 以觀常人; 矯飾之言, 以要俗譽。謂 永年良規, 莫盛於兹; 終日馳思, 莫闚其外, 故能成其私之體, 而喪其自然之質也。 於是隱匿之情, 必存乎心; 偽怠之機, 必形乎事。若是, 則是非之議既明, 賞罰之實 又篤。不知冒廕之可以無景, 而患景之不匿; 不知無措之可以無患, 而患措之不 巧, 豈不哀哉 (Dai 2014: 405). Four things can be said about this passage. The first concerns the notion that the people discussed above “do not employ what should be employed and employ what should not be employed. They do not search for the principle of what should not be employed but search for the way to use what they employ.” The first half of this sentence appears to be modelled after the famous line from chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi 31 Shocking the mind is something Zhuangzi spoke of in his story about the Yellow Emperor playing his zither. For more, see Chai 2017b. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 245 we cited earlier.32 The principle spoken of in the second half is not directly found in pre-Qin texts, but a case can be made that chapter 17 (qiushui 秋水) of the Zhuangzi played a role.33 As is normal for Ji Kang, he spends more time criticizing people whose views and lifestyle are contrary to Daoism than speaking about those who subscribe to it. Since self-interested people are more concerned about how their words and actions are perceived by others than with letting them take their own path, their self-concern becomes misguided over time as they reach for ever greater justifications to hold onto their lack of moral openness. No longer keen on embracing the arts of Dao, its principle of disinterestedness (i.e., naturalness) is supplanted with one devised to further separate people from their feelings and natural inclinations so as to reinforce an artificial social order. It is to this human-made order that Ji Kang’s second point is directed: “Thus, with an arrogant, uncongenial appearance, they look down on the common people and with overbearing, ornamental speech, they crave vulgar fame.” Confucius and his followers are the target of this remark, for only they deny the common people a chance to voice their views and wishes. With their socio-political privileges and entitlements, Ji Kang sees the Confucians as working to uphold their world-order at the expense of everyone else’s. Moral openness is frowned upon and spiritual wandering is virtually non-existent. Such is why, and this is Ji Kang’s third point, “they might be able to perfect their selfish selves but they will lose their naturally-given nature.” In terms of what this naturally-given nature entails, chapter 15 (liuyi 刻意) of the Zhuangzi sheds some light: “As for tranquility, indifference, silence, quietude, emptiness, and non-doing, these are the level of heaven and earth and the nature of Dao and its virtue夫恬惔寂寞, 虛無無為, 此天地之平而道德之質也.”34 The level (ping 平) of heaven and earth is the oneness that harmonizes the myriad things of the world. In order to do so without self-interest, said thread cannot have any discernably attainable traits; rather, its characteristics are attainable only after one learns to let go of morality so as to become moral in the meontological sense, that is, to discover the non-moralistic morality of Dao’s creative negativity. A perfect illustration of this is Ji Kang’s fourth point: “Not knowing that one can brave the shade without a shadow, they fear their shadow is not hidden.”35 Ji Kang’s shadow reference is not accidental and is an accurate description of those who are unwilling to abandon their moral selves for the selfless holism of Nature. Indeed, he goes into great detail about the openly harmonic reality of the world in his writings 32 See note 17 above. Specifically, this line: “One who knows Dao will have grasped the natural ordering of things, and one who grasps the natural order of things will understand its power. In being clear about this power, one can no longer be harmed by things 知道者必達於理, 達於理者必明於權, 明於權者 不以物害己.” Guo 1985: 588. 34 See Guo 1985: 538. Robert Henricks translates zhi as substance but this is too essentialist for my liking. 35 The Zhuangzi discusses shadows in chapters 27 (yuyan 寓言) and 31 (yufu 漁父). See Guo 1985: 959–960 and 1031, respectively. Whereas the Zhuangzi uses shadows to illustrate the mutual dependency of things onto-cosmologically, Ji Kang’s application is strictly moral. 33 246 D. Chai on music.36 The shadow, being an emptiness diminished of light, is not an inhospitable void that devours everything encountering it; on the contrary, it is a reflection of our genuine selfhood, a selfness that is selfless and in being such, welcomes all other selves to the fold. The shadow is spirit set free; it is an expression of dispelling self-interest taken to its ultimacy. When seen thusly, we are no longer fearful of revealing our shadow, no longer hesitant to release our shadow to the awaiting shade. Standing in a shadow, we are shaded by its darkness and so must relinquish the glare of our self-generated appearance and words, our craving for power and fame. Thus, to abandon perfecting one’s selfish self, one will thereby preserve their naturally-given nature; to embrace the shadow’s dark veil, one can catch sight of what lies beyond the border of the over-used heart-mind. With this, Ji Kang presents his penultimate final conclusion: As the gentleman already has this naturally-given nature, he looks once more at these examples.37 What he treasures are profound and bright, and as these are rare, he preserves them. What he rejects are arrogance and stinginess, and as these are bad, he keeps them at a distant. If he employs things that are wrong, he will be inwardly ashamed; if he hides things that are worthless, he will be outwardly humiliated. Such is why his words do not warily conceal, and his actions do not warily hide. He does not warily favor something because he likes it; he does not warily oppose something because he dislikes it. His heart-mind lacks arrogance, his feelings lack attachment. With a body that is clear and a spirit that is upright, his notion of right and wrong is fair and acceptable. He is loyal and respectful to the enlightened king, and sincere and trusting to the common people. He relegates ambition to the remote wastelands, handing down magnanimity to the end of time. Are these not the high actions and beautiful wishes of the worthy person, the gentleman? 君子既有其質, 又覩其鑒, 貴夫亮逹, 希而存之, 惡夫矜吝, 棄而遠之。所措一非, 而内愧乎神; 賤所隱一闕, 而外慙其形。言無茍諱, 而行無茍隱。不以愛之而茍 善, 不以惡之而茍非。心無所矜, 而情無所繫, 體清神正, 而是非允當。忠感明天 子, 而信篤乎萬民。寄胷懷於八荒, 垂坦蕩以永日。斯非賢人君子, 高行之美冀 者乎 (Dai 2014: 405). For the gentleman qua sage, nothing is more precious than Dao, yet authentic understanding of Dao is rarely seen in the human world, hence he works at preserving his own. However, this preservation of knowledge is not merely for the sake of having it but the ability to take comfort in not employing it.38 Knowledge of Dao is not something that can be directly transmitted to others; does preserving it qualify as selfishness? The answer would have to be no, for knowledge of Dao is not knowledge of things in particular but all things collectively. As human knowledge in no 36 See Ji Kang’s “Sound is without Grief or Joy” (Sheng wu Aile lun 聲無哀樂論) and “Rhapsody on the Zither” (Qin fu 琴賦). 37 The examples being referred to are the banishment of Shen Hou 申候 and the execution of Chancellor Pi 宰嚭. 38 Chapter 16 (shanxing 繕性) of the Zhuangzi says: “Those in ancient times who practiced Dao cultivated their knowledge in tranquility; although knowledge lived in them they did not act on its behalf. In this way, we may say they used knowledge to cultivate tranquility. Knowledge and tranquility took turns cultivating each other and harmony and natural order emerged from the inborn nature 古之治道者, 以恬養知; 知生而無以知為也, 謂之以知養恬。知與恬交相養, 而和理出 其性.” Guo 1985: 548. 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 247 way represents that of the myriad things of the world, why does humanity uphold its dark, divisive grip on life instead of letting Nature enlighten us about moral openness? Such being the case, is it any wonder Ji Kang says the gentleman does not welcome arrogance and stinginess but keeps them far afield? Arrogance and stinginess are manifestations of a heart-mind served by selfinterest; both are driven by a deep-seated insecurity with one’s inborn-nature, a nature bestowed by Dao. Using the profound light of Dao, the gentleman employs his self in a manner attuned to its naturalness, and so does no wrong. Should he deliberately—artificially—employ things out of arrogance or stinginess, he runs the risk of injuring his spirit; should he conceal things for the same reasons, he runs the risk of bodily injury. This is why his heart-mind has no room for arrogance and his feelings do not attach themselves to things. In this way, the gentleman’s body remains clear and his spirit upright. This, furthermore, explains why he interacts with the king and common people in a manner reflective of his own connectedness to Dao. Passing-over a short discussion of historical persons exemplifying the above, Ji Kang ends this section of the Essay with these remarks: To lack self-interest yet be wrong is because the will is focused on not employing things. To say that one does not employ things is not equal to saying one’s actions will be wholly right. To say that one is overly stingy is not the same as saying one simply stops speaking. Thus, to be overly stingy is wrong while not employing things is right. 無私而有非者, 無措之志也。夫言無措者, 不齊於必盡也; 言多吝者, 不具於不言 而已。故多吝有非, 無措有是 (Dai 2014: 406). Forcing oneself to not employ things is not as good as naturally leaving things be; forcefully trying to be without self-interest is a perversion of being self-interested. Ji Kang, as we have seen, allows for mistakes to occur; however, one must be willing to openly discuss them if they are to be rectified. When the heart-mind is no longer driven by pride, and when one’s words return to the lowly ground from which they sprout, right and wrong simply become matters of perspective, not divergence. Stinginess is thus a closing-off of fickleness, and fickleness is the funnel through which openness is strangled. If we wish to break the chains of all that stinginess entails, we must opt for the releasement of not employing things. Allowing the world to govern itself is to allow the myriad things to employ their inborn-nature as it was bestowed to them by Dao. As chapter 10 of the Daodejing writes: “[Dao] creates things without possessing them, assists them without making them reliant [on it], and lets them grow without being controlling 生而不有, 為而不恃, 長而不宰.”39 One can employ things, as Dao does, without injuring them, just as one can refrain from rambling without resorting to silence; what allows this to occur is moral openness. 39 Lou 1999: 24. 248 5 D. Chai Conclusion Ji Kang’s Essay draws to a close without any noticeable fanfare: In this way, the correctness of not employing things comes from the will not having selfpraise and the heart-mind not having desire. When one is clear about the profound nature of great Dao and acts naturally, the result is one can do no wrong. To embrace the One40 and not employ things, one will be without self-interest and do no wrong. When these two meanings are combined, there will be nothing but goodness. To be wrong yet willing to admit as much is better than not saying anything out of self-interest; to be wrong yet not employ things is hence a small error. Now, Diwu Lun41 was wrong but he revealed it and so we cannot say he lacked openness; in revealing all of his rights and wrongs, we cannot say he is self-interested. If we say he has self-interest because he was wrong, we would have to say such a view is confused. This is the principle of openness and self-interest. 然無措之所以有是, 以志無所尚, 心無所欲, 逹乎大道之情, 動以自然, 則無道以至 非也。抱一而無措, 則無私無非。兼有二義, 乃爲絶美耳。若非而能言者, 是賢 於不言之私, 有非無措, 亦非之小者也。今第五倫有非而能顯, 不可謂不公也; 所 顯是非, 不可謂有措也。有非而謂私, 不可謂不惑。公私之理也 (Dai 2014: 406). Repeating his argument that the will and heart-mind must not be utilized if one hopes to avoid doing wrong, Ji Kang also revisits an idea raised at the start of the Essay, that is, comprehending the great Dao42 and acting in accordance with Nature is the praxis by which one can do no wrong. What does Ji Kang mean by this? His response is to conjoin with things in oneness. By viewing all things equally, there is no longer the possibility for individualism to enter the fray, and such being the case, self-interest vanishes and incorrectness along with it. With right and wrong no longer an influencing agent in the world, good and bad fall by the wayside, leaving behind the authentic virtue of Dao. What is natural to Dao is hence natural to all that arises from it, and said arising, because it is not coerced and without self-interest on the part of Dao, benefits the entire world and thus is good. Said differently, the good is openness pushed to the cosmological level; the bad is privation reduced to the human level. The former surpasses the latter in all cases because the openness of Dao makes everything possible—it is potential-in-waiting. So long as one is open about one’s mistake and corrects it by inverting the self-interest that led to its occurrence into its opposite (i.e., openness), the need to employ things will slowly fade away. Ji Kang’s message, despite its deceiving simplicity, thus proves to be extremely powerful; it would have surely been a wakeup call for the people of his day. It would seem his goal was not to make people feel better about themselves but, rather, to engage one another in honest and non-prejudicial dialogue. Like his writings on “Embracing the One” (baoyi 抱一) is from chapter 22 of the Daodejing. See Lou 1999: 56. Diwu Lun’s dates are unknown, however, according to the History of the Later Han 後漢書, he was a high-ranking minister in the Eastern Han court. For more on Diwu’s life, see De Crespigny 2007: 145–146. 42 The phrase “great Dao” (da dao 大道) occurs four times in the Daodejing, eight times in the Zhuangzi, six times in the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記), and twice in the Mencius 孟子. It is, in other words, a phrase with diverse philosophical application. 40 41 12 Ji Kang’s “On Dispelling Self-Interest” 249 music and learning, Ji Kang’s belief that the natural world was as much a pedagogical tool as a necessary component of life, played a major role in shaping his views on human morality. That the world was not ready to heed such words was not Ji Kang’s fault. Does this make his Essay a less-than-worthy piece of philosophy? Absolutely not. Would modern society benefit from bringing Ji Kang’s doctrines out of the shadows and into mainstream philosophical discourse? It would indeed. Bibliography Brindley, Erica. 2013. “The Polarization of the Concepts “Si” (Private Interest) and “Gong” (Public Interest) in Early Chinese Thought.” Asia Major, 26.2: 1–31. Chai, David. 2017a. “Ji Kang on Nourishing Life.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 12.1: 38–53. Chai, David. 2017b. “Zhuangzi and Musical Apophasis.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 16.3: 355–370. Chai, David. 2019. Zhuangzi and the Becoming of Nothingness. Albany: State University of New York Press. Cheng, Shude 程樹德. 1997. Collected Annotations on Lunyu 論語集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Dai, Mingyang 戴明揚. 2014. Collected Annotations and Commentaries on Ji Kang’s Works 嵇康 集校注. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. de Crespigny, Rafe. 2007. A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220 AD). Leiden: Brill. Guo, Qingfan 郭慶藩. 1985. Collected Annotations on Zhuangzi 莊子集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Henricks, Robert. 1976. Hsi K’ang: His Life, Literature and Thought. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Henricks, Robert. 1983. Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China: The Essays of Hsi K’ang. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Huang, Huaixin 黄怀信. 2004. A Collection of Annotations and Collected Commentaries on Heguanzi 鶡冠子彙校集注. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Lou, Yulie 樓宇烈. 1999. Collected Explanatory Annotations on Wang Bi’s Works 王弼集校釋. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Wang, Liqi 王利器. 2009. Annotations on the Meaning of Wenzi 文子疏義. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. Yang, Bojun 楊伯峻. 2007. Collected Annotations on Liezi 列子集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. David Chai is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author of Zhuangzi and the Becoming of Nothingness (2019), and editor of Daoist Encounters with Phenomenology: Thinking Interculturally about Human Existence (2020). His works have appeared in a wide variety of journals and edited anthologies covering the fields of Chinese philosophy, metaphysics, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and comparative philosophy.