Historia – Einzelschriften – Band 256 Franz Steiner Verlag Sonderdruck aus: Communicating Public Opinion in the Roman Republic Edited by Cristina Rosillo-López Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS Cristina Rosillo-López Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7 PUBLIC OPINION: NATURE AND CHARACTER Frédéric Hurlet L’öffentliche Meinung de Habermas et l’opinion publique dans la Rome antique. De la raison à l’auctoritas ......................................................... 23 Amy Russell The populus Romanus as the source of public opinion ...................................... 41 Cristina Rosillo-López How did Romans perceive and measure public opinion? .................................. 57 PUBLIC OPINION: MILITARY AND INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS Enrique García Riaza Laureatae litterae. Announcing Victories and Public Opinion in the Middle Republic ....................................................................................... 85 Alejandro Díaz Fernández Military disasters, public opinion, and Roman politics during the wars in Hispania (153–133 B. C.) ............................................................................... 107 Wolfgang Blösel The imperia extraordinaria of the 70s to 50s B. C. and Public Opinion ........... 135 Kit Morrell “Who wants to go to Alexandria?” Pompey, Ptolemy, and public opinion, 57–56 BC ........................................................................................................... 151 Clifford Ando The space and time of politics in civil war ........................................................ 175 Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Table of Contents PUBLIC OPINION AS PUBLIC DIALOGUE Francisco Pina Polo Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case ............................. 191 T. W. Hillard Ventus Popularis? ‘Popular Opinion’ in the 70s and its senatorial Reception ........................................................................................................... 211 Kathryn Welch Selling Proscription to the Roman Public .......................................................... 241 THE TRANSMISSION OF PUBLIC OPINION W. Jeffrey Tatum Canvassing the elite: communicating sound values in the Commentariolum Petitionis ............................................................................... 257 Alexander Yakobson Velleius Paterculus, imperial ideology and the old republic .............................. 273 APPENDIX List of contributors ............................................................................................. 295 Index of Names .................................................................................................. 297 Subject Index ..................................................................................................... 303 Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 RHETORIC OF FEAR IN REPUBLICAN ROME: THE CICERONIAN CASE Francisco Pina Polo Modern electoral campaigns, and surely also those in previous decades, are dominated by the rhetoric of fear.1 Political parties frequently attempt to generate trepidation among voters, going so far as to base their campaigns upon it: fear that taxes may rise, fear that their pensions may be cut, fear of immigrants who take their jobs, etc. In short, fear of the supposed enemy, in many forms. During the campaign preceding the referendum on Brexit in the United Kingdom, both those who advocated leaving the European Union as well as those who advocated remaining competed to generate among voters the greatest fear possible of the outcome of the other side winning. Some warned of, and possibly exaggerated, the terrible effects that leaving the European Union would have on the British economy. Others appealed to British patriotism in the face of the supposedly massive invasion of immigrants who wanted to steal jobs from the British people and change British culture. Ultimately, the fear of the other won the election, the fear of difference. It did not matter that Brexit supporters sometimes used data that was exaggerated or simply false, their rhetoric succeeded in creating a sense of fear among a substantial part of the British population, and the appeal to fear was sufficient to win. For many years in Spain, it has been more important in electoral campaigns for parties to provoke fear about their rivals than to defend their own policies. The two-party system dominant until 2015 assisted the job of the campaign managers and their copywriters, who competed to devise the most ingenious slogans and 1 I will use the word “fear”, knowing that it is a general concept which incorporates more specific terms within its semantic field, along a spectrum which includes emotions of varying intensity, such as terror, alarm, anxiety, etc. The Oxford English Dictionary offers this definition: “the emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the prospect of some possible evil”. It is possible, nevertheless, to broaden this basic definition: fear is an emotional response to a threat which may be real or imaginary, but which in either case is accepted as a threat, and which is believed will result in pain and suffering. As such, fear is closely connected with the uncertainty caused by the near future. Fear is a primal emotion which does not require a sophisticated mental apparatus, but can be induced (Aron 1968: 20: “Fear needs no definition. It is a primal, and so to speak, sub-political emotion”). Given that it is directed towards ensuring the individual’s survival and wellbeing, the only pre-requisite is the existence of a danger that triggers that emotion (Ferraro 1995: 12: “To produce a fear reaction in humans, a recognition of a situation as possessing at least potential danger, real or imagined, is necessary. This conception of potential danger is what we may call perceived risk and is clearly defined by the actor in association with others”). This danger may not be certain, or may be exaggerated, but, in order to generate fear, it should appear genuine. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 192 Francisco Pina Polo videos to discredit their opponents and generate anxiety among the voters. The emergence of new parties modified the rules of the game, but not the game itself. In the elections in June 2016, three of the main parties opted to create fear among the voters by every conceivable means to prevent Podemos winning the elections, an outcome which polls suggested was possible: the country could fall into the hands of communism; Spain could be a new Venezuela and become a failed state; Spain could leave the Euro and Europe; the economic situation would immediately become catastrophic, etc. It is impossible to know to what extent the discourse of fear influenced Spanish voters, but it seems beyond doubt that such a vigorous campaign of panic about the future, supported on a massive scale by the mass media, must have had some influence. In the last debate of the French campaign for the presidential election, which was held on 3rd May 2017, fear permeated the discussion between the two candidates. Macron accused Le Pen of playing on the fears of the citizens when she spread her apocalyptic discourse about the Euro, migrants and terrorism. Macron went so far as to describe his adversary as “la grande prêtresse de la peur” (“the high priestess of fear”). Indeed, no one can deny that Le Pen based her campaign on the fear of the other, economic collapse, an increase in violence, and ultimately the destruction of France as an idea and as a community. Paradoxically, Le Pen was herself defeated by the fear aroused by her adversaries within French society towards the deeply negative consequences, for the country and for Europe, of her hypothetical presidency. The rhetoric of fear is neither an invention of the modern era, nor, of course, unique to democratic systems. Aristotle dedicated a section of his Rhetoric to explaining to the orator the importance of generating fear among the audience in order to achieve his objectives, as well as the ways in which this emotion may be aroused and spread.2 He started by defining fear:3 “Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils … but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote.”4 For Aristotle, fear was a mental construct, the sense that some great misfortune was going to occur in the future. Ultimately, fear comes from ignorance, from the unknown.5 Fear, therefore, goes hand in hand with uncertainty about the future, which is perceived as a threat. In order for someone to feel genuinely afraid, the potential damage should not only be sufficiently serious, but also perceived as some2 3 4 5 Cf. Fields 2012: 15. All the English translations of Aristotle are by J. H. Freese (London – New York 1926). Arist. Rhet. 2.5.1 = 1382a: δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ: οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται. Blits 1989: 424: “While we can desire something only if we know it, we naturally fear something precisely because we do not know. Knowledge is a necessary condition for desire; ignorance is a sufficient condition for fear.” Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 193 thing real and immediate, not in the far-distant future. All human beings, Aristotle says, know that they will die, but do not necessarily feel frightened by that knowledge, unless death seems close. Human beings accordingly experience fear when they think or feel that they are in danger, such that fear and danger are two closely connected sensations: “If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful.”6 The danger, furthermore, must not only be immediate, but also above all feasible and credible; that is, a person only feels afraid if they think that they may truly suffer harm from something or someone with sufficient power to inflict it: “Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear. If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times.”7 From these premises, Aristotle’s argument goes on to offer specific advice to the orator who believes that arousing fear would serve his objectives, proposing that he should use his oratorical skills to reveal to the audience that they are in danger, and that others have previously suffered in similar situations: “So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at time when they did not think it likely.”8 As we have seen, Aristotle did not at any time speak of seeking the truth, but instead of how the audience may envisage the situation, and of the power of oration to direct their imaginary dread. In summary, to incite fear in his audience and to create a certain public opinion, Aristotle recommended the orator to demonstrate that wellbeing and even life are endangered; that the threat is imminent; that their 6 7 8 Arist. Rhet. 2.5.2 = 1382b: εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας: διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά: ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός. Arist. Rhet. 2.5.13 = 1382b: εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται ἂν παθεῖν οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ᾽ ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. Arist. Rhet. 2.5.15 = 1383a: ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷον παθεῖν (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον), καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ᾽ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα ἃ καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 194 Francisco Pina Polo enemies are powerful and can execute their threats; that people should feel vulnerable and unable to control the situation; that the orator should appear trustworthy. Fear is by nature personal – it is substantially narcissistic, because it appeals to the innate instinct of self-preservation: all human beings tend instinctively to protect themselves, although secondarily they may be able to rationalise a situation and try to protect their loved ones, such as their children, as well as themselves. Although danger and its consequent distress are perceived in personal terms, fear nevertheless can be socialised: if the preservation of the communal good is believed to be at risk, a collective fear can arise. Politicians, both current and ancient, can contribute to creating this collective fear with their claims and speeches. This is what happens in electoral campaigns, and what happened in the months prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when some supposed world leaders propagated the (false) idea that a large number of weapons of mass destruction were stockpiled in that country, which endangered the survival of the “free world”.9 In other words, the primary, selfish fear, inherent in human beings, can become – and more specifically, can be induced to become – a collective fear, a political fear, so long as an individual is a member of a community.10 This political fear nonetheless always retains a fundamental, selfish component: the anxiety of losing that which you personally possess. People are not afraid if they think they are in control of a situation, so they have to be convinced, or must be persuaded, that there is a serious risk of social and economic chaos which could have repercussions for their personal circumstances. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the cultural context in which a collective fear is generated, given that social and political circumstances completely alter perceptions of danger and fear. In modern times, an abandoned package at a train station or airport can cause panic among those who happen to be there, because they immediately think of scenes of terrorist attacks with dozens of dead. In Antiquity, what could cause collective fear? Civil war, a change of political regime, the destruction of the city in which an individual lived, economic ruin, the loss of belongings …? Clearly, a fundamental difference between Antiquity and our era is the method of fomenting this collective fear then, and generating it now. Groups of individuals can be suggestible, and fear can be contagious and easily spread within the group, thereby influencing public opinion. How can this effect be achieved? The most obvious and defining transformation in this field is the existence of the mass media in the modern world. During the twentieth century, the mass media have made it possible to create a collective mental state among individuals who are physically separated from one another. This was possible initially with the written press, and 9 10 The Iraq Inquiry (also called the Chilcot Inquiry), published on the 6th July 2016, revealed the clear misrepresentations upon which was based the campaign in 2003 to build public support for the invasion of Iraq. Cf. Robin 2004: 2: “By political fear, I mean a people’s felt apprehension of some harm to their collective well-being – the fear of terrorism, panic over crime, anxiety about moral decay – or the intimidation wielded over men and women by governments or groups. What makes both types of fears political rather than personal is that they emanate from society or have consequences for society.” Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 195 later, more quickly and extensively, with radio and television. In recent years, the internet – and social networking in particular – has revolutionised personal and community relationships, since this collective mental state can be achieved within minutes, even on a global scale. Obviously, ancient Romans could not have conceived of something akin to the panic created when Orson Welles’ radio programme, The War of the Worlds, based on the novel by H. G. Wells, prompted millions of listeners in the USA to believe simultaneously that a Martian invasion was underway. Paradoxically, while in 1938 the majority believed that an extra-terrestrial invasion was taking place, in 2001 many initially believed that the attacks of September 11th were just such a hoax as Orson Welles’, despite them being transmitted live on television – or precisely because of this: it seemed implausible. Since the mass media did not exist in Antiquity, fear had to be incited and spread essentially through physical contact, by word of mouth. In Rome, the assemblies in which speeches to the plebs were delivered, contiones, served as the principal megaphone for the propagation among the city population of ideas, announcements, and canards. At an assembly, however, a few hundred people, at best, were present, a tiny proportion of the inhabitants of Rome. The subsequent rumours that spread from the orator’s tribune, spontaneously or by instigation, were an excellent and effective medium for dispersing news and opinions, and in short for creating a particular mood among the population.11 In a fundamentally oral society, the combination of popular assemblies and rumours spreading across the city was therefore the medium which a Roman politician needed to use if he wanted to circulate a sense of collective fear amongst the residents of Rome. In this context, the oration practised in the contiones was essential as a point of departure, as a point of ignition. Speeches were often delivered to the people in Rome, and the sources refer to them frequently. It is, however, very rare for an orator’s exact words to have been preserved – or even an approximation of his words, given the editorial process that followed the delivery of a speech. In fact, only the texts of some of the speeches Cicero gave in contiones have survived, and it is upon those which this article will focus, specifically upon the second and third speeches De lege agraria, delivered at the start of his consulate in 63;12 the second and third Catilinariae, also from 63; and the fourth and sixth Philippics, delivered respectively on 20th December 44 and 4th January 43, in the context of Cicero’s campaign against Antonius.13 In all these speeches, Cicero tried to promote hostility towards those whom he considered enemies of the Republic: the tribune of the plebs Rullus, for his proposed agrarian law; 11 12 13 Rosillo-López 2007; Pina Polo 2010. The second speech De lege agraria, which was the first delivered before the assembly, is of most interest, since the third is a very brief speech with limited content. The seventh of Cicero’s speeches to the people which has been preserved is the one Cicero delivered immediately upon his return from exile (Post reditum ad Quirites). The tone of the speech, in which Cicero thanked the Roman people for their support during his banishment, is completely different from the others that are preserved, and is therefore of little use for exploring Cicero’s use of the rhetoric of fear. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 196 Francisco Pina Polo Catiline, for his conspiracy to seize power; and Antonius, for his politics, which Cicero considered a continuation of the Caesarian “tyranny”. They were the collective threat against which immediate action was necessary, and Cicero devoted all his efforts to demonstrating this.14 In those speeches, it was not only important to demonstrate the risks that such enemies posed to Roman society, it was also essential to vilify those enemies even to the point of dehumanising them.15 Cicero used this strategy against Catiline and Antonius, and to a lesser extent against Rullus. Their dehumanisation was very important, because it rendered any violent action against them both reasonable and legitimate. In the case of the Catilinarians, the final outcome was the execution of those who had been captured, with neither trial nor appeal, while Cicero covered his back with the senatus consultum ultimum and senatorial condemnation of the Catilinarians, neither of which held legal force, as well as with his previous moral disqualification of the accused. In the case of Antonius, Cicero contested that it was ethically just to declare war on him, because of everything that he had already done and everything he could do if he was not confronted. In his speeches, Cicero went to great lengths to present Catiline and Antonius as depraved creatures, full of every kind of vice, as well as dangers to society. The message was therefore very clear and simple: the enemy (of the fatherland) was a vile, despicable and dangerous individual, whom it was therefore acceptable to destroy, physically if necessary. In his speeches delivered to the people against Catiline and Antonius, as well as against Rullus’ agrarian rogatio, one of Cicero’s principal tactics was to draw on the rhetoric of fear. Fear derives from human vulnerability, as an individual and as a member of a collective. As discussed above, fear must be felt and internalised, based on a plausible and immediate threat. What causes fear in a human being, and by extension in the group to which a person belongs? Loss, in particular: loss of liberty, of possessions, of life … This formed one of the central points of Cicero’s speeches, in which he emphasised to his audience what they could lose if they did not confront the enemies of the fatherland. Rullus’ draft agrarian bill is known only generally, and only along the particular lines of criticism that Cicero levelled at it in his speeches. We therefore do not know its details, and it is more than probable that Cicero misrepresented and distorted some aspects of the bill in order to present a totally negative image of it, to support his own thesis. What is not in doubt is the existence of a serious social problem in the first century in relation to the unequal access to land ownership, which was reflected in the draft agrarian bills which were brought throughout the period. In every instance, those attempts at agrarian reform met with steely opposition from a majority of senators, among whom undoubtedly was Cicero. If his opposition was more apparent in 63, that was due to his position of consul, which meant he led the obstruction of the tribune of the plebs’ bill. 14 15 I would like to clarify that it is not my intention to offer a study of the Latin vocabulary relating to the semantic field of “fear”. On that subject, see Riggsby. 2009; Fields 2012: esp. 27–45; Vanderpool 2016. See Duplá Ansuátegui (2017). Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 197 In his second speech against Rullus’ rogatio, the first to be delivered to the people, Cicero ignored the crux of the issue throughout. He said nothing about the agrarian problems, nor proposed alternative solutions. In fact, social concerns never seem to have formed part of the political agenda of Cicero, who was always preoccupied with the maintenance of the status quo, and always conscious that his natural allies were the locupletes, the wealthy.16 His only intention was to demonstrate to his audience that Rullus’ bill was in reality an illegitimate attempt to seize power, and that passing it would bring with it the loss of public property in the economic arena, the loss of liberty in the political arena, and, ultimately, the fall of the res publica.17 To that end, he endeavoured to instil in his listeners the anxiety that a tyranny of the few would be established, and for that reason he recurrently counterposed liberty and tyranny, libertas and regnum, throughout his oration. Cicero began by claiming that, when he became consul on 1st January 63, the res publica was imperilled by the schemes that the villains were concocting against her and against the welfare of her citizens. It appears to be a passage added a posteriori upon the publication of the speech, with the clear intention of emphasising Cicero’s role as saviour of Rome during his consulship, in particular with his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy. It did, however, in any case serve the self-interest of the orator to introduce one of the central themes of the speech, the terror that tyranny would supplant the Republic: “The people believed that there was a tendency towards new forms of domination (dominatio), not regarding the concession of extraordinary power, but rather in the introduction of tyranny (regnum)”.18 Rullus’ rogatio simply served, according to Cicero, to confirm those suspicions and give a specific form to the danger. The agrarian law, which the orator ironically described as pulchra et popularis, had not been designed to benefit the people, but rather a very few, to whom it gave everything, while it drained public property.19 Cicero emphasised that the sale of public property represented a robbery, not only for the state, but also for every Roman citizen, even when these estates were in a territory as distant as Anatolia, because their sale – with the aggravating circum16 17 18 19 On Cicero’s relationship with wealth and money, see Pina Polo 2016. In his first speech against Rullus’ draft bill, delivered before the senate, Cicero had especially emphasised the economic problems that its approval would bring, particularly the loss of income for the Roman state. Contrary to his tactics in the assembly, however, he did not pursue the argument that the law implied the loss of liberty and establishment of tyranny, probably because that was not a credible argument to most of the senators. Cicero undoubtedly thought that the members of a popular assembly would be more sensitive to this catastrophising argument. Cic. Leg.agr. 2.8: Ego qualem Kalendis Ianuariis acceperim rem publicam, Quirites, intellego, plenam sollicitudinis, plenam timoris; in qua nihil erat mali, nihil adversi quod non boni metuerent, improbi exspectarent; omnia turbulenta consilia contra hunc rei publicae statum et contra vestrum otium partim iniri, partim nobis consulibus designatis inita esse dicebantur; sublata erat de foro fides non ictu aliquo novae calamitatis, sed suspicione ac perturbatione iudiciorum, infirmatione rerum iudicatarum; novae dominationes, extraordinaria non imperia, sed regna quaeri putabantur. Cf. Walter 2013: 52–53. Cic. Leg.agr. 2.15: Sic confirmo, Quirites, hac lege agraria pulchra atque populari dari vobis nihil, condonari certis hominibus omnia, ostentari populo Romano agros, eripi etiam libertatem, privatorum pecunias augeri, publicas exhauriri … Cf. Walter 2013: 61–62. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 198 Francisco Pina Polo stance of not being carried out at public auction – would mean less rental income for the public purse: “Shall we allow them to sell our property assets, of which we would be permanently divested, far away in the shadows of Paphlagonia and the wildernesses of Cappadocia? … Shall the decemvirs sell your revenue (vectigalia), not only without your oversight but even without the public witness of a crier (praeco)?”20 While the economic damage was important, however, even worse was the political danger. The decemvirs who were to be charged with implementing the law, should it be passed, would be endowed with so many powers that they could be considered “kings (reges) of the public treasury, of taxes, of all the provinces, of the whole Republic, of the dominions, of the free peoples, in the end, of all the world”.21 The orator thus foretold the end of the Republic as it was known to his audience, because in its place, kings would be the new rulers of the city (reges in civitate constitui). And this became even more distressing when it was recalled that the proponent of such an outrage was a tribune of the plebs, an office upon which the forefathers had bestowed the role of “protector and guardian of liberty” (praeses et custos libertatis). This argument was repeated by the orator throughout the speech as a kind of mantra. Again and again Cicero repeated that the decemvirs would be tyrants, that the res publica would be replaced by a tyranny (regnum), and that freedom (libertas) would disappear from Roman society: “I will say to you again what I said at the start: with this law they want to institute tyranny (regnum) and destroy your freedom (libertas)”.22 Roman invective in the first century B. C. frequently used the term tyrannus, of Greek origin, as well as rex and dominus, as a means of discrediting an adversary, who was automatically dehumanised and transformed into a being devoid of morality and an enemy of the fatherland. It is unsurprising that the Gracchi, and other politicians during the Late Republican period, were accused of aspiring to tyranny in order to legitimate their deaths.23 The word tyrannos, in particular, was nevertheless rarely used by Cicero in his speeches before the people, in which he preferred to use terms more typical of Latin vocabulary and, therefore, more familiar to his audience: rex, regnum, dominus, dominatio.24 The meaning of 20 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.55–56: Venire nostras res proprias et in perpetuum a nobis abalienari in Paphlagoniae tenebris atque in Cappadociae solitudine licebit?… xviri vestra vectigalia non modo non vobis, Quirites, arbitris sed ne praecone quidem publico teste vendent? 21 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.15: Atque ego a primo capite legis usque ad extremum reperio, Quirites, nihil aliud cogitatum, nihil aliud susceptum, nihil aliud actum nisi uti x reges aerari, vectigalium, provinciarum omnium, totius rei publicae, regnorum, liberorum populorum, orbis denique terrarum domini constituerentur legis agrariae simulatione atque nomine. Cf. Walter 2013: 60–61. 22 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.24: renovabo illud quod initio dixi, regnum comparari, libertatem vestram hac lege funditus tolli. On the counterposition of regnum and libertas, see Wirszubski 1950; Arena 2012. 23 See Pina Polo 2006; 2017. On the use of “tyranny” in Late Republican invective, and in particular in Cicero, Sirago 1956; Dunkle 1967. 24 In his second speech against Rullus’ rogatio, Cicero only used the word tyrannus once: Formam adhuc habetis, Quirites, et speciem ipsam tyrannorum (Cic. Leg.agr. 2.32). He used it Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 199 all those words was very clear and very easy to understand for his listeners, always as the antithesis of the res publica libera. The regnum-libertas antithesis recurs throughout the speech: “Citizens, what is being instated are tyrants (reges), not decemvirs, and as such, not merely from the start of their magistracy, but from the moment they are instated, your rights (ius), your powers (potestas), your liberty (libertas) will have vanished”.25 In the final part of the speech, his warnings take on an almost apocalyptic tone: “Is it not clear that they want to establish a tyranny (regnum) in secret and destroy your liberty (libertas)? Because when those men, with the powers that will be available to them, get hold of everyone’s money – in one word, of all Italy – when they have besieged your liberty (libertas) with their garrisons and their colonies, what hope, what possibility will remain to you to regain your liberty (libertas)?”26 The logical solution could be none other than the failure of Rullus’ draft bill, to which of course Cicero offered no alternative to solve the agrarian and social problems that it pointed out. By approving the bill, the Roman citizens would lose everything and could even find themselves obliged to abandon the city to live in some revolting area of Italy: “You, citizens, if you choose to believe me, preserve your influence, your liberty, your right to vote, your dignity, your city, your forum, the games, the festivals, and all your other advantages; unless you prefer to abandon all that along with the splendour of the Republic to go and live in the arid lands of Sipontum or the pestilent plains of Salapia, where Rullus would take you”.27 The threat was clearly exaggerated, but the image of abandoning the great city to go and live in remote, desolate places would function well to create anxiety and rejection among the audience, probably including those who lived in insalubrious conditions in Rome. His opposition to Rullus’ agrarian reform was the first significant episode in Cicero’s consulship. The bill was not voted upon because, apparently, it was withdrawn by the tribune of the plebs, but we do not know how much that was due to the pressure exerted by Cicero. Undoubtedly, the events surrounding the Catilinarian plot again in the third speech, but in reference to Sulla’s dictatorship (Cic. Leg.agr. 3.5). In the Catilinarians delivered to the people, he used it explicitly to reject the possibility that the term tyrannus may be applied to himself (Cic. Cat. 2.14). In the Philippics, while Cicero used tyrannus on several occasions in his speeches to the senate, he did not do so even once in in his speeches to the people. On this, Rosillo-López 2017. 25 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.29: Reges constituuntur, non xviri, Quirites, itaque ab his initiis fundamentisque nascuntur, ut non modo cum <magistratum> gerere coeperint, sed etiam cum constituentur, omne vestrum ius, potestas libertasque tollatur. 26 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.75: Num obscure maiores opes quam libertas vestra pati potest, et maiora praesidia quaeruntur, num obscure regnum constituitur, num obscure libertas vestra tollitur? Nam cum idem omnem pecuniam, maximam multitudinem <obtinebunt>, idem totam Italiam suis opibus obsidebunt, idem vestram libertatem suis praesidiis et coloniis interclusam tenebunt, quae spes tandem, quae facultas recuperandae vestrae libertatis relinquetur? 27 Cic. Leg.agr. 2.71: Vos vero, Quirites, si me audire voltis, retinete istam possessionem gratiae, libertatis, suffragiorum, dignitatis, urbis, fori, ludorum, festorum dierum, ceterorum omnium commodorum, nisi forte mavoltis relictis his rebus atque hac luce rei publicae in Sipontina siccitate aut in Salpinorum <plenis> pestilentiae finibus Rullo duce conlocari. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 200 Francisco Pina Polo in the second part of 63 marked Cicero’s consulate, at the time and in the future. Cicero presented his fight against Catiline as his great triumph as consul and, above all, as his personal endeavour, firstly in bringing the conspiracy to light, and then in supressing it. Cicero delivered two speeches to the people, the second and third Catilinarians. The first was given on 9th November 63, when Catiline had already abandoned Rome, which appeared to be an implicit admission of guilt; the second was delivered on 3rd December, when the conspiracy was obvious and had been laid bare, since the Allobroges’ evidence had allowed some of the most prominent conspirators to be arrested in Rome. As he did in his opposition to Rullus’ agrarian law, Cicero focussed on two rhetorical tactics which avoided the heart of the issue: the personal denigration of the enemy, and the propagation of fear. In both speeches, the orator emphasised the danger posed to the survival of the res publica if Catiline and his men succeeded in seizing power. As in the case of Rullus’ agrarian rogatio, according to Cicero the dilemma was implicitly framed in terms of liberty or tyranny. On this occasion, however, Cicero preferred to draw upon an even more direct approach, with the objective of causing panic among his audience28. Catiline, whom Cicero presented as a depraved and dishonest creature, not only aspired to putting an end to the institutions of the Roman republic, but supposedly wanted to destroy the city of Rome. Cicero offered no evidence of this, nor explained for what purpose Catiline should wish to burn the city, but he accused him again and again, directly or indirectly, of having planned to set fire to Rome. That is, the problem was not merely a political one, but was indeed a question of survival: if Catiline and his men were not suppressed and their plot crushed, the Romans were at risk of losing their livelihoods and all their possessions. In the second Catilinarian, Cicero chose to make veiled accusations, which nevertheless left no doubt about the alleged intentions of the conspirators: “I can see to whom they have assigned Apulia, who has Etruria, who has taken charge of Picenum and who of the Gallic region, who has requested for themselves the treachery of bringing blood and flames to the city”.29 As in his speech against Rullus’ rogatio, Cicero suggested that the Catilinarians aspired to instate tyranny in the midst of the city’s destruction: “And when they achieve what in their extreme madness they crave, do they perchance expect to become consuls or dictators, or even kings (reges) among the ashes of the city and the blood of the citizens?”30 Once the plot was uncovered and made public, in his second appearance before the people Cicero enhanced the drama of his speech, and directly accused the Catilinarians of having as objective to set fire to the houses and temples of Rome, once again without offering evidence or testimony that this was true: “For this reason, these conspirators deserve the greatest hatred (odium) and the greatest punishment 28 29 30 See now Neel 2017. Cic. Cat. 2.6: Video, cui sit Apulia adtributa, quis habeat Etruriam, quis agrum Picenum, quis Gallicum, quis sibi has urbanas insidias caedis atque incendiorum depoposcerit. Cic. Cat. 2.19: Quodsi iam sint id, quod summo furore cupiunt, adepti, num illi in cinere urbis et in sanguine civium, quae mente conscelerata ac nefaria concupiverunt, consules se aut dictatores aut etiam reges sperant futuros? Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 201 (supplicium), because they have not only sought to set fire tragically and sacrilegiously to your homes and hearths, but also to the temples and sanctuaries of the gods”.31 As previously discussed, to generate political fear, the threat should seem real and ought to be perceived collectively. For that, it is important to identify precisely the danger that may frighten the audience, because when a person feels fear, it seems directly in front of them, as something that is immediate, and their whole attention is directed towards it. On occasions, it can suffice to imply something that the minds of the listeners or viewers identify rapidly as a threat. When Cicero accused Catiline of being an arsonist, with no concrete evidence whatsoever, he relied on the probability that it would arouse fear among a substantial part of the Roman population, which knew the risk of fires in the city was real: it was a discourse of intimidation, stemming from a threat which was in itself credible. Additionally, the fear should lead to anger – even hatred – against the individuals who endangered the possessions of the citizens. Outrage leads to action; anger spawns the desire to punish the enemy, once the danger and its consequent fear are internalised.32 To this end, in the passage previously cited (cf. n. 31), Cicero closely linked hatred (odium) with punishment (supplicium): “For this reason, these conspirators deserve the greatest hatred (odium) and the greatest punishment (supplicium) …”33 It is impossible to know whether Cicero’s accusation served as the source of a rumour which spread throughout Rome and which perceived the Catilinarians as arsonists, or if, conversely, the orator actually echoed a rumour that had already been circulating in the city.34 It seems, however, that the allegation penetrated public opinion enough to influence the creation of a current of hostility towards the conspirators. Sallust states this explicitly. According to him, once the conspiracy was laid bare, the plebs, who had initially been in favour of it, became totally opposed to 31 32 33 34 Cic. Cat. 3.22: Quo etiam maiore sunt isti odio supplicioque digni, qui non solum vestris domiciliis atque tectis sed etiam deorum templis atque delubris sunt funestos ac nefarios ignes inferre conati. See Knight 2015: 72 and 78. In his speech to the senate, Cicero had already claimed that the country hated and feared Catiline: Nunc te patria, quae communis est parens omnium nostrum, odit ac metuit et iam diu nihil te Iudicat nisi de parricidio suo cogitare (Cic. Cat. 1.17). Aristotle had recommended that the orator provoke anger amongst the audience against his adversaries in order to achieve his goals: “It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry” (Arist. Rhet. 1380 a = 2.2.27). Cf. Knight 2015: 43. It must be remembered that Cicero had already alluded to the conspirators’ alleged arson plans in the first Catilinarian to the senate: Catilinam orbem terrae caede atque incendiis vastare cupientem nos consules perferemus? (Cic. Cat. 1.3); Muta iam istam mentem, mihi crede, obliviscere caedis atque incendiorum (1.6); … discripsisti urbis partes ad incendia … (1.9); An, cum bello vastabitur Italia, vexabuntur urbes, tecta ardebunt tum te non existumas invidiae incendio conflagraturum? (1.29). In his fourth Catilinarian, again to the senate, Cicero repeated his indictments, going so far as to accuse Cassius of having the specific mission to set fire to Rome: … urbem inflammandam Cassio … (Cic. Cat. 4.13); Tenentur ii, qui ad urbis incendium, ad vestram omnium caedem … (4.4). Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 202 Francisco Pina Polo the Catilinarians and aligned themselves with Cicero. Sallust claims the main reason that the plebs changed their position was precisely the threat that the conspirators wanted to set fire to Rome and that that would mean they would lose all their possessions.35 Whether or not the accusation was true, it is clear that Cicero knew how to make good use of his trump card, and successfully created panic among the population of Rome, which thoroughly distanced it from the conspirators and ensured that the rebellion would not take place within the city. Excessive fear can, however, be paralysing, and that is not what Cicero wanted to achieve – nor is it what contemporary politicians aspire to today. On the contrary, Cicero sought rather to mobilise the Roman citizenry against the Catilinarians. To do that, once the danger is isolated and the fear of it incited, it is expedient to offer a solution to the collective fear, which is what Cicero did. In modern times, a political party or leader offers themselves as the solution, sometimes even going so far as to claim, calculatingly, that the choice is “me or chaos”. Cicero in fact did the same: he had the solution; his ideas and his actions were the solution; for that matter, he was the solution. The Roman citizens did not need to fear, because he would stand watch over their safety: “In these circumstances, you, citizens, continue defending your houses with guards and watchmen; I, for my part, have already taken the measures and made the provisions necessary for the city to be suitably protected, and free from unrest or tumult.”36 Ultimately, it was a question of confidence and credibility, because people tend to belief information and recommendations that come from a person in whom they trust. Naturally, this also makes it easier to manipulate the audience. In contrast with the vilification and dehumanisation of his adversary, Cicero strove to identify himself with the good citizens, including with the state per se. His position as consul in 63 played in his favour, or at least, was a trump card that Cicero could not fail to play: his words would seem more credible because they came from the highest magistrate in the Roman state, a figure historically endowed with auctoritas. If Cicero succeeded in painting Rullus – who was, after all, a tribune of the plebs – and the Catilinarians as enemies of Rome, he would get his audience to distance themselves from them, because they would fear and hate them. In exchange for support for his proposals, Cicero offered peace and the re-establishment of order, in contrast to the concern which he sought to provoke with his accusations. This is indeed how he presented himself to the people in his third Catilinarian: he had saved Rome and her Republic. He began his speech thus: “Citizens, the republic, the lives of all of you, and your possessions, your fortunes, your wives and children, as well as the seat of this great empire, this most beautiful and fortunate 35 36 Sall. Cat. 48: Interea plebs coniuratione patefacta, quae primo cupida rerum novarum nimis bello favebat, mutata mente Catilinae consilia exsecrari, Ciceronem ad caelum tollere, veluti ex servitute erepta gaudium atque laetitiam agitabat. Namque alia belli facinora praedae magis quam detrimento fore, incendium vero crudele, inmoderatum ac sibi maxume calamitosum putabat, quippe cui omnes copiae in usu cotidiano et cultu corporis erant. Cic. Cat. 2.26: Quae cum ita sint, Quirites, vos, quem ad modum iam antea dixi, vestra tecta vigiliis custodiisque defendite; mihi, ut urbi sine vestro motu ac sine ullo tumultu satis esset praesidii, consultum atque provisum est. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 203 city, have all been saved today from flames and the sword … by the love that the immortal gods profess for you, and everything has been conserved and restored to you thanks to my efforts, my vigilance, and the dangers I have faced”.37 Towards the end of the speech, he again capitalised on his success in the first person: “… and when your enemies thought that no more citizens would survive than as many as could escape the sword, nor any more of the city remain that that which the flames could not devour, I preserved the city intact, and kept the citizens safe and sound”.38 According to Cicero, an act of thanksgiving to the gods (supplicatio) had been decreed, which the orator in practice presented as an act of thanksgiving to himself, with the text referring specifically to the consul: “For I have liberated the city from flames, the citizens from having their throats slit, and Italy from war.”39 Actually, Cicero had not acted alone, since he had enjoyed the invaluable collaboration of the gods of Rome. In claiming this, Cicero transformed himself into the messenger and executive arm of the gods, and thus he legitimated his action: “To say that it was I who defeated them would be an excessive presumption on my part, which would be intolerable in me; it was Jupiter, yes, Jupiter, who confronted them; it was he who wished to save the Capitol, these temples, the whole city, and all of you. It is the inspiration of the gods which has directed my mind, citizens, which has upheld my will and which led me to uncover evidence.”40 Twenty years later the political context was very different. Cicero had applauded the assassination of Caesar, whom he considered a tyrant,41 but had later lamented the failure of the anti-Caesarians, whom he called tyrannicides, to articulate a credible alternative politics. In that situation, Cicero believed that the tyrant had died, but that the tyranny had not been decisively defeated. Antonius represented, to him, the continuation of Caesar’s regime, and consequently Cicero perceived him as a new tyrant. He directed his so-called Philippics against him, speeches that were delivered to the senate and to the people in the final months of 44 and early months of 43. Cicero’s position was very clear: Antonius was a tyrant, and as such was an enemy of Rome, whether or not the senate officially declared him a hostis publicus.42 37 38 39 40 41 42 Cic. Cat. 3.1: Rem publicam, Quirites, vitamque omnium vestrum, bona, fortunas, coniuges liberosque vestros atque hoc domicilium clarissumi imperii, fortunatissimam pulcherrimamque urbem, hodierno die deorum inmortalium summo erga vos amore, laboribus, consiliis, periculis meis e flamma atque ferro ac paene ex faucibus fati ereptam et vobis conservatam ac restitutam videtis. Cic. Cat. 3.25: et, cum hostes vestri tantum civium superfuturum putassent, quantum infinitae caedi restitisset, tantum autem urbis, quantum flamma obire non potuisset, et urbem et civis integros incolumesque servavi. Cic. Cat. 3.15: quod urbem incendiis, caede civis, Italiam bello liberassem. Cic. Cat. 3.22: Quibus ego si me restitisse dicam, nimium mihi sumam et non sim ferendus; ille, ille Iuppiter restitit; ille Capitolium, ille haec templa, ille cunctam urbem, ille vos omnis salvos esse voluit. Dis ego inmortalibus ducibus hanc mentem, Quirites, voluntatemque suscepi atque ad haec tanta indicia perveni. See Pina Polo 2002. Cic. Off. 3.32. Cf. Fields 2012: 54: on his Philippics, “Cicero’s most powerful tool for distorting information and arousing fear is character assassination”. Fields compares the third and fourth Philippics on pp. 98–123. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 204 Francisco Pina Polo He initially sought to convince the people of Rome of this:43 “Who does not see that with this decree Antonius has been judged enemy (hostis) of the fatherland? Indeed, who can be judged an enemy, if not the person against whom armies march under the command of generals whom the senate has considered worthy of receiving extraordinary honours?”44 Antonius desired the destruction of Rome and wanted to bring about an outright massacre of citizens: “For this man does not wish, as in previous times, for your slavery, but rather, ruled by anger, he is thirsting for your blood. No spectacle seems more delightful to him than blood, murder, and the slaughter of citizens before his eyes. You are not struggling against a criminal and sacrilegious man, but against a monstrous and cruel beast, who must be destroyed, since he has fallen into the trap.”45 As he did with the Catilinarians, Cicero strove to paint a catastrophic scenario for the inhabitants of Rome if Antonius were not destroyed, going so far as to compare him to Spartacus and Catiline, both figures who could arouse fear among Roman citizens: “Your present enemy is fighting against the republic, while he has no republic himself; he longs to destroy the senate … he has squandered your money … So then, citizens, this fight of the Roman people, of the conquerors of all peoples, is a battle against a murderer, against a thief, against a Spartacus. Indeed, as for his habit of boasting of being like Catiline, he is like him in the crimes he commits, but not in his planning of them.”46 Cicero ended his fourth Philippic by offering himself as the solution to the problem, and promised his audience to fight with all his strength for the preservation of liberty, which he once again implicitly contrasted with Antonius’ tyranny: “And certainly, whatever I may achieve with my dedication, my efforts, my vigilance, my authority and my advice, I shall not neglect to do anything which I consider in the interests of your liberty (libertas) … Today … for the first time in a long 43 The third Philippic, which took place in the senate that same morning, was a much longer and more verbose speech than the one delivered to the people. Cicero’s objective was of course the same: to undermine Antony and create a majority opinion against him. The speech, however, was full of names and facts which Cicero preferred to omit for the people. In any case, he also warned the senate that, in his opinion, Antony wanted to instate a tyranny: … quae vis quaedam paene fatalis, (quae tamen ipsa non tulimus) etiamne huius impuri latronis feremus taeterrimum crudelissimumque dominatum? (Cic. Phil. 3.29). The Romans were a people born for freedom, and there was nothing more shameful than slavery: Nihil est detestabilius dedecore, nihil foedius servitute. Ad decus et ad libertatem nati sumus … (3.36). 44 Cic. Phil. 4.5: Quo decreto quis non perspicit hostem esse Antonium iudicatum? Quem enim possumus appellare eum, contra quem qui exercitus ducunt, iis senatus arbitratur singulares exquirendos honores? 45 Cic. Phil. 4.11–12: Neque enim ille servitutem vestram ut antea, sed iam iratus sanguinem concupivit. Nullus ei ludus videtur esse iucundior quam cruor, quam caedes, quam ante oculos trucidatio civium. Non est vobis res, Quirites, cum scelerato homine ac nefario, sed cum immani taetraque belua, quae quoniam in foveam incidit, obruatur. 46 Cic. Phil. 4.14–15: hic vester hostis vestram rem publicam oppugnat, ipse habet nullam; senatum, id est orbis terrae consilium, delere gestit, ipse consilium publicum nullum habet; aerarium vestrum exhausit, suum non habet … Est igitur, Quirites, populo Romano, victori omnium gentium, omne certamen cum percussore, cum latrone, cum Spartaco. Nam quod se similem esse Catilinae gloriari solet, scelere par est illi, industria inferior. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 205 time we have burned with hope for liberty (libertas), with myself as its promoter and defender.”47 That speech was delivered on the 20th December 44. The sixth Philippic was given on the afternoon of the 4th January 43, and by then Cicero’s position had radicalised. In this speech to the people, much shorter than the one Cicero had delivered that same morning in the senate (the fifth Philippic), the orator defended clearly the need to declare open war on Antonius, and once again framed the conflict in terms of tyranny or liberty.48 This is how Cicero finished his speech: “It is sacrilegious that the Roman people, whom the immortal gods elected to set over all peoples, should serve as slaves. The situation has reached a critical moment; we must fight for liberty (libertas) … We must win, fellow citizens … or end in any other way than as obedient slaves. Other peoples may tolerate slavery, but the attribute of the Roman people is liberty (libertas).”49 War against the internal enemy was therefore the only advice possible, since Cicero declared that any negotiation with Antonius was useless. Dialogue was therefore precluded; it was time to take action: “I promise, I proclaim, I predict that Marcus Antonius will not fulfil any of the requests entrusted to the legates [*an embassy had been sent by the senate to negotiate with Antonius], but instead will lay waste to the land, prolong his siege of Mutina, and raise conscripts wherever he can. For in truth, Antonius has always scorned the opinion and the authority of the senate, in the same way as he has scorned your will and power.”50 It is always difficult to justify and legitimise war to the population, and is even more so if it is a civil war such as Cicero was proposing in 43, in a context of internal violence which had already lasted a long time and which had exhausted Roman society. Cicero’s rhetoric followed the logical steps to try to create a public opinion that favoured war against Antonius: he presented Antonius as a dishonest individual who was full of vices; he wanted to make his audience believe that Antonius wished only for the destruction of Rome and would cause a bloodbath in the city; Cicero knew the truth and had the solution: it was necessary to stand up to Antonius, and for that they had to declare war on the man, who was no longer a Roman citizen Cic. Phil. 4.16: Equidem quantum cura, labore, vigiliis, auctoritate, consilio eniti atque efficere potero, nihil praetermittam, quod ad libertatem vestram pertinere arbitrabor … Hodierno … longo intervallo me auctore et principe ad spem libertatis exarsimus. 48 The previous speech in the senate, the fifth Philippic, is much longer than the speech to the people. As with the third compared to the fourth, it is a rambling speech, full of information. In it, Cicero also warned of the risk of losing their liberty (see for example Cic. Phil. 5.6: … populum Romanum servitute opprimendi …), but the message is less simple than the one in his speech to the people. 49 Cic. Phil. 6.19: Populum Romanum servire fas non est, quem di immortales omnibus gentibus imperare voluerunt. Res in extremum est adducta discrimen; de libertate decernitur. Aut vincatis oportet, Quirites, quod profecto et pietate vestra et tanta concordia consequemini, aut quidvis potius quam serviatis. Aliae nationes servitutem pati possunt, populi Romani est propria libertas. 50 Cic. Phil. 6.5: Testificor, denuntio, ante praedico nihil M. Antonium eorum quae sunt legatis mandata, facturum, vastaturum agros, Mutinam obsessurum, dilectus, qua possit, habiturum. Is est enim ille, qui semper senatus iudicium et auctoritatem, semper voluntatem vestram potestatemque contempserit. 47 Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 206 Francisco Pina Polo but an enemy of Rome. In short: discourse of fear; dehumanisation of the enemy; violent solution. Cicero’s rhetoric was not novel in Antiquity, nor can it in any way be considered unusual throughout history down to modern times. If we read some of the speeches that George W. Bush gave after September 11th 2001, it is easy to recognise a very similar method to the one deployed by Cicero.51 The following passages provide some examples. The fight against terrorists is the fight of all humanity for freedom: “Fellow citizens: We’ve been tested these past 24 months, and the dangers have not passed. Yet Americans are responding with courage and confidence. We accept the duties of our generation. We are active and resolute in our own defense. We are serving in freedom’s cause, and that is the cause of all mankind.”52 Enemies are individuals without scruples who are impossible to negotiate with, and therefore it is necessary to be prepared for the immense harm they can cause: “In other words, one of the biggest dangers we face is if a biological, chemical, or nuclear device gets in the hands of terrorists. Listen, they will use them. By the way, you can’t negotiate with these people or reason with them. That’s what you’ve got to understand. These are not the kind of people you sit down and send a counsellor over and hope to convince them to change their ways. These are cold-blooded ideologues who will kill. And therefore, we’ve got to plan for the worst.”53 Since it is impossible to negotiate with terrorists, the only solution was that which Bush proposed, which was to attack them wherever they were to be found, in a total war which would mean they could not take action on American soil: “We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities.”54 To conclude, Cicero’s speeches had an implicit educational function, as they interpreted the world and taught how it should be understood, which naturally coincided with Cicero’s own vision; he sought to impose this vision through the auctoritas conferred upon him as consul in 63, and prominent senior senator in 43. Cicero declared himself qualified to decide which danger threatened Roman society, what its origin and nature were, and what response was required to eliminate it. Of course, this attitude is not exclusive to Cicero: political leaders, in Antiquity as now, assume one of their functions is to alert society to the dangers that stalk them. The choice of those dangers is not obvious, but depends rather on the politicians’ own ideologies and objectives. Appealing to fear is not intended to stimulate a critical discussion in search of the truth. On the contrary, the rhetoric of fear tends to replace debate, because 51 52 53 54 Cf. Campos Vargas 2011. Bush 2003. Bush 2005. Bush 2003. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 207 its internal logic only permits of one solution, which corresponds to the solution proposed by the very person who is generating the fear, and who is the person who knows what needs to be done: it is the person who possesses the truth, the saviour-leader, be he Cicero or Bush. In reality, to overcome collective fear, it is more important to believe that there is a solution to it than to know the truth. The discourse of fear is ultimately a political instrument that seeks to achieve particular short-term objectives.55 From the polarisation that the rhetoric of fear embeds in its discourse, fear can, on the one hand, become a powerful instrument for social cohesion, uniting society against whomever is designated the common enemy,56 but on the other hand, it is also an instrument of social control exercised by those in power, since anxiety about an uncertain future tends to favour the preservation of the established order and the failure of the new.57 Cicero did not suggest changes or reforms in his speeches; on the contrary, he recommended the established order as guarantor of peace and concord.58 With his rhetoric of fear, Cicero attempted to influence public opinion by polarising political reality to create two clearly defined groups, two simple, black-andwhite categories: good against bad, us versus them. On one side, there were the bad citizens who sought the destruction of the existing political system and, even worse, of the city of Rome herself, thus wiping out the possessions of her inhabitants; on the other side were ranged the good citizens, the true Romans, who wished for order and harmony, and who, with their ideas and actions, ensured the welfare of the community. The polarisation between good and bad citizens was accompanied by a glorification of the fatherland, which of course was associated with the boni, that is, with those who thought like Cicero. Once the danger was clearly demonstrated, once apprehension and uncertainty about the future had been injected into the population, the implicit questions were clear: in which camp did the audience wish to position themselves, among the good or the bad citizens? Did they wish to destroy 55 56 57 58 Robin 2004: 16: “Political fear … is a political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent advance, created and sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to gain something from it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific political goal, or because it reflects or lends support to their moral and political beliefs – or both.” Cf. Robin 2004: 3. Discussing the reaction in the USA after the attacks of September 11th, Robin says: “Only fear, we believe, can turn us from isolated men and women into a united people”. Or, further on: “Afraid, we are like the audience in a crowded theatre confronting a man falsely shouting fire: united, not because we share similar beliefs or aspirations, but because we are equally threatened”. Wood 1995, defines what he calls “Sallust’s Theorem” thus: “Fear of an external enemy promotes internal social unity” (p.181). Altheide – Michalowski 1999: 476: “The prevalence of fear in public discourse can contribute to stances and reactive social policies that promote state control and surveillance”. Obviously, the authors’ perspective is contemporary and based in the crucial role played by the mass media in the creation of public opinion. The essence of the idea, nevertheless, can be translated to the ancient world. In his first speech against Rullus’ agrarian law, Cicero claimed there was nothing as popular and cherished by the population as peace and concord: Etenim, ut circumspiciamus omnia quae populo grata atque iucunda sunt, nihil tam populare quam pacem, quam concordiam, quam otium reperiemus (Cic. Leg.agr. 1.23). On concordia as a political tool see Marco Simón – Pina Polo 2000; Akar 2013. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 208 Francisco Pina Polo or preserve the republic? In Cicero’s terms: which option was preferable: tyranny or liberty, regnum or libertas? In this simplified and reductionist discourse, there was only one possible answer to conquer the fear, and that was none other than the one that Cicero was suggesting.59 BIBLIOGRAPHY Akar, Ph. (2013) Concordia: un idéal de la classe dirigeante romaine à la fin de la République, Paris. Altheide D. L. and Michalowski, R. S. (1999) “Fear in the News: A Discourse of Control”, The Sociological Quarterly 40: 475–503. Arena, V. (2012) Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic, Cambridge. Aron, R. (1968) Main Currents in Sociological Thought I: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, de Tocqueville, Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848, Garden City, N. Y. Blits, J. H. (1989) “Hobbesian Fear”, Political Theory 17: 417–431. Bush, G. W. (2003) Update in the War on Terror. Washington D. C. September 7, 2003. Accessed 11th July 2016 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.07.03.html. Bush, G.W (2005) The Future of the Patriot Act, Baltimore, Maryland, July 20, 2005. Accessed 11th July 2016 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/07.20.05.html. Campos Vargas, H. (2011) “La lógica del temor en el discurso político de George W. Bush”, Revista de Lenguas Modernas 14: 395–412. Dunkle, J. R. (1967) “The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic”, TAPA 98: 151–171. Duplá Ansuátegui, A. (2017) “Incitement to violence in Late Republican political oratory”, in Political Communication in the Roman World, ed. C. Rosillo-López: 181–200. Leiden. Ferraro, K. F. (1995) Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimization Risk, Albany. Fields, B. M. (2012) Fear Mongering in Late Republican Rome, 88–28 BCE, PhD University of Florida. Knight, J. E. (2015) The Politics of Anger in Roman Society: A Study of Orators and Emperors, 70 BCE–68 CE, PhD University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Marco Simón, F. and Pina Polo, F. (2000) “Concordia y libertas como polos de referencia religiosa en la lucha política de la República tardía”, Gerión 18: 261–292. Neel, J. (2017) “Cicero’s Rhetoric of Terror”, Museion 14: 437–453. Pina Polo, F. (2002) “Cicerón, elegido de los dioses: la reprobación religiosa del adversario político como recurso retórico”, in Religión y propaganda política en el mundo romano, eds. F. Marco, F. Pina Polo and J. Remesal: 57–69. Barcelona. Pina Polo, F. (2006) “The Tyrant must die: Preventive Tyrannicidium in Roman Political Thought”, in Repúblicas y ciudadanos: formas de participación cívica en el mundo antiguo, eds, F. Marco, F. Pina Polo and J. Remesal: 71–101. Barcelona. 59 With a different approach to the rhetoric of fear, Rosenblitt 2016, has recently suggested that Sallust’s representation of the rhetoric of popular champions (M. Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 78, C. Memmius, tribune of the plebs in 111, and C. Licinius Macer, tribune of the plebs in 73) shows a distinctive and coherent popular discourse in the late Republic: “Sallust shows us a demagogic ideology … It is an ideology through which political relationships are constructed on a hostile model and the people are told that inflicting fear is the only effective means to their political ends. It is an ideology of social collapse and the rhetoric of a damaged society: a rhetoric of anger” (683). Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 Rhetoric of Fear in Republican Rome: the Ciceronian Case 209 Pina Polo, F. (2010) “Frigidus rumor: The Creation of a (Negative) Public Image in Rome”, in Private and Public Lies: The Discourse of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World, eds. A. Turner, J. H. K. on Chong-Gossard and F. Vervaet: 75–90. Impact of Empire 11, Leiden. Pina Polo, F. (2016) “Cupiditas pecuniae: Wealth and Power in Cicero”, in Money and Power in the Roman Republic, eds. H. Beck, M. Jehne and J. Serrati: 165–177. Brussels. Pina Polo, F. (2017) “The ‘Tyranny’ of the Gracchi and the Concordia of the optimates: An Ideological Construct”, in Costruire la memoria. Uso e abuso della storia fra tarda repubblica e primo principato, eds. R. Cristofoli, A. Galimberti and F. Rohr Vio: 5–33. Rome. Riggsby, A. (2009) “The Lexicon of Fear”, Center for the Humanities and the Public Sphere. University of Florida, 14 Nov. 2009 (lecture). Robin, C. (2004) Fear. The History of a Political Idea, Oxford. Rosenblitt, J. A. (2016) “Hostile Politics: Sallust and the Rhetoric of Popular Champions in the Late Republic”, American Journal of Philology 137: 655–688. Rosillo-López, C. (2007) “Temo a los troyanos’: rumores y habladurías en la Roma tardorrepublicana”, Polis 19: 113–134. Rosillo-López, C. (2017) Public Opinion and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, Cambridge. Sirago, V. (1956) “Tyrannus. Teoria e prassi antitirannica in Cicerone e suoi contemporanei”, Rendiconti della Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli, n. s. 36: 179–225. Vanderpool, E. (2016) “Towards a New Lexicon of Fear: A Quantitative and Grammatical Analysis of pertimescere in Cicero”, Midwest Journal of Undergraduate Researchi 6: 52–93. Walter, U. (2013) Cicero. Zweite Rede an das Volk gegen den Volkstribunen Publius Servilius Rullus über das Ackergesetz, Bielefeld. Wirszubski, C. (1950) Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate, Cambridge. Wood, N. (1995) “Sallust’s Theorem: A Comment on ‘Fear’ in Western Political Thought”, History of Political Thought 16: 174–189. Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Clifford Ando, University of Chicago, United States Wolfgang Blösel, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Germany Alejandro Díaz Fernández, Universidad de Málaga, Spain Enrique García Riaza, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain Tom Hillard, Macquaire University, Australia Frédéric Hurlet, Université Paris-Nanterre, France Kit Morell, University of Sydney, Australia Francisco Pina Polo, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain Cristina Rosillo-López, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain Amy Russell, Durham University, United Kingdom W. Jeffrey Tatum, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Kathryn Welch, University of Sydney, Australia Alexander Yakobson, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Th i s m at eri al i s u n d er cop yri gh t . An y u se ou t si d e of t h e n arrow b ou n d ari es of cop yri gh t law i s i llegal an d m ay b e p rosecu t ed . Th i s ap p li es i n p art i cu lar t o cop i es, t ran slat i on s, m i crofi lm i n g as w ell as st orage an d p rocessi n g i n elect ron i c syst em s. © Fran z St ei n er Verlag, St u t t gart 20 19