Akrasia

In "Locke, Hume and Moral Theory", Philippa Foot argues that John Locke and David Hume have made the same mistake concerning moral motivation: they believed that there is a dichotomy between knowing what is good and willing what is good. This paper sets out to analyze Foot's argument and provide an explanation to Foot's solution to the akratic problem.

This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, "inverse" akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent's total evidence determines both the beliefs and the intentions it's rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent's evidence does so in a way such that it's never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ.

How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness?  If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity?  How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves?  Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life?  In dream-reports perhaps?  Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs?  Or in certain jokes and hoaxes?  Are contradictions felt to be meaningless?  I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties.  First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others.  Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.

_____________________________________________________________ BOZZA __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 0. Premessa La tesi centrale di questo intervento e' che nelle scienze cognitive e del comportamento esiste una vistosa lacuna teorica fonte di continue ambiguita', contraddizioni, impossibilita' di relare i fenomeni a livello cognitivo alto (basati su rappresentazioni esplicite) con i loro precursori a livelli evolutivi precedenti, ecc. Ad esempio questa lacuna impedisce di avere una teoria unitaria dell'inganno (a livello non-intenzionale animale ed a livello umano) come impedisce una nozione generale di comunicazione, di cooperazione, di competizione, ecc. Essa e' anche una delle basi della difficolta' della teoria dell'autoinganno e della impossibilita' (paradossi) di applicare la normale nozione di inganno sociale-intenzionale in modo riflessivo. Ma l'ostacolo creato da questa lacuna teorica-per quanto concerne la teoria dell'autoinganno-e' ancora piu' vistoso: infatti, finche' non colmiamo questa lacuna disporremo di una magra alternativa nei nostri modelli teorici: una alternativa tra atti goal-governed, intenzionali, e puri meccanismi causali. Questa alternativa e' insufficiente per modellare la mente ed il comportamento. ______________________________________________________________ Castelfranchi Workshop Autoinganno-Roma 12 dic 98

The relationship between intention, intentional action, and moral assessment is of fundamental importance to ethical theory. In large part, moral responsibility is based on an assessment of agent responsibility, which in turn is based on the connection between an agent's intentions and the actions which they cause. In the last twenty-five years, there has been a debate in contemporary action theory about the relationship between intentions and intentional action. Objecting to what he calls the "Simple View," which he characterizes as the view that all intentional actions are intended under some description, Michael Bratman, among others, argues that not all intentional actions are intended. In this dissertation, we will defend the Simple View by appealing to Aristotle's theory of action as developed in his psychological and ethical works. In the first part of the dissertation, we argue that all intentional actions are intended under some description; however, we argue that distinctions between different types of intention are essential: specifically, the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate intentions and the distinction between the intention of the end and the intention of the means. Our account centers on Aristotle's concept of prohairesis, which he identifies as the distinctly human principle of action. The term prohairesis in Aristotle's works seems to have at least three senses: 1) primarily, the deliberate intention with which a person acts, an `occurent' choice; 2) the habitual or `dispositional' choice or resolve of `decent' people; and 3) general purposes that men have which may encompass voluntary action as a whole. The first sense of the term is the primary one that properly signifies the concept. Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion which Aristotle sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium. For Aristotle, orexis or desire is the cause of all animal motion, including human motion. Prohairesis is a deliberate desire for the means to an end. It is a principle of action peculiar to mature human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result of deliberation. It marks off a narrow but important stretch of intentional action. Prohairesis is set off against other types of intention, like boulesis, which is an intention of the end, and epithumia (bodily appetite) and thumos (anger), which are non-deliberate intentions relating to non-rational appetites like lust and anger. Aristotle, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional action, is unusually specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention. Different orexeis differ not only with regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail. Aristotle traces both the causal and moral responsibility agents have for their actions to the action of these internal principles of desire. Moral assessment is linked to the operative internal principle of an act. This allows for an action to be voluntary and intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the consequences of an action. Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis and what results from orexis, is not reducible to one mode but is irreducibly plural. Furthermore, each person's capacity for intentional action is shaped by his character, and each character has correspondingly different kinds of intention, both with respect to the objects of intention and in their relation to action. Finally, the scope of intention is not definite, and depending on the agent, can include those things which attend to the means of which he has cognizance, for instance, harmful side-effect consequences or other costs of his action. In the second part of the dissertation, we examine at length the objections to the Simple View, lodged by Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe. We give an overview of objections by Bratman, Harman, and Knobe which center on three cases and four objections. The cases are: 1) a hypothetical video game; 2) unexpected success; and 3) unintended consequences. The objections are: 1) with respect to the hypothetical video game, the Simple View ascribes an irrational intention to a gamer playing the game; 2) When agents are doubtful of the success of an action they undertake, the Simple View requires that they intend the act the perform rather than that they merely try to perform the act, which opponents argue that this is irrational and false; 3) The Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight which itself entails that agents intend all the results of their actions, even when those results are merely foreseen and not intended; 4) The Simple View does not adequately explain ordinary language usage with respect to ascriptions of intention for side-effect consequences, and therefore does not reflect basic, commonly shared notions of intentional action. The first two objections center on cases where it seems irrational for an agent to intend the act he performs. In the case of the video game, the scenario is so set up that the player wins a prize for hitting either target but knows that he cannot hit both or the game will shut down. It seems irrational for him to intend to hit both if he cannot; however, in order to maximize his chance winning, it would be rational to aim at both. In the case of unexpected success, it seems that agents do not intend acts whose chances of success they doubt because intending seems to require the positive belief that one will succeed; rather, it is argued that agents merely try but do not intend the act they perform. Against these cases and objections, we argue that agents are capable of conditional and complex intentions, such that one may conditionally intend to hit whichever target is opportune, while aiming at both. Likewise, we argue that intending to act does not require the positive belief that one will succeed; only that it is possible for one to succeed. Furthermore, the distinction between trying and intending is specious. Finally, we respond to the third and fourth objections centering on the intentionality of side-effect consequences. It is argued by Bratman et al. that the Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight, and that such a rejection further entails consequentialism. Likewise it is also argued that the Simple View fails to account for ordinary language ascriptions of intentionality for side-effect consequences. We agree that the Simple View entails rejecting the distinction between intention and foresight as it is currently applied, but deny that this entails consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action are the primary basis for moral evaluation and not the agent's intentions. Likewise, we agree that the Simple View does not model ordinary language ascriptions of intention; however, this is not necessarily a defect since such ascriptions are inconsistent and imprecise. Furthermore, we argue that the Simple View might be used to more adequately explain such usage. We center our response to these objections on the Doctrine of Double Effect. We argue that the doctrine arises from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of defensive killing. We argue that Aquinas does not hold that the death of an attacker is a foreseen but not intended side-effect, as proponents of Double Effect and opponents of the Simple View hold; rather it is intended as a means to the end of self-defense. Therefore, the two effects are not the desired end and a side-effect but rather the intended end and the intended means. Furthermore, we argue that this does not entail doing evil for the sake of good because Aquinas' Aristotelian account of action specification incorporates circumstances as essential components of intentions which give an act its moral quality. Furthermore, the necessary references to an agent's intentions show how the rejection of the application of the distinction between intention and foresight does not entail consequentialism. Finally, we tackle the underlying assumptions about intention and desire which lead to the rejection of the Simple View. Opponents of the Simple View hold that intention is not a form of desire because then it would not have an essential role in the genesis of action or in rational deliberation. We, however, argue that the major objections to the Simple View are defeasible once one understands intention as a species of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope includes consequences beyond acts performed and goals achieved. The paradoxes at the heart of the debate hinge on the ambiguity of the English word `intention' and its usage, as well as the inherent difficulty of examining psychological concepts. `Intention' has several senses unified by the purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is referred. These senses can often, but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the degree and kind of deliberation attendant to them.

The article deals with “brutishness” or “beastliness” (thēriotēs), a concept introduced by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and defined by him as a negative ethical disposition, different both from vice (kakia) and from incontinence (akrasia), and leading to such pathological behaviours as cannibalism, paedophilia, omophagy, phobias and compulsions. Aristotle’s statements concerning brutishness (VII 1, 1145a15–35, VII 5, 1148b15–1149a24 and VII
6, 1149b23–1150a8) are examined and interpreted in order to clarify the following issues: the essence of thēriotēs as a specific ethical disposition (Sections I–II), its concrete forms and their causes (Section III), the moral-psychological condition of persons with a brutish hexis (Section IV), and their self-consciousness and moral responsibility for their brutish acts (Section V).

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

A fin de clarificar qué es exactamente el fenómeno humano de la akrasía o incontinencia en sentido pleno (a saber, aquella por causa de la epithymía o apetito), en Ética nicomaquea VII.4-10, Aristóteles presenta la incontinencia por analogía, es decir, aquella por causa del thymós o coraje. A pesar de su intención, la explicación de la segunda solamente enreda la comprensión de la primera, y el lector termina por no tener clara ninguna de las dos. El propósito de este escrito es proporcionar algunas luces al tema de la akrasía por thymós, concretamente, intentando resolver tres incógnitas: (1) ¿qué es, exactamente, esta pasión? (2) ¿Quiénes son peores, quienes se dejan llevar por sus apetitos (como los que actúan mal por lujuria o gula) o quienes se dejan llevar por su coraje (como los que actúan mal por ira o celos), y por qué? Finalmente, (3) ¿somos responsables por los errores que lleguemos a cometer en un arrebato de ira?

Abstract: Whit the aim of clariflying what exactly is the human phenomenon of akrasía or incontinence in the fullest sense (namely, that caused by epithymia or appetite), in Nicomachean Ethics VII.4-10 Aristotle introduces a type of incontinence by analogy, that is, incontinence due to thymós or courage. Despite his intentions, the explanation of the latter only complicates understanding the former, and the reader ends up without a clear understanding of either. The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the subject of akrasía due to thymós, trying, specifically, to answer three questions: (1) what exactly is this passion? (2) Who are worse, those who get carried away by their appetites (such as those who misbehave out of lust or gluttony) or those who get carried away by their anger (such as those who misbehave out of anger or jealousy), and why? Finally, (3) are we responsible for the mistakes we make in a fit of anger?

This study examines the function of the vis cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions. It builds upon recent scholarship concerning his understanding of the way virtuous passions can contribute to deliberation and practical reasoning, by explicating the way the cogitative power is integrated into acts of practical reason, is essential to all acts of moral perception, and specifies the passions of the sensitive appetites. In order to clarify a number of ambiguous features of Aquinas’s doctrine of antecedent and consequent passions and the obedience of the passions to reason, this paper makes use of an analogous account of antecedent and consequent cogitative estimations that causally specify these different passions. It then compares the way prudence and other habits of practical reason enhance the acts of cogitative moral perceptions that specify the sensitive appetites in temperate, continent, and incontinent persons.

The question of akrasia (lack of self-control or weakness of will) has featured in the
philosophical discussions of every age, involving much-debated concepts such as virtue,
knowledge, will, freedom and moral norms. The experience of acting against what we know is best has challenged the ethical and epistemological theories of many thinkers, and for this reason it has been—and continues to be—a source of academic inquiry. In fact, the interest for akrasia goes beyond the realm of Philosophy, and in recent years, empirical scientists from the fields of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience have studied the phenomenon of akrasia to explore its possible causes.

Aristotle is the first philosopher who methodologically analysed the issue of akrasia. He does so in Nicomachean Ethics book VII, where he reviews the opinions from previous authors, clarifies its meaning, and formalises its description in logical terms. But, Aristotle brings up the question of akrasia in other books also, and he does so when discussing a range of subjects as varied as friendship, rhetoric, or physiology. Surprisingly, this wider exploration has not received much attention among Aristotle´s commentators.

The principal aim of this study is to provide a more complete picture of the question of
akrasia in Aristotle, incorporating all the perspectives that appear in his works. What are the dimensions of akrasia considered by Aristotle? How are they connected? Do they provide a coherent picture? Finally, is akrasia just a marginal subject that happens to appear from time to time in Aristotle´s works, or does it represent for Aristotle a major intellectual preoccupation?

How is practical reasoning related to ethical reasoning? The most common view is that they are identical: practical reasoning just is ethical reasoning. I criticize this view and then propose an alternative account of the relation between ethical thought and practical thought: ethical reasoning is reasoning *about* sound practical reasoning. I argue that this account of the relation between ethics and practical reasoning explains various phenomena that more familiar views leave unexplained. It also entails that the philosophy of action bears heavily on ethical inquiry.

My dissertation has three main parts. In the first I develop a commitment model of moral judgment. I argue that moral judgments and the broader discourse in which they take place can be understood in terms of the operation of distinct but interacting commitment strategies. To a first approximation, these strategies operate at the levels of individual and social psychology, and biological and/or cultural evolution. All commitment strategies provide motivational stability by reducing one’s (perceived) flexibility of action. Some such strategies are undertaken deliberately, such as when an addict signs a contract forcing her to donate money to a despised organization if she is caught using.
    However, the commitment strategies associated with moral judgments are rarely if ever conscious or deliberate. In fact, a central aspect of my commitment model holds that the peculiar motivational power of moral judgments is importantly connected to their power to deflect attention away from our actual motivations and values, and that this motivational strategy is undermined by an awareness of its workings. A primary goal of the first part is to explain (away) belief in intrinsic (nonrelational) value and practical reasons that are metaphysically independent of any person’s actual concerns.
    The second part is the third chapter and provides a positive defense of a neo-Humean view of practical rationality according to which all practical reasons and values are relative to some actual concern(s). I defend this view against rationalist (anti-Humean) objections, and then disgnose a common source of confusion among some of the most prominent rationalist conceptions of practical reason, namely their reliance on an untenable near-identification of willpower with rationality. A particular strength of my account is that it naturally explains how this highly problematic claim could seem so obviously correct as not to require any real defense.
    The final three chapters argue that moral discourse, due to its systematic deflection of attention from our motives, threatens to commit us in ways that are both radically at odds with our actual concerns and that motivate self-deception. As part of an an effort to better promote our (highest) values, I favor investigating and evaluating our actual values rather than our ostensible moral obligations.

In 'Nicomachean Ethics' VII Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic to be ignorant. The received view in the literature has been the intellectualist interpretation, which takes akratic agents to be so ignorant of the wrongness of what they do as to be unaware of it. In recent decades many scholars have identified serious problems in this interpretation and have moved towards the non-intellectualist reading, the strong version of which takes clearheaded akrasia to be possible. There is, however, a glaring shortage of discussion of the difficulties facing the strong non-intellectualist reading. In this paper I present what I take to be the most salient reasons for rejecting strong non-intellectualism, and argue that Aristotle’s text supports a moderate non-intellectualism, according to which clearheaded akrasia is impossible.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This paper analyses several psychological implications of the account of original sin in Gen 3:1-6 applying some ideas employed by Aristotle in his description of akrasia. In particular, it uses the concept of ēthos to study the original inner harmony of human nature, and that of prohairesis to discuss the possibility of sin and the nature of the temptation
leading to original sin.

In thirteen original essays, eminent scholars of the history of philosophy and of contemporary philosophy examine weakness of will, or incontinence--the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's better judgment. The volume covers all major periods of western philosophy, from antiquity through the Middle Ages and the modern period down to the present.

Alfred Mele and Alasdair MacIntyre examine weakness of will from a contemporary perspective. Mele addresses the issue from the vantage point of Libertarianism. MacIntyre argues against the widespread view that actions that are out of character require special explanation, and reinterprets weakness of will as a failure to use moral lapses for moral progress. The other authors critically engage accounts of weakness of will by past philosophers: Kenneth Dorter writes on Plato, Terence H. Irwin on Aristotle, Lloyd Gerson on Plotinus, James Wetzel on Augustine, Denis J. M. Bradley on Aquinas, Tobias Hoffmann on Henry of Ghent, Giuseppe Mazzotta on Dante, Ann Hartle on Montaigne, John C. McCarthy on Descartes, Thomas E. Hill Jr. on Kant, and Tracy B. Strong on Nietzsche.

The philosophical examination of weakness of will highlights central problems of action theory, such as the connections between desire, conviction, and action, between intellect and will, and between rationality and emotions. It also addresses important ethical issues such as the diversity of character dispositions, moral progress and moral education, the limits of virtue, and moral responsibility.

The historical and contemporary perspectives offered in this volume will enrich current debates, not only by suggesting answers, but also by broadening the usual range of questions about weakness of will. Owing to the intimate connection of the topic with other key themes in moral philosophy, the historical and thematic studies contained in this book also provide an overview of moral philosophy as a whole.

Some philosophers believe that because ignorance tends to excuse, a blameworthy actor will either be a knowing wrongdoer or her ignorance will be traceable to a prior instance of knowing wrongdoing. I argue that this claim is false because a wrongdoer’s behavior can exhibit moral and attributional qualities that are sufficient for blameworthiness even if she never acted akratically. However, while blameworthiness does not depend on a wrongdoer recognizing the moral status of her behavior, it often does depend on the wrongdoer being aware of the likely consequences of her behavior. Without this latter sort of awareness, an agent’s behavior may lack the moral features that make blaming responses appropriate. Moreover, what is often required in this context is actual awareness of the consequences of one’s behavior. Thus, the mere fact that an agent could have or should have been aware of the consequences of her behavior is in many cases not sufficient for genuine moral blameworthiness.

Aristotle claims in the Metaphysics that in order to be resourceful (εὐπορῆσαι) in first philosophic inquiry it is useful to go through perplexity well (τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς). In the following essay, my focus will be on the role that going through perplexity well plays in practical inquiry. The specific claim I seek to defend, or at least make initially plausible, is that the right sort of perplexity is necessary not only for the dialectical inquiry concerning practical wisdom Aristotle undertakes in the Ethics, but also for the practical deliberative inquiry he explores and describes in that work. Ethical deliberation, on Aristotle's account, is a kind of inquiry, and the intellectual virtue of good deliberation (εὐβουλία) a particular kind of rightness (ὀρθότης) in inquiry. What Aristotle's discussion of good deliberation in NE 6.9 makes clear, however, is that while the kind of rightness exemplified in good deliberation is a kind of rightness in thinking, it cannot be equated either with rightness of opinion nor with rightness of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη). Genuine deliberative thought (διάνοια), as opposed to both opinion and scientific knowledge, is "not yet an assertion" (οὔπω φάσις), so the rightness involved cannot be identified with arriving at the right account (ὀρθὸς λόγος) of what one is to do. It is not to be found in the answer to the question about which one deliberates. The rightness involved, I will claim, is rather to be found in an achieved clarity about the fundamental ethical question about which one deliberates. Moreover, I will claim that it is precisely in and through going through perplexity well that one achieves clarity about the question..

In Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, eds. Vigdis Songe-Møller and Olof Pettersson, Springer Philosophy Studies Series

This article is concerned with the famous passage towards the end of the Protagoras often referred to as the argument against the possibility of akrasia (Prot. 351b3-358d4). Here Socrates sets out a hedonistic position according to which all human motivation is ultimately reducible to pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and on this basis he argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. I consider the function of the hedonistic position and trace how it is repeatedly emphasized that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will as well as his argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life has the hedonistic thesis as a premise, and that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many. I further argue that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ views, and that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The arguments rather function as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself, and Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue thereby aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.

Motive des Unvermögens und Figuren des Scheiterns beschäftigen die Theoriebildung in den Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaften wie nie zuvor. Doch was in den Thematisierungen des Unwissens, Vergessens und Zauderns, der Blindheit, Undarstellbarkeit und Untätigkeit auf dem Spiel steht, ist keine philosophisch irrelevante und abgeleitete Problematik. Im Gegenteil: Es geht um eine fundamentale Neudeutung des Begriffs des menschlichen Könnens im Allgemeinen. Dirk Setton nimmt jene heterogene Motivlage philosophisch ernst und bringt sie auf eine Kategorie – die des Unvermögens. In Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophisch wirkmächtigsten Vermögenstheorie – der aristotelischen – und der philosophisch prominentesten Unvermögensfigur – der Willensschwäche – zeigt er, dass die Möglichkeiten des Scheiterns und der Irrationalität für ein vernünftiges Vermögen konstitutiv sind.

In Poetics 13, Aristotle claims that the protagonist in the most beautiful tragedies comes to ruin through some kind of ‘failure’—in Greek, hamartia. There has been notorious disagreement among scholars about the moral responsibility involved in hamartia. This article defends the old reading of hamartia as a character flaw, but with an important modification: rather than explaining the hero's weakness as general weakness of will (akrasia), it argues that the tragic hero is blinded by temper (thumos) or by a pursuit for fine, good and desirable things—that is, by what may be labelled ‘qualified’ weakness of will. The upshot is that hamartia ends up as being less blameworthy than ‘proper’ akrasia, but still explains why morally outstanding people are unsuitable for the most beautiful tragedies.

The paper explores Plato's authorial irony in the Protagoras and its reception in the fragments of Heraclides' dialogue on pleasure. By combining these two strands, it provides a better understanding of Socrates' hedonistic argument at the end of the Protagora, which turns out to be ad hominem. Moreover, it sheds new light on the structure and aims of Heraclides' lost dialogue.                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



A differenza della fin troppo discussa ‘ironia socratica’, che interessa le relazioni fra Socrate e i suoi interlocutori, l’‘ironica platonica’ concerne la comunicazione fra autore e destinatario e poggia sul fatto che quest’ultimo conosce le vicende sopravvenute ai personaggi negli anni successivi alla data drammatica del dialogo: le parole dei personaggi platonici acquisiscono un sovrasenso, spesso antifrastico, fondato sulla superiore conoscenza dei fatti che il destinatario condivide con l’autore. In questo, l’‘ironia platonica’ è af-fine all’ironia tragica, ma persegue al contempo finalità satiriche: i fatti noti al lettore sbugiardano speranze e vanterie del personaggio. Di qui una forma di ironia ‘tragicomica’, che si manifesta con particolare efficacia nel Protagora, un dialogo in cui le influenze del teatro sono evidenti. Proprio agli aspetti tea-trali e ‘ironici’ del Protagora sembra richiamarsi il dialogo Sul Piacere dell’anti-edonista Eraclide Pontico. Oltre a gettar luce sul frammentario dialogo di Eraclide, il confronto fra le due opere induce a interpretare in chiave di ‘ironia platonica’ la discussa conclusione del Protagora, ossia la tesi edo-nistica che sfocia nella proposta di una tecnica di misurazione volta a massi-mizzare il bene-piacere. Ne emerge una prova nuova per interpretare la tesi edonistica del Protagora come un argumentum ad hominem.

I offer a prolegomenon to the philosophical study of a uniquely human activity—the selfbinding
act. This philosophical interest directly connects with the Enlightenment project of
centralizing personal autonomy and individual freedom as primary values of personhood. Selfbinding
represents an easily referenced action that introduces a possible clash between autonomy
and freedom on the one hand seen as in conflict with other ancient basic human values like selfcontrol
and avoiding akrasia. This dissertation investigates the inverted manner whereby an act
of self-binding, which voluntarily and effectively limits a person’s options, can end up
augmenting rather than interfering with personal autonomy. I claim that, properly understood,
self-binding, rather than a threat to personal autonomy, turns out to be a paradigmatic act of
autonomous agency and a tool for overcoming akrasia. I show how the self-binding act assists
and even expands Harry Frankfurt’s concept of volitional necessity which overestimates the
potential stability of the human will and underestimates the impact of three considerations
related to the instability of the will: (1) the ontological reality of time; (2) the psychological
reality of a tendency to assent to or rebel against authority and (3) a discounted reality wherein
future negative consequences are minimized or dismissed. Accounting for these three realities in
the act of self-binding fortifies volitional necessity into a tighter, more integrated concept. There
are obvious traversals with the concepts of agency, autonomy, rationality and the inevitable
reductionist claims to consider along with worries about coercion and paternalism. Antecedent
authority-sourcing is a central issue for autonomy and self-binding. Surprisingly, the Self as the
sole, ultimate source for self-binding turns out to be more complicated than at first glance.
Finally, I have made an attempt to elucidate why and how the self-binding act might work by
proposing several analogues, particularly a striking correspondence with the functions a fence.

The Socrates of The Protagoras argues that akrasia, or weakness of will, is impossible. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously disagrees, arguing that our knowledge of the good may become inert and temporarily cease to be action-guiding. I argue that both positions possess attractive features, but that they are incomparable at the level of analyzing akrasia because they address themselves to fundamentally distinct psychological models. After drawing out the crucial differences between Socrates' and Aristotle's implicit moral psychologies, I offer some preliminary arguments for inclining toward the Aristotelian account.

Juger irrationnelles une croyance, une émotion ou une action, c'est faire un jugement normatif. De tels jugements peuvent-ils être objectifs ? On montre qu'ils peuvent l'être dans une classe importante de cas : ceux où une personne a un ensemble d'attitudes qui sont inconsistantes avec ses propres normes, ces normes étant constitutives des attitudes considérées. Les normes constitutives sont des normes avec lesquelles les attitudes et les actions intentionnelles des agents doivent s'accorder pour que les jugements d'irrationalité deviennent intelligibles.

According to Henry of Ghent, akrasia (incontinence or weakness of will) does not presuppose, but rather produces a cognitive defect. By tracing akratic actions and other evil actions to a corruption in the will rather than to a cognitive defect, Henry wants to safeguard their freedom. Though the will is able to reject what the intellect judges as best here and now, strength and freedom of the will increase to the degree that one adheres more firmly to the good. What strengthens the will are the moral virtues, which are essentially virtues of the will.

Most academic and public discussion about morality revolves around deliberating on the right moral position to take. Yet, our focus on this complex issue overshadows the fact that even having a clear sense of what the right thing to do is, we often fail to enact it in our everyday lives. This gap between our moral belief and action, called akrasia, poses a problem because it hinders our fulfillment as human beings, and because morality is inherently prescriptive-holding a moral belief requires that we strive to align our behavior to it. Following several scholars who argue that our widespread moral akrasia needs to be addressed through social institutions such as education, I suggest that reducing the gap between our moral beliefs and action should be the focus of moral education. After analyzing various reasons for akratic behavior and providing contemporary real life examples of it, I argue that the educational remedy for it lies in everyday moral reflection within an emotionally supportive community. Furthermore, I suggest more particular moral practice oriented educational activities to counter specific causes of akrasia.

In Laws 646e4, right after the puppet allegory, the Athenian introduces a distinction between ‘two virtually opposite kinds of fear’ (δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία). The first is described very generally as the expectation of evils, whereas the second refers, more specifically, to the fear of a bad reputation, also called ‘shame’ (αἰσχύνη; αἰδώς). Contrary to common fear, this second kind is to be fostered in the citizens’ souls. Based on this positive account of the emotion of shame and the considerable emphasis it receives throughout the dialogue, this paper offers a close reading of the relevant context that precedes this passage, leading to the assumption that in the Laws certain emotions not only help to acquire virtue, but actually partake in virtue. Furthermore, an analysis of the connection between the introduction of two kinds of fear and the puppet image reveals a reverse analogy between courage and moderation, and moreover, of no less importance, strongly suggests that in the Laws the tripartition of the soul continues to be Plato’s underlying thought pattern in regard to psychology.

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level.

Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences —and which are in this sense conscious— even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual process psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.

What characterizes Duns Scotus’s and other voluntarist explanations of free decision is that they attribute to the will the power to be inclined contrary to what the practical intellect judges best to do here and now. The question of how one can act against one’s better judgment thus seems to be unproblematic: without any cognitive defect, the will can cause incontinent behavior. Yet according to Scotus, the discrepancy between the practical judgment and the inclination of the will, though possible, is atypical. Normally, when one acts incontinently, the will makes the practical intellect turn away from the consideration of right reason.

Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumentation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I discuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and suggest that they have an instrumental nature, modeled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues. Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, I suggest that a theory of fallacy in argumentation virtue theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’.