Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) 宋儒二程论“德”： 有美德的人是否以自我为中心？ T he C heng B rothers on Virtue (de 德): Is a Virtuous Person Self-C entered? 黄 勇 H uang, Yong 库茨敦大学哲学系 Department of Philosophy, Kutztown University, Pennsylvania, US 12 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) 摘要：美德伦理学最近几十年在西方哲学界获得了令人注目的复兴。在一开始，它主要 作为在近现代西方哲学中占统治地位的道义论和功用主义的批判者出现，但随着美德伦 理学的日益成熟，它也开始受到道义论和功用主义伦理学的批评。对其中的有些批评， 美德伦理作出了比较恰当的回应，而对另外一些批评，它还没有、而且如果限于西方哲 学传统不可能作出恰当的回应。在本文中，我要讨论的关于美德伦理具有自我中心倾向 的批评就属于后一种类型。这个批评说的是，由于具有美德的人所关心的首先是自己要 成为一个具有美德的人，这样的人就是自我中心的。亚里士多德主义的美德伦理学对此 可以回应说，由于美德的一个重要特征就是要关心他人，具有美德的人就不是自我中心 的，但它却不能回应由此引出的这个批评的两个更深的层面：（1）具有美德的人在关心 他人时所关心的是他人的外在幸福，而在关心其自己时则关心其内在的品德。由于美德 伦理学认为内在的品德比外在的幸福更重要，具有美德的人还是自我中心的；（2）具有 美德的人对他人的关心是因为这是他关心自己的美德的要求，因此从根本上来说还是自 我中心的。在本文中，我认为宋儒二程的儒家伦理学能够对在这两个深层的意义上回应 关于美德伦理具有自我中心倾向的批评。 关键词：美德伦理，自我中心，二程，儒家 A BST R A C T：There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics in the last a few decades. While it appeared mainly as a criticism of the dominant moral theories, consequentialism and deontology, as it is now fully developed, it has also faced a series of criticisms or objections from its rivals. While it has successfully addressed a number of such criticisms and objections, it has not addressed and, if limited to the resources in the Western philosophical traditions, cannot address, with equal success, other criticisms and objections. In this paper, I discuss the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics: since a virtuous person is primarily concerned with his or her own virtues, a virtuous person is self-centered. While the Aristotelian virtue ethics FDQUHVSRQGWKDWDYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶VFRQFHUQZLWKKLVRUKHURZQYLUWXHGXHWRWKHQDWXUHRIWKH virtue itself, requires him or her to be concerned with others, it fails to respond to the objection on two deeper levels: (1) When a virtuous person is concerned with others, he or she is concerned with their external well-being, while when he or she is concerned with himself or herself, he is concerned with his or her virtue; since a virtuous person considers the internal virtue to be more important than the external well-being, a virtuous person is still self-centered.  ,WVHHPVDYLUWXRXVSHUVRQLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKRWKHUSHRSOH¶VZHOO-being mainly because he or she can therefore become a virtuous person. In this sense, a virtuous person is foundationally self-FHQWHUHG,QWKLVSDSHU,VKDOODUJXHWKDWWKH&KHQJ%URWKHUV¶QHR-Confucian virtue ethics can provide an adequate response to the self-centeredness objection on these two deeper levels. K E Y W O R DS: virtue ethics; the self-centeredness objection, the Cheng Brothers, Confucianism 13 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) I. Introduction In a different article, I examined the Cheng brothers¶ answer to the question, ³why be moral?´ (Huang 2008). For the Cheng brothers, one should be moral because it is joyful, and it is joyful because morality is a distinguishing mark of being human. To be moral is to fulfill one¶s own true nature. In this sense, the Cheng brothers¶ neo-Confucian ethics is fundamentally a virtue ethics, a type of ethics that focuses on the develoSPHQWRIRQH¶VFKDUDFWHUWUDLWVLQVWHDGRI PRUDOSULQFLSOHVWKDWFRQVWUDLQRQH¶VDFWLRQZKLFKLVWKHPDLQIRFXVRIWKLVDUWLFOH I shall start with a brief discussion of the main features of virtue ethics, particularly in its contrast to alternative ethical theories, with an eye to align Confucianism to virtue ethics (Section II). However, the main task of this article is to explore the unique contribution the Cheng brothers make to contemporary virtue ethics by providing a more adequate response to one of the central objections to virtue ethics: virtue ethics is self-centered. I shall argue that the Cheng brothers can relatively easily respond to this objection, at least on the first level, by showing that the self that a virtuous person is centered on is his or her virtue, which requires him to be centered on others (Section III). While this response is also available to Aristotelian virtue ethics, the main school of virtue ethics in the West, I shall argue that the Cheng brothers provide a better account of virtue than Aristotelians and so can better explain why a characteristic human being should possess other-regarding virtues (Section IV). I examine this self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics on two deeper levels: (1) a virtuous person, in being virtuous, is concerned only with the less important external material interests when the well-being of others is involved but with the more important internal traits of character when his or her own well-being is involved; and (2) the virtuous person is concerned with this well-being, whether external or internal, ultimately because the person wants to develop his or her own virtue. I argue that, while Aristotelians are ill-equipped to provide an adequate response to the objection on these two deeper levels, the Cheng brothers¶ neo-Confucian virtue ethics can not only avoid such objections but also show why virtue ethics is better than alternative theories of ethics (Sections V and VI). I shall conclude this article with a brief summary (Section VII). I I. V irtue E thics and Confucian E thics In the last few decades, there has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics as an alternative to deontology and consequentialism, which dominate modern and contemporary moral discourses. Virtue ethics comes in a variety of forms. While most contemporary virtue ethicists are neo-Aristotelians, there are others who get their primary inspiration from the Stoics, David Hume, Nietzsche, and John Dewey. What is unique about virtue ethics and common to its various forms is its focus on the character of agents, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism that focus on the nature of actions. So while virtue ethics does not always 14 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) disagree with deontology and consequentialism in moral evaluation, even when it issues the same moral approval or disapproval, its judgment is based on something different from those for deontology and consequentialism. To illustrate this, we can use Rosalind Hursthouse¶s example. The three types of ethics may well agree that I should help someone in need, but they disagree on why: ³A utilitarian will emphasize the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist will emphasize the fact that, in doing so, I will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as µDo unto others as you would be done by¶, and a virtue ethicist will emphasize the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent´ (Hursthouse 1999: 1). To say that virtue ethics focuses on the virtue of the agent in contrast to the rightness of the action does not mean that deontology and consequentialism are anti-virtue, just as it does not mean that virtue ethics is necessarily anti-rightness. For example, consequentialism can allow virtue to have a prominent place in it. This is particularly true of the so-called motive utilitarianism and, more directly, character utilitarianism. According to Robert Merrihew Adams, the most important advocate of motive utilitarianism, motives are ³principally wants and desires, considered as giving rise or tending to give rise to actions´ (Adams 1976: 467). Although he VHHVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDGHVLUHDQGDWUDLWRIFKDUDFWHUKHGRHVWKLQNWKDW³a desire, if strong, stable, and for a fairly general object«may perhaps constitute a trait of FKDUDFWHU´ (Adams 1976: 467). According to his motive utilitarianism, ³the morally perfect person«would have the most useful desires, and have them in exactly the most useful strengths; he or she would have the most useful among the patterns of motivation that are causally possible for human beings´ (Adams 1976: 470). Since what the morally perfect person in motive utilitarianism has is not merely desires or motivations, but patterns of such desires and motivations, such a person can be regarded as a virtuous person. However, motive or character utilitarianism is still different from virtue ethics, because the virtuous character is not intrinsically but only instrumentally good: it is good only because it is useful to produce the desired consequence. 1 Similarly, deontology, particularly the Kantian one, can also have a prominent place for virtue, so much so that some Kantian scholars even claim that Kant himself is a virtue ethicist. For example, Onora O¶Neill, in an article originally published in 1984, focuses on Kant¶s idea of maxims, which, according to her, ³are underlying principles that make sense of an agent¶s varied specific intentions,´ and so ³can have little to do with the rightness or wrongness of acts of specific types, and much more to do with the underlying moral quality of a life, or aspects of 1 7KXV*DU\:DWVRQSRLQWVRXWWKDWLQFKDUDFWHUXWLOLWDULDQLVP³WKHYDOXHRIWKHRXWFRPHRISRVVHVVLQJDQG exercising certain traits is the ultimate standard of all other values. It shares with act utilitarianism the idea that WKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDOQRWLRQLVWKDWRIDJRRGFRQVHTXHQFHRUVWDWHRIDIIDLUVQDPHO\KXPDQKDSSLQHVV´ (Watson 1997: 61). 15 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) a life«. To have maxims of a morally appropriate sort would then be a matter of leading a certain sort of life, or being a certain sort of person´ (O¶Neill 1989: 152). While duties indeed occupy a central place in Kant¶s ethics, O¶Neill argues that they are ³duties to act out of certain maxims, that is, to structure our moral lives along certain fundamental lines, or to have certain virtues´ (O¶Neill 1989: 153). However, we must keep in mind that maxims in Kant¶s ethics are not the most fundamental concepts. Sometimes one has to refrain from acting on certain maxims, and sometimes one has to act on certain maxims that one is reluctant to accept. It is the moral principle that tells us on which maxims we should act. 2 So in a ³Postscript´ to this article written fifteen years later, O¶Neill herself realizes that her earlier characterization of Kant as offering an ethics of virtue is misleading, acknowledging that ³Kant¶s fundamental notion is that of the morally worthy principle that provides guidelines not only for matters of outward right and obligation, but for good characters and institutions as well´ (O¶Neill 1989: 162). In short, virtuous characters are good only with the guidelines of the moral principle. Thus, in both consequentialism and deontology, virtues can have very important instrumental value to help promoting good consequences or acting on moral rules, while in virtue ethics, virtue is inherently good. While there are radical or extreme virtue ethicists, the so-called replacement virtue ethicists (see Anscombe 1958), who consider the notion of the rightness or wrongness of acts as unintelligible and want to replace it with the idea of virtue or vice of agents, most virtue ethicists writing today are reductionists. They do not necessarily deny the appropriateness of the notions of the rightness or wrongness of actions that deontologists and consequentialists are concerned with, but they think that such notions can be reduced to or derived from judgments about the moral characters of agents. For example, Hursthouse thinks that it is wrong to say that ³virtue ethics does not concern itself at all with right action, or what we should do´ (Hursthouse 1999: 26); for according to virtue ethics, ³an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the circumstances´ (Hursthouse 1999: 31). In other words, in order to know what the right action is, we need to do what a virtuous agent would do. In this sense, although Michael Slote claims that his agent-based virtue ethics, in contrast to merely agent-prior and agent-focused virtue ethics, is the most radical form of virtue )RURWKHUSUREOHPVZLWKVXFKDUHDGLQJRI.DQW¶VPD[LPVVHH/RXGHQ0-292. Robert Louden himself also thinks that Kant is a virtue ethicist, at least to some extent. However, instead of maxims, Louden IRFXVHVRQ.DQW¶VJRRGZLOOZKLFKLQKLVYLHZLV³DVWDWHRIFKDUDFWHUZKLFKEHFRPHVWKHEDVLVIRUDOORIRQH¶V DFWLRQV´ IURPWKLV/RXGHQLQIHUVWKDW³ZKDWLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\LPSRUWDQWLQKLV>.DQW¶V@HWKLFVLVQRWDFWVEXW DJHQWV´DQGLQWKLVVHQVH.DQWLDQHWKLFVLVDOVRDYLUWXHHWKLFVVLQFH³.DQWGHILQHVYLUWXH«DVµIRUWLWXGHLQ relation to the forces opposing a moral atWLWXGHRIZLOOLQXV¶7KH.DQWLDQYLUWXRXVDJHQWLVWKXVRQHZKR EHFDXVHRIKLVµIRUWLWXGH¶LVDEOHWRUHVLVWXUJHVDQGLQFOLQDWLRQVRSSRVHGWRWKHPRUDOODZ´ /RXGHQ  However, Louden himself also acknowledges a problem in reading Kant as a vLUWXHHWKLFLVWIRULQ.DQW³ERWK WKHJRRGZLOODQGYLUWXHDUHGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIREHGLHQFHWRPRUDOODZ«6LQFHKXPDQYLUWXHLVGHILQHGLQ terms of conformity to law and the categorical imperative, it appears now that what is primary in Kantian ethics is QRWYLUWXHIRUYLUWXH¶VVDNHEXWREHGLHQFHWRUXOHV9LUWXHLVWKHKHDUWRIWKHHWKLFDOIRU.DQW«%XW.DQWLDQ YLUWXHLVLWVHOIGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIWKHVXSUHPHSULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\´ /RXGHQ  16 2 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) ethics, it is still a virtue ethics of reduction rather than replacement. According to Slote, the DJHQWEDVHGYLUWXHHWKLFV³treats the moral or ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from independent and fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of PRWLYHVFKDUDFWHUWUDLWVRULQGLYLGXDOV´ 6ORWH 6R6ORWHKHUHGRHVQRWFRQVLGHUWKH rightness of action as an unintelligible idea. He only thinks that the rightness of action has to be derived from virtuous characters. The reason he claims that his virtue ethics is more radical than the more familiar types of virtue ethics, including the Aristotelian one, is that, in the agent-based virtue ethics, the character trait from which rightness of action is derived, is itself WKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDODQGQRWGHULYHGIURPDQ\WKLQJHOVHLQFOXGLQJ3ODWR¶VKHDOWKRIWKHVRXO DQG$ULVWRWOH¶VHXGDLPRQLD So, with regard to virtue, the distinction between virtue ethics on the one hand and deontology and consequentialism on the other is that virtue is inherently good for the former, while it is merely instrumentally good for the latter. Between these two positions, Thomas Hurka develops a recursive account of virtue. This account starts with what he calls a base-clause about goods such as WKLV³pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good´ (Hurka 2001: 12), and one about evils such as WKLV³pain, false belief, and failure in the pursuit of achievement are intrinsically evil´ (Hurka 2001: 15), where such actual states of affairs that count as intrinsic goods or evils may be replaced by others. The account then adds a recursion-clause about the intrinsic goodness of certain attitudes to what is good and evil and one about the intrinsic badness of certain other attitudes to what is good and evil. Since some states of affairs are intrinsically good and others are intrinsically evils, then the attitude of loving the former and hating the latter must also be intrinsically good, and the attitude of hating the former and loving the latter must also be intrinsically bad. Then finally the account defines virtues as precisely such attitudes to goods and evils (i.e. loving intrinsic goods and hating intrinsic evils) that are intrinsically good and, accordingly, vices as precisely such attitudes to goods and evils (i.e. loving evils and hating goods) that are intrinsically evil (Hurka 2001: 20). Since virtues are intrinsically good attitudes, they are intrinsically good; and since vices are intrinsically evil attitudes, they are intrinsically bad. However, Hurka argues that, since virtues are intrinsically good only because it is an attitude of loving what is intrinsically good or hating what is intrinsically evil, such intrinsically good attitudes to goods and evils, the virtuous attitudes or, simply, virtues, can be either good or bad instrumentally, just as intrinsically bad attitudes to goods and evils, the vicious attitudes or, simply, vices, can be either bad or good instrumentally. He LOOXVWUDWHVWKLVSRLQWLQWKHIROORZLQJZD\³where B tries benevolently to promote A¶s pleasure but through no fault of his causes A pain. B¶s benevolent action, though intrinsically good, is instrumentally evil, and if the pain it causes A is sufficiently great, it can be all things considered evil. Similarly, if a malicious attempt to cause A pain in fact gives A pleasure, it can be instrumentally and even all things considered good´ (Hurka 2001: 21). 17 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) In this article, I shall focus on the virtue ethicists¶ understanding of virtue. According to this understanding, virtuous character is more fundamental than right action, and to be virtuous is to be a characteristically human being. Thus a virtuous person performs virtuous actions ³µnaturally¶, without having to fight with emotions, inclinations or traits of character, without being in any conflict between µspirit¶ and µbody¶, or µreason¶ and µpassion¶´ (Statman 1997: 16). In other words, virtuous persons take delight in doing virtuous things. It is in this sense that we can claim that Confucian ethics is primarily a virtue ethics. For Confucianism, a moral person does moral things because doing moral things brings joy to the person, and it brings joy to the person because the person has the moral knowledge that to be moral is indispensable to being an authentic human being. Thus there is no wonder that effort abounds to relate Confucianism to virtue ethics, and the most stunning achievements of such an effort are the almost simultaneous publication of three comparative studies: Bryan Van Norden¶s Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (Van Norden 2007), YU Jiyuan¶s The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle (Yu 2007), and May Sim¶s Re m astering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius (Sim 2007).3 While such comparisons have been almost exclusively focused on classical Confucians, in this article, I shall focus on the neo-Confucian Cheng brothers. More importantly, my interest is not in exploring the similarities and differences between Confucianism and virtue ethics in the West as these comparative studies primarily aim to do, but in seeking the possibility of any possible contributions Confucianism can make to contemporary virtue ethics. While the revival of virtue ethics is impressive, there have been serious objections to it. Some of these, particularly the objection regarding uncodifiability, i.e. the inability of virtue ethics to provide people with practical action guides, have been persuasively responded to by leading virtue ethicists today. However, one of the central objections to virtue ethics, the so-called self-centeredness objection, particularly on its deeper levels, has not been adequately responded to and, it seems to me, can hardly be responded to adequately if we are limited to drawing on resources available in Western philosophical traditions. In contrast, I shall argue, a philosophically significant response to this objection can be found in the Cheng brothers¶ neo-Confucianism. 3 Vincent Shen argues that this approach to Confucian ethics is very different from the one adopted earlier by some contemporary neo-Confucians ³VXFKDV0OU Zongsan and his followers [who] XVH.DQW¶VFDWHJRULFDO imperative to interpret Confucian ethics, neglecting the imporWDQFHRIHWKLFDOSUDFWLFH´ Shen 2002: 31). This is perhaps true. However, when Mou links Confucian ethics and Kantian ethics, he regards them primarily not as against virtue ethics but as against the heteronomous ethics such as Christian ethics. Mou regards the central LGHDRI.DQW¶VHWKLcs as autonomy or self-legislation of moral agent, as this is a revolt against the Christian idea of God as the law-giver for human actions. It is this idea of autonomy that Mou sees as congenial to Confucian ethics, as he sees Confucian ethics as also autonomous and not heteronomous. In this sense, Mou is not necessarily against the interpretation of Confucian ethics as a virtue ethics, as virtue ethics is obviously also an autonomous and not heteronomous ethics. 18 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) I I I. T he Self-C enteredness O bjection: T he F irst Level The self-centeredness objection, as summarized by David Solomon, DOOHJHVWKDWDQ(9>HWKLFVRIYLUWXH@WHQGVWRIRFXVWRRPXFKDWWHQWLRQRQWKHDJHQW« Such theories demand a focus on the character of the individual agent. What gives the point to the task of acquiring the virtues is that one supposes that one should become a SHUVRQRIDSDUWLFXODUNLQG«7KLVYLHZGHPDQGVWKDWWKHPRUDODJHQWNHHSKLVRUKHURZQ character at thHFHQWHURIKLVRUKHUSUDFWLFDODWWHQWLRQ«>ZKLOH@WKHSRLQWRIPRUDO reflection essentially involves a concern for others. (Solomon 1997: 169) Solomon himself does not specify who raises this self-centeredness objection, but he thinks that this objection, or at least its spirit, can be found in Kant and contemporary Kantian SKLORVRSKHUV)RUH[DPSOHZHGRILQG.DQWVWDWLQJWKDW³DOOPDWHULDOSULQFLSOHVZKLFKSODFH the determining ground of choice in the pleasure or displeasure to be received from the reality of any object whatsoever, are entirely of one kind. Without exception they belong under the principle of self-ORYHRURQH¶VRZQKDSSLQHVV´ .DQW ,QDQRWKHUSODFH.DQWDUJXHV that Of the ancient Greek schools, there were only two opposing each other on this issue. But so far as the definition of the concept of the highest good is concerned, they followed one and the same method, since neither held virtue and happiness to be two different elements of the highest good, but seeking the unity of principle under the rule of identity. But again they differed in that each selected a different principle as the fundamental one. The (SLFXUHDQVDLG7REHFRQVFLRXVRIRQH¶VPD[LPVDVOHDGLQJWRKDSSLQHVVLVYLUWXH7KH Stoic said: To be conscious of onH¶VYLUWXHLVKDSSLQHVV7RWKHIRUPHUSUXGHQFH amounted to morality; to the latter, who chose a higher term for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom. (Kant 1956: 111) In short, for Kant, both Epicureans and Stoics regard morality as identical to happiness, which seems to him a self-centered conception of morality. 4 7KLVFULWLFLVPLQDSSHDUDQFHLVDOVRDSSOLFDEOHWRWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶QHR-Confucianism. TKH&KHQJ%URWKHUV¶DQVZHUWR³ZK\EHPRUDO´LVDSSDUHQWO\VHOI-regarding instead of other regardinJRQHVKRXOGEHPRUDOEHFDXVHRQHFDQWDNHGHOLJKWLQLW,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVLQRQH¶V own interest, or it pays, to be moral. As a matter of fact, as an admirer of the Golden Age, &RQIXFLXVFODLPVWKDW³DQFLHQWOHDUQHUVZHUHIRUWKHVDNHRIWKHPVHOYHV weiji 為己), while present learners are for the sake of others (weiren 為人)´ Analects 14.24). It is important, 4 )RUDGHWDLOHGH[DPLQDWLRQRI.DQW¶VFULWicism of such a conception of morality as self-centered, see Irwin 1996. 19 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) KRZHYHUWRVHHZKDW&RQIXFLXVPHDQVE\³IRUWKHVDNHRIRQHVHOI´DQG³IRUWKHVDNHRI RWKHUV´,QWKH&KHQJV¶YLHZE\³IRUWKHVDNHRIRQHVHOI´&RQIXFLXVPHDQVWRFXOWLYDWHRQH¶V LQQHUYLUWXHVZKLOHE\³IRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´&RQIXFLXVPHDQVWRGHFRUDWHRQHVHOIZLWKILQH VFKRODUVKLSLQIURQWRIRWKHUV,QWKHDERYHVWDWHPHQW&RQIXFLXVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW³DQFLHQW OHDUQHUV´WKDWKHDGPLUHVZHUHonly concerned with their own interests and ignore the interests RIRWKHUVQRUGRHVKHPHDQWKDW³SUHVHQWOHDUQHUV´WKDWKHORRNVGRZQXSRQDUHRQO\FRQFHUQHG with the interests of others while ignoring their own interest; otherwise he would give his praiVHWRWKH³SUHVHQWOHDUQHUV´LQVWHDGRI³DQFLHQWOHDUQHUV´ 7KHVHWZRGLIIHUHQWVHQVHVRI³IRUWKHVDNHRIRQHVHOI´DQG³IRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´DUHEURXJKW out most clearly when one of the Chengs contrasts learners ( xuezhe 學者) and officials (shizhe 仕者). This is particularly illuminating, as there is a saying in the Analects in the mouth of &RQIXFLXV¶VVWXGHQW=L[LD 子夏³WKHJRRGOHDUQHUVVKRXOGEHFRPHRIILFLDOV´ Analects 19.13). $IWHUTXRWLQJ³DQFLHQWOHDUQHUVZHUHIRUWKHVDNHRIWKHPVHOYHVZKLOHSUHVHnt learners are for WKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´&KHQJPDNHVDSDUDOOHOVWDWHPHQW³DQFLHQWRIILFLDOVZHUHIRUWKHVDNHRI RWKHUVZKLOHSUHVHQWRIILFLDOVDUHIRUWKHVDNHRIWKHPVHOYHV´ Yishu 6; 90; see also Cuiyan 1; 1214). Obviously Cheng here uses the two terPV³IRUWKHVDNHRIRQHVHOI´DQG³IRUWKHVDNHRI RWKHUV´LQWZRGLIIHUHQWVHQVHVLQUHODWLRQWROHDUQHUVDQGRIILFLDOVRWKHUZLVHZHFDQQRW understand why learners should be for themselves, while officials should be for others. In &KHQJ¶VYLHZOHDUQHUVVhould aim at cultivating themselves, not displaying their scholarship in front of others; and officials should be concerned with the interest of others and not merely ZLWKWKHLURZQLQWHUHVW+HUHLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRVHHWKDWWKHDQFLHQWOHDUQHUV¶³IRUWKHsake of WKHPVHOYHV´LVRQDSDUZLWKWKHDQFLHQWRIILFLDOV¶³IRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´DQGSUHVHQWOHDUQHUV¶ ³IRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´LVQRGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHSUHVHQWRIILFLDOV¶³IRUWKHVDNHRIWKHPVHOYHV´ To cultivate oneself (to be for the sake of oneself), in this Confucian tradition, means to GHYHORSRQH¶VLQERUQWHQGHQFLHVWREHFRQFHUQHGZLWKRWKHUV¶LQWHUHVWV7KHUHIRUHWKHPRUHRQH is for the sake of oneself, the more one is for the sake of others. On the other hand, to show off RQH¶VVFKRODUVKLSLQIURQWRIRWKHUV WREHIRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV LVWREHFRQFHUQHGZLWKRQH¶V own interest (in fame). So the more one is for the sake of others in this sense, the more one is for the sake of oneself. It is in this sense that CHENG <LVD\VWKDW³µDQFLHQWlearners were for WKHVDNHRIWKHPVHOYHVEXWHQGHGXSEULQJLQJWKHJRRGQHVVRIRWKHUVWRFRPSOHWLRQ´ Yishu 25; 325; see also Cuiyan 1; 1197).5 ,QFRQWUDVW³SUHVHQWOHDUQHUVDUHIRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUVDQGHQG 5 :KHQGLVFXVVLQJWKH&RQIXFLDQLGHDRI³IRUWKHVDNHRIWKHVHOI´TU Wei-PLQJSRLQWVRXWWKDW³WKH Confucian insistence on learning for the sake of the self is predicated on the conviction that self-cultivation is an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Those who are committed to the cultivation of their personal life for its own sake can create inner resources for self-realization unimaginable to those who view self-cultivation PHUHO\DVDWRROIRUH[WHUQDOJRDOVVXFKDVVRFLDODGYDQFHPHQWDQGSROLWLFDOVXFFHVV´ 7X ,Q7X¶V YLHZLI&RQIXFLDQV³GRQ¶WVXEVFULEHWRWKHWKHVLVWKDWOHDUQLQJLVSULPDULO\IRUVHOI-improvement, the demand for social service will undermine the integrity of self-FXOWLYDWLRQDVDQREOHHQGLQLWVHOI´ 7X :KLOH 20 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) XSORVLQJWKHLURZQVHOYHV´ Yishu 25; 325; see also Cuiyan 1; 1197). In other words, if learners focus their attention on showing off their scholarship and neglect self-cultivation, their inborn moral heart/mind will be lost. From this we can see that, since for the Chengs, virtuous agents are for the sake of themselves, this neo-Confucian position may be characterized as self-centered. However, there are two things distinctive about such a self-centeredness. First, while this Confucian response also says WKDWLWLVWRRQH¶VVHOI-interest to be moral, this self-LQWHUHVWLVQRWVRPHWKLQJH[WUDQHRXVWRRQH¶V PRUDODFWLRQDVWKHWHUP³VHOI-LQWHUHVW´LVFRPPRQO\XQGHUVWRRG,n contemporary business ethics, LaRue Tone Hosmer, for example, asks, ³ZKDWVKDOOZHVD\WRDPRGHUQ*\JHVDFWLYHLQ PDQDJHPHQW"´ +RVPHU UHIHUULQJWRWKHP\VWLFULQJLQ3ODWR¶VRepublic , which can PDNHRQHLQYLVLEOHZKHQGRLQJLPPRUDOWKLQJV+RVPHU¶VDQVZHULVWKDW³DFWLQJLQZD\VWKDW FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHµULJKW¶DQGµMXVW¶DQGµIDLU¶LVDEVROXWHO\HVVHQWLDOWRWKHORQg-term FRPSHWLWLYHVXFFHVVRIWKHILUP´ +RVPHU +HUHGLVUHJDUGLQJVRPHFULWLFLVPVRI such an approach as ineffective, 6 we can see that the reason it pays to be moral is that such a moral action will, sooner or later, bring material benefits to the business person. In such situations, the business person does not find it a joy to be moral. As a matter of fact, the person is perhaps pained by being moral. He or she nevertheless chooses to be moral in order to seek the benefits that may come with his or her moral actions. In other words, one performs moral actions not for the sake of moral actions but for the sake of benefits likely to accompany such actions. One performs moral actions only for prudential reasons. Similarly, in contemporary virtue ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse argues that virtue benefits its possessor in a similar sense. Hursthouse acknowledges that virtue does not always benefit the agent, enabling her to flourish,7 and so she agrees that virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for the flourishing of WKHDJHQW³LWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\VLQFHLWLVJHQHUDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHZLFNHGPD\IORXULVK like the green bay tree. And it is not sufficient because of those nasty cases that came up in FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHSDUWLFXODUTXHVWLRQ´ +ursthouse 1999: 172). Even so, Hursthouse still thinks that by and large virtue benefits its possessor. She makes an analogy. While following ,WKLQN7XLVULJKWLQH[SODLQLQJWKLV&RQIXFLDQLGHDRI³IRUWKHVDNHRIWKHVHOI´KHGRHVQRWSD\HQRXJK DWWHQWLRQWRWKHFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSDQGHYHQLGHQWLW\EHWZHHQ³IRUWKHVDNHRIRQHVHOI´ PRUDOFXOWLYDWLRQRIVHOI  DQG³IRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUV´ YLUWXRXVDFWLRQVWRZDUGRWKHUV  6 For example, Bill Shaw and John Corvino argue that Hosmer here does not take into serious consideration *\JHV¶VULQJLQ3ODWR³ZHFDQQRW tell whether true morality will fare better than the mere appearance of morality in generating corporate success. Furthermore, we see no way at all to test whether true morality will IDUHEHWWHU«>+@RZFDQZHH[SHFWWKHP>PDQDJHUV@WREHKDYHPRUDOO\ZKHQthey believe that they can hedge WKHLUEHWVDQGDFKLHYHDVPXFKRUPRUHVXFFHVVE\YLFHWKDQE\YLUWXH"´ 6KDZDQG&RUYLQR  7 7KXV VKH VWDWHV ³+HUH LV DQ RFFDVLRQ ZKHUH VD\ LI , VSHDN RXW DV , VKRXOG , DP JRLQJ WR EH VKXW LQ DQ asylum and subjected to enforced drugging; here is another where doing what is courageous maims me for life; here is another where if I do what is charitable I shall probably die. The answer to the particular question, on WKHVHRFFDVLRQVMXVWFDQQRWEHµLI\RXZDQWWR be happy, lead a successful, flourishing life, you should do what is honest or courageous or charitable here²\RXZLOOILQGWKDWLWSD\VRII¶´ +XUVWKRXVH  21 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) medical advice is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for being healthy, following it is RQH¶VEHVWEHW for being healthy. Similarly, although being virtuous is neither necessary nor VXIILFLHQWIRURQH¶VIORXULVKLQJLWLVRQH¶VEHVWEHWIRUIORXULVKLQJ +XUVWKRXVH  8 If the Cheng brothers mean the same thing as Hosmer and Hursthouse when they claim that it is a joy to be moral, then the claim is indeed self-centered. However, as we have seen, in the Cheng EURWKHUV¶&RQIXFLDQYLHZWKHVHOI-interest one seeks by performing moral actions is inherent in these actions: one feels joy in being moral not EHFDXVHLWFDQVHUYHRQH¶VLQWHUHVWLQJDLQLQJ fame or praise or wealth, etc., that may be brought to him or her; rather it is because one UHDOL]HVRQH¶VVHOI-nature²as a moral being²by being moral. Second, while the familiar version of self-interest by itself is in conflict with morality (although LQVRPHVLWXDWLRQVRQH¶VVHOI-LQWHUHVWPD\PRWLYDWHRQHWREHPRUDODQGRQH¶VEHLQJPRUDOPD\ EHFRQGXFLYHWRRQH¶VVHOI-interest), in Confucianism, there is no such conflict. Although the Cheng brothers claim that one should be moral because it is a joyful thing to do, they do not mean that one should do whatever brings one joy. In other words, while one should be moral EHFDXVHLWLVLQRQH¶VRZQLQWHUHVWWREHPRUDORQHVKRXOGQRWGRZKDWHYHULVLQRQH¶V self-LQWHUHVW+HUHRQHPXVWILUVWEHFOHDUDERXWZKDWRQH¶VJHQXLQHLQWHUHVWLVWRILQGWKH uniquely human joy which is precisely to do virtuous things. Here the conflict between self-LQWHUHVWDQGPRUDOLW\GLVDSSHDUVVLQFHRQH¶VSURSHUVHOI-interest is precisely to be FRQFHUQHGZLWKRWKHUV¶LQWHUHVW,QWKLVVHQVHWKHEHWWHURQHVHUYHVRQH¶VVHOILQWHUHVWWKHPRUH moral the person is. Here, as Richard Kraut states, a virtuous person ³ILUVWSURSRVHVDFRQFUHWH conception of the good, and then urges each of XVWRPD[LPL]HRXURZQJRRGVRFRQFHLYHG« ,WGRHVQRWFODLPWKDWRQHVKRXOGVHHNRQH¶VRZQJRRGFRPHZKDWPD\IRURWKHUVUDWKHUE\ arguing that acting virtuously and acting well coincide, it seeks to undermine the common assumption that at bottom the VHOIPXVWFRPHLQWRFRQIOLFWZLWKRWKHUV´ .UDXW†  7KHHVVHQFHRIWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶YLHZDERYHLVVXPPDUL]HGE\5REHUW6RORPRQZKRWKLQNV that the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics can be responded to, at least on this level, if we take account of an important distinction between two features of an EV. There is, first, the IHDWXUHWKDWWKHREMHFWRUQRWLFHVWKHFHQWUDOSODFHWKDWRQH¶VRZQFKDUDFWHUSOD\VLQWKH practical thinking associated with an EV. But there is also within an EV the set of virtues that each agent aims to embody in his character. While the first feature of an EV may 'DYLG&RSSDQG'DYLG6REHOGLVDJUHH³3HUKDSVLWLVWUXHGHVSLWHRXUREMHFWLRQVWKDW µIRUWKHPRVWSDUWE\ DQGODUJH¶EHLQJKRQHVWDQGJHQHURXVDQGNLQGDQGFDULQJEHQHILWVDSHUVRQ%XWIRUDOOZHKDYHVHHQLWPLJKW DOVR EH WUXH WKDW µIRU WKH PRVW SDUW E\ DQG ODUJH¶ EHLQJ VHOILVK GHWDFKHG DQG FDXWLRXV EHQHILWV D SHUVRQ´ (Copp and 6REHO    7KH\ GR UHFRJQL]H KRZHYHU WKDW ³RQH RI WKH DGYDQWDJHV RI +XUVWKRXVH¶V SURSRVDO«LVWKDWLWGRHV QRW GHSHQG RQ D PRUDOL]HG FRQFHSWLRQ RI IORXULVKLQJ 6KH DGPLWV IRU H[DPSOHWKDW sacrifices required by virtue can count as losses in eudaLPRQLD´ &RSSDQG6REHO  22 8 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) appear to render it excessively self-centered, the second feature is surely able to counteract that danger. The particular virtues characteristic of an EV may be as other-regarding as one might wish. While each agent may be expected to devote primary practical attention to the development of his or her own character, the attention may be required to turn the agent into a person fundamentally concerned with the wellbeing of others. (Solomon 1997: 171-2) In other words, while the virtue ethical reasons for actions may appear to be self-regarding: to cultivate your own virtues, the very virtues (or at least some of them) you need to possess are other-regardiQJ2QHFDQQRWFXOWLYDWHRQH¶VYLUWXHZLWKRXWWDNLQJFDUHRIWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKH others. The virtuous person, DVVWDWHGE\%HUQDUG:LOOLDPV³GHVLUHVTXLWHRIWHQWRGRYDULRXV YLUWXRXVWKLQJV´DQGRQHPD\FODLPWKDW³DQ\WKLQJPRWLYDWHGE\GHVLUHVLVGLUected toward SOHDVXUHDQGWKHSXUVXLWRIWKHSOHDVXUHLVHJRLVWLF´ :LOOLDPV +RZHYHUDV :LOOLDPVDOVRSRLQWVRXWLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRVHHWKDW³VRPHRIP\GHVLUHVDLPDWVWDWHVRIDIIDLUV that do not involve me at all.... There are self-transceQGLQJGHVLUHV´ :LOOLDPV ,Q other words, we cannot claim that a virtuous person is self-centered simply because the person always tries to satisfy his or her own desires. We need to see what desires this person wants to satisfy. As a virtuous person, the desires he or she typically wants to satisfy are desires of helping others. In this sense, the virtuous person is not self-centered at all.9 ,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶QHR-Confucianism is quite consistent with the Aristotelian view. We have seen that Hursthouse has made a controversial argument that virtue benefits its possessor, which may well be subject to the self-centeredness objection. However, as a good Aristotelian, she emphasizes that this argument is only part of her entire argument and so must be understood in combination with her other argument, that virtue makes its possessor a characteristic human being. In this argument, virtuous people do virtuous things not because they believe that this is the best bet for their getting more material and external benefits. In contrast, when they do virtuous things, they do so for the sake of others. For this reason, they RIWHQVDFULILFHWKHLURZQPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWDQGHYHQWKHLURZQOLIH9LUWXRXVSHRSOH¶V self-interest is served by serving the interest of others, as they take delight in their actions of PDNLQJRWKHUVKDSS\7KLVLVPDGHPRVWFOHDUE\$ULVWRWOH¶VLGHDRIWUXHVHOI-lovers. In $ULVWRWOH¶VYLHZWUXHORYHUVRIVHOIDUHQRWWKRVH³ZKRDVVLJQWRWKHPVHOYHVWKHJUHDWHUVKDUHRI ZHDOWKKRQRXUVDQGERGLO\SOHDVXUHV´ $ULVWRWOHE-16), but those who are always DQ[LRXVWKDWWKH\³VKRXOGDFWMXVWO\WHPSHUDWHO\RULQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDQ\RWKHURIWKH In this respect, Hursthouse also makes an interesting observation: ³WKHIXOO\YLUWXRXVFKDUDFWHULVWKHRQHZKR W\SLFDOO\NQRZLQJZKDWVKHVKRXOGGRGRHVLWGHVLULQJWRGRLW+HUGHVLUHVDUHLQµFRPSOHWHKDUPRQ\¶with her reason; hence, when she does what she should, she does what she desires to do, and reaps the reward of VDWLVILHGGHVLUH+HQFHµYLUWXRXVFRQGXFWJLYHVSOHDVXUHVWRWKHORYHURIYLUWXH¶ D WKHIXOO\YLUWXRXVGR what they (characteristically do), gladly´ (Hursthouse 1999: 92). 23 9 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) YLUWXHV´DQGLQJHQHUDO³DUHDOZD\VWRWU\WRVHFXUHIRUWKHPVHOYHVWKHKRQRXUDEOHFRXUVH´ (Aristotle: 1168b26- 7KHUHDVRQLVWKDWDSHUVRQRIWKHODWWHUW\SH³DVVLJQVWRKLPVHOIWKH WKLQJVWKDWDUHQREOHVWDQGEHVWDQGJUDWLILHVWKHPRVWDXWKRULWDWLYHHOHPHQWLQKLPVHOI«DQG therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it LVPRVWRIDOODORYHURIVHOI´ $ULVWRWOH 11168b29- 7KHQKHUHDFKHVH[DFWO\WKHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQDVWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV³WKHUHIRUH the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his QHLJKERXUVIROORZLQJDVKHGRHVHYLOSDVVLRQV´ $ULVWRWOHD-15). I V . V irtue and H uman Nature From the above, we have seen that both Confucian and Aristotelian virtue ethics can have an appropriate initial response to the self-centeredness objection. A virtuous person is indeed FRQFHUQHGZLWKRQH¶VRZQFKDUDFWHUV+RZHYHUWKHFKDUDFWHUVWKDWDYLUWXRXVSHUVRQLV concerned with are virtues, which are typically if not exclusively other-regarding.10 The more RQHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKRQHVHOI RQH¶VRZQYLUWXHV WKHPRUHRQHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKRWKHUV7KXV crucial to this initial response to the self-centeredness objection is what determines a character as virtue instead of vice. For example, why is benevolence a virtue rather than a vice, and why is greediness a vice and not a virtue? Obviously, if benevolence is a vice, and greediness is a virtue, then the virtue ethics would be unable to respond to the self-centeredness objection. So any virtue ethics must have a theory or at least an account of virtue: what makes a character trait virtuous? It is here that I think Aristotelian virtue ethics faces a problem that the Confucian virtue ethics can avoid. Although both Confucianism and Aristotelianism appeal to human nature to explain virtue, they have very different conceptions of human nature. Hursthouse provides a prudential argument for virtue as something that benefits its possessor, which I think is problematic and clearly subject to the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics. However, as we mentioned, she makes it clear that this prudential argument is inseparable from the DUJXPHQWWKDWYLUWXHPDNHVDSHUVRQDJRRGKXPDQEHLQJ7KLVLVUHODWHGWR$ULVWRWOH¶VIDPRXV function argumHQW$FFRUGLQJWR$ULVWRWOHWKHJRRGDQGWKH³ZHOO´RIDQ\WKLQJWKDWKDVD IXQFWLRQRUDFWLYLW\PXVWUHVLGHLQWKHIXQFWLRQ6RWKHJRRGDQGWKH³ZHOO´RIKXPDQEHLQJV must also reside in the human function, which is characteristic of human beings or, to use 0F'RZHOO¶VWHUPZKLFKLWLVWKHEXVLQHVVRIKXPDQEHLQJVWRSHUIRUP$ULVWRWOHLGHQWLILHVWKLV KXPDQIXQFWLRQDVWKH³DFWLYHOLIHRIWKHHOHPHQWWKDWKDVDUDWLRQDOSULQFLSOH´ $ULVWRWOH 1098a3). Thus virtue is what makes a person a good human being, a human being who performs rational activities, or lives a rational life, excellently. 10 Of course, not all virtues are other-regarding. Some virtues are self-regarding, and some virtues are both self-regarding and other regarding. However, even those merely self-regarding virtues, such as temperance (in drinking, eating, playing, etc.) are at least not selfish traits that tend to cause harm to others. 24 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) This account of virtues, particularly moral virtues that concern us here, has several problems. We will quickly bypass two of them so that we can focus on the third one, which is most relevant to the issue discussed here. First of all, since Aristotle distinguishes between practical reason and intellectual reason in a hierarchical order, with the latter being higher than the former, it is not clear whether a good human being must be morally virtuous, since one can have a well, if not better, functioning reason in contemplation without being moral. Second, even if moral virtues are necessary for the good functioning of human reason, it is not clear whether the Aristotelian ethics can be properly regarded as a virtue ethics. As we have seen, virtue ethics regards virtue as central, which contrasts it to other types of ethics that allow virtue only a secondary place in their systems. However, if virtue serves reason in Aristotle, then it is not much different from the virtue that serves the greatest good in utilitarianism and the virtue that serves duty in deontology. 11 In other words, virtue with such a secondary function will not make the ethics virtue ethics. However, the more serious problem in this Aristotelian virtue ethics is with the relation EHWZHHQPRUDOYLUWXHVDQGUHDVRQ:KLOHPRVWSHRSOHDJUHHZLWK$ULVWRWOH¶VYLHZRIUDWLRQDOLW\ as characteristic of human beings as well as his substantive view of moral virtues, 12 there have EHHQVHULRXVFKDOOHQJHV\HWWREHPHWDGHTXDWHO\DERXWZKHWKHU$ULVWRWOH¶VYLUWXHVFDQEH derived from his conception of human nature as rational. Bernard Williams, for one, has consistently doubted the possibility of deriving the former from the latter. In an early work, he FODLPVWKDW³LILWLVWKHPDUNRIDPDQWRHPSOR\LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGWRROVLQPRGLI\LQJKLV environment, it is equally a mark of him to employ intelligence in getting his own way and WRROVLQGHVWUR\LQJRWKHUV´ :LOOLDPV1: 73-74).13 In his major work, Ethics and the Lim its of Philosophy:LOOLDPVFRQWLQXHVWRWKLQNWKDWWKHUHLVDJDSEHWZHHQ$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRI KXPDQQDWXUHDQGWKDWRIYLUWXH³LWLVKDUGWREHOLHYHWKDWDQDFFRXQWRIKXPDQQDWXUH²if it is not already an ethical theory itself²will adequately determine one kind of ethical life as DJDLQVWRWKHUV´ :LOOLDPV ,QDORQJDUWLFOH0DUWKD1XVVEDXPWULHVWRUHVSRQGWR :LOOLDPV¶VFKDOOHQJHRQEHKDOIRI$ULVWRWOH6LQFHLQWKHTXRWHGSDVVDJH:LOOLDPVDGds the 11 7KRPDV+XUNDIRUH[DPSOHDVNV³the question of how distinctively virtue-ethical a theory is whose central H[SODQDWRU\SURSHUW\LVLQIDFWIORXULVKLQJ«. This ethics would not be at all distinctive if it took the virtues to FRQWULEXWH FDXVDOO\ WR IORXULVKLQJ DV SURGXFWLYH PHDQV WR D VHSDUDWHO\ H[LVWLQJ VWDWH RI IORXULVKLQJ´ +XUND 2001: 233). 12 )RUVRPHVHULRXVFULWLFLVPVRI$ULVWRWOH¶VHWKLFVDVDYLUWXe ethics, see Santas 1997. 13 In response to this challenge, YU -L\XDQDUJXHVWKDW³DJRRGOLIHIRUKXPDQEHLQJVPXVWLQYROYHWKHH[HUFLVH DQGPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\KXPDQIHDWXUH>UDWLRQDOLW\@,IRQH¶VOLIHLVGRPLQDWHGE\DSSHWLWHLW µDSSHDUVFRPSOHWHO\VODYLVK¶DQGµLVDOLIHIRUJUD]LQJDQLPDOV¶ NE, 1095b19- ´ <X $SSHWLWHLVD life without reason, but it is not necessarily against reason. It can be guided by reason. A life of appetite regulated by reason is obviously not a life for grazing animals but a properly human life, a life of practical reason, although for Aristotle a properly human life is not merely a life of appetite regulated by reason; it also includes the intellectual life. If life of appetite, broadly understood as bodily life, even when guided by reason, is still not properly human life, then no morally virtuous life could be counted as properly human life, as what a virtuous person does to others is, in most cases, to enhance the bodily lives of others. 25 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) FRQGLWLRQDO³LILWLVQRWDOUHDG\DQHWKLFDOWKHRU\LWVHOI´RQHRI1XVVEDXP¶VJRDOVLVWRVKRZ WKDW$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRIKXPDQQDWXUHLVQRWPRUDOO\QHXWUDODQGLQKHUDQDO\VLVRI $ULVWRWOH¶VIXQFWLRQDUJXPHQWVKHFRPHVWRWKLVFRQFOXVLRQ since no life will count as a good life for us unless it is first of all a life for us, and since a life for us must be a life organized, in some fashion, by practical reason, in which all IXQFWLRQVDUHLQIRUPHGDQGLQIXVHGE\UHDVRQ¶VRUJDQL]LQJDFWLYLW\then eudaimonia must be sought within the group of such lives, not in a life totally given over to bodily pleasure ZLWKRXWUHDVRQQRWLQWKHVOHHSHU¶VOLIHRIQRQ-guided digestive functioning. (Nussbaum 1995: 116) However, with such an account, a life without the guidance of reason indeed cannot be regarded as a human life, as Nussbaum claims; yet it does not show a vicious life must be a life without the guidance of reason and so must also be regarded as not a human life. Naturally Williams is not convincHG³$V1XVVEDXPSRLQWVRXWKRZHYHUWKHOLIHRIDZLFNHGRU self-indulgent person is equally a certain kind of life structured by reason; it is also a distinctive kind of hum an life. So far we still wait for the considerations that may move the idea of a life µVWUXFWXUHGE\UHDVRQ¶LQWKHVSHFLILFGLUHFWLRQRIOLIHRIPRGHUDWLRQ´ :LOOLDPV  14 :LOOLDPV¶VVXVSLFLRQLVVKDUHGE\-RKQ0F'RZHOO,QDQHVVD\RQ$ULVWRWOH¶VHXGDLPRQLD McDowell first imagines a debate between a person, X, who thinks that a human being should exercise certain virtues, including those other-regarding ones, and another person, Y, who thinks that the virtuous life is suitable only for contemptible weaklings and that a real man, who looks out for himself, does not practice those other-regarding virtues. Then McDowell ORRNVDW$ULVWRWOH¶VIDPRXVSDVVDJHLQWKHIXQFWLRQDUJXPHQWFRQFOXGLQJWKDWWKLVSDVVDJH³can EHUHDGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHFRQFOXVLRQLV VRIDU QHXWUDODVEHWZHHQ$ULVWRWOH¶VRZQ substantive view [of virtues] and, say, a view of eudaimonia corresponding to the position of Y LQWKHGLVSXWH´ 0F'RZHOO ,Q0F'RZHOO¶VYLHZ WKHWKHVLVWKDWPDQ¶Vergon [function] consists in rational activity obviously excludes what might otherwise have been a conceivable view of eudaimonia, namely, a life of unreflective gratification of appetite; in the spirit of the ergon argument, we might say that that embodies no recognizable conception of a distinctively human kind of excellence. But no other likely candidate is clearly excluded by the eliminative argument for that thesis. (McDowell 1998: 13) ,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHIXQFWLRQDUJXPHQW1XVVEDXPDOVRGLVFXVVHV$ULVWRWOH¶VDUJXPHQWIRUWKHSROLWLFDOQDWXUH of human beings (see Nussbaum 1995: 102- E\ZKLFK:LOOLDPVLVHTXDOO\XQFRQYLQFHG³*ODXFRQDQG Adeimantus, agreeing that human beings are essentially or typically rational and they essentially or typically live in societies, could still deny that human reason is displaced at its most effective in living according to the UHVWULFWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIVRFLHW\´ :LOOLDPV  26 14 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) ,QDGLIIHUHQWHVVD\RQ$ULVWRWOH¶VPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\0F'RZHOOIXUWKHUH[SODLQVWKHNLQGVRI life that may be excluded and the kinds of lives that cannot be excluded by ArLVWRWOH¶VIXQFWLRQ argument: In fact there are only two substantive points on which Aristotle suggests that facts about KXPDQQDWXUHFRQVWUDLQWKHWUXWKDERXWDJRRGKXPDQOLIH«)LUVWDJRRGKXPDQOLIHPXVW be an active life of that which has logos ( N.E. 1098a3-4); this excludes, for instance, the ideal of uncontrolled gratification of appetite with which Socrates saddles Callics, in 3ODWR¶V Gorgias. Second, human beings are naturally social ( NE 1097b11, 1069b18-19); this excludes a solitary life. Obviously these two points fall a long way short of purporting WRDIIRUGDYDOLGDWLRQRI$ULVWRWOH¶VHWKLFLQIXOO 0F'RZHOO-36) To further illustrate his point that rationality does not necessarily lead to virtue, in yet another essay arguing against Aristotelian naturalism, McDowell imagines a rational wolf. Without reason, the wolf would find it natural for him to play his part in the co-operative activity of KXQWLQJZLWKWKHSDFN+RZHYHU³+DYLQJDFTXLUHGUHDVRQKHFDQFRQWHPSODWHDOWHUQDWLYHVKH FDQVWHSEDFNIURPWKHQDWXUDOLPSXOVHDQGGLUHFWFULWLFDOVFUXWLQ\DWLW«DQGIUDPHWKH TXHVWLRQµZK\VKRXOG,GRWKLV"¶«ZRQGHULQJZKHWKHUWRLGOHWKURXJKWKHKXQWEXWVWLOOJUDEKLV VKDUHRIWKHSUH\´ 0F'RZHOO ,Q0F'RZHOO¶VYLHZHYHQLIWKe wolf by its nature does what virtue might require it to do, the addition of reason may cause it to question its QDWXUDOEHKDYLRU7KHQ0F'RZHOOGUDZVWKHOHVVRQ³HYHQLIZHJUDQWWKDWKXPDQEHLQJVKDYH a naturally based need for the virtues, in a sense parallel to the sense in which wolves have a naturally based need for co-operativeness in their hunting, that need not cut any ice with VRPHRQHZKRTXHVWLRQVZKHWKHUYLUWXRXVEHKDYLRXULVJHQXLQHO\UHTXLUHGE\UHDVRQ´ (McDowell 1998: 173). One might wonder whether Williams and McDowell do not have a proper view of rationality and rationality, when properly understood, would necessarily require moral virtues. Thomas Hurka, another critic of the view that rationality necessitates moral virtue, however, argues that WKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH,Q+XUND¶VYLHZ$ULVWRWOH¶VIXQFWLRQDUJXPHQWEDVLFDOO\VD\VWKDW   human flourishing consists in the development of what is fundamental to human nature, (2) rationality is what is fundamental to human nature, and (3) moral virtues instantiate rationality EHFDXVHWKH\³H[HUFLVHSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQGLIIHUHQWGRPDLQVRIDFWLRQDQGDUHWKHUHIRUH HVVHQWLDOWRDIORXULVKLQJOLIH´ +XUND +XUND¶VSUREOHPLVZLWK  QRWQHFHVVDULO\ because it is false but because it is misleading. To see this, Hurka invites us to consider our definition of rationality. In his view, rationality can be either defined formally or substantively. 7KHIRUPDODFFRXQWRIUDWLRQDOLW\³VD\VWKDWDFWLRQVH[SUHVVSUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\WRDKLJKHU degree when they involve better-justified beliefs that they will achieve their goals and when their goals are more extended and arranged in more complex means-HQGKLHUDUFKLHV´ +XUND 27 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) 2001: 237). Hurka argues that there are two problems with this formal definition. First, virtues DUHYDOXHGKHUHQRWDVYLUWXHVEXWDVWRROVWRWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHDJHQW¶VUDWLRQDOLW\6HFRQG DQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\³WKHFULWHULDGRQRWVXFFHVVIXOO\GLVWLQJXLVKYLUWXRXVDFWLRQVIURPQHXWUDO and even vicious ones; playing chess DQGWRUWXULQJFDQDOVRH[WHQGDSHUVRQ¶VJRDODQGLQYROYH complex means-HQGUHDVRQLQJ´ +XUND +XUNDWKHQDVNVXVWRLPDJLQHWZR VLWXDWLRQV,QRQHDSHUVRQFDQHLWKHUVDYHDQRWKHU¶VOLIHRUFRQWLQXHZLWKDWKHRUHWLFDODFWLYLW\ In another, one¶VVDYLQJDOLIHZLOOGLVWUDFWKHUIURPVRPHPRUHFKDOOHQJLQJDQGFRPSOH[ DFWLYLW\VXFKDVFKHVVSOD\LQJRUHYHQWRUWXULQJ VHH+XUND ,Q+XUND¶VYLHZWKLV formal account of rationality cannot show that a rational person will perform the morally YLUWXRXVDFWLRQRIVDYLQJDSHUVRQ¶VOLIHDVWKHDOWHUQDWLYHDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHVHWZRVLWXDWLRQVFDQ EHWWHUH[WHQGWKHDJHQW¶VUDWLRQDOLW\WKDQWKHPRUDOO\YLUWXRXVDFWLRQV,IVR+XUNDDUJXHVWKDW we may need to accept a more substantive account of rationality, according to which rationality ³LQYROYHVUHDVRQLQJDERXWLGHQWLI\LQJDQGVXFFHVVIXOO\SXUVXLQJZKDWLVJRRG$VWUXWKLVWKH proper aim of belief, so goodness the proper aim of desire, and practical rationality is directed to this aim. As so diUHFWHGLWLVLQVWDQWLDWHGHVSHFLDOO\E\YLUWXH´ +XUND ,IWKH formal account makes virtues serve reason, this substantive account makes reason serve virtues. If so, moral virtues, instead of rationality, both practical and theoretical, would become central to human flourishing. This, of course, is not consistent with the Aristotelian view. However, I VKDOODUJXHWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\WKHYLHZDUJXHGIRULQWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶QHR-Confucianism. 7KH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶&RQIXFLDQDFFRXQWRIYLUWXHLVDOso closely connected with its conception of human nature, and so virtue makes its possessor a good human being. However, because it is based on a different conception of human nature, it can avoid the Aristotelian gap between virtue and human nature. What distinguishes human beings from beasts is not rationality but morality: human nature is virtuous and human virtues are natural. In other words, virtues are virtues of human nature (xing zhi de 性之德), and human nature is always virtuous nature (de xing 德性). Here, CHENG +DRWHOOVXV³ZHWDONDERXWµYLUWXRXVQDWXUH¶LQRUGHUWRVKRZWKH nobility of human nature, which is equivalent to saying that human nature is good; we talk DERXWµYLUWXHVRIKXPDQ QDWXUH¶WRLQGLFDWHZKDWKXPDQQDWXUHSRVVHVVHV´ Yishu 11; 125). By YLUWXRXVQDWXUHWKH&KHQJVPHDQWKDWLWLV³QDWXUDOHQGRZPHQWDQGQDWXUDODVVHW´ Yishu 2a; 20). Because human nature is virtuous and human virtues come from human nature, Confucians often talk about natural virtue (tian de 天德). CHENG Hao tells us that the reason that sages and the worthy talk about natural virtues is that they are all things originally complete in us by nature. If they are not corrupted, we only need to straightly practice from them. When some minor defects appear, we need to fix them with reverences so that their original status can be restored. We can restore their original status precisely because we are originally complete with them. ( Yishu 1; 1). 28 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) It is well known that humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness occupy the FHQWUDOSODFHRQWKH&RQIXFLDQOLVWRIKXPDQYLUWXHV)RUWKH&KHQJV³WKHVHILYHFDUGLQDO Confucian virtues, humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness, are also human nature. Humanity is like the whole bodyZKLOHWKHRWKHUIRXUDUHOLNHWKHIRXUOLPEV´ Yishu 2a; 14). In another place, CHENG <LFODLPVWKDW³LQKXPDQQDWXUHZHQHHGWRPDNHDGLVWLQFWLRQ among these five: humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness´ Yishu 15; 168). This view of identity between human nature and human virtue is of course closely related to the Confucian view of human nature as good. Thus CHENG Yi states, all actions from one¶s human nature are good. Because of the goodness of human nature, sages name it by humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness. Because their applications are different, these five different names are used. Whether viewed as a unity or viewed separately, however, they are all dao. When one acts in violation of these five, one is in violation of dao. There are people who think that human nature, dao, is different from these five. This is only because they lack the knowledge: they have not experienced their own human nature; they have no idea of where dao lies. (Yishu 25; 319) Here, what CHENG Yi means by dao is the dao by which human beings relate to each other. So in another place he tells us: ³Confucius says that µthe dao governing father-son relationship is one¶s innate nature ( tian xing 天性).¶ Here Confucius is talking about filial piety, and therefore he says that [this dao governing] father and son is one¶s innate nature. However, what about the dao governing the relationships between rulers and ministers, between older and younger brothers, between hosts and guests, and among friends? Is not it also one¶s innate nature?´ (Yishu 18; 235). This Confucian account of human nature as virtuous or of human virtues as natural is significant. As we have seen, the Aristotelian virtue ethicists want to claim, as Hursthouse does, that ³the virtues make their possessor a good human being. (Human beings need the virtues in order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a characteristically good, eudaimon, human life.)´ (Hursthouse 1999: 167). However, because they hold that what is characteristically human is the rational activity, they have trouble not only in maintaining that the Aristotelian ethics is a virtue ethics (since virtues are good in their ethics only to serve the function of rational activity) but also in showing that a characteristically good human life necessitates virtues or that virtues will make its possessor lead a characteristically good human life. The Confucian view of human nature as virtuous can avoid this problem. Here, virtues are good also because they benefit their possessor as a human being, but the nature of human being itself is defined by virtue. So in Confucian ethics, virtue is inherently and not merely instrumentally good. At the same time, since human nature is virtuous, virtue will naturally make its possessor a good human being. ,WLVLQWKLVVHQVHWKDWWKH&KHQJV¶QHR-Confucian 29 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) ethics can also avoid what Gary Watson regards as the dilemma of ethics of virtue. The GLOHPPDLQTXHVWLRQLVWKDW³HLWKHUWKHWKHRU\¶VSLYRWDODFFRXQWRIKXPDQQDWXUH Rr characteristic human life) will be morally indeterminate, or it will not be objectively well IRXQGHG´ :DWVRQ +XUVWKRXVHVWDWHVWKLVYHUVLRQRIWKHGLOHPPDLQDFOHDUHUZD\ ³HLWKHUZHVSHDNIURPWKHQHXWUDOSRLQWRIYLHZXVLQJDVFLHQWLILFDccount of human nature²in ZKLFKFDVHZHZRQ¶WJHWYHU\IDU>LQJHWWLQJYLUWXHVIURPKXPDQQDWXUH@²or we speak from within an acquired ethical outlook²in which case we will not validate our ethical beliefs, but merely re-H[SUHVVWKHP´ +XUVWKRXVH .15 Hursthouse herself tries to argue that the Aristotelian naturalism is able to avoid this dilemma, while our argument above shows that, as an objective, well-founded, and neutral view of human nature, it is morally indeterminate in the sense that to be a characteristically human being in terms of rationality does not determine one to be a morally virtuous person. 6RLIWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQHWKLFVIDOOVRQWRRQHRIWKHKRUQVRI:DWVRQ¶VGLOHPPD EHLQJREMHFWLYHLQ accounting human nature but unable to derive virtue from such an objective account), we need WRVHHZKHWKHUWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶&RQIXFLDQHWKLFVE\DYRLGLQJWKLVKRUQIDOOVLQWRWKHRWKHU In other words, by avoiding this problem of moral indeterminacy, does it merely re-express virtues and therefore become objectively not well founded? The answer is no. The Cheng brothers regard human nature as virtuous. This, however, does not mean that this view is merely internal and not objective. For the Cheng brothers, we know that human nature is virtuous because we can experience the four moral feelings, both in ourselves and in others. )RUH[DPSOH³LWLVIURPWKHIHHOLQJRIFRPPLVHUDWLRQWKDWZHNQRZWKDWKXPDQQDWXUH SRVVHVVHVWKHYLUWXHRIKXPDQLW\´ Yishu 15; 168). Similarly, from the feeling of shame we know that human nature possesses the virtue of rightness, from the feeling of courtesy that of propriety, and from the feeling of right and wrong that of wisdom. A possible objection to such a view of human nature is that, if so, there would be no vicious human beings. As a matter of IDFW&RQIXFLDQLVPLQJHQHUDODQGWKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶QHR-Confucianism in particular does claim that there are no vicious hum an beings, because those who have lost their original virtuous human nature are no longer regarded as human beings. However, it also claims that, unlike beasts, those who have lost their originally virtuous human nature can still get it back and become human beings again. To understand this, we need to see that the Confucian explanation of virtue is neitKHUPHUHO\H[WHUQDO RU³QHXWUDO´LQ+XUVWKRXVH¶VZRUGV QRU HQWLUHO\LQWHUQDO RUIURP³DQDFTXLUHGHWKLFDOYLHZ´LQ+XUVWKRXVH¶VZRUGV 5DWKHUWRXVH Hursthouse argXHV WKDW ³%HUQDUG :LOOLDPV«KDV SLQSRLQWHG EDVLFDOO\ WKH VDPH GLOHPPD ,I µJRRG KXPDQ EHLQJ¶ DV LW ILJXUHV LQ WKH PRGHUQ QDWXUDOLVP SURMHFW LV OLNH µJRRG ZROI¶ D ELRORJLFDOHWKRORJLFDOVFLHQWLILF FRQFHSWWKHQLWLVREMHFWLYHO\DOOULJKWEXWLWZRQ¶W\Leld anything much in the way of ethics; it will be largely PRUDOO\LQGHWHUPLQDWH«$FRQFHSWRIKXPDQQDWXUHIRUPHGZLWKLQRXUHWKLFDORXWORRNPD\ \LHOGXVTXLWHD rich hoard²but then, of course, the rich hoard will not be objectively well-founded but the mere re-iteration of WKHYLHZVLQYROYHGLQWKHHWKLFDORXWORRN´ (Hursthouse 2004: 165). 30 15 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) 'DYLG:RQJ¶VWHUPLWLVLQWHUQDOWRKXPDQQDWXUH VRWKDWDOODQGRQO\KXPDQEHLQJVFDQEH virtuous) but is not necessary internal with respect to any given individual agent (so that there can be individuals who are not virtuous) (Wong 2006: 188).16 Such virtues, to use Christopher Toner¶s term, are natural norms. 17 They are natural, since all human beings and only human beings can have them, although not every individual human being actually has them. In this sense, this Confucian account of virtues also has an objective basis and therefore does not merely re-express the normative virtues. At the same time, however, they are norms, since not everything that humans naturally have is recognized as virtues. Not only many things that all human beings naturally share with animals (such as the desire to exploit [see Toner 2008: 236]), but even some things that are uniquely human, such as rationality and sociality, are not recognized as virtues in Confucianism. For this reason, the Confucian account of virtue, while based on nature, is not morally indeterminate. V . T he Self-C enteredness O bjection: T he Second Level In the above, we have seen that a virtuous person, while concerned with oneself, is concerned ZLWKRQH¶VFKDUDFWHUVEHLQJYLUWXRXVDQGYLUWXRXVFKDUDFWHUVSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHRWKHU-regarding ones, make the virtuous person concerned with the interest of others. In this sense, virtue ethics is not self-centered in the morally condemnable sense. However, this response to the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics, as David Solomon points out, may allow the objection to arise at a deeper level, at which, WKHREMHFWLRQSRLQWVWRDQDV\PPHWU\WKDWDULVHVEHWZHHQDQDJHQW¶VUHJDUGIRUKLVRZQ character and his regard for the character of others. The question raised here has this form: Since an EV [ethics of virtue] requires me to pay primary attention to the state of my own FKDUDFWHUGRHVQ¶WWKLVVXJJHVWWKDW,PXVWUHJDUGP\RZQFKDUDFWHUDVWKHHWKLFDOO\PRVW important feature of myself? But, if so, and if I am suitably concerned about others, VKRXOGQ¶WP\FRQFHUQIRUWKHPH[WHQGEH\RQGDPHUHFRQFHUQWKDW their wants, needs and desires be satisfied, and encompass a concern for their FKDUDFWHU"6KRXOGQ¶W,LQGHHGKDYH the same concern for the character of my neighbour as I have for my own? (Solomon 1997: 172) 6RORPRQXVHVWKHH[DPSOHRID&KULVWLDQ¶VYLHZRIORYHRUFKDULW\DVRQH¶VSULPDU\YLUWXH7KLV person will take it his or her task to become a person who exhibits this virtue toward others, but 16 0LFKDHO7KRPSVRQPDNHVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPHSRLQWZKHQKHFODLPVWKDW³:KDWPHUHO\µRXJKWWREH¶LQWKH LQGLYLGXDOZHPD\VD\UHDOO\µLV¶LQLWVIRUP´ 7KRPSVRQ). 17 7RQHUGHYHORSVKLVLGHDRI³QDWXUDOQRUP´WKURXJKKLVXQLTXHFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHILUVWQDWXUHDQGWKHVHFRQG nature. The universal human nature can be regarded as the first nature, while virtue can be considered as the VHFRQGQDWXUH+RZHYHU³first and second nature must be related so that the second is a natural outgrowth of the first, and so that that in our given makeup is (first) natural which does tend toward an ethically mature VHFRQGQDWXUH´ (Toner 2008: 236 ). 31 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) this virtue does not require the person to bring it about that others around him or her be YLUWXRXV³&KULVWLan love requires me to attend to the wants, needs and desires of others. But GRHVQ¶WWKLVVXJJHVWWKDW,UHJDUGRWKHUVDVOHVVPRUDOO\LPSRUWDQWWKDQP\VHOI"6DWLVI\LQJWKHLU needs is good enough for them, but I require of myself that I become a loving perVRQ´ (Solomon 1997: 172). As this objection may sound somewhat strange, one might wonder who would raise such an objection. Solomon himself does not state it clearly except that it is also traceable to some versions of Kantianism. This is perhaps true. However, the closest example of this objection I can find is in Bernard Williams, hardly a Kantian. As we have seen, Williams argues against the view of virtue ethics as egoistic in the sense that virtuous persons desires pleasure in performing virtuous actions, as the actions they perform are other-regarding. However, he DUJXHVWKDWHYHQZKHQZHJHWULGRIWKLVPLVFRQFHSWLRQ³WKHUHPD\VWLOOVHHPWREHVRPHWKLQJ OHIWWRWKHFKDUJHRIHJRLVP´ZKLFK³LQYROYHVWKHDJHQW¶V thinking about these dispositions themselves and relating them to a life of well-being. Even if the dispositions are not themselves directed toward the self, it is still his own well-being that the agent in Socratic reflection will be FRQVLGHULQJ(JRLVPVHHPVWREHEDFNDJDLQ´ :LOOLDPV 50). The type of egoism that Williams has in mind is clearly what Solomon calls the self-centeredness of objection to virtue ethics on the deeper level: the virtuous person is exclusively concerned with the external well-being of others but is primarily concerned with the internal well-being of his or her self, when he or she clearly realizes that the internal well-being is far more important and constitutive of human being than the external well-being. This becomes most clear when he tries to expose the pUREOHPRI6RFUDWHV¶YLHZWKDW³WKHJRRGPDQFDQQRWEHKDUPHG´ RQHFDQ KDUPKLVERG\EXWQRWKLVVRXOZKLFKLVKLVWUXHVHOI ³LQGHVFULELQJPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQVLWWDNHV DYHU\VSLULWHGYLHZRIRQH¶VRZQLQWHUHVWVEXWWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHURIHWKLFVUHTXLUHV it to give a OHVVVSLULWXDOYLHZRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VLQWHUHVWV,IERGLO\KXUWLVQRWUHDOKDUPZK\GRHVYLUWXH UHTXLUHXVVRVWURQJO\QRWWRKXUWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERG\"´ :LOOLDPV  +HUHLWPLJKWEH added: if bodily pleasure is not real pleasure, why does virtue require us so strongly to bring such pleasures to others?). Aristotle does not think that bodily harm and pleasure are not real harm and pleasure, but still regards it as less important than the harm and pleasure of the soul. Yet, precisely ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHKDUPDQGSOHDVXUHRIWKHVRXO$ULVWRWOH¶VYLUWXRXVSHUVRQLV only concerned with himself or herself. Moreover, the virtuous person acquires the pleasure and avoids the harm of his or her own soul largely by providing others with bodily pleasure and HOLPLQDWLQJRUGHFUHDVLQJWKHLUERGLO\KDUP7KXV:LOOLDPVVWDWHV³ZKHQ$ULVWRWOHVHHPVPRVW removed from modern ethical perceptions, it is often because the admired agent is disquietingly FRQFHUQHGZLWKKLPVHOI´ :LOOLDPV  32 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) What WiOOLDPVKDVLQPLQGPXVWEH$ULVWRWOH¶VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHYLUWXRXVSHUVRQDVDWUXH self-lover as we mentioned earlier in this article. Aristotle makes a contrast between such true self-lovers and self-ORYHUVLQWKHFRPPRQVHQVH7KHODWWHUDUH³SHRSOHZKR assign to WKHPVHOYHVWKHJUHDWHUVKDUHRIZHDOWKKRQRXUVDQGERGLO\SOHDVXUHV´ $ULVWRWOHE-7). Such self-lovers are to be reproached. However, a true self-ORYHULVWKHRQHZKRLV³DOZD\V anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with DQ\RWKHURIWKHYLUWXHV´VXFKDSHUVRQLVDWUXHVHOI-ORYHUEHFDXVH³DWDOOHYHQWVKHDVVLJQVWR KLPVHOIWKHPRVWDXWKRULWDWLYHHOHPHQWLQKLPVHOIDQGLQDOOWKLQJVREH\VWKLV´ $ULVWRWOH 1068b25-30). Such a true self-lover is obviously not self-centered in the sense that, when he SHUIRUPVYLUWXRXVDFWVDQGWKHUHIRUHEHQHILWVKLVIHOORZVKHGRHVVR³IRUWKHVDNHRIKLVIULHQGV DQGKLVFRXQWU\DQGLIQHFHVVDU\GLHVIRUWKHP´ $ULVWRWOHD-20). However, the Aristotelian self-lover is self-FHQWHUHGRQDGHHSHUOHYHOLQ'DYLG6RORPRQ¶VVHQVH$OWKRXJK SHRSOH¶VYLUWXRXVDFWVZLOOEHQHILWWKHPVHOYHVDQGWKHLUIHOORZVDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHUHLVDQ asymmetry between these two kinds of benefit: the benefit their fellows get from their virtuous actions is wealth, honor, and bodily pleasures, while the benefit they get themselves from their virtuous acts is nobility; and Aristotle makes it clear that nobility is much more important than wealth, honor, and bodily pleasure: the true self-ORYHU³ZLOOWKURZDZD\ERWKZHDOWKDQGKRQRUV DQGLQJHQHUDOWKHJRRGVWKDWDUHREMHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQJDLQLQJIRUKLPVHOIQRELOLW\´ $ULVWRWOH 1069b20-21). Here the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics is precisely this: while the Aristotelian virtuous agents do care for others for their own sake, they only care about their external goods, not their more important internal goods (virtue or nobility); while they sacrifice their own external goods, they do so, at least partially, in order to acquire their own internal goods. Solomon, himself an advocate of virtue ethics, acknowledges that the self-centeredness objection at this deeper level is ineliminable within virtue ethics. In his view, the only reasonable response to such an objection is to find partners in crime (if it is indeed a crime, he adds), i.e., to indicate that the major rivals to virtue ethics, particularly deontology and utilitarianism, commit the same crime. For example, Kantian ethics requires an agent to act from the sense of duty but does not require the agent to try to bring it about that the others also act from the sense of duty. Kant thinks that we have imperfect duty to promote our moral SHUIHFWLRQDQGWRDGYDQFHRWKHUV¶KDSSLQHVVEXWZHGRQRWKDYHWKHFRUUHsponding imperfect GXW\WRSURPRWHRXUKDSSLQHVVDQGRWKHUV¶PRUDOSHUIHFWLRQIRUWKHIRUPHUEHFDXVHZHGRQRW KDYHDGXW\WRGRZKDWZHDOZD\VDXWRPDWLFDOO\ZLVKWRGRDQGIRUWKHODWWHUEHFDXVH³WKH perfection of another man, as a person, consists precisely in his own power to adopt his end in accordance with his own concept of duty; and it is self-contradictory to demand that I do (make LWP\GXW\WRGR ZKDWRQO\WKHRWKHUSHUVRQKLPVHOIFDQGR´ .DQW 6RLQ6RORPRQ¶V YLHZ³WKH.DQWLDQVORJDQKHUHPLJKWEHµULJKWQHVVIRUPHKDSSLQHVVIRU\RX¶´ 6RORPRQ 33 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) 172).18 The case of utilitarianism is slightly more complicated, as Solomon acknowledges that classical utilitarianism requires that an agent ought not only to make himself or herself benevolent but also to attempt to make others benevolent. However, the asymmetry is still there: ZKLOHWKHDJHQW¶VFRQFHUQIRURWKHUV¶EHQHYROHQFHLVRQO\RILQVWUXPHQWDOFRQFHUQ WRPD[LPL]H KXPDQKDSSLQHVV WKHDJHQW¶VFRQFHUQIRUKLVRUKHURZQEHQHYolence is not merely of LQVWUXPHQWDOFRQFHUQ7KHEHQHYROHQFHRIWKHDJHQW³LVDVLWZHUHWKHSHUVSHFWLYHIURPZKLFK the benevolence of others attains a kind of (instrumental) moral significance, but his [the DJHQW¶V@RZQEHQHYROHQFHFDQQRWLWVHOIDWWDin moral significance from this perspective, because it is WKHSHUVSHFWLYH,WLVLQWKLVZD\WKDWHYHQIRUDXWLOLWDULDQRQH¶VRZQFKDUDFWHUKDV DVSHFLDOVWDWXVWKDWLVGHQLHGWRRWKHUV´ 6RORPRQ  Still, some Aristotle scholars try to go beyond this partners-in-crime argument by showing that $ULVWRWOH¶VHXGDLPRQLVPFDQDYRLGWKHVHOI-centeredness objection on this deep level. 19 The strongest evidence for them is a passage in which Aristotle discusses what they regard as moral FRPSHWLWLRQV³WKRVe, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common weal, and everyone would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of JRRGV´ $ULVWRWOHD-12). Richard Kraut, for example, argues that Aristotle here is talking about the moral competition among virtuous agents. Such competLWLRQ³GLIIHUVIURPRWKHU forms of competition in precisely this respect: normally, when people try to outdo one another, RQHSHUVRQ¶VJDLQLVDQRWKHU¶VORVVEXWZKHQYLUWXRXVLQGLYLGXDOVµFRPSHWHIRUWKHILQH´WKHQ HYHU\RQHEHQHILWVLQVRPHZD\RURWKHU´ (Kraut 1989: 117). To illustrate this, Kraut uses the DQDORJ\RIDFRPSHWLWLRQDPRQJVRORPXVLFLDQV³7KHEHWWHUHDFKSOD\VWKHPRUHOLNHO\KHLVWR ZLQEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHHYHU\RQHHOVHEHQHILWVE\WKHIDFWWKDWHDFKLVVWULYLQJWRGRKLVEHVW´ (Kraut 1989: 117). 18 Michael Slote, whose version of virtue ethics emphasizes the symmetry between agent and patient, SUHFLVHO\WULHVWRDYRLGWKLV.DQWLDQDV\PPHWU\SDUWLFXODUO\LQKLVHDUOLHUZULWLQJV³LQFRPPRQ-sense terms we DGPLUHERWKZKDWDSHUVRQLVDEOHWRGRWRDGYDQFHKLVRZQRURWKHUSHRSOH¶VKappiness and what a person is able to do to advance the admirability either of himself or others. We commonly admire people for their possession of self-regarding and other-UHJDUGLQJ YLUWXHV« DQG ZH DOVR DGPLUH SHRSOH ZKR KHOS RWKHUV WR develop admirable RUYLUWXRXVWUDLWVRIFKDUDFWHU«$QGVR,WKLQNLWLVSDUWRIFRPPRQ-sense virtue ethics to DVVXPH WKDW SHRSOH VKRXOG EH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH KDSSLQHVV DQG YLUWXH« both of others and of themselves´ (Slote 1992: 111). More recently, however, Slote does not insist on the strict symmetry in the sense that a virtuous person does not have to pay equal attention to his or her own happiness and that of others, although he still thinks that a virtuous person should paying equal attention to both his or her own virtue and that of others. 19 0F.HUOLHGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQHJRLVWHXGDLPRQLVPDQGDOWUXLVWLFHXGDLPRQLVP³2QHDQVZHUVD\VWKDW Aristotle gives to each agent the single fundamental goal of making his or her own life realize eudai monia. I will call this view thHµHJRLVWLFHXGDLPRQLVW¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ7KHDOWHUQDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWDNHV$ULVWRWOHWREH an altruistic eudaemonist. He thinks that as well as aiming at eudaimonia in our own lives we should also have as a fundamental aim that at least some other people realize eudai monia´ 0F.HUOLH $VZHVKDOOVHH McKerlie himself argues for the second way of understanding Aristotle. 34 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) The idea is that my playing to my best will cause others to play to their best, as we all want to win the competition. So in this moral competition among virtuous persons, the more I try to develop my own virtuous characters, the more I do to develop the virtuous characters of others. Julia Annas makes a similar point. In her view, since Aristotle has redefined self-love as love RIRQH¶VYLUWXRXVFKDUDFWHU it is not surprising that the competition between true self-lovers is also redefined, and turns out to be wholly different from the common understanding of competition. Normally FRPSHWLWLRQLVIRUDOLPLWHGJRRGDQGKHQFHLVDWRWKHUV¶H[SHQVHLI,JHWPRUH\RXZLOO JHWOHVV%XWZKHQSHRSOHµFRPSHWHWREHYLUWXRXV¶ZKDWWKH\GRLVQRWDWWKHRWKHUV¶ expense, for Aristotle insists that each SHUVRQJHWVWKHJUHDWHVWJRRGVLQFHµYLUWXHLVWKDW NLQGRIWKLQJ¶9LUWXHLVDQLQH[KDXVWLEOHJRRGLI,KDYHPRUHWKLVGRHVQRWOHDYHOHVVIRU you. (Annas 1993: 297) So although neither Kraut nor Annas clearly states it, the significant difference between moral competition and other forms of competition is perhaps that, while in the latter there is normally only one winner, in the former everyone can be a winner, as if the referee of the competition had a different criterion from the one used in other forms of competition. In a normal race, for example, the winner is the fastest runner. However, in the Aristotelian race, the winner is the one who does his or her best. Thus, while it is possible that the winner runs slower than others (as those who run faster than the winner may have not done their best), it is also possible that everyone is a winner (if everyone does his or her best). It is perhaps in this sense that Kraut FODLPVWKDW³ZKHQ$ULVWRWHOLDn agents compete with one another to be best, each places far PRUHHPSKDVLVRQGRLQJDVZHOODVKHFDQWKDQRQGRLQJEHWWHUWKDQRWKHUV´ .UDXW  This is indeed an interesting interpretation. However, as a response to the self-centeredness objection, there are at least three serious problems. First, to what degree can we make sense of the moral competition among virtuous persons? To show what I mean, let us look at a couple of examples used by Aristotelian scholars to explain the following passage of Aristotle in the FRQWH[WRIPRUDOFRPSHWLWLRQWKHWUXHVHOIORYHUDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVZLOO³VDFULILFHDFWLRQVWR KLVIULHQGVLQFHLWPD\EHILQHUWREHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUKLVIULHQGV¶GRLQJWKHDFWLRQWKDQWRGRLW himself. In everything praiseworthy, WKHQWKHH[FHOOHQWSHUVRQDZDUGVKLPVHOIZKDWLVILQH´ ( Nicom achean Ethics 1169a33-36). Christopher Toner illustrates this self-ORYHU¶VVHOI-sacrifice of virtuous action by such a scenario: two of us are friends and fellow members of a platoon engaged in a dangerous reconnaissance. One volunteer is needed to be the first to cross an open area. I am moved to volunteer, but I recall that you have unfairly acquired a reputation for cowardice and wanted to clear this reputation. So I remain silent so that you can be the first (see Toner 2006: 611). Richard Kraut provides a similar illustration: Suppose I think my friend is capable of supervising major civic projects, but that he has had too few opportunities to show 35 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) his worth. So I persuade public officials who oversee such projects to secure the opportunity for him (Kraut 1989: 126). In both examples, the virtuous person sacrifices virtuous actions so that his or her friend can perform them. In this case, the virtuous person awards himself or herself what is fine, while his or her friend has the chance to perform the virtuous actions. However, there is something ZURQJKHUH,QERWKFDVHVWKHYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶VIULHQGLVDOUHDG\YLUWXRXV,Q7RQHU¶VH[DPSOH the courageous friend just has a bad reputation of beiQJDFRZDUGDQGWKHYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶V sacrifice of the courageous action helps his or her friend to restore his honor. However, this does not make his friend more virtuous, as for Aristotle, honor belongs to the same category as money and wealth, things that the self-lovers in the vulgar sense love. A truly virtuous person is only concerned with being virtuous, not with being known for being virtuous. As a matter of IDFWDV7KUDV\PDFKXVLQ3ODWR¶VRepublic VD\VRIWKHSHUIHFWO\YLUWXRXV MXVW SHUVRQ³WKough doing no wrong, he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust WKRXJKEHLQJMXVW´ 3ODWRF ,Q.UDXW¶VH[DPSOHWKHYLUWXRXVSHUVRQVDFULILFHVKLVYLUWXRXV action for his friend so that the friend can have an opportunity to show his worth. This assumes that a person who has more opportunities to perform virtuous actions is more virtuous than a person who has fewer opportunities to do so. This assumption is wrong. It focuses too much on actions. A virtuous person is simply one who does virtuous things whenever such circumstanceVRFFXU0RUHRYHUDV+XUNDKDVSRLQWHGRXW³WKRXJKDSHUVRQFDQFHUWDLQO\DFW virtuously, she can also have virtuous desires and feelings that never issue in action²for H[DPSOHFRPSDVVLRQIRUVRPHRQHZKRVHSDLQVKHLVXQDEOHWRUHOLHYH´ +XUND  After all, Aristotle himself also claims that virtue is related to both action and feeling. 6HFRQGDVVKRZQLQERWK7RQHU¶VDQG.UDXW¶VH[DPSOHVWKRVHZKRDUHLQWKHPRUDO competition must already be somehow virtuous persons or true self-lovers. Only virtuous persons are willing to join the moral competition, and virtuous persons compete with only virtuous persons. This causes an immediate problem. The self-centeredness objection to virtue HWKLFVLVSUHFLVHO\DERXWWKHYLUWXRXVDJHQW¶VODFNRILQWHUHVWLn making others virtuous. While there is no need for a virtuous person to be concerned about the character of another virtuous person, we need to know whether a virtuous person in the Aristotelian sense is also concerned or able to make non-virtuous persons virtuous. On the one hand, in his discussion of friendship, Aristotle makes it clear that this is friendship of characters, i.e., friendship among virtuous people.20 Moreover, as pointed out by Kraut, if a virtuous friend turns to be bad, the virtuous 20 $V-XOLD$QQDVSRLQWVRXW³WKHEHVWRUSHUIHFWNLQGRIIULHQGVKLSLVRQHLQZKLFKHDFKSHUVRQLVIULHQGZLWK the other becDXVHRIWKDWSHUVRQ¶VJRRGQHVVVSHFLILFDOO\KLVJRRGFKDUDFWHU²indeed this kind of friendship is 36 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) person who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange (1165b13-21; see Kraut 1989: 111). This shows that the Aristotelian virtuous person is not concerned with the character of non-virtuous persons. On the other hand, the Aristotelian YLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶V action is unable to make non-virtuous persons virtuous. Suppose that the person to whom the YLUWXRXVSHUVRQLQ7RQHU¶VH[DPSOHVDFULILFHVKLVDFWLRQLVLQGHHGDFRZDUG:LOOWKHYLUWXRXV SHUVRQ¶VVDFULILFLQJKLVDFWLRQLQWKLVSDUWLFXODU situation make his friend courageous? A coward is so not because he or she has never encountered any dangerous situations, but because every time he or she encounters a dangerous situation, he or she is scared. So, if anything, the YLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶VUHIUDining from performing the courageous action would only make the person not feel guilty of being a coward, as he would see no one doing anything differently from what he or she does: those who are cowards just like him, as cowards, will not move forward, and those who, unlike him, have the virtue of courage would decide to sacrifice their courageous actions to those cowards. If a courageous (virtuous) person can make a coward (vicious person) become courageous (virtuous) by sacrificing their courageous (virtuous) actions to the coward (vicious person), then a coward (vicious person) can also perform this IXQFWLRQDVDFRZDUG YLFLRXVSHUVRQ QDWXUDOO\PDNHVVXFK³VDFULILFHV´0RUHRYHULIVXFKD negative sacrificing (withdrawing from virtuous actions) is useful to make a vicious person virtuous, we might even have to endorse such positive actions, which otherwise are considered vicious, as virtuous. For example, continuously harassing a person may be useful to cultivate in the person harassed the virtue of patience. This of course is absurd, as it implies that vicious SHUVRQVDUHUHDOO\YLUWXRXVSHUVRQVDVWKH\³VHOIOHVVO\´QRWRQO\JLYHEXWHYHQFUHDWH opportunities for others to perform virtuous actions.21 Third, even in the moral competition among somehow DOUHDG\YLUWXRXVSHUVRQVRQH¶VHIIRUWWR GHYHORSRQH¶VRZQYLUWXHVDVIXOO\DVSRVVLEOHPD\LQGHHGFDXVHKLVRUKHUFRPSHWLWRUVWRPDNH similar efforts to develop their own virtues as fully as possibly. However, this makes it look like the invisible hand justification of individual greediness in competition in a well-ordered PDUNHWHFRQRP\WKHPRUHRQHVWULYHIRURQH¶VRZQLQWHUHVWWKHPRUHWKHSHUVRQFRQWULEXWHVWR RWKHUV¶ZHOIDUH,QVXFKFRPSHWLWLRQVLWLVWUXHWKDWHYHU\RQH¶VVHOI-centered actions benefit RWKHUVLQWKHFRPSHWLWLRQDVDFRQVHTXHQFHEXWRQHMRLQVWKHFRPSHWLWLRQIRURQH¶VVHOI-interest and not for the benefit of others. Some Aristotle scholars disagree about this. They think that the virtuous persons not only make others virtuous as a consequence of their being virtuous but also intend to make others virtuous. However, this view is often supported by problematic RIWHQFDOOHGIULHQGVKLSRIFKDUDFWHU´ $QQDV-50). 21 The absurdity of this is also clearly seen by Cheng Yi. When told that those who understand dao and those ZKRGRQRWVXSHULRUSHRSOHDQGLQIHULRUSHRSOHPXWXDOO\SURPRWHHDFKHLWKHU&KHQJ<LFOHDUO\VD\VWKDW³KRZ can it not be the case that everyone be a superior person?.... Otherwise, it would be thought that the existence of human beings, insteDGRIUHO\LQJXSRQVDJHVDQGZRUWKLHVUHOLHVXSRQ>PRUDOO\@VWXSLGSHRSOH´  Yishu 21a; 272). 37 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) inferences from some ambiguous passages in Aristotle. For example, Kraut infers that virtuous ³IULHQGVKHOSHDFKRWKHUGHYHORSLQFKDUDFWHUDQGFRUUHFWHDFKRWKHU´ .UDXW IURP $ULVWRWOH¶VFODLPVWKDW³DFHUWDLQWUDLQLQJLQYLUWXHDULVHVDOVRIURPWKHFRPSDQ\RIWKHJRRG´ (Aristotle: 1170a11- DQGWKDW³WKHIULHQGVKLSRIJRRGPHQLVJRRGEHLQJDXJPHQWHGE\WKHLU companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving HDFKRWKHUIRUIURPHDFKRWKHUWKH\WDNHWKHPRXOGRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKH\DSSURYH´ (Aristotle: 1172a12). Obviously, what Aristotle says in these passages about the improvement of virtues can also be read in such a way that is entirely compatible with the invisible hand argument. 'HQQLV0F.HUOLHPDNHVVRPHVLPLODULQIHUHQFHV$ULVWRWOHVD\VWKDW³KH>WKHJRRGPDQ@LV UHODWHGWRKLVIULHQGDVWRKLPVHOI´ $ULVWRWle: 1166a31-32). From this McKerlie infers that, for $ULVWRWOH³LQWKLVNLQGRIIULHQGVKLSZHVKRXOGIHHODFRQFHUQIRUDQRWKHUSHUVRQWKDWGRHVQRW GLIIHULPSRUWDQWO\LQLWVQDWXUHIURPWKHFRQFHUQZHIHHOIRURXUVHOYHV«>:@HVKRXOGFDUH about the frienG¶VUHDOL]LQJeudaimonia in much the same way that we care about realizing it RXUVHOYHV6RWKHIULHQG¶V eudaimonia should be almost as fundamental a goal as our own eudaimonia´ 0F.HUOLH $ULVWRWOHDOVRVD\VWKDW³DVKLVRZQEHLQJLVGHVLUDEOHIor HDFKPDQVRRUDOPRVWVRLVWKDWRIWKHIULHQG´ $ULVWRWOHE-8). For McKerlie, this SDVVDJH³FRXOGPHDQWKDWWKHJRRGPDQYDOXHVWKHIULHQG¶VH[LVWHQFHWRDOPRVWWKHVDPHH[WHQW WKDWKHYDOXHVKLVRZQH[LVWHQFHRUWKDWKHYDOXHVWKHIULHQG¶VHxistence in almost the same ZD\RUPDQQHULQZKLFKKHYDOXHVKLVRZQH[LVWHQFH«WKHNH\WRWKHDUJXPHQWLVWKHWKRXJKW WKDWWKHIULHQGLVDQRWKHUVHOI«,VKRXOGFDUHDERXWWKHIULHQG¶V eudaimonia in the way that I care about my own eudaimonia ´ 0F.HUOLH2001: 96-97). However, in both cases, Aristotle can also be understood as saying that a virtuous person should only make friends with virtuous persons. ,GRQRWGHQ\WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIPDNLQJVXFKLQIHUHQFHVWRVKRZWKDW$ULVWRWOH¶VYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ is inteUHVWHGLQWKHYLUWXHVRIRWKHUV WKRXJKWKHVH³RWKHUV´DUHFOHDUO\OLPLWHGWRWKRVHZKRDUH already somehow virtuous), so that the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics may be responded to in the Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, when we turn to WKH&KHQJEURWKHUV¶ neo-Confucianism, we are presented with a much clearer, more direct, and brighter picture. In WKH&KHQJV¶YLHZDSHUVRQLVDVXSHULRURUYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ junzi 君子) not simply because he or she has the disposition to provide material and external comforts to people in need, but also because he or she has the disposition to make others virtuous. This is most clear in their interpretation of the beginning sentences of the Great Learning³WKHZD\RIJUHDWOHDUQLQJLVWR m ing m ing de 明明德, xin m in 新民, and zhi shan 至善´3DUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWWRRXUFRQFHUQ here are the first two phrases, m ing m ing de and xin m in. According to common interpretation, m ing m ing de and xin m in are two different items: the former is related to oneself: to brighten 38 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) RQH¶VRZQRULJLQDOO\EULJKWYLUWXHDQGWKHODWWHULVUHODWHGWRRWKHUVWRORYH KHUH xin 新 is interpreted as qin 親, love) people. Thus understood, it may also be subject to the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics on the deeper level, particularly if we understand loving people in the normal sense of providing people with material and external goods. +RZHYHULQWKH&KHQJV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ³WRm ing m ing de and xin m in cannot be separated. 7KH\DUHERWKWKLQJVQHFHVVDU\IRURQHWREHFRPHYLUWXRXV´(Yishu  ,QWKHLUYLHZ³ m ing m ing de is to understand the dao, and xin m in is to let people transform themselves with this dao´ Yishu 2a; 22). This makes it clear that a person is not virtuous or does not understand dao if the person is not interested in letting others transform themselves with this dao so that they can also become virtuous. )RUWKLVUHDVRQWKH&KHQJVPDNHIUHTXHQWUHIHUHQFHVWR0HQFLXV¶FODLPWKDWWKRVHZKRDUH awake first should wake those who are not awake yet ( Mencius 5a7). In WKH&KHQJV¶YLHZD virtuous person is like the person who is awake, i.e. understands dao, first. Thus, CHENG Yi FODLPVWKDW³WKHOHDUQLQJRIVXSHULRUSHUVRQVLVWKDWµWKRVHZKRXQGHUVWDQGWKH dao first should enlighten those who have not understood it yet, and those who are awake first should wake up those who are not awake yet. In contrast, according to Laozi, instead of enlightening others, [those who understand dao ILUVW@VKRXOGNHHSRWKHUVLJQRUDQW´ Yishu 25; 322). In CHENG <L¶V view, those who claim to have obtained knowledge and therefore fulfilled their nature and yet DUHQRWLQWHUHVWHGLQHQOLJKWHQLQJRWKHUVDUH³GHVWUR\LQJWKHLURZQQDWXUH´ Yishu 25; 322). In other words, the very meaning of being awake implies being disposed to wake those who are QRW\HWDZDNHDQGWKHYHU\PHDQLQJRIIXOILOOLQJRQH¶VRZQQDWXUHLPSOLHVIXOILOOLQJWKHQDWXUH of others. A person who appears to be awake and yet does not proceed to wake others cannot be said to be really awake, and a person who appears to be virtuous and yet does not proceed to PDNHRWKHUVYLUWXRXVFDQQRWEHVDLGWREHDUHDOO\YLUWXRXVSHUVRQ7KXVIRUWKH&KHQJV³KRZ FRXOGDSHUVRQZKRLVDZDNHQRWZDNHXSRWKHUV"´ Yishu 1; 5). In another place, interpreting Analects 14.42, CHENG Yi also states WKDW³LIRQHWKLQNVWKDWLWLVHQRXJKWRKDYHRQHVHOI RUGHUHGRQHLVQRWDVDJH\HW´ Yishu 15; 169). 6RLQWKH&KHQJV¶YLHZDSHUVRQFDQQRWEHUHJDUGHGDVYLUWXRXVXQOHVVWKHSHUVRQDOVRKDVWKH GLVSRVLWLRQWRPDNHRWKHUVYLUWXRXV2QH¶VVHOI-cultivation and moral cultivation of others are one and the same process: ³RQH¶VKHDUWPLQGSRVVHVVHVWKHKHDYHQO\YLUWXH:KHQRQH¶V heart/mind is not fully realized, the heavenly virtue is not fully realized. When one tries to fully UHDOL]HRQH¶VRZQKHDUWPLQG, one is also fully realizing [the heart/mind] of other people and WKLQJV´ Yishu  ,QRWKHUZRUGVWRIXOO\UHDOL]HRQH¶VYLUWXHDQGWRUHDOL]HWKHYLUWXHRI others, to make oneself virtuous and to make other virtuous, are one and the same thing. For example, CHENG +DRFODLPVWKDW³WRDURXVHSHRSOHDQGFXOWLYDWHWKHLUYLUWXH´LVWKHZD\D superior person cultivates himself and others (Yishu 14; 140). Clearly, CHENG Hao does not 39 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) regard cultivating the virtue in others as something a superior person can or should do only after he or she finishes cultivating the virtue in himself or herself. Instead, to cultivate the YLUWXHLQRWKHUVLVLQKHUHQWLQRQH¶VFXOWLYDWLQJWKHYLUWXHLQRQHVHOI,QRWKHUZRUGVDYLUWXRXV person cannot not be concerned with the virtue of others. This claim of the Chengs was objected to as providing an unrealistic short cut: when one becomes virtuous, everyone becomes virtuous automatically (see Yishu 10, 115). What the Chengs mean, however, is that a person cannot become virtuous without being concerned about the virtue of others. Thus in his interpretation of in the Zhongyong, CHENG <LVWDWHVWKDW³LIRQHZDQWVWREULQJRQH¶VRZQ goodness to completion, one will necessarily think how to bring the goodness of others to completion´ Jingshuo  DQG³DVVRRQDVRQHFXOWLYDWHVRQHVHOIRQHNQRZVKRZWR FXOWLYDWHRWKHUV´ Jingshuo 8; 1157).22 It is important, however, to point out that, in their interpretation of xin m in in the Great Learning, what they say is, instead of transforming people with this dao³WRPDNHSHRSOHWR transform themselves with this dao´ shi ren yong ci dao yi zi xin 使人用此道以自新). Similarly, in their interpretation of Mencius 5a1, where a virtuous person (one who is already awake) enlightens those who are not virtuous yet (wake up those who are not awake yet), it is HPSKDVL]HGWKDW³WKLVLVQRWWRWDNHVRPHWKLQJRXWRIPH>YLUWXRXVSHUVRQ@WRJLYHLWWR\RX>RQH who is not virtuous yet], for you yourself also possess the moral principle ( yili 義理); only that I DPDZDUHRILW>DQG\RXDUHQRW\HW@´ Yishu 1; 5). While a virtuous person can try to help others to become aware of the moral principle, the former cannot force it upon others. For the Chengs, a person can become virtuous ultimately by oneself. Virtue as moral knowledge cannot be taught to others in the same way scientific knowledge is taught, because moral knowledge is not acquired merely through intellectual understanding but, more importantly, through inner experience. For this reason, the Chengs put a great emphasis on self-getting (zi In this context, it is interesting to bring a famous passage in Analect WRRXUGLVFXVVLRQ³RQHZKRZLVKHV to establish oneself establishes others, and oQHZKRZLVKHVWREHQREOHOHWVRWKHUVEHQREOH´  7KLVSDVVDJHLV normally understood as the Confucian version of the Golden Rule in its positive expression (in contrast to its negative expression in Analects ³'RQRWGRXQWRRWKHUVZKDWRQHGRHVQRWZLVKRWKHUVGRXQWRRQHVHOI´  However, Qing scholar MAO Qiling 毛奇齡, in his Corrections of the Four Books 四書改錯, interprets it to mean that one cannot establish oneself without establishing others and one cannot make oneself noble without letting others be noble. In other words, to establish others is the intrinsic content of establishing oneself, and to let others be noble is the intrinsic content of making oneself noble. For this reason, MAO Qiling relates this SDVVDJHQRWRQO\WRWKHLGHDRI³UHDOL]LQJRQeself (cheng ji 成己 ´DQG³UHDOL]LQJRWKHUV cheng wu 成物 ´LQ the Doctrine of the Mean WKDWZHKDYHDOUHDG\GLVFXVVHGEXWDOVRWR³PDQLIHVWLQJRQH¶VFOHDUFKDUDFWHU ming mingde 明明德 ´DQG³ORYLQJSHRSOH qin min 親民 ´DWWKHYHU\EHJLQQLQJRIWKH Greating Learning, to ³PDNLQJRQHVHOIDORQHSHUIHFW du shan qi shen 獨善其身 ´DQG³PDNLQJWKHZKROH(PSLUHSHUIHFW jian shan tian xia 兼善天下 ´LQ Mencius DDQGWR³FXOWLYDWLQJRQHVHOI xiu ji 修己 ´DQG³EULQJLQJVHFXULW\WR people ( an ren 安人 ´LQ Analects 14.42 (see CHENG Shude: 429). In this understanding, the two items in each RIWKHVHSDLUVDUHLQVHSDUDEOHRQHFDQQRWUHDOL]HRQHVHOIZLWKRXWUHDOL]LQJRWKHUVPDQLIHVWRQH¶VFOHDUFKDUDFWHU without loving people, make oneself perfect without making the world perfect, and cultivate oneself without bringing peace to people, and vice versa. 40 22 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) de 自得). At the same time, however, this does not that mean that virtue as moral knowledge FDQQRWEHWDXJKWDWDOODQGDSHUVRQVKRXOGRQO\FDUHDERXWRQH¶VRZQYLUWXHV7KXVZKHQ Wang Yanlin 王彥霖RQHRIWKH&KHQJV¶VWXGHQWVVD\VWKDW³DSHUVRQFDQEHFRPHJRRGRQO\ when the person himself or herself is willing to become virtuous. We cannot force a person to EHYLUWXRXV´&HENG +DRUHSOLHV³ZKLOHLWLVWUXHWKDWDSHUVRQQHHGEHZLOOLQJWREHJRRG himself or herself, we FDQQRWWKHUHIRUHOHDYHKLPDORQH7KHUHLVDQHHGIRUHGXFDWLRQ´ Yishu 1, 2). Although CHENG <LVWDWHVWKDW³LQUHODWLRQWRRWKHUVVXSHULRUSHUVRQVORRNIRUPHULWVLQ WKHLUIDXOWVLQVWHDGRIORRNLQJIRUIDXOWVLQWKHLUPHULWV´ Yishu 21b, 274), he does not mean that ZHVKRXOGGRQRWKLQJZLWKSHRSOHLQIHFWHGZLWKYLFH:KHQRQHRIKLVVWXGHQWVDVNV³ZKHQ, see a person I live with has some fault, I feel uneasy in my heart/mind. Yet what to do if I point WKLVRXWDQGWKHSHUVRQLVXQZLOOLQJWRDFFHSW"´&KHQJUHSOLHV³WROLYHZLWKWKHSHUVRQDQG\HW not to point out his or her fault is not zhong 忠. The important thing is to be sincere with the SHUVRQEHIRUHWDONLQJWRKLP7KHQKHZLOOWUXVWZKDW\RXVD\´ Yishu  DQG³WKHZD\WR demand goodness [from others] is to have more than enough sincerity and less than enough WDONLQJ´ Yishu 4; 75).23 However, the most important way a virtuous person is concerned with the virtue of others, in WKH&KHQJV¶YLHZLVWRVHWDSHUVRQDOH[DPSOHLHWREHDYLUWXRXVSHUVRQRQHVHOI7KXV CHENG <LSRLQWVRXW³7KHZD\VXSHULRUSHUVRQVFXOWLYDWHSHRSOHLVWo teach them to improve themselves in aspects in which they are not as good as others so that they can be as good as others. In order to cultivate people, one need cultivate oneself through zhong 忠 and shu 恕. 7RGHPDQGRQH¶VVRQVWREHILOLDORQHILUVWUHDOL]HVKRZGHILFLHQWRQHLVWRVHUYHRQH¶VSDUHQWV 7KHVDPHLVWKHFDVHZLWKRQH¶VGHPDQGVXSRQRQH¶VVXERUGLQDWHRQH¶V\RXQJHUEURWKHUDQG RQH¶VIULHQG´ Cheng Shi Jingshuo 8; 1155). It is in WKLVVHQVHWKDW&KHQJHPSKDVL]HV0HQFLXV¶ LGHDRI³JUHDWSHRSOH´ da ren 大人) as those who make themselves upright so that others will EHXSULJKW>E\WKHPVHOYHV@´ Mencius 7a19) (Yishu 9, 105; see also Yishu 11; 119). So in the above situation described by Toner, a virtuous person in the Confucian tradition will not ³VHOIOHVVO\´\LHOGWRRWKHUVWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRSHUIRUPWKHFRXUDJHRXVDFWLRQDVRQO\E\VHWWLQJ a good example by performing courageous actions in such a dangerous situation can the virtuous (courageous) person move others to act in the same way in similar future situations. Thus, to be virtuous oneself of course implies that one does all appropriate things to provide PDWHULDODQGH[WHUQDOFRPIRUWWRRWKHUVLQQHHG+RZHYHULQWKH&KHQJV¶YLHZa virtuous person does so not merely for the sake of such material and external comfort for others, but 7KH&KHQJVDOVRPHQWLRQHGVRPHGHWDLOVDERXWVXSHULRUSHUVRQV¶ZD\RIPRUDOHGXFDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOH³LQ educating people, superior persons sometimes guide them, and sometimes refuse to see them. In each case, superior persons do so because they know what is missing in a given person. The common purpose of both ZD\VRIHGXFDWLQJSHRSOHLVWROHWSHRSOHIXOO\IXOILOOWKHPVHOYHV´ Yishu 4; 70- DOVR³VXSHULRUSHUVRQVKDYH priority iQHGXFDWLQJRWKHUVWKH\ILUVWVWDUWZLWKWKLQJVVPDOODQGQHDUDQGWKHQSURFHHGWRWKLQJVJUHDWDQGIDU´ (Yishu 8; 102). 41 23 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) also to move others to be virtuous like them. Thus, CHENG <LFODLPVWKDW³VLQFHULW\FDQ [morally] touch people (dong ren 動人). The reason that there is [moral] transformation ZKHUHYHUDVXSHULRUSHUVRQSDVVHVLVQRWKLQJEXWWKLVH[HPSODU\PRYLQJSRZHU´ Yishu 18; 203; see also Yishu 18; 185).24 The Chengs believe in the moving power of such moral education. CHENG Yi, for example, in his interpretation of the sentence at the very beginning of the Analects, ³:KDWDMR\LWLVWRKDYHIULHQGVWRYLVLWIURPDIDU´SRLQWVRXWWKDWWKLVLVEHFDXVHD YLUWXRXVSHUVRQ¶V³JRRGQHVVWRXFKHVRWKHUVZKREHFRPHPRUDOO\FRQYHUWHGDQGWKLVEULQJV MR\WRWKHYLUWXRXVSHUVRQ´ (Jingshuo 6; 1133). V I. T he Self-C enteredness O bjection: T he Foundational Level We have now examined the Cheng brothers¶ Confucian response to the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics on both the surface level and the deeper level as discussed by David Solomon, an advocate of virtue ethics himself. A virtuous person desires to do virtuous things and feels happy when such a desire is satisfied. This, however, does not mean that this person is self-centered. First, the things that the virtuous person desires to do are virtuous things, things that require him or her to be concerned about the interest and welfare of others. Second, the interest and welfare of others that a virtuous person is concerned with is not limited to their external and material benefits but also includes their characters. As we have seen, while both Confucianism and Aristotelianism have resources for the former, clear evidence for the latter can only be found in Confucianism. However, the self-centeredness objection goes even deeper than anticipated by Solomon. What I have in mind is Thomas Hurka¶s objection that virtue ethics is foundationally egoistic. This objection agrees that a virtuous person is concerned with the interest of others; it would agree with Confucians that the interest of others the virtuous person is concerned with includes their character; and it would even agree that the virtuous person is concerned with the good, whether external or internal, of others for their own sake and not merely for the sake of the agent himself or herself. However, it claims that virtue ethics is still self-centered or egoistic, for the virtuous person is concerned with the interest of others, including their characters, for their sake, ultimately because the person is concerned with his or her own interest in fully realizing his or her virtue. In Hurka¶s view, virtue ethics SUHVXSSRVHVDQHJRLVWLFWKHRU\RIQRUPDWLYHUHDVRQVZKHUHE\DOODSHUVRQ¶VUHDVRQs for action derive from his flourishing. The resulting virtue-ethical theory need not be egoistic LQLWVVXEVWDQWLYHFODLPVDERXWDFWLRQLWFDQWHOOSHRSOHWRSURPRWHRWKHUV¶SOHDVXUHDQG 5REHUW0HUULKHZ$GDPVDOVRHPSKDVL]HVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPRUDOPRYLQJSRZHU³WKHIRUPLQJRIHWKLFDO beliefs is not an entirely separate process from that of forming ethical feelings and desires, and the former will QRWJRZHOOLIWKHODWWHUJRHVEDGO\´ $GDPV  42 24 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) knowledge [and, we may add, virtue] even at the expense of their own. Nor need it be egoistic about motivation: it can say that to act virtuously, thH\PXVWFDUHDERXWRWKHUV¶ pleasure and knowledge [and virtue] for its own sake. But it is what I will call foundationally egoistic, insisting that their reasons to act and be motivated in these ways derive ultim ately from their own flourishing. (Hurka 2001: 232; emphasis added) This further objection of Hurka¶s is partially a response to Julia Annas¶ defense that virtue ethics is not self-centered or egoistic. In her response, Annas makes a distinction between self-centeredness in content and self-centeredness in form. She thinks that a virtuous person is not self-centered in content but can be regarded as self-centered in form: What I have to develop, in order successfully to achieve my final good, are the YLUWXHV«. [B]ut all virtues are dispositions to do the right thing, where this is established in ways that are independent of my own interest. Thus the fact I aim at my own final end makes ancient ethics formally agent-centered or self-centered, but does not make it self-centered LQFRQWHQW«. [A]chieving my final good, happiness, whatever that turns out to be, will involve respecting and perhaps furthering the good of others. (Annas 1993: 223) Annas insists that a virtuous person is committed by being virtuous to respecting and furthering the good of others for their sake and not merely as instrumental to his or her own good or end. Still, Annas agrees that virtue ethics is self-centered in form, as a virtuous person respects and furthers the good of others in his or her effort to achieve his or her own final good. This, in Hurka¶s view, means ³WKDWWKH\ [virtue theories] FRQQHFWDOORIDSHUVRQ¶VUHDVRQVIRUDFWLRQWR his own flourishing. Assuming his flourishing is a state of him, this makes the theories egoistic LQP\IRXQGDWLRQDOVHQVH´ (Hurka 2001: 232-233 note 28). While Hurka can agree that a virtuous person respects and furthers the good of others for the sake of others, he or she does it in such a way that it is ultimately for the sake of his or her self. In other words, a virtuous person is concerned with his or her own good, and yet due to the special nature of this good (virtue), the virtuous person has to be concerned with the good of others, and to be so for their sake. To use Richard Kraut¶s terms, it is for one¶s own sake that a virtuous person should benefit others for their sake. While Kraut himself finds it unintelligible to talk about ³benefit[ing] others for their sake for your own sake´ (Kraut 1989: 136), we can see the point that Hurka tries to make. On one level, the virtuous person, in contrast to a prudential person, does benefit others for their sake. If the person benefits others for the sake of himself or herself, whether externally or internally, he or she is not a virtuous person. However, on a higher level, the virtuous person does so for his or her own sake: to be a virtuous person. Now, according to Hurka, it is ³QRWYLUWXRXV²it is morally self-indulgent²to DFWSULPDULO\IURPFRQFHUQIRURQH¶V 43 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) RZQYLUWXH6RPHRQHPRWLYDWHGE\WKHWKHRU\¶VFODLPVDERXWUHDVRQVZLOOWKHUHIRUHEH motivated not virtuously but in an unattractively self-LQGXOJHQWZD\´ (Hurka 2001: 246).25 One way to respond to this self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics on the foundational level is that the virtuous person is fundamentally, ultimately or, simply, foundationally other-regarding. It is true that the virtuous person seeks his or her own goal, but the goal he or she sets for himself or herself is to respect and further the good of others. In this sense, a virtuous person acts for his or her own sake only in the sense that he seeks to realize his own goal, which is to respect and further the good of others. 26 In other words, a virtuous person is concerned with the good of others. Only in the sense that the goal of respecting and furthering the good of others is his or her own goal and not anyone else¶s goal, the virtuous person is virtuous for his own sake. +RZHYHUQRRQHFDQVHHNDJRDORWKHUWKDQRQH¶VRZQ:KHQRQH VHHNVWKHJRDOVRIRWKHUVRQHUHJDUGVVXFKJRDOVDVRQH¶VRZQ6R to imitate what Richard Kraut says, it is perhaps to benefit others for my sake for their sake. Kraut would certainly regard it as also unintelligible, but the implied idea here is that, while (as Julia Annas says) the virtuous person aims at her own flourishing ³just in the sense that she is living her life and not PLQH´ $QQDV , the life she lives is to respect and further the good of others. Thus, the virtuous person is essentially other-regarding. If the self-centeredness objection claims that virtue ethics reduces the good of others to the good of the agent, this reply to the objection seems to claim that the good of the virtuous agent is reduced to that of others. However, in this sense, Hurka claims that, instead of self-indulgence, virtue ethics then turns out to be self-effacing: virtue ethicists can say that to flourish or express virtue, a person must act from genuinely virtuous PRWLYHVVXFKDVDGHVLUHIRUDQRWKHU¶VSOHDVXUHIRULWVRZQVDNH,IVKHLQVWHDGDLPVDWKHU own flourishing or virtue, she does not act from the required motives and so does not achieve the flourishing or virtue that is her goal. This requires the theories to be what 25 It is important to point out that, in discussing the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics, we have been primarily focused on the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics and not other versions of virtue ethics, some of which, the aretaic one advocated by Slote, for example, is claimed to be immune to such an objection, as it focuses on what is admirable. However, Hurka argues that his charge of foundational egoism is also applicable to such a version of virtue ethics, for ³an aretaic theory likewise gives a self-regarding explanation, that the DFWLRQ ZLOO EH VRPHWKLQJDGPLUDEOH RQ WKH DJHQW¶V SDUWDQGWKLV LV again, not the right explanation. Because WKH\IRFXVVRFHQWUDOO\RQWKHDJHQW¶VYLUWXHYLUWXDO-ethical theories find the ultimate source of his reasons in KLPVHOILQZKDWYLUWXRXVDFWLRQVZLOOPHDQIRUKLVIORXULVKLQJRUDGPLUDELOLW\´ (Hurka 2001: 248). 26 &KULVWLQH6ZDQWRQIRUH[DPSOHDUJXHVWKDW³LQGHIHQVHRIHXGDLPRQLVPRQHPD\FODLPWKDWUHDVRQVIRU µW\SHRUUDQJH;¶SHUWDLQWRWKHSRLQWRI;DVDYLUWXHDQGWKDWLQWXUQLVFRQVWLWXWHGE\WKHDLPRUWDUJHWRI; So, for example, if X is the virtue of friendship, X-type reasons have to do with expressing friendship in acts of affection, promoting the good of the friend, and so on. No surreptitious or covert egoism seems lurking here. In short, reasons for type X derive from the target of X and are not themselves reasons for a claim that X is a YLUWXH´ 6ZDQWRQ  44 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) Parfit calls self-effacing, telling agents not to be motivated by or even to think of their claims about the source of their reasons. (Hurka 2001: 246) This, Hurka claims, is ironic, because ³some partisans of virtue ethics have been vocal critics of the self-HIIDFLQJQHVVRIFRQVHTXHQWLDOWKHRULHV«EXWWKHLURZQWKHRULHVKDYHWKHVDPHIHDWXUH if anything in a more distXUELQJZD\´(Hurka 2001: 246). To avoid this dilemma between self-indulgence and self-effacingness, a correct understanding of the nature of virtue, particularly Confucian virtues, is not to see it as either foundationally self-indulgent (for the sake of oneself) or as foundationally self-effacing (for the sake of others); it is rather both ³to benefit others and to benefit oneself.´ Moreover, it is not to see them as two independent reasons, as Kraut says (Kraut 1989: 137), as if a virtuous person can have one without having the other or can have one before the other; it is rather to see them as two sides of one and the same reason. As we have seen, a virtuous person in the Confucian tradition cannot be an altruist (serving the interests of others) without WDNLQJJRRGFDUHRIRQH¶VRZQ JUHDWERG\WRXVH0HQFLXV¶WHUPV,QWKLVVHQVHDQDOWUXLVWKDVWREHDQ³HJRLVW´KRZHYHURQH FDQQRWEHDQ³HJRLVW´ WDNLQJFDUHRIRQH¶VRZQJUHDWERG\ ZLWKRXWVHUYLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRI others. IQWKLVVHQVHDQ³HJRLVW´has to be an altruist. Thus, the two apparently antithetical ideas, egoism and altruism, or self-regarding and other-regarding, are combined. Moreover, they are combined not in such a way that a virtuous person is partially egoistic and partially altruistic, but in a way that the person LVFRPSOHWHO\³HJRLVWLF´DQGFRPSOHWHO\DOWUXLVWLFDYLUWXRXV SHUVRQDFWVHQWLUHO\IRUWKHVDNHRIRQH¶VWUXHVHOIDQGVRLVFRPSOHWHO\HJRLVWLFKRZHYHUWKLVLV only because the virtuous person realizes his or her true self as one concerned with the good of others and so is entirely altruistic. It is not correct to say that the virtuous person is primarily or IRXQGDWLRQDOO\DQ³HJRLVW´DVif he or she takes care of the interests of others only as a means to serve the interest of his or her own true self, just as it is not correct to say that the virtuous person is primarily or foundationally an altruist as if he or she takes care of his or her own true self only as a way to serve others. Rather, altruism and egoism here completely overlap. As illustrated by the figure used by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, which looks like a duck in one way and a rabbit in another (Wittgenstein: 194), a virtuous person looks like an egoist in one way (he or she serves his or her own goal) and an altruist in another way (he or she sets his goal to serve the interest of others). In this sense, it is wrong to ask, as a Kantian may well be tempted to, whether a virtuous person does a virtuous thing because he or she thinks it is to his or her interest or because the person thinks it is really the right thing to do. In the Kantian view, if the former, the person does the virtuous WKLQJIRUDZURQJUHDVRQDQGRQO\LIWKHODWWHUFDQWKHSHUVRQ¶VDFWLRQKDYHDQ\ genuine moral value. In Confucian virtue ethics, however, to be self-interested and to be concerned with others are not only not contradictory; they are even not two things that happen 45 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) WRFRLQFLGHSHUIHFWO\WKH\DUHDFWXDOO\RQHDQGWKHVDPHWKLQJ:KHQRQHVHHNVRQH¶VWUXH self-interest, one must be doing virtuous things; and when one does virtuous things, one must EHVHHNLQJRQH¶VWUXHVHOI-interest. Thus, we can say that a person seeks the interest of others (is other-regarding SUHFLVHO\LQRUGHUWRVHHNRQH¶VRZQLQWHUHst (be self-regarding); and we can DOVRVD\WKDWDSHUVRQVHHNVRQH¶VRZQLQWHUHVW LVself-regarding) precisely in order to seek the interest of others (be other-regarding). To be self-interested in this sense is identical to being interested in others. The very action that promotes the interest of others, precisely when and EHFDXVHLWSURPRWHVWKHLQWHUHVWRIRWKHUVSURPRWHVRQH¶VVHOI-LQWHUHVWDVRQH¶VVHOI-interest is precisely to promote the interest of others. Thus, the more virtuous (more concerned with the interest of others) a person is, the better his or her self-interest is served, and vice versa. In this connection, ,WKLQN+DUU\)UDQNIXUW¶VDQDO\VLVRIORYHLVTXLWHLQWHUHVWLQJ$FFRUGLQJWR Frankfurt, there are two aspects of love. On the onHKDQG³Whe inherent importance of loving is due precisely to the fact that loving consists essentially in being devoted to the well-being of what we love. The value of loving to the lover derives from his dedication to his beloved. As for the importance RIWKHEHORYHGWKHORYHUFDUHVDERXWZKDWKHORYHVIRULWVRZQVDNH´RQWKH RWKHUKDQG³KRZHYHUZKDWKHORYHVQHFHVVDULO\SRVVHVVHVDQLQVWUXPHQWDOYDOXHIRUKLPLQ virtue of the fact that it is a necessary condition of his enjoying the inherently important DFWLYLW\RIORYLQJLW´ )UDQNIXUW 7KHVHWZRDVSHFWVDUHVRFORVHO\LQWHUZRYHQWKDWIRU Frankfurt, it is foolish to ask whether I love someone for the sake of the beloved or for the sake of my own enjoyment in loving the person. He uses the following example to make his point: Consider a man who tells a woman that his love for her is what gives meaning and value WRKLVOLIH«WKHZRPDQLVXQOLNHO\WRIHHOWKDWPDNHVZKDWWKHPDQLVWHOOLQJKHULPSOLHV that he does not really love her at all, and that he cares about her only because it makes him feel good. From his declaration that his love for her fulfills a deep need of his life, she will surely not conclude that he is making use of her. (Frankfurt: 60) 27 So the most distinctive of virtue ethics in general and Confucian virtue ethics in particular is that, when a virtuous person takes care of the interest of others, he or she does not have to overcome his or her inclination. Instead one takes delight in being concerned with others, because, by being concerned with others, one satisfies one¶s desire, achieves one¶s goal, realizes one¶s true self, and therefore feels happy. This is indeed one of the unique features of virtue ethics. 27 In addition to parental love of children, Philippa Foot also uses the example of friendship to make the same SRLQW³:KDWIULHQGVKLSUHTXLUHVDIULHQGWRGRIRUDIULHQGPD\LQGHed be onerous, involving even life itself. But what is done in friendship is done gladly, con a more´ )RRW  46 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) However, it might be asked why it is not enough for one simply to be moral but one must take delight in being so. This is perhaps also what is behind the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics. When asked why a virtuous person should benefit others, the virtue ethics explains, in the end, WKDW³WKLVZLOOPDNHKLVOLIe better or admirable, but that is, intuitively, not the right H[SODQDWLRQ7KHULJKWH[SODQDWLRQLVWKDWLWZLOOPDNHWKHRWKHU¶VOLIHEHWWHU´ +XUND  To respond, first of all, it is obvious that the moral life recommended by virtue ethics must be a better life for the agent than the lives recommended by alternative theories of ethics. For example, Michael Stocker asks, ³ZKDWVRUWRIOLIHZRXOGSHRSOHOLYHZKRGLGWKHLUGXWLHVEXW QHYHURUUDUHO\ZDQWHGWR"´ 6WRFNHU 2EYLRXVO\ZKHWKHr such a life is good for others for whom one performs moral duties, this cannot be a good life for the moral agent, as the agent has to make a great effort to overcome his or her natural inclination in order to perform moral actions and therefore cannot take delight in doing so. This is made most clear by .DQW¶VVHSDUDWLRQRIPRUDOLW\IURPKDSSLQHVV Of course, critics of virtue ethics think that whether a moral life is good to the agent is at least not the most important thing we need to keep in mind when we are talking about morality; what matters is whether it is good for moral patients. However, contrary to what we may normally think, moral actions recommended by non-virtual ethical theories are not necessarily good for moral patients either. This point is made most clear by 0LFKDHO6WRFNHU¶s following hypothetical scenario: Suppose you are in a hospital, recovering from a long illness. You are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend²taking so much time to cheer you up, traveling all the way across town, and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks ZLOOEHEHVW«. [T]KHPRUH\RXWZRVSHDNWKHPRUHFOHDULWEHFRPHVWKDW«LWLVQRW essentially because of you that he came to see you, not because you are friends, but EHFDXVHKHWKRXJKWLWKLVGXW\«RUVLPSO\EHFDXVHKHNQRZVRIQRRQHPRUHLQQHHGRf cheering up and no one easier to cheer up. (Stocker 1997: 74) This example shows clearly that only when and because a virtuous person¶s action benefiting others makes the person¶s life better can it make the lives of others better. V II. Conclusion In this article, I claim that Confucianism in general and the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism in particular is a virtue ethics, a type of ethical theory that has emerged or, rather, revived in the Western philosophical world in the last few decades. However, my interest is not to justify this claim but to explore the possible contribution that Confucianism can make to contemporary virtue ethics. With this in mind, I focus on the self-centeredness objection to virtue ethics. The 47 Journal of Sino-Western Communications, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December, 2010) objection states that, since virtue ethics recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters, it is self-centered. In response, I argue that, for the Chengs, the self that a virtuous person is concerned with is precisely such virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While such an answer is also available to the Aristotelian eudaimonistic virtue ethics, I argue that the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism can better respond to the objection. First, Aristotelian virtue ethicists claim that virtue makes its possessor a characteristically human being and a characteristic human being is one with rational activity. However, they fail to show that a rational being has to be morally virtuous. In contrast, the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism claims that a characteristic human being is a virtuous being. Thus it shows in a more convincing way that virtue can make its possessor a characteristic human being. Second, the self-centeredness objection goes a step further, claiming that, while a virtuous person, as in the eudaimonistic virtue ethics, is concerned with the external and material goods of others, he or she is concerned with his or her own character. Since virtue ethics thinks that one¶s character is more important than the material benefit, virtue ethics is self-centered in this deeper sense. I argue that a virtuous person in the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism, unlike one in Aristotelianism, is virtuous because the person takes care of not only the material well-being but also the character traits of others. Third, the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism can even respond to the self-centeredness objection on a foundational level: a virtuous person promotes the good, both internal and external, of others, ultimately for the sake of his or her own good. I argue that, in the Chengs¶ neo-Confucianism, one¶s concern with oneself and one¶s concern with others are inseparable and therefore one cannot say which is more foundational or ultimate. References Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1976. ³Motive Utilitarianism.´ Journal of Philosophy 73: 467-481. _____. 2006. A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Annas, Julia. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. _____. 2006. ³9LUWXH(WKLFV´In David Copp ed., Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1958. ³Modern Moral Philosophy.´ Philosophy 33: 1-19. Aristotle 1963. Ethica Nicom achea . In Works of Aristotle , vol. ix. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 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