Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9959-8 Patient Moral Relativism in the Zhuangzi Yong Huang 1 Received: 23 November 2017 / Revised: 11 February 2018 / Accepted: 12 February 2018 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Moral relativism familiar in the Western philosophical tradition, according to David Lyons, is either agent relativism (moral judgments are relative to the standards of the agent or the agent group) or appraiser relativism (moral judgments are relative to the standards of the appraiser(s) or appraiser group(s)). As Lyons has convincingly argued, they are both problematic. However, in the ancient Chinese Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi, we can find a different type of moral relativism, which I call patient relativism (moral judgments are relative to the patients’ standards). In the essay, I aim to argue in what sense Zhuangzi is a patient relativist and how patient relativism can avoid the problem of agent relativism and appraiser relativism. Keywords Moral relativism . Zhuangzi . Daoism 1 Introduction This essay continues and expands the theme of a number of my previous essays. In an early paper, I argued for a moral copper rule partially construed from the Daoist (particularly the Zhuangzi) tradition. In contrast to the familiar Golden Rule, Bdo unto others as you would like to be done unto,^ and the equally familiar Silver Rule (sometimes regarded as the negative formulation of the Golden Rule), Bdo not do unto others as you would not like to be done unto,^ the moral copper rule is: Bdo (or do not) do unto others as they would (or would not) like to be done unto^ (see Huang 2005). In two more recent papers on the Zhuangzi, I developed this theme in the name of ethics of difference. In contrast to the familial ethics of commonality, which assumes that all human beings are similar in morally relevant aspects so that what it is moral to do to one person must be also moral to do to any other persons, the ethics of difference requires that, when we do things affecting others, we need to pay attention to what is unique to * Yong Huang yonghuang@cuhk.edu.hk 1 Department of Philosophy, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong Philosophia our moral patients, as an action appropriate to one patient may not be so to another patient (see Huang 2010a, b). Whether in the name of copper rule or that of ethics of difference, however, the Zhuangzian ethics that I have developed in previous articles is liable to the charge of moral relativism, which, at least in the forms known to us, is problematic, dangerous, and even self-defeating. This essay thus focuses on the issue of moral relativism. However, before I tackle the issue of moral relativism, I shall first argue why Zhuangzi is not a moral skeptic as is often claimed.1 Ethics is supposed to tell us what is right and what is wrong or what is virtuous and what is vicious. However, if Zhuangzi is skeptic, doubting everything, then it becomes hopeless to search for any normative answers to our moral questions from the Zhuangzi (Section 2).2 In the third section I shall argue that while Zhuangzi is a moral relativist, he is not a moral relativist of a familiar type, either the agent-centered or the appraiser-centered, but one of an entirely new type, unseen in the Western philosophical tradition, the patient-centered, whose uniqueness I have elaborated on in a recent essay (see Huang 2014). I argue that such a patient moral relativism is not inflicted with the obvious problems associated with the more familiar types of moral relativistic views. According to such a benign moral relativism, the rightness or wrongness of an action is indeed relative. However, it is not relative to the agent’s norms (agent relativism) or the appraiser’s norms (appraiser relativism) but in light of the patient’s norm. In the remaining two sections, I shall provide some further support for my interpretation of the Zhuangzi as presenting a patient centered relativism. 2 Why Zhuangzi Is Not a Moral Skeptic Almost no scholars who read the Zhuangzi as skeptic would fail to notice the following famous passage from Chapter 2, BOn Equality of Things,^ the arguably most important chapter in the Zhuangzi: Nie Que asks Wang Ni, BDo you know whether there are common standards for things?^ Wang replies, BHow can I know that?^ BDo you know what you do not know?^ BHow can I know that?^ BThen nothing can be known about anything?^ BHow can I know that? Nevertheless, let me try to say this. How can it be known that what I say I know is not what I do not know and what I say I do not know is what I do know? Now let me ask you: If a human being sleeps in a damp place, 1 For some, skepticism and relativism are mutually exclusive, as a relativist can make a truth claim that a skeptic is unable to make (see, for example, Raphals 1996, p. 29, Chinn 1998, p. 476, and van Norden 1996, p. 249). For others, they are mutually enforcing: a skeptic will end up being a relativist and a relativist will end up being a skeptic (see, for example, Hansen 1992, pp. 292–296, and Fraser 2009). 2 Perhaps for this reason, Joel Kupperman argues that the Zhaung zi Bis not about morality^ and that Btransformation at the heart of the Zhuangzi… is not necessarily or primarily a moral transformation^ (Kupperman 1996, p. 187; p.188). Philosophia the person will have a pain in loins and get paralysis. Is that true of eels? If a human being lives up in a tree, the person will be frightened and tremble. Is that true of monkeys? Which of the three knows the right place to live? Humans eat meat, deer eat tender grass, centipedes enjoy snakes, and owls and crows like mice. Which of the four knows the right taste? An ape mates with a gibbon, a buck seeks after a doe, and an eel enjoys company with fishes. Mao Qiang and Xi Shi were considered by men to be beauties, but at the sight of them, fish plunge deep down in the water, birds soar up in the air, and deer dash away. Which of the four knows the right kind of beauty? In my view, the principles of humanity and rightness and the standards of right and wrong are so complicated and confused. How can I make distinction among them? (Zhuangzi 2, p. 91-93). The reason this passage has often been used to show that the Zhuangzi is skeptic seems to be clear: not only does Wang Ni reply to Nie Que’s three questions with three Bhow can I know that?^ but the whole passage consists of a series of questions. To determine whether Zhuangzi is a skeptic, however, we first need to be clear about what Zhuangzi is supposed to be skeptic about. In the above passage, there are at least two things involved. The first is whether common standards of right and wrong exist for all things, and the second is whether there are standards of right and wrong for any individual things respectively. Is Zhuangzi skeptic about the common standards? In appearance, he is, as he repeatedly says Bhow can I know that?^ However, from the clear examples he carefully chooses, the respectively right places for eels, monkeys, and humans to live, the respectively good food for humans, deer, centipedes, and owls to eat, and the respectively beautiful things for humans, fish, birds, and deer to appreciate, it is odd to think that Zhuangzi really has no ideas of whether a common right place, a common good food, or a common beautiful thing exists or not for all these different animals. If Zhuangzi were really a skeptic on such things, he could have very easily chosen some alternative examples that are much more ambiguous. Thus, in my view, while Zhuangzi does not explicitly say that no such common standards exist for the variety of things mentioned in the above passage, his view to that effect is unmistakable. In other words, regarding whether such common standards exist, he is not a skeptic: they don’t exist. If this unmistakable message is nevertheless not clearly stated in the above passage, it is so in a very similar passage from Chapter 18, BUltimate Happiness^ (Zhile), an outer chapter normally regarded as consistent with the inner chapters: Upon hearing the xianci and jiushao music played in the wilderness of Dongting, birds will fly away, beasts will ran away, the fish will dive deep into water, but humans will gather around to listen to it. Fish’s life depends upon water, while humans will die in it. As humans and fish are different, what they like and dislike are also different. Therefore, ancient sages do not require them to have the same talents, nor do they force them to do the same things. (Zhuangzi 18, p. 621) As we can see, the examples given here are almost the same as those in the passage quoted above from the chapter on the equality of things. However, here claims are made not in the form of rhetorical questions but in the form of straightforward statement: humans and fish are different, and therefore they like different things. Thus, Philosophia this passage clearly denies that there are any common standards for right sound or right residence for these different beings. Moreover, the passage ends with a moral: sages do not require people to have the same talents or to do the same thing.3 So, on the issue of whether there are common standards for all things, Zhuangzi is not a skeptic: he denies, implicitly but unmistakably, the existence or, rather, the need for any discussion, of such common standards. This somewhat provocative interpretation of mine can be supported, at least to some extent, by an examination of whether Zhuangzi is a skeptic on the second issue: Do different things have their respectively definite standards of (for example) right residence, right food, or right beauty? If Zhuangzi is not a skeptic on this issue, believing that different things do have different standards of right and wrong, then it is unlikely that he will be skeptic about the existence of common standards of what is right and wrong for these things, at least in the same respects in which different things have different standards: he will deny them. Now I believe that it is clear that Zhuangzi is not a skeptic on this second issue.4 For example, in the passage from the chapter on the equality of things, he states unequivocally that neither damp place nor tree top is right place for human beings to live,5 and then asks rhetorically whether it is true of eels and monkeys respectively. Here Zhuangzi is not skeptic at all about what constitutes the best place for eels to live, the best place for birds to live, and the best place for humans to live. There is a known and absolute standard in each of these cases. It would be very odd for us to think that Zhuangzi does not know, and excludes our possibility of knowing, that, for example, damp place is the wrong place for humans to live and dry place is the wrong place for eels to live. What Zhuangzi tries to say is 3 Since stories in the Zhuangzi often involve animals and other non-human living beings, attempts have often been made to explore the possible hints of animal rights and environmental concerns in the Zhuangzi. While I do not want to make any judgment on such attempts, I think that, even if we do make such attempts, we do not afford to ignore that Zhuangzi often uses the relationship among different animals he explicitly talks about in such stories as a metaphor or analogy to illustrate the proper relationship among different human beings. This is not only clear in the passage from the Zhile chapter, as the story about different animals ends with the sage’s view of human relationship; it is also the case with the previous passage from the chapter on the equality of things, as the discussion about right residence, right food, and right beauty for different animals culminates in a statement about Confucian and Moist principles of humanity and rightness and standards of right and wrong. 4 Thus even a couple of scholars who think Zhuangzi is a skeptic about the common standards agree that he is not skeptic about particular standards for particular things. For example, Lai argues that BZhaungzi is neither skeptical about plurality, nor is skeptical about the validity of each assertion made from a singular perspective. But he is skeptical about the underlying assertions of universality and objectivity that normally accompany knowledge-claims^ (Lai 2006, p. 365). Wu Kuang-ming holds a similar position: Zhuangzi’s uncertainty about commonality of all things Bdiffers from confident agnosticism or the anything-goes sort of arbitrary indefniteness, for we do know that different species do have their respective ‘correct-proper’ lodgings, foods, and beauties. Our ignorance is not here, but in what it is that they all agree on as the proper lodging, food, beauty^ (Wu 1990, p. 207). Paul Kjellberg also recognizes that, in Zhuangzi’s view, Bfor any given creature, there is a fact of the matter about what course of action is best for it given its particular circumstance,^ although he immediately adds that Bthe difficulty arises from the fact that what is good for one creature in one situation may not be good for another in a different one^ (Kjellberg 1996, p. 13). I do not see why this is a difficulty, unless universal standards are necessary. Moreover, I want to go a step further than these scholars: Zhuangzi is even not skeptic about these universal claims: he denies them. 5 One may notice that there is one place in the Zhuangzi, in a miscellaneous chapter, that mentions a group of people in the ancient who actually lived on treetops, which, however, can be easily explained. What the text says is that Bin the ancient there were more beasts than humans, and therefore people built nestles on treetops to avoid them. They picked oak chestnuts during the day and slept on treetops in the evening^ (Zhuangzi 29, pp. 994). So clearly they were forced to do so. However, even if ancient people really loved to sleep on treetops, this would still not contradict what the Zhuangzi says here, in the most authentic chapter, since the point is precisely to emphasize the uniqueness of different individuals. Philosophia simply that the right place for eels to live is not necessarily the right place for human beings to live. There is nothing skeptic about it. So Zhuangzi is not a skeptic either regarding the universal standards for all things or regarding the particular standards for particular things: He denies the former and affirms the latter. Thus, regarding the standard of beauty for humans, fish, birds, and deer, Feng Youlan correctly points out: Bif one insists on one single correct standard for beauty, then ‘who of the four species knows it?’ However, if one does not insist on the single correct standard of beauty for all, then each of the four is the correct standard for beauty^ (Feng 2003, p. 31); it is for this reason that Bthere is no need to establish one single fixed standard for everyone to follow. Sages establish standards and various social and political institutions for everyone under heaven. Although their intention does not lack goodness and their purpose is not without love, the consequence, however, is, as in the case of Marquis of Lu’s loving a seabird, that love results in harm^6 (Feng 2003, p. 29).7 3 In What Sense Is Zhuangzi a Moral Relativist: Agent-Centered, Appraiser-Centered, or Patient-Centered? If so, it seems that, instead of a skeptic, Zhuangzi must be a relativist, which is after all a quite common view among Zhuangzi scholars.8 However, before we proceed, we need to know what is meant by saying that Zhuangzi is a moral relativist. Moral relativism, of course, is the view that moral judgments are all relative. However, according to the David Lyons, there are two different types of moral relativism, depending on their respective answers to the question: to what are moral judgments relative? On the one hand, we have agent relativism, according to which an action is right or wrong relative to the moral framework of the agent. In Lyons’s view, Bif we wish to judge a given act…. this theory tells us to apply the norms of her social group. It 6 This refers to a story of the Zhuangzi in which Marquis Lu, who treats the seabird alighting outside his palace in the way he himself would like be treated: feed it the meat he likes to eat, let it drink the wine he likes to drink, and play the music he likes to entertain it. The result is that the bird died in three days (Zhuangzi 18, p. 621). I discussed the implication of this story in Huang 2010a, pp. 75–76. 7 A further evidence to show that Zhaungzi is not a skeptic can be seen from the passage in which Zhuangzi discusses the things being so and not so, permissible and not permissible, and right and wrong. At the end is the following well-known statement: Btherefore sages harmonize right and wrong and rest in things’ natural pattern. This is called to walk both ways (liang xing 兩行)^ (Zhuangzi 2, p.70). In other words, everything is right according to its own standard but wrong according to standards of others (that are different from its own standard). Here I agree with Chris Fraser, according to whom, this passage has moral implication, as it Bappears to endorse a form of reciprocal consideration of others, manifested by finding ways to interact with them harmoniously—by seeking to ‘walk two ways,’ theirs and our own, at once, rather than imposing ours on them^ (Fraser 2009, p. 439). 8 Yang Guorong 楊國榮 is one of the very few who hold a different view. According to Yang, Brelativism is something that Zhuangzi tries to transcend and not something he adopts^ (Yang 2006, p. 105). I think Yang is right. The question is how Zhuangzi transcends such a relativism. Yang seems to suggest that, to transcend relativism, Zhuangzi presents a unified worldview (ibid.). Hyun Höchsman, in her argument against the view of Zhuangzi as a relativist, states that Zhuangzi Bbelieves that morality consists in seeking agreement in action even when there are individual differences^ (Höchsman 2001, p. 43). I shall argue, however, that Zhuangzi transcends such a relativism of our views of things by highlighting the respective distinctive features of these things. Philosophia therefore seems to imply that any single item of conduct can correctly be judged in one and only one way^ (Lyons 1982, p. 211). An agent relativism, as pointed out by David Copp, is a species of internalism of moral reasons, a view that Ba person ought morally to do something only if he has certain desires, intentions, or goals, or, more generally, certain motivational attitudes, which give him a reason to do it^ (Copp 1982, p. 227). Implied in this internalism of moral reasons is what Moody-Adams calls the Binability thesis^: Bsometimes one’s upbringing in a culture simply renders one unable to know that certain actions are wrong^ (Moody-Adams 1994, p. 293). This inability thesis is shared by a number of philosophers who are normally not regarded as moral relativists, as it appears to be identical to the slogan Bought implies can.^ So agent relativism really is the view that we can make moral judgment of a person’s action only in light of what the person can do, and what the person can do is related to the person’s motivational attitudes or, in other words, moral standards. Agent relativism is clearly problematic: if it is true, essentially there would be no immoral action; even Hitler’s action would be moral if his action has to be judged according to his own moral standard. In my view, moral internalism, in its extreme form, is wrong, even though we do not have to therefore accept moral externalism. A person’s lack of certain motivational attitudes does not necessarily mean that we cannot judge the person’s action as immoral. First, this person’s lack of the needed motivational attitudes may be due to his or her moral negligence; in other words, while the person does not have these motivational attitudes, it may be the case that he or she should have them. Second, even if the person’s upbringing, which is out of his or her control, makes it impossible for the person to have the needed motivational attitudes, we can still say that the person ought to have such motivational attitudes, as moral judgment is not merely retrospective but also prospective. Of course, the motivational attitudes must be something this person as a human being can have, even though he or she did not have it then and does not have it now. In this sense, I agree with David Wong’s hybrid view of moral reasons, a view between the extreme forms of internalism and externalism: moral reasons must be internal to human nature, even though it may be external to an individual person at a particular stage of his or her life (see Wong 2006, chapter 7). On the other hand, we have the appraiser moral relativism, according to which Ba moral judgment is valid if, and only if, it accords with the norms of the appraiser’s social group^ (Lyons 1982, p. 212). In other words, an action can be judged as morally right or wrong only in relation to a particular moral framework. Since different appraisers may belong to different social groups with different norms, it is natural that one same action judged as moral in relation to one moral framework may be judged as immoral in relation to a different framework. In Lyons’s view, appraiser relativism thus often suffers the problem of incoherence, by which he means that the same action may thus be appraised as right and wrong at the same time (Lyons 1982, p. 212), since there are often multiple appraisers of the same action holding different moral frameworks. Gilbert Harman, one of the very few foremost philosophical defenders of moral relativism, tries to respond this charge of incoherence by making the analogy between moral judgments and spatial temporal judgments: just as there is no necessary incoherence between the judgment that BDavid is to the right of John^ and BDavid is to the left of Sam,^ there is no incoherence between the judgment that BDavid’s action is right according to John’s moral standard^ and the judgment that BDavid’s action is wrong according to Sam’s moral standard.^ However, such a response is ultimately not Philosophia satisfactory. Appraiser relativism may thus indeed be able to avoid theoretical incoherence, but morality is essentially practical and not merely theoretical. Thus, from a practical point of view, we will see that appraiser relativism still suffers incoherence, although a practical one this time: when appraiser John says that David’s action is right, he recommends that David perform the action; and when appraiser Sam says that David’s action is wrong, he recommends that David not perform the action. With these two incoherent recommendations, agent David will be at a loss about whether to perform the action or not.9 With this distinction between agent relativism and appraiser relativism, we can see that when Zhuangzi scholars claim that Zhuangzi is a relativist, they normally mean that Zhuangzi is an appraiser relativist, although the more common term used in describing Zhuangzi’s relativism is Bperspectival relativism.^ What is the right place to live? From the perspective of eels, it is a damp place; from the perspective of monkeys, it is treetop, and from the perspective of human beings, it is a dry place. In appearance, this is pretty much what Zhuangzi says. However, if we examine it more carefully, we will realize that this is not the case. If we adopt perspectivism, then from our human perspective, a dry place is the right place to live not only for us humans but also for all other animals to live; from the perspective of eels, a damp place is the right place to live not only for them eels but also for all other animals; and from the perspective of monkeys, the tree top is the right place to live not only for monkeys but also for all other animals. It is in this sense that perspectivism inevitably leads to the conflict among different perspectives, what Lyons means by Bincoherence^.10 The reason there is such a conflict is precisely that they all try to find common standards for all things, while for Zhuangzi different things have different standards. Thus, while I agree that Zhuangzi is a moral relativist, I argue that his is an entirely new species of moral relativism, a species unseen in the Western philosophical traditions. I coined the phrase Bpatient relativism^ to refer to such a relativism. Just as for agent relativism moral judgments are relative to the agent’s moral standards and for appraiser relativism moral judgments are relative to the appraiser’s moral standards, for patient moral relativism moral judgments are relative to the patient’s moral standards. In other words, whether my action affecting others is moral or not does not depend upon how I as a moral agent think about the action or anyone else as a moral appraiser thinks about the action; rather it depends upon how the patient, the person who receives, or is affected by, my action, thinks about it. Moreover, since different patients of my action may think differently about my action and the same patient may think about my action differently at different times, my action that is moral with regard to one patient may become immoral with regard to a different person, and my action 9 For a more detailed discussion of the agent-centered and the appraiser-centered moral relativism and their respective problems, as well as how such problems may be avoided in patient relativism, see Huang 2014. 10 Because of this conflict, Chad Hansen argues that it reminds each one who has a particular perspective that others have equal confidence in their own perspectives. Thus perspective relativism fuels the skepticism (Hansen 2003, p. 150). In contrast, Brook Ziporyn tries to bring something more positive out of the conflict: BIf one really wanted to make sure that everything each affirms is negated and vice versa, as each side of the debate seems to do, the easiest way would be to use the obvious (ming 明) state of affairs, namely, this fact itself, the fact that they negate each other. The obvious fact itself solves the problem and ironically achieves what they themselves wanted to do, namely negate each other!^ (Ziporyn, p. 45). Philosophia that is moral with regard to one patient on one occasion may become immoral with regard to the same person on a different occasion. Clearly, Zhuangzi’s view is such a patient relativism. For example, the right place for eels to live is relative to eels, the right place for monkeys to live is relative to monkeys, and the right place to live for humans is relative to humans. In other words, if there is a conflict among the standards adopted by eels, monkeys, and humans, then the right place to live for eels must be determined according to eel’s (and not monkey’s or human’s) standards; the right place to live for monkeys must be decided according to monkey’s (and not eels’ or humans’) standards, and the right place for humans to live must be determined according to humans’ (and not eels’ or monkeys’) standards. Suppose that humans and monkeys are arguing about what the best place for eels to live is, with the former thinking that it is dry land and the latter thinking that it is treetop. It is clear that the lesson that Zhuangzi wants us to draw from his story is that the right place for eels to live is the place that eels, not humans or monkeys, think is right. In this context, humans and monkeys, whether as moral agents or moral appraisers, have to give up their own respective perspectives on the right place for eels to live. Of course, the exactly same thing can be said of the right residence for humans and that for monkeys.11 One unique feature of patient-relativism, in contrast to agent and appraiser relativism, which is normally an anti-realistic view, is that it is or at least can be a kind of moral realism,12 since it is based on the simple fact that things are different. Of such a view, Steve Coutinho makes a very plausible observation: there is nothing in it with which any philosopher, or nonphilosopher, would disagree. It simply expresses common sense. No one would deny that it is bad for a fish to sleep in a tree…. Acknowledgment of such individual appropriateness is not what is usually meant by the philosophical doctrine of relativism. If this amounted to philosophical relativism, there would be no one who is not a philosophical relativist. (Coutinho 2004, pp. 63-64)13 Clearly Coutinho’s philosophical relativism is what we have seen as appraiser relativism, the view that Ball claims to objective judgment are really just claims from a particular point of view, and more significantly that all conflicting claims are equally valid since no judgment can be made between them^ (ibid). However, Zhuangzi’s 11 Such a patient-relativistic view is also clear in what I regard as the difference stories, such as those about Emperors Shu and Hu’s paying their gratitude to Hundun, about Marquis of Lu’s treatment of seabird, and Bole’s training of horses (see Huang 2010a). 12 Paul Bloomfield also argues for the compatibility between realism and relativism, although from a virtual ethical point of view: while human goodness, just like healthiness, is a realistic idea, what counts as good, just as what counts as healthy, varies at the species-wide level (Bwe cannot assume that moral practices that are good for Homo sapiens will be good for every sentient form of life^) and the individual level (Bwe cannot assume that what one individual ought to do in a particular situation is what every individual ought to do in that situation^) (Bloomfield 2001, p. 39; see also Bloomfield and Massey 2014). 13 Xu Fuguan thus points out that BQiwu is to claim the equality of things…. Since they are equal, none has the right to interfere anyone else. Thus, everything is left to follow its own nature and become free…. Zhuangzi believes that any thought that comes from one’s free will, as long as it does not go beyond oneself, is right and valuable. As soon as it goes beyond itself and is imposed upon others, it becomes meaningless and bad^ (Xu 1999, pp. 400–401). Philosophia Bcommon sense relativism,^ to use Coutinho’s term, is not such a relativism, because it claims that Bit is better for fish to sleep under water; it is bad for them to sleep in trees^ (ibid.).14 Instead of Bcommon sense relativism,^ though, we call it patient relativism in this essay, to distinguish it from agent relativism and appraiser relativism. In the above, I claimed that the Zhuangzian patient moral relativism is an entirely new species of moral relativism. This claim can be backed up in a number of ways. First, as we have seen, in his now classical essay on moral relativism, David Lyons classifies it into two types, agent relativism and appraiser relativism, without leaving room for patient relativism. Second, and more important, in literature on moral relativism in particular and on moral theories in general, the concept of Bpatient^ is either entirely absent or relegated to the background. For example, Gilbert Harman, one of the most important defenders of moral relativism, claims that an Bought^ statement Brelates an agent A, a type of act D, considerations C, and motivating attitudes M^ (Harman 2000, p. 9), where Bpatient^ does not come into the picture at all. David Wong, another important contemporary defender of moral relativism, states that Bwe may think of a moral reason as a three-place relation between an agent A, an action X, and a feature in the agent’s situation F that weighs in favor of A’s doing X^ (Wong 2006, pp. 68–9), where Bpatient^ is also entirely absent. It’s true that the patient does appear in the common sense morality of the Golden Rule, BDo (or don’t do) unto others [patients] as you [agent] would (or would not) like to be done unto,^ but even here it starts from what Byou,^ the agents, think about others, the patients, and not what they, the patients, think about themselves. This is indeed surprising, given that it is the patient who is affected by the action, the moral status of which we ought to be primarily concerned with here.15 Third, while the central idea of patient moral relativism has been hinted at by some Western philosophers, it was always immediately dismissed by them. As stated at the beginning of this essay, I developed this central idea of patient moral relativism first in the name of moral copper ruler as an alternative to the Golden Rule: BDo (or don’t do) unto others as they would (or would not) like to be done unto.^ Alan Gewirth and Markus Singer, among others, regard it as the inversion of the Golden Rule, which is seen as either immoral or self-contradictory. For example, Singer claims that "the idea that the Inversion of the Golden Rule has 14 While most scholars regard Zhuangzi as a perspectival relativist, Cui Da Hua 崔大華 holds an interpretation that is very close to mine. Cui argues that, Bin Zhuangzi’s view, relativity is the mode of existence of the world itself. It is not the fault of our knowledge…. Everything, natural and social, has its own distinctive features to be different from other things^ (Cui 1992, p. 276). It is not clear which view Liu Xiaogan 劉笑敢 holds on this issue. Commenting on the same passage on the standards for best residence, best food, and best beauty, in one place, Liu follows the crowd to criticize Zhuangzi as a subjectivist, someone who believes that Bthe criterion of our knowledge varies for different persons and therefore is subjective and relative^ (Liu 1993, p. 172); in another place, however, Liu seems to adopt the realistic interpretation of the Zhuangzi that is largely what I am advocating: Zhuangzi Bbelieves that humans’ eating meat and deer’s eating grass, and humans’ resistance to living in the damp place and eels’ love for mud, are all determined by the original nature of things. It is something that cannot be changed by our subjective desires. We can only acknowledge it, but we cannot attempt to determine its rightness or wrongness^ (Liu 1993, p. 229). 15 Of course, we as moral agents may disagree with our patients about what is good for them and may want to persuade them accept our view about what is good for them. However, unless and until we persuade them, their own standard about themselves should be our standard for our actions unto them, although not necessarily the standard for our actions unto others, including ourselves. Here even Bfor the sake of the goodness of the patient^, as John Dewey points out, cannot be a reason for us to impose our values upon our patients: while it is good for a person to obtain his completest development, Bit is also true … that he must find this place and assume this work in the main for himself^ (Dewey 2008, p. 243). Philosophia certain advantages over the Golden Rule, or should be substituted for it, must be given up, and results only from failure to trace out its implications" (Singer 1963, p. 297; see also Gewirth 1980, pp. 134–135). Hans Hoche has a different reason to dismiss the central idea of the Zhuangzian patient moral relativism: it is impracticable. For example, he states, Bin a given practical situation it is not always possible to ask or to discover how the other would like to be treated at the moment; indeed, there are situations—situations that are often of great moral interest—where it would not even be meaningful to assert that the other person wills or wishes anything at all^ (Hoche 1982, p. 78). I have made detailed responses to both Singer (Huang 2005, pp. 410–416) and Hoche (Huang 2005, pp. 409–410) elsewhere and will not rehearse them here. My present purpose is merely to show that the central idea of the Zhuangzi patient moral relativism has never been taken seriously in Western philosophy. 4 Meaning of BQi Wu Lun^: A Support for the Interpretation of Zhuangzi as a Patient Relativist We have been using BOn Equality of Things^ to refer to the second chapter of the Zhuangzi. The title in Chinese is the three characters, Qi wu lun 齊物論, which, by itself, allows at least two different interpretations, depending upon whether you read the first two or the last two characters together. If we read the first two characters together, we have Qiwu lun, meaning a Bdiscourse on equality of things (or on equalizing things)^; if we read the last two words together, however, we have Qi wulun, meaning Bequalizing discourses (or theories, or perspectives) on things.^ In the Chinese commentary history, there has been debate on which one of the two meanings is more appropriate (see Chen 2004, pp. 17–19). Contemporary scholars, however, tend to think that both meanings are intended. Chen Shaoming 陳少明, for example, argues that Bwe can find evidence for both from the text. After all, these two meanings are not mutually exclusive^ (Chen 2004, p.19). Cao Chuji 曹礎基, while believing that the second meaning is primary, also argues that the two meanings are related: Bsince everything is equal from the perspective of Dao, all theories of things must be equal^ (Cao 1982, p. 15; see also Chen 1992, p. 37). More recently, Vincent Shen 沈清松 also argues that, although it is generally agreed that this title Bdoes not come from Zhuangzi himself but is added by Guo Xiang 郭象 when he edited the text,^ Bthese two meanings can both find their textual evidence in the current version of the Zhuangzi. As a matter of fact, these two meanings are closely related to each other.^ In Shen’s view, Bthe Qi wu lun chapter starts with ‘equalizing various theories of things.’ It then traces the origin of the differences among these theories to the constitution of the selves. From this, it goes all the way to the authentic self, which is nothing but the Dao itself. Finally it leads to a metaphysical theory of equality of things. Thus, these two meanings not only do not come into conflict with each other, but actually belong to the same development of meaning in the text^ (Shen 2007, p. 53). In my view, however, these two meanings cannot be consistently argued for simultaneously. If things are indeed equal, then theories of things cannot be all equal: at least those theories that argue for inequality of things cannot be considered as equal to those that argue for equality of things. This is precisely what is said in the Yu yan chapter: Bwithout talking, things are equal. Things originally equal become unequal when talking takes place. Added with talking, equal things become unequal. So when Philosophia talking, one should be without fixed opinions. Without fixed opinions, one talks all his life as if he did not talk at all^ (Zhuangzi 27, p. 949). Since it seems to me clear that Zhuangzi does argue for the equality of things, he cannot consistently argue for the equality of theories of things. For this reason, Guan Feng 關鋒 is also wrong even though he claims that, in the Zhuangzi, to equalize things is primary and to equalize views of things is secondary. For him, Bit is through equalizing things that Zhuang equalizes views of things^; and to equalize things and views of things is to see that they are all equal from the perspective of Dao (Guan 1961, p. 118). This does not make sense. If it is indeed true that things are all equal, then how can a view that regard things as equal and a view that regard things as unequal be equal?16 The reason that scholars claim that what is to be regarded as equal not only includes things but also perspectives of things is that we do find Zhuangzi sometimes arguing for the equality of some perspectives. But a careful examination of such passages can immediately show why such scholars are wrong. On the one hand, there are perspectives that are equally right within their respectively specified and limited domains of applications. Thus the eels’ perspective that the damp place is the right place for them eels to live, the human perspective that the dry place is the right place for us humans to live, and monkeys’ perspective that trees are the right place for them monkeys to live, while all different from each other, are equally right. Such perspectives can co-exist harmoniously without any potential conflicts. On the other hand, there are also perspectives on things that are equally wrong, because each of them claims to be the universal standard for all things. Since each makes a different claim about the only universal standard of all things, then conflict and therefore debate among them become inevitable and irreconcilable. This is precisely what Zhaungzi intends to show in a passage toward the end of Chapter 2, a passage that has never escaped the eyes of anyone who thinks that Zhuangzi is a skeptic or relativistic: Suppose that two of us are arguing over something. If you win and I lose, does this really mean that you are right and I am wrong? If I win and you lose, does this really mean that I am right and you are wrong? Is it the case that one of us is right and the other is wrong, or that both of us are right, or that both of us are wrong? If neither you nor I can tell, then other people will be more in the dark. 16 Zhong Tai 鐘泰 also holds the view that what is to be qi includes both things and views of things. However, he understands qi not as Bequalizing^ but as Bdistinguishing.^ In this view, some views of things are correct, while some views of things are wrong. To qi views of things is simply to tell right things from wrong things. Moreover, he claims that the views of things can be right or wrong because Bsome things are beautiful and noble, while some other things are ugly and lowly.^ So there is a need to qi things: to tell beautiful and noble things apart from ugly and lowly things (see Zhong 2002, p. 26). Such a view is problematic. First, it is very odd to interpret qi as Bdistinguishing^ [things and/or views of things from each other] or recognizing [things and/or views of things as they are]; second, while it is true that for Zhuangzi views of things can be either right or wrong, or so I shall argue, Zhuangzi clearly claims that things by themselves (not from the perspective of other things) are all right: BThings are inherently so, and things are inherently allowed to be so; there is nothing that is not inherently so, and there is nothing that is not allowed to be so^ (Zhuangzi 2, p. 69). In other words, there is no distinction between inherently beautiful and noble things and inherently ugly and base things from the perspective of Dao (see Zhuangzi 17; p. 577); third, it does not make any logical sense to claim that views of things can be right or wrong because things themselves are ugly or pretty: even if all things are pretty, there may still be both correct views (that regard them as pretty) and wrong views (that regard them as ugly); and even if all things are ugly, there may still be both correct views (that regard them as ugly) and wrong views (that regard them as pretty). Philosophia Whom should we ask to decide? Ask someone who agrees with you to decide? Since the person already agrees with you, how can the person make the decision for us? Ask someone who agrees with me to decide? Since the person already agrees with me, how can the person make the decision for us? Ask someone who disagrees with both of us to decide? Since the person disagrees with both of us, then how can the person make the decision for us? Ask someone who agrees with both of us to decide? Since the person agrees with both of us, how can the person make the decision for us? If neither you nor I nor others can decide, then whom else shall we expect to make the decision? (Zhuangzi 2, p. 107) To better understand the passage, we can make the passage more vivid by providing some content of the argument. Since there can be no disagreement among perspectives with clearly defined and limited domains of applications (for example, between the eels’ perspective that the damp place is the best place for them eels to live and the monkeys’ perspective that trees are the best place for them monkeys to live), the argument Zhuangzi has in mind here must be one between alternative perspectives making universal claims. So let us suppose that an eel and a monkey are arguing with each other about what is the best place to live, not just for eels or monkeys or any other particular animals, but for all animals. Naturally the eel thinks that the damp place is the best place to live, while the monkey thinks that treetop is the best place to live. Obviously, if either of the two wins the debate (perhaps by virtue of being clever or being good at debate), that does not mean the view of the winning party is right. Since they cannot make the decision for themselves this way, they may decide to ask a different party to make the decision for them. Now whether they ask a different eel or any other animals that agree with the eel, or a different monkey or any other animals that agree with the monkey, or a human being or any other beings that disagree with both of them, or a seagull or any other animals that agree with both of them, to make the decision, the decision cannot be right. So the conclusion of the whole passage is that since no one can make the right decision, there is perhaps no decision to be made, as all decisions are wrong decisions. In other words, all perspectives that make universal claims are indeed equal, but they are equally wrong.17 So there is one group of perspectives that are equal to each other: while all different, they are equally right; and there is another group of perspectives that are also equal to each other: while also all different, they are equally wrong. However, perspectives from these two groups, for example, the perspective that damp place is the right place for eels to live and the perspective that damp place is the right place for all animals to live, are obviously not equal to each other, as the former is right and the latter is wrong. There is not only no evidence that Zhuangzi intends to equalize these two very different types of perspective; but to affirm the equality between these types of perspective will necessarily lead to the denial of equality of things. The reason that some perspectives are wrong and therefore are not to be equalized to the right perspectives is that things are equal. If we hold that perspectives that regard things as unequal are equally right or 17 Thus, commenting on this passage, Feng Youlan points out: Bhere sharp debate cannot lead to the distinction between right and wrong. If one insists on one single opinion as [universally] right, then whose opinion among all those under heaven is it?.... However, if one does not insist on that, then all opinions under heaven are [respectively] right^ (Feng 2003, p. 31). Philosophia equally wrong as perspectives that regard things as equal, we will be unable to hold the view that things are actually equal. For example, the perspective that damp place is the right place for all animals to live assumes that other animals are inferior and therefore have to live in the same way as eels do. It is in this sense that the title of Chapter 2 can only be appropriately understood as BDiscourse on Equality of Things^ and not as equalizing theories of things. 5 Four Types of Knowledge and three Pipings: Further Support My view that Zhuangzi is a patient relativist, believing that things, but not theories of things, are all equal, can be further supported by an examination of two related ideas developed in the Zhuangzi. One is the distinction among the four types of knowledge, and another is the distinction among the three pipings, both in the same Qi wu lun chapter. About the four types of knowledge, Zhuangzi states: First, there are people who think that nothing exists in the first place. This is most thorough and exhaustive knowledge, to which nothing can be added. Next, there are people who think that things exist but are not distinct from each other. Next, there are people who think that things are distinct from each other but there is no distinction between things right and things wrong. When distinction between right things and wrong things is clearly made, Dao is blocked. (Zhuangzi 2, p. 74) There is almost a consensus among Zhuangzi scholars that Zhuangzi here establishes a hierarchy of knowledge, with the knowledge of non-being as the highest.18 There is some plausibility in such a consensus. However, such an understanding ignores or at least downplays the important difference between the first three types of knowledge and the last type of knowledge; or, to put it in a slightly different way, it ignores or at least downplays the important similarity among the first three types of knowledge. In my view, while there is some distinction among the first three types of knowledge, the only important distinction Zhuangzi really intends to make here is the one between the first three types of knowledge and the last type of knowledge, as all the first three types of knowledge are related to Dao, while the last type of knowledge, the knowledge that makes distinction between right things and wrong things, blocks Dao. The first type of knowledge, as pointed out by many scholars, is knowledge of Dao (see, for example, Liu 1993, p. 144). Knowledge of Dao is regarded in this passage as knowledge of nonbeing, because Dao, as we are told, Bdoes not have action and is formless; it can be transmitted by heart but not mouth; it can be acquired by heart but not seen by eyes^ (Zhuangzi 6, p. 246). 18 For example, Edward Slingerland argues that there is a Bprogress of the fall^ from the first type of knowledge to the last one (see Slingerland 2003, p. 177). Chen Shaoming argues that Zhuangzi here asks us to transcend the lower three types of knowledge one by one to reach the most thorough and exhaustive knowledge of nonbeing. In Chen’s view, this is also how Zhuangzi goes beyond his relativism: to go beyond the concrete things to find their commonality and ignoring their individualities, and Bthis commonality, in a nutshell, is ‘being’…. In contrast to the concrete being, this abstract one being is also a non-being^ (Chen 2004, p. 25). Philosophia When we use the first type of knowledge, the knowledge of Dao, to look at things as a whole, we will see the whole universe as interconncected and unified. That is why Zhuangzi says, a few lines back, that Bstalk and pillar, the leper and the beautiful Xishi, and all sorts of things strange and odd, are all connected into one by Dao (dao tong wei yi 道通為一)^ (Zhuangzi 2, p. 70).19 This is precisely the second type of knowledge. It is important to realize that to say that all things are one from the perspective of Dao is not to say that all things are the same; it merely says that they form a unified whole. So this is not in contradiction to our knowledge of things as different but equal, which is the third type of knowledge.20 Thus both the second and the third types of knowledge presuppose the first type of knowledge: they are types of knowledge that you can obtain by looking at things from the perspective of Dao. The only difference between the second and the third types of knowledge is the one between seeing things as a whole and seeing them individually. When we look at things without the perspective of Dao, we will erroneously make distinctions between right things and wrong things, the fourth type of knowledge. About this, there is a famous passage from Chapter 17, Qiushui (autumn water), one of the outer chapters: From the perspective of Dao, there is no distinction between noble things and mean things; from the perspective of things, each regards itself as noble and others as mean; and from the perspective of the worldly learning, the standard to distinguish between the noble and the mean lies outside things. (Zhuangzi 17, p. 577)21 Among the three perspectives mentioned in this passage, the first one is equivalent to the third type of knowledge mentioned in the previous passage in Chapter 2. Here it is made clear that such knowledge is possible only from the perspective of Dao; The other two perspectives both attempt to provide a standard to make distinctions between noble (right) and mean (wrong) things. The only difference between these two is that the standard for making such a distinction is subjective (Bmy^ standard) in one case but is claimed to be objective in another case. In this sense, these two perspectives are two examples of the fourth type of knowledge mentioned in the previous passage in Chapter 2. So the three types of knowledge that Zhuangzi says that ancient people have are indeed not separate from each other. On the one hand, the knowledge of things as different but equal (the third type) and knowledge of things as forming a unified whole (the second type) require one to have the knowledge of Dao (the first type); on the other hand, knowledge of Dao is really not something separate from or additional to the other 19 Shang Geling argues that dao tong wei yi, which he translates as BDao throughs as one,^ is the single most important idea in the Zhuangzi. See Shang 2006, pp. 23–29. My understanding of this term diverts from his interpretation in a few respects. 20 In this sense, I disagree with Chen Guying who claims that dao tong wei yi means that Bthere are no difference among things from the perspective of Dao^ (Chen 1992, p. 138). Yang Guorong seems to hold a similar view, as he complains that Zhuangzi’s emphasis on Bequalizing^ (qi 齊) and Bconnecting^ (tong 通) Bcan easily lead to the ignorance of multiplicity and difference^ (Yang 2006, p. 85; see also p. 106). 21 Dan Lusthaus translates the last perspective as Bcommunal^ perspective, which Bapplies the standard impartially. But Daoists (cf. Laozi, chapter 38) argue that this sort of ‘impartiality’ is also implicitly contentious, since (1) it is a general rule for holding someone or something to be better than something else, and (2) rules are made to be enforced^ (Lusthaus 2003, p. 189). Philosophia two types of knowledge. It is nothing but knowledge of things as unified but not identical and as different but not unequal. Thus, commenting on this Qi wu lun passage on the different types of knowledge, Qian Mu 錢穆 claims that Zhuangzi’s discussion of Dao, in appearance, seems to deny all standards; carefully examined, however, it does not deny any standards. In appearance, Zhuangzi seems to think that everything should use heaven (tian) as the standard; carefully examined, however, in Zhuangzi’s theory, everything in the universe has its own standard, and heaven is the only one that does not have its own standard. If the heaven has its own standard, then nothing in the universe should have its own standard. Yet if nothing in the universe has its own standard, then, we have to ask, exactly what is the so-called standard of heaven? (Qian 1991, p. 118)22 In Qian’s view, Dao itself does not have a standard different from the standards of individual things in the universe. So when we look at things from the perspective of Dao, we do not impose a universal standard, supposedly the standard of heaven or Dao, to everything; rather we let each individual thing in the universe take its own standard as the standard for itself. In other words, we do not take the standard of one of the things in the universe as the standard of everything else in the universe. This is because, from the perspective of Dao, everything in the universe is equal and therefore should model itself on its own standard. In the view of one of Zhuangzi’s followers, BTo mold things with try square, the ruler, the compass, and the angle square is to destroy their own natures, and to fix things with strings, cords, glue and lacquer is to violate their qualities (virtues)^ (Zhuangzi 8, p.321).23 This is also an understanding that is supported by Zhuangzi’s story of three types of piping at the beginning of the Qi wu lun chapter. In this story, Ziqi, the master, tells Ziyou, his disciple, Byou may have heard the piping of humans, but you may have not heard the piping of the earth. You may have heard the piping of the earth, but you may have not heard the piping of heaven^ (Zhuangzi 2, p. 45). To this, Ziyou says, Bthe piping of the earth consists of sounds from various hollows and the piping of humans consists of sounds from various flutes. However, what is the piping of the heaven?^ (Zhuangzi 2, p.49). Ziqi replies, Bthe piping of heaven lets each of them [various hollows of the earth and flutes of human] to be so of itself by producing its own sound so that ten thousand different sounds are produced. Who else [other than the hollows of earth and flutes of humans] produce the piping of heaven?^ (Zhuangzi 2, p.50). What is particularly important here is that the perfect music, the piping of heaven, in Zhuangzi’s view, is not an additional music to those of earth and humans. It is simply the music consists of various sounds of earth and humans put in harmony by letting each sound be of itself (xian qi zi qu 閑其自取). It is in this sense that Zhong Tai 鐘泰 is right to claim that Bthe piping of heaven is neither outside of the piping of earth nor outside of the piping of humans^ (Zhong 2002: 30). So the piping of heaven is just like a 22 What Qian means by heaven is Dao, knowledge of which Zhuangzi regards as the most thorough and most exhaustive. About this, Xu Fuguan points out that Bone important difference between Laozi and Zhuangzi is that Zhuangzi often uses tian instead of Dao^ (Xu 1999, p. 367). 23 On taking the perspective of Dao as letting each thing take its own perspective on itself, Chen Guying also points out that Beach individual thing’s spontaneity and self-so-ness is nothing but Dao. To be so of itself is to be Dao and to follow Dao is to follow the thing’s self-so-ness^ (Chen 1992, p. 193). Philosophia symphony. The symphony itself does not have its own sound from its own instrument, in addition to, or as the standard for, various sounds from various instruments played by members of the orchestra. The Bpiping^ of heaven can form a symphony out of various sounds from various types of piping of earth and piping of humans only because each of them is allowed to play its own unique role, not because each of them competes for the only right sound to be heard. Otherwise we would have cacophony instead of symphony. From this, it is clear that, for Zhuangzi, the harmony of the universe is not achieved as a result of the mutual negation of competing claims to universality, which are merely particular claims in disguise, as Ziporyn argues (Ziporyn 2003, p. 45), or by establishing a truly universal claim that goes beyond each individual claim, as Chen Shaoming seems to believe (Chen 2004, pp. 24–25), or by each individual’s unwillingness to assert itself due to the lack of confidence of its own claims, as Hansen maintains (Hansen 2003, p. 150). Rather, it is achieved by letting each individual thing follow its own standard without imposing it upon others, for all things are equal.24 6 Conclusion In this essay, I have presented and defended the Zhuangzian patient moral relativism, a position that puts the patient at the central stage of both our moral actions and our moral assessment of these actions. While sharing their general antipathy toward moral absolutism or universalism, it avoids the problem of agent moral relativism, which essentially renders it impossible to make any moral judgment, and that of appraiser moral relativism, which suffers from the problem of incoherence, as pointed out by David Lyons. Unlike agent relativism, patient relativism can make strong condemnation of Nazism, because what Nazis did to Jews were not what Jews, the patients, liked. Unlike appraiser relativism, it is free from the problem of incoherence, either theoretical or practical, since, instead of multiple ones, it endorses only one set of moral standards, that of the moral patient, as appropriate in determining our particular actions and assessment thereof. Without denying their commonalities, such a patient relativism takes into serious consideration differences among moral patients: what is morally right to oneself as an agent may not be so to someone else as a patient, what is morally right for one patient may not be so to another, and even what is morally right for one patient in one situation may not be so to the same patient in a different situation. Such a moral theory is particularly significant in this global age, as our neighbors, the immediate 24 Regarding the three types of piping, Chen Guying points out that Bthere is no difference of value among them. They are all natural sounds in the world, just like a symphony. The piping of heaven and the piping of humans correspond each other^ (Chen 1992, p. 132). I think Chen is absolutely right that the three pipings are of equal value, although I think he is wrong when he implies that the piping of heaven is a piping separate from the piping of humans and that of earth. Scott Cook states well in his explanation of Guo Xiang’s view of the three types of pipings, although he himself is not willing to endorse Guo’s interpretation: Bthe myriad sounds produced by the myriad crevices…differ fundamentally from the cacophonous voices of the Confucians, Mohists, and other schools in at least this respect: they are merely self-affirming and each expressive of its own particular voice; there is none that seeks to set the standard for all the other voices… but by simply self-attaining, by celebrating the distinctiveness of one’s own particular self, one is ultimately celebrating the diversity of all creatures and things that exist in the world, and in this sense one has both captured and lost oneself simultaneously…. For Guo… the panpipe of heaven is merely the general name for the self-so diversity of all the myriad things of existence^ (Cook 2003, p. 72). Philosophia moral patients of our daily actions, are often people with cultures and religious, beliefs and desires, customs and habits very different from ours, and it is important for us to learn about them to ensure our actions toward them are morally appropriate. References Bloomfield, P. (2001). Moral reality. Oxford and New York: Oxford university press. Bloomfield, P., & Massey, D. (2014). The metaphysics and semantics of moral relativism. In Y. Xiao, & Y. Huang (Eds.), Confucianism, Daoism, and moral relativism: Wong responds to critics. Albany: State university of New York Press. Cao, C. 曹礎基. (1982). Zhuangzi qian zhu 莊子淺注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Chen, G. 陳鼓應 (1992). Lao Zhuang xin lun 老莊新論. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe. Chen, S. 陳少明 (2004). Qiwulun jiqi yingxiang 《齊物論》及其影響 . Beijing: Beijing university press. Chinn, E. Y. 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