Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Skip to main content

    Rainer Schweickert

    This paper analyses potential internal and external determinants of institutional change as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) based on a panel of 25 transition countries for the period from 1996 to 2005. We show that... more
    This paper analyses potential internal and external determinants of institutional change as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) based on a panel of 25 transition countries for the period from 1996 to 2005. We show that natural resources and capital inflows exert an insignificant or negative influence and that economic policy allows to break path-dependency. Most importantly, however, we are able to show that incentives provided by NATO membership are important for institutional development and even more robust than variables measuring the integration into the EU. This allows for some optimism about the effectiveness of ENP policies and supports the argument that NATO, offering regional security, may provide significant additional incentives for good governance
    Research Interests:
    Research Interests:
    This paper argues that in the absence of a strong membership incentive within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a top‐down institutional convergence of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries towards European standards... more
    This paper argues that in the absence of a strong membership incentive within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a top‐down institutional convergence of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries towards European standards is unlikely to be successful. However, due to enlargement fatigue within the EU, the membership incentive is off the agenda for the CIS. The ENP must therefore either initiate or hasten a bottom‐up institutional convergence by identifying bottom‐up domestic forces that are willing and able to drive the convergence in a particular country. Ukraine, whose oligarchic clans are the main bottom‐up forces behind institution‐building, is a case in point. Having supported the first wave of institutional reforms during the Orange Revolution, these bottom‐up forces are now facing great difficulties in forming sustainable coalitions for further institutional reforms. The paper shows that the EU, by providing economic incentives rather than the membership incentive, could exploit the strong business interests of the oligarchic clans in the EU markets and EU investment to motivate them to jointly drive institutional convergence from the bottom up.
    Page 1. 149 Post-Soviet Affairs, 2010, 26, 2, pp. 149–183. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X. 26.2.149 Copyright © 2010 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved. The European Union's Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan ...
    ... to-down institutional change (Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008; Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). Central Asian ... assumed to matter in cultural and an economic dimensions as well (Way and Levitsky 2007; Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). ...
    Most studies on the relationship between public debt and economic growth implicitly assume homogeneous debt effects across their samples. We –in accordance with recent literature– challenge this view and state that there likely is a great... more
    Most studies on the relationship between public debt and economic growth implicitly assume homogeneous debt effects across their samples. We –in accordance with recent literature– challenge this view and state that there likely is a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity in that relationship. However, other than scholars assuming that all countries are different, we expect that clusters of countries differ. We identify three country clusters with distinct economic systems: Liberal (Anglo Saxon), Continental (Core EU members) and Nordic (Scandinavian). We argue that different degrees of fiscal uncertainty at comparable levels of public debt between those economic systems constitute a major source of heterogeneity in the debt-growth relationship. Our empirical evidence supports this assumption. Continental countries face more growth reducing public debt effects than especially Liberal countries. There, public debt apparently exerts neutral or even positive growth effects, while for...
    This paper assesses to what extent the arguments put forward in the consensus debate can help explain the different economic performance of Latin American and Asian countries. The paper shows that Latin America and fast-growing Asia... more
    This paper assesses to what extent the arguments put forward in the consensus debate can help explain the different economic performance of Latin American and Asian countries. The paper shows that Latin America and fast-growing Asia indeed differ significantly with respect to all economic policy areas under consideration. A comparison of these groups of emerging market economies can thus help develop a comprehensive development strategy for Latin America which should focus on four elements: priority for external stability, transfer of best-practice technologies, poverty alleviation, and institution-building.
    Der Beitrag analysiert die Argentinien-Krise, vergleicht die makrookonomische Entwicklung von Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile und Mexiko seit der Mexiko-Krise und entwickelt Indikatoren zur Beurteilung der Entwicklungschancen dieser Lander.... more
    Der Beitrag analysiert die Argentinien-Krise, vergleicht die makrookonomische Entwicklung von Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile und Mexiko seit der Mexiko-Krise und entwickelt Indikatoren zur Beurteilung der Entwicklungschancen dieser Lander. Fur Argentinien wie fur Brasilien, Chile und Mexiko zeigt sich im Zeitraum 1994?2002 kein eindeutiger Zusammenhang zwischen Wechselkursregime, realer Aufwertung, Staatsdefizit und Leistungsbilanzentwicklung. Strukturreformen und monetare Stabilitat sind daher fur Argentinien wichtiger als Sparprogramme und ein flexibler Wechselkurs. Die Indikatoren ?Makrookonomische Perspektiven?, ?Wettbewerbsfahigkeit? und ,Strukturreformen? zeigen im internationalen Vergleich: Nur fur Chile sind die Entwicklungschancen als gut und fur Mexiko als durchschnittlich zu bezeichnen. Fur Brasilien sind die Entwicklungschancen unsicher: die Schuldensituation des Landes ist nach wie vor als kritisch einzustufen und die Geldmarktzinsen sind – bei geringen und sinkenden Wah...
    Bolivia's macroeconomic performance in the period 1994 to 1998 is analyzed and compared with the performance in former periods and the performance of other developing countries (grouped according to income, region, and debt status).... more
    Bolivia's macroeconomic performance in the period 1994 to 1998 is analyzed and compared with the performance in former periods and the performance of other developing countries (grouped according to income, region, and debt status). This allows to assess what has been achieved in Bolivia since the deep crisis of the early 1980s. A special focus is whether the constraints to investment, economic development, and redistribution, i.e. on domestic savings, export performance, and fiscal revenues have been relaxed. Findings suggest an overperformance with respect to stabilization and an underperformance with respect to the growth constraints.
    The quality of institutions is considerable worse in Central Asia than in other transition countries. Based on a panel of 25 transition countries for the period from 1996 to 2005, this paper shows that oil and aid exert a negative... more
    The quality of institutions is considerable worse in Central Asia than in other transition countries. Based on a panel of 25 transition countries for the period from 1996 to 2005, this paper shows that oil and aid exert a negative influence on institutional development. At the same time, transition countries benefited from external incentives due to cultural proximity to the West or a membership perspective in either EU or NATO. However, the evaluation for Central Asia reveals that aid, oil, and geography explain part of the backlog but, even accounting for the fact that the countries are "far away" and do not benefit from external incentives as do other transition countries, there is a strong and homogenous negative regional component of bad governance. Hence, change might come but at a very low pace.
    The paper outlines the challenges for entry into EMU set up by Germany and the extent to which potential members accepted these challenges. Three groups of countries are identified: the core group (D-mark zone), the outsider group... more
    The paper outlines the challenges for entry into EMU set up by Germany and the extent to which potential members accepted these challenges. Three groups of countries are identified: the core group (D-mark zone), the outsider group (countries not willing to participate), and the convergence group (formerly) unstable countries willing to participate). It is especially the progress towards convergence made by the convergence group and the non-compliance of most countries with the fiscal criteria which leads to uncertainty for the future path of European monetary integration: there is still no consensus on the interpretation of the convergence criteria. Additionally, there is another - maybe even more important - challenge for European monetary integration: the lack of a consensus about the blueprint for economic policy making in an European currency area - centralized versus decentralized, active versus passive monetary and exchange rate policy.
    We analyze potential convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) economic systems toward western prototypes. The corresponding comparative capitalism literature identified four prototype economic systems among... more
    We analyze potential convergence of Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) economic systems toward western prototypes. The corresponding comparative capitalism literature identified four prototype economic systems among (traditional) OECD countries: Liberal, Continental, Nordic, and Mediterranean. Based on a comprehensive macroeconomic cluster approach, we are able to confirm these prototype country clusters. At the same time, our results indicate that the economic systems of CEECs have still not completely converged toward these prototypes, but complement them by independent Liberal (CEEC LME) and Continental/Nordic (CEEC CME) varieties, showing no signs of convergence toward the inconsistent and underperforming economic system of Mediterranean countries.
    We explain economic growth by both politics, i.e. government activity including spending as well as regulation, and institutional quality and its interaction with politics. This extends previous work on institution building in transition... more
    We explain economic growth by both politics, i.e. government activity including spending as well as regulation, and institutional quality and its interaction with politics. This extends previous work on institution building in transition by looking at its impact and, at the same time, considering endogeneity problems. While intially planned in two stages, the modified approach is able to integrate the arguments developed in the cluster approach on varieties of capitalism and their potential explanatory power for economic growth. As forseen for the second stage, we estimate the determinants of transition based on the exogenous components of institution building only as well as on other factors, especially welfare policies. This approach also allows to integrate various measures of income or well-being as soon as panel data becomes available.
    Long-term beneficial welfare state reforms not only face opposition from powerful insiders and beneficiaries of the system in place. While potential losers from a policy change are often relatively easy to spot, ewll-designed reforms... more
    Long-term beneficial welfare state reforms not only face opposition from powerful insiders and beneficiaries of the system in place. While potential losers from a policy change are often relatively easy to spot, ewll-designed reforms generate mostly diffuse gains, and the potential winners are much more difficult to identify. Moreover, gains from reforms regularly do not accrue immediately but only after a costly adjustment or a frictional re-organisation process. Policy change on a large scale hence occasionally triggers political resistance from politically vocal losers, but sometimes also from prospective winners. Overcoming both the 'rational' and ostensibly 'irrational' obstacles to policy change is thus a core challenge of political reform management. A key message is that important factors for successful change have found too little attention in the literature, compared to technical aspects of reform implementation In that respect, policy bundling and developing economic compensation strategies are important devices to mitigate opposition to reform, However, communication of reform goals, credible political commitment, conformity with fairness norms and moral beliefs, trust formation and social learning play important roles for acceptability of reforms in society.
    Research Interests:
    The effectiveness of NATO conditionality for institutional reforms is highly controversial. Some papers argue that any effect this conditionality might have had may be due to endogeneity effects, i.e. NATO may have picked the winners. We... more
    The effectiveness of NATO conditionality for institutional reforms is highly controversial. Some papers argue that any effect this conditionality might have had may be due to endogeneity effects, i.e. NATO may have picked the winners. We argue that this is not the case. First, NATO-Mazedonia relations provide a case in point. Macedonia was granted entry into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 due to country’s strategic importance. Only after the Ohrid agreement, effective conditionality set in and marked a switch in NATO strategy from security only towards institution building. Second, this is supported by econometric evidence based on panel data. An event study reveals that entry into NATO’s accession process was mainly driven by neighbourhood and good relations with the West. We conclude that empirical evidence clearly supports a stronger role of NATO’s political agenda, i.e., low entry barriers but strict accession conditionality
    Research Interests:
    Russia and China are assumed to challenge democratization and to promote autocracy. In a first step, we analyze Central Asia as the most-likely case, considering both Russia and China as relevant external actors. We develop a concept for... more
    Russia and China are assumed to challenge democratization and to promote autocracy. In a first step, we analyze Central Asia as the most-likely case, considering both Russia and China as relevant external actors. We develop a concept for our analysis based on the different strategies of Russia (dominance) and China (doing-business) towards the region and present the results of a qualitative study of the main dimensions of autocracy promotion with respect to regional and bilateral schemes. In a second step, we extend a previous framework (Melnykovska and Schweickert 2011) and provide econometric evidence based on a panel of post-socialist countries. We show that bilateral schems are (still) more relevant for external influences in Central Asia and that (unintentionally) China’s doing-business approach may in fact promote institutional change. Arguably, democratization should not be a precondition for cooperation as in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) but rather be promoted by swee...
    Research Interests:
    In this paper, a real-financial CGE model is employed for Bolivia to simulate the macroeconomic and distributional effects of exchange rate policy in a highly dollarized economy. Overall, dollarization appears to matter more through real... more
    In this paper, a real-financial CGE model is employed for Bolivia to simulate the macroeconomic and distributional effects of exchange rate policy in a highly dollarized economy. Overall, dollarization appears to matter more through real than through financial-sector effects. The main macroeconomic result of the simulations is that the potential of nominal devaluation to smooth the adjustment path after a negative shock primarily depends on the absence of wage indexation. Only if nominal wages are constant in the short run, devaluation reduces unemployment and cushions the reduction of real GDP induced by the shock. Financial de-dollarization tends to be contractionary in Bolivia but different degrees of financial dollarization hardly change the real sector effects. As concerns distributional effects, nominal devaluation in no circumstance reduces the poverty effect of the external shock. Even the significant short-run macroeconomic expansion that occurs without wage indexation does...
    Formerly a favourite location for private capital inflows, Brazil was virtually cut off from further bank lending in the 1980s. The country's rating in secondary loan markets plummeted, and foreign direct investment dwindled. New... more
    Formerly a favourite location for private capital inflows, Brazil was virtually cut off from further bank lending in the 1980s. The country's rating in secondary loan markets plummeted, and foreign direct investment dwindled. New external financing was replaced by an ...
    This paper presents a new set of indicators concerning the status of economic reform in the candidate countries for the enlargement of the European Union which is scheduled for 2004. After an overview of indicators of institutional... more
    This paper presents a new set of indicators concerning the status of economic reform in the candidate countries for the enlargement of the European Union which is scheduled for 2004. After an overview of indicators of institutional development, macroeconomic policy and trade policy, a composite index is derived. It turns out that the ranking of the candidate countries according to the composite index diverges from the ranking provided in the progress reports of the European Commission.
    Research Interests:

    And 125 more