@ Margarida Abreu, 1999.
Exchange rate market tensions in a small open economy during the transition to
EMU: can Asian countries learn from the Portuguese experience in 1992-1995?✷
Margarida Abreu
CISEP – ISEG – U.T. Lisboa
Abstract
This paper studies the various Portuguese escudo exchange rate crises during the
period 1992-95. Were they the result of the market evaluation of the Portuguese
economy fundamentals? Were they the outcome of the expected political changes?
Or, to the contrary, can we suggest self-fulfilling crises?
After a general introduction, the paper starts with an estimation of the exchange rate
policy credibility a la Svensson and a brief description of the escudo exchange rate
crises. The paper then presents different theoretical explanations for speculative
attacks, paying special attention to the new formalizations of the behavior of market
agents. We conclude with some normative remarks concerning the Portuguese
exchange rate crises, and some lessons that Asian countries can learn from the
Portuguese experience.
JEL Classification: F3, E5.
Keywords: Exchange rate policy, exchange rate crisis, uncertainty, financial market
agents’ behavior.
✷
This paper has been presented at the 6th annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Finance Association,
Melbourne – July 1999. I deeply thank conference participants for helpful comments. The usual disclaims
apply.
Correspondence to Margarida Abreu, CISEP, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, Rua Miguel Lupi 20,
1200 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: mabreu@iseg.utl.pt).
1. Introduction
Portugal became a member of the European Community (EC) in January 1986. The
political option to join the EC did have a significant impact on the policy instruments
available, as well as on the performance of the Portuguese economy in the last 15
years. The ultimate goal of the single currency and the overall convergence effort by
all European members have forced Portugal to follow a strong nominal convergence
effort. The nominal convergence did have an impact on the real performance of the
economy, that is, on real growth and on all variables that depend upon economic
growth.
Monetary policy was affected: credit ceilings and interest rate controls were slowly
abandoned in the late eighties and early, and indirect control via money market was
established. As regards the exchange rate, the policy designed in earlier periods to
promote economic growth will not be able to be continued, and the pricecompetitiveness of the Portuguese economy is now more difficult to achieve. The
nominal depreciation of the escudo is progressively reduced, and it will no longer
compensate the inflation differentials of Portugal vis-à-vis its main competitors.
The performance of the Portuguese economy was impressive during the second half
of the eighties, the first years as an EC member. Portugal experienced its longest and
more intense growth period since the 1974 revolution, and this allowed a strong real
convergence of the economy. Between 1986 and 1990, the average annual real GDP
growth rate was 4.5%, a total of 28.2% for the 5-year period. The real growth rate for
the European Community as a whole was 18.2% on average, 10 percentage points
smaller than that for Portugal.
A significant change took place in the late eighties regarding the ranking of economic
policy targets. In the spirit of the Delors plan and under Spanish pressure1 Portuguese
authorities became more concerned with inflation reduction, the more relevant
condition for the Portuguese escudo to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism –ERM- of
the European Monetary System - EMS. As a result, the crawling-peg policy was
abandoned in 1990 and monetary policy became more restrictive. Similarly to other
countries in South Europe (Spain and Italy), Portugal was then following a
competitive disinflation strategy. The escudo was ‘nominally aligned’ with the Deutch
mark. The goal was twofold: on the one hand, to induce a disinflation process via
domestic demand contraction; on the other hand, to induce domestic firms to increase
their international competitiveness by labor cost reduction. Portugal was therefore
following a risky integration strategy insofar as it was depending upon the exchange
rate stability (and credibility) and at the expenses of a smaller growth rate (at least in
the short run).
1
The Spanish peseta joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System in August
1989.
-2-
In spite of the worsening external environment (the early nineties witnessed the
German unification, the recession in Europe in a context of world deflation, and the
European Monetary System crisis), economic policy in Portugal was continued along
the same lines. The Portuguese authorities did not take advantage of the widening of
the fluctuation bands decided in August 1993 in the wake of the EMS crisis, not even
from a qualitative standpoint.
As a result of the policy orientations, the nominal exchange rate of the escudo stays
stable during 1990, and then appreciates between January 1991 and August 1992.
Given the inflation differentials between Portugal and the EC average, the end result
of the exchange rate policy was a strong real appreciation of the currency. Between
1991 and 1992, the growth rate of the economy slows down, and unemployment
reduction slows down as well. A strong recession, with an increasing unemployment
rate, takes place between 1992 and 1994. The average growth rate of the Portuguese
economy was a mere 1.1% per year between 1991 and 1995. The real convergence
achieved during 1985/90 was followed by a real divergence: the GDP growth rate for
the 91-95 period (5.4%) represents around 2/3 only of the average growth rate for the
EC country members (8.1%).
Looking back (particularly since 1990) at the European integration strategy followed
by Portuguese authorities, we can raise some questions regarding its soundness, that
is, was it the best convergence strategy, particularly from 1992 onwards? Some
doubts arise because the disinflation process witnessed during the period allowed
Portugal to join the Monetary Union from the very beginning, but on the other hand
the Portuguese economy suffered one of the worst recessions in Europe, both in terms
of intensity and duration. The costs of that strategy are partially the result of the
difficulty to affirm the credibility of the exchange rate commitment, particularly from
October 1992 onwards. In fact, the presence of the escudo in the ERM of the EMS
was marked since October 1992 by a recurring lack of credibility and by numerous
periods of tension in the foreign exchange market, the end result being 3 exchange
rate adjustments and 5 exchange rate crises.
This paper studies the nature of the escudo crises. Were they the result of the market
judgement of the fundamentals of the economy and can therefore be interpreted as a
government sanction? Were they the result of market agents anticipating policy
changes? Or should we postulate the possibility of heterogeneous and sometimes
temporally incoherent points of view being homogenized under the influence of some
events, and therefore a speculative attack on the run?
The paper develops as follows. We begin with a brief discussion on the evolution of
the escudo credibility between 1992 and 1995, and describe the escudo crises. We
then review the theoretical explanations for speculative attacks, with a special
emphasis on the most recent developments regarding the behavior of financial market
agents. We conclude the paper with some remarks about the crises of the escudo in
the light of the speculative attack theory, and bring to light some lessons Asian
countries may learn from the Portuguese experience.
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2. The credibility of the escudo fluctuation band between 1992 and 1995
During this 3-year period we can identify different phases regarding the position of
the escudo relative to the other currencies of the EMS, as well as the stability of the
currency and the intensity of authorities interventions deemed necessary to defend its
central parity.
The escudo market stays stable between April and September of 1992, the currency
being one of the strongest of the ERM. During this 6-month period, in spite of the
small interest rate differential vis-à-vis the Deutch market, systematic capital inflows
pressured an escudo appreciation. The currency strength seemed to prove that it was
possible to consistently achieve economic stabilization and strong growth. The pegged
nominal exchange rate seemed to work well together with a policy designed to
improve growth (low interest rates and a sharp government deficit), for the inflation
differentials and the external imbalances seemed not to disturb the external currency
stability.
This ‘grace period’ was abruptly over in September 1992, with the EMS crisis. The
exchange rate policy did not suffer any relevant modification but, in spite of that, the
escudo was realigned three times between September 1992 and March 1995: the first
in November 1992, then again in May 1993, and finally in March 1995. Numerous
other tension periods occurred between those dates.
Figure 1 shows the expected depreciation of the escudo for a 3-month time horizon
and for a 95% confidence interval. Each vertical line defines a 95% confidence
interval for the expected (at time t) depreciation rate of the central bilateral DEM-PTE
parity three months in advance, in percentage points. The methodology used to draw
this figure is in annex 1.
On the one hand, the figure clearly shows that all exchange rate adjustments were
anticipated approximately three months in advance; on the other hand it also shows
that 3 different phases can be defined regarding the exchange rate policy credibility.
The Portuguese monetary authorities benefited from complete credibility of the
fluctuation band until August 1992. But from August 1992 up to July 1993, periods of
renewed confidence in the wake of each adjustment were followed by periods of lack
of confidence. Finally, from July 1993 until March 1995 the credibility of the escudo
fluctuation band does not exist, with the exception of one month in early 1994. During
the 32-month period between the first EMS crisis (September 1992) and the last
escudo adjustment (March 1995) we can identify 5 escudo crises.
-4-
-5-
3. The escudo crises between 1992 and 1995
The first crisis of the escudo develops during the period September/92-November/92,
a period of great EMS instability. This crisis was very intense and reveals what could
be named the ‘reaction function’ of the central bank (Banco de Portugal) when facing
speculative attacks against the escudo. It was the end of the golden period of the
escudo in the ERM, a period of optimistic expectations. As a result of the floating
British pound and Italian lira, and following the attacks against the Danish kroner, the
Irish pound, the Spanish peseta, and the French franc, the crisis was finally over when
the escudo was devalued by 6%, along with the second peseta devaluation2.
The second crisis occurred in February-March/1993. It was very similar to the first
one, both in terms of intensity and duration. However, the main differences were the
increased difficulty to fight the speculative attack, and the reasons behind the renewed
depreciation expectations. This second crisis was marked by the worsening of the
fundamentals of the Portuguese economy and is partially the result of the attack
against the peseta. By turn, the attack against the Spanish peseta was the result of
uncertainty regarding the upcoming elections and government in Spain. There was a
speculative surge against the escudo by mid-March, and it was also tied to the public
knowledge of a latent conflict between the different Portuguese authorities regarding
the adequate conduct of the monetary policy.
The third crisis occurred in July 1993. It affects all currencies in the EMS. It did start
with an attack against the currencies in the narrow fluctuation band, and is later on
generalized to all currencies (escudo included). However, the third crisis is different
from the first two because a favorable scenario never develops once the crisis is over,
and the credibility of the escudo fluctuation band never fully resumes after the attack.
The widening of the fluctuation band (15% on each side of the central parity) was set
up in motion in August 1993. The strategy followed by Portuguese authorities was
very similar to the one followed by Spain at first, and basically the target was to keep
the escudo exchange rate within the previous 6% band. As a result of this strategy, the
authorities were required to keep high short-run interest rates as a means to prevent
hostile speculative positions.
The fourth and longest crisis hits the escudo between February and July 1994. This
time the crisis is purely domestic, and the speculative attack (as well as the measures
against it) was slowly in motion. This escudo crisis happens at a time when the
currencies in the EMS were showing clear signs to be back to normal stability, the
Spanish peseta included. The crisis was connected with the existing conflict between
the government and the central bank regarding the interest rate policy. The attack gets
under way when the Portuguese prime minister, Cavaco Silva, talking to the press in
2
The Spanish peseta was devalued 5% in September 1992 and 6% more in November.
-6-
early March suggests that the reference interest rates should quickly be reduced, and
that was a strong criticism of the central bank behavior in pursue of the foreign
exchange target.
Finally, the fifth crisis precedes the last escudo realignment in March 1995. The crisis
affects the lira, franc, and peseta, and follows the depreciation of the American dollar
that took off in December 1994. The French franc is not devalued, but in spite of the
improving fundamentals of the Portuguese economy, authorities are forced to devalue
the escudo in the footsteps of the Spanish authorities.
4. Three theoretical models of speculative attacks3
The speculative attack theory gives us three explanations for foreign exchange crises.
Firstly, speculative attacks against one currency can be the end result of
incompatibility between domestic policies and the foreign exchange rule. They can
also happen if that incompatibility does not actually exist but is anticipated as highly
likely to occur. Finally, they can be self-fulfilling in the sense that they drive some
changes in the domestic macroeconomic policy, and the policy becomes inconsistent
with the existing foreign exchange rule. These three interpretations of a speculative
attack are the basis for three types of models. They were developed in the footsteps of
Krugman’s balance of payments crisis model. Although they have a common ground,
the three models are different in the way they identify the factors leading to the
formation of currency depreciation expectations that trigger off the attack.
i) The speculative attack as the end result of incompatibility between domestic
policies and the foreign exchange rule
Krugman (1979), and Flood and Garber (1984) set up the basis for the balance of
payments crisis model. The basic idea of the model is the following. In a fixed
exchange rate regime if a country’s international competitiveness deteriorates (if we
have expansionary monetary policy, for example) the amount of foreign reserves is
reduced up to a point when the foreign exchange regime change is inevitable. The
authorities are therefore forced to devalue the currency or to abandon the fixed
regime. If the change only takes place when foreign reserves hit the zero level, then
the nominal depreciation is instantaneous, for it would be necessary a brutal
improvement in competitiveness to stop the reserve leakage. The sudden depreciation
brings about foreign exchange losses for non-resident holders of assets denominated
in the domestic currency. In order to avoid this capital loss, non-resident agents carry
through an early speculative attack as soon as they realize that the nominal
3
For a formal presentation of the models, see Abreu (1997) or K. Blackburn and Sola (1993).
-7-
depreciation is inevitable. Therefore, they sell their assets denominated in domestic
currency even before foreign assets reach the zero level, causing an even smaller level
of reserves and forcing the option for a flexible exchange rate system.
Krugman’s model has been developed in different directions4, but one idea is common
to all the developments: the speculative attack is explained by the macroeconomic
behavior of the country. In particular, those policies liable for systematic balance of
payment deficits, which are not consistent with the nominal stability of the exchange
rate. Speculative attacks are thus connected with the exchange rate determinants. A
country suffers one balance of payments crisis whenever its international
competitiveness progressively deteriorates, and this lack of competitiveness is the
result of unbearable monetary and budget policies under a fixed exchange regime.
ii) Speculative attacks as the result of anticipated policy changes
The credibility of a foreign exchange regime (or of a fluctuation band) does not
depend solely on the agents’ evaluation of the compatibility between policies and the
foreign exchange regime. It is also prospective in the sense that agents’ judgement is
also on the (expected) future policy prospects. Therefore, the credibility of the
fluctuation band depends upon the market’s judgement and evaluation of the
monetary authorities announcements regarding the future pursue of policies that are
compatible with the currency parity. On the one hand, this judgement is a function of
the monetary authorities’ reputation and efforts to keep the currency parity; on the
other hand, it is a function of the agents’ evaluation of the fundamentals of the
economy and the sustainability of the policy5. In fact, the macroeconomic policy
necessary to keep the parity may bring about domestic costs that market agents
consider excessive (mainly in terms of employment and economic growth). It is
therefore possible to anticipate a policy reversion, against the formal policy
announcements, if the announced policy (necessary to keep the exchange rate regime)
is judged responsible for the deterioration of the fundamentals of the economy, or at
least if it does not allow an improvement of the fundamentals.
Wyplosz and Eichengreen (1993) stress that a speculative attack may occur even
when the followed fiscal and monetary policies are consistent with the foreign
exchange regime, if there are strong expectations in favor of a policy reversal because
of the costs of that policy. The speculative attack would thus be an anticipation of
4
Willman (1988) considers that external imbalances are the result of an expansionary fiscal policy.
Permanent public deficits reinforce depreciation expectations, and anticipate the attack. Calvo (1987) uses a
wage equation where wage levels depend upon expected prices, i.e., expectations regarding the exchange
rate. Anticipation of a speculative attack raises wages and therefore the crisis is premature and more intense.
Grilli (1986) and Classens (1991) introduce the question of agent uncertainty regarding monetary creation,
and the timing of the attack becomes a random variable.
5
As Drazen and Masson (1994) put it, the credibility of the policy announcement is beyond the authorities
reputation. An anti-inflationary policy based on nominal exchange rate anchorage may result in higher
unemployment, and that weakens the credibility of the political compromise in the future.
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what would happen later: the policy change. This is an explanation based on
credibility, in the words of Artus (1995). The loss of credibility is explained by the
high costs of the macroeconomic policy, not the foreign exchange commitment.
iii) The self-fulfilling speculative attacks
According to either one of the previous two approaches, the likelihood of a
speculative attack is very slim when a country is ‘irreprehensible’. A speculative
attack only exists when macroeconomic policies are judged as ‘excessively lazy’ or
when they imply substantial economic costs, meaning that the exchange rate
commitment is not suitable for the economy. In both cases the speculative attack
sanctions a ‘bad policy’.
Obstefeld (1986) suggests a third explanation: the speculative attack is independent of
the judgement and evaluation of the past, present and anticipated policy. The attack
itself validates, a posteriori, the pertinence of speculative foreign exchange positions
insofar as once the attack is under way the authorities are forced to abandon the
previous exchange rate commitment. The reasons for a self-fulfilling speculative
attack are therefore very different from those in the first two models. The exchange
rate is attacked not because its level is considered (or anticipated) to be not suitable
with the fundamentals of the economy; to the contrary, in the event of a speculative
attack (uncertain event), market agents anticipate a policy reversal, and the reversal of
the policy makes the attack a lucrative one. The idea here is that there are multiple
equilibria that may or may not bring about a speculative attack, but in the event that
they actually happen they validate themselves because they force a policy change.
The question then becomes: why do authorities react to speculative attacks with a
policy reversal? Obstefeld claims that they react with a policy reversal because central
banks cannot raise international funds when the level of its reserves is very low (and
that is a result of the attack itself). Gros (1992) hints that authorities are averse to an
interest rate increase brought about by a non-accommodating policy, and that market
agents anticipate this aversion. Finally, Artus and Bourguinat (1994) suggest that if
the currency is devalued in the wake of a speculative attack, the credibility of the
exchange rate commitment stays under fire and authorities lack the incentive to
defend the fixed exchange rate regime because restrictive policies do not any longer
have a positive effect.
-9-
5. Modern financial market theories: another explanation for foreign exchange
crises.
The self-fulfilling theory of speculative attacks does not explain how and when
expectations are coordinated in a particular combination of self-validated
expectations. Recent theories about the behavior of financial market agents and price
dynamics offer new grounds for meditation. In the aftermath of the stock exchange
crises of the eighties, particularly the October 1997 crash, some people studied the
causes of price fluctuations in financial markets, and the profound divergences
between market and equilibrium prices. Their research raised two new questions. On
the one hand, the existence of mimetic behavior is now studied as a rational answer
under uncertainty; on the other hand, they also considered the heterogeneity and
diversity of market agents’ behavior, as a result of different rationality and/or
asymmetric information. Therefore, these new approaches stress that prices in
financial markets are the result of a very complex dynamic, able to be destabilizing
under specific conditions. The approach was later extended to the interpretation of
crises in the foreign exchange market under fixed rates. The reason is twofold. Firstly,
the idea that the endogenous dynamics of the foreign exchange markets may lead to
multiple equilibria and therefore self-fulfilling attacks. Secondly, they help us to
understand how uncertainty about future economic policy may lead to expectation
instability or even to polarization over a pessimistic scenario6 (even when monetary
authorities pursue an intransigent policy to protect the parity of the currency).
5.1. Mimetic: the rational answer under uncertainty
Orléan (1989a, 1992 and 1994) gives one of the most fruitful contributions for the
comprehension of phenomenon that rule financial markets. Uncertainty is an essential
characteristic of financial markets, and represents the existence of an important doubt
regarding the evolution of markets. Orléan shows that, in this context, market agents’
rational answer can only be a mimetic behavior, and this behavior is the basis for the
high price instability that characterizes these markets.
Traditionally, economic theory uses stationary random variables to express individual
rationality under uncertainty, that is, variables with an invariant or slowly changing
probability function. Risk is therefore based on stable and unambiguous ‘working
laws’ of the economy.
Orléan defines uncertainty in a very different way. Uncertainty is the “outburst of new
happenings, incapable of being reduced to old data, such as technological change”
(Orléan, 1989b). ‘New’ qualifies those events for which does not exist any base,
inside the existing body of knowledge, to evaluate its plausibleness. It is impossible to
6
Regarding the evolution of the currency’s external value.
- 10 -
infer it from the state of knowledge at the moment. What matters to us is the
following: if we perceive uncertainty in such a way, does it change the usual concept
of the agents’ behavior? As a matter of fact, the answer is yes. Under uncertainty,
market agents’ behavior in financial markets does not any longer correspond to the
archetype of a financial agent with a profound knowledge of the economic laws and a
rational behavior7, for the future events escape her/his optimizing capacity.
Faced with uncertainty, a market agent is more interested in the way other agents
interpret information than with it being true or false. Pertinent information can no
longer be objectively defined as that information which is able to truly represent the
fundamentals, but it psychologically counts instead on the grounds that it allows one
to forecast the beliefs of the majority of market agents. Since the other agents act in a
similar fashion, to anticipate others’ opinion leads to anticipating what others think
the average belief is going to be. Therefore, assuming an identical rationality for the
different agents, it is possible to prove that the sole admissible anticipation is the
infinite-level anticipation. Financial markets are thus a self-referenced system, where
the “average opinion is simultaneously the result of individual anticipations and the
purpose on which agents base the determination of his/hers anticipations”8. The
market price is the limit of this process of increasing crossed anticipations. Orléan
names it as “specularity”.
How is it that a risk-averse rational agent, aware of her/his limited information, is able
to anticipate the way by which other agents interpret her/his own anticipations
regarding collective anticipations? Under uncertainty, each agent possesses two
sources of information. One is market exogenous, usually imperfect, and reveals
his/her own interpretation of the state of the economy. The other is purely endogenous
and is connected to her/his own awareness that he/she is acting in a market where at
each moment the observed price only represents the average opinion of market agents.
The rational agent uses both types of information. She/he evaluates the probability of
moving from one to the other opinion, according to the confidence he/she gives
his/hers own opinion vis-à-vis the group opinion. The stronger uncertainty is (i.e., the
more incomplete the information on the price fundamentals) the more the investor is
rationally led to imitate the others, to identify herself/himself with the market trend.
The mimetic (or imitative) anticipation, defined as “agent’s i anticipation when he/she
considers his/hers other agent’s or group of agents’ anticipation”, is the rational
answer of agents under financial market uncertainty. Mimetic behavior is therefore a
form of specularity frequently witnessed in uncertain financial markets. The effect of
mimetic specularity on the working of financial markets leads to a very particular
price formation process. The more striking fact is that the actual equilibrium cannot
be forecasted a priori for multiple equilibria is possible. Specularity can therefore lead
to price drifting, i.e., cases where actual prices are completely out of line with
7
The knowledge and behavior are the result of his/her capacity to select and digest pertinent information.
8
Cf. Orléan (1989b) p.257.
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objective data. Specularity allows one to understand speculative bubbles as well as
price volatility relatively to the volatility of the fundamentals.
According to Cartapanis (1994), this type of behavior has a good chance to get
generalized when the intrinsic value of the asset is vague and uncertain, that is, if
doubt exists regarding the pertinence of the fundamental values. If that is the case, any
rumor regarding the existence of a singular event (able to affect the price of an asset)
may easily drive market agent anticipations towards a pessimistic scenario. The
market is then exposed to fluctuations even when the evolution of the economy does
not justify the reversal.
Summing up, recent theoretical developments regarding financial market agents’
behavior offer some new elements for the comprehension of speculative attacks
against one currency, and they escape the macroeconomic rationality (i.e., they are
beyond any effort to evaluate its fundamental value). Uncertainty is an intrinsic
characteristic of financial markets. Therefore, agents’ beliefs may concentrate on the
value of an asset (a certain exchange rate level) that does not match its ‘fundamental’
equilibrium value, or even tend to divert from its equilibrium value in a self-fulfilling
way (the case of speculative bubbles)9.
The own dynamic of financial markets leads to the same results when we account for
heterogeneous agents. Speculation may be destabilizing even when agents have a
rational behavior insofar as the microeconomic rationality of behavior may lead to
macroeconomic irrationality of speculation.
6. Conclusion: The escudo crises in the light of the theoretical explanations for
speculative attacks and the instability of the foreign exchange market.
1. The deterioration of the Portuguese economy fundamentals creates an
increasingly suspicious environment regarding the currency but does not
explain all escudo crises.
The past evolution of macroeconomic variables traditionally considered more relevant
to assess the viability of a fixed exchange rate regime (such as the inflation rate, the
growth rate of the money stock, the budget deficit, and the current account balance)
cannot explain all escudo crises. As a matter of fact, since 1993 the worsening of the
external accounts supplied solid reasons to question the robustness of the escudo
parity. However, between April/1992 and March/1995, different moments of strong
tension on the escudo-mark parity show that anticipations of escudo devaluation are
far more volatile than those variables and are therefore autonomous. However, one
9
And those processes may not find any reference on the evolution of the economic fundamentals.
- 12 -
cannot conclude that the speculative attacks did lack economic foundation. The
analysis developed in this paper suggests that if the economic ‘fundamentals’ of the
escudo are only partly (or not at all) based on past performance, anticipated policies
and anticipated policy changes play a prominent role in the arousal of speculative
attacks.
2. Market opinion about the lastingness of the policy appears to be one critical
determinant of the anticipation of the escudo depreciation.
The analysis of the escudo crises leads one to conclude that exchange rate
anticipations are formulated based on hypothesis about the likely evolution of the
domestic economic policy. Various aspects seem to have been accounted for
whenever agents challenged the likelihood of exchange rate stability. On the one
hand, considerations related to the worsening of the domestic environment (the
intensity of the recession and the slow recovery) were interpreted as costs of a strong
escudo. On the other hand, the market interpretation that the Portuguese and Spanish
economies were strongly tied up.
2.1. An exchange rate system judged inconsistent with the fundamental needs
of the economy
The different tension episodes on the foreign exchange market seem to follow the
rhythm of disclosure of statistical information (both historical and forecasted figures)
on unemployment and the GDP growth rates. They do not seem to follow the
publication of information on variables that the balance of payments crisis model
considers the more relevant. The hypothesis that the worsening fundamentals of the
Portuguese economy would in fact lead to a rejection of the exchange rate stability
target seems to be the determinant factor in the polarization of anticipations regarding
a pessimistic scenario. This was particularly evident during the February-May/1993
and the July/1993 crises.
After July 1993, strongly diminishing domestic interest rates were considered a
necessary and fundamental condition to warrant economic recovery, and this
condition seemed to be, from the market perspective, inconsistent with the stability of
the escudo parity.
2.2. The market considers that the Portuguese and Spanish economies are
strongly tied up.
A second aspect seems to have strengthened anticipations regarding policy changes:
the idea that the escudo exchange rate was strongly connected to the Spanish peseta
exchange rate. On the one hand, Spain became a more relevant market for Portuguese
exports; on the other hand, Spanish products became strongest competitors with
Portuguese products in international markets. As a result, market agents felt that
Portuguese monetary authorities could not remain indifferent in the case of peseta
realignment. To not follow the peseta would be a factor allowing the deterioration of
Portugal’s international competitiveness, and would make recovery even more
- 13 -
difficult. If the domestic fundamentals of the economy were not good, and with signs
that Spain was preparing less restrictive monetary and foreign exchange policies, then
that would create anticipations of a changing exchange rate policy in Portugal. The
public debate, in Portugal, in the wake of the peseta realignment in September/92 (the
only one that was not followed by an escudo realignment) provides a good example.
3. But the escudo crises lead us to the self-fulfilling theory as well…
The theory of self-fulfilling speculative attacks gives some additional insights in the
Portuguese case. And Spain is, once again, important. There is the idea that a pesetazone exists inside the mark-zone. In other words, the past experience of simultaneous
peseta and escudo realignments leads market agents to assume that whenever the
market witnesses a peseta devaluation an escudo devaluation will necessarily follow.
Thus, anticipations of a peseta realignment are a strong incentive for a speculative
attack against the escudo. Market agents anticipate that the attack is going to be very
profitable when there is a strong probability of peseta devaluation, regardless of the
announced intentions by Portuguese authorities. This seems to be the main
explanation for the speculative attacks against the escudo in July/93 and March/95.
4. … and stress the relevance of the highly destabilizing political conflict among
Portuguese authorities.
The ranking heterogeneity of monetary and foreign exchange policy targets among the
authorities in charge of the conduct of those policies is one of the most interesting
aspects of the analysis of the Portuguese escudo crises. It is eventually the more
original fact in the EMS experience, and this public conflict did have highly
destabilizing consequences on expectations. The public announcement, by monetary
authorities, of their determination to keep a certain exchange rate policy is not enough
to lead to expectation stability, but the unity of the official discourse is certainly a
necessary condition.
The Portuguese case clearly shows the destabilizing danger caused by the indefinition
of future policy targets. The political conflict regarding interest rates reached the
media and became one additional source of anticipation instability for it did lead to
increased uncertainty. The observed conflict led market agents to polarize their
opinions onto two opposing scenarios, that is, mimetic behavior. In this context of
high uncertainty regarding future policy orientations, polarized opinions were created
regardless of the actual evolution of the fundamental macroeconomic variables (or
even the evaluation of that evolution).
Two clear examples are the finance minister speech (Braga de Macedo) in March 4th,
1993, and the prime minister (Cavaco Silva) speech one year later. These two events
marked the strongest speculative attacks against the escudo and are without any doubt
the determinant element of the tensions in the foreign exchange market during 199410.
10
The other currencies in the ERM, peseta included, found their stability during the year.
- 14 -
5. The early liberalization of capital movements has reduced the efficiency of
foreign exchange market interventions.
The high sums invested in the foreign exchange market in the defense of the escudo
were not a critical factor insofar as the non-resident positions were not legally limited
by capital controls. The existence of capital controls was very important in
September/92 to defend the escudo. However, Portuguese monetary authorities
anticipated the timing of capital control dismantlement. The end result was that from
January 1993 onwards central bank interventions in the defense of the escudo parity
became less efficient and more costly.
6. In the lack of efficiency of foreign market interventions, the interest rate policy
is responsible for the defense of the escudo parity. However, interest rates are
difficult to manage; their management could eventually become disastrous
whenever used to sustain an excessively rigid nominal exchange rate anchorage.
The two basic instruments to fight a speculative attack in the foreign exchange market
are central bank interventions and the interest rate policy. In fact, once devaluation
expectations are revealed, both instruments are able to discourage speculation because
of the high costs involved with speculative activities.
But the interest rate instrument must be used with caution. On the one hand, the
interest rate hike must be sufficiently strong so that it is interpreted as a clear sign of
the authorities’ determination to fight speculation. On the other hand, the size and
duration of the interest rate hike must be sufficiently limited. During the FebruaryJuly/94 crises domestic interest rates increased as a result of the higher short-run
interest rates. In fact, it is necessary that the interest rate hike does not lead to higher
domestic interest rates and these higher interest rates bring with them the risk of
renewed depreciation expectation because of the unsustainability of the monetary
policy. However, authorities can not speed up the process of bringing the rates back to
their pre-crisis level11 because market agents may interpret that sudden diminishing
rates as a sign of a future policy changes regarding the exchange rate regime.
Portuguese monetary authorities decision to not use the entire escudo fluctuation band
(and that would have allowed a more suave monetary restriction) was finally
translated into a crescent difficulty to preserve the nominal anchorage. Intending to
preserve a very rigid nominal restriction, the authorities were responsible for an
excessive real appreciation of the escudo. This appreciation increased the adjustment
costs and, in the limit, has reinforced the anticipations of escudo depreciation.
7. The recent Asian financial crisis in the light of the theoretical explanations of
speculative attacks: what can we learn from the Portuguese experience.
Both the escudo 1992-95 crises and the recent Asian currency crises seem to prove
that the different theoretical explanations for speculative attacks are nothing but
11
And that was the case in the aftermath of the May/93 crisis.
- 15 -
complementary (and not concurrent) explanations for the interpretation of those
crises. On the one hand, fundamental disequilibria seem to be determinant at the birth
of the crisis (real currency appreciation, in particular) but, on the other hand, negative
expectation perpetuation and subsequent currency attacks seem to support Wyplosz’
arguments as well as the self-fulfilling attack theory. The analysis of both the
Portuguese and the Asian experiences also lead us to draw some notes on the adequate
foreign exchange regime and the monetary authorities interventions in response to a
speculative attack.
7.1. An adequate foreign exchange regime
The Portuguese and the Asian experiences seem to prove that the viability of a foreign
exchange regime depends upon its capacity to assure both a certain predictability of
the authorities’ behavior and the efficiency of real adjustments. The predictability of
the authorities’ behavior is fundamental to preserve anticipation's stability. The
efficiency of the adjustment mechanisms allows the absorption of real economic
divergences. The need to compatibilize these two ‘qualities’ in just one foreign
exchange regime leads us to conclude that intermediate regimes such as the “managed
float” and the “flexible peg” are the more adequate for small economies, increasingly
open to foreign trade and free capital movements.
This intermediate regime should adopt two basic principles:
i) the reference parity should be defined relative to a representative (in terms of the
country’s foreign trade structure and capital flows) currency basket. The main
international currencies (US dollar, Japanese yen and Euro) should be part of the
basket regardless of the above mentioned structures. This redefinition of the nominal
anchorage basket will allow the reduction of vulnerability vis a vis the international
fluctuations amongst the big international currencies12;
ii) the reference parity should be regularly redefined in order to preserve its mediumterm sustainability, should be progressively (crawling-peg) and preferably adjusted at
a pre-announced rate (in order to assert a certain predictability).
7.2. Authorities intervention in response to a speculative attack
Uncertainty increases in the wake of a speculative attack: monetary policy loses its
reference, foreign exchange risk as well as foreign exchange rate volatility strongly
increase, and nobody knows the pace of the stabilization movement. An adequate and
timely intervention is fundamental in order to prevent a generalized economic
recession in this context of increased uncertainty. The first question authorities must
12
The strong US dollar/yen fluctuation (when the vast majority of Asian currencies was anchored to the US
dollar) was a major source of instability. After 1995, the yen depreciation (emphasizing the real appreciation
of Asian currencies vis a vis the Japanese yen) concurred for a rapid deterioration of the pricecompetitiveness of these Asian economies in a context of growing economy vulnerability (as a result of
increased openness – tariff reduction and the removal of quantitative barriers) [cf. Kwan 1998, Rasiah 1998].
- 16 -
face is that of the sustainability of the attacked nominal anchorage. In the case of a
real sustainability problem (and certain real shocks could have such a nature that they
justify this adjustment) the solution is to go forth with the necessary adjustment. If
such a real sustainability problem does not exist, and once the pertinence of the
nominal anchorage is confirmed, two fundamental principles should guide the
intervention of the authorities:
-
A flexible, balanced and progressive answer to the downward pressures.
The 1992 EMS crises did show, and the Asian crises confirms it, that rigid and
automatic policies to fight speculation (defending the nominal exchange goal at all
costs, using all foreign reserves) do not have a permanent positive result. The
voluminous central bank interventions in order to preserve the parity of the currency
are not very useful, particularly when the speculative positions held by non-residents
are not limited by the existence of capital controls. Thailand provides a good example.
The intervention of authorities must be flexible and progressively developed. A good
equilibrium must be found between market interventions (avoiding reserve depletion)
and interest rate policy (avoiding the risk of contagion of the interest rate term
structure due to a lengthy increase in short-term interest rates). If the pessimistic
scenario is prominent, a good equilibrium could be obtained with only a slight interest
rate increase (incorporating a stable and reasonable risk premium, designed to
encourage the demand for the national currency), whilst the market exchange rate
stays undervalued vis a vis the desired parity.
-
A transparent intervention policy
The escudo crises, as noted above, clearly show the negative effect caused by the
nonexistence of a clear definition of the political goals set forth by monetary
authorities. But the recent Asian experience brings to light a different aspect of the
same problem: the authorities behavior contradicts the policy announcements. On July
2, 1998, after months of asserting that it would do no such thing, the government of
Thailand abandoned its efforts to maintain a fixed exchange rate for the bath. Within a
few days, the currency depreciated more than 20 percent. The problem here is the lack
of efficiency of future interventions as a result of the loss of credibility of policy
orientation announcements.
- 17 -
Annex: The parametric credibility tests.
We use the methodology suggested by Svensson (1991b) and Rose and Svensson
(1991) to estimate the anticipated rate of devaluation of the escudo. Assuming that the
anticipated total depreciation rate of a currency is equal to the interest rate
differential13, the anticipated devaluation rate in a fluctuation band regime equals the
difference between the interest rate differential and the currency’s depreciation inside
the band. This is a parametric method in the sense that the anticipated depreciation
rate inside the band is estimated rather than computed from all the length of the
fluctuation band (as in the simple credibility tests – Svensson 1991a).
The anticipated rate of devaluation can therefore be defined as
(a1)
gtm = ∆tm - Et[∆xt+m| no realignment]/m.dt.
where
gtm = anticipated (at period t) devaluation rate of the central parity m periods in
advance;
∆tm = itm - i*tm = interest rate differential (domestic rate – foreign rate) on bonds with
maturity m;
Et[∆xt+m| no realignment]/m.dt = anticipated (at period t) depreciation rate inside the band,
m periods in advance, conditional to the non-existence of a realignment;
xt = st - ct = difference between the log of the market exchange rate and the log of the
bilateral central parity;
∆xt+m = xt+m - xt ;
Et[∆xt+m| no realignment] = expected value (in period t) of the change in x between periods
t and (t+m) conditional to the inexistence of a realignment.
The anticipated devaluation rate of the escudo vis-à-vis the mark in a 3-month time
horizon was computed as the expected escudo depreciation inside the band subtracted
from the interest rate differential between Portugal and Germany. The expected
escudo depreciation inside the band was estimated by OLS using the following
equation:
(a2)
(xt+64 - xt)/(254/64) = Σj β0j dj + β1 xt + β 2 ∆mpte + β 3 ∆mesp + ut+64
with
dj = j dummy variables, identifying each time-period between two realignments. We
therefore allow (and are able to test) for different anticipated depreciation rates
13
That is, accepting the hypothesis of uncovered interest rate parity.
- 18 -
between realignments. If a coefficient is positive and significant then it means that the
escudo was on average, a strong currency inside the band during the period between
the two realignments.
xt = st - ct , is the exchange rate inside the band, and is frequently used as the solo
explanatory variable when explaining ∆xt+m. The coefficient of xt, if negative and
statistically significant, shows the existence of a force pulling the exchange rate
towards the central parity, i.e., the deviation of the exchange rate has a stabilizing
effect.
∆mpte and ∆mesp represent the difference between the euro interest rates in Portugal and
Germany (∆mpte) and in Spain and Germany (∆mesp). The use of ∆mesp allows one to
test the influence of the stability of the peseta market on the escudo market.
We use daily observations on the DEM-PTE exchange rate and daily interest rates in
Portugal, Germany and Spain, for the period April 14th, 1992 – March 7th, 1995. The
interest rates are those for eurodeposits, daily bid rates in the London market, for 3month deposits.
Our main goal is to compute the anticipated depreciation rate, conditional to the
inexistence of realignments. Therefore, we exclude observations that precede any
realignment within 3 months, and that amounts to 64 observations. Equation (a2) was
estimated by OLS, and results are in table 1. The estimated anticipated devaluation
rate of the escudo (vis-à-vis the mark) computed using (a1) for a 95% confidence
interval is in figure 1.
Anticipated depreciation rate DEM-PTE, 3-months in advance, inside the band
14/04/92
to
22/11/92
23/11/92
to
12/05/93
12/05/93
to
05/03/95
β1
β2
β3
Est. Coef.
1.916
-2.633
12.814
-3.974
-0.286
0.904
t-ratio
(0.29)
(-0.28)
(2.097)
(-15.54)
(-0.58)
(0.70)
R2
0.86
Standard deviation
0.041
Nº observations
547
OLS estimation of equation (a2), using LIMDEP. T-ratios are computed using Newey-West standard deviations.
The Banco de Portugal gently granted original data on daily exchange and interest rates.
- 19 -
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