grto popers WAR ZONES I SB N 978-3-8s676-390 -9 ilil ilt ililililt ilt I lllillilt 9 783856 763909 -a.- Samia Henni lntroduction 4 lean-Louis Cohen Designing within and for War Zones 11 Sfanislaus yon /v\oos and Daniel Weiss From the gta Archives Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculating the Apocalypse 38 Felicify D. Scoff Haunted by War 49 Ayesha Sadraz and Arsalan Rafique Barricade Urbanism 60 Alfredo Thiermann Radio as Architecture 69 Asja lvtandid Under Siege 84 Nora Akawi Drawing from fhe Jawlan 96 lsmae'l Sheikh Hassan Reconstructing Nahr el-Bared 1O4 Eva Schreiner The Control Room 115 L6opold lamberf State of Emergency 126 lllusfrafion Credifs 134 21 Silvia Berger Ziauddin is Assistant Professor of Hislory at lhe University of Bern. Note: Parls of lhis article were published in Silvia Berger Ziauddin, "Superpower Underground: Swilzerlandi Rise lo Global Bunker Expertise in lhe Alomic Age," Technology and Cullure 58, no.4 (2017): 921-54. @ Society for lhe History of Technology. Reprinted with permission of John Hopkins Universily Press. I Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz, ed., lubiläumsbuch 50 Jahre Schulz und Hilfe (Bern: Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschulz, 2013),71. 2 Peter Amstutz, "Wie Murmelliere ab in den Schulzraum," CD Sicherheits-/Aanagemenl 32, no. 3 (2008): 13-15, here 15. 3 Sophie Schimansky, "Bunker-Boom: Das Geschäft mit der Angst," NZZ am Sonnlag, Sepfember 24,2017. 4 On the legal and institulional evolution of the Swiss system of civil defense outlined in this paragraph, see Yves Maik Meier and Martin Meier, "Zivilschutz: Ein Grundpfeiler der Schweizer Landesverfeidigung im Diskurs," Schweizerische Zeitschriff für Geschichle 60, no.2 (20101:212-36. 38 Calculating fhe Apocalypse: The Unexpecfed Career of fhe Swiss Nuclear Bunker Silvia Berger Ziauddin lmagine a nation with security cells in every home. Five decades ä9o, this vision materialized in Switzerland. At the height of Cold War saber rallling in the early 1960s, a federal construction law obliged the Swiss authorities to build 360,000 privafe nuclear shelters, the majority of them in the basements of family homes. To this day, 12 billion U.S. dollars have been invested ' in constructing highly standardized nuclear shelters for the population. By 2006, the protection ralio reached 114 percent, meaning Switzerland currently has more protective spaces than inhabitants. ' The survival infrasfructure in the privafe sphere nof only left massive scars in the country's soil, however; nuclear bunkers made in Switzerland have had a global impact. Since the 197Os, design codes and bunker technology from the alpine republic have represented a global benchmark from the United States fo Saudi Arabia. And Swiss shelter know-how is still in demand. The ever-growing "survivalist" movemenf , for example, heavily relies on Swiss ventilation technology when equipping doomsday shelters. How did a country that defined itself ' as neutral and never took center sfage in the Cold Wars recurrent international crises become a hub for bunker design and technology? How was the expertise in the alleged "periphery" accumulated? And how did it materialize into concrete and generafe such international momentum? The Emergence of Swiss Vertical Defense There have been few peacetime eras in which the specter of war was so vividly present in so many people's minds as the 1950s and early 1960s. ln Switzerland, four "hol" phases significantly exacerbated the feeling of being under threat and proved to be catalytic for the emergence of the Swiss syslem of civil defense: the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, fhe Suez and Hungarian crises ol 1956, and the Berlin and Cuban crises of 1961 and 1962 respectively. 4 During the Korean crisis, military air-raid protection corps were established in support of the population, and the Federal Council required property owners to install air-raid shelters in new buildings fo protect against shrapnel and debris. Referenda held after the dual crises of 1956 put civil defense and the right to civil protection on a constifutional basis and assigned responsibility for both to the civil authorities. The construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis in turn forged the legislative anchors of civil defense. The Swiss parliament in 1962 voted in favor of the first phase of the new civil defense legislation, covering the gla papers 2 organizational and service requirements for civil defense.ln 1963, it passed the Federal Shelter Construction Law which foresaw the installation of modern nuclear shelters for all new buildings in communes with over 1,000 inhabitants. ln 1971, this provision was extended to all municipalities. Each inhabifant of Switzerland, including registered refugees and immigranl laborers, would receive a protective space to which the public sector contributed at leasl 70 percent of the cost. ' Switzerland s endeavor to roll out a blanket system of vertical defense is properly understood only if considered againsf the countryt guiding principles. Particularly pertinent is a concept propagated since the early 1950s by the government and the military alike; namely, that a "total war" necessitates a "tofal nalional defense." Consequently, not only milifary but also civil forms of defense were enormously expanded. Anolher motive for the defensive efforts was the belief that Switzerland was a "special case." This mindsef, particular to nafional security officials, had been reinforced by the belief that the Swiss had survived the vicissitudes of the Second World War unscafhed thanks to their own determination and strong deterrents - the latter symbolized by the Swiss militia army, which was based in a highly fortified alpine bastion, the so-called "redoubt." The shared memory of being spared from an attack by Nazi Germany and mythologies flourishing around the redoubt fostered strong support for äivil defense. ln addition, values perceived as 'Swiss' that strengthened the politico-cultural movement of "spiritual national defense" played a decisive role: love of freedom, independence, neutrality, military readiness, and the rejection of everything foreign. This 'tultural fortification system" served fo encourage a "hedgehog" mentality and legitimized both cultural and political isolationism. Switzerland morphed into an inwardly highlyintegrated defense community, which also left a strong legacy for civil protection. The fully self-sufficient "hedgehog" should . ' ' be formed up again to dissuade potential attackers. Bun' kers not only fit perfectly into this picture of a forfified country whose citizens would never submit to subjugation. Advocates of the idea also embraced the redoubt myth by promoting private shelters as "citizen redoubfs" that replicated the alpine military fortress. rc Furthermore, the idea of a "survival island" for fhe middle-class family, that "primary cell of democratic society," resonated well with the notion that Switzerland was a chosen model republic, apt to survive as an isle of the blessed in a sea of destruction and death. ' 5 Bundesaml für Zivilschutz, Zivilschulz Konzeplion 1971 (Bern: Bundesamt für Zivilschutz, 1978); "Bundesgeselz über die baulichen Massnahmen im Zivilschufz," Zivilschulz 10, no. 6 (1963): 127-29, here 128. 6 Bernhard Degen, "Die totale Verteidi- gungsgesellschaff," in Krieg, eds. Christoph Maeder, Ueli Mäder, and Sarah Schillinger (Zurich: Seismo, 2OO9), 89-105. 7 On the genealogy of lhe idea of a fortified "redoubt" in fhe Alps, see Rudolf Fuhrer and Marc Hamel, Röduit l: /Äililä rgeschichfe zum Anfassen (Zurich: Au, 2007). 8 lakob Tanner, "Die Schweiz in den 1950er Jahren: Prozesse, Brüche, Widersprüche, Ungleichzeitigkeiten," in achtung: die 50er lahre! Annäherungen an eine widersprüchliche Zeil, eds. Jean-Daniel Blanc and Chrisline Luchsinger (Zurich: Chronos, 1994), 19-50, here 44. 9 Degen, "Verteidigungsgesellschaft" (see note 6), 100. l0 "Reduit des Bürgers," Protar 18, no. 7 /8 (19s2): 91. 1l Werner Heierli, "Der Schutzraum als Überlebensinsel," Schulz+Wehr 34, no. 9/1o (1968):120-22; "Praktischer Familienschulz," Prolar 18, no. 7 /8 (9s2): 87; Thomas Maissen,'Auserwählles Volk- Unter den Boden," in lm Unlergrund, eds. Sylvia Ruettimann and Monika Hardmeier (Nuremburg: Verlag für moderne Kultur, 2007), 81-86, here 84. Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculating {he Apocalypse 39 12 Daniel Marek, "Die Landnahme im Unter- grund," in lm Unter grund, eds. Ruettimann and Hardmeier (see note l3 11), 75-80. Schweizerischer Bund für Zivilschutz, Wir können uns schülzen, civil defense movie, 1963. 14 Ernst Basler, epilogue to Schr'/d aus Slern und Eisen, ed. Ren6 Bondt (Stäfa, Switzerland: Th. Gut and Co., 1978),229-34, here 230. 15 Frilz Sager, "Die Bedeutung der Zivilschutzkonzeption 1971," Schweizer Baublalf, April 1972, 4--:14, here 4. 16 Swiss Federal Archives (SFA), 4390C, 1977 /164, vol. 48, Ordinance regarding lhe working group on sfructural civil defense, December 28,1962. 40 Ever since the Swiss had started to build elaborated tunnels through the Alps in the second half of the nineteenth century in order to advance transport and trade, fhe vertical axis represented the inherently Swiss axis of colonization. n Thanks to this conquest of the underground, as well as the subsequent rereading both of the underworld and of mountain ranges as protective zones, fhere was little expectation that the public might baulk at the idea of retrealing below ground. By choosing the alpine marmot as the mascot of Swiss civil defense, the authorities made the most of these associalions of subterranean spaces. In Swiss civil defense propaganda, marmots warned of air raids by emitting a whistle, whereupon all animals were to retreat nimbly to their underground caves. 13 Accumulaling Knowledge "Nuclear war is doable"-this was the slogan the Swiss authorities propagated in the early 196Os. ln the eyes of the Federal Council, modern shelters would considerably enhance the population's chances of survival, despite the devastating potential of nuclear weapons. The actual construction of nuclear shelters was still on shaky ground, however, in part because Swiss engineers and architects were reluctant to engage with the modern threat, but also because Switzerland, a nonmember of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had limited knowledge of the complex effects of nuclear weapons. A When thermonuclear scenarios started to proliferate in the mid-1950s, Swiss air defense officials realized how little use the air-raid shelfers built thus far (approximately 65,000) would be in the event of a nuclear attack. The existing shelters had been geared to a conventional war: the walls were designed to withstand falling rubble, doors were made of wood, and the need for ventilation systems was not foreseen. Any claims to real expertise in bun'u ker design for the atomic age would have been far-fetched at this stage. At fhe start of the 1960s, with new shelter construction legislation in the pipeline, Switzerland had to launch itself on a frenzy of nuclear learning. ln 1962, a Working Group for Strucfural Planning for Civil Defense was set up at the Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP), a ten-member advisory board comprising physicists, engineers, architects, chemists, and civil defense officials. ro Yet how was this group of self-confessed "beginners" supposed to acquire data on the effects of nuclear weapons, including the latest and most powerful one, the hydrogen bomb? On this steep nuclear learning curve, Samuel Glasstone's book The Effecfs of Nuc/ear Weapons proved to be a vital first step. The U.S. Atomic gta papers 2 Energy Commission had published the book in beings, materials, and structures. Knowledge transfer, however, depended on more than 1957, subse- quent to a policy shift in the mid{950s: the U.S. government had revoked the "top secret" classification of knowledge pertaining to the effects of nuclear weapons, thus signaling its intent to facilitate other countries' defense strategies by allowing them monilored access to the relevant data. ', Glassione! wort c€lh rz samuerGrassrone, be regarded as a simplified condensate of a varied spectrum of itr3r7[if,j'##?:l'local äctor-worlds, comprising human and nonhuman actants 3'"11?',Yllliti5i?:",., such as test sites in Nevada, atomic bombs, measuring tools and ül?':T3*[Iffi.. practices, animals, buildings, scientists, and inscriptions devices. irl::?'.:?#löä:irt 'By r"uns of statistics, illustrations, and graphs, The Effects of S-il.iJlllillPrintins Nuc/ear Weapons delivered from the American desert to Switzerland data on phenomena such as pressure waves, thermal radiation, and radioactive fallout and lheir effects on human just textbooks crossing the Atlantic. From 1963 until circa 1970, increasing numbers of people boarded airplanes, made contacts in the United States, visited research labs, acquired reports and data, took notes on test sites, refurned to Switzerland, dispatched letters to the United States, received answers, and welcomed American afomic physicists, engineers, and civil defense officials in Switzerland. The starting point for this process of knowledge accumulation was a symposium organized by the Working Group on Structural Civil Defense at the Federal lnstitute of Technology (ETH) Zurich in 1963. Glasstone may have provided data on nuclear weapons, but his book contained no concrete guidelines on effective dimensions for shelter structures. Time was running shorl, for in 1962 the Federal Council had announced forthcoming legislation on structural civil defense. To facilitate the development of the requisite building codes, the Swiss decided to pool all the data they had acquired on nuclear weapons effects and to invite all known structural defense specialists to Switzerland. Appointing German ballistics expert l'",!'i:""Jff'lilf':' Hubert Schardin to act as conference director proved to be a f":"?::fru'-l'"i' decisive move - he had an excetlent network oi European and ::*ifJ:illill?" American contacts. 18 The efforts paid off. ln the summer of !'#;"',1'fl!i,p,XIPJ",,", 1963, more or less all of the Western world's combined know-how 3l"J",i':".?-'.lIJ"1"*' on the effecfs of nuclear weapons and passive defense systems ffi:?i''*l" Europe at rolled intoZurich, including Harold Brode, a physicist and weap- re Bundesamrrür ons impact specialist on the RAND Corporation payroll; Nate U!i'Ii,I2,'!:X:f,f,':# Newmark, the'central figure in refining understanding oi slructural st#,?l',i3,,'11ffr.. response to atomic blasJ effecfs, fromlhe University öf lllinois; and iß;',tr"';j5:f,älä^ world-renowned civil engineer John Biggs of the Massachusetts ä?ft/;'J"1'';?!'.,' Institute of Technology (Änf). e l?,:'#f"U,o'ö"u' Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculating lhe Apocalypse 41 20 See Ernsl Basler, Erinnerungen (Zollikerberg, Swifzerland: Ernst Basler+Partner, 2010), 210. 2I SFA, FMB 5484, 1978/44, vol. 8, Foreign Contacls. 22 See "Neil FitzSimons, 71," Washington Posf, April 1, 2000. Despite the phalanx of experts, the outcome of the cönference was ultimately modest. Owing to the number of factors to be considered - f rom dynamic and static pressure to impulse and reflection, from supersonic and subseismic waves to Rayleigh waves, from fusion and fission bombs to primary and secondary radiation - not one of the participants was able to provide a complefe assessment of shelter criteria. Yet the symposium was beneficial in the medium term. lt put the issue in the public eye, established the bunker as a legitimate study object of Swiss civil engineering, and, most important, laid the groundwork for further contacts with the United States. 20 Additional stimuli for such exchanges came from fhe Research lnstitute for Military Construction (FMB), a strong institutional hub founded at the Federal lnstitute of Technology in 1964. The director of the new institute, Lieutenant-Colonel Ernst Basler-a civil engineer who had graduated from ETH Zurich and completed his postgraduate studies at MIT-arranged stays at American research laboratories for his team, organized observations at experimental test stations, and invited American scientists and officials to FMB. 2t Close friendships even developed; for example, wifh Neal FitzSimons, who, as director of the Engineering Development Division, Office of Civil Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, led special projects studying ways to protect the president and key federal officials from military attack. 22 (London: lmperial College Press, 2003). Local Calculations The foreign data that piled up in Switzerland ultimately served to define building codes apt for immediate use. Basler was essential for the speedy production of this new enfity of knowledge. He and his team at FMB defined most of the critical issues, created sfable institutional settihgs, and led the epistemic groundwork for new conceptual frames and methodological repertoires. Given the time pressure and the limited number of expert staff, time-consuming and labor-intensive test-site experiments did not take center stage. The adopted solution instead was to synthesize all available data and draw up theoretical models with the aid of mathematical and quantitative methods and techniques, such as stochastics, statistical correlation, and cost-benefit analysis. Since the Second World War this repertoire had been applied to the thriving field of operations reseärch. zr Basler and other Swiss engineers, such as Werner Heierli, ranked among its greatest advocates. ln their opinion, fhere was no better way to address a highly complex engineering system like the nuclear shelter, or indeed any intricate system that required decisions be reached on the basis of incomplete and imprecise information. 42 gta papers 23 See Dominique Pestre and Amy Dahan, "Transferring Formal and Malhemalical Tools from War Management to Political, Technological and Social lnlerven- tion (1940-1960)," in I Concepfs and /Äalhemalical Tools in fhe Evolulion of Tec h n o I og i ca Modern Engineering Sysfems, eds. Mario Lucertini, Ana Millian Gasca, and Fernando Nicolo (Basel: Birkhäu- ser, 2004), 79-492; Maurice W. Kirby, Operalional Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from lhe 1930s fo 1970 2 Their approach was fueled by the dual premise formulated at the outset: protective measures should safeguard against all types of weapons effects, and they should be economically viable. Shelters were accordingly required to offer not fotal protection but the opfimal protection possible proportional to the cost expendfig,l Floor plan of a iture. This aspiration to provide a uni- single shelter (5R) and form level of protection (i.e., against all a shelter group with weapons effects) yet to simultaneous- ly tolerate the reality that protection would never be total had already been formulated by Glasstone. 24 However, had the Swiss been less eager to adopt the knowledge register and mafhematical tools of optimizafion, Glasstone's b,$tunsruF ideas would not have left the drawing board. Likewise, had Switzerland not had the political will and finances, plus a cultural tradition apt to foster a bunker mentality, the concerfed research on protective structures and the utter sense of vocation that drove the small group of people entrusted with shelter issues would never have transpired. As it was, the scientists, engineers, and civil defense officials involved were all persuaded of the absolute necessity of a defense in the vertical plane; all had an unwavering faifh in the feasibility of planning and designing civil defense against even the most complex threats; and all had strong ties with the military and accordingly saw eye fo eye on matters concerning the physical and ideological defense of their land. The first outcome of the Swiss efforts to synthesize the available data was a handbook of weapons effects for the design of profective structures, published in 1964. 2s The compendium described the relalive effects of the broadest possible range of weapons and calibers on buildings and people and came complete with graphs and diagrams for easier comparison. Subsequent studies centering on the optimal scope of protection were published in smaller reports and articles. As the a) value of protective constructions could not be assessed without an 'bbjective" ')Ei'&hub'ur four shelter cells, an airlock system (S), and cleaning room (RE). 24 Samuel Glasstone, Die Wirkung der Kernwaffen (Cologne: Heymanns, 1960),491. Grulldekffisenutu Gitterrost mln. 't PD 25 Arbeitsgruppe für den baulichen Zivilschutz, Handbuch der Waffenwirkungen für die Bemessung von Schulzbaulen (Bern: Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschulz, 1e64). fig.2 Specificalion for the layout of the emergency exil. Elnfallwlnksl mln.30o rating scale, Basler coined a new concept, Wirkungsgrad, roughly translatable as "efficiency rafio." ln an article published in the trade journal Schweizerische Bauzeitung in 1965, Basler presented the efficiency ratio in terms of probability calculations; namely, as the relation of the increase of the population s chances of Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculating the Apocalypse 43 26 Ernst Basler and Ulrich Kämpfer, "Über den Wert von Schutzmassnahmen gegen nukleare Waffen," Schweizerische Bauzeilung 83, no. 28 (196s):500-s05. 27 See Theo Ginsburg, Grundlagen für Ve r I u sle rwa rt u n g sre c h nungen, FMB 6513 (Zürich: Forschungsinstitut für Mililärische Bautechnik, 1965); Serge Prölre, Unlersuchungen zur Ermitflung einer oplimalen Schufzraum-Konzeplion, FMB 66-2 (Zürich: Forschungsinstitut f ür Militärische Baulechnik, 1e66). 2-8 Basler and Kämpfer, "Uber den Wert von Schutzmassnahmen" (see note 26), 5O5. fig.3 survival with a specific protective measure to the likelihood of losses of life were that measure nof taken. 26 The FMB then drew on specifically developed computer programs to assess the protective yield of differenf installations in typical Swiss settlements and was thus able to quantify the damage the Swiss population would suffer in a future war. 27 Finally, it turned its attention to the cost-benefit analysis, the purpose of which was to define the optimal scope of protection. The number crunching boiled down to a concrete question: How many lives could be saved per Swiss franc invested in shelter construction? The conclusion ultimately drawn from these optimization studies was that the investment of CHF 1,000 per person and fhe construcfion of shelters able to withstand a force of fifteen pounds per square inch (psi) would effectively reduce the number of losses in Switzerland to one-tenth, whatever lhe weapons used. This corresponded to an efficiency ratio of 90 percent. zg These calculations paved the way for state endorsement of the shelter construction program. FOCP accepted the experts' opinion without a word, and shortly afterward the findings provided the basis for the lech nical Direcfives for lhe Consfrucfion Ml&nb6 Schemalic plan for the concrefe reinforcement of a single shelter envelope in a family home. H. Mot... h. scHNtrT A-A sHN[l c-c SCHNIIT B-B tp at0 KI-EINSCHUTZRAUM 4aDa bis max. 25m, aO u IE .J5 tre i fn RMERUNffiEU 1ai u r.s lre a=s i'-l &rn, tAprll lW lEdiübüo PK muNoRlss Affo (:-8, k,h Bn Aq-ü[r., qr. u. ol *rs SCHNTI D.D i t&- Id ) ßw, .o*gtcml rca, Er&d am eFd.h.. @ a 2.5cm l,sd il." l*i of 9 s t '{ t! lrtrl Private Air-Raid Shelters (TWP 66), published in 1966. Comprising detailed design and construction regulations for shelters able to withstand 15 psi, the manual thus embodied those gradual processes of adaptation and transformation by which the traces produced at nuclear test sites abroad were translated to the Swiss political-cultural arena, in keeping with its technological, material, and methodological agendas. The urgency of pushing through legislation, along with the broad political consensus on vertical defense, explains why the recommendations were endorsed immediately and disseminated as technical guidelines. The 44 gta papers 2 of the technical knowledge can also be ascribed to the experts' rhetoric, which consisted of unambigu- seamless officialization ous, categorical, and quantifiable statements. The TWP 66 was circulated with an initial print run of 46,000 copies. 2e The manual included planning principles for single shelters in private homes, consisting of a reinforced shelter envelope in the basement, as well as for shelter groups with multiple shelter cells. The latter were suited for larger apartment buildings and would provide profective space for up to two hundred people :,- ris.r Architects could find data on the space required per person, the height of the ceiling, the strength of the walls of the shelter envelope, the clear dimension of the standardized blast door, the layout of the entrance and emergency exit, effective ventilation systems, and the layout of the airlock system and cleaning room that were mandatory for shelters with protecfive space for over fifty people. tis.2 To facilitate the dimensioning and detailing of the shelter for the engineer, a schematic plan for the concrete reinforcemenf of a standardized shelter in a private home was also included in the manual. 3onig.3 The TWP 66 spurred shelter construction in Switzerland, in a climate rendered favorable by the simultaneous' general building boom. 3r From 1963 to the early 1970s, the number of nuclear shelters doubled from 50,000 to 100,000, which assured almost 50 percent of the population access to a modern, ventilated bunker. tis.4 Shelter groups beneath aparfment and office buildings, churches, or schools completed the system of single nuclear shelters in family homes, as floor plans for shelters with two separate shelfer cells, an airlock system and a cleaning room in the basement of an apartmenf block illustrate. ris.5 To create protective spaces for inhabitants of old buildings in historic city centgrs, nuclear shelters were also occasionally incorporated into new parking garages. Economic crisis triggered by the oil shock and the introduction of ausferity measures slowed the increase of bunker consfruction in Switzerland in the midl970s. Yet by the early 1980s the construction sector was booming again, and the nationwide shelter deficit was soon reduced. r' Thus, within two decades the country was peppered wifh highly standardlzed defensive 'tapsules," 33 transforming Switzerland into an archipelago of insular underground entities. Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculating lhe Apocalypse 29 Schweizerisches Bundesamt für Zivilschulz, l0 lahr Bundesaml für Zivi I sch u fz, I 963-1 972 (Bern: Bundesamf für Zivilschutz, 1973),3. fig,4 Entrance to the nuclear shelter in my parent's family home, built according lo TWP 66. 3O Schweizerisches Bundesaml für Zivilschutz, TWP 1966: Technische Weisungen für den privalen Schutzraumbau (Bern: Eidgenössische Drucksachen- und Materialzentrale, 1966), appendix. 31 From 1950 to the effective investment in building in Switzerland increased by 250 percent. During this period, Switzerland counted among the counlries with the highest investment in building and home construclion worldwide. 1973, 32 Martin Meier, "Von der Konzeption 71 zum Zivilschutz 95: Der Schweizer Zivilschulz zwischen Schein und Sein" (Master! thesis, University of Fribourg, 2007),95,99. 33 I adopt the term capsu/e from the philosopher Lieven de Caufer, Ihe Capsu/ar Civilizalion: On the Cily in an Age of Fear (Rofterdam: Nai, 2004), 81. ln de Cauters understanding, capsules are architectural membranes thal absorb velocily and change; the active protection against hostile environments is lransferred to the capsule, which renders lhe passenger immobile and passive. 45 Going Global Since the197Os, Swiss bunker know-how and building codes have made a splash internationally. Sure enough, the longstanding humanitarian tradition and lhe fact that Switzerland with its concept of armed neutrality had not been involved in an international fig.5 Shelter layouf according to TWP 66 in lhe basemenl of an apartment building, drawn by the engineering office Heierli AG, a Swiss company specialized in constructing proteclion againsf nuclear r weaponS. I .l "l Abb.3. Beispiel einor Schulzraumanordnung nach TWP im Untergeschoss eines Wohnblockes. Science, 1966), 134. conflict since becoming a federal state helped to confer upon the country's bunker zeal an exemplary aura of trustworthiness. The Swiss themselves repeatedly characterized their civil defense shelters as "peaceful insurance" and a deterrent against outside interference and nuclear blackmail. The bunker experfise was not only closely linked to Switzerlandi self-conception as an independent, purely defensive and peaceful country; it also symbolized the "swiss" virtues that the engineers had accredited to themselves: efficiency, pragmatism, and economic thinking. As for the information floW FOCP made sure to distribute copies of TWP 66 to all foreign civil defense officials, asking for feedback and making public the most laudatory comments in professional journals. 34 From the beginning, they allowed translations and reprints (TWP 66 was translated into twelve languages) and offered to show the underground infrastrucfure to foreign visitors. Bultressed by various presentations and bunker tours, the countryi defensive capsules started to rival the Swiss Alps as a magnef for American scientists. Among the mosf renowned participants in such "bunker fourism" were the atomic physicist and Nobel Pnze winner Eugene P. Wigner and the legendary "father of the hydrogen bomb," Edward Teller. 35 The new engineering prowess fostered by the circulation of the technical guidelines and the shelter tours also became a considerable source of income. When the domestic building boom came to a halt due to the recession following the oil shock, efforts to open up new markets came to the fore. During lhe 197Os and 1980s, Swiss companies rapidly gained a reputation as bunker consfruction specialists. For such internationäl ven+ures, international 46 gta papers 2 34 See "Die Schweiz hat die besten Weisungen für den Privaten Schutzraumbau," Zivilschulz: Die deufsche wssenschaftlich-fechnische Fachzeitschriff für die zivile Verleidigung 11 (1967):374; "Swiss Civil Defense'Best in World,'' Zivilschulz 15, no.7 /8 (1968): 194. 35 Ernst Basler, oral hislory interview, August 16, 2013. On Wigner! and Teller! acclaim for Swiss sheller design and policy, see Eugene P. Wigner and Walter Murphey, ?rmed Neutrality," Bullelin of the American Scienlrsl 31, no. 6 (1975):2; Edward Teller, "ls Civil Defense lhe Way lo Prevent War?" in Civil Defense: A Symposium Presenfed al lhe Berkeley /Äeeling of lhe American Assoclafion for lhe Advancemenl ofScience, December 1965, ed. Henry Eyring (Washington, D.C.: American Associalion for ihe Advancement of civil defense fairs acted as door openers. The largest of these events took place in Riyadh in 1986 and was organized by the Swiss Office for Trade Promotion. After a welcoming address by lhe director of FOCP and presentations ranging from shelter design to training for civil defense operations, thirty-six Swiss companies were allowed fo advertise their 'tost-effective" planning and design services and "efficient" products to Saudi Prince Nayif, his generals, and various ambassadors of Arab and African "Saudisch-schweizecountries. 36 The sales brochure was adorned with images of 36 risches Zivilschulzsymposium," Neue Zürcher Saudis sitting in a standard shelter and the slogan "Switzerland: Zeilung, October 1986. Your Partner in Civil Defence." vftis.6 This slogan echoed all over the world, most markedly in ry saudi-swisssympothe early 1980sJwhen a resurgent arms race pushed the so-cailed üTfll:'"ii3,?1ü* "second Cold War." ln 1981, t'he country! expertise attracted the 5"',"o1i|-,f'iä3f", attention of reporters from the New York Times, which ran a story l',;?ln',13;tlilg?:'" entitled "Swiss, Determined to Survive, Dig Nuclear Shelters and 38 Susan Heller Show Others How." 38 According to the limes, the Swiss Office Anderson, "Swiss, Delermined to Survive, for Civil Protection had had to cope with more than one thou- Dis Nuclear Shellers Show Olhers How,' sand inquiries from foreign authorities and private firms since the and New York fimes, March beg inning of 1981. As media reports in recent years have docu- 20,1981. mented, Switzerla nd's reputation fig.6 Sales brochure, Swilzerland: Your as a "superpower underground" Parlner in Civil 21, also caught the attention of potentates in the 1980s. When reporters from the Al-Jazeera \ network investigated Muammar Gadhafi's Al-Baida Palace in eastern Libya in 2011, for example, they found a bunker system equipped with Swiss shelter d oo rs ä n d ve nt i at o n tec h n o o gy from the Swiss firm Zellweger I l' 't -: Jr -l l-t {t if,. :-ra '-'.i{l t i I Luwa AG. 39 The same company also supplied parts of the nucle- ar command bunker beneath Saddam Hussein's presidential 'frt palace in Baghdad. 40 To this SWITZERI.AND 'a; day, Swiss bunker design and YOUR PARTNER IN A @ CIVIL DEFENCE technology still dominates the market. Swiss ventilation and filtration systems are a commercial success worldwide, as are the Swiss-made explosion protection With survivalism edgvalves and blast doors by Andair AG. Ing deeper into mainstream culture and demands for doomsday shelters and technology rising, 42 the future for Swiss bunker products and expertise looks bright. ) ,r 41 Silvia Berger Ziauddin Calculaling fhe Apocalypse Defence,1986. sc JackyRowrand, ä,3i:lq?jil3e,11' iXl,".""hr1liai'ti,r'o "W,lÄ?i2!if,it'rrr iflliff:"""'"T1?,1; rr, 2016). 40 Gret Heer, "Unglückliche Hand," Handelszeilung, March 24,2011; Ruedi Suter, "Saddam Husseins verschwiegene Schweizer Bunkerbauer," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 23,2OO3. 4l The Californiabased company Atlas Survival Shelter, for example, relies on Swiss-made air filtration sysfems and blasl valves. See hllp://www. atlassurvivalshelters. com,/features/ (accessed Oclober 19, 2017). 42 Evan Osnos, "Doomsday Prep for lhe Super Rich," The New Yorker, January 30, 2017. 47 Swiss air filters installed in American doomsday bunkers mark the latest step in a remarkable history that started in an era when nuclear war was anticipated, talked about, and calculated in perpetual loops. In the 1960s, Swiss engineers, thanks to the pooling of know-how and transatlantic transfers of knowledge, started to familiarize themselves with the language and technomaterial routines of weaponry-effects and protective-structures specialists. Local compilation of data, the introduction of an epistemic register of optimization, and sophisticated cost-benefit analysis subsequently transformed Switzerland into a center of calculation. Driven by a strong sense of vocation, sustained by an immense faith in their planning and design capacities, and backed by a state solidly committed to implemenling their recommendations, the shelter experts were free to rationalize and standardize the prospect of a nuclear war through the application of building codes. ln technical guidelines, future risks and complex threats were transformed into manageable, classifiable, quantifiable entities. Incorporating the concept of the "optimized" bunker, the building codes perpetuated the belief that security and survival are feasible even in the case of nuclear apocalypse - and prompted an unprecedent use of resources both financial and concrete material. Poured in concrete, the resulfs of the Cold War calculations are still present. Not only historians but politicians and the larger Swiss public will have to tackle the often unsetfling affective and material qualities of these architectural capsules that permeate the domestic sphere and have quite literally brought home the theater of war. 48 gla papers 2