Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram

Terrorism & Political Violence, 2019

This article examines the factions, leadership, and internal organization of Boko Haram, the terrorist group which has operated to devastating effect in parts of northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It finds the group’s leadership has been significantly more centralized than previous literature has acknowledged. The leadership was also extremely ruthless but enforced group cohesion by killing anyone who sought to defect. Group members attempted to defect and depose the leadership in 2012 and 2016 by seeking external interventions from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), respectively. In the first instance Boko Haram’s leadership demonstrated control and influence by forcing defectors back into submission, but in the second instance ISIL-backed militants deposed the leadership in a rebellion and coup. The loyalty to ISIL of jihadist commanders and foot soldiers in Nigeria explains why only the rebellion and coup succeeded in 2016 even though AQIM provided greater material support to the first set of defectors in 2012. This article contributes to research on internal dynamics of Boko Haram, the relationships between Al Qaeda and ISIL and their allied and affiliated organizations, and the costs and benefits of extreme leadership for terrorist groups.

Boko Haram is at the intersection of the ongoing insecurity, religious intolerance, and unbridled insurgency around the Lake Chad Basin of West Africa. Boko Haram is ideologically driven by the fundamentalist Islamic tenet of replacing the “morally bankrupt” Nigerian government with the supremacy of strict Islamic sharia laws (Awoniyi, 2013; Blanquart, 2012; Ladan-Baki, 2015; Onuoha, 2012; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The movement also promotes an ISIS spirit with Al-Qaeda inspiration and Libyan weaponry. Because it has become increasingly clear that peace cannot return to the Lake Chad Basin unless Boko Haram is comprehensively understood and dealt with, this chapter sets for itself, the initial objective of investigating if the emergence of and transformation of domestic insurgencies to transnational insurgencies in the Chad Basin are explainable using Paul Staniland’s(2005) “theory of insurgency.” From this backdrop, I then examine the relationship between Boko Haram and the social, economic, cultural, and ideological fortunes of the group’s primary targets including the countries of Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The probable fate of Boko Haram, in terms of its ultimate lot, will likely play out similar to other transnational insurgency groups including the Revolutionary United Force (RUF) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). To achieve the above, the subsequent discussion is divided in to five sections. First, I present some background information on insurgency, transnational insurgency, counterinsurgency, and their connections. Second, I provide the chapter’s context regarding the Lake Chad Basin. Third, I consider Boko Haram’s metamorphosis, the nexus between a part of Staniland’s (2005) theory and the group, and the multifaceted effects of the group’s activities in the region. The different categories of transnational counterinsurgency measures deployed against Boko Haram and the inability of these measures to defeat the group form the basis of the fourth section. In the fifth section, the preceding is underlined by the remaining positions in Staniland’s (2005) theory followed by an examination of an alternative explanation based on the Failed State Index (FSI) and the Human Development Index (HDI). I conclude by making a case for the ultimate containment of Boko Haram, similar to that of the RUF and NPFL.

Journal of Power, Politics & Governance, 2021

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2021

2019

Boko Haram (BH) has transformed from a small group living in isolation to a large- scale terrorist movement. Academics and policy makers suggest that BH seeks to substitute Nigeria’s secular state with a strict Islamic system, while BH’s violent campaign has spilled over to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. Existing studies have suggested that socioeconomic deprivation along with religion and counter terrorism (CT) sustain BH’s violence, with these studies having concentrated on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism. Terrorist behaviour is dynamic, and thus the ever-changing nature of terrorist behaviour requires groups such as BH to be studied over time both internally and externally in order to have an in-depth understanding of a terror group. This thesis is a case study on BH. It investigates how the behaviour of BH has influenced its evolution from a small isolationist movement to a large-scale violent group. The study provides a multi-level analysi...

EJMSS Volume NO 3, 2023

The Sahelo-Sahara region, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, became an attraction for jihadist groups since the end of Cold War in the 1990s. Most of mujahidin (jihadists) from Maghreb, who were fighting Soviets in Afghanistan, returned to their countries of origin. The Global War on Terrorism and the fall of an Islamic State in Afghanistan are among the factors that contributed to the rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel. The fall of Muhammar Ghadhafi and the spread of the Libyan arsenals across the Sahel empowered the Nigerian jihadist group, Boko Haram, militarily. Boko Haram pleaded allegiance to the Islamic State, proclaimed by al-Baghdadi, and became its Province in West Africa. A multinational force was set up to fight the Boko Haram by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) members. Another similar force was put in place by 5 Sahel States (G5 Sahel), among which are Chad and Niger also members of LCBC. The diversion of Chadian troops from the Lake Chad Basin impacted negatively on the fight against Boko Haram. Using primary and secondary data, the paper analyzed the conditions that seemed to have facilitated the transformation of Boko Haram into a military power, its expansion and affiliation to the Islamic State. Also, exploring the theory of Collective Defense, the paper arrived at conclusions that security of a nation state requires the collaboration of its neighbors, especially when the threat does not confine itself to a same country. African states need to emulate the example of Nigeria in its efforts to fighting terrorism as it mobilized her neighbors, particularly in the North East geopolitical region, to collectively deal with the menace of Boko Haram terrorist group.

Institute for Security Studies, 2018

Borderland Policy Briefing Series, 2020

The response to the Boko Haram conflict has been defined by strategies largely national in scope. In providing a regional approach to tackling this challenge, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), in collaboration with the African Union Commission (AUC) and with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), developed the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience (RSS). The framework of this regional strategy has nine pillars that intersect security, development, and humanitarian issues. The crucial role of key stakeholders at local, national, and regional levels is also outlined. However, effective implementation remains a challenge. This research and policy brief presents findings on conflict dynamics in the Lake Chad borderland region, undertaken by the UNDP Africa Borderland Centre. The policy brief aims to fill emerging knowledge gaps, highlighting how responses to the conflict have been exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It also articulates key policy considerations relating to the conflict.

The Nigerian Army has recently initiated a new military operation in the northeast region of the country and around Lake Chad to eradicate the remaining Boko Haram militants. Major General David Ahmadu, army chief of Training and Operations, said the operation would last four months and involve the deployment of additional six army brigades and other military assets in Borno state, where the insurgents remain active.(1) Boko Haram insurgency is believed to have claimed at least 100,000 lives, displaced more than 2.6 million people, caused pain to over 52, 311 orphans and 54,911 widows, and led to about $9 billion worth of damage.(2) UNICEF blames the militant group for killing around 2,295 teachers and destroying more than 1400 schools destroyed since the conflict started nearly nine years ago. Boko Haram waged a short-lived uprising surged in violence under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, and has grown resilient under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration. This paper examines the trend of Boko Haram’s violence, and aims at explaining the group, societal, state and international dynamics that have shaped its rise and decline.