Did Terrorism Sway Spain's Election?

“Whether or not they were right to do so, a significant number of Spanish voters assumed that the bombings in Madrid were related to the Aznar government’s support for the war in Iraq, and reacted to them by seeking to vote his party out of office. ” Did Terrorism Sway Spain’s Election? CHARLES POWELL O ciates, Ayman Al Zawahiri, publicly referred to AlAndalus (the Arabic name given the Iberian Peninsula by its Muslim conquerors) as a promised land that one day would revert to Islamic rule. Factors such as its geographic proximity to North Africa, the presence of a rapidly growing Muslim immigrant community, and the prominence often attributed to Al-Andalus in narratives of the historical and cultural development of Islamic identity had singled out Spain as an attractive terrorist target long before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, it was the shift in Spain’s foreign policy in relation to America and Iraq that most likely prompted Al Qaeda to target Madrid on March 11, 2004. During his first four-year term in office, Aznar mainly trod in the footsteps of his predecessor, Felipe González, when it came to relations with the European Union and the United States. Changes began to occur after his reelection in March 2000, when his Popular Party obtained an absolute majority in the Cortes, the Spanish parliament, freeing Aznar from having to take into account the wishes of his former parliamentary allies. Even so, subsequent changes in foreign policy were essentially reactive. They largely can be attributed to the inauguration of George W. Bush as US president in January 2001, and, more important, to the terrorist attacks of September 11. In response to 9-11, Aznar immediately joined other European leaders in condemning the attacks and offering Washington his solidarity and support. Unlike many of his European colleagues, however, the Spanish prime minister fully shared the Bush administration’s diagnosis of 9-11 and its likely consequences—including the need to embark on a global “war on terrorism” that might entail preventive use of force against rogue states. When asked to justify his position, Aznar added a specifically Spanish dimension to the debate, pointing out that since Madrid had often sought (and obtained) external n March 14, 2004, three days after train bombings in Madrid killed 192 people and injured 1,500 others, the Spanish electorate voted out of office a government that was thought to have performed well and had been leading in the polls. Critics of the outgoing prime minister, José María Aznar, blamed his unexpected defeat on his government’s attempt to pin responsibility for the bombings on Basque separatists, in spite of strong early evidence pointing to Al Qaeda involvement. More likely, it was the connection established by many Spanish voters between the terrorist bombings and Aznar’s support for the war in Iraq that proved his undoing. SPAIN JO IN S THE FRO N T Were it not for the remarkable changes that Aznar introduced in his country’s foreign policies in the wake of his second election victory in March 2000, one would be tempted to argue that Spain was always a likely target for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Indeed, Arab terrorists had been active in the country long before the birth of Al Qaeda, sometimes with dramatic consequences. In April 1985, militants planted a bomb in an outdoor restaurant near Madrid frequented by US military personnel from the nearby Torrejón air base, killing 18 people, most of them Spanish civilians. More alarmingly, after 9-11 it was discovered that a number of terrorists directly involved in planning and executing the attacks had visited Spain to obtain false documents and other materials from members of Al Qaeda’s so-called sleeper cells. A month after the attacks in New York and Washington, one of Osama bin Laden’s closest assoCHARLES POWELL is deputy director of the Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Madrid and author of España en Democracia, 1975–2000 (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2001). 376 Serg io Perez / Reuters Did Terrorism Sway Spain’s Election? • 377 support in its struggle against domestic terrorism, it 2002 that they began to establish a closer personal would be disloyal and inconsistent not to join a rapport. Along with US Secretary of State Colin Washington-sponsored “coalition of the willing” Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Aznar against Al Qaeda. This was so, he insisted, even endorsed the idea of seeking an explicit UN Security though the United States had hitherto played a rather Council resolution to apply renewed pressure on modest role in the fight against ETA (Euskadi Ta Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to demonstrate Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque Homeland), compliance with UN resolutions on the destruction the Basque separatist terrorist group. In the short of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. term, Aznar’s policy resulted in Spain ’s sending troops But Security Council Resolution 1441, finally to Afghanistan as part of the war against the Taliban adopted in November 2002, was subject to conand Al Qaeda, in which flicting interpretations, and some 20 other countries France in particular did not were involved, including accept that Iraqi noncompliFrance and Germany, and ance should automatically lead which enjoyed the blessings to war. Aznar for his part had of the United Nations. become increasingly impatient For the longer term, with Saddam. By late DecemAznar interpreted 9-11 as ber he was in favor of military the beginning of a new action with or without a UN post –post –cold war era—an resolution in support. Addiera that offered fresh opportionally, Spain became a more tunities for Spain in the significant player in January international arena. The 2003, when it took up a nonprime minister believed that permanent seat in the Security his country’s spectacular Council. Shortly afterward, economic growth in the Aznar inspired the so-called 1990s, which had allowed letter of the eight, signed by Spain to become the eighththe prime ministers of Spain, largest economy in the Britain, Italy, Portugal, Dendeveloped world, entitled it mark, Poland, Hungary, and to play a more prominent the Czech Republic. Published Under Bush’s Thumb? role in international affairs. on January 29, 2003, in The Bush and Aznar in t he Azores, M arch 2003 He also felt this was best Wall Street Journal, it argued achieved by developing a that “the transatlantic relationcloser relationship with the United States. Furship should not fall victim to the current Iraqi thermore, in the course of his second term, Aznar regime’s attempts to threaten world security.” became increasingly disillusioned with an EU that In Spain, however, domestic opposition to war was strong and growing. According to a poll conseemed unwilling or unable to foster serious ecoducted by the Elcano Royal Institute in February nomic reform in Europe, that had little to offer in 2003, 64 percent of Spaniards opposed any kind of the fight against international terrorism, and that military intervention in Iraq, 27 percent would supfailed to come to Spain ’s assistance when Morocport it only if it enjoyed the UN’s backing, and only 2 can gendarmerie invaded the island of Perejil in the summer of 2002 in an attempt to reclaim the uninpercent approved the use of force with or without a habited Spanish territory. resolution. On February 15, several million demonstrators took to the streets all over Spain to oppose A ZN AR’ S U- TURN war. This sentiment led Aznar to support Blair’s quest Aznar’s closeness to the Bush administration, and for a second UN resolution that would explicitly conhis increasingly critical view of Franco-German demn Saddam for failing to comply with Resolution opposition to an invasion of Iraq, gradually became 1441 and thereby pave the way for the use of force. apparent in the course of 2002. Although the prime Later that month Aznar joined Blair and Bush in minister had first met the new American president sponsoring a draft resolution, but in spite of Spain ’s in June 2001 in Madrid, and had seen him again in lukewarm efforts to win over fellow Security CounNovember in Washington, it was in the spring of cil members Mexico and Chile, support fell far 378 • CURREN T HISTO RY • N ovember 2004 short of what was required. Anxious to avoid a resounding diplomatic defeat, the three leaders finally decided to go it alone at a meeting held March 16, 2003, at Lajes air base in the Azores. Two days later, US troops began the invasion of Iraq. In the eyes of many Spaniards who opposed the war, the photographs taken at the Azores, showing President Bush resting his hand on Aznar ’s shoulder, came to epitomize the latter ’s foreign policy U-turn and his subservience to the US administration. Unlike other coalition members such as Britain, Australia, or Poland, Spain did not send troops to Iraq until after the fall of Baghdad, and was therefore not involved in the invasion itself. The reasons for this were mainly political: Aznar had initially toyed with the idea of sending part of the Spanish fleet—including its only aircraft carrier, the Príncipe de Asturias— to the region, but was talked out of it by senior party officials alarmed by the approach of local and regional elections scheduled for May 2003. With the elections out of the way, several Spanish support vessels— including a hospital ship —finally landed in Iraq in July once the fighting was over, allegedly to perform humanitarian missions. A more permanent contingent of some 1,300 Spanish troops became fully operational in September, under Polish command. THE TERRO RISTS’ TARGET It is telling that Spanish interests were among the first European targets to be attacked by Islamic terrorists. Contrary to what Aznar’s government argued at the time, there can be little doubt that a May 2003 suicide bombing attack on the Casa de Españ a social club and restaurant in Casablanca, Morocco, in which 45 civilians lost their lives, was intended as a warning. Shortly after the deployment of Spanish troops, the Arab television station Al Jazeera in October 2003 showed a video in which Osama bin Laden himself threatened to punish coalition members Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy for backing the Bush administration in Iraq. Even more important, two months later a Norwegian academic came across a text in Arabic on the Internet, allegedly written by a (probably Moroccan) member of Al Qaeda, that carefully analyzed the domestic political situation in a number of coalition states with a view to identifying the most vulnerable. The document dedicated six pages to Spain, which was described as Washington ’s closest European ally except Britain, and underlined the extent of popular opposition to the government ’s support for the war in Iraq. The text also noted that as early as March 2003, the leader of the opposition, José Luis Rodr íguez Zapatero, had promised to withdraw Spanish troops should he win the next general election, which was scheduled for March 2004. In short, Spain was the weakest link in the coalition chain, and if the Aznar government failed to survive a major terrorist coup, its successor would bring Spain ’s presence in Iraq to an end. The Norwegian researcher paid little attention to this text until after the events of March 11. There is no proof, furthermore, that its author was directly involved in planning or executing the bombings that shook Madrid that fateful morning. Nevertheless, it shows that Islamic fundamentalists saw powerful reasons for making the Spanish capital a terrorist target. By way of contrast, bombing London —an option that European security services considered more likely at the time—would not have had the same political consequences. The Tory party, which might have replaced Labour in office had public opinion forced Blair to resign, was on the whole favorable to Britain ’s presence in Iraq. FO UR DAYS IN M ARCH In the weeks leading up to the general election of March 14, 2004, most political analysts and pollsters predicted a narrow victory for Aznar’s Popular Party. This was never an easy election to call, mainly because the outgoing prime minister had decided not to stand for office, later anointing a close colleague, Mariano Rajoy, as his possible successor. Furthermore, this was to be Zapatero’s first general election as leader of the opposition, and it was widely felt that he was still a politician in the making. In spite of several highly publicized and potentially damaging setbacks, such as an oil spill resulting from the sinking of the tanker Prestige off the coast of Galicia, the government was generally deemed to have performed reasonably well. This was particularly so in the economic sphere, where a period of unprecedented economic growth had sent unemployment levels to an all-time low. Given that the government had fared well in local elections held in May 2003, at the height of the Iraq crisis, it was widely believed that opposition to the war would not have a major impact on the 2004 election. Even so, government officials’ uncertainty about the election outcome may partly explain their behavior in response to the bombs that exploded on three commuter trains headed for Madrid ’s Atocha railway station on the morning of March 11. To be fair, it is perhaps understandable that, in light of a 30-year struggle against ETA terrorism that had cost more than 900 lives, the authorities should instinc- Did Terrorism Sway Spain’s Election? • 379 tively attribute a major terrorist attack to the orgaby the interior minister later that evening, only nization they knew best. Furthermore, ETA had hours away from the opening of polling stations. attempted to plant bombs in Madrid railway staThat same evening, authorities found a videocastions the previous Christmas, and two of its memsette near the central Madrid mosque, on which an bers had recently been intercepted while driving Al Qaeda spokesman claimed responsibility for the half a ton of explosives to the capital. bombings and justified them as punishment for the In any case, it was immediately evident to Spanish government ’s involvement in Iraq and experts and laymen alike that the Popular Party Afghanistan. By that stage feelings were running high would probably fare better at the polls if the bombamong some of the government’s more vocal critics. ings could be attributed to ETA, and would likely be Many who demonstrated noisily outside Popular punished by voters if the culprits turned out to be Party offices throughout the country were veterans Islamic fundamentalists, since the attacks might be of the massive antiwar rallies held the previous year. blamed on Aznar ’s support for the Iraq War. The BO M BS AN D BALLO TS outgoing government acted accordingly, remaining As could be expected, the relationship between steadfast in its conviction that ETA was to blame the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004, and the outlong after foreign intelligence experts and even come of the elections held just three days later journalists had come to the conclusion that Al became a hotly contested issue. The Popular Party Qaeda was responsible. argued that, however narrowly, it would have won By noon on March 11, the government knew that had it not been for the train bombings, both the police had discovered a van containing detonabecause of the wave of antiwar sentiment they protors, explosives, and a tape recording of Koran voked and, more converses. Aznar, however, troversially, because of personally telephoned the manner in which editors of Spain ’s leading Bin Laden did not win the Spanish elections, this sentiment was supnewspapers to reassure nor was the new Socialist prime minister posedly manipulated by them that ETA was to sectors of the media blame. Later that afteranother Neville Chamberlain. traditionally hostile to noon, the foreign minAznar and his policies. istry instructed Spanish The Socialists, for their part, claimed that they would ambassadors abroad to confirm that ETA was behind have won the elections regardless, and that it was in the attacks, urging them to inform the local media any case the government’s heavy-handed attempt to accordingly. The government even insisted that the withhold the truth about the bombings that backUN Security Council make an explicit reference to fired, providing hundreds of thousands of voters with ETA in its official condemnation of the bombings, at fresh reasons for wanting to oust the conservatives a time when most analysts in the United States were from office. According to one survey, 59 percent of working on the assumption that Al Qaeda was to respondents believed the government had misinblame, causing considerable discomfort to some of formed the public; 30 percent denied this was true. the senior diplomats involved. In the March 14 balloting, the Socialists won 11 In spite of the government’s determination to pin million votes. The Popular Party received 9.7 milthe attacks on ETA, police experts had begun to purlion. A postelection poll by the Center for Sociosue Al Qaeda-related leads almost at once. In the logical Research found that 28 percent said the early hours of March 12, the discovery of a bag conbombings had influenced their decision. Given that taining explosives that had failed to detonate, with a total of 28 million Spaniards voted, this would a mobile telephone connected to them, seemed to mean that the bombings affected some 7.4 million confirm that ETA was not responsible. Yet the govpeople. In most cases, the killings simply reaffirmed ernment did not reveal this news until that evening. a decision to vote for the party that voters had That night, an estimated 11 million people (out of already thought of supporting before March 11. a total population of 42 million) took to the streets However, 22 percent of those who admitted having of Spanish towns and cities to protest the bombings, been influenced by these events—in other words, without knowing for certain who was to blame for some 1.6 million citizens—claimed that they had them. Early on the afternoon of March 13, the originally intended to abstain, but had turned out police arrested several Moroccan citizens linked to to vote in response to the train bombings. the attacks, a development formally acknowledged 380 • CURREN T HISTO RY • N ovember 2004 In addition, another 13 percent of those who claimed to have been influenced —about 1 million voters—admitted to having changed the party of their choice. The Center’s poll unfortunately did not ask respondents to identify the parties affected by this decision. However, more than 9 percent of those who had voted Socialist cited the events of March 11 as the main reason for doing so, while only 1.5 percent of Popular Party voters mentioned this. In all likelihood, the government’s handling of the crisis was an important additional factor in encouraging many left-leaning potential abstainers and first-time voters to react in this manner. While it is impossible to rule out a Socialist victory had the attacks not taken place, it is reasonable to conclude that the killings mobilized potential abstainers and undecided voters—resulting in a 77 percent turnout, the third-highest in Spanish voting history since the return of democracy in 1977. Voters came out in force to punish the departing Aznar government. This interpretation is borne out by an Elcano Royal Institute poll carried out in May 2004, according to which 64 percent of respondents believed that the bombings would not have taken place had Spain not backed the United States in the Iraq War, a causal relationship questioned by only 23 percent of those interviewed. Strictly speaking, this conclusion was as absurd as it would have been to claim that the US presidential election in 1980 was won by Iran ’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and not Ronald Reagan, who ran successfully against Jimmy Carter, the incumbent who came to political grief at the hands of the Iranian revolutionary leader. What is more, given Spain ’s considerable experience of terrorism over the past 30 years, it was unfair to accuse public opinion of being faint-hearted in the face of adversity, particularly if one considers the personal courage and sang-froid displayed by ordinary citizens in the aftermath of the March 11 attacks. Given, as well, the US administration ’s failure to establish a strong link between Saddam ’s regime and Al Qaeda, popular Spanish opposition to the war in Iraq could hardly be interpreted as evidence of a lack of determination —let alone capitulation —in the struggle against international terrorism. Bin Laden did not win the Spanish elections, nor was the new Socialist prime minister another Neville Chamberlain. Whether or not they were right to do so, a significant number of Spanish voters assumed that the bombings in Madrid were related to the Aznar government ’s support for the war in Iraq, and reacted to them by seeking to vote his party out of office. The war had been perceived from the out- THE AFTERM ATH The events of March 2004 in Spain were subjected to close scrutiny throughout the world because of their complex and worrying implications. In the first instance, they gave rise to an interesting debate—about the nature of public opinion, terrorism, and democracy—that far transcended the Spanish environment in which the events took place. For many politicians, analysts, and journalists in the United States (but only a handful of their brethren in Spain and elsewhere in Europe), the election results represented a triumph of terrorism over democracy: an intimidated public opinion had buckled under the impact of a daring strike in the nation ’s capital; the electorate chose the party that had promised to withdraw troops from Iraq on the understanding that this would radically diminish the likelihood of further terrorist attacks. (It should be noted in this regard that 49 percent of Spaniards, according to an Elcano poll, believed troop withdrawal would make Islamist attacks less likely, while 43 percent doubted this would be the case.) According to this view, bin Laden, rather than Zapatero, won the Spanish elections. A Current History Snapshot . . . “Never was a war so righteous as is the war against Germany now; never any State in the world so clamored for punishment; but be it remembered that Europe’s quarrel is with Germany as a State, not with the German people, with the system, not with the race. The older tradition of Germany is a pacific, civilizing tradition. The temperament of the mass of the German people is kindly, sane, amiable. Disaster to the German Army, if it is unacco mpanied by such a memo rable wrong as dismemberment or intolerable indignity, will mean the restoration of the greatest people of Europe to the fellowship of the western nations.” “The Fourth of August— Europe at War” Current History, December 1914 H. G. Wells Did Terrorism Sway Spain’s Election? • 381 set as unlawful, unnecessary, and illegitimate by a The events of March 2004 in Spain also attracted majority of Spaniards, including many Popular interest throughout the world for other, less acaParty voters and the Catholic Church, and it is not demic reasons. Above all, there was the immediate surprising that the bombings sparked more votes concern that, if Al Qaeda interpreted the Popular for the party that had opposed the war most conParty’s defeat (and the resulting withdrawal of Spansistently. Furthermore, Zapatero’s decision to withish troops from Iraq) as a victory, terrorists might be draw Spain ’s troops by June 30, 2004, unless the tempted to reproduce the Madrid bombings in other United Nations became responsible for the milicountries about to hold elections, including the tary and political situation in Iraq (carried out earUnited States. Furthermore, although Spain ’s military lier than initially expected and completed in May), contribution to the pacification of Iraq was relatively enjoyed the support of 78 percent of the populamodest, Washington feared that Zapatero’s decision tion, according to one poll. From this point of to withdraw troops might weaken the resolve of view, the elections could be seen as a spectacular other coalition members, most notably Italy and triumph for democracy—and a salutary reminder Poland. In fact, the evidence suggests Spain ’s impact to democratic leaders that, even when they enjoy on events in Iraq has always been relatively modest, comfortable majorities in parliaments, they may both before and after the March elections. still pay a high political price for pursuing policies REJO IN IN G EURO PE strongly opposed by the vast majority of the elecEvents in Spain may, however, have modified the torate. Consequently, though undoubtedly signifexisting balance of power within Europe away from icant, the impact of the bombings on the elections Atlanticists and in favor of the more “Eurocentric” cannot be said to have diminished or undermined nations, a cleavage that the legitimacy of the largely coincided with outcome. the separation between The events of March It was the shift in Spain’s foreign policy intergovernmentalists and 2004 also triggered a in relation to Iraq that most likely integrationists within the debate about the way prompted Al Qaeda to target Madrid. European Union. Although foreign policy should be in the past Spain had conducted by Western generally sided with the democracies in the early latter, and had been quite content to operate twenty-first century. Until World War I, foreign polunder the Franco-German umbrella, Aznar had icy had been the private domain of governments become increasingly independent and critical of and their diplomats. This situation began to change the status quo during his second term in office, in the interwar years and even more so in the afterand tended to find himself in the company of math of World War II, which awakened elites to the Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. importance of linkages between domestic and forThe Spanish leader was unimpressed by the Euroeign policies. Although the advent of mass media pean Convention ’s efforts to draw up a draft con(and television in particular) forced governments stitution for the EU, and regarded the result with to acknowledge the importance of public opinion, the view that foreign policy was less vulnerable to suspicion and distaste, not least because it scrutiny than other areas of government activity, deprived Madrid of the institutional power in EU supposedly because it was too complex and alien to decision making it had been awarded by the Nice their everyday lives for regular citizens to underTreaty in December 2000. stand, remained current. The Iraq conflict, however, The Zapatero government, which came to office underlined the extent to which globalization in the in April 2004, argued that, having pulled out of the political and media domains was making it difficult “Azores coalition,” Spain would be free to return for democracies to act abroad without the consent to its supposedly influential role at the heart of (if not support) of their citizens. In the Spanish Europe, acting in full agreement with France and case, in spite of the relatively modest number of Germany. This goal appears to have been popular troops deployed (about 1,300) and casualties with public opinion at large, unaccustomed as it incurred (less than a dozen), involvement in Iraq was to seeing Spain in the somewhat unlikely— aroused the determined opposition of significant and not always reliable—company of Britain. sectors of the electorate, which the government It soon became apparent that proposed constituignored at its peril. tional changes to voting powers in the EU remained 382 • CURREN T HISTO RY • N ovember 2004 a point of contention. Nevertheless, France and Germany accommodated Spain ’s demands somewhat, thereby rewarding the young Socialist leader for having removed Spain from the Azores coalition and returned to the Eurocentric fold. Spain has undergone very significant changes in the past decade. Its citizens were reminded of this somewhat abruptly when they awoke to the fact that one in four victims of the Madrid commuter train bombings was foreign, many of them immigrants who had entered the country illegally. What was recently a highly homogeneous society, both in ethnic and cultural terms, has rapidly joined the European mainstream of diversity. Indeed, one of the most significant domestic consequences of the March killings, which are thought to have been carried out by Moroccans, may turn out to be an increase in xenophobic sentiment, a trend that was already visible in recent years. (Between 1996 and 2004 the proportion of Spaniards in favor of expelling Moroccans tripled from 7 percent to 19 percent, and that of people who would refuse to marry Moroccans rose from 39 percent to 52 percent.) Fear and rejection of Muslim fundamentalism may provide new depth and breadth to more traditional forms of anti-Arab racism. Also, for the first time in recent history, a majority of ordinary citizens no longer regard ETA terrorism as the most serious threat to their security. The longer-term consequences of the events of March 2004 for Spain ’s role in the international arena are not easy to predict. Many Spaniards clearly believed that the election results would allow a return to the more familiar relationships and alliances of the past. According to his critics, by siding with the United States and others over Iraq, Aznar had broken with several decades of domestic consensus on foreign policy issues, leaving Spain isolated and exposed. Within the EU, this departure had led to an open confrontation with France and Germany, something Spain could ill afford given its continued reliance on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and substantial regional subsidies. Further afield, Aznar ’s support for the Bush administration had allegedly undermined Spain ’s role as a bridge between Latin America and Europe, as well as its prestige and credibility in the Arab world. Justified or not, these views were in keeping with results of the Elcano Royal Institute poll, according to which a majority felt that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq would improve Madrid ’s relations with France and Germany, the Arab world, and Latin America. Most of those polled also believed that withdrawal from Iraq would hurt Spain ’s relations with the United States, but by the same token, the government ’s decision seems to have been welcomed as a sign of autonomy and self-respect. A NEW FOREIGN POLICY Significantly, and contrary to what some had argued in the wake of the March events, this same survey found 74 percent of respondents in favor of Spain ’s playing an active role internationally. A majority of Spaniards apparently agreed with Aznar ’s diagnosis of his country’s need to become more of a protagonist in world events. They simply saw his way of going about it as misguided and counterproductive. In September 2004, Zapatero hosted a mini-summit in Madrid for President Jacques Chirac of France and Chancellor Gerhard Schr ö der of Germany, thereby confirming Spain ’s return to more EUfriendly positions. Only weeks later, the prime minister called for an “alliance of civilizations” between the Western and Arab-Muslim worlds in an address to the UN General Assembly, while at the same time stressing his support for multilateralism and international law. Additionally, the Spanish leader called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iraq, a gesture that did little to improve already badly strained relations with the Bush administration. Taken together, these initiatives added up to an almost complete reversal of the foreign policy priorities of his predecessor. ■