Zheng Zemian

每个哲学家都义无反顾地奔赴他思想的命运，而当他逡巡不前、踌躇低回之时，正是哲学问题结穴之处。世人皆知：朱子三十七至四十岁之时的中和之悟是他的哲学重要转折点，却鲜有人知：另一个令他产生自我怀疑的重要节点是他六十岁后的诚意问题。世人皆知：阳明质疑朱子“纵格得草木来，如何反来诚得自家意”，却鲜有人知他早已有所反省：他在六十岁出版了对四书的章句集注之后，又对“诚意”问题进行了长达十年的反思，以至于他在临终前三天仍在修改《大学》“诚意”章注。而“诚意”也是理解王阳明思想发展（由“诚意”到“致良知”再到“四句教”）的钥匙。朱子说“诚意”是“圣凡分别关隘”。本书由此引申出一条新的宋明理学叙事的线索，名曰“诚意关”。[……]

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朱子说格物是“梦觉关”，而诚意才是“善恶关”（或“人鬼关”）。设想：当朱子含辛茹苦地建构了一个美轮美奂的儒学体系，挟“千峰向岳、百川赴海”之势，本以为大功告成，攻破了梦觉关（“格物致知”），进城门之后才发现被另一道“善恶关”（“诚意”）挡住去路，真可谓：兵入“瓮城”，进退维谷，是何等窘境！前方陆九渊的评论犹在耳：“朱元晦泰山乔岳，可惜学不见道，枉费精神。” 后方王阳明更是质疑朱子不该在“诚意”章之前补“格物致知”传。 朱子在晚年已经清楚地意识到这些潜在的挑战，并且作出了精密的分析，指出了不同于心学的化解之道。本书梳理了朱子反复修改其诚意章注的过程，考证了朱子临终前三日所修改的确切内容，弄清朱子的这份“哲学遗嘱”对我们意味着什么。

玄学与佛学曾就“宗极”问题展开论战，谢灵运《辨宗论》是玄学家基于“得意忘言”而融合、超越佛学的努力。谢灵运不仅借用了王弼的“体无”以折中孔释，而且开创了“凭无伏有”的思想，其“物我同忘”的思想开程颢《定性书》之先河。谢灵运山水诗之美可归因于其顿悟理想与个人体验之间的张力。谢灵运是玄学之殿军、二程之先声，也是早熟的禅宗。其思想继承了“佛性普遍”和“顿悟成佛”，却无“平常心是道”，以至必须独自面对“顿悟无阶梯”的千仞绝壁，这种求悟不得的痛苦反而成就了一种新的崇高感和诗歌精神。月作为超越的崇高之象在中国诗歌史中首度出现，这可能与谢灵运润色的《泥洹经》中的月喻有关。谢灵运的诗歌是其情理未融、心迹未冥的自我剖析与精神写照，是玄学家的一次颇具哲学史价值的自我书写。The Xuanxue thinkers and the Buddhists had disputed on what is the ultimate truth, before Xie Lingyun wrote Bianzonglun ( On Distinguishing the Ultimate) , using the idea of“forgetting words after understanding” to incorporate and surpass Buddhism. Xie Lingyun is a Xuanxue thinker．He not only borrows Wang Bi's thought of “embodying nothingness”to argue that Confucius's achievement is equal to Buddha's but also proposes a new idea of “the dependency on nothingness.  ”His thought on “forgetting the subject-object division”anticipates Cheng Hao's similar thought in “Letter on Calming Nature.” The aesthetic experience in Xie Lingyun's mountain-and-river poems can be explained by the tension between the poet's spiritual pursuit and his ideal of sudden enlightenment articulated in On Distinguishing the Ultimate．Xie Lingyun is the last great philosopher in Xuanxue, a precursor of the Cheng brothers, and also a precocious Chan．

:王阳明的“良知见在”不同于阳明后学的“良知现成”,宜从时间意识的维度并在儒释道互动的大背景下加以探讨。良知不是超越时间的本体,而是有时间性的。良知典型地表现为道德意识对凡俗的私意计度的时间意识的斩断;“良知见在”不是理论陈述,而是实践的指点,也即让学生专注于当下的、非功利的道德实践,放下对过去与未来的执着与算计。“见在”在阳明用语中大多数应当理解为“尚存”,“良知见在”即“良知尚存”,虽不完满,但蕴含着缺而待圆的动势。此语警策人们:当下一念良知醒觉就该行动,沉浸在非功利的时间体验中从事道德实践。阳明论“良知见在”时还说“过去未来事,思之何益”,可见它与意念管理有关,钱德洪、邹守益、孙应奎与王畿等阳明后学都点出了这种关联。在时间体验上,道家与佛教对儒家构成了挑战:庄子有“无古无今”、郭象有“忘先后之所接”、禅宗有“前后际断”和“无念”。阳明点出“良知见在”,化用了禅宗的斩截的时间体验工夫,以工夫论之“断”求本体论之“续”,才使儒家从佛道的威胁中突围,而觅得新的工夫进路。

结合概念结构相似性与人物交往、阅读史，证明朱熹论真知与诚意时所说的 “流注想”“一刀两断”等思想来自大慧的“将第八识断一刀”，从而说明朱子晚年的工夫论仍然 受到大慧、禅宗甚至唯识学的影响。朱熹排斥大慧追求顿悟的看话禅，但接受经过大慧而传播 的唯识学的“流注”观念，特别警惕人的潜意识会不知不觉陷于自欺。朱子截断“流注想”是为 了彻底地达到诚意，而为了诚意，又必须由格物致知以获得“真知”，因为“真知”带来决断。正 如大慧的“将第八识断一刀” 是为了超脱“世间法” 而通达“出世间法”，朱子的“ 一刀两断” 则 要求学人由凡入圣地修炼、获得具有整体性与建设性的“真知”。

關於宗密影響了宋明理學的論述大多似是而非。可以確定的是朱子注「明德」所用的「虛靈不昧」受到宗密的「靈知」思想的影響。本文遍舉朱子提及宗密知字之處（如：論述涵養先於省察、與論述天之主宰義），以佐證此結論。朱子哲學超越宗密之處是：從宗密知字中點出「知覺」中自有「主宰」，這是朱子中和之悟的關鍵，由此建立了心統性情、敬貫動靜之說。朱子與宗密都熱衷於探索心之體之在自身的狀態，朱子涵養未發之知覺主宰，可類比於宗密之「自性本用」之寂知。佛教語境使宗密不能正面講主宰義，而朱子能正面建立道德主體概念。學界往往把朱子學類比於唯識宗或北宗禪，筆者認為宜將朱子類比於宗密，而朱陸的工夫論之爭可以類比於同為南宗禪的宗密之菏澤宗與馬祖之洪州宗之異。

朱熹与陆九渊是南宋儒学的两座高峰，他们都无意于援禅入儒，但由于二人处于儒禅杂糅的时代，朱、陆的字号恰好保存了儒禅代兴的痕迹。给朱子取字的刘子翚由默照禅契入，会通禅学与颜子之学，其《字朱熹祝词》中的根本—枝叶之喻主要来自默照禅。刘子翚不顾大慧宗杲及其儒门好友的劝导，坚持以静默为本，其“木晦于根”乃默照禅之旨。陆九渊建精舍于马祖道一曾经结庐之地，用“象山”之名掩盖其旧名“禅师山”，居象山时常说“耳自聪，目自明”等语，颇似马祖禅风，正是在此时朱子认为他找到了陆氏是禅的“真赃”。朱、陆的字号折射出儒禅之代兴，为探索经典世界的察名法提供了例证。

本文通過澄清「先天」與「經驗」的歧義，探討王陽明良知思想中道德認知能否增長、如何增長的問題。在現代陽明學研究中，「先天」既可指存有論上的「先天」，也可指道德知識來源的「先天」，也可指道德禀賦的「天生」。本文區分了本體論的「良知」與具體道德判斷的「良知」。前者是「先天」的，但後者需要結合經驗才能指導實踐。現代學界在陽明學詮釋中往往著重「先天」而避談「經驗」，然而，「經驗」可以指：（1）間接的道德知識歸納，（2）作為「事件」的良知呈現，（3）探索與試錯的歷程。對於（1），陽明偶爾有貶抑經驗的說法：批評後儒以聞見填塞良知而造成障蔽。至於（2）、（3），「經驗」具有開放性。與之相應，可以歸納出三種良知整合經驗的模式：「有機整合」、「逆覺轉化」與「由疑生悟」。本文引用馬里翁的「溢出現象」詮釋陽明的良知發竅說，引用古希臘的經驗概念以佐證陽明關於問路的「知行合一」之說所體現的經驗的開放性。
  In what sense is liangzhi (original knowledge of the good) a priori? Is liangzhi complete and perfect in guiding moral actions? If not, how does liangzhi evolve by incorporating experience? In order to answer these questions, I examine two ambiguous terms, “xiantian” (a priori/inborn) and “experience”, two terms frequently used in the interpretations of Wang Yangming’s ethics. Liangzhi as an ontological concept is a priori, and liangzhi is inborn in theory of human nature, but is not perfect and complete in guiding actions in concrete ethical situations. I argue that modern commentators of Wang Yangming usually avoid using the term “experience,” because their notion of “experience” is influenced by Kant’s rather narrow and negative view of experience. For them, experience means the totality of sense data, or second-hand knowledge or worldly wisdom gained through the induction from past experience. I point out that there are two other senses of “experience” that are rather positive: experience as happening events, and experience as the process of trial and error. To expand the concept of experience, I borrow Jean-Luc Marion’s notions of saturated phenomena, and the ancient Greek notion of empeiría. Corresponding to these three senses of “experience,” there are three modes in which liangzhi incorporates experience to develop itself and cope with ethical situations.

摘要：朱子認為湖湘後學近禪，但他對後者的批評也借用了禪宗，採用以禪抑禪的方式。首先，朱子批評湖湘學派的「觀過知仁」會導致「一心三分」，筆者在《大慧語錄》中找到了類似「一心三分」的說法，還有朱子批評湖湘學派時引用的公案；其次，朱子批評湖湘學派的「以心求心」，認為：「即覺其失，覺處即心，何更求為？」轉而提倡「常惺惺」的主敬工夫；而大慧宗杲也說：「能知昏鈍者，決定不昏鈍，」緊接著引用瑞岩禪師「常惺惺」的公案。本文使用互證法：結合「思想結構相似性」與「人物交往、文獻閱讀史」，確證了從大慧到朱子的影響鏈。

Abstract: Zhu Xi criticizes that Huxiang School’s way of self-cultivation bears some resemblance to Chan, but his criticism also borrows Chan (especially Dahui Zonggao). His approach can by characterized as “refuting Chan by Chan”. First, Zhu Xi maintains that Huxiang School’s “understanding humaneness through observing one’s own moral failure” would lead to “dividing the heart into three (parts/functions)”. I found in Dahui’s writings a similar statement about “dividing the heart into three” and the Chan Gong’an (punchline story) that Zhu Xi quoted in a letter to Huxiang School, which suggests that Zhu Xi’s idea was borrowed from Dahui. Second, Zhu Xi criticizes Huxiang School’s “seeking (the lost) heart by heart” and remarks that “once you know that the heart is lost, such awareness is the heart, why do you need to seek it?” In place of the Huxiang method, Zhu Xi proposes “jing” (seriousness) as a way of “keeping awake and alert” (a method from a Chan master, Rui Yan). Similarly, Dahui wrote, “one who knows one’s own dimwittedness definitely is not dimwitted,” and also quote Rui Yan’s “keeping awake and alert”. I propose a research method that combines “structural similarity of thought” and “history of text reading and social networking.” In order to prove that Zhu Xi was influenced by Dahui, it does not suffice to merely point out their conceptual similarity, thus in this paper, I extensively draw on Zhu Xi’s social networking and text reading to prove that he had read Dahui’s text that contains the relevant thoughts.

本文首先從《論語》的“ 勇者不懼”到《老子》的“ 勇於不敢”，再到《墨辯》的“ 勇，以其敢於是也命之，不以其不敢於彼也害之”，梳理出一條先秦“勇”觀念史的發展線索。對《老子》“慈故能勇”的歷代詮釋包括儒家、道家與法家三種傾向，其中儒家傾向的詮釋高度體現了儒道的德性倫理學的會通。最後，老子的“慈故能勇”與孔子的“仁者必有勇”背後所蘊含的德性倫理學的理論框架不同：孔子的“仁”與其他德目的關係可以用德性本末論和德性偏全論來概括，
而老子的理論框架則是一種消極德性與積極德性相互轉化的動態的德性整全論。通過對照老子論德性的“大似不肖”與論道的“大曰逝、遠、反”，可將老子的德性整全論與其道論相匹配，理解爲一個融貫的系統。

The recent scholarship on Wang Yangming’s dictum of zhi xing he yi (知行合一, unity of knowing and doing) focuses on whether Wang’s notion of zhi (knowing) is restricted to moral knowledge; and whether the dictum makes sense when facing the challenge of weakness of will. I argue that these inquiries, though fruitful, might not be Wang’s original concern. For Wang, zhi xing he yi serves to answer a question: how is sincerity (cheng 誠, a common neo-Confucian ideal of sagehood) possible?  This is a question Zhu Xi endeavors to answer but, according to Wang, misses the correct approach. Zhu Xi argues that “thoughts cannot render themselves sincere on their own”, for thoughts tend to deceive themselves, thus only objective inquiry of knowledge can ensure a proper beginning to attain genuine sincerity. By paying closer attention to this puzzle, I tell a story of how Wang proposes an alternative way to attain sincerity and bypass Zhu Xi’s theoretical and practical obstacles. My explication of this “alternative way” also explains the inner logic from Wang’s earlier doctrine “zhi xing he yi” to his later doctrine “extending liangzhi”: (1) His zhi xing he yi provides guidance for seeking an original state where sincerity is already present in everyday experience. (2) Wang claims that liangzhi (良知, original knowledge of the good/innate knowledge) has the capacity of value-perception and self-examination that pre-empts any danger of self-deception and motivational impurity.

摘要：本文梳理王阳明的戒慎恐惧工夫论的前后变化，以考察阳明良知学产生的逻辑线索。起初阳明不反对朱子的“未发”观念，只是反对朱子将戒惧与慎独截然分开，但已经偏向于将未发与已发理解为体用一源的关系、而不是平列的动静两种状态。后来通过对静坐工夫的反省，认为戒惧亦是念、实无无念时。然而，如果戒惧亦是念，如何避免工夫的间断与纷扰？为此阳明区分良知与意、念，知得意、念之善恶者是良知。能戒慎恐惧者是良知。良知愈思愈精明，其发用之思简易明白而无纷扰。最后，朱子将戒惧于不睹不闻解释成防邪念于未然，而阳明则认为“不睹不闻”是良知本体，从而在戒惧中增加了自我认同感和“一念开明，反身而诚”的本体之乐。
結論：总而言之，一方面，阳明合“戒惧”与“慎独”为一，又以“独知”论良知；这是良知学发展的一条明确的线索；另一方面，阳明以体用一源为根本立场，不采取朱子工夫论的动静、未发已发二分，认为“动无不和，即静无不中”，戒惧亦是念，但不是善恶混杂之念，而是良知发动之念，此念存续不断，即为立志，念念在致良知，即是良知之思，自不同于私意安排之思。此种“念”与“思”的根源既然是“良知”，人在戒惧之中应当逆觉其“所以戒慎恐惧者是良知也”，此良知即不睹不闻之体。由此认同感而生发出活活泼泼、豁达开朗的本体领悟。这是理解阳明良知学发展的两条线索。

本文追溯了朱子诚意思想的前后变化，考察了朱子晚年修改《大学》“诚意”章注的过程，指出“诚意”在朱子的修养工夫论体系中的尴尬地位，其问题的症结在于：既然真知必然乐行，为什么在致知之外仍然需要诚意工夫？诚意工夫是否有独立的意义？工夫的要领是什么？朱子早期坚持知至之后必然意诚的观点，工夫论上大有天才知吞没诚意工夫之嫌。后来他逐渐意识到诚意的独特性。朱子对“自欺”的解释开始为“有意自欺论”，转为“无意自欺论”，最后又改为一种温和的“有意自欺论”。朱子临终前应当是将经一章注的“一于善”改为“必自慊”，而非相反。并且，临终所改内容可能不只此三字。

本文由“化”字字义入手讨论庄子的死亡观。“化”与“死”不同，它强调事物变化的整体性；“化”与“变”不同，它强调变化的自然而然，不知其所以然而然。“化”无处所可指，亦无形质可拘；不可预知，亦不可系絷。“化”属天而“变”属人为。《荀子·正名》则重新定义“化”，这构成了思想史的转折。庄子主张以道观之，玄同生死，游心于道而与物俱化。故而庄子讲“死生一体”，相信人通过心灵的修养，终究可以蝉蜕于小我之中，在意义的世界中与道冥合。庄子对灵魂不朽的议题存而不论，不死不生之类的说法仅仅是境界的指点，而非质实的断言。庄子的死亡观并不建立在对死后状态的断言之上，而是正视“化”之不可知，教人直面死亡，并从体道的无限性上获得精神慰藉。文章篇末区分死亡之可惜与可怕。可惜与否是“死是不是恶”的价值问题，是给直面死亡者的哲学慰藉；可怕与否是心理素质的问题，庄子不教人用幻想美化死亡，而是示人以直面死亡的庄严与豁达。

In this paper, rather than to simply negate the value of the Taizhou School (especially noteworthy is its attempt to awaken individuality and re-evaluate traditional norms), I will try to demonstrate that besides its
seemingly deconstructive tendency, the legacy of the Taizhou School could also be ascribed another tendency, represented by Luo Jinxi’s notion of body, his view of moral spontaneity, and of the value of communal life, a tendency whose proclaimed aim is to recover social solidarity and underpin ethical norms by a new construal of the meaning of rituals.
  The elements of Luo’s thoughts could be encapsulated in three phrases: (1) the heart of a child; (2) forming one body with Heaven, Earth and all things; (3) xiao-ti-ci, three key familial norms representing all communal life and duties. In the following sections, the thought concisely represented abovewill be elucidated at length. Section 2exploreshow Luo departs from the common Neo-Confucian way of seeking purity and tranquility of the heart-mind, and how the notion of the “original heart of a child” opens up a new vision of somatic theory for Luo. Section 3carefully analyzes Luo’s view of the body. Section4 explains how this view of the body lends itself to an appreciation of communal life and values. Based on the above observations, Section 5discusses the significance of ritual in Luo’s thought.

Zhu Xi believes that if one attains genuine knowledge of good and evil, one will do good and avoid evil wholeheartedly. As a result, the phenomena of self-deception and akrasia (weakness of will) pose a challenge to his moral psychology. On his deathbed, he revised his commentary on self-deception and sincerity in the book Great Learning. His final explanatory model could be understood as a moderate version of intentionalism: a self-deceiver tacitly allows room for thoughts that run counter to his ethical beliefs, even if this potentially undermines his integrity. This model highlights two major causes for self-deception: uncritical self-trust and the dubious ethical status of first-order desires. Zhu contends that thoughts cannot render themselves sincere on their own. As a remedy, he advocates an open-minded dialogue with the cultural world documented in the classics so as to avoid the myopia of the self.

Oneness, a serene experience of being profoundly united with Heaven, Earth and all things in the world, is one of the main themes of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism. A discussion on how to attain inner peace could be found in Cheng Hao’s Letter on Calming Nature (ding xing shu, 定性書) in reply to Zhang Zai. I argue that this Letter not only shows a discrepancy between their ways of inner peace, but also indicates more profoundly the difference between their notions of oneness, although the latter are widely believed to be unanimous. The profound difference could be detected if we compare the Letter with Zhang’s text. Zhang’s approach could be characterized as “contemplative oneness”, in that he teaches to view the world as one, through a metaphysical insight. However, this approach presupposes an inner-outer distinction which hinders him from experiencing oneness and inner peace when he puts this insight into daily practice. Cheng in this Letter provides an approach which dispenses with the inner-outer distinction. He teaches the learners of ren (humanity) to feel the world as one (“perceptive oneness”). This article provides a new reading of Cheng’s Letter, reconstructs his arguments against Zhang, and elucidates the difference between their approaches to oneness. Cheng’s argument is therapeutic rather than dogmatic. His ethics could be understood as a moderate version of ethical realism.

DAI Zhen 戴震criticizes Song-Ming 宋明Neo-Confucianism, especially ZHU
Xi’s 朱熹dichotomy between principle (li 理) and desires (yu 欲) and his claim that principle is received from Heaven and completely embodied in the heart/mind, as if Zhu advocates asceticism and ultra-intuitionism. This criticism culminates in the accusation of “using principle as a means of killing or persecuting people.” In this paper, I argue that DAI Zhen misunderstands ZHU Xi’s moral theory and does not do him justice. At some point Dai’s criticism is similar to the utilitarian criticism of deontology. However, more interesting are Dai’s unique ideas, especially his arguments for desires that covertly appeal to the immanent-monist trends of thought in the Ming-Qing 明清period. His own ethical enterprise lies in dismissing Song Confucians’ notion of ethics as revealing principles a priori, and then establishing criteria or procedures that enable common moral deliberation.

如果我们要论证：在荀子的理论中，“化性”如何可能，我们就必须解决“性”的内容是什么，这些内容中哪些是可化的，然后我们才能达到“化性是可化的”这个结论。因此，性的内容便成了整个论证的关键。但是荀子对“性”字的规定是比较形式化的。无论是“天之就”还是“材性”或“本始材朴”，都只是从形式上与人伪相对。我们尚未得到任何实质性的内容。可巧《正名》说：“性者，天之就也；情者，性之质也；欲者，情之应也。” 质是体质、质地、底子、根茎。可见“情”字是关键。我们可以猜测：荀子关于情、欲的论述或许可以为我们提供一些实质性的证据，解开“化性如何可能”的谜团。更巧的是：在荀子对宋钘的“情欲寡”的反驳中，我们可以看清情、欲二字的义涵，由此再反过来与性字比照，则“化性”之义可明。

告子被不同的学者们解读为道家、儒家或墨家。本文支持葛瑞汉的观点，认为告子思想与《管子》诸篇所记载的稷下道家思想有明显的相似处。借助《管子》诸篇，特别是“内静外敬”一语，可知告子的“不得……勿求……”句不是条件句，而是并列句，表示“即使不得，亦勿求”。这与《管子》诸篇反对“求”而主张“不求而自得”相同。《墨子》的相关材料说明，《孟子》知言养气章的“必有事焉而勿正心，勿忘，勿助长”整句都在批评告子。求与得、内与外的关系是一个基本的伦理学问题，孟子的“求则得之”可以看作是他的思想起点，而这一起点恰恰是在与告子的“不得勿求”思想相对立的情境下提出的。

本书以诚意与自欺问题为中心，重构从朱子晚年到王阳明的哲学逻辑进程，以“诚意史观”兼容和取代“格竹叙事”。朱子批评陆象山学派有自欺的危险，这令他更关注如下问题：诚意如何可能？自欺如何诊断？格物致知之后为何仍须诚意？这些问题困扰着晚年朱子，使之不得不反复修改其《大学》诚意章注，直至临终前三天。而王阳明的知行合一、致良知与四句教等思想都可以看成心学对该问题的逐步解决和对朱子的回应。本书系统地诠释了王阳明哲学。在保持良知的先天性的基础上，本书揭示良知的开放性，探讨良知与经验如何结合、良知如何呈现于时间意识中，阐发良知与诚意之学对儒佛互动、中西文明互鉴的意义，将良知与诚意之学溯源于洒落与光风霁月的人文理想。