Eastern Partnership
2030 Trends
A B
Q C
P H
K L
H M
P P
W P
P U
authors
Anton Bendarzsevszkij
Quincy Cloet
Pavel Havlicek
Kerry Longhurst
Hennadiy Maksak
Peter Plenta
Pavel Usov
editors
Wojciech Przybylski
Quincy Cloet
Published by the Res Publica
Foundation in cooperation with the
German Marshall Fund of the U.S.
November 2019
Project supported by the
International Visegrad Fund and the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Brief
T
his report outlines major trends
that over the course of the next
decade will shape the future of
Eastern Partnership (EaP) region,
to be understood as six individual countries
and as a policy framework of the European
Union. The authors of the report have focused particularly on those trends that are
common for all or at least for most of the
EaP countries. This brief lists directions
that are explained in the following sections.
1 The dynamics of the political processes in the Eastern Partnership countries
are becoming more determinant for the directions regarding the external partners than
any political plans outlined by major global
players. Political instability and activism from
within increasingly shape political and institutional developments, while remaining subject
to external security dilemmas. The EU policy framework in respect to these countries is
evolving: it searches for stability and consolidation, while new impulses come from the
Russian Federation or China. In the next decade, the countries of the region will gravitate
towards larger economic and political spaces
as well as towards common cooperation platforms to reinforce their bargaining positions.
2 Demographics are rapidly changing and bringing more diversity along global
trends such as the urban-rural divide, brain
drain and changing family models. Pre-existing migration patterns are amplified while governments remain unprepared to respond. In
the last decade, only Azerbaijan increased its
population while other countries saw a decline.
3 The economic exchange with the EU
single market generally is increasing although
there are differentiated patterns of trade. Overall, the export of ICT service is on the rise.
Trade relations with the EU are building up
some resilience against recession due to lower costs of production and services in the EaP
countries. These are expected to have an insulating effect although they may fail to stop the
consequences of a large economic slowdown.
4 Information and digital public services are rapidly changing, often more dynamically than in the EU countries. Online media
are an area of experimentation and testing of
new disinformation tactics while programmes
to build cyber resilience are also on the rise.
EaP governments will be quick to adopt digital
tools for governance but there is not enough
bottom-up digital literacy education in the region. The exchange of good practices betweenthe EaP countries in these areas is still minimal.
5 Changing patterns of energy consumption, exports and transit will be a determining factor in the next decade. Facing
an ambitious green policy from the EU and
being pressured by economic constraints, the
EaP countries will seek to increase energy efficiency and modernise infrastructure. Fossil
fuel exports and transit remain crucial strategic factors in the politics of the region. These
will be areas of struggle between, on the one
hand, a demand for greater flexibility and interconnectedness and, on the other hand, the
protection of long-term monopolies and vested interests.
3
Visegrad Insight
4
Brief
3
Introduction
5
Politics and Security
7
Society and Demography
10
Economy and Technology
13
Information and Digital
17
Energy and Environment
20
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Introduction
T
he Eastern Partnership is a joint
policy framework of the European
Union and six eastern neighbours.
It is also the only working format
of approximation between the EU and the
countries to the East. This year marks a
decade since it was launched in Prague
during the first EaP summit. It is expected
to evolve and further shape the future relationship between all the involved countries.
The idea brought up by Poland and Sweden
has grown in significance largely because
of the continuous commitment all Visegrad Group countries, other EU members
but first and foremost due to EaP countries
themselves.
Since 2009, the Eastern Partnership has had a
considerable domestic and international impact, although its effects did not evenly spread
across the region. Throughout this period, the
participating states have undergone political,
economic and social changes that redefined
their relationship with the rest of Europe. What
is more, they must contend with competitive
and divergent interests from both global and
regional powers.
From the East, the Russian Federation undermines the security of the region. The stabilising
role played either by the United States or the
United Kingdom recently has been thrown into
question while new powers, such as China, are
seeking a stronger foothold in Eastern Europe.
Regional demographics and energy ties are increasingly disruptive as are digitalisation and
disinformation. These are just a few of the factors that influence long-term trends and that
drive political and social change. In this situa-
tion, the EU takes the ten year anniversary of
the EaP to review this initiative. Then, in 2020,
the European Commission is to announce its
revised policy for the region, a daunting task
given that eastern neighbours are more differentiated and multifaceted than ever.
This publication outlines major trends that will
shape the future directions of the EaP countries identified by a group of experts from the
EU and the EaP states. It is part of a broader
effort that over the course of a year brings together more than 30 analysts, opinion shapers
and community leaders who discuss the future
strategy for the Eastern Partnership, outline
major trends and resulting scenarios, organise
public debates across the region and eventually
launch a final report with policy recommendations based on the scenarios that give a voice
to the representatives of the region as part of
policy debates.
The project “Eastern Partnership 2030” takes
a scenario-based approach that has been developed jointly by the Visegrad Insight of the
Res Publica Foundation and the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. along with a number of
regional partners including the Slovak Foreign
Policy Association, the Association for International Affairs, the Centre for Euro-Atlantic
Integration and Democracy, the Foreign Policy
Council “Ukrainian Prism”, and the International Strategic Action Network for Security.
It is co-funded by the International Visegrad
Fund and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the analysis and opinions published
in this report do not represent the official position of either of the sponsors.
5
Visegrad Insight
Politics and Security
T
he European Union’s Eastern Partnership has brought six eastern
countries closer to political cooperation. Political and security
issues will determine the development in
the region and cooperation with the EU in
the following decade. There are four political trends that will significantly shape the
future of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.
First, growing Russian resilience in the region. Second, the EU increasing its focus
on more efficient but less political cooperation. Third, a growing individualisation
of the Eastern Partnership countries and
its implications for the region's security.
Fourth, the continuation of political instability an activism in the EaP countries.
External actors have increased their presence
in the region, most notably the European Union, over the last few years. This phenomenon
is called polycentrism. The involvement of oth6
er actors in the Russian backyard has created
resilience from the Russian leadership. The EaP
is seen as a vehicle of the EU to advance its interest in the near neighbourhood, which Moscow considers its sphere of influence. As the
Russian position is relatively declining, it will
be paradoxically more resilient, by promoting
its interests and ideas. By way of frozen conflicts, it undermines NATO and EU’s membership ambitions in some of the EaP countries.
The strength of an assertive Russian stance
will depend on domestic and external factors.
Among the main internal factors belong to the
improvement of the fragile economy. The Russian Federation faces international sanctions
and growing social issues. Due to military adventures abroad, Russian economic sources are
going to be under increasing pressure. Another
challenge lies in the transformation of the Eurasian Union into an attractive economic (and
political) project. Though there is an ambition
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
to enlarge its membership, the Eurasian Union
also faces discontent of the minor members
with the current situation.
It is not possible to expect significant changes
in the Russian presidential election of 2024. On
the other hand, like in the past, the Russian political elite can use foreign policy tools to distract the domestic population from structural
problems. The rise of a post-Soviet generation
of politicians represents another factor contributing to possible shifts in domestic politics.
External factors that will influence Russia’s
stance are mainly related to the EU-US relation
and frozen conflicts. There will be a continued rise of politicians in the European Union
member states that call for closer cooperation
with Russia. The European Union will be increasingly divided over the issue. Russia needs
conflict with the West for domestic purposes,
regardless of whether such a conflict is happening or not.
The second factor is the frozen conflicts in the
region. The only Eastern Partnership country
without frozen conflict, so far, is Belarus. These
conflicts keep the Eastern Partnership in longterm instability and cripple the efforts to come
closer together with the EU and NATO. While
the frozen conflicts will not be resolved in the
next decade, they represent a possible danger
of turning into “hot” disputes and various skirmishes, possibly involving Russian troops as
well.
From the EU’s perspective, the 2010s were
characterised by institutional stagnation and
internal issues related to the economic and migration crises and Brexit. The external policies
of the EU received less of a prioritisation than
before. The rise of populists, Eurosceptics and
far-right politicians is another factor that further hindered common policies towards eastern partners. The last couple of years of the
EaP can be described as a process of squaring
the circle of matching different expectations
of partner countries with possibilities on the
EU’s side. At the same time, EaP countries are
difficult partners because of problems in the
implementation of Association Agreements
(AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas (DCFTAs). Both the EU and EaP
are dealing with issues that will not be resolved
overnight, and thus they are going to shape
mutual relations in the next few years.
This development can be called a “status quo
plus” or deepening of integration, instead of
enlargement. It is based on a current approach
which concentrates on good practices, sector-specific cooperation, and avoids politically-sensitive issues. The recent proposal of
further institutionalisation of the EU’s eastern
policy could be accepted in the future. It is feasible to expect a strengthening of the EU’s role
in security management, particularly in Moldova and Ukraine.
While the EU is trying to revive the multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership, these
efforts have not brought success in the previous years. However, in the case of successful
sectoral integration, the multilateral framework would offer the opportunity for EaP
countries to cooperate on new specific targets
related to closer cooperation with the EU.
One of the most challenging issues will be for
the EU to clarify the absence of the new incentives, which shaped the policy in the previous
decade, including a visa-free regime, an association agreement and access to the EU single
market. Not only EU institutions and member
states feel some “EaP fatigue”, due to the little
progress in partner countries. Also, the political elite and citizens of these countries can
feel exhausted by continues mentoring by the
EU and dissatisfaction with the “graduate approach” in mutual relations
The absence of a grand vision, something that
the EU is not willing and able to provide to the
eastern neighbourhood, can trigger a decrease
of pro-EU attitudes as well as a decline in support for a reform agenda and the implementation of Association Agreements and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas.
Despite a shared history, a similar development and dealing with the same political and
economic issues, the EaP countries differ in
7
Visegrad Insight
The EU is trying
to revive the EaP
framework. One of
the most challenging
issues will be for
the EU to clarify
the absence of new
incentives, which
shaped the EaP policy
in the previous decade
significant terms. Such differences have deepened in previous years and the degree of differentiation and individualisation is going to
continue in the following years. This will be
visible on two main dimensions, foreign policy
and internal development.
The current differences will be intensified because of countries’ choice of the economic,
political and normative framework offered by
the European Union, the Russian Federation
or by the intensification of cooperation with
other external players. The EaP finds itself in
a contested normative space: especially the
civilisational choice between the EU and Russia represents a serious dilemma, while China
emerges as another actor in the region.
While some of the countries chose closer cooperation and possible sectoral integration
with the European Union, others have decided for limited cooperation or even selection of
another institutional framework, i.e. participation in Russia-led projects. Due to ongoing international competition, the European Union
(and Russia) will extend their support to the
8
countries belonging to “their” block and reinforce their presence there. At the same time, it
will increase instability in countries with “divided loyalties”, such as Moldova and Armenia,
where the political elite and society are polarised over the issue.
The choice of framework will have obvious
implications to the security environment of
the countries of the Eastern Partnership. For
some, NATO membership remains high on
the agenda while others will try to retain a strategic balance or continue to depend on Russian
dominance. The risk of escalation remains high
in case of a decisive move towards deeper integration with the EU and NATO for Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova. The instrumentalisation
of active and frozen conflicts, the use of hybrid
warfare and the "stick" of energy dependence
are feasible outcomes in such a scenario. As a
consequence, regional differences the result of
security choices will be further emphasised because of future investments and procurement
of military and cyber technology as well as
their technical compatibility with Euroatlantic
or Russian defence systems.
Unless a significant change in the international
system will happen, the international orientation is going to cause increasing differentiation
in internal development as well. Although economic and political reforms in the region did
not always bring desirable results, the influence
of the European Union is gradually changing
the political institutions, the economy and encouraging greater involvement of citizens into
political processes.
Economic and political reforms and access to
the EU single market bring increasing benefits
in terms of economic growth, social support,
and strengthening democratic institutions and
practices. This could reinforce the middle class
as well as small and medium enterprises, with
an increasing impact on political processes.
On the other hand, if the rise of illiberal politicians and practices will continue inside the
EU, these ideas can spill over to neighbouring
countries as well.
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Eastern Partnership countries have a historical legacy of being tempted towards stability
and a strong, hierarchical rule. While relatively
marginalised so far, traditionalist politicians
oriented towards resentment could be on the
rise, in case of instability, failure of economic
progress or the successful development of Eurasian Union project.
Regional leaders and populations lack a clear
idea how their state and society should develop
and position itself in the international arena.
The palpable absence of political will in the EU
to provide a membership perspective to the
EaP countries threatens an increase in disappointment within the region. In the absence
of visible progress towards EU membership,
other developments such as the rise of illiberal
leaders and closer ties with EU regional competitors, such as China, Turkey and Russia, will
gain ground.
Currently, regional leaders do not portray a vision of prosperous countries able to improve
their situation without the help of external
actors. Such development will coincide with a
generational change in politics. At least some
of the new politicians increasingly will utilise
populist, anti-liberal, anti-democratic and
even anti-EU perspectives.
The EaP finds itself in
a contested normative
space: especially the
civilisational choice
between the EU and
Russia represents a
serious dilemma
Popular revolutions, post-election protests
and mobilisation against poor economic performance, corruption, injustice and the power
of oligarchs already marks the Eastern Partnership countries. Close ties with the European
Union have encouraged citizens to demand an
end to poor governmental policies, corruption
and repressive practices. Even if the protesters
were not waving the EU flag, they evoked its
ideals by asking for a better and more democratic life. Since protests have become an effective tool, they often will be exploited by various political actors to spread their agenda. The
recent development in Armenia indicates that
the regime in Belarus and Azerbaijan may face
new challenges as well.
While showing the “power of the people” and
removing ruling elites from their positions,
revolutions and mass protests have brought
only limited results, since widespread corruption, clientelism and oligarchic power persist.
Growing disappointment with the actual situation and the absence of a clear future perspective will coincide with a series of elections
in the region and the call for new leaders. The
young will be activated in the next decade.
Their rise and the importance of civil society
represent both an opportunity and a threat.
Youth movements in the EaP countries have
more experience with politics than in many
other regions of the world. However, fulfilling a
“change” with the help of a concrete vision and
a political programme remains one of the most
significant challenges for regional leaders, including the next generation.
9
Visegrad Insight
Society & Demography
B
y 2030 the Eastern Partnership
countries are likely to be characterised by greater diversity in
the area of demography and as a
consequence the "human" dimension of
development. Overall, the impact of an increasing urban-rural divide, brain drain and
changes in family structures cannot be underestimated as significant and interrelated trends.
While according to traditional economic measures, which tend to suggest a general trend of
economic growth, an upswing in GDP and
amelioration in basic living standards, a more
nuanced reading and forwards projection
could indicate a less than rosy and far more
stratified picture. Furthermore, though the
UN ranks Belarus as "very high", and the other
five EaP states "high" in terms of their Human
Development, this is seemingly tempered the
Happiness Index rankings, which, based on
people’s perceptions and senses of whether
10
they are "living the life they value", reveals less
optimistic outcomes, especially with regards to
the views of Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians. Current and emerging trends and facts
on the ground suggest that by 2030 economic
growth and human development, understood
in a broad sense, will be more patchy and societies less happy. A number of interrelated
trends appear to confirm this claim.
First, GDP growth will be somewhat overshadowed by divergences across a number of axes,
including between urban and rural settings and
between older and younger generations. This
could imply that by 2030 striking differences
in wealth and opportunity will be ever more
apparent, particularly in Moldova, Armenia
and Georgia, with capital cities becoming focal
points for investment and development to the
detriment of other regions. By definition this
will lead to a swelling of urban populations and
a continuation of the socio-economic hollowing out of towns and villages, to unprecedent-
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
A more nuanced
reading and forwards
projection could
indicate a less than
rosy and far more
stratified picture of
economic growth and
basic living standards
ed levels, which will pose significant challenges
for governments to create adequate social safety nets.
Despite any government policies aimed at bolstering the regions and spurring rural development, by 2030 areas beyond the capitals are
likely to be marked by vicious circles of high
levels of poverty, weak infrastructure and limited economic development.
This tendency could well be exacerbated by
sustained outflows from the regions of predominantly younger working-age populations, which by definition will expedite the
ageing process, raise unemployment rates,
lower GDP per capita and heighten poverty
rates compared to the average national level.
In the face of governments' lack of resources
and capacities in the fields of social and health
policies, lifelong-learning and (re)training for
the over 50s structural as well as long-term
unemployment may become the norm beyond
the big cities. What this adds up to could be
a scenario in which substantial and unbridgeable divergences become ever more apparent
within societies, which cannot be ameliorated
by government policies.
A second key trend also relates to migration.
Declining populations have long been a principle feature in virtually all post-Soviet states.
This trend will be both reinforced, but also
transformed, by more intensive and varied
forms of outwards migration, which over the
next ten years will have far-reaching impacts
upon the EaP states. In terms of destinations,
workers from the EaP states, and especially
from Moldova, Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine,
who may have previously opted to work in
Russia, increasingly head westwards to take up
employment in the EU member states. However, it does not end there, as a change of destination is only a small part of a bigger and more
consequential story.
There is a notable tendency for migrant workers from the EaP states to be female, so much
so that by 2030 it is possible to foresee that the
typical EaP migrant worker will no longer be a
male working in the construction industry, but
rather a young female working in the service or
care sector in Western Europe. Coupled with
this, though demand for workers in manual
(and male) domains will continue, by 2030 the
types of jobs on offer to migrant workers from
the East will typically attract the more educated and skilled elements of society.
A further discernible trend is for migrant
workers to hold longer term contracts and
therefore for migration to be less ‘circular’ and
fixed-term in nature. Difficult and unpredictable economic realities in Eastern Partnership
states, coupled with attractive opportunities
in the West, are seeing migrants become more
attached to their host countries and therefore
less involved and interested in their countries
of origin. In other words, in the run up to 2030,
migrants are spending more time away from
home and some figures suggest that permanent migration is a becoming a discernible
feature.
The effects of this are already being felt and are
likely to become more pronounced over the
forthcoming decade. To begin with, the brain
drain is becoming ever more intense and the
notion that migrants will return with new11
Visegrad Insight
The socio-economic
condition of most
EaP states on route
to 2030 is not wholly
positive. This situation
will pose significant
policy challenges for
governments which
do not have adequate
resources
found skills and attributes to deploy at home
to boost local development is being palpably
challenged by reality. Global trends suggest
that such changes in migration patterns have
direct and detrimental effects on societies; a
fall in the levels of remittances, which traditionally get passed either directly to families
and relations back home or formally via state
coffers, will make households poorer and reduce levels of consumption and state income.
Based on current tendencies Moldova, Armenia and Georgia would be most affected in this
area, which is noteworthy given that by 2030
payments from overseas workers could plausibly fall by around 25%. All in all, whilst labour
migration will continue to bring benefits, by
2030 the changing nature of outwards migration will be an ever more pressing source of
insecurity and risk for EaP states.
A third contributing trend to shaping states
and societies in the EaP region also relates to
the structural factors and impacts outlined
above but refers to very specific developments
at the level of families and communities. Mi12
gration studies tend to concur that the family
unit is a victim of migration, especially when
it involves movements on based on economic
hardship from very poor to much richer countries or regions.
Within the EaP region migration patterns within countries, coupled with strong outwards
migration has indelible effects on families and
on the children who are most likely to be ‘left
behind’ when their parents move away for
work, especially for lengthy periods. Though
commentators disagree on how far this phenomenon detrimentally affects children’s development and psychological well-being in a
permanent sense, in the context of the Eastern
Partnership states the consequences are fairly
well documented and crucially are expected to
be of more significance and impact.
A growing number of economic migrants from
the EaP countries tend to leave their children
in the care of grandparents or other ageing relatives, often in rural areas and, as already mentioned, tend to be away from home for longer
and longer periods. Trends suggest that instances of parents leaving their children home
will only increase, rather than abate, in the face
of sustained domestic economic hardships and
perceptions that things are not getting any better. In this scenario, research suggests that children of migrant workers may have higher cases
of nutritional neglect and attachment-related
behavioural problems, which present intensive
policy challenges for governments to create
and support institutional structures needed to
alleviate problems with being ‘left behind’.
Overall, based on the selection of the kinds of
indicators highlighted above, the socio-economic condition of most EaP states on route
to 2030 is not wholly positive and crucially, it
will be the already underprivileged elements of
society that will continue to be most vulnerable. This situation will pose significant policy
challenges for governments which do not have
adequate resources and means to implement
the kind of social, educational and regional
policies to counter this scenario.
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Economy and Technology
T
here are five important economic
trends for the EaP countries, which
will determine their prospects for
the future. First, the effects of
the DCFTA agreements in case of Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova. Second, the role of
the ICT sector and the diversification of the
economy. Third, problems related to demography and migration. Fourth, developments of transport infrastructure and fifth,
the possible implications of a new economic crisis and the economic vulnerabilities of
the EaP countries.
Despite their geographical and economic differences, the Eastern Partnership has proven to
be a viable initiative, providing the grounds for
a beneficial dialogue, a boost in trade flows between the EU and the neighbouring countries
and increasing the overall favourable opinion
on the European Union in the six states.
The assessment of the effects of the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas is an important step, because the agreements serve as a
benchmark for those EaP states that did not
agree to closer association and access to the
EU single market. Positive results may serve as
an additional incentive to deepen partnerships
with the others.
Moldova and Georgia joined the DCFTA in
July 2016 and in the case of Ukraine, it fully
entered into force in September 2017, offering
the associated countries the "four freedoms"
of the EU single market, with some limitations concerning the free movement of capital,
goods, services, and people.
Among the three members, Moldova has
witnessed the strongest signs of a developing
partnership between 2013 and 2018 – over
60% growth in exports, while also increasing
the EU’s export share from 56% (2013) to 74%
13
Visegrad Insight
One challenge remains
the region’s ability to
further innovation
within the sector
and let its local tech
companies grow into
big enterprises before
seeing them depart to
the United States.
(2018). Ukraine saw significant growth of its
exports to EU as well – 20% growth from 2013
to 2018, while the EU’s share in Ukraine’s exports also increased: from 27% (2013) to 42%
(2018). It is important to note, that this increase happened even though Ukraine was experiencing an armed conflict in Donbas, losing
parts of its territory and seeing a 25% decrease
in total exports. Among the three DCFTA
members, Georgia had the lowest increase in
its exports to EU, 6%, while the European Union’s share between 2013-2018 remained the
same (16%). The reason behind it is that Russia
has lifted sanctions, imposed on Georgia’s ag-
ricultural products in 2005-2006, resulting in
the increase of the export share of Russia from
8% (2013) to 22% (2018).
Overall the effect of the DCFTA proved to
be beneficial for these countries, especially in
terms of export, while the growth in foreign
direct investment was insignificant. These
promising results could encourage other EaP
countries to follow suit.
One sector that plays an important role in the
majority of the EaP countries is Information
and Communication Technology (ICT). The
ICT sector is expected to grow even more
rapidly in the next decade. Its success is due
to comparable ease to export services, which
goods suffered more high costs after the dissolution of the USSR. Thus, it was a logical
decision for many countries to jump on the
bandwagon of a relatively new sector. Belarus,
Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova and to a lesser extent Georgia started by providing incentives to
the big tech companies and the adaptation of
favourable regulations. Another reason for the
sector’s success, was the relatively safe degree
of investment and a lower degree of corruption.
Belarus has large tech parks and attracts a
great number of foreign investments. Ukraine
is one of the region’s leaders, with a high number of the Fortune 500 list relying on its country-based expertise. It also has the fourth-largest ICT workforce in the world. Already under
the Soviet Union, Armenia was a notable IT
ICT service export share of total export (%)
7.4%
8.0%
6.6%
7.0%
5.8%
6.1%
6.0%
6.3%
6.5%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.7%
2.9%
3.7%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
3.3%
1.0%
0.8%
0.3%
1.3%
1.1%
0.8%
0.3%
1.2%
1.0%
0.7%
0.2%
1.5%
1.2%
0.8%
0.3%
2000
2010
2011
2012
4.4%
4.2%
5.9%
5.0%
4.9%
3.9%
5.6%
5.1%
4.9%
4.0%
3.5%
3.9%
3.1%
2.2%
1.7%
2.1%
0.8%
0.3%
0.8%
0.4%
0.7%
0.4%
0.9%
0.4%
1.2%
0.3%
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
3.1%
0.0%
Ukraine
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Moldova
Georgia
ICT service export share of total export (%) between 2000-2017. Source: World Bank.
14
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Population change in EaP countries between 1991-2018
36.74%
40.00%
30.00%
Moldova
20.00%
Armenia
10.00%
Georgia
Azerbaijan
0.00%
-10.00%
-20.00%
-30.00%
Belarus
Ukraine
-4.27%
-6.95%
-14.19%
-15.79%
-22.85%
Population change in Eastern Partnership countries between 1991-2018. Source: World Bank.
centre where 40% of military mainframe computers were created. The country was a natural
choice for further development of the sector
and now has a year-on-year 25% growth rate,
also supported by a large Armenian diaspora.
Moldova has a high share of ICT services in
relation to its GDP and overall exports, partly because of other low-performing sectors.
Azerbaijan is characterised by a high imbalance: while declaring the ICT sector a priority, its share in overall export is still very low.
Baku remains very dependent on the export
of natural resources. As such, the ICT sector
will play a crucial role in the future economic
development of these countries. One challenge
remains the region’s ability to further innovation within the sector and let its local tech
grow into big enterprises before seeing them
depart to the United States.
Demography plays a crucial role for the economy. A population with a low average age can
give a significant boost to the labour market,
as it happened after the Second World War,
while a high average age creates a deficit of labour and puts pressure on the healthcare and
pension systems. Almost all of the EaP countries – with the exception of Azerbaijan – saw
a significant decrease of population between
1991 and 2018 and today face the problem of
an aging population.
Ukraine is the “leader” in terms of population
decrease, having lost almost 23% of its population since gaining independence. Weak economic performance in the EaP has lowered
fertility rates, increased mortality rates and
reduced the average life expectancy. However, migration is the most important reason for
the population decrease. In the past, people
moved from the EaP countries to the Russian
Federation but in the last few years this trend
has changed, also due to of a badly performing Russian economy and a devaluation of the
currency. Migration patterns have reoriented
to other, mostly EU labour markets. Ukraine
and Belarus see an outflow to Poland, Moldovans migrate to Italy and Georgians go to other
EU member states. Absent a recovery of the
Russian economy, the EaP workforce mostly
will target the EU as a labour destination in
the next decade. This will result in more people-to-people contact and economic ties between the EU and the EaP, while not resolving
the significant demographic challenge for the
eastern neighbourhood.
To a large degree, the development of transport infrastructure and international as well
as external connectivity will have an impact
on areas such as trade, economic growth and
migration. Many of the countries in the region
– Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ar15
Visegrad Insight
A deepening of trade
relations with the EU
based on the DCFTA
agreements and
increased exports in
the short run will help
to avoid a sudden
economic slowdown
and could have
favourable long-term
effects
There is a reasonable chance that another
global economic crisis could have lasting consequences for the EaP region. This could be the
rest of a slowdown of the Chinese economy,
protectionist economic policies and tariff wars
that hamper trade. Out of the six EaP countries, the economies of Ukraine, Belarus and
Azerbaijan seem the most vulnerable, however, for different reasons.
Ukraine looks the most vulnerable, due to a
high level of inflation (9.78 in 2018), a high rate
of government debt to GDP (75.6% in 2017)
and a large trade deficit (9.5 billion dollars in
2018). Combined with the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and the use of economic sanctions, these are obstacles to growth that
are unlikely to dissipate in the near future.
menia – have a challenging situation in terms
of infrastructure because of frozen conflicts
and threats from geographical isolation.
The vulnerability of Belarus is due to its deep
connections to Russia and its dependency on
cheap Russian fossil fuels. The devaluation of
the Russian rouble also has direct effects on
Belarus: an even slight increase in the price of
energy resources could crash the energy-intensive Belarussian economy. The economy of
Azerbaijan is driven by the export of crude oil
and gas, it represents over 91% of Baku’s exports and is responsible for 44% of its GDP.
Such reliance on oil and gas makes Azerbaijan’s
economy extremely sensitive to changes in the
global prices of energy resources.
The EU foresees that the development of the
infrastructure significantly will bolster economic growth and create additional job opportunities in the region. This is why in 2017 the
EaP countries were included into the trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and in
December 2018 a so-called Investment Action
Plan was adopted to provide almost 13 billion
euros investment to construction and rehabilitation of a total of 4,800 kilometres of roads
and rail network, six ports and 11 logistics
centres by 2030. The biggest beneficiary of the
investments will be Ukraine (4.4 billion euros)
and Georgia (3.4 billion euros). All the proposed investment projects should boost trade
and economic relations of the region, while
also increasing mobility and interpersonal relations.
Not all economic trends foresee a negative
scenario for the EaP region. A deepening of
trade relations with the EU based on the DCFTA agreements and increased exports in the
short run will help to avoid a sudden economic slowdown and could have favourable longterm effects. Strong growth in the ICT sector
and ambitious infrastructure projects will encourage greater connectivity with and between
the countries of the region. Nevertheless, it
is important to emphasise the implications
of demographic decline and migration in the
EaP countries: a labour deficit, a sizeable brain
drain and additional pressure on the healthcare and pension systems; while in case of a
new global economic crisis, some countries are
extremely vulnerable to any serious slowdown
and would fall into recession for years.
16
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
Information and Digital
H
ybrid information threats from the
Russian Federation have become
one of the key factors in the activation of processes concerning
the information and digital environment of
the Eastern Partnership countries. For the
next few years, support for the struggle of
the countries of the region against these
threats is both a palpable trend and priority
of external assistance from the EU, which
is reflected in an acceleration of the formation of information and digital policies in
the region’s countries. Of course, the development of these areas also falls under the
influence of global challenges regarding
the role of information and technological
progress.
The information space of the Eastern Partnership countries has become one of the bridgeheads of the struggle for sovereignty over the
past five years. This struggle intensified signif-
icantly after the 2014 revolution in Ukraine,
when the information channels of the Russian
Federation significantly diversified methods
of disseminating disinformation regarding
Ukraine. In addition, the Russia Federation
advanced its geopolitics among neighbouring
countries.
In the EaP countries, there is a lack of active
mechanisms (including a legislative framework) to identify and counter propaganda. Yet,
there are also a number of cases of public campaigns and initiatives to counter propaganda in
Ukraine and Georgia.
For the region, the share of Russian media content that affects a large part of the population
in the media remains significant. The post-Soviet socio-economic memory of the population and the formation of controlled political
elites are important factors which contribute
to this Russian media influence. Topics such
17
Visegrad Insight
as the usage of language, religion and ethnicity are a convenient means for destabilisation
of the information space in the EU’s eastern
neighbourhood. The financial influence of the
media propaganda, often channelled through
powerful business players with international
commercial interests, only contributes to this
hostile media environment.
Online media remain an important niche in
terms of confronting the current level of disinformation. They are periodically subjected
to direct or indirect pressure in individual EaP
countries. At the same time, Russian-based
social networks (such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki) play an important disinformation role in the region’s internet environment.
There is a growing influence of cyberattacks
and the increased use of technology to achieve
political goals in the EaP region. These are
correlated to a wider growth of international
political tension between the region and the
Russian Federation.
Technological and human resources play an
important role in the ability to counter cyber
threats in the region. In the next decade, this
will require a thorough methodological and
technical training as well as adequate financial
support. In particular, digital isolation because
of a gap in “digital literacy” between generations risks a further deterioration of the situation.
Cooperation with the relevant EU structures,
such as the DG Communication Task Force
on Disinformation and the EU East StratCom
Task Force, will be one of the ways to strengthen information resilience of the countries of
the region. NATO is an equally important potential partner in countering hybrid information threats. The Ukraine-NATO Platform and
the Agreement on the Implementation of the
Ukraine-NATO Trust Fund on Cybersecurity
between the Security Service of Ukraine will
provide a vital framework to counter hybrid
information threats.
With regard to the broader digital space, new
opportunities will be provided under the recently launched project “EU4Digital: Support18
ing Digital Economy and Society in the Eastern Partnership”, funded within the European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) framework.
The main efforts of this initiative are to harmonise key sectors of the EaP’s digital markets
with those of EU member states: telecom rules
and digital infrastructure, e-trust and cyber
security, e-trade, start-up and ICT innovation
ecosystems, digital skills and e-health.
In the past three years, the priority of digital
development of the economy and society increased significantly in all EaP countries as
well as for the EU which evidenced by opening
additional opportunities for partner countries.
The main positive result of multilateral cooperation in the telecom sphere is the confirmation by the EaP ministers that they are ready
to sign the regional agreement on decreasing
international roaming rates between the EaP
countries by 2020 and approve a joint roadmap
that should lead to the signing of this regional
agreement.
Importantly, EaP countries and EU member-states will look to establish a common
space for international roaming, including economically sustainable cutting of roaming rates
between the EaP countries and the EU. The
parties have agreed to start discussions and
conduct a respective study in the next year. A
future agreement will mean a significant boost
for regional connectivity and fruther development of the digital economy.
In a related area, the main positive prerequisite
for the development of cybersecurity sector
in the EaP countries is the launch of a related
project named “EU4Digital: improving Cyber
Resilience in Eastern Partnership countries”
(also under ENI). Its goal is to improve cyber
resilience and the respective systems of criminal judiciary in EaP countries. It will focus on
designing technical mechanisms and cooperation mechanisms that improve cybersecurity
and readiness for cyberattacks. These include
reinforcement of institutional management capacity and the legal framework, the development of critically important IT infrastructure,
and the improvement of the potential for cyber
crime incident management.
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
It will be crucial to
create a common
platform for the EaP
countries for dialogue
in the sphere of
information security
in the next few
years, including the
development of soft
power tools
The region is delivering some accomplishments in this sector, among others, the adoption of a number of national strategies on cyber security (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine), the
establishment of cybersecurity departments
in government authorities and the first steps
to implement an EU directive on the security
of network and information systems (Belarus,
Georgia and Ukraine lead the way).
Looking ahead, the digitalisation of the socio-political sphere of the region will become
an indispensable tool to increase independence and the level of free flow of information
in EaP countries through the expansion of
broadband access to the Internet, the adoption
of regulations that promote cross-border socio-economic relations between EaP countries
and the increase in digital skills of the population in all countries of the region.
come a means for regular diplomatic consultation. Moreover, the presence of a mediator
of an international level (EU, NATO, OSCE)
would be a prerequisite.
Technical and financial support for the EaP
information sphere will be vital to counteract
hybrid threats and to help to build a powerful tool to fight disinformation in the region.
Moreover, such support should be directed
to traditionally problematic (television) and
potentially massive (new media and Internet
media) information channels. Moreover, digital skills and media literacy should become the
flagship when developing future digital policies for the EaP countries.
In the upcoming decade, the drafting of national strategies for digital skills could complement the existing legislative framework. The
creation of a permanent open digital databases
for the main socio-political players in the EaP
region (including the media) may be one of the
possible tools for monitoring socio-political
stability.
Greater attention to hybrid threats means
that information security will become one of
the priorities for the Eastern Partnership. The
region is the closest and most vulnerable target for the Russian Federation's information
war. Therefore, the EU will intensify its work
through bilateral association with the three
countries that have an Association Agreement
(Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), as well as with
those that do not have such framework agreements (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia). Additionally, improving the transparency and visibility of the EaP digital markets will increase
accountability and lead to an improved understanding of the digital sphere, its problems and
impact on wider society.
It will be crucial to create a common platform
for the EaP countries for dialogue in the sphere
of information security in the next few years,
including the development of soft power tools.
Ultimately, such a common platform could be19
Visegrad Insight
Energy and Environment
M
any of the trends in the areas of
energy and environment will be
driven by policies of the European Union, whether it concerns a
greening of its Eastern Partnership agenda
or capacity-building against hazards and
differentiating energy needs, from production to consumption, in the region.
The European Union takes active attempts towards the greening of its policy action which
will see ramifications in the relationship with
its eastern partners. Climate has become
mainstream in all areas of its exclusive competences and those shared with member states.
More money is earmarked to boost green projects, combat pollution and support local and
national authorities in their transition towards
a decarbonised society as well as prepare for
the burgeoning impact of climate change.
The Eastern Partnership is not overlooked
as an area in terms of EU ambitions to be a
20
role model for the international community
in terms of green and carbon-neutral investment. Agreements with partners from the
eastern neighbourhood include far reaching
specifications concerning climate change and
energy efficiency. The EaP platform is used to
strengthen the focus on clean energy production, greater connectivity of infrastructure,
improvements in efficiency and the reduction
of waste, as well as a transparent management
of the transition and mitigating the effects of
climate change. Greater pressure is put on
strategic actors in terms of energy transition
and critical infrastructure to move away for
investment in fossil fuel sources and focus exclusively on carbon-neutral means of energy
production.
The EU will raise expectations when it comes
to EaP countries targets for decarbonisation
and implementation of policies to achieve this
aim. Past examples have shown ambition in
countries such as Ukraine and Belarus to focus
Eastern Partnership 2030 Trends
on energy efficiency and the green economy,
enabled through platforms such as the Eastern Europe Energy Efficient and Environment
Partnership (E5P), but with few results because of limitations in absorption capacity of
EU support as well as a general underexploited
potential. Conflict could arise in areas where
there is a clear mismatch between high EU
expectations and impediments to realise the
green agenda component of the EaP policies.
Weak administration of public funds, the absence of a coherent, integrated policy towards
climate continues to haunt the region. In part,
EU support will seek to offset such obstacles
at the national level by reorienting attention
to bottom-up and local initiatives that aim to
build awareness and practical experience in
the implementation of a climate strategy.
Overall, countries that have a closer relationship with the EU, such as Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova, will be more intensively exposed to
attempts of transposition and implementation
of the EU acquis in the domains of energy and
environment. Hitherto, there is no concerted
effort although the trend suggests moderate
improvements during the next decade. Yet, the
weak resonance of EU rules and the few immediate rewards could still hamper success in
this area.
Many of the improvements depend on the extent of additional funding from the EU institutions, the European Investment Bank (EIB)
and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), which will be tied
to new elements of conditionality. Investment
in energy resources, water supply and waste
management are areas where there is a clear
prospect of financial support being dependent
on bringing countries in line with key international climate objectives. This could trigger
broader, comprehensive efforts to develop a
coherent environmental policy that addresses
both issues of energy and environment.
In strategic terms, the EU plans to build a more
visible component of resilience into its green
focus. The eastern partners are encouraged
to address challenges in terms of energy production and transit as well as climate change
in terms of capacity-building to protect society
against the consequences of a transition to carbon-neutrality by the mid-2050s.
The issues of resilience and capacity-building
against both natural and man-made disasters
will see greater resonance in the next decade,
as cleavages emerge within societies and between countries in how to deal with hazards
occurring because of global warming, pollution, deforestation, as well as the poor implementation and a lack of enforcement of measures due to corruption and a lack of adequate
safety standards. The impact of a major nuclear
disaster continues to have a lasting impact and
is reflected in the concerns of society and the
international community. Extension of nuclear
reactors with EU support, for instance in Armenia, will face more scrutiny and opposition
in the next few years.
The greatest threats to the EaP region’s institutional capacity in dealing with hazards, however, will come from the consequences of the
projected warming of the Earth. Likely effects
are extreme weather and longer periods of
warming in the greater region. Temperature
rises will cause excessive drought and heat
waves occurring at more regular intervals.
While Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are already affected, such climate-related episodes
are expected to be frequent and put great
strain on government authorities.
From the local to the national level, authorities in the EaP will have to show they are acting and do not restrict themselves to empty
words – or risk pressure from the street and
frustration in their relationship with the EU.
Attempts at building greater resilience against
climate-related hazards are dire at best. There
is little effort undertaken to promote initiatives
related to reducing the carbon footprint, improve energy efficiency at home and at work.
Local innovations that could empower a wider
government strategy barely exist, and where
they exist they do not offer adequate incentives for extensive experimentation with capacity-building. In addition, there is a lack of
cooperation between all relevant stakeholders.
21
Visegrad Insight
The Russian
Federation will
offer competing
projects to the EU,
thereby seeking to
undermine efforts
at interconnection
between the EaP
countries and links
with the EU’s energy
market
Apart from the difficulties such obstacles will
create in relation to the EU, civil unrest will be
a defining factor that could sway local and national governments to do more. While many
places in the EaP still have problems with
sparse awareness about climate and the finite
potential of mobilisation, the first signs of civil
society and non-governmental action are palpable in Ukraine and Moldova and may extend
to the South Caucasus.
In determining future energy needs and how
to build the institutional capacity to manage
the transition towards a decarbonised economy, the Eastern Partnership will face a great
variation of existing situations, demands and
resources to address the issue. Differentiation
in terms of energy needs, for investment and
consumption but also priorities to address environmental concern, will create generate divergences within the region. In turn, this could
create cleavages within countries but particularly in terms of intra-regional cooperation.
Differentiation may limit the effectiveness of
22
financial support channelled through international actors.
Already, there is potential for disruption in
intra-EaP cooperation because of broad spectrum of institutional relations and degrees of
integration with the EU or Russia, which has
led to divergences in terms of agenda, priorities and the overall question of energy interdependence. DCFTAs between the EU and some
of the countries will serve a platform for deepening cooperation in the field of energy but at
the same time may weaken the overall potential of the EaP as an umbrella platform and enabler in the fields of energy and environment.
A multitude of bodies and platforms such as
the Energy Community (of which Ukraine and
Moldova are signatories) and the E5P also entail a risk of fragmentation. In the case of Azerbaijan, a separate strategic partnership with the
EU is the only foreseeable outcome and would
hamper the overall aims of the EaP agenda.
The Russian Federation is certain to be a factor of instability because of its continued attempts to divide and isolate countries using
energy and climate change agendas. Continued reliance on fossil fuel, bespoke infrastructure and long-term contracts go against the
greater need for flexibility, de-carbonisation
and renewable energy sources propagated by
other actors. In the next decade, the Russian
Federation will offer competing projects to the
EU, thereby seeking to undermine efforts at interconnection between the EaP countries and
links with the EU’s energy market. Moreover,
it will continue to sponsor climate change deniers in an attempt to sow societal division. Armenia’s and Belarus’ continued dependence on
Russia for energy needs, while Ukraine reduces
its dependence, are examples of how differentiation will put pressure on the strategic and
security outlook of each country in the region.
Finally, the picture will be complicated by the
likely occurrence of serious energy price fluctuations and volatility the result of changes
in the energy mix. Similar to the impact and
consequences of environmental hazards, such
events could bring about civil unrest within
countries and see regional repercussions.
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