Yong Huang

Moral realism, as a metaethical theory, arises from philosophical reflections on one of the most fundamental issues, if not the most fundamental one, of normative ethics: objectivity of moral properties or facts. Until recently, normative ethical theories dominating modern Western philosophical discourse have been consequentialism and deontology, both of which are primarily concerned about moral properties of rightness and wrongness of actions. Understandably, thus, moral realism has been also action-focused, aiming to show the objectivity of these moral properties, and classical criticisms of moral realism have been, also understandably, largely directed to this action-focused moral realism. However, in the last a few decades, virtue ethics as a normative theory, which is primarily concerned with the goodness and badness of human persons, has experienced an impressive revival and become a powerful rival to deontology and consequentialism. Unfortunately, however, most of our metaethical discussions, including the debate between moral realism and anti-realism, are lagging behind, failing to reflect this fundamental shift of the scene in normative ethics. It is in this context, as a virtual ethicist in normative ethics, someone who thinks that virtue ethics is a more plausible normative theory, that I’m motivated to develop an agent-focused moral realism, reflecting on issues arising from virtue ethics, to argue for the objectivity of moral properties of goodness and badness of persons, heavily drawing on, indeed mostly explicating, the view of the neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi. As it is a novel approach, of course, I expect and indeed welcome criticisms from my fellow meta-ethicists who are commenting on my paper, to whom I’m most grateful and to whose comments I am most happy to make the following responses.

Generally speaking, moral realism is a position good to take but difficult to defend. It is good to take because it provides a solid foundation for our moral judgements about the rightness and wrongness of actions. It is difficult to defend because it needs to explain away the apparent difference between non-moral claims such as “someone steals” and moral claims such as “it is wrong for the person to steal”; indeed, any attempts to do so have to surmount the almost insurmountable blocks piled up by moral anti-realists such Is-Ought problem, open question argument, argument from queerness, argument from relativity, and argument from evolution, to name just a few. In contrast, moral anti-realism is a position easy to defend but not good to take. It is easy to defend because it simply accepts the apparent difference between non-moral claims and moral claims as given, explaining that, while the former describes the world, the latter prescribes it. It is a position not good to take, however, because if moral anti-realism is true, then there is no clear way for us to determine whether a particular moral claim is true, and even if there is a way to do it, it is difficult to prevent it from falling into the hopeless moral relativism.

In this chapter, we are going to examine two strategies to eat the cake and have it. Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism takes an anti-realist position, claiming that our value judgements  are expression of our attitudes instead of description or representation of the reality, and yet still aims to earn the right to talk of moral truth, which he does by appealing to coherentism, pragmatism, and what I consider to be realism of another brand. The last one is most significant: our moral claims as expressions of our attitudes are true not in terms of their accurate representation of the external reality but in terms of their correspondence with our human nature. While we can only find some hint to this most promising approach in Blackburn, who is indeed quite unsure about it, it is Wang Yangming who develops a full-blown version of moral realism of that brand, which is primarily concerned with moral properties of goodness and badness of a person, in contrast to the familiar type of moral realism, which is primarily concerned with moral properties of rightness or wrongness of action. Elsewhere I characterize it as an agent-focused moral realism in contrast to the action-focused one (Huang 2024).

美德伦理学在当代西方获得了令人瞩目的复兴。与此同时，从事比较哲学研究的学者也往往从各自所熟悉的非西方传统中寻找美德伦理学的资源。其中有学者根据“庖丁解牛”等寓言故事所推崇的轻松自在的生活而认为《庄子》中也蕴含有美德伦理学思想，特别是其好生活观。但这种观点存在着严重的问题，因为要确定一个人的生活是否是好生活、具有美德的生活，我们就不能只看其行形式（how），还要看其内容（what）,而后者就一定牵涉某种特定的人性论，因为人类的好生活之“好”一定与（例如）狼的好生活之“好”不同。《庄子》里确实有一种确定的人性观，而这种人性观的一个重要方面就是对不同的生活方式的尊重。因此这种尊重也成了《庄子》美德伦理学的最重要美德，而且也是《庄子》对我们今天的美德伦理学的发展所能够作出的最重要贡献，因为这是一种为我们熟悉的几乎所有美德伦理学所忽略的美德，而同时又正是生活在这个多元时代的我们所最需要的美德。

Confucian economic ethics is centred around the relationship between moral rightness and economic and other external benefits. It is a consensus that Confucianism gives priority to rightness over benefits. Scholars disagree on whether this is because Confucianism regards rightness as an intrinsic value independent of, even though not necessarily inconsistent with, benefits or because it sees rightness as the best instrument to produce benefits. The former takes Confucianism as a deontological theory, while the latter a consequentialist or even utilitarian one. In contrast, this chapter argues that it is a virtue ethical theory, concerned with a flourishing human life, consisting of both external and internal well-being. Benefits are indispensable for external well-being, while the virtue of rightness is essential for internal well-being. Although these two aspects, each of which has its own intrinsic value, are mutually instrumental, conflicts between the two may arise, and when they do, Confucianism puts rightness ahead of benefits, as it is what makes human life different from other forms of life.

In the last a few decades, virtue ethics, once regarded as ethics appropriate only for the ancient people, has experienced a very impressive revival, becoming a serious rival to deontology and utilitarianism, once considered to be the only appropriate ethics for the modern people (see Slote 2015). There are at least three indications for the flourishing of virtue ethics today. First, virtue ethics itself has become pluralized: while Aristotelianism is still the mainstream of virtue ethics, there are other schools of contemporary virtue ethics primarily drawing on other philosophical traditions, such as the Stoic, the Humean, the Nietzschean, and the Deweyan, among others. Second, while at the beginning of its revival, virtue ethicists devoted their main efforts to criticizing its rivals, deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethicists today are more seriously reflecting on its own potential or actual difficulties and respond to criticisms its rivals have started to lodge against them; in contrast, its rivals, especially Kantianism, and especially in China, start to unrelentlessly attack virtue ethics. Third, scholars doing comparative philosophy have become eager to look for the virtue ethics potentials in their own traditions, and thus articles and even books abound in Hindu virtue ethics (Gier 2005), Buddhist virtue ethics (Kewn 1992), Islamic virtue ethics (Bucar 2017), Daoist virtue ethics (Huang 2010a, Huang 2015), and, most importantly, Confucian virtue ethics (Huff 2015, Walsh 2015, and Harris 2014).

However, comparative studies of virtue ethics have generally tended to use a historical instance of virtue ethics in the Western philosophical tradition, particularly the Aristotelian virtue ethics, as a measure, first to identify its main features and then try to see whether such features can be found in the tradition the comparativist is concerned with in order to identify whether virtue ethics also exists in that tradition. An obvious deficiency of such a comparative work is that, since it uses a historical instance of virtue ethics in the Western philosophical tradition as a paradigm to measure instances of virtue ethics in a different philosophical tradition, it not only tends to cut the feet of latter to fit the shoes of the former but also to draw the conclusion that, while the latter does contain something like virtue ethics, it is somewhat defective or at least deficient in the sense that it doesn’t contain all the features the former has or doesn’t contain them as systematically, thoroughly, and coherently as the former does. This problem can be seen better if we  imagine a comparativist starts off his or her comparative work from the opposite side: to use the instance of virtue ethics in the tradition the comparativist is concerned with, Confucian virtue ethics for example, as the paradigm, first to identify its main features and then try to see whether such features can be found in an instance of virtue ethics in the Western philosophical tradition, Aristotle’s ethics for example, in order to identify whether the latter is a virtue ethics. We can easily imagine the result: although we can say Aristotle’s ethics is something like virtue ethics, compared to Confucian ethics as the paradigm of virtue ethics, it is more or less defective or deficient. This tells us that, in order to determine whether a particular ethical theory in a particular historical tradition is a virtue ethics or not, we should not use a different ethical theory in a different historical tradition as a measure. Instead, we should use virtue ethics of an ideal type as a common measure to be applied to any ethical theories in any historical traditions. For this reason, in this essay, I shall first explain what virtue ethics of the ideal type is or should be (Section 2), and then apply it to Aristotle’s ethics, concluding that it is short of being a virtue ethics of the ideal type (Section 3), and then apply it to the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi’s ethics, arguing that it is a genuine virtue ethics of the ideal type or at least closer to it than Aristotle’s (Sections 4), before drawing a brief conclusion (Section 5)。

Toleration or tolerance has now been almost universally regarded as one of the most important political values and/or personal virtues, if not the most important one, since the modern time.  John Locke starts his famous “A Letter Concerning Toleration” by saying that “mutual toleration among Christians” is “the principal mark of the true church” (Locke: 3). John Stuart Mill, in the same paragraph with his famous saying, “If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode,” asks rhetorically: “Why then should tolerance…extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents?” (Mill: 115). Contemporary political philosopher John Rawls claims that his trade mark conception of justice as fairness “would complete and extend the movement of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual acceptance of the principle of toleration” (Rawls: 154). Indeed, the idea of toleration has been written into the Preamble of Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” of 1948, and UNESCO declared 1995 as the “Year of Tolerance” and November 16 of each year beginning from this year as the “International Day of Tolerance.” Accordingly, a number of scholars have explored the idea of toleration in the Confucian tradition, claiming that it is also a political value and personal virtue that Confucians, particularly Confucius, promotes. In this paper, however, I shall argue, by drawing on Confucius’s Analects, that tolerance as a moral idea is fundamentally flawed. To show this, we need first to see what toleration is.

1 Introduction
Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) can be plausibly
regarded as the founding brothers of Neo-Confucianism in the Song-Ming period.
In this process, their positive and creative appropriations of the Mencius played an
indispensable role, in both negative and positive aspects of their Neo-Confucian
project. Negatively, the Cheng brothers’ Neo-Confucian project was undertaken in
the environment in which Buddhism had long prevailed over Confucianism, a situation similar to what Mencius described himself to be in, where the whole world
was said to be dominated by Mohism and Yangism. Thus, the Cheng brothers got
their inspiration from Mencius about how to defend Confucianism in the hostile
environment. Positively, the best way to defend Confucianism is to develop it, and
the central ideas in their Neo-Confucian project, particularly human nature (xing
性) and principle (li 理), are found in the Mencius. After a brief discussion of the
important role the Cheng brothers played in the movement elevating the status of
Mencius and the Mencius (Sect. 2), this chapter will present an analysis of the
Cheng brothers’ Mencian hermeneutics (Sect. 3), followed by an examination of
three examples of their appropriation of the Mencius, the ideas of human nature
(xing 性), extension (tui 推), and self-getting (zide 自得) respectively (Sects. 4, 5,
and 6), before it concludes (Sect. 7). It will be shown, in the process, that these
appropriations of Mencius, while philosophically innovative, are nevertheless quite
consistent with Mencius’s own hermeneutics.

Toleration or tolerance has almost been universally regarded as an important political value and/or personal virtue since modern time. Indeed it is seen as so important that it appears in the Preamble of "Charter of the United Nations" of 1945: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined ... to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors." Article 26 of "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of 1948 also enjoins us "to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups". In light of the spirit of these two documents, UNESCO declares that 1995 be "The Year for Tolerance," and November 16 as the annual "International Day of Tolerance" beginning in 1995, "to address a rise in intolerance towards ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious minority populations, migrant workers, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, writers and intellectuals exercising their freedom of expression, and vulnerable groups in society" (Article 19 of UNESCO "Declaration of Principles and Follow-Up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance"), since "The world young people are entering today is a multicultural, multiethnic and increasingly urban reality, where tolerance of diversity is necessary for the survival and human development of all members of society" (Article 27). While the agent of the toleration promoted here can be either a political institution, where toleration is considered to be a value, or individual person, where it is regarded as a virtue, in this paper, I shall primarily consider the latter, i.e., individual persons as the potential agents of toleration. Then what is the object of toleration? From the above, as we can see, it is primarily people, or, rather, beliefs and practices thereof, of different ethnicities, races, languages, religions, cultures, and geographical locations. In their Introduction to a collection of essays on toleration, John Horten and Susan Mendus also point out that contemporary debates about toleration involves people of different races, religions, and sexual orientations as the proper objects of toleration (Horton and Mendu 1985: 2). In this paper, I shall argue, however, toleration cannot be regarded as a virtue, at least in relation to the above mentioned people or their beliefs and practices as the objects of toleration. To do this, we need to know what toleration is supposed to be (section 2). Then I shall argue that, when we are dealing with people, or beliefs and practices thereof, of different ethnicities, races, languages, religions, cultures, geographical locations, and sexual orientations, the proper virtue one needs to have is not toleration but respect, as exemplified in the Zhuangzi (section 3). Finally, I shall show that the Zhuangzian respect is different from "respect" in respect-based toleration advocated by some contemporary scholars (section 4) before I conclude (section 5).

In a Chinese paper published in 2017, entitled: “Learning for the Sake of Oneself and Learning for the Sake of Others: A Reexamination from a Post-Modern Point of View,” Vincent Challenges the traditional and standard interpretation of the Analects passage: “Ancient Learners are for the sake of themselves, and present learners are for the sake of others” (Analects 14.24). According to the traditional interpretation, Confucius is praising the ancient learners who are learning for the sake of themselves and criticizing the learners of his time who are learning for the sake of others. To explain why it is wrong to learn for the sake of others and why Confucius is against it, as it appears perfectly right to learn for the sake of others, Confucian scholars, historical and contemporary, have provided many ingenuous explanations. The most widely accepted one is provided by the neo-Confucian philosopher in the Song dynasty, Cheng Yi, according to which the ancient learner learn for the sake of cultivating their own virtues, while learners at Confucius’s time learn in order to show off their scholarship. While agreeing that to learn for the sake of oneself is to learn to cultivate one’s own virtue, Vincent argues that to learn for others is to learn to be concerned about others’ wellbeing, thus showing that these two types of learning are equally important (Shen 2017). In this paper, I shall argue, in the spirit of Vincent Shen, that corresponding to two different types of hermeneutics: the hermeneutics as we are familiar with is a hermeneutics for the sake of the interpreter oneself, while the hermeneutics that I’m going to highlight is one for the sake of others.

[Abstract] Tu develops his idea of tizhi primarily or at least initially to characterize the Neo-Confucian idea of knowledge of/as virtue in contrast to knowledge from hearing and seeing. Instead of depending upon our sense organs' perceptions of external things and events, it relies upon the comprehension of our xin; instead of purely intellectual understanding of the mind aspect of xin, it is more due to the affective experiences of the heart aspect of xin; and instead of merely a piece of knowledge added to its possessor, it is existentially transformative of its possessor. Knowledge of such a nature cannot be accounted for by our traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief, nor by Ryle's knowing-how. It is a third type of knowledge, knowing-to. In this sense, it is a significant contribution that Tu's Confucian idea can make to contemporary epistemology.

I’ve been developing an ethics that I initially identified in the text of Zhuangzi, which I have characterized in different ways under different names. First, in contrast to moral Golden (and Silver) Rule, which asks us to do (or not do) unto others as we would (or would not) like to be done unto, I call it moral Silver Rule: Do (or don’t do) unto others as they would (or would not) like to be done unto (see Huang 2005). Second, in contrast to ethics of commonality, a general term I use to include the moral Golden Rule, Kantian ethics (including Kantian revisions of the Golden Rule), and even Rorty’s anti-Kantian ethics, according to which an action is right to one person in one situation must be also right to anyone else in the same situations and to the same person in any other situations, I call it ethics of difference, which enjoins moral agents to pay attention to relevant differences both between them as agents and recipients of their actions and among different recipients of their actions (see Huang 2010a). Third, in contrast to agent moral relativism, according to which, the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined according to the standard of the agent(’s group), and appraiser relativism, according to which the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the standard of appraiser(’s group), I call it patient relativism, according to which the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the standard of the patient (not that of the patient’s group) who receives the action (see Huang 2014, Huang 2018). I have argued that the Zhuangzian ethics under these different names, essentially meaning the same thing, is superior to its alternatives mentioned above. So it is interesting to read the paper by Jianping Hu who disagrees with me on both the merits of such an ethics and its claimed source in the Zhuangzi. I’m happy to make brief responses on both accounts, and since she uses the term I have used in my most recent papers on the topic, “patient relativism,” from this point on, I shall use this term to describe the type of Zhuangzian ethics, though the other two terms essentially mean the same thing. Before I proceed to respond to Hu, however, I would like to start by making two initial points, one related to the Zhuangzi, and one related to patient relativism, both of which are relevant to Hu’s criticism and my responses to them.

In his Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa aims to provide contemporary solutions to the two Platonic problems involving the constitution of knowledge and value of knowledge, which he deals with in chapters 1 and 3 respectively. In this chapter, I shall introduce a third Platonic problem involving the impact of knowledge, not because the two Platonic problems Sosa deals with are unimportant, but because this third one is not only important in its own light but can also shed light to the first two problems. In the attempt to provide a solution to this third Platonic problem, I shall draw on the philosophical insights from the neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming, according to whom genuine knowledge is one that motivates one to act, and thus one who knows in Sosa’s sense cannot be said to know full well, if the person is not motivated to act according to his knowledge, or if  he can be said to know full well, then a person who knows in Wang Yangming’s sense knows better than full well.

Virtue epistemology can be seen as a parallel to virtue ethics in a number of aspects. First, both can be traced (at least) to Aristotle. Aristotle regards rationality as something distinctively human, and rationality for him can be divided into the theoretical and the practical ones. As virtue is merely excellence of rational activities of the soul, there are intellectual virtues and moral virtues. While virtue ethics is concerned with the latter, virtue epistemology is concerned with the former. Second, there is an impressive revival of virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy as a rival to deontology and consequentialism. Similarly, virtue epistemology has also emerged as a viable alternative to naturalized epistemology, with the former being normative and the latter descriptive. Third, contemporary virtue ethics has become pluralized, partially because different virtue ethicists today are appealing to different philosophers, such as Aristotle, Stoics, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey, among others, for their inspirations. Similarly, contemporary virtue epistemology has also become pluralized, with different virtue epistemologists drawing on different sources such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kierkeggard, Nietzsche, Pierce, among others, in developing their ideas. However, there is a clear disanalogy between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. As virtue ethics prospers in contemporary Western philosophy, scholars doing Chinese philosophy have quickly produced an impressive number of publications on virtue ethics in Chinese traditions in the form of journal articles, book chapters, and single authored monographs. In contrast, virtue epistemology has not attracted its deserved attention from these scholars, with only a small handful of articles exploring the virtue epistemological potentials in Chinese tradition so far published. In this context, it is significant that, in this volume, 11 experts of Chinese philosophy critically and constructively engage the work of Ernest Sosa, the pioneer of contemporary virtue epistemology, and bring it to fruitful dialogues with classical Chinese philosophers, especially Confucius, Xunzi and Wang Yangming (Confucianism), Zhuangzi (Daoism), and Linji (Chan Buddhism).

This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville’s The Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.

The Humean belief-desire model is still the mainstream theory of moral motivation, according to which an agent is motivated to act if the person has a desire, which is coupled with a means-end belief of the agent that this desire can be served by a particular action (section 2). In contemporary philosophical scene, there are some anti-Humeans, mostly rationalists, who claim that belief alone is sufficient to motivate a person; and there are also some anti-Humeans, mostly emotivists, who claim that there is no such a thing as moral belief: if it is moral, it is not a belief but merely an emotion, and if it is a belief, then it has nothing to do with moral motivation. However, this paper is interested in a third group of anti-Humeans, who agree with Humeans that both belief and desire are needed to motivate a person to act, but belief and desire here are not two separate mental states but, instead, form a single, unitary one, the so-called besire. This paper will focus on Michael Slote as a representative of this third group of anti-Humeans (section 3). Recongizing significant contributions that Slote’s idea of besire makes to the issue of moral motivation (although his main concern is philosophy of mind), this essay will also reveal some of its limitations, which it argues can be overcome by Wang Yangming’s conception of liangzhi, literally “good knowledge,” a kind of besire (section 4). The essay concludes with a brief summary of the main arguments.

Slote Encountering Chinese Philosophy is the first volume in our series of Fudan Studies in Encountering Chinese Philosophy. The series aims to promote the living dialogue between contemporary Western philosophy and traditional Chinese philosophy. Each volume, as well as each conference in preparation for the volume, will feature one prominent contemporary Western philosopher, who may or may not previously know anything about Chinese. A dozen or scholars in Chinese philosophy are invited to critically and constructively engage aspects of the work of the featured Western philosopher from Chinese philosophical perspectives. Then the featured Western philosopher makes responses to the critical essays by these scholars of Chinese philosophy. While clearly of a comparative nature, the primarily purpose of each volume is not to identify similarities and differences between a contemporary Western philosopher and a traditional Chinese philosopher or philosophical text. Rather it attempts to see how insights from Chinese philosophical traditions may shed new lights of philosophical issues this Western philosopher engages. In short, the project is primarily not historical but philosophical.

[Abstract] David Hume famously claimed that there is a huge gap between a is (fact) statement and an ought (value) statement, as they are two entirely different types of statement, and one cannot derive an ought statement from a is statement. Later, G. E. Moore coined the equally if not more memorable term " naturalistic fallacy, " understood to mean that it is a fallacy to derive an ought statement from a is statement. While this proclaimed dichotomy between is and ought has been held as a dogma by most students of philosophy, there has never been a shortage of attempts to derive ought from is. In this chapter, I shall first examine two formalistic attempts to do the derivation and show why they are not successful. Then I shall discuss a substantive attempt to derive ought from is by contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethicists, particularly Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that, while such an attempt proceeds in the right direction, its conception of human nature, used as the is statement from which the ought statement is to be derived, is problematic. I shall then examine Zhu Xi's neo-Confucian attempt to derive ought from is, which in general structure is similar to the neo-Aristotelian one but starts with a different is statement. I argue that this neo-Confucian derivation is more promising.

It has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern, is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived to have an obvious weakness in comparison with its two rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons, and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with the individuals’ character traits, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important such attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtue. Yet, obviously the government has many other jobs to do through making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology can easily provide their answers in light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provides its own? This paper attempts to provide an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Daniel Bell’s The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy is a significant contribution to contemporary political theory. I am very much in sympathy with his ideal of political meritocracy, although I would disagree with him on the degree to which it is realized or practiced in China today; for me, the reality is as distant from Bell’s ideal of political meritocracy, if I understand it correctly, as it is from democracy. However, in the present comment, I will not exploit this disagreement. Instead, I will try to make two friendly amendments to his political meritocracy as an ideal, with which I have a lot of agreements. In the Introduction to the book, Bell discloses that “I developed an interest in political meritocracy as a result of
engagement with the Confucian tradition, and my earlier writings on political meritocracy tended to be inspired more by Confucian philosophy than by actual politics” (Bell 2015, p. 12; references to this book hereafter will be indicated by page number only). Although in the book itself he does not make too explicit this source of his inspiration, since he believes the ideal of political meritocracy developed in the book may also be supported by other schools of thought, he still makes extensive references to Confucians and Confucian classics. Moreover, in the second appendix, he and his conversation partner explicitly and directly draw on the Confucian tradition in developing this ideal of political meritocracy. So the two friendly amendments to this ideal that I am about to offer are also explicitly and directly Confucian.

I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to Chenyang Li for proposing, organizing, and arranging the publication of this symposium discussion on my book, Why Be Moral?: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Brothers. I would also like to thank Jeeloo Liu, Justin Tiwald, and Kam Por Yu for their serious engagements with my work with stimulating and inspiring comments. As they seem to me so persuasive, at the end of the day, I would perhaps have to embrace a wholesale acceptance of their constructive criticisms and abandon what I have said in the contrary in the book. In the following, however, I shall try my best to reply to some of the questions raised in their comments.

Is Confucian ethics primarily egoistic or altruistic? There is textual support for both answers. For the former, for example, Confucius claims that one learns for the sake of oneself; for the latter, we can find Confucius saying that one ought to not impose upon others as one would not like to be imposed upon. This essay aims to explain in what sense Confucian ethics is egoistic (the highest goal one aims to reach is to become a virtuous person oneself) and in what sense it is altruistic (a virtuous person is necessarily concerned with the well-being, both external and internal, of others). The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not that Confucian ethics is both egoistic and altruistic, but that it is neither, since the Confucian ideal of a virtuous person is to be in one body with others so that there are really no others (since all others become part of myself), and since there are no others, there is no self either.

For neo-Confucians, the root of evil is to be found in the coarseness and turbid- ness of qi, the vital force. Despite some impressions to the contrary, however, on the one hand, what neo-Confucians really maintain is not simply that those who are endowed with turbid qi are bad people. Rather, those who are endowed with turbid qi will be bad people, if they do not set the will to purify the turbid qi. For this reason, if they actually become bad, then they are still morally responsible for this fall into evil.

On the other hand, as Zhu Xi points out, with the exception of rare cases of inborn sages, those who are endowed with qi of better quality will only be less likely to fall into evil as a consequence. They will not be able to enter the realm of sagehood if they do not make the effort to learn to be human. So for Zhu Xi, the impact of one’s natural endowment, either positive or negative, as great as it may be, is always limited, but the impact of learning is unlimited.

In his Justice: What Is the Right Thing To Do, Michael J. Sandel examines three approaches to justice: the utilitarian idea of justice as maximizing welfare or happiness, the freedom based idea of justice as respecting freedom and human dignity, and the Aristotelian idea of justice as recognizing, honoring, and rewarding virtues. Sandel is not neutral with respect to these three different approaches. In his view, the first two, which dominate contemporary political philosophy, are inadequate, and he himself aims to develop a version of the third approach (Sandel 2011: 1303). Two central features of this approach can be summarized as justice as a virtue and justice according to virtues.

On the one hand, in this conception, justice is not something merely to facilitate activities of a group, as otherwise a robber band may also be regarded as just. It is in this sense that Sandel, in one of his early works, claims that “if an increase in justice does not necessarily imply an unqualified moral improvement, it can also be shown that in some cases, justice is not a virtue but a vice” (Sandel 1982: 34). In order to ensure that justice is a virtue rather than a vice, we have to adopt the Aristotelian teleological view, regarding justice as a character trait, which is the appropriate excellence in accordance to which the unique human function is performed, aiming at the uniquely human good. It is in this sense that Sandel claims that “arguments about justice and rights unavoidably draw on particular conceptions of the good life, whether we admit it or not” (Sandel 2005: 28); and it is also in this sense that he argues against the liberal view, represented by John Rawls, that our conception of justice should be neutral with respect to religious and metaphysical conceptions of the good.

On the other hand, Sandel stresses two related ideas that he claims to be central to Aristotle’s political philosophy: “1. Justice is teleological. Defining rights requires us to figure out the telos (the purpose, end, or essential nature) of the social practice in question. 2. Justice is honorific. To reason about the telos of a practice—or to argue about it—is, at least in part, to reason about what virtues it should honor and reward” (Sandel 2009: 186; references to this work will be indicated with page numbers only hereafter). Before I explain what Sandel means, it is important to point out that the teleology that Sandel is talking about here is different from the teleology related to the idea of justice as a virtue. In the latter, the teleology is concerned about the telos of human life itself, according to which a character trait can be defined as either virtuous or vicious. In the former, however, the teleology is concerned about the telos of the things to be distributed. For example, if it is the university teaching positions that are being distributed, then we need to inquire the telos of the university. This is what Sandel considers to be the first central idea of Aristotle’s political philosophy, to which the second idea is closely related, because it is the telos of the thing being distributed that can tell us what kind of virtues a person ought to have in order for them to have the thing.  In the case of university, a person must excel in relevant knowledge and teaching skills in order to receive its teaching position. So justice in this sense is to distribute things according to (relevant) virtues, as a way to recognize, honor, celebrate, and reward people with virtues, and, correspondingly, to punish those with vices.  Sandel uses numerous examples to illustrate his point, and we can summarize two of them, one positive and one negative. As a positive example, Sandel mentions the distribution of the medals of Purple Heart: “In addition to the honor, the medal entitles recipients to special privileges in veterans’ hospitals…. [T]he real issue is about the meaning of the medal and the virtues it honors. What, then, are the relevant virtues? Unlike other military medals, the Purple Heart honors sacrifice, not bravery” (10). As a negative example, Sandel uses the US government bailout of some failed companies in 2008-9. There was a public outrage about this bailout, particularly when some of this bailout money was used to pay bonuses to managers of these failed companies. As pointed out by Sandel, “The public found this morally unpalatable. Not only the bonuses but the bailout as a whole seemed, perversely, to reward greedy behavior rather than punish it” (14).  In short, justice in this sense requires us to reward the virtuous and punish the vicious.

In the following, I shall first discuss Sandel’s idea of justice as a virtue relatively briefly (Section 2) so that I can focus the rest of my discussion on his conception of justice according to virtues (Sections 3-5). In both cases, I shall draw on Confucian resources.

Gilbert Ryle has made the famous distinction between intellectual knowing-that and practical knowing-how. Since knowledge in Confucianism is not merely intellectual but also practical, many scholars have argued that such knowledge is knowing-how or, at least very similar to it. In this essay, focusing on Wang Yangming’s moral knowledge (liangzhi 良知), I shall argue that it is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, but a third type of knowing, knowing-to. There is a unique feature of knowing-to that is not shared by either knowing-that or knowing-how: a person with knowing-to (for example, knowing to love one’s parents) will act accordingly (for example, love his or her parents), while neither knowing-that (for example, the knowing that one ought to love one’s parents) nor knowing-how (for example, the knowing how to love one’s parents), whether separately or combined, will dispose or incline its possessor to act accordingly (for example, love one’s parents).

In this chapter, by drawing on the ideas mostly developed by the neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming, I have argued that Confucian environmental virtue ethics can avoid some pitfalls of deontological and consequentialist approaches to environmental issues as well as those of other versions of environmental virtue ethics, particularly the Aristotelian ones. Central to this Confucian environmental virtue ethics is the idea of being in body with ten thousand things. A virtuous person in this sense feels the pain and itch of these ten thousand things, just as he or she feels the pain and itch on his or her own back, because he or she feels to be in one body with ten thousand things; or reversely, the person feels to be in one body with ten thousand things, because he or she feels their pain and itch. Such an ability to feel either (both) the pain and itch of ten thousand things or (and) to be in one body with ten thousand things is ren, the cardinal Confucian virtue that characterizes a human being as a human being. It is not merely cognitive but also affective. A person who feels the pain and itch on his or her back is not merely a person who knows that there is pain and itch on his or her back but also a person who is motivated to get rid of such pain and itch. Similarly, a person who feels the pain of a bird, for example, is not a merely a person who knows that the bird is in pain but also a person who is motivated to help the bird get rid of the pain. So a Confucian environmental virtuous person takes care of ten thousand things not because of their intrinsic values but because they are part of his or her own body. Despite its appearance, such a person is not self-centered, as there is nothing outside the person, or, to put it another way, everything is part of the person, while egoism assumes the separateness of the self from others.

There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics in the West, as a challenge to ethics of duty and consequentialism that have been dominating modern dis- courses of ethics. Many attempts have thus been made to explore the potential of virtue ethics in Asian traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and, most prominently, Confucianism. However, little attention has been paid to the virtue ethics potential in Chinese Daoism. This chapter on Daoist virtue ethics thus cannot but be experimental. While the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are the two greatest and yet quite different classics in philosophical Daoism, this chapter will draw on the latter only.

In this essay, I shall challenge Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, particularly when these two types of knowledge are seen as exhaustive of all knowledge. In Section II, I shall start with a discussion of Confucian conception of moral knowledge as something other, or more, than both knowledge-that and knowledge-how. In neo-Confucianism, such moral knowledge is not knowledge about morality but is itself moral, which is in contrast to what they call knowledge of seeing and hearing. While one who possesses the former is inclined to act accordingly, one who possesses the latter is not. So what is unique about moral knowledge is that it includes its possessor’s disposition or inclination to act accordingly, which is not included in either knowledge-that or knowledge-how in Ryle’s distinction. However, this Confucian conception of moral knowledge as including disposition and inclination to act is not acceptable to contemporary Humeans, for whom disposition or inclination belongs to what they regard as desire, which is not part of any knowledge or belief but works together with belief to cause a person to act. In their view, a mental state that includes both belief and desire, the mental state of besire, is bizarre in light of Anscombe’s view about the opposite directions of fit for between belief and the world on the one hand and between desire and the world on the other. So in Section III, I shall argue in what sense this single mental state of besire is not bizarre. In Section IV, I shall try to show that this Confucian conception of moral knowledge is similar to the spiritual or liberative knowledge, which includes moral knowledge, in the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism: they are both knowledge that not merely inform but also transform their possessors; they both include belief and desire, which constitute a single mental state of besire; and they both can only be acquired through a person’s inner experience and not merely by reading books or listening to lectures. I shall conclude the essay with a brief summary.

There is a scholarly consensus that a theology of pre-Confucius Confucianism can be distinguished, especially in the Xia and Shang dynasties, whereas it is debatable whether there is a theology in the classical Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius. For
neo-Confucianism, it is agreed that there is only metaphysics but no theology. Focusing on the neo-Confucian brothers Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, I argue that, instead of regarding the divinity in Confucianism as some thing, some entity, or some substance that acts and gives birth to everything in the universe, the Confucian God is the activity, the life-giving activity (sheng 生), and the creativity manifest in the world. Such a theology may be unfamiliar to us, but I shall propose that it has a surprising resemblance to the contemporary (neo-)Christian theology developed by Gordon Kaufman.

On the issue of how to deal with those who have wronged us, Confucius holds a view very different from Jesus, although they are both against “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” While Jesus asks us to turn the left cheeks when someone strikes us on the right, Confucius advises us to repay an injury with uprightness. It is commonly believed that the position Confucius recommends here lies between the position Jesus recommends and the
position they are both against: while the former is morally too demanding and the latter is morally too permissive, Confucius’s position is morally realistic. This essay argues against such a common conception and claims that the position Confucius advocates actually sets a moral standard that is even
higher than Jesus’ position, since what Confucius asks us to do is to do all that we can to help the wrongdoer cease to be a wrongdoer and become a moral person.

This essay discusses how Confucianism can deal with two related issues of virtue ethics and moral responsibility: praise and blame. We normally praise a person because the person has done something difficult, but a virtuous person does the virtuous things effortlessly, delightfully, and with great ease. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are indeed praiseworthy. We can blame a person for doing something wrong only if the person does it knowingly.
However, according to virtue ethics, anyone who has genuine
moral knowledge acts virtuously, and anyone who does not act virtuously, or acts viciously, only because the person does not have the genuine moral knowledge. Thus the question arises regarding whether such actions are blameworthy.

This essay introduces a unique approach to Chinese philosophy in a Western philosophical context. The central question of such an approach is why a Western philosopher ought to care about, or what he or she can learn from, Chinese philosophy. For this reason, instead of comparing and contrasting some aspects of Chinese and Western philosophy, as is usually done, a comparativist should first be familiar with the issues Western philosophers are interested in, the representative views that they have developed on each of these issues, and any problems that exist with each of
these views, and then try to see whether Chinese philosophers have anything new or better to say on any of these issues. Since this approach is inevitably comparative, this presentation is preceded by a discussion of the possibility of comparative philosophy; and since such a methodological discussion is
necessarily abstract, it is followed by a case study adopting such an approach to Chinese philosophy.

In this paper I shall first examine an apparent paradox in Confucius’ view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand, he says that common people cannot be made to know things. To understand this apparent paradox, I shall argue that education for Confucius is primarily moral education, as he teaches his students to become virtuous persons. So the apparent paradox is really one about whether virtue can be taught. I shall argue in the last section that while Confucius’ answer to the question is affirmative, he does not think that virtue can be taught in the same way as theoretical knowledge or technical skills are taught. For Confucius, the most effective way to teach people to be virtuous is through personal example.

Virtue ethics has become an important rival to
deontology and consequentialism, the two dominant moral
theories in modern Western philosophy. What unites various
forms of virtue ethics and distinguishes virtue ethics from its
rivals is its emphasis on the primacy of virtue. In this article, I
start with an explanation of the primacy of virtue in virtue ethics
and two dilemmas, detected by Gary Watson, that virtue ethics
faces: (1) virtue ethics may maintain the primacy of virtue and
thus leave virtue non-explanatory, or it may attempt to explain
virtue in terms of something else and thus render virtue secondary
at most; (2) the explanation of virtue may be objective and
thus become morally indeterminate, or it may be normative and
thus lack objectivity, merely re-expressing the virtue it intends
to explain (Section II). After showing the failure of both classical
Aristotelian and contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue
ethics to escape these dilemmas, I turn to the ethical theory of
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200)—the greatest synthesizer of neo-
Confucianism, whose place in Confucianism is comparable to
that of Thomas Aquinas in the Christian tradition—to show
how it can successfully avoid both dilemmas.

As virtue ethics has developed into maturity, it has also met with a number
of objections. This essay focuses on the self-centeredness objection: since virtue ethics
recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters,
it is self-centered. In response, I first argue that, for Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism,
the character that a virtuous person is concerned with consists largely in precisely
those virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While
such an answer is also available to the Aristotelian virtue ethics, I argue that Zhu
Xi’s neo-Confucianism can better respond to the objection on two deeper levels:
(1) a virtuous person is not only concerned with others’ external well-being but
also their virtuous characters, and (2) a virtuous person’s concern with others’ wellbeing,
both internal and external, is neither self-indulgent nor self-effacing.

As the ethics of virtue, with a focus on cultivating admirable traits of character instead of commanding adherence to rigid rules, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary moral discourses, scholars have tried to find evidence of virtue ethics in such ancient traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This article explores the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has
been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi. Contrary to a common misconception of the Zhuangzi as skeptical, relativistic, and therefore empty of any guide to moral life, it presents a solid normative ethics through various stories, and this normative ethics is a virtue ethics. The most important trait of character
in this Daoist virtue ethics is respect for different ways of life—a virtue not discussed in any familiar versions of virtue ethics in the West and yet most valuable to contemporary life in a global and pluralistic society.

This paper argues that both Blackburn and Wang Yangming are moral expressivists. Instead of regarding value judgments as descriptions or representations of some putative properties or facts existing out there in a mind-independent way, they take them to be expressions of our feelings, emotions, attitudes, or, better, besires, which we project or spread on things. Moral expressivists, however, have to face the question about how to determine whether a particular value judgement is true of false. Neither Blackburn nor Wang Yangming takes a thorough-going moral anti-realist approach, as both believe that our value judgements can be true or false, and at least some of them are true, despite their subjective nature. To determine their truth value, Blackburn adopts three criteria, coherence, pragmatism, and correspondence in a different sense: whether the value judgements correspond to human nature. Wang Yangming has a fully developed agent-focused moral realism, which provides a much firmer ground than Blackburn’s quasi-realism for determining whether our moral judgements are true or whether we express appropriate besires and spread appropriate values on things outside us.

2022年7月30日，由复旦大学哲学学院、上海儒学院和上海市儒学研究会共同主办的“《美德伦理学：从宋明儒观点看》新书研讨会”召开。研讨会就香港中文大学黄勇教授在“复旦哲学·中国哲学”丛书系列出版之新书（商务印书馆2022年）进行研讨。本次会议以“宋明儒何以使美德伦理学成为可能”为主题，来自复旦大学、清华大学、中国人民大学、中山大学、华东师范大学、香港和台湾地区的十八位学者与会，这些学者的研究领域横跨中国哲学、西方哲学和伦理学等不同学科。另有近500人在线参会。各位专家学者就《美德伦理学》一书，从virtue的汉语翻译、美德伦理与儒家伦理的视域交汇以及中国儒家美德伦理学何以可能等诸多前沿理论问题，展开了富有学术性、创见性的深度讨论，堪称“二十一世纪的‘美德’（virtue）之辨”。

关于儒家伦理学到底是不是美德伦理学的问题，学界有不少争论。但在从事这样的争论时，我们首先必须注意到，无论是儒家伦理学还是美德伦理学，都既有其历史形态也有其理想形态。就美德伦理学而言，其理想形态指的是与道义论和后果论相区分的、以美德为首要概念的一种规范伦理学；其历史形态就是历史上出现的将美德概念作为首要概念或者至少将美德概念置于后果和原则概念之前的各种规范伦理学。就儒家伦理学而言，其历史形态就是历史上不同的儒家学者提出的伦理学形态，而其理想形态是我们今天认为儒家应该采取的形态。目前学者在讨论儒家伦理学到底是不是美德伦理学时，往往是在讨论儒家伦理学的某种历史形态是不是美德伦理学（在西方哲学史上出现）的某种历史形态（如亚里士多德的美德伦理学），而更值得讨论的则是儒家伦理学的某种历史形态是不是理想形态的美德伦理学，或者儒家伦理学的某种历史形态，较之西方哲学史上出现的某种或某些或所有美德伦理学的历史形态，是否更接近美德伦理学的理想形态，或者儒家伦理学的理想形态是否应该是理想形态的美德伦理学。

宽容在当代社会往往被看作一种政治价值和个人美德，但这是有问题的。宽容指的是我们应该接受那些我们有（特别是道德上） 合理的理由加以反对的他人或者其言行。不用说今天要求我们去宽容的对象，如异文化、异种族、异宗教、异语言、异国别（地区）等的他人，我们没有、不应该有也不可能有道德上合理的理由加以反对；就是我们确实有道德上合理的理由加以反对的人及其言行，宽容也不是恰当的态度。在孔子看来，如果我们确有充分的道德上的理由反对某些人及其言行，我们不应当放任不管。这是因为，在孔子看来，这样的人是在人性上有缺陷的人。就像对于身体有病的人的恰当态度不是宽容，而是给他们治病，对于人性上有缺陷的人的恰当态度也不是宽容，而是给他们治病，即帮助他们成就德性。因此孔子主张的是以教化代宽容。

道德特殊主义（particularism）是当代西方伦理学中出现的一种学说，它认为一个行动的对错不能靠普遍的道德原则和任何其他不变的标准来确定，而需要洞察每一个行动所涉及的特殊状况。在这一点上，道德特殊主义与美德伦理学具有亲和性。事实上，所有的美德伦理学都可以看作是某种类型的道德特殊主义，但并非所有的道德特殊主义都是美德伦理学，例如当代道德特殊主义的最重要代表单西（Jonathan Dancy）就不是一个美德伦理学家，因为他主要关心的还是一个行动的对错而不是一个人的好坏。这样的道德特殊主义存在两个问题，一是如何确定在一个特定场合应该做什么事情，而是如何确立规范的客观性。相对来说，本文考察的宋明理学家二程虽然也持道德特殊主义的立场，但他们从美德伦理学出发，因此可以避免这样两个问题。

In this global and plural age， toleration has often been regarded as the most important virtue one ought to cultivate toward people of different nationalities，ethnicities，religions，cultures，languages，geographical
regions， and sexual orientations and their ways of life. This， however， is problematic， because one of the key elements of toleration is the objection to what one tolerates， and if toleration is a virtue， such objections must be based on good reasons instead of personal biases. Yet， clearly， we cannot have any reasonable objections toward people simply because their ways of life are different from ours in the above-mentioned senses. Therefore，the virtue we really need to cultivate is not toleration but the Zhuangzian respect. A person with such a virtue not only has no
objection to what they respect and thus would not interfere with them but also，when needed，assist them to live their unique ways of life. This Zhuangzian respect differs from the respect that sometimes also serves as the basis of toleration. While the latter is only directed to others as persons and not to their ways of life，especially when they are very different from one’s own，the former is not only directed to others as persons but also to their ways of life，even if they are very different from one’s own.

美德伦理学在当代西方获得了令人瞩目的复兴。与此同时，从事比较哲学研究的学者也往往从各自熟悉的非西方传统中寻找美德伦理学的资源。其中，有学者根据“庖丁解牛”等寓言故事所推崇的轻松自在的生活而认为，《庄子》中蕴含美德伦理学思想，特别是其良好生活观，但这种观点存在着严重的问题。因为，要确定一个人的生活是否是良好生活、具有美德的生活，我们就不能只看其形式（how）,还要看其内容（what）,而后者就一定牵涉某种特定的人性论，因为人类的良好生活之“好”一定与动物（如狼）的良好生活之“好”不同。《庄子》里确实有一种确定的人性观，而这种人性观的一个重要方面就是对不同的生活方式的尊重。因此，这种尊重也成为《庄子》美德伦理学中最重要的美德，而且也是《庄子》对我们今天的美德伦理学发展所能做出的最重要贡献，因为这是一种为我们熟悉的几乎所有美德伦理学所忽略的美德，同时又正是生活在这个多元时代的我们所最需要的美德。

在中国哲学中，如何恰当理解义利关系，各家对此问题存在长期的争论。一般认为，儒家重义轻利，分歧在于，儒家是将义视作一种独立于利、虽然不一定与之冲突的内在价值，还是将义视为取利的最佳工具。前者认为儒家思想是一种道义论，后者则认为儒家思想是一种后果论甚至功利论。儒家思想其实是一
种美德论，关心如何过上良好的或繁荣的人的生活。这样的生活离不开外在福祉和内在福祉，前者离不开利，后者离不开义。此二者各具内在价值，又互为工具，但彼此之间也可能冲突。如果二者冲突，儒家先义后利，因为是义使人类生活不同于其他的生活形式。

西方哲学中的道德相对论基本上有两种，一种是以评判者为中心的道德相对论，一种是以行为者为中心的道德相对论。以行为者为中心的道德相对论的问题比较明显，它认为，一个行动的对错是以从事这个行动的人的标准而定的，这也就是说，几乎没有一个行动会是错的，因为几乎没有一个人不是按照自己的标准去行动的。评判者相对论则认为，一个行动的对错是以对这个行动作评判的人的标准而定的，由于不同的评判者有不同的标准，有的评判这个行动为对，有的评判这个行动为错，而评判者相对论认为这两个评判都是真的，也就是说它们评判的这个行动既是对的又是错的，而这就是其批评者认为这样一种相对论存在的不自恰的问题。但《庄子》中道德相对论认为，一个行动的对错既不是相对于评判者的标准，也不是相对于行为者的标准，而是相对于行动对象的标准，因此是一种以行动对象为中心的道德相对论。由于这种对《庄子》的理解和这种道德相对论本身都比较独特，很容易引起异议，而这些异议也很值得回应。

索萨讨论了两个关于知识本性和知识价值的柏拉图问题，但知识不仅还涉及索萨所没有讨论的第三个柏拉图问题，而且离开了这第三个柏拉图问题，索萨所讨论的前两个柏拉图问题也不能得到真正的解决。这第三个柏拉图问题即知识的影响问题：一个人的知识是否具有内在驱动作用。由索萨所讲的认知能力所产生的完好适切的道德信念并不具有道德上的动力。为了解决第三个柏拉图问题，我们可以借鉴王阳明的良知说，考察良知的三个特性。在阳明看来，道德知识是一种引发人行动的动力之知。依此，索萨意义上的知者并不具有完好之知，因为他的知识并没有引发他做出相应的行动。

与后果论要求我们为最多的人创造最多的幸福和义务论要求我们遵循普遍的道德规则不同，美德论要求我们成为具
有美德的人。因此美德论有时被批评具有自我中心倾向，似乎我的唯一目标就是使自己获得美德。这种批评表面上很容易回
应，因为美德论要求我获得的很多美德都是涉及他人的，例如仁慈这种美德就要求我关心他人的利益，因此不是自我中心的。
但这种批评还有两个更深的层次：一方面，美德伦理学认为一个人的美德比一个人的外在利益更重要，但一个人在追求美德过
程中为自己获得的是比较重要的美德，而给他人提供的只是一些外在的利益；另一方面，具有美德的人虽然也关心他人利益，
但他之所以关心他人利益，最后还是为了自己成为一个具有美德的人。在这两个方面，西方的美德伦理学家迄今还没有能够
作出令人满意的回应。儒家传统，特别是朱熹哲学，可以很好地回应这样的批评：一方面，儒家传统中具有美德的人不仅关心
他人外在的利益，也关心他们的内在利益，即不仅要使自己成为具有美德的人，而且也要使他人成为具有美德的人；另一方面，
在儒家传统中，具有美德的人对自己美德的关心和对他人美德及其外在利益的关系是一体两面，不存在目的与手段的关系。

在元伦理学中，特别是在道德本体论问题上，存在着道德实在论与反实在论之争。实在论者承认(1)道德命题有真假，而且至少其中有些是真的(;2)其真假取决于客观存在的道德事实或道德性质。反实在论者都否认(2)，有的还否认(1)，而对(1)的否定又可采取两种形式，要么根本否认有道德命题存在，要么承认有道德命题存在，但否认有任何道德命题为真。 因此，道德反实在论基本上可以分成三 类。最极端的是非认知主义(non-cognitivism)，认为我们的道德判断并不具有认知 的意义，因此没有真假;它事实上并不是道德命题，而不过是伪装成道德命题的，或 者有道德命题假象的我们的情感的表达，所以这样一种立场通常被称为情感主义(emotivism)或者表达主义(expressivism)。例如，当我们说某个行动不对时，我们 实际上只是在表达我们不喜欢这个行动的情绪，这样的表达也许有恰当与否之分， 但没有真假之别。这种理论的主要代表是艾耶尔(A. J. Ayer)和布莱克本(Simon Blackburn)。另一种反实在论承认道德判断是认知性的，而且试图描述某种客观的道德实在，但由于这样的实在根本不存在，这样的道德判断便总是错的，而永远没 有任何真的道德判断。其情形类似于历史上的燃素说，它想用燃素来解释燃烧现 象，但由于这样的燃素根本不存在，不管什么样的燃素说总是错的。所以这样一种 理论也叫作错误理论(error theory)，主要由麦基(John Mackie)和罗伊斯(Richard Royce)提出。道德反实在论的第三种形式认为我们的道德判断有真假，但否认客 观的道德实在的存在。一个道德判断的真假取决于判断者所接受的一套主观标 准。我们说某人的行动不对与一个球赛的裁判说某个球员的动作犯规类似。我们 可以确定这个裁判的判断的真假，但我们根据的标准是球赛规则，而球赛规则不是 客观的，而是为球赛更爽心悦目而制定出来的。因此这样一种理论通常也被认为 是主观主义或者非客观主义。当代元伦理学中的大多数反实在论者都属于这一 类，主要代表则有哈曼(Gilbert Harman)和科斯嘉(Christian Korsgaard)。道德实 在论也有各种形式，但根据一种简单的分类，有自然主义的和非自然主义的。自然 主义的道德实在论认为客观存在的道德事实或道德性质要么就是自然事实或自然 性质，要么是依附于(supervene)自然事实或自然性质上的事实或性质，我们可以 像认识其他自然现象一样认识道德事实。代表这样一种立场的有博伊德(Richard Boyd)和莱顿(Peter Railton)。非自然主义的道德实在论认为道德事实、道德性质 不是自然事实、自然性质，而是与三角形所具有的其内角之和为 180 度这样的数学 性质或者是像柏拉图所讨论的形式所具有的形而上学性质类似的非自然性质。这 种立场以摩尔(G. E. Moore)和夏佛—兰道(Russ Shafer-Landau)为代表。按照另一 种不太常见但对本文的讨论至关重要的划分，道德实在论还可以分为以道德行动 为关注点的道德实在论和以道德行为者为关注点的道德实在论。前者所说的道德 事实和道德性质都涉及道德行动的事实或性质，而后者说的道德事实或性质都涉 及行为主体的事实或性质。在这个意义上，这两种道德实在论的元伦理学立场分 别相应于大家熟悉的几种规范伦理学立场:前者相应于关注行动的后果论和道义 论，而后者相应于关注行为者的美德论。我之所以说这种划分不常见(事实上也许 是我在这里第一次明确地、有意识地做出这样的区分)，是因为在当代道德哲学中 的道德实在论几乎都是以行动为中心的。我之所以说这种划分对本文的讨论很重 要，是因为本文将关注的朱熹的道德本体论不仅在实在论与反实在论之争中持实 在论立场，在自然主义与反自然主义之争中持自然主义立场，而且在道义论、后果 论与美德论之争中持美德论的立场。在我看来，道德实在论必须要正面面对反实在论者认为道德实在论必须面对的一些严重困难(第一节)，但以行动为中心的道 德实在论无法克服这样的困难(第二节)。只有以美德伦理为进路的道德实在论， 即以行为者而不是以行动为焦点的道德实在论才能为道德实在论提供一个真正 的出路。在这方面，代表当代西方美德伦理学复兴运动中最重要的新亚里士多德 主义的霍斯特豪斯(Rosalind Hurshouse)虽然并没有有意识地提出一种道德实在 论，但她对美德的客观性的详细论述表明了以美德伦理为进路的道德实在论之可 能性，但由于其亚里士多德主义固有的理智主义倾向使这样的道德实在论不能真 正说明一个行为主体作为人为什么必须要具有美德(第三节)。本文的重点是要阐 明，朱熹的以儒家美德伦理学为进路的道德实在论不仅可以克服新亚里士多主义 的问题(第四节)，而且也可以很好地避免道德反实在论认为道德实在论所具有的 困难(第五节)。最后我对全文做一小结。

随着美德伦理学的复兴!环境美德伦理学也开始崭露头角，但环境美德伦理学也有它自身的问题，即它将人类对环境的关心（即使是为环境而不是为人类而对环境的关心）看作人的繁荣生活的必要条件，因此具有人类中心主义的倾向。明儒王阳明的万物 一体观不仅关心人类，而且关心鸟兽、草木甚至瓦石，因此可以看作一种环境伦理学。他认为只有仁者才能以万物为一体，而仁在他看来又是把人与其他存在物区分开来的根本的
美德，因此这是一种环境美德伦理学'。王阳明的环境美德伦理学可以避免人类中心主义，不是因为它是自然中心主义，而是因为它的万物一体观把人类与人类之外的所有其他存在物看作一个连续体，而对这个连续体的关心就既不可能是人类中心主义的，也不可能是自然中心主义的，因为这两者都假定了人与自然的分离。虽然王阳明主张仁者以万物为 一体，这样的仁者对万物（从父母到路人、到鸟兽、到草木、到瓦石）并非一视同仁，而是厚薄有别的。换言之，王阳明持一种道德偏倚论，即儒家传统里的爱有差等。 虽然作为一个心理学事实，大家都承认，我们对亲近的人的爱甚于对路人的爱，对路人的爱甚于对鸟兽的爱，对鸟兽的爱甚于对草木的爱，对草木的爱甚于对瓦石的爱。但如何在道德上证成这种偏倚性则是一件不容易的事。

“为什么要有道德”可以理解为为什么要做道德的事，也可以理解为为什么要做道德的人。这两个方面当然是有联系的，但有两种不同的联系方式。一是将做道德的事作为首要的事情，并以此定义道德的人: 道德的人就是做道德的事的人; 二是将做道德的人作为首要的事情，并以此定义道德的事: 道德的事就是道德的人所做的事。在大家熟悉的三种规范性伦理学中，后果论和道义论属于前者，而美德论属于后者。因此，问为什么要有道德也就是问做道德的事或做道德的人的理由，而这样的理由可以理解为辩护的理由，也可以理解为动机的理由。在前一种情况下，问这个问题的人不知道为什么应该有道德，而在后一种情况下，问这个问题的人知道应该有道德，但缺乏去做道德的事或人的动机。在 《为什么要有道德: 师法二程》一书中，黄勇以二程为焦点，认为美德伦理学对这个问题的回答更有效，而且由于提这样一个问题的往往是利己主义者，他们需要的不是做道德的人的辩护理由，而是其动机理由。一些学者对黄勇的观点提出了异议，值得在此做进一步的讨论。

在最近几十年中文世界伦理学讨论中，经常出现三个看上去差别不大的词，“美德伦理学”、“德性伦理学”和“德行伦理学”，或者是作为对英文Virtue Ethics的翻译，或者是作为儒家伦理学的概括。在这三者中，第二个略逊于第一个，因为virtue是相对于vice的，同样“美德”是相对于“恶德”的，但“德性”相对于什么呢？但问题更大的是“德行伦理学”，无论是作为对virtue ethics的翻译还是对儒家伦理学的描述。在当代西方哲学中得以复兴的virtue ethics，与近现代西方哲学中强调人的行动的道义论和后果论不同，强调人的内在品格。这样的品格不仅决定了这个人的行动，而且也决定了这个人的情感。德行伦理学无法把握virtue ethics的这种特征。在认为人的品性决定人的行动方面，在对道德情感的强调方面，儒家伦理学与西方的美德伦理学有类似性，因此“德行伦理学”也无法反映儒家伦理学的特征。

在当代西方美德伦理学复兴运动的多元景观中，以亚里士多德为源泉的 理性主义和以休谟为养分的情感主义是主流。 情感主义认为美德是一种情感，而当代情 感主义美德伦理学的最重要代表斯洛特(Michael Slote)认为，作为美德的最重要的情感 或者情感产生机制是同感，即对他人痛苦的感同身受。 在他看来，程颢讲的与万物为一 体实际上就是同感，或者说同感就是程颢的万物一体感，因为与万物为一体也就是能感 到万物的痛痒。 在这个意义上，可以将程颢看作是情感主义美德伦理学家。 但与当代西 方的情感主义美德伦理学不对同感为什么是美德做进一步说明不同，程颢将万物一体感 与儒家最重要的美德即仁相联系，认为只有仁者才能与万物为一体，而仁又属于将人与 动物区分开来的人性。 所以万物一体感之所以是美德，是因为它是人之为人或人之为健 全的、没有缺陷的人的标志。 在这一点上，又可以将程颢看作是个理性主义美德伦理 学家。

“体知”是杜维明提出的一个重要概念，用来说明儒家传统所强调的 一种特殊的知识类型。这种知识类型在宋明儒学中被称作“德性之知”，而与“闻 见之知”相区别。这种知识有两个主要特征:一方面，要获得这样的知识，不能只 靠理智的认知活动，还需要有内心的体验活动;另一方面，这样的知识不只让其拥 有者知道孰是孰非，而且还会让他好是恶非、行是除非。这种知识类型既与西方传 统认识论强调的命题性知识(knowing-that)不同，也与 20 世纪中叶为赖尔所强调 的能力之知(knowing-how)不同。就其能够驱使其拥有者做出与这种知识相应的 行动而言，它是一种动力之知(knowing-to);就这种知识不只是信念(belief)而且 也是欲望(desire)而言，它是一种信欲(besire)。在这个意义上，作为动力之知的“体知”概念的提出是对当代认识论特别是道德认识论的一个重要贡献。

Morality involves what a moral agent can control, while luck involves what a moral agent cannot control. Thus, even Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, the two contemporary philosophers who developed the idea of moral luck, have regarded it, respectively, as an oxymoron and paradox, and yet they insist that it is still reasonable for us to employ this idea in our moral evaluations. Still, it is strange to consider it reasonable to use an oxymoron or paradox in morality or, for that matter, anywhere else. By examining Wang Yangming's neo-Confucian account of the origin of evil, we can see in what sense Wang Yangming also has a concept of moral luck and yet avoids its contradictory and paradoxical nature so that it can be safely used in moral assessments. Wang Yangming maintains that there are two conditions for the occurence of evil: the turbid qi that one is endowed with and the unfavorable environment in which one is growing up. Since these two conditions are beyond a person's control and yet affects this person's moral quality, we can see that Wang Yangming also has an idea of moral luck. However, for Wang, the turbid qi and/or bad environment are only necessary conditions for one to become evil. They are not sufficient. If one has established a strong will, one can remain good even
under these two conditions and can become good if already evil. Since the will is something that one can control, one can he held responsible for becoming evil even under the two unfavorable conditions. By emphasizing
moral responsibility, however, Wang does not negate the idea of moral luck. This is because a person with bad luck (with more turbid qi and worse environment) has to make much great effort than one with a better luck in
order to remain a good person or avoid becoming evil, and thus Wang Yangming argues that the former is more praiseworthy than the latter if both succeed in being good.
摘 要： 德涉及的是道德主体能够控制的东西， 而运气涉及的则是道德主体无法控制的东西。因 此， 即使是最早系统阐述这个概念的威廉斯和乃格尔也分别认为 "道德运气" 概念是一种矛盾 (oxy-moron) 或悖论， 尽管他们还是坚持认为这是一个合理的、 我们应该使用的概念。但作为矛盾或悖论 的概念怎么是合理的、 我们应该使用的概念呢？通过考察王阳明关于恶的起源的说明， 我们可以看 到王阳明在何种意义上有道德运气的该概念， 而同时又能避免这个概念的矛盾或悖论性质， 从而使 我们真正能够合理地使用这个概念。王阳明将恶的起源归于人与生俱来的自然之气的不纯和生于 其中的社会之习的恶劣， 即习气。由于这两者都是人无法掌握的， 因此王阳明承认道德运气的存 在。但他同时指出， 这两种因素是一个人变恶的必要条件， 但不是其充分条件， 因为人可以通过立 志抵制这两方面的影响， 因此一个人应该为其变恶负责， 而不能将它归于这两个方面。而在强调这 个合理的道德责任概念的同时， 王阳明也没有转而否定道德运气的作用， 因为要避免恶并成善人， 不同习气的人所要付出的努力不同， 道德运气好的人需要付出的努力少， 道德运气差的人需要付出 的努力多， 而如果这两个人一样地实现了避恶成善的目标， 则后者比前者更可贵。 关键词： 王阳明； 道德运气； 道德责任 基金项目： 国家社会科学基金重大项目 "伦理学知识体系的当代中国重建" (19ZDA033) 作者简介： 黄勇， 香港中文大学哲学系教授 (香港 999077)

休谟式的信念—欲望模型仍是道德动机理论的主流。在当代哲学中，理性主义的反休谟主义者宣称信念自身足以使人产生行动的动机，因此欲望不是必要的；而情感主义的反休谟主义者则宣称只有欲望或情感才能解释一个人的行动。第三种反休谟主义者既同意休谟主义的观点，认为信念和欲望都是为解释一个人的行动所必需的，同时又不同意休谟主义，认为信念和欲望并不是两个相互分离的心灵状态，相反它们构成了一个称作“信欲”的单一心灵状态。迈克尔·斯洛特是第三种反休谟主义者的代表，其信欲概念对道德动机问题的讨论做出了重要贡献，然而亦有其局限性；王阳明的良知概念及“知行合一”思想为克服斯洛特观点的局限性提供了启发。

The Cheng brothers have played an important role in the movement elevating the status of Mencius and the Mencius. Their Mencian hermeneutics follows Mencius’ idea of “knowing the original intention of its author with one’s understanding of its meaning”. They emphasize that the underlying principle (yili) is the Dao carried by classics, while the literary meaning (wenyi) serves to carry the underlying principle. They develop their hermeneutics from the inspiration of Mencius, which they also apply to their interpretation of the Mencius itself. So what is important is not to take every word recorded in the Mencius literally but to grasp the Dao carried in the Mencius as a classics. Then this thesis makes an examination of three examples of their appropriation of the Mencius, the ideas of human nature, extension, and self-getting respectively. They emphasize the significance of Mencius’s view of human nature as good, believing that human beings are born with complete virtues. Moreover, they develop Mencius’s view of human nature as good in discussing the relationship between human nature and human emotions, and that between human nature and material qi as well. The concept “extension” turns out to be even more central for the Cheng brothers. It is the capacity of “extension” that serves as a distinguishing mark of being human. Cheng brothers have elaborated on the knowledge of/as virtue with Mencius’s idea of “self-getting”.

孔子 的 教 学 内 容 既 不 是理论 知 识 也 不 是技能 ， 而 是成德之 方 。 尽管 孔 子 充分 认识 到 ，一个人最 终 只 能 靠自 己 变 成 有 德 之士 ， 但他 确 实认 为 ， 美德 之人 可 以 做很 多 事 情去帮 助 别 人成 为 有 德之人 ， 而 其 中 最重 要 的 是成 为 美德 典 范 。任何一 个有 德之 士 当 然都 可 以 做到 这一点 ， 不 过 ， 孔 子 更加 注重政 治 领袖 ， 因 为 他 们 的 影 响 更广 更深 。 因 此之 故 ， 在 孔 子 的政 治 哲 学 中 ， 政府 的 首 要 职 能是对 民 众 的 道德 教 育 ， 这 与 当 代政 治 自 由 主 义 形 成 鲜 明 对 照 ； 此 外 ， 政 府履行 道德 教育 的 职 能主 要不 是通过法 律和 其他 政 治 手 段 ， 而 是通 过 统 治 者 自 身 的道德 典 范 作 用 ， 这 又 与 亚 里 士 多 德 的 观 点 形 成 鲜 明 对 照 。 在孔 子看 来 ， 法律和 惩 罚 还不 能 完 全废 除 ， 但应 该仅仅作 为 临 时性 的 补 救措 施 。 即 使这样 的 措 施 势 在 难 免 ，一位有 德 的 政 治领 袖 在 不 得 不 使用 这 些措 施 时 也 会 自 然 而 然 感 到 悲 伤 ，一方面 因 为 恶 人 令 人遗 憾 的 状 态 ， 另一 方 面 因 为 他 自 己 未 能 通 过 其他 措 施 改 变恶 人.

In the English-speaking world, with its revival in the last few decades, virtue ethics, which has been regarded as an ethics for the ancient, has not only become an equal with deontology and utilitarianism, which have dominated modern philosophy, but has even acquired a momentum to surpass them.In this context, it's natural that many scholars doing comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy have argued that Confucian ethics is also a virtue ethics. While interesting, it is more important to see whether Confucianism can make some significant contribution to the development of contemporary virtue ethics, especially if we share the conviction that virtue ethics is superior to its two main rivals. Confucian contribution may involve responding to the external objections to contemporary virtue ethics, addressing its internal difficulties, and making unique contribution to other areas of philosophy from the virtue ethics point of view.Indeed, Confucianism has both a great potential and rich resources in all these three areas.

最近几十年来，美德伦理在英语世界出现了较大的复兴，开始打破了道义论和功利论的垄断地 位，使当代伦理学出现了三足鼎立的局面。从事比较哲学的学者也纷纷在自己的哲学传统中挖掘美德伦理的 资源，在这方面儒学研究尤其突出，短短十几年出现了大量讨论儒家美德伦理的论著。当然这方面也有异议。 最近南乐山在《善一分殊》一书中，就对“可以富有成效地把儒家看作是美德伦理”这种“相当流行的看法”表 示了怀疑。一方面是因为他认为美德伦理存在着一些儒家伦理不存在的缺陷，而另一方面，儒家伦理具有一 些美德伦理所缺乏的长处。通过正面讨论美德伦理的若干特征，并通过表明儒家伦理也具有这些特征而论证 儒家伦理是一种美德伦理，可以发现南乐山所谓的美德伦理的缺陷其实并不存在，而他眼中的儒家伦理的一 些长处实际上美德伦理也具有，因此我们基本上可以将儒家伦理看作是一种美德伦理。

Arguing against the utilitarian and liberal theories of justice, Michael Sandel develops a version of Aristotelian conception of justice, which has two unique features: justice as a virtue and justice (in distribution) according to virtues. According to the latter, justice is to distribute things according to relevant virtues in order to recognize, respect, celebrate and reward virtuous people and punish those who lack virtues or are simply vicious. In order to determine what virtues are relevant, one needs to inquire about the end of the things to be distributed. For example, if the thing to be distributed is the university teaching positions, then one needs to know the end such positions serve. Suppose their end is the transmission of knowledge, then such positions should be given to people who possess not only knowledge but also the skills to transmit knowledge. Confucianism will agree that justice is a virtue. However, it recognizes the difference between justice as a virtue of individual person and justice as a virtue of social institution and emphasizes that the latter should be based on the former. In comparison with Sandel’s justice according to virtues, Confucians put more emphasis on justice of virtues or justice in distributing virtues. Seeing that in a given society, some people are virtuous and some people are vicious, Sandel advocates distributing things according to virtues so that virtuous people are rewarded while vicious people are punished. In contrast, Confucians regard virtuous people as healthy people, while vicious people as defective people. Just as we don’t reward physically healthy people and punish physically defective people but to help the latter overcome their physical defects so that they can also become healthy people, what is needed is not to reward virtuous people and punish vicious people but to help the latter overcome their vices so that they can also become virtuous people. As Confucians regard it unjust that some people are virtuous while some are vicious, the Confucian justice of virtues aims to make people equally (maximally) virtuous. Although Sandel’s Aristotelianism also regards it a duty of government to make people virtuousues, its significant difference from Confucianism is that moral education is mostly realized through legislation for Sandel but through virtues and rituals for Confucians.

Confucius' "loving virtue as one loves sex" makes it clear that the highest realm for Confucius is not merely to do moral things but to take delight in doing them. This view makes multiple contributions to contemporary virtue ethics. First, it provides a plausible answer to the question, Why be moral, a question that has troubled Western philosophers ever since Plato: only by being moral can one become a healthy or non-defective human being; second, it offers a convincing response to the objection to virtue ethics as fundamentally self-centered: while a virtuous person is concerned with being a healthy and non-defective human being himself or herself, the very term "a healthy or non-defective human being" is defined as one who is concerned with the well-being of others; third, it proffers a better solution to what Philippa Foot calls the paradox of virtue (virtue is about things difficult for human beings, and yet a virtuous person can do these things effortlessly): Virtuous persons are at ease doing virtuous things precisely because they have made great efforts to become a virtuous person, while non-virtuous persons can do virtuous things only with a great effort precisely because they fail to make any effort to become virtuous persons.

In the Analects, Confucius recommends to not disclose one’s father stealing a sheep, claiming that zhi lies within it. This passage has become the focus of a heated and prolonged debate among Chinese scholars in the last decade. Some understand zhi as “upright”, which requires the son to disclose his father stealing a sheep, while others understand it as “straightforward,” which explains why the son does not disclose it. However, Confucius does not say whether non-disclosure is zhi or not, but only says that zhi lies in the non-disclosure. A proper understanding of zhi is to straighten the crooked, or uprighten the non-upright. So what Confucius means is that the upright son ought to make his non-upright father upright. The best way to do so is to remonstrate his father against his wrongdoing, and the best environment for the successful remonstration can be better provided by non-disclosure of his father’s wrongdoing. That is why Confucius says that uprightness lies in the non-disclosure. This view of Confucius’ indicates that he has a unique view of wrongdoers. In contemporary legal philosophy, there is a debate between utilitarianism and retributive theory. While both think punishment is needed, they have different reasons: the former claims that punishment is needed to deter the wrongdoer and other potential wrongdoers from doing the same again, while the latter argues that it is needed to return the same degree of harm to the wrongdoer that he inflicts upon his victims. In contrast, Confucius holds a restorative theory: since the wrongdoer causes harm to his own internal well-being when causing harm to the external well-being of the victim, what is needed to do to the wrongdoer is to cure him of the harm caused to himself so that his internal well-being can be restored. The advantage of the Confucius’s restoration model is that it can avoid the respective problems of both the utilitarian and retributive models, while realizing their respective goals: when the wrongdoer’s internal well-being is restored, he will not commit the wrongdoing again (the utilitarian goal) and try to make any possible compensation to his victim (the retributive goal).

Gilbert Ryle has made the famous distinction between intellectual knowing-that and practical knowing-how. Since knowledge in Confucianism is not merely intellectual but also practical, many scholars have argued that such knowledge is knowing-how or, at least, very similar to it. In this essay, focusing on Wang Yangming's moral knowledge (liangzhi 良知), I shall argue that it is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, but a third type of knowing, knowing-to. There is a unique feature of knowing-to that is not shared by either knowing-that or knowing-how: a person with knowing-to (for example, knowing to love one's parents) will act accordingly (for example, love his or her parents), while neither knowing-that (for example, the knowing that one ought to love one's parents) nor knowing-how (for example, the knowing how to love one's parents), whether separately or combined, will dispose or incline its possessor to act accordingly (for example, love one's parents).

(This is the complete version; a significantly abridged version of the same paper, with the same title, also appears in traditional Chinese in Newsletter of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy 中國文哲研究通訊, 23.3: 91-115; a differently abridged version appears as 公共權利應如何勸教生活方式.” 學術前沿, 2013, July, No. 2: 12-33)

The award winners will be noted in the website of the journal as well as the website of Springer, the publisher of the journal. The award ceremony is held each year at the American Philosophical Association Annual Meeting (Eastern Division) in early January, where a special panel on the theme of the award-winning essay is held. The critical comments and the author's responses to them presented at the panel, after review and revision, will be published in the last issue of Dao each year.

Harvey Letterman, “What Is the ‘Unity’ in the ‘Unity of Knowledge and Action’?” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 21: 569-603

(Click the link the free access to the paper: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11712-022-09853-9)

The “unity of knowledge and action” is a trademark doctrine of Wang Yangming, one of the most important philosophers in the neo-Confucian tradition. Precisely what Wang means by “unity”, however, has more been taken for granted than explained. In this carefully crafted essay, Harvey Lederman undertakes to explain the meaning of this “unity”, painstakingly examining the relevant passages, on the way to developing a  unique, stimulating, and thought-provoking interpretation. Accepting the common view that the unity of knowledge and action has two aspects, one regarding ethical training (gongfu) and the other regarding the original natural condition (benti), Lederman argues that, in the former case, knowledge and action are taken to be the same thing (identity), while in the latter, knowledge and action are just taken to be necessarily coextensive (unity without identity). The clarity, carefulness, and subtleness of the arguments this essay displays, along with the novelty of its thesis, represent the type of scholarship this journal aims to promote in the study of Chinese and comparative philosophy.

The award winners will be noted in the website of the journal as well as the website of Springer, the publisher of the journal. The award ceremony is held each year at the American Philosophical Association Annual Meeting (Eastern Division) in early January, where a special panel on the theme of the award winning essay is held. The critical comments and the author's responses to them presented at the panel, after review and revision, will be published in the last issue of Dao each year.

2020 Dao Annual Best Essay Award

Dao has established “The Annual Best Essay Award” since 2007. In addition to a certificate of achievement, the award comes along with a prize of US$1,000. The award winners are noted in the website of the journal as well as the website of Springer, the publisher of the journal. The award ceremony is held each year at the American Philosophical Association Annual Meeting (Eastern Division) in January, where a special panel on the theme of the award winning essay is held. The critical comments and the author’s responses to them presented at the panel, after review and revision, will be published in the last issue of Dao each year.

The selection process consists of two stages. First, a nominating committee of at least three editorial members, who have not published in Dao in the given year, is established. This committee is charged with the task of nominating three best essays published in the previous year. These three essays are then sent to the whole editorial board for deliberation. The final winner is decided by a vote by all editorial board members who are not authors of the nominated essays.

The editorial board has just finished its deliberation on the best essay published in 2020, and the award is given to:

Shu-shan Lee, “‘What Did the Emperor Ever Say’—The Public Transcript of Confucian Political Obligation,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (2020): 231-250

What is the Confucian conception of political obligation? While there is a widespread view that it demands people’s absolute obedience to their rulers, there are also scholars arguing that it includes people’s duty to correct rulers. In this award-winning essay, Shu-shan Lee shows that the former lacks textual support, while the latter confuses Confucian scholar-officials’ political duty with commoners’ political obligations. Instead, Lee argues, convincingly, that imperial Confucian political obligation is a conditional theory of paternalistic gratitude: common people’s obedience to their rulers is an expression of, and thus is conditional upon, their rulers’ benevolent care for them. This ground-breaking conception of Confucian political obligation results fromLee’s careful study, integrating multi-faceted perspectives, philosophical and historical, theoretical and empirical, and ancient and contemporary. It is the type of research that Dao aims to promote.

The Department now invites applications for TWO positions in Philosophy (including one advertised last year [reference no.:190001XU], which was not filled due to the pandemic; those who applied for that position last time are welcome to reapply) with specialization in Continental European Philosophy (preference for phenomenology and contemporary French philosophy). Exceptionally outstanding candidates may be considered for the Professor rank. Applicants should have a relevant PhD by the time of employment. While courses can be taught either in Chinese or English, Chinese language proficiency is a plus. Duties include (a) pursuing academic research and publications; (b) applying for external research grants; (c) teaching four courses a year over two semesters in philosophy (undergraduate and graduate) and general education; (d) supervising and examining postgraduate students; and (e) assisting in administrative work in Department, College, Faculty, and University. Complete dossier should include (a) a cover letter, indicating what rank you are applying for and explaining why you are best suited for the position; (b) a CV, with a complete list of publications (attach the acceptance letter for an accepted but unpublished paper); (c) a research statement; (d) a teaching statement; (e) up to three representative papers, published or unpublished; (f) previous teaching evaluations if any; and (g) three confidential reference letters. Except item (g), the dossiers should be submitted online at the website of Human Resources Office, the Chinese University of Hong Kong (https://www.hro.cuhk.edu.hk/en-gb/career-opportunities) or be mailed to Chairman,

Duties include (a) pursuing academic research and publications; (b) applying for external research grants; (c) teaching four courses a year over two semesters in philosophy (undergraduate and graduate) and general education; (d) supervising and examining postgraduate students; and (e) assisting in administrative work in the Department, College, Faculty, and University. Complete dossier should include (a) a cover letter, indicating what rank you are applying for and explaining why you think you are best suited for the position; (b) a CV, with a complete list of publications (attach the acceptance letter for an accepted but unpublished paper); (c) a research statement; (d) a teaching statement; (e) up to three representative papers, published or unpublished; (f) previous teaching evaluations if any; and (g) three confidential reference letters. Except item (g), the dossiers should be submitted online at the website of Human Resources Office, the Chinese University of Hong Kong (https://www.hro.cuhk.edu.hk/en-gb/career-opportunities) or be mailed to Chairman,

This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville’s The
Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian
ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first
examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that
Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then
it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that
Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it
argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian
ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills
beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be
kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.

In " Early Confucian Philosophy and Development of Compassion, " David Wong carefully examines such metaphors as adorning, crafting, water flowing down, and growing sprouts used for moral cultivation in early Confucian texts, the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi. While clearly with different meanings, Wong argues that, far from being competitive, such metaphors, working together, adequately reflect the complexity of moral cultivation, which in turn reflects the complexity of human nature. Central to this picture of moral cultivation is its emphasis on the relational and holistic aspects: cultivation of self with others and within social practices. Wong makes a strong case for this Confucian version by connecting it with some of the best of contemporary human sciences, including psychology, cognitive sciences, and neurosciences. Wong's essay seamlessly combines solid textual analysis with sophisticated philosophical argument. It exemplifies the type of scholarship that Dao aims to promote.

近代以来，道义论（deontology）和后果论 (consequentialism)，特别是功用论(utilitarianism)，是西方伦理学的主流，而美德论（virtue ethics）则被看成是古代人的伦理而受到冷落。但在最近几十年，美德伦理在英语世界出现了较大的复兴，开始打破了道义论和功用论的垄断地位，使当代伦理学出现了三足鼎立的局面。美德伦理的这种繁荣至少有若干体现。第一是美德伦理自身出现多元化。虽然亚里士多德主义仍然是美德伦理的主流，但也有不少美德伦理学家主要是从斯多葛学派、从休谟传统、从尼采传统或从实用主义特别是杜威那里汲取养料。第二是与其刚开始复兴时呈现的主要是美德伦理对道义论和功用论的批评不同，现在道义论和功用论也开始批评起美德伦理，而美德伦理也开始认识到自己的缺陷并加以发展。第三，从事比较哲学的学者纷纷在自己的哲学传统中挖掘美德伦理的资源，所以我们看到了印度教的美德伦理(如Gier 2005)，佛教的美德伦理(如Keown 1992)，伊斯兰教的美德伦理（如Bucar 2017），道家的美德伦理（如Huang 2010a）等。当然在这最后一方面，最重要的是对儒家的美德伦理的研究。在2007年一年内，就有三本研究儒家美德伦理的英文专著出版（ Sim 2007, Van Norden 2007, Yu 2007），而有关的研究论文更是不计其数。

我本人对美德伦理的研究也主要集中在儒家传统，只是我侧重的是儒家传统对当代美德伦理所能做出的贡献，包括回应其他伦理学派对美德伦理的批评，帮助在西方哲学传统中发展出来的美德伦理避免其所存在的自身的缺陷，以及作为美德伦理学对伦理学甚至其他临近的哲学学科所可能做出对贡献，而没有较多地着墨去论证儒家伦理就是美德伦理。这倒主要不是在儒家伦理和美德伦理的关系问题上没有争议。事实上在这个问题上争议很大。尽管很少有人想论证儒家伦理是功用主义（Im 2011 ），在学界，特别是受到当代新儒家牟宗三影响的中国学界，还是有不少学者认为儒家是一种康德主义的道义论，而最近还有不少人认为儒家并不从属于西方的三种主流伦理学派的任何一种，而是一种独特的角色伦理。我之所以迄今为止没有参与这样一种讨论，一则觉得这样的讨论虽然有其一定的意义，但无论是对于儒家思想的发展还是对于美德伦理的发展，贡献不大；二则我也认为，即使儒家思想本身并不是一种美德伦理，这也并不表明其不能对美德伦理作出贡献，而这正是我所关心的。但最近有机会参加南乐山新著《善一分殊》的讨论(Neville 2016)，促使我对这个问题加以思考。因此虽然本导论的主要目的是想对我最近十几年关于儒家思想对美德伦理所能做的贡献做一总结（第三部分），在此之前，我想先说明一下，在何种意义上不仅儒家思想是一种美德伦理（第一部分），而且是比亚里士多德主义更纯粹的美德伦理（第二部分）。