Book Reviews and Response* Cook, Scott, ed., Hiding the World in the Worlck Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi. Albany: State University o f N e w York Press, 2003, x+317 pages. Hiding the World in the World is a fine collection of essays on the philosophy of the Zhuang~ ( ~ : ~ ) that continues a series of similar volumes, particularly Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics (edited by Paul KjeUberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). While it also focuses on problems of skepticism, relativism, and ethics, it is not limited to discussing these issues. The scope of the articles is somewhat broader and includes topics such as mysticism and bodily cultivation as well as some philological aspects of the Zhuang~j. The volume begins with an essay by Harold D. Roth who e.xplores the "mystical experiences" that are either described or alluded to in the Zhuang~. Roth argues that the Zhuang~i should be understood in the larger context of ancient Chinese practices that include breathing exercises and meditation techniques. According to Roth, the mystical praxis documented in the Zhuang~i, and particularly in the Qiwulun ~ - ~ chapter, is "bimodal" and comprises an "introvertive" and an "extrovexfive" aspect. The introvertive experience consists of achieving a "total selfforgetting or total serf-emptying" in which the practitioner merges "with the Way." After this experience the practitioner will "return to the world of everyday riving" without, however, losing the "prior condition of contact with the Way" (26). The introvertive experience allows one, through breathing exercises, to empty out one's consciousness and to approach a state of profound tranquility "until a condition of unity is achieved" (16). In this state, one loses the "attachment to one's individual viewpoint" (24) and no longer sticks to one's former relativist perspective. The "skepticism" that many authors ascribe to the Zhuang~ is thus nothing but the cognifive or "extrovertive" result of one's "intxovertive" practice. Once one returns from the mystical practice to the everyday world, one "is no longer attached to oneself" (25) and reaches the "axis at the center of the circle," i.e. a standpoint without individual bias so that "no thing is only It and not Other" (26). Brook Ziporyn attempts to overcome the dichotomy between relativist readin~ of the Zhuang~ and those that ascribe a particular (non-relativist, and often "mystical") perspective to the text. He suggests instead a so-called "omnicentric holism" and explains the difference between his interpretation and a merely relativist one in this way: "[I]f the usual relativist rims into self-contradiction because he chims that 'since all propositions are relative to some perspective, none can be true,' thereby creating a paradoxical truth status for this claim itself, Zhuangzi has no such problem because he chims instead that 'since all propositions are relative to some perspective, they are all necessarily true!"' (55). lake Roth, Ziporyn also makes use of the Zhuang~fs axis, pivot, or hinge image. According to him, the Zhuangx"ienvisions " Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyDecember2005,Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 173-206. 92005 by GlobalScholarlyPublications.All rights reserved 174 Dao: A Journalof Corn,parativePhilosophyV.1 a plurality of such pivots, which represent the ability to feel one's way into multiple positions or perspectives while remaining uninvolved or "not fully absorbed into or committed to this perspective" (52). The Daoist sage in the Zhuangzi is thus able, so to speak, to switch from pivot to pivot and to affirm each perspective without behag personally tied to a single one. Scott Cook explores a similar "multi-perspectivism" in the Zbuang~i, particularly in its musical image~. The famous "panpipes of heaven" that are mentioned in the Qiwulun chapter represent, according to Cook, the "ever-changing melody of the Great Transformation" (76). All in all, this symphony of transformation is not a cacophony, but a barmony, so Cook argues, ff one is only able to adequately listen to and equally appreciate the multiplicity of sounds. He concludes that such "individuals are, indeed, rare; but this sort of aesthetic appreciation for life's diversity without evaluation is a state of mind we are dearly capable of approaching" (78). Rur-Bin Yang, like Harold D. Roth, is interested in the concrete meditation and bodily praxis associated with the Zhuangx',i.He views the various practices that the Zhuang~i discusses as being aimed at a transformation o f our perception and rationality. This is achieved by re,king the "vital energy" (qi ~) permeate the body to such a degree that "the distinction between subject and object, inner and outer becomes extremely 'dim and desolate"' (117). This ~ then lead to a state "of no death and no life, of solitary illumination by the light of the soul" so that "no language whatsoever can be used any longer to describe it, let alone such terms as se?f and bodythat carry the sense of individuality" (117). In his article entitled "Guru or Skeptic? Relatvisfic Skepticism in the Zhuangx~," Chad Hansen elaborates on his thesis that Zhuangzi is by no means a mystical "guru," but rather a philosophical relativist and skeptic with a political edge. Hartsen explains in detail his stance that what the Zbuang'L4"denies is the Confuc~anMohist assumption that the appeal to norms can come to an end" (152). According to Hansen, the relativist nature of debates among philosophers that can never be ultimatdy decided from any .~chimedean point of view leads Zhuangzi to a (linguistic) skepticism and, practically, to a political liberalism which allows for ideological neutrality and "toleration of different ways of living" (151). Zhuangzi's "relativism motivates the skepticism, which, in turn, motivates the liberal political stance" (151). Dan Lusthaus argues, not so differendy from Hansen and most other contributors to the volume, that Zhuang'zi is a skeptic, but only to a certain degree, and thus not truly a skeptic. His relativist-skeptical attitude leads Zhuangzi, in Lusthaus' view (again not so different from Hansen's), to an ethical conclusion: Because we cannot justify ultimate truth claims, we should not impose a specific set of ethics on others. Zhuangzi's "aporetics ethics" is a negative ethics that ethically advises us from insisting on one and only one specific morality. Lusthaus says: "Zhuangzi has moved from epistemology to ethics by showing that epistemic distinctions invariably become valuational" (195). If we adhere to one and only one set of knowledge claims we tend to attach practical or ethical claims to it: "Ethics and epistemology become two sides of the same coin" (196). Zhuangzi's "aporetics ethics" exposes the potential fundamentalism that can be attached to epistemological and ethical beliefs. Like ma~y other authors in this volume, Alan Fox also makes use of the im oage of the hinge or the axis (or the potter's wheel or the pivot). The hin~ symbolizes for Fox the perfect fit into one's surroundin~ that goes along with effortlessness, responsiveness, and unobtrusiveness, or, in Daoist terms, with u,uum"~ . Fox stresses that this "fit" is of pure immanence, not of a transcendent nature: we "immerse ourselves in the world" (222). He concludes: "ks a result, suggests Zhuangzi, the most effective mode Book Reviews and Response ! 75 of human experience is to blend or 'fit' (sht) into any given situation in such a way as to allow ourselves to 'respond' ~'ng) effortlessly and spontaneously, just like the hinge. This mode of non-obmasive experience is what we might call '~,u~n"' (220). Paul Rakita Goldin suggests, as he himself admits, a rather controversial hypothesis, namely that the Zhuang~i is among several ancient Chinese philosophical texts that, at least implicitly, operate with a mind-body dualism derived from folk psychology. Goldin believes that "the Zhuangzi is at once materialistic and dualistic" (237). He snmmatizes his theory as such: "We are told, on the one hand, that all matter constantly cycles and recycles through various shapes and combinations and, on the other hand, that our immaterial spirit escapes this process and fives on in essentiallythe sameform after death" (237). MichaelJ. Puett analyzes the meaning of the term "spirit-man" (shen ten ~ k ) in the Zhuang~i. According to Puett, the meaning of "spirit" (sben~) and "spirit-man" in the Zhuangzi is somewhat different from the meaning of this term in other ancient texts such as the Guanr~ (~-Y-.) . While the Guan~i views the "spirit" as some sort of power that helps to subdue or control nature and to understand good and bad fortune, the Zhuang~, according to Puett, evokes the notion of the "spirit-man" in order to call "for man to accept that which is given to him and not to add to life by categorizing thin~ according to humanly constructed distinctions of right and wrong" (258). The "spirit-man" in the Zhuang~ is one who accepts fate rather than attempts to judge or control it. The final chapter in the volume, an essay by Shuen-Fu l.in, differs methodologically from the preceding ones. Rather than offering a philosophical interpretation of the text or one of its aspects, Lin presents a philological discussion ofA.C. Graham's translation of the Zhuangox4.While generally appreciating Graham's efforts, Lin criticizes a number of Grah~m's emendations. Lin also classifies the style of the Zbuang~ as being historically later than that of '%ose" compendiums such as the La0~' ( ~ z~) but earlier than thoroughly composed essays such as the Xun~i ( ~ ) . I do not intend to come up with a thorough discussion of all the individual articles in this thought-provoking volume and ~ instead conclude with two very brief remarks: First, the essays in this volume (except perhaps those by Lin and Goldin) are rather tightly connected with each other and not really far apart in their interpretations. ~Mthough authors such as Hansen and Roth seem to represent rather different readings, I do not think that their views are entirely incompatible--they only document different layers of or approaches to the Zhuang~i that can quite easily coexist with each other. The recurring images--the hinge, the pivot, the axis, the potter's wheel---discussed in various articles demonstrate similar philosophical interests of many authors. Second, while I disagree with the readin~ of some of the core passages in some of the articles (e.g. Cook's reading of the "pipe of heaven" allegory in which he, in my view, fails to distinguish between the pipes of heaven and those of the earth, and Lusthaus' reading of the butterfly dream in which he, wrongly as I believe, alleges that Zhuang Zhou remembers his dream), I still agree, interestingly enough, with most of the philosophical conclusions (e.g. Cook's insistence on the equal validity of all tones in the "Great Harmony," or Lusthaus's insistence on the radical difference between the butterfly and Zhuang Zhou that allows for their transformation). I think, in fact, that the readings of the passages that I have suggested support the interpretations of the authors even better than their own. Hans-Georg Moeller, Brock University E-maih hmoeller@brocku.ca 176 Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhilosophyV.1 fin, Chunfeng g,@l~i, The Course of FENG You/art's Philosophical Iafe { ~ , ~ tg~@~) 9Taibei i~L: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Wen Zhe Yanjiusuo ~a 5/Lq~3~N~N, 2003, 448 pages. The study of FENG Youlan ~ g ~ in China, which began in the 1940s, follows a pattern from academic criticism to political criticism and back again. In the 1940s and 1950s, FerN's philosophy of human life, his history of Chinese philosophy, and his new doctrine of k"t~ received both praise and criticism. Serious academic critics studied FerN in this period. In the 1960s and 1970s, political criticism of FerN's philosophy replaced academic criticism. Since then, critics of FerN's thought have returned to the academic perspective. Jin's book is the first published work that completely and systematically examines FerN's whole philosophical thought and activities. Jin divides FerN's thought into four periods (ii-iii). In the first period (191%1926), FerN had wide contact with Western philosophy and tried to merge it into Chinese philosophy and culture. In the second period (1927-1935), FerN completed his two-volume History of Chinese Philosophy. In the third period (1935-1948), FerN built up his own system of philosophy. In the fourth period (1949-1990), Feug rewrote his History of Chinese Philosophy. Following this division, Jin systematically examines the course of Feng's philosophy. In his examination of the first period, fin compares FerN with LIANG ShumirN ~ , pointing out that, although Feng disagreed with Tiang on the lattefs view of Western and Eastern cultures (36-3-0, FerN's comparative approach and his attitude toward Laozi, including his dissertation at Columbia University (62, 64), were deeply influenced by Liang. jin also analyzes Feug's view regarding the famous debate of science versus metaphysics, asserting that Feng stood on the side of science against metaphysics (43). Further, Jin tracks the change in FerN's attitude to the notion of intuition in Henri L. Bergson and LIANG Shuming from acceptance to rejection (47). In addition, Jin examines the fomaation of FerN's scientific view of human life (52). Finally, jin moves to FerN's view of the history of Chinese philosophy, suggesting that FerN interpreted Confucianism from the perspective of Daoism (64). In his examination of the second period, Jin takes FerN's view of the history of philosophy as best represented in FerN's two-volume History of Chinese Philosophy. He evaluate FerN's work on Confucius and affirms that Feng recognized Confucius' historical place by acknowledging Confucius as the first teacher who ran a private school, the first philosopher who built up his own system of thought, and the first master who founded a school (75). Meanwhile, Jin thinks that FerN's contribution consists in returning to a view of Confucius as a human being by removirN the three noble titles traditionally given Confucius: sage, king without a throne, and pontiff (81). Jin notes that FerN takes the thought of Xnn~i ~ - - u p to Cheug-Zhu ~A~--as the mainstream of Confucianism (93). The place of XnnTi's thought in Confucianism is especially addressed. Jin appreciates FerN's approach to Laozi, ZhnarNzi, and GONGSUN Long ~ , and praises FerN's mode of analysis because Fern distinguishes between the origin of the history of philosophy and the narzation of the history of philosophy (110). Jin analyzes FerN's treatment of the philosophy of the Han Dynasty, pointing out what he sees as FerN's misunderstanding of the main trend of Han philosophy and affirming, against FerN, that Confucianism and Daoism were the mainstream in the development of philosophical thought in the Han Dynasty (129). Jin thinks that FerN's exploration of GUO XiarN ~ is an important discovery (13"0, and notes that in Guo's thought on "ultimate da0 (zhidao ~:N)'" and "ultimate non-being (zhiu,u ~_,~,,)" (138), Guo's he- Book Reviews and Response !77 gation of the premise of God in epistemology (139) and his notion of ideal personality (143) deeply influenced Feng. As far as I know, this source of Feng's thought has not yet been fully studied. Jin characterizes Feng's interpretation of NeoConfucianism in the Song-Ming Dynasties as a neorealist one (165), but Jin does not give any analysis to support his assumption, as will be shown later. As the final part of the examination of the second period, Jin draws lessons from the perspective of methodology. It seems to him that, while the strength of Feng's two-volume H/rt0~yof Chinese Phihsophy consists in discovering the philosophical universality, expressed in Chinese philosophy (175), its weakness lies in its ignoring the partiollarity of Chinese philosophy (180). In the examination of the third period of the development of Feng's philosophical thought, Jin focuses on Feng's creation of his new doctrine of k'. Jin believes that before building up his own philosophical system, Feng had already accepted a neo-realist standpoint (201). Thus, he suggests that what Feng tried to build was a kind of metaphysics on a foundation of the highest universality. Starting from the point of view of universals, Jin argues against Feng's conception of k" as existing prior to particular things (222); Jin thinks that Feng's concept of # ~ is eventually self-contradictory (228), and the concept of dao~ ~W is inconsistent because Feng wanted to usse the abstract metaphysical world of ]i to explain myriad thin~ in the real world (233). I will suggest later that Jin somewhat misunderstands Feng's doctrine of ]i. However, Jin recognizes the important place of Feng's theory of four realms of hnman life the Natural Realm (~iranfingiie ~ - ) , the Realm of Utility (gonglijin~ie ~lJ~$g), the Moral Realm (diodefin~ie ~ $ g ) , and the Realm of Heaven and Earth (tiandijin~offie~ ) - - M his philosophy as a whole. Jin thinks that Feng's theory of the Realm of Heaven and Earth is close to the ideas of XIANG Xiu ~]~: and GUO Xiang ~ (256). jin thinks that Feng did not really continue the Song-Ming doctrine of $ (284), becausse the doctrine of li in the Song-Miag period, especially in ZHu Xi ~ , was deeply influenced by the Chart School of Buddhism. Without the knowledge of the Doctrine of Mind, one cannot clearly comprehend the Chan spirit; but Feng's doctrine of h"was against the Doctrine of M.ind; therefore, Feng's thought cannot really be understood as a continuation of the Song-Ming doctrine of k"(284). In the third , which period, Feng published his New Treaty on Carrot Pract#al Affairs ( ~ ) Jin interprets as Feng's acceptance of Marxist historical materialism (292). While it is well acknowledged that the publication of the Doctffne of I_2"marks the apex of Feng's philosophical career, Jin thinks that the significance of this doctrine consists in its rational, logical approach, by which Feng shaped his philosophical system (308) in his theory of realms of humatl life, his exploration of the spirit of Chinese philosophy (311), and his systematical study of methodology. This approach constitutes the foundation for the modernization of Chinese philosophy (319). In his examination of the fourth period, Jin further explores the process of Feng's acceptance of Marxism. Jin divides this process into three periods: from 1949 to 1953, Feng cban~d his attitude toward Marxism from estrangement to identification; from 1953 to 1957, Feng incorporated ~Latmsm into his own thought; from 1957 to 1959, Feng's new doctrine of h" was regarded by scholars following "Mao's Thought" as objectivist idealism (337). Since then, Feng has been forced to deny his own doctrine of $ (357, 377). Jin concentrates his examination of Feng's new edition of History of Chinese Philosophy on this process. As the editor of the first five volumes of Feng's new History of Chinese Philosophy, Jin is very familiar with the differences between Feng's earlier two-volume History of Chinese Philosophy 178 Dao: A Journal of Co~arative PhilosophyV.1 and this new detailed version. Jin dearly points out Feug's new ideas in the new version, including Feng's abandonment of vulgar Marxism in his dealing with the Taiping Rebellion (388), Feng's re-evaluation of the place of idealism in the history of philosophy (390), Feng's return to his standpoint of the 1930s and 1940s in dealing with Laozi (392, 393) and with Wei-Jin metaphysics (weijinxuan.x'ue~:~3~) in terms of his theory of the realms of human life (394, 399). In addition, Jin pays attention to Feng's summary, of the new version in which Feng criticized MAO Zedong @~_~ (404) and reinterpreted the debate between public and private and between righteousness and utility (409). Finally, Jin thinks that Feng returned to ZRANG Zai ~ i ~ i n his theory of realms of human life (416). In the concluding part of his book, Jin offers his answers to some frequendy asked questions in the study of Feug: Was Feng a venerator or a critic of Confucius? Jin claims that although Feng adopted some Confucian ideas, generally speaking, Feng should be identified as a critic of Confucius (424). Jin demonstrates that Feng understood Confucianism with a sympathetic attitude (425). Was Feng a neoConfucian then? Jin believes that Feng was a rico-Confucian before the 1950s (430), but after the 1960s Feug accepted Marxism and applied it to examining the history of Chinese philosophy (431). Jin thus refuses to oversimplify Feng's stance with regard to Confucian thought. Feng's Me was filled with conflicts and contradictions, sometime referred to as the "FENG Youlan phenomenon." Jin suggests that this phenomenon is a reflection of the threefold encounter between traditional Chinese philosophy and culture, Western philosophy, and Marxism (432). With the examination of the four periods mentioned above, Jin has mapped the course of Feng's philosophical life. In so doing, some of his own views on related issues also manifest themselves. For instance, Jin thinks that Feng's explanation of Mengzi's idea of the relation between li and righteousness as a relation e~ernal to the mind does not correspond to beleugzi's actual idea (95). Jin disagrees with LAO Siguang's ~ , ~ judgment that Feng's History of Chinese Philosop~ is a failure (170), even though he concedes that what Feug did write is "philosophy in China," not really a history of "Chinese philosophy." Jin notes that in Feug's metaphysical application of h"to interpreting the changes of the myriad thin~, he has difficulty in maintaining the logical consistence of his theory (233). He also notes that Feng's application of the Marxist analysis of class struggle in his two-volume History of Chinese Philosop~ was a reflection of historical circumstance ha which he lived, not Feng's personal choice (386). Jin believes that Feng's new History of Chinese Philosophy marks the return of Feng's thought to his earlier views in the 1930s and t940s (402). Feng agreed with JIy Yuelin ~ , a famous logician and philosopher, also a close friend of his, that philosophy is a kind of conceptual game; but Jin contends that, if philosophy is isolated from real productive and social activities, it cannot fulfill its duty to serve human life (408). Jin believes that both the venerators and the critics of Confucius have their own appropriate grounds (418). In a certain sense, this book effectively exhibits the author's own insights about ancient Chinese philosophy, especially the philosophy in the Han Dynasty, while it aims at understanding Feng's life and philosophy. Now I would like to highlight a few points in Jin's discussion of Feug where one may take issues with him. HU Shi ~ criticizes Feng's choice of Confucius as the first philosopher in the history of Chinese philosophy, whereas Jin contends that Hu's critique is a mistake (6). However, Jin does not seem to provide further argument about where and why Hu's critique is wrong. In addition, Jin believes that Neorealism became a style of thinking as well as a style of life for Feng (6). Indeed Book Reviews and Response !79 Feng was deeply influenced by Neorealism, but we must also recognize a tiny but essential difference between Feng's philosophy and Neorealism. For Neorealism, "Form" as a universal is not only true but also real, whereas for Feng, "Form" is . It true but not real, as he repeatedly stressed in his A New Doctrine 0f/.d ( ~ ) seems to me that Jin's understanding of Feng's concept of "desire" (44-47) is also questionable. According to Feng, a good society must be able to satisfy people's desires to the highest degree. His concept of "desire" is used in a broad sense and he discusses this issue from a metaphysical perspective. When Jin criticizes Feng's notion of desire, he does not provide much evidence to demonstrate that Feng's concept of "desire" excludes the desires that are derived from peoples' social and spiritual activities as well as from their religious faiths. Jin's criticism of Feng's idea above can hardly be established. Jin also somewhat equates LIANG Shuming's concept of intuition with Bergson's, and so he equates Feng's criticism of Bergson with his criticism of Liang. In fact, what Bergson aimed at was reconstructing an intuitive metaphysics, which is very different from l.iang's idea of intuition. Jin's assumption would be more reasonable if he could ChriCythe following three concepts: intuitive metaphysics, intuition, and visible things. Jin interprets Feng's world of h' as another name for God (221), which is at least debatable. Feng indeed claimed that li is objective, and its existence does not rely on in~vidual things. Yet the existence of individual things must correspond to the/i, which is objective and discoverable. Feng's li is not a creator, while God is the creator of myriad things; Li is impersonal, but God, for most believers and in most religions, is a personal supreme being. In order to understand Feng's world of li, we need to understand the three layers in his system of metaphysics: First, the True Realm (~henji ~ ) or the world of li, which consists of all/i(s), is not a mystical kingdom of heaven, but rather a generalization of the essence of the myriad things. Second, the Real Realm (shift ~ consists of all concepts, including general concepts. Third, there axe particular things, or in Feng's terms, real things and events. According to these three dimensions, there are (1) a particular horse, (2) a concept of horse, and (3) the li of horse. Particular horses and other particular things belong to Feng's natural world; the concepts of horses and other concepts, including general concepts, belong to Feng's Real Realm; while t h e / / o f horse and other/i(s) belong to Feng's True Realm or the world of li. Concepts, including general concepts, are not Feng's h'; only that which determines an snimal as a horse, but nothing else, can be called k" Thus, Feng's h"is neither God nor a concept. However, many scholars, including ZHu Gnan~ian ~ , HONG Qia.n ~ , ZHANG Yinlin ~ M , ZHANG Dainian ~ 4 ~ , and Feng's other contemporaries as well as scholars on Feng today, tend to simplify Feng's three layers or dimensions into two, following the traditional division of metaphysical (above the form) and physical (with foma). When we understand Feng's world of h"in terms of these two dimensions, or simply treat Feng's Real Realm as natural thln~, a problem arises: how does the h' connect with partict~ thin~? This question has been puzzling scholars since ZHU Guangqian's criticism of Feng's Doctrine of I_d in the 1940s. Jin's criticism of Feng's world of h~the theory of universals, and the application of Feng's doctrine of h' to the realm of human life (239) are also limited to the two dimensions. Furthermore, Jin claims that Feng's philosophy is a kind of rationalism. When he applies this philosophy to dealing with the issues of morality,, Feng advocates social utilitarianism (243). However, when Feng uses the moral realm to describe the actual moral level of the people, it is not Feng's own ideal realm of human life. Jin lacks a sound basis for concluding that Feng assumes a view of social utilitarian- 180 Dao:A Journalof Compara#wPhilosophyV.1 ism. Finally, Jin thinks that Feug interprets Confucianism in terms of Daoism. I believe that this issue is directly related to the debate whether Feug is a Confucian, neo-Confucian, or, standing against the Confucian position, a Daoist philosopher. Despite the fact that, since 1980s Chinese scholars have produced plenty of research works on this issue, Jin's judgment does not seem to pay adequate attention to those works. As a related note, his entire book lacks reference to the works of other contemporary scholars, which no doubt weakens its scholarly value. CHEN Derong, University of Toronto E-mail: d.chen@utoronto.ca Hu, Zhihong ~ , , , A ConfucianDiscoursein the GlobalContext:A Study of the ~3@~.fl~ New Confucian Thought of Tu Weiming ( ~ q b ~ f ~ A @ ~ : p~,~,~-~ ) . Beijing ~L~,,: Sanlian Shudian - - I ~ , 2004, 431 pages. This is one of the rarely seen works in the Chinese la%maage that almost perfectly meets with contemporary academic standards in terms of research, presentation, and editorship. It is the first comprehensive examination of the thought of TU Weiming (1940--), a prominent Confucian thinker and "public intellectual" (Tu's own phrase), who is generally considered as belonging to the third generation of contemporary Confucians. In view of his academic achievement and his increasing influence in North America, East Asia, and some important intemadonal organi~,.adons, Hu's book is indeed a timely contribution to the study of Tu's Confucian thought. On the basis of a thorough study of Tu's publications and talks, as well as his diaries, notes, and other primary sources, Hu has engaged Tu's ideas at a deep level and shed light on many easily confusing aspects. Hu's numerous personal discussions with Tu, especially while Hu was a visiting scholar at Harvard-Yenching Institute (of which Tu is the Director) in 2001-2002, have greatly benefited him in conducting this research work. The book falls into six chapters. Chapter One traces Tu's education and the process of the maturation of his thinking. Chapter Two introduces Tu's development of methodology for the transfomaadon of Confucian thought in the contemporary world. Chapter Three delineates Tu's reflection upon the major Enlightenment ideals. Chapter Four deals with one of Tu's central discourses, "Cultural China," which takes Confucian tradition as its core meaning. Chapter Five explicates Tu's ideas concemiug dialogue between civilizations and global ethics. Chapter Six provides an evaluation of Tu's thought as discussed in terms of the above four areas. It also points out the direction of the further development of Tu's thought. At the end of this book, one can find four carefully researched and edited appendices: (1) a review of and comment on major secondary literature on Tu's thought; (2) a list of annals of Tu's life; (3) a chronologic list of Tu's writings; and (4) two detailed indices to Hu's book, one according to names and works, the other according to subjects. Until now, providing an index or indices to one's monograph has been done only rarely in publications in Chinese. The presentation of the two nicely aeranged indices sets up a good paradigm for the wholesome advancement of Chinese scholarship. In addition, the book contains a preface by Professor GUO Qiyong ~ , an established scholar in Chinese philosophy. This preface offers a succinct overview of the general themes of Tu's intellectual concerns and central thoughts. It also provides insightful comments on the overall merits of Hu's research. Book Reviews and Response !8 ! In the following, I shall focus my review upon Hu's discussion of Tu's methodology involved in his creative interpretation and transformation of the traditional Confucian intellectual sources in regard to ontology, philosophical anthropology, social and political theories, and cosmology. One way to understand the methodological orientation of Tu's thought is to take a look at his education and academic experience in a global context. After fini.~hing undergraduate study in Taiwan, he went to Harvard University and obtained a Ph.D. degree in 1966. After that, Tu spent most of his time teaching and doing research in North America. In the meantime, he traveled frequently around the world attending academic events, as well as learning from or meeting with Confucian thinkers of the earlier generation, such as MOU Zougsan ,~,,= (1909-1995) and TANG Junyi N ~ N . This background made Tu well versed in both traditional Confucian thinking and Western systematic learning, which lent him fresh insights in providing a renewed interpretation of Confucian thought. Flu presents Tu's efforts at rejuvenating understanding of the Confucian tradition in terms of three stages. The first stage is called assimilation (btfu ~gN). This is a more or less superficial way of explaining one culture in reference to another. It is characterized by an urge to find counterpart elements of one's home culture in another culture, and vice versa. The disadvantage of this approach lies in its triviality and haphazardness. The second stage consists in a creative interpretation of the Confucian sources. This method of interpretation can be called geyi ~ . It aims to place Confucian intellectual sources into the Western theoretical framework so as to disclose their quintessential value by interpretation and comparison. This is not a Westernization of original Chinese thought, but a necessary step for bringing the ancient tradition into contemporary, intellectual discourse. This method, according to Hu, has also exerted a great influence on Western academic advancement and thus its significance has exceeded the realm of Chinese thought. Moreover, when Tu's English writings are translated back into Chinese, they create an impact on the studies of Confucian thought in Chinese as well In the third stage, Tu establishes a grand Confucian theoretical system in employing the methodology of gwi. This system embraces individuals, civil societies, nature, and tiandao 5e.~, and their relations to each other. Hu considers g~/, the interpretative methodology employed by Tu, as an important contribution to the theory-building of contemporary Confucian thought (271278). Geyi originally refers to a way of explaining Buddhist scriptures in the FUeiJin ~ period in Chinese history. Ge ~'6 means standard, measure, or criterion, whileyi refers to meaning or idea. In the context of Tu's employment of this method, with ge standing for the systems and frameworks of Western discourses, ggi means letting the integral Confucian thought transform itself and bringing its significance to fight by connecting it to Western theoretical systems and frameworks (43-44). According to Hu, the use ofgeyi is one of the aspects that distinguishes Tu from the earlier generation of contemporary Confucian thinkers. The earlier attempts at transmitting Confucian thought to the Western intellectual context have been marginal and restricted to indirect ways, such as translations into Western languages (273). Even if Western theoretical systems are consulted, the consultation is limited to their Chinese translations and therefore is also indizect (45). What Tu adopts, as Tu himself states, is the way of directengagement(zhifiejinqu ~ _ ~ ) (273). That is, Tu explains, to "completely situate Confucian thought in the context of the English language" (273). As a result, what is explicated and interpreted retains an inherent kinship with the original Confucian spirit; at the same time, the Confucian thought as expressed in English poses a challenge to the propositions and arguments in 182 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophyV.1 Western discourses, and thus obliges the West to renew its understanding of its own tradition. Since Western academic discourses indisputably occupy the dominant position in the modem world, the transference of Confucian thought into Western discourse and its engagement with it should be considered as an indubitable indication that "for the first time Confucian intellectual tradition has become a world discourse" (273). The process of explicating and interpreting Confuchn thought in a Western language involves a self-transformation of the source tradition. This selftransformation, in Hu's mind, becomes most manifest when Tu's writings in English are translated into Chinese, the mother language of the Confucian tradition. Since the creative interpretation of Confucian tradition through the method ofg~i has been done in accordance with modem theoretical and evaluative systems, this interpretative practice achieves a renewal of the Confucian tradition and reclaims respect and love for it (273). As an intellectual who has received education in a multi-lingual global context, and served on many distinctive academic posts, both in the homeland of Confucian thought and in North America and other parts of the world (in comparison with other Confucian thinkers whose academic activities are restricted to their homeland), Tu has been able to situate himself in the global social, political, and intellectual context which offers him a vantage point where he can speak of Confucian thought as part of the heritage of world civilizations. His interpretative methodology, with its strong emphasis on directengagement, rather than mere transmission of ideas, makes an extremely valuable contribution to the contemporary advancement of Confucian thought. What might constitute a problem in Hu's presentation, however, is an implicit identification of Western with modernor conter~ora~y, as weU as a related assumption that writing in a Western (primarily English) language is the only or the best way for the transformation of the Confucian tradition. As the native l~ngxtage of Confucian thought, Chinese seems to occupy a secondary position in regard to the revival of the Confucian tradition. It does not seem easy to justify this assumption. It is perhaps true that in thepresentera English assumes a status of k'nguafranca, but this does not naturally email that the revJt~liTationof the Confucian heritage is the same as presenting it in English in the first place, no matter in how superb a manner this is done. The global context should not be equated with the Western context, though admittedly they overlap each other. Tu is certainly right ha advocating dz~ctengagement with various aspects of Western discourse. However, it does not seem justified to use the specific linguistic medium in which some occasions of engagement have occurred as the sole criterion for judging the direcmess/indizectuess of the engagement. I am not trying to degrade the importance of English as the widest employed international la%maage. Neither do I have the slightest intention to underestimate the brilli~nt achievements of Tu. My point of emphasis is the following. Tu is right in saying that his Confucian predecessors rarely wrote in English (273). Parallel to this fact is that, until recently, most Western scholars had failed to take into account Confucian traditions in their intellectual endeavors. However, the situation is now changing. Nowadays, there are a significant number of scholars who deal with topics involving Confucian thought in both English and Chinese. Attention to original philosophical contributions in Chinese has been steadily increasing. The reason why in the past wtifictgs in Chinese tended to be considered not direct, not global, is unrelated to the mere fact that they were written in Chinese. It is rather because their readers were confined to those who had limited global impact, and thus the sphere of their influence was necessarily restricted. With the gradual change of the Book Reviews and Response 183 situation, philosophical contributions in Chinese will cerr=inly obtain a global status. The phrase "global context" as used in the title of Hu's work can only live up to its true sense when this neglected and yet to be cultivated aspect is taken seriously. It seems a regrettable limitation to identify the global context one-sidedly with the English one, and to restrict the ge of the gevt'method to Western theories. My quibble in the foregoing concerns an unelarified aspect embedded in FIu's (or perhaps Tu's) argument. This is just a minor point compared with the broad terrain covered in Hu's monograph, which is not only an indispensable reading for studying Tu's Confucian thought, but also a highly helpfial aid, written in a non-Western language, for scholars who set as one of their tasks d/rectengagementwith the Confucian tradition. MA Lin, University of Leuven E-m~il: lin.ma@hiw.kuleuven, ac.be Perkins, Franklin, Leibniz and China: Commerce of La'ght. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, xiii + 224 pages. Franklin Perkins has written an outstanding book about a prominent philosopher: Gottfried WRhelm Leibniz. Surprisingly, Leibniz's cultural exchan~ or "commerce of light" in respect to China still remains relatively obscure. Perkins's book remedies this. What interests Perkins is the fact that Leibniz's fascination with China stands in contrast to his contemporaries' ambivalence. Although Perkins is aware of the ethnocentrism of Europe in the colonial era, he focuses on an early period. As he writes: "In its evaluation of other cultures, the early modern period is remarkably heterogeneous: when Leibniz calls for Chinese missionaries to come and teach ethics to Europeans, not everyone found his remark outrageous" (x). The mission of Perkins's book is two-fold: to explain Leibniz's thought philosophically and to situate it historically. Leibniz is a pioneer in multi-cultural efforts on many levels. As Perkins relates: "Leibniz's openness to China is not an accident of his experience or personality but flows naturally from his philosophy" (xi). By Leibniz's time, hundreds of thousands of European traders and missionaries were living throughout the world. Europe's understanding of China was filtered through "lenses" fashioned from these and earlier encounters. As Perkins notes, one of the lenses was "nanazal theology" that relates "to knowledge that can be had 'naturally,' without the aid of revelation" (4). Although natttral theology began with Christians using Neo-Platonic pagan writers, it evolved as Islamic and Greek texts entered Europe through Spain. Natural theology was a guiding light for Jesuits entering China for the first time. As Perkins notes: "Philosophy assists theology by proving what it can about God and by showing the flaws in any argument about faith" (5). Natural theology was a passage for "freeing" philosophy from theology. Leibniz took this seriously in The0d~, where he sees the debate between faith and reason emanating from medieval scholars appeasing Plato and Aristotle. The greater implication of natural theology was that "reason" or "experience" could help anyone understand truths about the nature of things. Another "lens" for cross-cultural communication comes from the Renaissance tradition ofpHsca theologicaor "ancient theology" whereby Christianity is placed beside pagan thought. Early founders wished to demonstrate that the "wisdom" of Plato actually derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition. One of the faulty assump- 184 Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhilosophyV.1 fions of ancient theology was that texts were written over millennia and across many cultures. With these assumptions, scholars interested in hermetic texts were fas~nated with both Egyptian and Chinese cultures. Hence, the Jesuit Athanasius Kirchez, Paul Beumer, and Gottlieb Spitzel were scholars of Egypt and China. In 1663, Beurrier connected Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, and andent Chinese thought. Leibniz corresponded with both Beurrier and Spitzel. The Jesuit Joachim Bouvet was Iw.ibniz's primary source on Chinese thought. Speaking both Chinese and Manchu, Bouvet specialized in ancient Chinese classical texts. The Emperor Kangxi ~.,~, of the Qing ~ Dynasty admired Bouvet as the only Westerner proficient in Chinese literature (9). Bouvet's approach, later known as Figurism, was indebted to both ancient theology and hermetism. Like KJ_rcher and Beurrier, Bouvet felt that both Egyptian hieroglyphs and Chinese characters pointed to a primordial language before the Deluge. In 1700, Bouvet sent his essay on the Daoist Yij~ng ( ~ ) (Book of Changes) to both Leibniz and the Jesuit Charles Le Gobien. In his essay, Bouvet argued that the Yifing housed "many precious remains of the debris of the most ancient and most excellent philosophy taught by the first Patriarchs of the world to their descendants, since corrupted and almost entirely obscured by the course of time" (9). Pythagoras, Plato, and the Kabbalah reveal the same system of thought. As Bouvet moved more toward Biblical connections, he later presented the Yij~ng as a text written by the Biblical Patriarchs. According to Bouvet, Fuxi ~@, the legendary inventor of Yil~n~ lived 4600 years earlier, near the time of Noah, and was probably the same person as Zoroaster, Hermes, or Enoch. Attesting to his ingeniously flawed etymology, the name Fuxi supports this theory. Perkins relates Bouvet's view:. "the character fu [~] is made up of two other characters, one meaning 'dog' (quart) [~] and the other meaning 'man' (ten) [A]. The name obviously refers to Hermes, traditionally pictured with the head of a dog and the body of a human being" (9). Whereas Bouvet believed China had acquired the knowledge of God from ancient revelation, the Jesuit Matteo Ricci believed China had established its own 'flight of reason." Ricci had close contact with the Chinese court and a widely acknowledged scholarship that included wanslating (together with XU Guanqi ~ ) Euclid's Ekments into Chinese. While the hermetic tradition relies on the hermeneutics of ancient texts, natural theology points toward "autonomy of reason." Perkins argues that Leibniz's hermeneutics owes much to the hemaetic tradition as well as to the renaissance tradition of "conciliatory eclecticism" (10). In his Novissima Sinica, Leibniz published a stellar description of Kangxi by Bouvet. The Jesuits primarily studied with the ru ~, the ~teratiat Chinese courts who represented neo-Confu,fi,nism. For the Jesuits, Christianity was a spiritual supplement to Confucian ethics. Perkins argues that we must look at Confuclamsm at the time of Plato and Buddha in order to understand what both Bouvet and Leibniz encountered. The Warring States Period in Chinese history (475 BCE to 221 BCE) saw many wandering scholars of both Confucian and Daoist persuasions. Perldns argues that this anarchic dislocation of thinkers was the breeding ground for the emergence of Chinese philosophy. Three crucial points held true in this period: living a good life, lamenting the decline of society while gaT.ingto the past for soludous, and ignoring anything outside of the natural world. Nature pointed toward an inherent pattern of following Da0 ~ or "the way." As Perkins suggests: 'r m~in disagreement was over what these natural patterns entailed, as Daoists tended to think education and social structure were imposed on da0 while Cons thought they were rooted in dad' (16). Leibniz and the Jesuits were fascinated by heroes of the prehistoric Xia ~ Dy- Book Reviews and Response 185 nasty such as Yao ~ , Shun ~ , and Fuxi, who were supposed to have lived close in time to the Deluge. The term Shangdu"_k~ as "tfigh rules also caught the attention of the Europeans as a "god for all" as well as lian Y. "heaven" and lianming ~ @ "mandate of heaven." In particulax, Leibniz was enthralled by Chinese ethics and the Yifing. As Perkins relates, the Yifing "describes a dynamic universe cha%oiug according to graspable patterns" (18). The interpretation of the hexagrams offered ethics lessons, wise sayings, and an early science of natural laws. Leibniz was also concerned with the harmonization of Confucian virtues alongside filial piety or xiao @. The brand of Confucianism known to Leibniz and the Jesuits was called k"xue ~. ~ , associated with ZHU Xi : ~ (1130-1200) and the brothers CHENG Hao (1032-1085) and CHENG Yi ~ (1033-1107) of the Song 5~ Dynasty. Perkins writes: 'fla" =cuecan be broadly characterized as the attempt to integrate a speculative, systematic metaphysics influenced by Buddhism and Daoism into the ethically and socially oriented system of Confucianism" (21). The k' xse were skeptical of Buddhism's "selfish avoidance of social and familial duty" and therefore tried to combine the quest for awakening with public responsibility. Thus, for I_~.ibniz, the Yifing r e p r e s e n t e d / / ~ as the ordering of a dynamic universe with qi ~ as its materially m~nifested force./_2 is a unifying and unified force that exists in every thing. Hence, citing a famous sentence from ZHANG Zai ~ , Perkins asserts: "~ is one, but its manifestations are many, the single m o o n has countless reflections in the water. The image is strikingly similar to Leibniz's conception of monads as diverse expressions of one God" (21). Unlike Leibniz's view, the k' xse are not fixed on individual substances but rather on unified fields. ZHU Xi reinforced this idea: "Fundamentally, k" [principle] and qi [material force] cannot be spoken of as prior or posterior. But if we must trace their origin, we are obliged to say that k' is prior. However, k"is not a separate entity. It exists right in qi. Without qi, li would have nothing to adhere to" (21). Although the Europeans tended to equate h' and qi with form and matter respectively, it does not quite fit./_.i is like a natural pattern through which life operates. Qi as energy-matters obeys the laws of li. As Perkins maintains, it is not "passive" matter. Neither do monads have parts nor do they interact; neither do monads have doors nor do they have windows. For Leibniz, each monad contamed the whole universe: past, present, future. Leibniz not only practiced tolerance for divergent views but also insisted on learning from those views. In a letter to the Jesuit Antoine Verjus, Leibniz wrote about intellectual exchange between Europe and China: "For this is a commerce of light, which could give to us at once their work of thousands of years and render ours to them and to double so to speak our true wealth for one and the other" (42). Leibniz was knowledgeable about virtually every source written on China in Europe and managed to discuss all of them in his correspondences. While I.w.ibniz's first mention of China was in De Arte Combinatoria in 1666 when he was twenty years old, by 1675 his discussion of China was fluid. In an early correspondence with the Asian scholar Gottlieb Spitzel, there was an analysis of Christianity and atheism. Spitzd spoke of Athanasius Kircher and commented on the Jesuit Prospero Intercetta's translation of Confucius as an "exact moral and political philosophy, or knowledge of natural things" (109). By 1672, Leibniz had read Intercetta and concluded that while the Europeans were superior in theoretical arts, the Chinese won out in immediate sciences. Leibniz also corresponded with the Berlin scholar 3mdreas Miiller, who claimed to have found a clads dnica or a "key" to the Chinese language that would "decode" it. Any such creation of a "universal characteristic" intrigued Leibniz. Since Miiller insisted on money for his secret, it seemed !86 Dao:A Journalof ComparatiwPhilosophyV.1 to die with him since no one was willing to pay. Yet Leibniz's corresponding questions to Miiller proved fruitful Do characters refer to words or things? Axe they reducible to an alphabet? _Are immaterial things expressed through visible or invisible things? Is the language artificial or formed through common elements? Does the Language make the nature of things rational? Do signs refer directly to things or to characteristics? (113-114). Perkins does an admirable job in describing Leibniz's interactions with various scholars of China. In 1687, Leibniz's Chinese studies accelerated with his relationship to the Jesuit Claudio Filippo GrimaldL While Veljus was the procurator of the China missions, Grimaldi and Bouvet worked in the Beijing mission. These Jesuit correspondences resulted in the publication of the Novissima Sinica in 1697. Perkins writes: "The preface is a wonderful document, with its call for cultural exchange, the need to learn from China, and the complementary strengths of East and West" (114). Leibniz saw his role as a "conduit" for Chinese philosophy and culture. He engaged in many main debates including polygamy, the Nestorian monument, Biblical and Chinese historical records, and possible Jewish communities in China. Leibniz wrote in one letter: "I will thus have a sign placed at my door, with these words: bureau of address for China, because everyone knows that one has only to address me in order to learn some news." Iw.ibniz continues: "And if you wish to know about the great philosopher Confucius, or about the ancient Chinese Kings quite close to the Deluge ... you have but to order it" (115). Perkins highlights an important connection between Leibnlz and China in respect to binary arithmetic and the hexagrams of the Yijing. Leibniz's binaries of zero and one paralleled God's creation of unity, and nothingness. Thinking that his binaries might help missionaries explain Western thought to the Chinese, he sent his explanations to Grimaldi in 1697 and Bouvet in 1701. Since Bouvet was workhag on the Yifing as a system of "secret knowledge" connecting Fuxi to the Biblical Patriarchs, he found Leibniz's binaries quite illuminating. He convinced Leibniz that the hexagrams represented binary arithmetic. Subsequendy, Leibniz believed that Westerners could rediscover the wisdom of ancient China through binary arithmetic. To this end, Leibniz tried to establish various scientific societies in Germany and Russia with plans for a European academy in China. Perkins eloquently explicates Leibniz's focus on Chinese language. Perkins writes: "As signs are a consequence both of the structure of our innate ideas and our position expressing the universe, the concern for signs leads to cultural exchange" (139). Our "apperception" of ideas depends on cultural contexts. Leibniz asked Bouvet for the "Lord's Prayer" in Chinese and other languages. In the New Essays, Leibniz wrote: "And when there are no more ancient books to examine, their place will be taken by mankind's most ancient monument--languages. EventuaUy every language in the universe will be recorded, and contained in dictionaries and grammars; and comparisons will be made amongst them" (139). The coincidence of ideas and experience "expresses" the structure of mind. Language enhances this understanding. When looking for "universal characteristics" of language, Leibniz retied on Chinese because of its natural connection between culture and signs. He saw Chinese characters as holding a "natural" rather than "arbitrary" connection to language. His main goal, according to Perkins, was to connect semantic and syntactic functions into one sign system. Perkins writes: "The characteristic would have a set of basic elements signifying different ideas, and a formal system allowing calculation with these elements" (142). As such, Leibniz saw three "qualifies" for Chinese characters: they have non-arbitrary connection, they repre- Book Reviews and Response 187 sent ideas directly, and they can be read by speakers of different langxtages. Chinese characters are ideographic; the characters, rather than sounds, represent ideas; they are read in Japan and Korea. In 1707, referring to Chinese as a "living Logic," Leibniz wrote a letter to Berlin librarian Mat~lrin Veyssi~re La Croze: "[1If we could discover the key of Chinese characters, we would find something which would serve the analysis of thought" (146). Perkins reminds the reader that ff Leibniz had known more, he would have been more "enthusiastic" "because the Yifing is meant as a system of everything, and it was one of the explanatory frameworks used in Chinese science. The system, however, does not allow for calculations" (145). Perkins sees that hexagrams display nanaral situations but are not a calculus for them. In a brilliantly argued chapter entitled "interpreting China," Perkins outlines how Iw.ibniz understood "cultural exchange" by way of a hemaeneutical approach. Although Leibniz saw Europe and China as holding diverse methods of analysis, there were moments of convergence. Leibniz's "hermeneutic generosity" included taking a middle position for ambiguous texts and "preserving the good" in contradictory texts. As such, Leibniz followed the Jesuits in giving priority to ancient over modem texts. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Leibniz gave China the benefit of the doubt. As Perkins observes: '%ionads with considerable shared experience, expressing the universe from similar places, will recognize more of the same patterns and will share a culture. When a mind from one culture meets a mind from another, it could expect to share some patterns already, such as those mound the needs of the body" (159). Regulax readers of Leibniz might connect this with his cross-cultural idea of conatus or "derivative force" as a precursor to the monad. Thought consists in conatus as body consists in motion~ Every body is a momentary. mind. As the body consists of motions, the mind consists of a harmony of conatuses. Conatus is a hin~ between body and mind and between motion and stillness. In sl~'nmaty, Perkins' informative and well written book is an eye-opener for many readers who might dismiss either Leibniz or his Jesuit interlocutors in respect to Chinese philosophy. Leibniz's interaction with Jesuit scholars was itself a "commerce of light" that helped bring together two divergent cultures of Europe and China. By using the idea of generosity himself, Pertdns allows these thinkers to speak for themselves in a cultural exchange that advances philosophy both East and West. Jay Goulding, York University E-mail: jay@york~ca Tan, Sor-hoon, Confudan Democrat7:A Deweyan Reconstruction. Albany: State Universi~ o f N e w York Press, 2004, 288 pages. In recent years, we have witnessed a growing interest in exploring similarities and affinities between the thought of John Dewey and classical Confueianism~ Sorhoon Tan's new work, ConfucianDemocracy,m~kes a significant contribution to this ongoing dialogue by drawing specific attention to the possibility of constructing a Confucian democracy. The central project of Tan's book is to demonstrate that though many conceive of Confu,fianism as inherently authoritarian and incompatible with democracy, classical Confucian thought can be reconstructed, in light of Dewey's pragmatist philosophy, to support and foster a democratic government. Tan recognizes the diversity and complexity of the Confucian tradition and thus !88 Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1 does not claim to present the correct reading of Confucianism. Drawing from the three pre-Qin Confucian texts---~e Anakcts, the Mendus, and the Xun~i--Tan seeks to challenge certain misconceptions and misappropriations of Confucianism and in turn to revise it in light of modem sentiments and values in an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of constructing a Confucian democracy. This is not to suggest that Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi are democratic theorists, but rather to demonstrate that the classical Confucian texts have cultural resources which are conducive to democracy, and, for Tan, these resources must be explored and developed if Confucianism is to establish itself as a viable and practical political philosophy capable of meeting the needs of a new generation. Tan's attempt to develop a Confucian democracy demands not only a reconstruction of Confucianism but a reconstruction of democracy, i.e., Western liberal democracy, as well. The classical liberal notion of democracy, which conceives of the state as an evil that tends to encroach upon the absolute rights of autonomous individuals, does not mesh well with Confucian sentiments. Confucianism does not, like classical liberal democracy, posit an individual that is inherently opposed to society and thus does not privilege the individual at the expense of the community. Instead, Confucianism adheres to a notion of the self as fimdamentally social a self that is shaped and formed via participation in f~rnilinl and communal relationships. Such a notion of the self demands a different type of democracy than that offered by classical liberalism. Tan turns towards the philosophy of John Dewey and suggests that a Confucian democracy would resemble a Deweyan democracy, for it is within Dewey's thought that we find similar sentiments concerning the nature and development of the self, and its fundamental relation to the community. Exploring these similarities, Tan places her discussion of a Confucian democracy within the Western liberal-commurfir,ri=n debate and suggests that with the help of Dewey's social and political philosophy her proposed Confi~an democracy offers a middle alternative that satisfies the needs of both liberals and cornrnunitarians without overemphasizing one at the expense of the other (14). Though Tan argues for the possibility of a Confucian democracy similar to that of the Deweyan type, she does not attempt to merely transpose a Western style democracy upon a Confucian society. That is to say, Tan is not guilty of poor comparative philosophy in the sense that she does not draw hasty and over-simplified comparisons between Dewey and classical Confucianism and thus does not diminish the value or character of either tradition. Rather, she displays an exceptional ability to work within both traditions and to treat them on their own terms when necessary before bridging the gap between the two to illustrate her vision of a Confucian democracy. In this sense, Tan does not ignore the importance of cultural differences and assume that democracy would look and operate the same in Asian countries as it does in the West. Though consistent with Dewey's notion of democracy., Confucian democracy would be unique and consistent with Confucian sentiments. For example, in a Confucian democracy, ritual practices are apt to serve a greater function than laws do in developing and promoting social order. This distinctive characteristic, argues Tan, could be advantageous to developing Dewey's notion of democracy as "a way of life." In his attempt to establish true democracy, democracy not merely on paper, but rather a lived democracy in which individuals have a direct and significant impact in directing and shaping the activities of the groups and commumties to which they belong, Dewey sought to broaden and enrich our notion of culture and our understanding of how people live and interact. 'q]xe Confucian emphasis on ritual practices," argues Tan, "draws attention to something that some sec- Book Reviews and Response 189 tot's of Western societies are sorely in need of, which Western scholars have gestured at with words such as 'civility,' 'courtesy,' and 'mast"' (141). In this area, she suggests, Confucianism could make a significant contribution by illuminating new directiom and possibilities for the creation of a Deweyan democracy. Here we may note the value of Tan's interesting and engaging wore First, Tan successfully refutes the traditional reading of Confucianism as authoritarian~ patriarchal, and collectivistic by presenting her case for the reconstruction of Confucianism along Deweyan sentiments. Working within the classical Confucian tradition, which most admit promotes a governmentfor thepeople, Tan convincingly argues that Confucianism can, and ought to, be pushed further to promote government~v the people. It is only by accomplishing this task that Confucmmsm can continue to evolve as a viable political philosophy and thereby satisfy the needs of present and future generations. In this sense, Tan makes a significant contribution to Confucian scholarship. Moreover, her discussion of a Confucian democracy entails, as well, interpreting Dewey's philosophy along new and different lines. In short, Tan presents a new avenue to put Dewey's thought into practice, and thus provides an interesting and unique reading of Dewey's political thought. Thus, Tan also makes a significant contribution to the scholarship of John Dewey. The only question I have for Tan is, "why Dewey?" There are obvious similarities between the thought of John Dewey and classical Confucianism, and this is of significant philosophical interest; yet are there no contemporary political theorists that also may share some affinity with classical Confucianism, and in that sense play a prominent role in leading China towards a Confucian democracy? Tan's project, I believe, could have been strengthened by exploring Confucian simfl,rities with more contemporary thinkers. One particular contemporary thinker that may prove beneficial to Tan's project is one whom Tan herself discusses, though only briefly, namely W'ill Kymlicka. Though a liberal, Kyrnlicka is critical of the liberal and communitarian debate; he considers it problematic and misleading, and thus attempts to overcome it by cl,rifying the liberal position. In that sense, perhaps Tan should consider him more seriously, for he may be able to assist her in clearing the ground for the third alternative between the liberals and the communitarians, namely Confucian democracy. Overall this book is well written and persuasively argued. With its comparative theme, it should be of interest to both Confucian and Deweyan scholars. Its clear and readable style makes it a valuable resource not only for graduate level students but for undergraduates as well. In short, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in social and political thought, classical Confucianism, and/or the philosophy of john Dewey. Travis Smith, Southern Tllinois University Carbondale E-mail: smithtw@siu.edu Wagner, Rudolf G., Language, Ontology, and Political Philosophy in Chin~" WANG Bi's Scholarly Exploration of the Dark (Xuanxm). Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, viii+261pages. This is the third of Wagner's three books on WANG Bi's 5E~ philosophy. The subtitle of the book notwithstanding, this is not a book about "the Dark", nor is it about Wang's exploration of it. Except for the subtitle and a three and half page section, the book barely mentions the dark. 190 Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhilosophyV.1 Studies of history of philosophy fall into two general categories, as the author of the book tells us in the preface: those that outline the general lines of development or the tenor of the philosophy of an era, and those that are m-depth studies of certain aspects of a new era or an individual philosopher. This book, says the author, is intended to be a study in the latter sense. It opens with a brief critical account of FENG Yu-lan's ?,~I~ two stage division of the history of Chinese philosophy. Although the criticism is justified, the account is rather redundant, since it is about a framework used in a single book published more than seven decades ago and Feng's views chan~d quite a few times in the years following the publication of that pioneering work (lest we forget that Feng also conducted in-depth studies of Neo-Daoism, let me mention the fact that Feng's insightful study of the philosophy of G u o Yi~ng ~ is still unsurpassed). On the other hand, the digression is also misleading; it leaves the reader with the impression that part of the reason there is this new book is that many in the field of Chinese philosophy are still working in that framework, which is, of course, not true. The book is divided into three parts, entitled respectively: "Discerning the That-by-Which," "WANG Bi's Ontology," and "WANG Bi's Political Philosophy." A brief summary of the first two parts of the book is given here. The first chapter constitutes the bulk of the book, taking up dose to half; apparently what is dealt with here must be regarded as central by the author. The main subject of this part is the familiar subject of language. It is entirely understandable why a study devoted to the philosophy of WANG Bi would start with such a topic; as the scholar TANG Yongtong ~ ) ~ first forcefully argued and convincingly showed, a new understanding of the nature of language and its relation with reality--and in general, the relation between a signifier and the signified----is what made the new philosophy possible. Wagner gives a detailed account of how the dominant view of language accepted by most philosophers of the Wei-Jin ~ era came about; several early works of both the Confucian and Daoist schools are carefiaUye~umined and textual evidence of the development--most of which is furniliar tO students of Chinese philosophy----is meticulously documented. Chapter Two deals with WANG Bi's ontology. Although the author initially raises an issue with TANG Yongtong's now familiar characterization of the difference between the philosophy of Han and that of Wei-Jin, Tang's terms nonetheless continue to be used in the rest of the chapter, as they will be throughout the book. Wagner's focus in this part of the book is Wang's ontology and the conceptual framework the latter employed in the characterization of the ontological features of entities. One virtue of the book is the attention Wagner gives to the details; this is true (the debate about language and of his account of the familiur.yanyizbibian ~ ' ~ intention) in Chapter One as weU as his careful discussion of certain concepts in Wang's philosophy (see, for example, his discussion of u,u ~, "things," and ski ~, "events", starting on page 101; his discussion of li ~, "principle", starting on page 111). The book is a timely and valuable contribution to the study of an era that deserves far more attention than it has received. In the remaining part of this review I will briefly comment on some of the problems that I see in the book. One thing about the book is that many of the claims the author makes are not new, and the material and textual analyses offered here have been documented in other studies. Some of the claims Wagner discusses at length include (1) Waug's new philosophy is closely related to a particular view about the nature of language, which allows Wang to talk about something to which language is supposed to be unsuitable; (2) Wang's commentaries on the classics are to be treated as genuine Book Reviews and Response 191 philosophy rather than standard commentaries on classics as usually understood; (3) Wang's philosophy represents an "evolutionary tuna" from a commentary tradition aimed at annotating the Sages' words to a "discursive philosophy" (90); and (4) Wang was the first to characterize entities as having a "binary structure" (98-108). Readers who are familiar with recent studies of the philosophy of this era will not fail to notice that these are claims that others have made---many of which are listed in the bibliography of Wagner's book (the works by the Chinese scholars XU Kangsheng ~, CHEN Lai ~ , and FANG Litian ~ - ~ , to name just a few). Wagner also makes numerous other claims, many of which I find very questionable. I will briefly comment on a few of them. Wagner claims that Wang relies heavily on the method of "induction" (89, 93, 94, and 97) ha his account of n~u (nothinomaess). Wagner claims, for example, "he [Wang] went along with the notion of haduction and extrapolation as the only viable approach to the Dao" (121). That the term is being employed by Wagner ha its usual sense is dear, since he contrasts induction with deduction. However, to describe Wang's approach as "induction" is surely a mischaxactefization. Suppose that, following Wang, you believe that there is such a thing as ~u ~ ; since this is a rather unusual type of thing which does not allow you to approach it ha a normal way, one thing you might try is to look around and observe the ordinary thi%vs: things which have perceptible or describable features. So here is a dog, and ff it is a dog, it cannot be a cat; there is a square, and if it is a square, it cannot be a circle; here is a thing that is white, and if it is white, it cannot be black, and so on and so forth. At the end of the day, you draw the conclusion that there must be something out there, which is not a dog or a cat, not white or black, not square or round, and so forth. Wang definitely deployed something similar to this ha his account of ~u, but induction has nothing to do with it. A related claim by Wagner is that Wang's philosophical approach to wu is marked by a method of verification; ha Wagner's own words, it is "marked by its capacity to organize philosophical concepts on the basis of verifiable criteria" (101), or, "Wang Bi's induction is guided by logical methods of proof and verification" (94). This type of claim indicates very great confusion. In what sense is Wang's method "vefificational" ha nature? Certainly no one can verify the Hairn that there is something called "that-by-which", or that it has such and such features just by observation. Interestingly, Wagner also claims that WANG's theory represents a type of philosophy that "relied for its proofs on argument and not the authority of wisdom or the teacher's position" (89), that "the project of Wang Bi's generation" is something for which there was no word "beyond the general lun ~, 'judgment'-a scholarly enterprise" (89). However, offering "proofs" and engaging ha "argument" sound a lot more like engaging ha conceptual discoursing rather than conducting induction, which is an empirical enterprise different from argumentation. How Wagner can maintain these two theses at the same time is not easy to see. Let me mention a few more dubious claims Wagner makes ha the book. Wagner opens his book by quoting a bit of Wang, and then goes on to claim that the text quoted contains a phrase that constitutes the core concept of Wang's philosophy. The phrase ha question is suofi ~j:.~, which appears in texts such as '~u wu zhi suoyi shen&gong zhi suofi cheng~TL~j.'~ ~, ~ ; L ~ J ~ . " Wagner translates these two sentences as "that by which things are created" and "that by which achievements are brought about," which is perfect rendering as far as I can tell. However, Wagner singles out the two characters suoyi,~J:.Land claims that the phrase was deployed by Wang as the reserved term for referring to the chief concern of his ontology. Wagner uses this phrase all through the book to refer to what the Neo-Daoists-- 192 Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1 including WANG Bi himself---called Da0 or wu. I find this rather unusual, to say the least, for the phrase su~/is never a substantive phrase in the Chinese language, nor in Wang's works. The philosophy that rose in the Wei-Jin era has always been known as you~uzhizhengNN;Zff~ (debate on being and non-bein~ and wu, da0, xu N (vacuous), ~ n N (heaven), and ~iran N ~ (nature) are the temas featured in the debate. Furthermore, "that by which" is just one of the meanin~ of some of these temas as Wang and other Neo-Daoists used them. So the term suoyi that Wagner coins and relies on so much is not only linguistically questionable but is also philosophically ill-motivated; the idiosyncratic use of the phrase sheds no new light on the issue. Similar claims abound in the book (see the discussion starting on page 100 conceming the two temas wu N and shi ~g and the discussion regarding the phrase quhu ~ starting on page 69-70). Here is an example of such discussions. Wagner d~ims that the two temas ruing~ and cheng~ are deployed by Wang in his philosophical writings as two well-defined terms refer~g to specific things: the former, says Wagner, is used in the traditional sense of definition, and the latter, "the heuristic proposition" (71), is an invention of Wang. Wagner devotes several pages to this matter, and still he leaves it entixdy unclear in what sense these are two technical temas in Wang's philosophy and how they differ from each other. Furthermore, whether ruingis a reserved term for "defirtition" in Wang (or in the era before him) and cbeng a heuristic device, it is a mistake to call cheng--a descriptive name--a "proposition", since names and propositions are two different kinds of thin~. I would like to make one more point before concluding this review. Wagner begins the second chapter of his book with a long quote--two and half pages-- from a well-known work by TANG Yongtong; he then goes on to raise several complaints about the points Tang made in that article, especially the latter's characterization of the difference between philosophy dnring the Han and that in the Wei-Jin era. One of Wagner's complaints is that Tang and other scholars after him had never been en~ely dear about the real difference between "cosmology" and "ontology"; and Wagner attributes the difficulty to the Western orions of these two terms. The reader is led to expect that some new insights will be offered following this evaluation of the situation. However, one searches the remainder of the book and fails to find any new answers. As far as I can tell, Wagner's treatment in the book of Wei-Jin philosophy, and the philosophy of Wang in particular, follows dosdy the model others working in this field have followed, which is the one laid down by T&NGYongtong in the first haft of the last century. The difference between the works of Tang and the more recent studies, if any, is in the attention given to details; this is dearly illustrated in works such as GUO J~h'angand Wei-JinXuanxue ( ~ g ~ N . I R ~ ) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983) by TANG Yijie 33 ~', a work that contains a great deal of detailed discussion of key concepts in Neo-Daoism but is not even listed in Wagner's bibliography. ZONG Desheng, Utica College E-mail: dzong@urica.edu Wang, Robin R. Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture:. Writingsfrom the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dyna@ Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2003, x+449 pages. Robin R. Wang's anthology consists of fifty-foux chronological entries of partial and complete translations of classical writings concerning women in Chinese cul- Book Reviews and Response 193 ture and thought from the Shang ~ Dynasty (1600-1045 BCE) through the Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE). Many of the translated texts are in English for the first time. The scope of the texts included ranges across familiar canonical texts and dynastic histories such as the Fi~ C/asdcs and the Four Books, philosophical texts such as Daodejing ( ~ , ~ ) , Anakcts ( ~ ) , La'e~ ( ~ - ) , and Huainan~ ( ~r~ -7:) , didactic texts and family instruction books such as N~jie ( 7 ~ ) , Anakctsfor Women ( 7 ~ ) , Classicsof Fik'al Pietyfor l~/omen ( 7 ~ ) , and Yan 's Fami~ Instructions ( ~ l l ) , Buddhist and Daoist religious texts such as The Fourty-Two Chapters Sutra (~-~--~g~) , Guanying Chapter of the Lotus Sutra ( ~ ) , and Assembled Transcendents of the City uSth Forufied Walls ( ~ [ - ~ r and lastly, popular folk tales and esoteric texts such as The Classics of Mountains and Seas (flJ~A) , Classics of the White Girls ( ~ 7 ~ ) , In Search of the Supernatural ( ~ A ~ g ) , and The Ballad of Mulan {;~l~l~) 9Its extensiveness is unparalleled by existing anthologies in the field of gender studies in China and Far East Asia that I know of. It certainly complements well Susan Mann and Yu-Yin Cheng's anthology, Under Confudan Eyes: IVritings on Gender in Chinese History, which includes eighteen pieces of translation from the Tang ~ Dynasty to the Qing ~ Dynasty. Wang's anthology is divided into five parts. Part one covers Shang and Western Zhou ~ texts; part two Eastern Zhou; part three Han ~; part four Wei ~1, Jin ~, and South-North Dynasties; and part five Tang and Song, which has the longest list of ~ansLated texts. Each translated excerpt or full text is first summarized by a contemporary scholar to provide an overview of the text and its connection with gender. The caption in each chapter and the relatively short excerpt of most texts make the anthology particularly suitable as a source book not just for scholarly research but for classroom teaching as well. One of the difficulties of doing research in the field of gender studies in China and teaching Chinese gender history for both speeialists and non-specialists is the inaccessibility of primary texts, many of which are hard to locate or have no translation available. Wang's comprehensive anthology, ufili~ng the expertise of contemporary sinologists, historians, and philosophers, is an impressive collection of translated classical writings that provides scholars an invaluable tool for surveying the images of women across the literary landscape of China. The issue of gender oppression in China is certainly not new, but its presumed connection with Confucianism as well as with theyinyang ~ cosmology has now become a hotly contested issue (for more detail, see my Confucianism and IVom~'A Philosophicallnterpretation. Albany: SUNY Press, 2006). Despite the frequent characterization of Chinese patriarchal family structure as Confucian and theyi~ang cosmology as indicative of the inferiority of Chinese women by early feminists and sinologists, it is not entirely clear to what extent sexism in Chinese culture can be attributed to Confucianism, or what underpins the problem of sexism in China. Although there seems to be a progressive rigidity in gender roles reflected in Later writings of Ming-Qing Neo-Confucianism, Wang cautions readers not to identify the problem of sexism as "either the inevitable result or the essential implication of the cosmic vision arfirnating Chinese thought and culture"(xi). Rather, she argues, the familiar pattern of female subordination and restriction found in Later writings is a departure "from the richer and more open-ended estimation of women found in the Chinese cLassics" (x). In other words, the Neo-Confucian interpretation of the yi~ang cosmology subverts the early, more complementary, vision of gender relations. However, I would take this a step further, and argue that the venerable yang and the baseyin found as early as in the Hanyinyang cosmology in fact cannot 194 Dao: A Journal of Compara~'vePhilosophyV.1 even function as a theoreticalexplanatory account for the rigidity of gender roles in Chinese society (see my Confucianism and Women, specially Chapter 3). Rather, the essentially complementary nature of theyinyang cosmology seems to offer a potential reversal of gender roles. O f course, the theoretical flexibility of theyinryang reversal contrasts greatly with the familiar rigidity of gender roles found in Chinese society. Instead of attributing the suborc]i-ation of women to the yi~ang cosmology, the focus, I would argue, should be on the nd-wa/~r (insider-outside) distinction as a fimctional gender distinction. Surely, this is not to say that nei-wai is the sole cause of gender inequality in Chinese culture; rather it is one of the strong contributing factors. The demarcation of genders in accordance with the nei-wai distinction begins with birth. As sinologists and feminists alike have noted, it is undeniable that there is a persistent preference for boys in Chinese culture, where the birth of a boy is a joyous occasion while the birth of a girl is a sign of distress. The earliest oracle bone inscription regarding the childbirth of the beloved consort of King Wu Ding, Fu Hao, recorded in the Shang Dynasty, demonstrates the subordination o f women: "Crake-making on the dayjiashen. Que divined: 'Lady Hao's child-bearing will be good'.... After the thirty-one days, on the dayjiayin, she gave birth. It was not good; it was a girl" (3). The pattern of gender inequality continues in the limited curriculum for girls in a secluded inner chamber where girls are groomed to be humble wives for lives of servitude as dictated in the Lift (~SE) (Book of Rites): "A girl at the age of ten ceased to go out (from the women's apartments). Her governess taught her (the art o~) pleasing speech and manners, to be docile and obedient, to handle the hempen fibers, to deal with the cocoons, to weave silks and form fiJlets, and to learn (all) women's work" (59). The so-called aide []~, (four womanly virtues) and sancong - - ~ (threefold following) as elaborated in the/_2fi and subsequent didactic te~s and family instruction books axe also indicative of Chinese women's dependent kinship roles of daughter, wife, and mother (cf. 33, 60). Although fomaally women in all three stages of their lives are subordinate to the senior men in their families due to their dependent status, there is no shortage of accomplished and talented women celebrated in Chinese literary tradition, both fiction and nonfiction. Strong, virtuous widowed mothers such as Mencius' mother (150) and GONGFU Wenbo's (~f~3~{~ mother (87-91), who played the essential role in shaping their sons' virtuous characters and continued to instruct their grown sons regarding matter of ritual propriety and state affairs, are especially iconic in historical narratives. There are also numerous well-known female warriors and generals such as Mulan Jg~ (250-54) and woman Xian ~ (261-64) in history, despite the constraints of the nei-wai, ritual boundary, that confines women to the limited realm of household management. The paradox between a conservative ritual representation of women as limited, subordinate beings and the actual authority and achievement of women ha social and historical reality is perplexing. Even more perplexing is the first and foremost female historian, BAN Zhao ~ (45-114 CE), whose conservative didactic text Lesmnsfor W/omen ( ~ ) , on the one hand, natuzal~es the inferiority of women and, on the other hand, is also the first text in written history to advocate comparable education for girls (181)! Although ritnalisticaUy women are confined to the illiterate realm of nei (inside), female authors dominate the literary, tradition of didactic texts. For instance, the Four Booksfor lY/omen (3Z[]~) (two of which, Lessomfor W/omen and Anakcts for W/omenaxe included in the anthology) were not just written for women but also by talented and accomplished women themselves. Paradoxically, given their conserva- Book Reviews and Response 195 uve presentation of women's functionary role and unconditional servitude to the patdlineage, they subverted that very conservatism by crossing into the literary realm of wa/(outside) thereby affirming the agency of women in defining thek own gender identity. The two Song sisters who authored the Anakctsflr Women, despite their advocacy for limited, functionary roles of women confined to the domestic sphere, followed BAN Zhao's footsteps by living a rather solitary, literary life instructing princes and princesses in the palace (327). The ambitious title of their simple handbook, the Anakctsfir Women, obviously implies the intended parity between men's education, which takes the Anakcts as its essential text, and women's education. Furthermore, just as Confucius' teaching is prominent for men's educalion, BAN Zhao--the first and foremost female court historian---hys the foundation for women's education. Again the intended parity between Confucius in the realm of wai and BAN Zhao in the realm of neiis apparent in the two Song sisters' use of BAN Zhao as the master in their Anakctsfor Women. Although not without limitation, women authors in reinforcing the conservative readin~ of women's proper sphere also expanded the illiterate realm of nei and elevated the humble status of women. The constraint of the nei-waiboundary is indeed not just theoretical, but also regulatory. Of course, other interpretations of the root of women's oppression in China are also possible. Wang's comprehensive anthology, which includes a wide range of literary writings that go beyond the Confucian and Daoist traditions, is able to present a complex picture of the various images of women in Chinese thought and culture from the pre-Qm to the Song Dynasty. The richness of the anthology surdy reflects the complexity of the issue of gender oppression in Chinese history. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, University of ;MaryWashin~on E-m~il: llee@umw.edu Wu, Xiaomin ~ n ~ , My Way is One Throughout: Re-reading Confudus ( ~ R - ~ : _@~) . Beijing ~ff,,: Beijing University Press ~ L f f , , ~ @ ~ d - , 2003, 320 pages. The annotation and interpretation of ancient texts, especially Confucian classics, have long been a major engagement of ancient Chinese intellectuals. This hemaeneutical practice, indeed, characterizes a way through which Confucian ethical thinking evolves. Among all the classics, the importance of Confucius' Ana/ects can never be overstated. At a time when China increasingly submits herself under the influence of Western economical models and ideologies, however, contemporary Chinese scholars run into many challenges in rethinking the meaning of this critical text. How, for example, shall we understand our relation to the intellectual tradition represented by this text, a tradition that has been continuously criticized and denigrated since the beginning of the last century? How can we establish the independent value and standing of this ancient text under the dominance of Western philosophical systems? Above all, how can we develop an interpretation in modem Chinese, a language that is still evolving toward maturity and seeking a balance between the poetic elegance of classical Chinese and the metaphysical loadln~ of Western languages introduced v/a translation? Wu's book makes a courageous move to meet these challenges by working out an important ck'mensionof Confucius' thinking in modern Chinese. Wu acknowl- 196 Dao: A Journal of Cor~arative PhilosophyV.1 edges that he is inspired by Levinas in developing this interpretation of Confucius f.tom the perspective of "the other." Notably, Levinas's thinking of the Other constitutes a reaction to the tradifonal Western metaphysics that bases ethics upon ontology. Inverting this relation between ontology and ethics, Levinas interprets "the Other" as an infinity that always surpasses the totality and primacy of the self, the Same, the subject, or the Being. For Levinas, thus, the Other is a transcendental infinity, which, in its unfolding process, constantly exceeds the limits imposed by its own concepmdiTation. It is in the ethical relation to the Other, which is a "relation without relation" as the other remains outside the totality of the Same, that the self discovers the meaning of its genuine freedom as the responsibility and obligation toward the Other. Without elaborating and developing Levinas's convoluted and profound thinking of the Other, however, Wu seems to base his interpretation of Confucius upon a commonsensical understanding the Other as the "person" of the other. Therefore, as Wu admits, the book does not constitute a genuine comparative study between Confucius and Levinas. However, by developing a consistent reading of Confucius from the perspective of "the other," it may well have paved the way for a real dialogue between Confucian moral teachings and Levinasian ethics. Wu demonstrates the dimension of "the other" in Confucian ethical thinking by carefully reinterpreting a group of its most important concepts, including humaneness (ren C-), decorum (h" @), filial reverence (Mao ~), loyalty (zhong ~,) and love. In most cases, Wu elaborates these concepts in the context of some key chapters selected from the Analects. The first chapter, the backbone of the whole book, dwells upon the meaning of humaneness by a careful, word-by-word analysis of the sentence in Anakcts 6.30: "a humane person would establish others in establishing himself." As Wu understands it, this sentence makes manifest an interdependence of the accomplishment of the self and of the other. Humaneness, which for Wu constitutes an "ideal" of Confucianism, would only arise "between" this ethical relationship of the self and the other. Wu draws further on a famous line in the Doctrine of the Mean that defines humaneness in terms of human (ren). Playing upon the double senses of the Chinese character ren [.K human/the other], Wu argues that the achievement of humaneness is not a matter ofpers0nal cultivation but requires the engagement of everyonein a society. With the basic meanings of hurnar~eness and its rdafion to "the othes clarified, Wu opens the second chapter with another paragraph in the Analects that explains the practice of humaneness in "self-overcoming and returning to the rule of decorum" (Analects 12.1). By examining the implications of Confucius' inquiry in the great temple, which is described in Analects, Wu identifies the root of decorum as the reverence and respect of "the other". Decorum, according to Wu, is the language that expresses the reverence and respect of the other by the self. The Confudan emphasis upon the rule of decorum, which rn,kes possible the harmony of social relations, manifests an elevated metaphysical status that discloses the "truth" of the other: "the other transcends the self; the other itself is transcendent" (151). Understood in this way, the self-overcoming and the renaming to the rule of decorum contain an invitation; it summons the self to the truth of the other and vitality of humaneness. Having revealed the significance of reverence and respect of the other in decorum, Wu moves on for an in-depth investigation of the embodiment of such reverence and respect in family relations, i.e. in filial reverence (:&a0~t) and fraternal love (ti'~). Filial reverence and fraternal love, according to Confucius, is "the mot of humaneness" (dnakcts 1.2). Wu stresses the ethicalaspect of filial reverence and locates its essence in a Book Reviews and Response 197 fuI~dame.ntal respect of "the other." The essential meaning of the monming of dead parents, a main practice of filial reverence, according to Confucius, lies in the proper inheritance of their ambition and the proper record of thek deeds. As Wu interprets it, this practice of mourning is first and foremost a preservation of the other as the other; it "lets the other exist as the other instead of as a part of myseh~ (176). IAke decorum and fill,1 reverence, loyalty (Thong) is in Wu's reading not primarily a political concept, but articulates "a basic principle that dominates the ethical relation of the self and the other" (186). According to Wu's interpretation in Chapter Four, true loyalty is concerned with the fundamental reyponsibih~ of the self toward the other. As an embodiment of humaneness, loyalty has to be understood on the basis of my inexorable responsibility toward the other and thus my irrevocable recognition and respect of the other. By elaborating on the relation of loyalty to the concept of mast (:tin ~ ) and courage ~yong~), Wu demonstrates its significant role for understanding the profound meaning of the ethical relation between the self and the other in the Confucian tradition. The last concept Wu examines in Chapter Five is "love." After some meticulous study of the meaning of the Chinese word for "love" (~ ~) in a number of contexts, Wu identifies the core of Confucian love as the fundamental care for the existence of "the other." By interpreting this love further as an ethical requirement and imperative, Wu brin~ out the import of Confucian love: the accomplishment of the self as a humane person, viz. as an ethicalsubject It is through this love from one's heart and conscience that one becomes a humane person that is one and the same with heaven and earth. The love of or care for the existence of the other, therefore, forms the foundation of an ontological understanding of humaneness in later neo-ConfudanismAfter the elucidation of the central Confucian concepts from the perspective of "the other," Wu pushes for a deeper understanding of humaneness in Chapter Six by a sentence-by-sentence elaboration of Anakcts 12.2. By exploring the profound meanings of Corffucius' statement on humaneness in terms of responsibility and obligation to the other, Wu finally locates the essence of Confucian ethical thinking in the sense of concern (you ~[). The sense of concern, as Wu explains, is ultimately a concern for "the other" for whom I am responsible; thus it reflects my fundamental care of the other. The last chapter discusses two special kinds of persons as the other--woman and the mean person in the context of Confucius' remark in Analects 17.25 that it is "difficult to treat them." While acknowledging Confucius' prejudice against women, Wu points out that the "need" to treat them nonetheless manifests the ethical responsibility that Confucius determines to take. The Appendix of the book involves an interesting and important comparison between the rule of decorum and the rule of law. Wu explores the meaning and origin of the sense of shame in Colffucian thinking by analyzing the principle of action indicated in Analects 13.18. The discussion of the sense of shame leads f:maUy to the question of the essence of the human being. After a brief review of the discourse on the essence of the bureau being by some leading Western thinkers, Wu proposes that a rereading of Confucius and reinterpretation of the meaning of Confucian humaneness from the perspective of "the othes would help us to confront this critical and complicated problem. Toward this significant project, indeed, Wu's book has made a solid and worthy step. Huaiyu Henry Wang, Penn State University Email: hzwlOl@psu.edu 198 Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhilosophyV.1 Yang, Guorong ~ k ~ , Dimensions of Being: Metaphysics in a Post-metaphysical ~_Iz@t~DA:@) . Beijing ~ , , : Renmin Chubanshe )k ~ / ~ T d : , 2005, 5+4+317 pages. Age ( ? g ~ E ~ : YANG Guorong has established himself as a prominent scholar in Chinese philosophy. However, his f~mili~ritywith and understanding of Western philosophy often makes many of us who are primarily working in the area of Western philosophy blush with shame. His firm grasp of both philosophical traditions provides him with a unique angle from which to do comparative philosophy. His most recent book, Dimouiom ofBeing: Metapl~sics in a Post-meta]@~'calAge, is a work of comparative philosophy at its best. While most scholars of comparative philosophy are doing ~mpariso~ of different philosophical traditions, Yang is doingpbilosopl~y drawing on resources from different philosophical traditions. Of this, Yang has a dear consciousness: "It is quite superficial if comparative philosophy is limited to listing the respective unique features of Chinese and Western philosophies, to show their simil,rlties and differences" (3). In his view, it is a more genuine work of comparative philosophy if one can use the perspective from a different philosophical tradition to understand, enrich, and develop one's own philosophical tradition. Yet, ha Yang's view, the most profound comparative philosophy should aim at constructive philosophical thinking: "In their respective long history, both Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy have developed some original and creative ideas, which are not only historical accomplishments, but also constructive origins from which contemporary philosophy can star(' (3). Yang claims that his book is an experiment of comparative philosophy ha this last sense. In addition to "Introduction," the book consists of nine chapters. The first chapter, "Metaphysics and Concreteness of Being," discusses being qua being, the central topic of metaphysics, not as an abstract idea but as a concrete one ha two senses. On the one hand, particularly drawing from the Qhag ~ neo-Confucian WANG Fuzhi's iS~;Z philosophy, Yang argues that the metaphysical (:dngersbang ~_L) is not separate from the physical (xCngerxia~ T ) . On the other hand, appropriati~ Heidegger's idea of temporality, Yang emphasizes the historicity of being. In the second chapter, "The Nomaative Dimension of Value," Yang argues that the question of being is not only about what something is, but also about what value it has to human beings, and what it should become. The htter two questions, ha Yang's view, are normative ones. In this context, Yang discusses several very important ideas, such as fact and value, knowing the world and changing the world, and humanized nature and naturalized humans. In the third chapter, "Knowing, Being, and Wisdom," Yang discusses the metaphysical dimension of knowledge, as both the thln~ to be known (suo ~)~) and the knower (neng~) are first of all beings. This is what he regards as the ontological presupposition of knowledge (more detailed argument of this chapter can be seen ha Yang's article, published ha this same issue). Chapter Four, "Being and Method," continues the theme of the previous chapter. With the question "what is being" previously discussed, Yang explores the question of "how to know being" ha this chapter, and so it is a chapter on methodology, with the central focus on the unity of the order of being, the order of knowhag, and the order of action. In Chapter Five, "The Metaphysical Features of Language," Yang argues that the way to understand being cannot be independent of language. He particularly examines several important functions of language: (1) to refer to reality ~i rain zhi wu J ~ R ~ ) ; (1) to distinguish thin~ from each other (yi min bian wu ~s (3) to do things ~'yan xing shi J.Xg~r~g), and (4) to govern things ~t" ruing zhi wu V),~z~). Chapter Six, "Ontological Dimensions of the Beau- Book Reviews and Response 199 fiful," tunas to aesthetics. What Yang means by ontological dimensions includes (1) the being of the object of the aesthetical experience: "the harmony of heaven and earth" (tiand zhi he ~ Z ~ ) ; (2) the being of the subject of the aesthetical experience; and (3) the being of the purposefulness of the object to the subject. Chapter Seven, "Morality and Being," comes back to the theme of Chapter Two. Unlike Chapter Two, which focuses on the moral dimension of being, however, this chapter discusses how morality can transform Being, i.e., the Being of human beings, through its norm,tire regulation of human behaviors. Parfimd,rly interesting in this chapter is Yang's use of the Confucian idea offing ~ (emphasizhag universality) and quan~ (stressing flexibility) to explain moral principles in order to avoid moral dogmatism and relativism. Chapter Eight, "Ordinary Life and the Ultimate Concern," is a chapter on the philosophy of religion. Seeing that in the Western religious traditions, everyday life and the ultimate concern are often regarded as opposing each other, Yang argues that in Chinese traditions, they are always connected. This is well expressed in the Zhon~ongstatement of"reaching the greatest height and brilliancy and following the path of the mean" (Zhon~ong27). In Yang's view, "the greatest height and brilliancy" is the ultimate concern, which can be reached only by following "the path of the mean," the everyday life. In the last chapter, "Freedom: A Metaphysical Perspective," Yang argues that freedom is the ability of a particular being, human being, to transform other beings from beingsin-themsdves to beings-for-us. It is in this sense that he considers Zblranowzi'sunderstanding of freedom (~you ~fl~) as being natural (:~ran~ ) as not sufficient, as it does not reflect human ideals and purposes that are closely connected with the idea of freedom. Yang also tackles the difficult issues of free will and determinism and ends up endorsing Roderick Chisholm's idea of agent causation in contrast to the idea of event causation as a plausible solution to the problem. It is clear that, although Yang claims that he does not mean to provide a "system" of metaphysics in this book, he does discuss all the important metaphysical issues in a systematic way. Of course, since Yang touches a wide range of issues, one can always find some fault with his discussion. While I ~ not go into any of the detailed issues, I do want to raise a very general one. Yang's book has a subtitle: '~Ietaphysics in a Post-Metaphysical Age." Seeing that, readers will naturally want to know in what sense Yang uses the term "post-metaphysical," how metaphysics is possible in a post-metaphysical age, whether such metaphysics in a postmetaphysical age is a different type of metaphysics, and, if so, how it is different from traditional metaphysics. These questions, however, are not directly answered in the book. In the "Introduction," Yang does mention Habermas's use of the term "post-metaphysics" in his PostmetapbysicalTbinka'ng(1) but does not provide any further explanation. It is my hunch, however, that Yang's metaphysics in a postmetaphysical age does not go well with Habermas's postmetaphysical thinking (after all, Habermas does not use the term "postmetaphysical metaphysics"). Habermas's post-metaphysical thinking is primarily concerned with procedural rationality, while Yang's metaphysics in a post-metaphysical age is still concerned with rationality of content, to use Habermas's term (PostmetapbysicalTbinkin~ Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1993, 35). As a matter of fact, one may even wonder whether Yang's metaphysics in a postmetaphysical age somehow still belongs to what Habermas regards as an example of traditional metaphysics, which is centered on the three themes: "uniW within the philosophy of origins, the equation of being with thought, and the redemptive significance of contemplative life" (Habermas: 29). 200 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophyV.1 Despite this, I think that the metaphysics Yang develops in this book can still be adequately regarded as a post-metaphysical one, if we can use the term in some non-Habermasian senses. Heidegger is critical of traditional metaphysics and yet still develops his metaphysics, which can thus be seen as a postmetaphysical metaphysics, even though Heidegger himself does not use this label. One of the central features of such a postmetaphysical metaphysics is the inseparability of the meaning of Being and a particn!~r being, the human being (Dasein), that alone can ask and understand the question about the meaning of Being (with another feature being that it is not centered around being, even the first being, but the Being of beings). Richard Rorty is perhaps the most anti-metaphysical among contemporary philosophers. However, his use of "postmetaphysical hope" suggests that he at least accepts one sense of metaphysics: metaphysics not as a descriptive science (telling us what the reality really is) but as normative hope (telling us what we human behags should be or do) (see Rorty, PhilosophyandgodalHope, London: Penguin Books, 1999, 160). Now in this Heideggetian-Rorfian sense, the metaphysics Yang develops in this book can indeed be regarded as post-metaphysical. One of the most important claims that Yang makes is that the meaning of Being, the proper topic for any metaphysics, is possible only from the perspective of human beings. For this, he not only cites from the Neo-Confucian DAI Zhen ~ , who criticizes ZHU Xi's ~ "empty talk about principle independent of human beings" (49-50), but also directly appeals to Heidegger on the priority of Das~'n to the question of Being (54). Although Yaug does not claim that metaphysics is entizely normative, two of the three questions that he thinks are central to any type of metaphysics are related to the normative aspect: what a thing means to bnm~n beings and what it should become (67). With my initial concern about the postmetaphysical nature of the metaphysics Yang presents in this book thus cleared, however, I start to wonder whether, instead of being not postmetaphysical enough, Yang's metaphysics is too much postmetaphysical in the above mentioned Heideggefian-Rortian sense. Explaining the two normative questions of metaphysics, Yang states: "the question of 'what meanhag it has' asks the meaning a thing has for human beings, and the question of 'what it should become' asks whether and how a tbing should realize the meaning it has for human beings" (67). Commenting on the statement in Zbongyong 22 that only absolutely sincere people "can fully develop the nature of things," Yaug emphasizes that "this does not mean that humans help completing the natural processes, but that humans, t.krough their actions, transform the objective world (heaven and earth) from the things-in-themselves (~ai .Tbiu,u f~;Z.~) to thingsfor-us (woiwozhi wu lg~;Z~), so that they can meet h,amahs' rational needs and obtain their values" (84). This is what he calls the "humanization" (renhua)'.4t) of the nature, in which not only the object is transformed from things-in-themselves to things-for-us, but human beings who undertake this transformation are also transformed from things-in-themselves to things-for-themselves (x~wei~biu,u f~lg~ ~ ) (287). The reason I suspect Yang of going too far in this postmetaphysical direction is that it smacks of anthropocentrism. While it is certainly true that only humans can understand the meaning and value of beings, it is not equally true that things are meaningful or have value only to human beings. Today, it seems to be a general consensus that animals have their value in, to, and for themselves, independent of and in addition to their possible value to and for human beings. Some people even go so far as to claim that plants also have their own value independent of and in addition to their value to human beings. A somewhat famous argument in Book Reviews and Response 201 this respect is the so-called "the last man argumenf': Suppose that you were the last surviving human (or sentient) being and were soon to die as well; Suppose that also it were within your power to destroy the last tree (the last living thin~ which could otherwise continue to flourish and propagate; Suppose again that you would not die more comfortably by destroying the tree or suffer more pain by leaving it alone. In this case, would you do anything wrongby destroying it? If our answer is perchance "yes", it can only mean that the tree has its own value independent of its values to human and other sentient beings (see Richard and Val Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in EnvironmentalPhilosophy, ed. by Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1986, 178-183). If this is the case, then I think it at least not entirely uncontroversial to say that the goal of hum~r~ action is to transform natural things (at least living things) from thin~-inthemselves to things-for-us. Of course it is one thing to say that animals and plants may have value in and for themselves; it is another to say that they are aware of such value. It is still true that only human beings (or other rational beings) can realize not only value of those non-rational living beings to human beings but also their values for themselves (thanks for the comments by Dr. ZHENG Yujian). What all this does show is that, while animals and plants cannot be considered as moral agents, they do deserve to be considered as our moral patients. Having said that, I think no one who has read this book will fail to admire Yaug's expertise in both Chinese and Western philosophical traditions and his acute philosophical perceptivity. Yang's book is exemplary of comparative philosophy. HUANG Yong, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania E-maik yhnang@kutztown.edu Zhang, Zailin ~ , Contrast and Compatibik~ betweenthe Chinese and Western Philosophies ( q b ~ @ ~ @ ~ ) . Beijing ~L~,,: Renmin Chubanshe ),.L~ /:B~T~, 2004, 244 pages. The comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies has been nothing new to Chinese academia in the past few decades. What marks the uniqueness of Zhang's book is its focus on modern and contemporary thinkers of both the Continental and Auglo-Amefican traditions, with the author's effort to show how the influx of new knowledge from the West adds to resources for the study and reassessment of traditional Chinese philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. The first part is categorized by eight topics in temas of epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, religion, the purpose of philosophy, hnguage of philosophy, and political philosophy. Through these classifications, Zhang seeks to create a concrete dialogical situation that leads to what he calls "a common ground" (4-5) despite the existent differences between the East and West. The philosophers under discussion include, but are not limited to, Edmund Hussed, Max Scheler, Franz Rosenzweig, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Leo Strauss. The second part is devoted to specific philosophical issues and schools, such as Bubes dialogism, Hussed's phenomenology, and Maclntyre's commtmitarianism. Zhang sees Western philosophy as a common denominator upon which one can translate diverse philosophical systems for the purpose of comparison and mutual understanding. Much has been said with respect to a radical difference between the Chinese and Western approaches in philosophy. Discussing in line with the traditional th,o- 202 Dao: A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1 na-versus-prax4s distinction maintained by many Chinese scholars, Zbang argues that Chinese philosophy as a whole, contra to traditional Western philosophy, is pragmatically oriented. For instance, the Western ~isteme, developed out of intellectual curiosities, leads to theoretical constructs in the philosophy of knowledge; whereas Chinese philosophy, derived from a concerned responsiveness to human existence, leads to practical wisdom for guiding human life. Accordingly, Chinese ontology is an "ontology of love" that is relationship-oriented rather than an "ontology of being" that is truth-oriented. Neither of these two models, however, says Zhang, is perfect, and thus need to be supplemented by the other. It is in this sense that Zhang argues that the differences between the Chinese and the Western philosophies should be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. One of the most engaging parts of Zhang's interpretation of Continental philosophy is the principle of "intersubjectivity," originating from the dialogism of Rosenzweig and Buber, the very concept that enables Zhang to bring the Chinese philosophical tradition into conversation with Western philosophical theories. Zhang contends that "intersubjectivity" provides an alternative for Western philosophy to be free from an Afistotelian subject-predicate proposition, or a Kantian transcendental identity of apperception (in the form of "I think"). For Zhang, intersubjectivity is defined as a state of the mind as well as a method of communication that centers more on human relationships and social interaction. Following this argument, Zhang considers open interpersonal and intercultural dialogues to be necessary for the crystallization of the common discourse that is essential for mutual understandings between the East and West. In his discussion of comparative ethics, Zhang introduces Max Scheler (18741928), one of phenomenology's earliest figures, whose theory of ethical personalism has become a major voice in the formation of phenomenological ethics in the West. According to Zhang's interpretation, Scheler's "non-formal" system of values (as a reaction against the fixed, absolute, apnon of Kanfianism) resembles many aspects of the intuitionistic approach to ethics exemplified by the Confucian tradition from Mengzi ~q~ to WANG Yangming SEPOY. This type of moral intuition becomes a morality of autonomy in the Chinese tradition, and is made possible, says Zhang, because of the fundamental Confucian belief in a non-dual relationship between human moral nature and biological nature (38). Like Scheler, Zhang contends that it is the self-evident human "heart/mind" (x/njik",0~N~A) or the intuitiveness of "pure knowing" (k'angzhi~ , 38) rather than a transcendental ego, reason, or a will that accounts for the true essence of human existence. Nevertheless, Zhang acknowledges the need for some form of reasoning to articulate moral judgments and resolve moral conflicts. Zhang also employs the idea of "intersubjectivity" to explain the Chinese aesthetic sensibility that in turn shapes Chinese philosophy. While subject-object dualism leads to dichotomization and separation of the world as fragments, Chinese intersubjecfivity (i.e., the totality of self and other) constitutes the idea of inter-involvement via constant inter-plays, inter-exchan~, and inter-transfomaations. Zhang points out that the intersubjective way of thinking is evident in the Confucian notion of beauty in a matrix of human relationship, i.e., the idea of liren weimei ~ U - ~ , as well as in the Daoist subversion of the subject-object duality by speaking of"thinghag things" ~yiwuguanwu L X ~ ) . " Zhang further argues that to overcome the separation between the subjective and the objective is exactly what the FIusserlian "intentionality of consciousness" attempts to do, and that the Chinese concept of inter-involvement in terms of the totality of one's self and the world provides an Book Reviews and Response 203 alternative solution to the problem. In the section on contemporary religious thought, Zhang's predilection for dialogical philosophy is shown through his choice of Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1926) to explain modem Continental philosophical and theological viewpoints. As an important thinker of the 20th century whose thought has great impact on such philosophers as Levinas, Derrida, and Buber, Rosenzweig attempts to blend Eastern philosophies with Jewish mysticism, which is perhaps another reason that his theological position is attractive to Zhang, Nevertheless, Rosenzweig's Judaism, with its biblical implications of life, death, and redemption, and the relationship between God, world, and humanity, does not fit very well with the concept of Chinese cosmology and cosmogony, represented by the Ytfing (~i~) , as Zhang has suggested (71-74). It remains a question whether Jewish mysticism in terms of the communion between divinity and humanity (in the symbol of "David's Shield") can be identified with the notion of the oneness of Dao maintained in Chinese philosophy, not to mention the polyvalence of the meaning of Dao within the framework of the Chinese tradition. Leo Strauss (1899-1973), a German-born American philosopher selected by Zhaug, is an interesting figure. Strauss is well known for his ruthless attacks on the demoralization of modem political philosophy characterized by the technocratic, legalistic, and empirical models and promoted by modem social philosophy of reason. Instead, Strauss calls for the demand of virtue advocated by pre-modem, or more specifically, ancient political philosophers since Xenophon and Plato. One of the reasons that accounts for Strauss's contempt for modem liberalism is that it is made only for the mediocre man (vs. the superhuman) for the sake of maintaining social prosperity and stability, which, as Strauss sees it, fails to realize the ultimate goal of the higher bnman achievements. On the other hand, it is in Strauss' structure of social order that Zhang finds an affinity with the Chinese intellectual tradition, paztic,hrty with its emphasis on the ideal of "governing by virtue" (&xing ~hizhi ~'~:Z ~). Zhang concludes that Confilcqanism and Laozi's Daoism, to a certain degree, represent a Chinese version of Straussian political philosophy, which also seeks a reciprocating society bound by shared ends, ruled by a sage-like man (shengren~_A.), and in which common people simply assume and fillfill socially given roles. The second part of Zhang's book continues many topics discussed in the first, which deals with dialogism, postmodemism, phenomenology, commtmitarianism, and the semiotic philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel. Zhang employs Apel, who seeks a new interpretation of the transcendental conditions that make argumentation possible, to explicate the limits of a "linguistic turn" both in contemporary continental and analytical philosophies. As a whole, the comparative essays in the second part remain sketchy and loosely related. It reads like a collection of previously published short articles, devoid of a sense of systematic coherence. Zhang's comparative study is a welcome contribution to the much-needed discussion on the future of Chinese philosophy. As a matter of a fact, the book is a product of this practical concern, i.e., what the author calls an "anxiety consciousness" ~ouhuany#hi ~,~,,~-~) in the age of globalizafion (2). It should be noted that throughout the book the author proposes his view on the future of Chinese philosophy via the notion of universalism or a universal language ~gongdu.x'ng.yuyan~ . '~) (6). According to Zhang's argument, both traditional Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy can become a universal thought that goes beyond particular cultural differences. Yet obviously, Zhang does not want to identify universalism with fotmdationalism, as he questions foundationalism, both ha the form of Eurocenttism and in the name of "Asian values" (which tends to emphasize the 204 Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1 "distinctive characteristics" of a culture for the sake of protectionism). In order to avoid confusing universalism with foundationalism, Zhang relies on dialogism as a new form of universalism. It is in this sense that Zhang's analyses of the philosophical schools and philosophers are consistent with his overall agenda that universal validity exists in metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. Politically, Zhang seems to suggest a kind of new conservative position, which is shown in his promotion of Strauss' ideal of elitist ruling and Macintyre's ideal of a communitarian society. Meanwhile, the dialogical modality is implied by the title of the book, which entails the idea of "encountering" (hut"~) and "fully understandi,~' (tong~_) the other. The chief hermeneutic burden that Zhang faces is how to "fially understand" the other without reducing the other for the sake of a hermeneutics of identity, unity, and the coherent wholeness. It seems, however, that Zhang tends to downplay or even ignore the differences (contrasts) of "categories of thought" in his comparative project since he is too eager to look for the finality ofa Gadamafian "fusion of horizons" (compatibility) in terms of "Self-in-the-Other" and "Other-in-the-Self." The problem of reductionism is also associated with the author's methodology: In order to demonstrate how philosophical conceptions from the West help to "uncover" the beauty of traditional Chinese thought, Zhang tends to check the Western norms first, looks for parallels in his own tradition, and then proves that the Chinese philosophy has the same or similar ideas (only much earlier). As a result, Zhang's comparative project is still conditioned by the distinctive perspectives, emphases, and vocabularies (some of which, I am afraid, are awkwardly translated) of Western philosophy. Another flaw of the book lies in Zhang's overall presentation of Chinese philosophy, which basically focuses on Confucianism. He does cover Daoism and Buddhism in certain sections, but those discussions are very weak, and even problematic. For example, on the topic of religion, he relies on Zhuxi's ~ interpretation of Buddhism to critique the Buddhist failure to address the issue of life and death (59). His treatment of the issue of "Phenomenology and the Consciousness-Only School (IVeishi ~ ) Buddhism" (178-190) is partiod,rly inadequate, with no acknowledgement of similar yet much more sophisticated studies done by scholars in the past decades. Other minor errors include incomplete names and wrong spellin~ of the works and authors cited in the book. The original names should be provided when important philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Franz Rosenzweig, and Max Scheler are discussed. The reading would be more enjoyable if such errors were avoided. Ellen Zhang, Independent Scholar E-mail: ezhang3121@yahoo.com Response: Xunzi, Again Paul tL Goldin* The editors of Dao have kindly allowed me to submit this brief re-assessment of Xtmzi occasioned by Bongrae Seok's review of my book, l~'tuals of the Way: The " AssociateProfessorof East AsianLanguagesand Civilizations,Universityof Permsylvama,851 WilliamsHall,Philadelphia,PA 19104-6305;emaikprg@sas.upenn.edu. Book Reviews and Response 205 Philosophy ofXun~i (Dao 4.2: 375-78). My purpose is not to quarrel, since the review was fair and insightful, but to provide an outline of how my views of XunTi have developed since the publication of that book in 1999. Advances in the field have necessitated a reconsideration of some of the claims in Rituals of the Way, and changes in my thinking have suggested others. I still hold to what I have always considered the fundamental argumems of the book, but the crudity of the exposition may make it hard for readers to discern which are supposed to be the fundamental arguments and which the ancillary ones. 1. Xunzi believes that Heaven produced the da0 ~ (in contrast to La0~, for example, where it is dearly said that the da0 produced Heaven). Why or how Heaven accomplished this is not knowable, and thus it is a waste of time to speculate about the issue. What can be known is how the da0 operates in the material worl& We infer this by observing the world around us and using out minds (x/n ,~,,) to derive principles from what we observe. (I do not agree with the position that the principles of the da0 are open to human interpretation, nor with the position that the da0 is correlative. In my view, Xunzi believes the da0 simply is; it is how the universe works, and it never changes.) Once we have come to know how the da0 operates, we can improve ourselves and out society by conforming to it. If we attempt to conduct ourselves or o u r society in a manner that is incompatible with the da0, we will suffer---and have only ourselves to blame. When a ruler governs a state well, there are bound to be good results; when a ruler governs a state badly, there are bound to be bad results. Disasters have no long-term consequences: a well governed state will prosper even in the face of disasters, and a poorly governed state will be vanquished even if it avoids disasters altogether. (Xunzi's opinion of the recent hurricane would undoubtedly have been that hurricanes strike all states equally, but a well governed state will be adequately prepared for such an event, whereas a poorly governed state will be in no position to respond to the crisis.) Consequently, Heaven plays a sure but indirect role in determining out fortune or misfortune. Heaven never intercedes directly in human affairs, but human affairs are certain to succeed or fail according to a timeless pattern that Heaven determined before human beings existed. 2. Xunzi believes that we are born imperfect. We are born with the necessary faculties to become good and successful people, but we are not born with habits that lead us to become good and successful people without conscious effort. The tema xing '~=is used to denote everything we have from birth, and since we are not admirable people from bix-th, our xqng is said to be e ~ , or "bad" (in the semantic range of "detestable"). Yet the fact that we are born with a detestable disposition does not mean that we are constitutionally or irremediably bad. We can use our minds to perceive the da0, and force the rest of our body to comply with what we come to recognize, through reason, as a better mode of life. In this manner we can reform out habits. Since it is difficult for ordinary human beings to do this, the Sages, who discovered the da0 for themselves, left behind a corpus of practices, texts, and songs which Xunzi calls ~ ~ , ring ~A, and yue ~, respectively~that serve to help us learn the right way to behave. But these are merely aids (signposts m~rking treacherous spots in a ford, as Xunzi puts it); one does not need to be a master of the rites in order to be a good person. The essence of points 1 and 2 is encapsulated in Xunzi's maxlm, "Heaven and Earth gave birth to it; the Sages perfected it (lianck'sheng zhi, ~hengrenchengz h i ~ J ~ ;g, ~.L~;Z)." Xunzi uses the term chengj@/~ to mean "completion, perfection," as in bringing something to a successful conclusion. This is what I no longer hold: 206 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophyV.1 I. I no longer hold that Xtmzi's world view was "wholly new." In 1999 (or 1995, when I wrote the bulk of the manuscript), Xunzi's world view may have seemed "wholly new," but the recently excavated Guodian ~ / g manuscripts show that rn~ny of his basic ideas were anticipated in the fourth centreT B.C. Indeed, it now seems evident that if anyone's world view was new, it was Mencius'. While Xunzi's use of the term .x'ingis almost identical to that of the Guodlan manuscripts--~ng is what aU members of a species have by birth--it was Mencius, by using ~ng to refer to the state that members of a species should attain if they are provided with a suitably nurturing environment, who forged a novel sense for the term. However, Xunzi's philosophy was not derivative, either. Xunzi moved beyond many of the tenets of the Guodian manuscripts, and never adopted their pecnliar view that ten U~is internal andyi ~ external (see my After Confucius:Stuck'esin Earlr ChinesePhilosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005, 36-57). The fact that Gaozi ~ T echoed this infamous distinction highlights how far apart Xunzi and Gaozi rernai,ed, even though they both argued against Mencianism. (On this issue, I think Seok may have misread me.) 2. I am no longer sure of the merit of comp, ring Xunzi to diverse Western philosophers. I tried not to be glib about such juxtapositions, and acknowledged the differences between Xunzi and Hobbes that Seok stresses in his review, but today I would not try to salvage such comparisons, since I fear that they obscure Xunzi's distinctive place in his world. For example, the rn~in problem with comparing h"and contract~ianism (at the time, I was still greatly influenced by Herbert Fingarette) is that it fails to capture the element of self-cultivation embedded in li. Yes, k, like the rules of a contracr~fi~n, serve to organize society into a cohesive and harmonious network, but X,n:fi takes pains to emphasize that arbitrarily chosen regulations could have the same effect, and yet would s~ill fall short of being ~ because they would have no didactic value. I am not sufficiently familiar with Western philosophy to make strong ~luirns about contemporary contractafianism, but generally I do not find in it the same concern for moral self-cultivation as in Xunzi. In sum, if I were writing a book like Rituals of the Way today, I would spend more time comparing Xnn~.i to Laozi and Mozi, and less time comparing him t o Hobbes and Tindak The former are the only comparisons that would have been meaningful to Xunzi himself. Incidentally, my first lesson about the hazards of comparing Chinese and Westem philosophers, without regard for their context, came when I strode into the late W.V. Quine's office and tried to explain to him why I thought the "Qiwu Lun ~ ~ " of Zhuang~ (~-~) was similar to his idea of ontological relativity. He thought about it for a moment, and then said a few sentences that I could not begin to understand. I am sure he thought I was insane. When we met again at a luncheon a few months later, I held out the faint hope of clarifying what I had tried to say about Zhuangzi and ontological relativity, but he insisted on discussing goulash.