THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

598 UFRGSMUN | UFRGS Model United Nations ISSN 2318-3195 | v.4, 2016 | p.598-644 THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN Bruno Palombini Gastal1 Patrícia Graeff Machry2 Sérgio Minuzzi Tessuto3 ABSTRACT The present article assesses both historical and current aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan. The country has a great geopolitical importance, historically being a trade and energy hub in Central Asia and a crossroad for different cultures and people — thus, it has been a subject of dispute among great powers, such as Russia and Great Britain, in the 19th century, and the USSR and the United States, in the late 20th century. The year of 2001, nonetheless, marked a new moment in the Afghan history: as a response to the 9/11 attacks — claimed by Osama bin Laden’s group Al-Qaeda —, an important measure of the War on Terror foreign policy of George W. Bush was implemented. Having reasons to believe the Taliban government in Afghanistan protected the Al-Qaeda leader, the United States and NATO allies invaded the country in order to dismantle its regime—in which it had succeeded. More than a decade later, still, the country is far from stable. After NATO’s withdrawal more than a year ago, Afghanistan lives some of the most violent times in last years, with the resurgence of an increasingly violent Taliban and the worrying rise of the Islamic State in the country. 1 Bruno is a 3rd year student of International Relations at UFRGS. 2 Patrícia is a final year student of International Relations at UFRGS. 3 Sérgio is a 4th year student of International Relations at UFRGS. 599 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND This section summarizes Afghanistan history, comprehending the period between the early human settlements in the Afghan territory and 2008. It focuses on the most relevant aspects for the discussion on the current situation, such as the country geopolitical importance, its ethnic composition, and the Soviet and NATO invasions in the country, in 1979 and 2001, respectively. 1.1 THE AFGHAN STATE The Afghan territory is located on an important crossroad between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Thereby, it had the possibility to contact a great variety of cultures throughout its history, whereas it allowed its neighbors to grow and develop as important trade emperors that ruled commerce routes among continents (Maley 2009). Partly, the formation of the Afghan state can be explained by this particular territorial condition. Nomads who tamed the great variety of fruits within the slopes of the mountains were the first settlers. However, the subsequent invasion by several ancient empires built the social structure of Afghan people in a very particular way. Besides Persians (550 b.C.), Macedonians (300 b.C.) and Mongols (350 AD), the most important outsider to meddle into Afghanistan society were Muslims (Wahab and Youngerman 2010). A result of the long campaigns performed by Arab armies in the region, Islamism was introduced in the 8th century, becoming an important element to the conflicts in Afghanistan among external powers and local tribes — since the Islamic culture turned into the great common factor among the different tribes in the region. The most important Islamic group that occupied the region, by then, and which had achieved to build in there an incipient political organization, were Muslim Persian dynasties — stability, however, was undermined by nomads that came from the north. At that point, it is possible to observe the rise of the Pashtuns4 — a group (that are themselves divided into several tribes) original from the region around the current Afghan-Pakistani border through the slopes of Hindu Kush —, which was possible thanks to the association of both modern and tribal aspects of everyday life (Wahab and Youngerman 2010). Their support will be shown very important to promote any political organization among the differents tribes settled in the region. In 1747, the appearance of Ahmad Shah “Durr-i-Durran” as a leader UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 600 UFRGS Model United Nations among a great number of tribes (especially Pashtuns) is considered the first attempt to centralize power in the region. Despite finding certain resistance among the mountain tribes, the endeavor of creating a modern state succeeded thanks to the weakening of the surrounding empires, as the commercial routes explored by them lost importance to sea trade5 (Tanner 2002). Map 1: Simplified ethnic division of Afghanistan Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnicities_map_ 4Dec2009.jpg The vacuum of power in the surrounding region guaranteed political 4 Besides the Pashtuns, which represent nearly 50% of the population, the main groups in Afghanistan are: (i) the Tajiks, descendants of Persians, which settled in Afghanistan after the expansion of the Soviet Army towards Central Asia and that now represent nearly 30% of the Afghan population; (ii) the Hazaras, descendants of Mongols from central Afghanistan, which represent nearly 10% of the population and that traditionally were adepts of the Sharia Law; (iii) the Uzbeks, who represent a bit less than the Hazara population, are a Turkic people who migrated and settled originally in northern Afghanistan, most of them Sunni muslims. Besides, there are less populous groups such as Aimaiks (4%), Turkmen (3%), Baloch (2%), and others (Wahab and Youngerman 2010, The Asia Foundation 2012, 181–182). 5 Several empires were raised in Central Asia due to land trade routes that were heavily used by Europeans to bring products from Asia to the West. Whenever the land trade routes were left aside over sea routes, the empires collapsed (Tanner 2002). 601 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL gains for the just-founded state of Shah Durran, once there was no serious menace of invasion. However, it had likewise allowed European powers to approach Afghan borders. Great Britain, at that point, consolidated its influence over the Indian region and headed West towards where today is Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Russian Empire found no difficulties to conquer and append huge amounts of land from impoverished empires in Central Asia, reaching the northern limit of today’s Afghanistan as the Tsar headed south. The confrontation between the two great powers seemed imminent — nonetheless, it was avoided by Afghan mountainous geography, which kept England and Russia apart as each of them remained on one side of the Hindu Kush mountains (Jones 2010). This friction between the two countries would be called “The Great Game”. 1.2 THE DURAND LINE AND THE WAKHAN CORRIDOR Willing to conquer Afghan territory and decrease Russian influence in the region, the British invaded Afghanistan in 1839 — starting what is known as The First Anglo-Afghan War, which was finished in 1842 with the Europeans suffering a humiliating defeat. The strategic interest in controlling Afghanistan, to avoid a further expansion of the Russian Empire towards British India, was confirmed by a second assault from the British to the Shah land in 1878. However, this time, after two years of warfare, the Europeans were victorious counting on more than 30,000 soldiers fighting on three fronts (Jones 2010). Defeated, Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman could not do much more than negotiate the war assets that, in this case, would be the border lines of Afghanistan. Hence, the two European powers agreed in late 1880’s to create a joint commission to define the frontiers in a diplomatic way. In the north, the Russian Empire acquired no substantial gains (Wahab and Youngerman 2010). However, when the British defined its colony’s northern and eastern borders with Afghanistan, the latter lost considerable parts of its southern and eastern territories — which was accepted by the Emir in change of the payment of annuities by the United Kingdom (Tanner 2002). The treaty was signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand in 1893, creating the Durand Line, which would serve as a frontier between Afghanistan and the British India (Jones 2010). UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 602 UFRGS Model United Nations Map 2: The Durand Line Source: https://c.o0bg.com/rf/image_1920w/Boston/20112020/2014/07/06/BostonGlobe.com/ EditorialOpinion/Images/durand.png Afghanistan then became a buffer state that prevented the Russian Empire of crossing the Hindu Kush, allowing Great Britain to undisturbedly rule India. However, its borders did not take into consideration geographic and ethnic basis. In the north, for instance, the frontier cut off important seasonal routes of nomad Afghan groups such as Uzbeks and Tajik tribes; and in the east, likewise, the Durand Line prevented the Pashtun to be united in Afghan territory. In the next decade, Afghanistan would still accept one more treaty with Russia and Great Britain, regarding a final agreement on frontiers. In order to avoid the potential instability of an Anglo-Russian frontier, the Wakhan Corridor was created in 1907, extending the northeastern border of Afghanistan alongside with the southern border of where is Tajikistan today to China (Wahab and Youngerman 2010). 603 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Map 3: The Wakhan Corridor Source:http://3.bp.blogspot.com/CxSIsjpYOTM/UhUFrJrCYzI/AAAAAAAABZg/0y2oCbvRnys/ s1600/24mortenson-map-popup.jpg The First World War, nonetheless, changed the geopolitics in the region. Russian Empire and Great Britain, together with France, were now allies against Ottoman, German and Austrian empires. Although Afghanistan started the war in a neutral position, it enjoyed the conjuncture of war to essay its independence, declaring war to the United Kingdom in 1919. The Third Anglo-Afghan war ended with the independence of Afghanistan within the borders defined in 1907, namely the reassurance of the Durand Line and the Wakhan Corridor (Tanner 2002). The autonomy of Afghanistan’s foreign policy would be proved especially after the Second World War. Having chosen to remain neutral under the reign of Zahir Shah, the post-conflict urged to negotiate cooperation agreements with the winner powers (Tanner 2002). However, the background now was different, as British India was dissolved into different countries: India, with a mostly Hindu population, and Pakistan, which shared the Durand Line as its frontier with Afghanistan and had a mostly Muslim population (Jones 2010). The attrition in England’s capabilities caused by the Second World War followed by Independence Wars in the colonies precluded the possibilities of British cooperation. The Americans, on the other hand, had the resources but considered the investment in Pakistan much more important strategically. Consequently, Kabul and Moscow gradually deepened their relations (Tanner 2002). UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 604 UFRGS Model United Nations 1.3 THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN During the first thirty years of Muhammed Zahir Shah reign, which lasted from 1933 and 1973, Afghanistan experienced the longest period of stability in recent times. Although power was not truly exercised by him, since the political structure left him shadowed by his relatives who ran the government, Zahir Shah implemented important democratic and modernizing reforms — to which, however, there was severe internal resistance that prevented the deepening of the reforms. Prince Muhammed Daoud, Zahir’s prime minister (and cousin) between 1953 and 1963, sought to largely invest in education and military defense. The minister believed an organized and well-equipped national army was necessary to implement an actual modernization plan, in order to control the opposition. Daoud succeeded to create an inclusive educational system — which would promote women empowerment and modern ideals — and a new constitution, which guaranteed legal equality for every group within Afghanistan borders, freedom of religion (including to non-Muslim citizens), assurance of private property, and freedom of creating political parties was then granted. Moreover, under his leadership, Afghanistan improved relations with the United States, China, Pakistan and, mainly, the USSR. Huge amounts of money and arms that came from the Soviet Union — as loans that would later be paid with Afghan natural gas—evidenced this country’s strategic support to Daoud (Marsden 2009). At this point, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, a communist party) and Jamiat-i-Islami6 (or Islamic Society) emerged as polarized political groups7 (Tanner 2002). If in one hand it was possible to observe an actual modernizing plan implemented, in the other, a great dissatisfaction arose among conservative communities, especially due to women’s emancipation. Besides, the country had become completely dependent of international aid — mainly the USSR —, and the population could not enjoy a truly autonomous economy that offered qualified jobs and welfare. In 1973, Prince Daoud deposed his cousin from the throne and proclaimed the Republic with important support of a 6 Jamiat-I-Islami was founded in 1968 basing its political aims in the Sharia, or the Islamic Law. The group has become particularly popular during the Soviet Invasion, since the most powerful mujahideen groups were vinculated to it (Vizentini 2002). 7 It is important to stress that only an urban minority experienced political life, as most mountain tribes still lived as nomads (Vizentini 2002). 605 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL front led by a Marxist faction of the PDPA named Parcham — to which followed a decade of instabilities. Still in need of external support, and willing to diminish the dependence on the USSR, Daud approached Iran, China, United States, and Pakistan. In the meantime, the Prince tried to oust left-wing elements from the government. In 1978, however, a radical left-wing faction of the PDPA named Khalq undertook a coup d’état, ousting Parcham of the party and deposed Prince Daud from the government. Nur Muhammed Taraki, their leader, implemented important socialist reforms that sparked several riots among the conservative citizens who were supported, in special, by Pakistan (Vizentini 2002). Taraki traveled, then, to Moscow in order to guarantee military assistance and stability to his government, offering in exchange a more moderate stance, since the Soviet were not pleased with the often too radical actions of Khalq. However, returning to Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, a deputy of Taraki, executed him and took power. Hence, as instability gripped the country, the Soviet Union decided to intervene (Maley 2009). Meanwhile, large amounts of money and weapons were sent to anti-Soviet fundamentalist guerrillas of the Afghan mountains by China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and, mainly, Pakistan and the United States (Moniz Bandeira 2014). Although the USSR had deposed Amin and had given power back to Brabak Karmal, a moderate left-wing Parcham representative, political control could no longer be established (Vizentini 2002). The guerrillas were either entrenched in the mountains or settled over the Durand Line in Pakistani territory. Year after year, the warfare remained more violent and less defined. After ten years, in 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan leaving behind an incipient civil war, nearly 15,000 soldiers dead and 35,000 wounded, besides 1,000,000 Afghan fatalities and 5,000,000 refugees. The failed campaign costed a high price for the public opinion in the Soviet Union (Jones 2010, Runion 2007). 1.4 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TALIBAN REGIME As previously stated, the United States sent a huge supply to the Mujahideen8 resistance, developing a very complex structure of money transference that deeply involved also Saudi Arabia9 and Pakistan (Moniz Bandeira 2014). Many Islamic anti-communist militias fled to Pakistan through the porous Durand Line, where they had found a safe place to settle and organize their military actions. The Pakistani government, then, distributed arms and supplies through the main Afghan Islamic parties, that is: UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 606 UFRGS Model United Nations Hisb-e-Islami, composed by Pashtuns; Jamiat-e-Islamic, composed by Tajiks and led by an important character of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, Ahmad Massoud; and Hazara-e-Islami, the Hazara party formed by the country’s Shi’a minority. Based on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line were also the training fields of Islamic militias, among which several Saudi Wahhabist volunteers that were trained in the Pakistani region of Peshawar to fight the Soviets during their occupation. The most famous of these armed groups was led by Osama Bin Laden and was named Al-Qaeda (Marsden 2009). However, as the USSR withdrew and the United States thus succeeded in expanding its influence in the oil-rich Persian Gulf countries, Washington stopped the millionaire weaponry aid. Warlords were already loaded up with heavy weapons, including anti-aircraft systems, though, and a wave of violence emerged again in Afghanistan territory, beginning the Civil War (Runion 2007). This background aspect of the conflict is particularly important to understand the subsequent events. Despite the Soviet withdrawal in February of 1989, their planes kept flying in Afghan territory in order to help the stabilization of the new president Mohammed Najibullah (Maley 2009). Moscow spent nearly 3 billion dollars in humanitarian aid and strategic support a year, but as it started opening the regime, the supply became scarcely. In 1992, when the renewed Russian Federation refused to sell oil products to Najibullah, thus leaving Afghanistan with scarce fuel and food during the winter, his government collapsed (Runion 2007). 8 Mujahideen is the plural of Mujahid, which refers to the ones engaged in Jihad. The term is mainly related to the islamic warlords who fought USSR in Afghanistan (Jones 2010). 9 Even before the Soviet invasion, the Saudis received about 20 million dollars annually ( more than 600 million in 1987) from the CIA to distribute to Mujahedeen leaders close to the high policy makers of Riyadh (Moniz Bandeira 2014). 607 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Map 4: Provinces of Afghanistan Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/images/afghan-provinces-map. gif At that point, millions of refugees returned to Afghanistan after the war and the Mujahideen tested their forces by creating a chaotic climate of violence and corruption, especially in the region near the Durand Line, covered by huge masses of poverty (Tanner 2002). In this scenario, in 1992, a group of puritanical Sunni Pashtun students from Helmand and Kandahar came up calling themselves the “Taliban”, or the “seekers of knowledge”. Willing to establish a strict obedience to the Islamic law, the group received training and funding from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) — with the support of Western oil companies — and took control of Kabul in 1996. Four years later, Taliban ruled nearly 95% of Afghan territory (Runion 2007). Taliban invaded city after city, deposing and killing the mujahideen and the civilians. Their violent practices against the people considered as pagans served as an example of what would happen to the ones who did not obey the Sharia (Maley 2009). The population suffered from the violation of human rights, especially women, who were excluded from society and obligated to cover themselves in public. During the decade, the regime had UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 608 UFRGS Model United Nations very few diplomatic recognition and oodles of complaints (Runion 2007), yet their relation with Pakistan remained tight, since mattered to Islamabad to maintain in Afghanistan a government that guaranteed its interests, that is, control the oil ducts and trade routes (Mardens 2009). Taliban raised their funds with drug production. The group developed the business seized by the mujahideen years before and extended it by taxing farmers, manufacturers and transporters. Taliban legitimated their action by assuring that no Afghan enjoyed these drugs, something that only “unfaithful Western people” would do (Rashid 2009a). Osama bin Laden first contacted Taliban in 1996, when Kabul was seized. Having the ISI as intermediate, the leader of Al-Qaeda offered the incipient group formal partnership in order to guarantee his free action recruiting and training terrorists. Al-Qaeda’s special brigade was introduced to Taliban, and the group was significantly strengthened. bin Laden was considered the leader of many terrorist attacks all over the world (Maley 2009). After several bombings, the United States court considered him criminal and demanded his extradition. However, disregarding the advice of Islamabad, the Taliban refused to adhere to American orders, claiming that Osama was missing for a long time (Runion 2007). The collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 had two important reasons. The first one was internal. The Northern Alliance10 and its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud (or, as he was respectfully known, “The Lion of Panjshir”), were one of the main reasons why the Taliban had not completely dominated Afghanistan yet. Massoud was an excellent strategist and very esteemed among his fighters as he refused high posts in the Taliban government, clearly seeing that their regime could not stand much longer (Rashid 2009a). His rising popularity, also in the West, threatened the ruling order. Thus, on September 9, two supposedly supporters of Al-Qaeda — presenting themselves as European interviewers — exploded bombs tied to their bodies and killed Massoud. Facing the death of a very cherished leader, the Afghan population started to see Taliban as a group of terrorists, compliant to any Al-Qaeda operation in order to preserve their support to the regime (Runion 2007). The second reason was external and took place in New York two days later. 10 The Northern Alliance was an armed group leaded by former members of Islamic Party of Afghanistan created in 1996 during Taliban regime. Firstly, Tajiks started the defensive combats, later other groups such as Uzbeks, Hazara and a minority of Pashtun joined the battle against Taliban supporters (Maley 2009). 609 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1.5 THE 9/11 AND THE NATO OCCUPATION On September 11, 2001, the world watched live and repeatedly the news about the well-orchestrated terrorist plan claimed later by Al-Qaeda’s leader Osama bin Laden. Two commercial aircraft were hijacked and crashed against the World Trade Center, in the heart of Manhattan. Thousands of lives were lost and other thousands were injured, and an immediate retaliation was urged (Maley 2009). Therefore, president George W. Bush declared that the United States of America was starting a “War on Terror”. Bush assembled a neoconservative team of policymakers from the Republican Party. Among other guidelines, this group aimed to increase expenditure on defense, strengthen democratic bonds and challenge hostile regimes to arrange the system in order to defend the United States’ security. Thereby, 9/11 was a convincing excuse to implement Bush’s militarized foreign policy. In fact, invading Afghanistan would be very valuable for Washington’s interests in Central Asia since it was Bush’s intent to guarantee the safety of oil ducts in the region (Moniz Bandeira 2014). United States recalled, then, article 5 of the NATO charter, which considers an armed attack against one member an issue to every signatory, and called for the support of several members of the organization (Maley 2009). In 24 hours, the CIA had already found the responsibles for the attacks and their relation to bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. The US immediately demanded his extradition from Afghanistan. The Taliban government, however, refused to accept the American request without negotiation, despite being advised to do the contrary by Pakistani representatives (Tanner 2002). Washington did not wait and implemented its response with Operation Enduring Freedom, aiming to eliminate both Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces within Afghan borders. Bush associated with the Northern Alliance and, in November of the same year, Taliban was already reduced to a guerrilla group of Kandahar suburbs, while its leaders alongside with Al-Qaeda’s (including number ones mollah Omar and bin Laden, respectively) entrenched themselves into Hindu Kush caves (Runion 2007). In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1386, which allowed the establishment of a NATO-led six-month coalition force in order to maintain a minimum stability to the transitory government. A few months later, the UNSC also installed the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with Resolution 1401 (UNAMA 2015). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as it UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 610 UFRGS Model United Nations was named the coalition, was firstly set to act in the surroundings of Kabul. However, after having trespassed its legal mandate, in 2003 the forces received from the UN authorization to freely operate in the whole country (Vizentini 2012). The next months were used to debate the subsequent events: an interim government, the constitution and democratic elections. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader from the tribe Popalzai, was chosen to be the interim president (Runion 2007). The figure of the former governor Zahir Shah was important to legitimate the institutionalization process of elections, as he was appointed Chairman of the Interim Administration. Overall, the restructuring plan of political institutions in Afghanistan worked: within a few months, a Constitution was written and elections took place on October 9, 2004. With 55,4% of the votes, Karzai was declared the winner and remained in office (Maley 2009). Corruption, dissatisfaction of former warlords that lost power, and complex disagreements in political debates made Afghanistan particularly insecure. This weather of chaos recreated the perfect context for the reappearance of Taliban, which now fought to expel external powers from their country, criticizing especially US airstrikes that constantly harmed civilians (Maley 2009). By late 2005, a vast rural area that no longer supported the government gradually deceived by Taliban dominance. Karzai had no ability to extend its influence outside Kabul, and neither the Afghan police nor its army managed to stabilize the country, especially in Taliban and warlords mainstays. At that point, NATO occupied the north and moved to the west of the country (Jones 2010). By 2006, locals were progressively distrustful on their government and on the NATO coalition and suffered from menaces by Taliban if they cooperated with the outsiders. NATO, in turn, could no longer guarantee the security of their missions (Jones 2010). Yet, Operation Medusa was launched aiming to clear the Kandahar region. First seen as an important victory, killing hundreds of Taliban soldiers and arresting other dozens, Operation Medusa confirmed two issues: first, it showed the world the abuses that NATO soldiers were committing by killing innocent Afghani and second, that Taliban had fled Afghan borders to get into Pakistani territory (Ottawa Citizen 2007). In 2007, NATO had completed four stages of occupation and was then divided into five geographic commands: Regional Command Central, North, West, South and East. However, the international community started to debate on how effective the coalition was when official claims suggested 611 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL that Al-Qaeda had found safety within Pakistani borders and that the next year would be particularly violent. In April, president Hamid Karzai escaped from an attempted murder. In June, the US “friendly fired” the country and ended up killing nearly a dozen Pakistani soldiers. In the next month, the Indian Embassy in Kabul was bombed, causing approximately 50 fatalities. In August, the US was once again charged to kill civilians in airstrikes (Jones 2010). At that point, there was one extremely important question to be answered: how could the US presidential elections of 2008 deal with the conflict in order to make it less chaotic? 2 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE The current section exposes the situation in Afghanistan since 2009. As in this year Barack Obama assumed the presidency of the United States — with important consequences to the NATO intervention and thus to Afghanistan itself — the section will firstly assess the new government’s objectives for Afghanistan and ISAF’s acting since then. In 2015, with the end of ISAF and the beginning of the so-called Afghan Civil War, the focus will shift to the Central Asian country’s internal developments, with a final analysis of the current situation of the most important actors in the conflict — including insurgents and the Afghan government. 2.1 THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE “SURGE” IN AFGHANISTAN A year before the elections that made him president, Barack Obama wrote an article that expressed some of the most important points that would guide his government’s foreign policy through the following years. For him, the war in “Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists” while Afghanistan and Pakistan were “the central front in [the] war against Al Qaeda” (Obama 2007, online). In his presidential campaign, Obama committed to ending the war in Iraq as soon as mid-2010, keeping only a residual force in order to guarantee the safety of the transition and fight remaining terrorists. This would enable more resources to be spent in the Afghan war — a war which, in Obama’s words, the United States “[had] to win” (Obama 2008, online). The year of 2008 was the deadliest for the North-American army in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war, surpassing even the death toll of Iraq. The situation was deteriorating since 2006 and it did not seem to improve even with Bush doubling the number of active troops in the war, UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 612 UFRGS Model United Nations which reached almost 40,000 in 2008 (Washington Post 2008). Thus, when the new president took office in 2009, he announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, which comprised: the deployment of over 20,000 more troops11; enhanced cooperation among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan; a huge increase in civilian assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan; fostering talks between Afghan official forces and Taliban “moderate” sectors; and the goal to capacitate an Afghan army of 134,000 along with a police force of 82,000 by 2011 (Miller 2016, Obama 2009). NATO endorsed this “surge” strategy in April of the same year, mainly supported by Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom (Larsen 2013). Obama’s first year as commander-in-chief, however, was even worse than the past years. Insurgents bombed a NATO and a CIA headquarters, the death toll of American soldiers was more than the double of the previous years, and the relationship between the intervening powers and the Afghan government deteriorated (Miller 2016). As preparations for the Afghan 2009 presidential elections drew a significant part of ISAF’s efforts, Taliban was able to act more freely, intensifying the violent acts. On the voting day, the Taliban perpetrated hundreds of attacks around the country, which made attendance to polls very low. The two main candidates were President Hamid Karzai, going for reelection, and Abdullah Abdullah, former Karzai’s foreign minister. Amid massive accusations of vote-rigging, the President was pointed winner of the votings and, despite having his legitimacy widely questioned, was recognized by the intervening countries — even though they had not support his candidacy (Rashid 2009b). The fraud allegations in the Afghan elections alongside with the rising violence influenced negatively on the international and popular support for the intervention in Afghanistan, undermining Obama’s political will to fully commit to the war as he had planned. However, General Stanley McCrystal, who assumed in June the role of top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, assessed the worsening situation and claimed that at least 40,000 more troops, as well as huge resources, were necessary to drive an efficient “population-centric” counterinsurgency strategy, focusing on stopping the Taliban and enhancing Afghan governance (Katzman 2016, Larsen 2016). Obama, nevertheless, announced a much less bold approach: despite announcing the deployment of a new surge of 31,000 troops, he outlined a strategy that was limited to a counter-terrorism effort—in other words, more 11 The US government ended sending more than 30,000 soldiers, as it will be explained below in the text. 613 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL focused on intelligence gathering and in the elimination of Al-Qaeda than in fostering a viable political environment and governance in Afghanistan (Miller 2016). In this same speech, delivered at West Point, Obama also announced that the transition from Western to Afghan authority would start in July 2011. The Afghan government would gradually assume the lead of the country’s political and military stabilization, followed by a reduction in US and NATO personnel. However, due to critics made by Afghan authorities, which accused the planned retreat of foreign forces of being too abrupt, another strategy was drawn during NATO’s Lisbon summit in November 2010, with the presence and compliance of President Karzai (Katzman 2016). The transition was still to start in early 2011 and was to be concluded until the end of 2014 — a process which would be “conditions-based, not calendar-driven”, as Afghan forces would gradually assume the control of the districts according to their stabilization (NATO 2010). Months before the NATO summit, Netherlands had announced its retreat from Afghanistan by the end of 2010, being the first allied country to do that. This action was mainly explained by domestic political reasons, and produced significant negative effects on ISAF, as the Dutch 2,000 troops had a high prestige among Afghans and were responsible for the security and rebuilding of the central Uruzgan province — which was one of most important locus of ISAF operations by 2010 (Fox 2010). Besides this political and strategic setback, nonetheless, ISAF had important gains on Afghan terrain in this year. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 614 UFRGS Model United Nations Map 5: Afghan political division and major cities Source: Forsberg 2010 The surge in the Afghan war culminated in mid-2010, when ISAF launched the Hamkari (“cooperation”, in Dari and Pashto) campaign, a broad military and political action that focused on securing the strategic southeastern province of Kandahar (see Map 3)—Hamid Karzai and Taliban’s homeland and the latter’s de facto capital (Forsberg 2010). This effort was mainly conceived by General McCrystal, who defended a reorientation in ISAF’s focus towards Kandahar and the neighbor province Helmand, regions where Taliban had deep economic and political linkages with local authorities. Until Hamkari, ISAF’s approach in these provinces was restricted to disruption operations of Taliban connections, refraining from a direct combat to their strongholds (Coll 2010). Meanwhile, the Taliban launched an unprecedented series of attacks aimed both at the civilian population and at ISAF, in order to stop the advance of Hamkari. The group’s strategy had basically two main aspects: an intense use of small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED) against official troops, in order to divert them from Taliban safe havens and lines of communication; and a massive assassination campaign against the civi- 615 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL lian population in rural and urban areas, seeking psychological control and intimidation (Forsberg 2010). On the other hand, it was during this period that the United States started the widespread use of drone attacks not only in Afghanistan but also in neighbor Pakistan. Only in 2010, the number of drone strikes reached 118, almost three times bigger than during the period between 2004 and 2008. It can be attributed as a side-effect of this drone campaign a generalized sense of resentment among Pakistanis, which diminished their government’s credibility, as it was formally a supporter of the Western intervention (Tardelli 2011). The military actions of the Hamkari process focused mostly on Kandahar City and surrounding areas. This urban center is the second-largest Afghan city, with half a million inhabitants, and is the core of the Pashtun south of Afghanistan. Moreover, it has access to the country’s main transport hub: Highway One, connecting this city with Kabul. By the second half of 2010, the operations managed to eliminate important Taliban leaderships and facilities, undermining its support and infrastructure in the region—the Afghan National Security Forces12 (ANSF), thus, which had its greatest involvement in military actions so far, won a favorable momentum and took the initiative from the insurgents (Forsberg 2010). According to RAND analyst Seth Jones, the 2009–2011 surge allowed ISAF to take over important regions of southern Afghanistan and undermine popular support for Taliban. Besides the increase in conventional military efforts, one of the reasons appointed by the author was Karzai’s Afghan Local Police program, which enhanced security forces at the community level and allowed tribes from Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan provinces to stand for themselves (Jones 2011 ; Miller 2016). Nonetheless, the ground lost by Taliban in the south was in part compensated by an increased presence in non-Pashtun areas in the North. Moreover, the intense violence produced by both sides during 2010 increased civilian casualties by 15% when compared to the previous year (Tardelli 2011). Corroborating the claim that Taliban was weakened by the 2010 military efforts, the rate of insurgent attacks dropped in May 2011, a trend maintained in the following year (Miller 2016). Furthermore, the killing of Osama bin Laden in this same month, in Pakistan’s rural area, spre12 Consists in the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Air Force (AAA). Although it is also called Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) since 2015, in this work we will use the former acronym ANSF, as it is still widely known. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 616 UFRGS Model United Nations ad optimism regarding the possibility of advance in talks with Taliban, as Mullah Omar’s personal relationship with the Al-Qaeda leader was one of the main reasons for proximity between these two groups (Rogin 2011). These expectations, however, were widely frustrated by the assassination of the government’s High Peace Council representative Burhanuddin Rabbani, the prominent ethnic-Tajik who had been president of Afghanistan and was leading the negotiations with Taliban (ISW 2011). On November 26, there was another major setback for the stabilization of Afghanistan when NATO helicopters allegedly crossed the blurry Afghan–Pakistani border and killed 28 Pakistani soldiers (Boone 2011, Tribune 2011). Bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan were already much strained as bin Laden’s death caused a negative effect on the latter’s public opinion, and the incident motivated the Pakistani government to suspend its logistic assistance to ISAF and to boycott the Bonn Conference scheduled for December (Ali 2012). Expected to produce a main framework for post-2014 Afghanistan, the high-level meeting did not achieve significant advances besides general commitments from NATO to keep supporting the country after the withdrawal, mainly due to the absences of the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan—seen as the only country capable of influencing the region’s insurgent groups (Mir 2011). 2.2 THE TRANSITION PERIOD After 2011, for several reasons, such as the lack of political support and the death of bin Laden, international engagement in Afghanistan started to effectively decrease. American civilian support, for example, significantly decreased from this year on, suggesting that the US had given up the nation/statebuilding effort to focus solely on a rough stabilization that would permit its withdrawal (Miller 2016). In June, Canada has ended its combat involvement in Afghanistan, a move mirrored by France by the end of 2012 (CTV News 2012, Libération 2012). Both countries left only some military trainers and civilian personnel. In May 2012, amid a thorny moment in bilateral relations, the United States and Afghanistan managed to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement, in which, among others, the US committed in broad terms to keep assisting Afghanistan for ten years after its withdrawal from the country, scheduled to 2014 (Graham-Harrison 2012, Time 2012). These commitments were confirmed two months later when the Western country granted Afghanistan the status of “major non-NATO ally”, giving it privileged 617 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL access to US financial and military aid (New York Times 2012). Still in May, the NATO Summit held in Chicago advanced in outlining the exit from Afghanistan, affirming that all command roles would already be in Afghan hands by mid-2013 (NATO 2012). Additionally, Afghanistan became an observer member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and agreed on a strategic and cooperative partnership with China, deepening economic and political ties (Xinhua 2012). During the first months of 2012, there was an incipient attempt by the United States to hold talks with the Taliban. In March, however, the group suspended all contact with the Americans when they failed to release five militants detained in Guantanamo, who were to be traded for a captive US soldier. Meanwhile, relations between the Taliban and Pakistan also deteriorated, motivating the former to decrease its assistance to the latter. This compelled the group to be more open to dialogue with foreign parties, which was helped by the UNSC’s decision to alleviate some travel restrictions on its leaders. Pakistan, for its part, showed an improved will in negotiating with Afghanistan, which is explained by its huge domestic difficulties in dealing with an increasingly violent Taliban13 and a serious socioeconomic crisis — which forced the Pakistani government to cooperate with the United States in exchange for financial support (Rashid 2012). On June 18, 2013, the Afghan government and NATO announced the former had assumed all lead positions in the country’s security forces, as planned in the Chicago summit (Dale 2014). At this time, the number of US troops on ground had already been reduced to 65,000, and the plans for 2014 included a further withdrawal of at least 30,000 (Miller 2016). Meanwhile, there was a renewed effort in talks among the United States, Afghanistan, and Taliban. However, this was frustrated as the latter had opened a representation office in Qatar and, seizing the opportunity to acquire international recognition, insisted in raising the old flag of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — which angered Karzai and undermined the negotiations (BBC News 2013). Consequently, the Afghan government suspended its negotiations with the US regarding the Bilateral Security Agreement, which would settle the last details regarding mutual post-withdrawal relationship (Majidyiar 2014). 13 The Taliban Movement in Pakistan (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) was created in 2007 and is not affiliated to its Afghan counterpart, although both share as a common objective the fight against NATO troops. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 618 UFRGS Model United Nations As the transition followed and negotiations stalled, violence again started to rise. There was an increase of 15% in civilian casualties from 2012 to 2013, and the first months of 2014 saw a significant escalation. The transition also was producing deep economic difficulties, as thousands of jobs were expected to be lost with the withdrawal, depreciating the afghani (Afghanistan’s currency) and devaluating properties (International Crisis Group 2014). The country was locked in a sort of stalemate, as it waited for the result of the presidential elections of 2014 and for NATO to advance in its retreat. Despite Taliban’s efforts to disrupt the elections by attacking voters, the process went relatively well, notwithstanding several low-level attacks around the country. After the first round of votings in April, the two front-runners, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah (who lost in 2009 to Karzai), faced a runoff on June 14. Even though the latter had a comfortable lead in the first round, Ghani was declared winner in July, with 56,44% of votes (Reuters 2014a). Ghani is an ethnic-Pashtun seen as reformist who lived a great part of his life abroad, teaching at American universities and working as an economist for the World Bank. This technocrat profile, nonetheless, made him look like an outsider for the Afghan population—which forced him to align with regional leaders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, a prominent Uzbek warlord who became Ghani’s vice-president (VICE News 2014). As Abdullah initially claimed a fraud in the votings and refused to accept its outcome, there was widespread fear that the country would face tough instabilities. Nonetheless, the UN, after carrying out an audition of the votings, pointed frauds on both sides but with little effect on the result. Hence, in order to curtail instability, Ghani and Abdullah signed a power-sharing agreement through the appointment of the latter to the newly-created role of chief executive officer, which would assume some of the president’s functions (similar to a prime-minister) (The Economist 2014). In the end of September, right after assuming the presidency, Ghani signed with the United States the much-expected Bilateral Security and Status of Forces Agreements, in which the latter committed to largely assist the former even after the intervention (CFR 2014, Hodge and Stancati 2014). Post-2014 relations between Afghanistan and ISAF countries would be based on NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, approved in June. This effort, meant to be ISAF’s successor and to start on January 1st, 2015, was focused on military training and counter-terrorism, for which NATO would 619 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL keep around 13,000 troops in Afghanistan. The US, particularly, renamed Operation Enduring Freedom to “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” and committed to maintain 9,800 troops on Afghan soil, 6,000 of which involved in Resolute Support Mission (Katzman 2016). The transition was, thus, well underway. The Taliban, however, seized this opportunity to take action against the ANSF. Violence heightened, and 2014 held an all-time high in civilian casualties in Afghanistan (Miller 2016). Moreover, Kabul, once one of the less-violent parts of the country, had now become a spot of intense attacks by the Taliban. The insurgents were determined to show their force in the last days of ISAF. Thus, when on December 28 NATO announced the formal ending of its combat operations, the Taliban declared “the US and its allies had been defeated”, and was prepared to keep fiercely fighting the Afghan official government (Reuters 2014b, The Washington Post 2014). 2.3 THE POST-2014 PERIOD From 2011 to 2014, despite some severe difficulties related, especially, to the escalation of violence in the country, the transition of the security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF was going well in many areas. Even though it still had several debilities in its equipment and warfighting capability, ANSF was building its long-term sustainability to achieve a lasting peace, with significant improvement within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. As the US forces stepped back and the insurgents continued carrying out attacks against the coalition’s remaining forces, ANSF kept being advised to improve different capacities—especially intelligence, aviation, and logistics—and to better integrate the three main security pillars: army, police and intelligence services. By the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces had full responsibility for internal security issues and were already planning and executing almost all combat operations in the country (Cordesman 2014, United States Department of Defense 2014). When addressing the terrorist and insurgent threats, the “Report on Progress towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, produced in October by the US Department of State, affirmed the counterterrorism operations had successfully restricted al Qaeda’s presence, and classified the Haqqani Network as the “most virulent” element of insurgency in the country. The Taliban, in turn, despite its effective propaganda, controlled no major urban centers in the country and failed in holding significant terrain and in UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 620 UFRGS Model United Nations having strategic gains throughout the year (United States Department of Defense 2014). In a press release of October 4, General John Campbell, the last ISAF commander, declared his confidence in the Afghan forces. The general stated that there was no place that the Afghan military could not take back from any insurgent takeover, and that “there’s nowhere that we have Afghan security forces that the Taliban can get the terrain and hold the terrain” for longer than only temporarily (Campbell 2014). After 2014, however, there was still no evidence that the “surge” had succeeded in eliminating the insurgent threat and defeating Taliban. In fact, without NATO’s ISAF on the ground, the group increased its attacks against government forces, and 2015 was marked by a significant deterioration in the Afghan security situation (Cordesman 2015a, United States Department of Defense 2015). There were also worries regarding Afghanistan’s national institutions and their capabilities to guarantee political unity as well as stable and responsive governance, since corruption was still an enduring challenge to the government. Provincial and District governments remained severely divided and weak, allowing the empowerment of local power brokers and warlords, as well as of insurgent groups. The gloomy fact that the Afghan president had effective control only in Kabul’s surrounding areas led analysts to ironically call him “Kabul’s major” or to address his area of domination as “Kabulstan” instead of Afghanistan. Even if we admit that the strong division of the nation dates back from the Soviet invasion, worsening during the civil war and the US intervention, it is evident that the withdrawal of the international coalition deepened the government’s difficulties in effectively protecting the territory and safeguarding stability and unity (Cordesman 2015b). 2.3.1 THE REVIVAL OF THE INSURGENT THREAT Before 2015, Taliban’s main propaganda was directed to getting rid of foreign influence in the country. With ISAF’s withdrawal, the main lines had to change. On April 24, 2015, the group announced the beginning of a new season of fighting, which would now be focused on targeting Afghan government officials. In July, the rumor regarding the supposed death of Mullah Omar was confirmed with the announcement that he had died in 2013 and that the group was now led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour. The group hid this information for two years in order to keep their militants motivated by their loyalty to the supreme leader (Cordesman 2015b, Unites States Department of Defense 2015). Internal disputes 621 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL regarding the appointment of Mullah Mansour as emir took place and the group suffered some dissidence, but that was not enough to effectively weaken Taliban’s activities. The Taliban remained active in its traditional areas of influence, notably the Helmand province in the South and Logar and Wardak in the East. The reinforcement of Taliban’s presence in Helmand was strategically important, since it is an economically important region: it is the main producer of opium in the country, providing Taliban a great share of drug business to finance its activities (Unites States Department of Defense 2015, Osman 2015). Besides reaffirming its position in its strongholds, the group also engaged in conquering new territories. In 2015 alone, the Taliban expanded its presence in the country more than in any other year since the US intervention—it is estimated that the group officially controls one-third of the country, but virtually half of it. Even though it could not retain all the wrested checkpoints for long, the seizing of new districts demonstrated that the Taliban was stronger and eager to keep challenging the Afghan government. One of the main events of this new expansion effort by the Taliban was the battle for Kunduz, in the north, which produced a period of instability in the region and concerned authorities, since the Taliban had traditionally been stronger in the south than in the north of the country (Almukhtar and Yourish 2016, Azami 2015, Unites States Department of Defense 2015, Cordesman 2015b). The Taliban fighters began attacking some areas of the Kunduz Province in August, and ended up seizing the capital, Kunduz, on September 28. The Afghan forces, supported by US forces’ airstrikes, counterattacked in order to retake the city. The Taliban, however, managed not only to hold the city but also to expand to other districts, as the district of Chardara, considered strategic due to a road that connects it to Mazar-i-Sharif, the largest city in the North. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, it was the first time since 2001 that (...) the Taliban managed to conquer an entire province and for several days hold its capital. The psychological effect in Afghanistan was tremendous. Kunduz is vital strategic province, with major access roads to various other parts of Afghanistan’s north. Moreover, those who control the roads—still the Taliban—also get major revenue from taxing travelers, which is significant along these opium-smuggling routes. (Felbab-Brown 2016, p.11) UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 622 UFRGS Model United Nations On October 3rd, a Doctor Without Borders facility in Kunduz was stroked by a very controversial US airstrike against Taliban, in support to the Afghan government, killing 30 people and leaving 37 injured. The coalition assistance enabled the Afghan forces to take back control of Kunduz in two weeks, but that did not come without heavy humanitarian losses: 493 civilians died and 1,392 were wounded during the fighting (Almukhtar and Yourish 2015, Unites States Department of Defense 2015, Felbab-Brown 2016). After the Kunduz battle, nonetheless, there was no more than a slight decrease in the intensity of the attacks and, in April 2016, Taliban announced that with the beginning of spring and the warmer weather they would be starting a new period of offensives. They publicized that this new offensive would be called “Operation Omari”, in reference to the deceased leader Mullah Omar. Also in April, the Haqqani Network conducted one of 2016’s deadliest attacks, with over 60 people dead and 300 wounded (McLeary and Rawsnley 2016, Felbab-Brown 2016). Several attacks followed and are still taking place in Afghanistan. Map 6: Taliban-controlled and disputed areas Source:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-a-year-of-the-caliphate-4-maps-that-show-how-far-and-fast-the-group-has-spread-10342191.html 623 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Taliban, however, was not the only threat to peace and security in Afghanistan since 2015. In January of that year, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) established a new branch in the Khorasan province in Afghanistan. Recruiting discontent young militants from Taliban and battling against it, ISIL created in consequence a third front in the Afghan conflict. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Khorasan’s (IS-K), as it is designated, is still not as big and influential in the country as the Taliban or even as al-Qaeda—which, in turn, did not increase its presence in the country but it also was not weakened. Nonetheless, its presence is a new motivation for Taliban fighters to enhance fighting over control of larger areas (Unites States Department of Defense 2015, Simpson 2015, Unites States Department of State 2016). On July 23 2016, the Islamic State demonstrated the growth of their presence and power by claiming responsibility for an attack in Kabul against the Hazaras, a Shiite minority, where 80 people died and over 200 were wounded (Harooni 2016). Map 7: ISIS presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan Source:http://static.independent.co.uk/s3fspublic/styles/story_medium/public/thumbnails/image/2015/06/24/17/IsisPakistanAfghanistan.jpg UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 624 UFRGS Model United Nations All of these elements together increased the security threat in many areas of the country, considered “severe” in nearly half of the districts. That was the reason why, on October 15, 2015, US president Barack Obama announced that US soldiers would remain in Afghanistan until the end of his term in 2017, in a clear revision on his administration’s original plans to cut the troops in the country by half in 2016 and also in response to a request from Kabul. This decision to delay the withdrawal of their remaining forces does not only represent an indefinite prolongation of US presence in the Afghan war, but it also concedes that ANSF is still not fully prepared to protect the country and tackle the current crisis on its own (Rosenberg and Shear 2015, IISS 2016b). Since the beginning of 2016, the Afghan government made some advances in negotiating with Hezb-e-Islami in Afghanistan (HIA). The group was one of Afghanistan’s most influential Sunni parties during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and it currently has a more moderate approach if compared to Taliban. In May, the National Unity Government (NUG), represented by the President Ashraf Ghani, and HIA signed a preliminary agreement that was considered a positive development for Afghanistan’s security situation. Both parts affirmed the desire for reaching peace in the country, and one of HIA’s main demands for negotiating was the agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops—which they have been attacking since 2001 (Amin Ahmadzai 2016, Putz 2016). Both the Afghan and the Pakistani governments stated their willingness to engage in peace talks with the Taliban as well. However, on May 22, 2016, the Taliban leader Mullah Mansour was killed in a US strike in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan (Mashal 2016). Three days later, the group announced Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada as Mullah Mansour’s successor. The new leader vowed that no peace talks with the Afghan government would be held under his command. He affirmed that the fighting will continue and that the peace talks are not the solution for the ending of the insurgent activity (Akbar 2016). 2.3.2 THE FAILURE IN CIVILIAN PROTECTION AND THE WORSENING SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION In February 2016, UNAMA reported that 2015 had hit a new high on civilian casualties since the US invasion, with a raise of 4% from 2014. Over 11,000 civilian casualties (3,545 dead and 7,457 wounded) were documented, caused mainly by the increase of fighting in high-populated 625 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL areas. According to the Mission, the gross majority of these cases were due to anti-government elements’ attacks, and around 10% of them were due to Afghan forces actions—the ones with international support included (UNAMA 2016). Unfortunately, the problems do not exist only when it comes to civilian protection in the conflict. The worsening security situation is accompanied by worsening demographic, economic and political conditions. The current population growth (more than 40% of the population is 0–14 years old) generates an intense pressure in the economy, which is extremely debilitated by increasing poverty (nearly 40% of the population live below the poverty line) and weak job creation. The Afghan economy was recovering well from 2001 to 2014, but since 2014, this growth has noticeably slowed. ISAF’s withdrawal is probably one of the reasons to this reduced growth rate, since foreign troops were responsible for a significant part of the consumption. Therefore, Afghanistan remains highly dependent on international donations, but structural reforms within the economic institutions to improve revenue collection and resource allocation—highly harmed nowadays by massive corruption—are crucial to a long-term sustained development (CIA 2016). The Afghan economy is also still extremely dependent on agriculture, with 75% of the population living in rural zones and 78% of the country’s labor force employed in agriculture. However, even with this characteristic, the country cannot meet its food needs and it is considered a food-insecure country. It is also important to stress that the narco-economy plays an increasing role in the country’s economy as well, and this area was highly benefited from the failure of the government’s counter-narcotics programs (Cordesman 2016). A great share of the population living in the rural zone is dependent on the opium production and sale, as well as on the commercialization of other illicit drugs. As aforementioned, the drug trafficking is also one of the main sources of revenues of insurgent groups as Taliban, and its growth may pose a serious threat if it keeps financing terrorist activities. Finally, it is crucial to understand that ethnical divisions have always played a major role in the disputes in Afghanistan. The next session will focus on understanding the country’s ethnic composition as well as the interests of each group involved in the Afghan conflict, from the warlords to Taliban to the foreign powers. 2.4 ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND GROUP INTERESTS UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 626 UFRGS Model United Nations According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the main ethnic groups in Afghanistan are Pasthun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek, with small numbers of Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, Pashai and Kyrgyz—the latter not recognized by Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution (CIA 2016). The country has two official languages, Dari (or Afghan Persian) and Pashto, but there are also Turkic languages such as Uzbek and Turkmen, and nearly 30 other minor languages such as Balochi and Pashai (CIA 2016). These pieces of information demonstrate the complexity of Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal formation, which are responsible for many of the territorial and power disputes among warlords, local powers and insurgent groups that historically took place in the country, with each of the groups demanding a fair share of power and governance. The current president Ashraf Ghani is a Pashtun, and his vice-president, Abdul Rashid Dostum, is an ethnic Uzbek. Dostum was a Northern Alliance warlord, which enabled him to get support from northern fighters in January 2015 to form an anti-Taliban force of 20,000 men. This was an important development considering that Afghan warlords, as well as jihadist commanders, traditionally criticized the government for excluding them from politics by not appointing them to important positions. Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Officer, Abdullah Abdullah, who is a mix of Pashtun and Tajik ethnicity but most commonly referred to as Tajik, was also a warlord from the Northern Alliance. However, his rivalry with president Ghani hardens an actual political unity in the country, which reflects in the lack of governance and in the poor capacity in controlling the majority of the territory (IISS 2016a). The responsibility for providing security was transferred to ANSF since the ending of ISAF’s combat operations in December 2014. Afghan forces’ size and capabilities have considerably improved in the past years, but they still struggle to effectively hold the territory, since they do not have enough combat power and personnel to protect every district. ANSF have performed well in fighting against insurgents in 2015, especially in the north—the battle for Kunduz poses a good example—but they are constantly challenged with operational issues, such as high attrition, increasing casualty rates, logistics and maintenance matters. The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) also has serious gaps in its ability to develop long-term capabilities (IHS 2016a, IHS 2016b). The ethnic issues reflect very clearly on the MoD, with efforts being made to form a representative military staff. In the beginning, the National 627 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Army was controlled by a majority of Tajiks, since they played an important part in the Northern Alliance, which was crucial in overthrowing the Taliban regime. During the Karzai government, the Pashtuns were favored and became the majority of the MoD, while current president Ghani is making an effort to establish a multiethnic national force (IHS 2016b). Terrorism, insurgency, drug trafficking and the tensions with Pakistan are the main threats faced by the armed forces. To improve its capacities and to better deal with these threats, ANSF receives equipment and training from many countries, especially the US, the United Kingdom, India, China, and, despite attrition between the two countries, also from Pakistan. Even with gross international aid, the ANSF had heavy losses in 2015: over 7,200 soldiers were killed and many troops deserted, leading the government to resort to the use of militias, which damaged popular support (IHS 2016a, IHS 2016b, IISS 2016a). Nowadays, the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission is the main representation of foreign direct presence in the country. The mission operates mainly from Kabul, but it has subordinate headquarters in the North (Mazar-e-Sharif), in the West (Herat), in the South (Kandahar) and in the East (Laghman). As of May 2016, troop numbers contributing to Resolute Support are 12,486, and around 3,000 from the United States alone are engaged in Operation Freedom Sentinel (IHS 2016b, NATO 2016, IISS 2016b). The Taliban is the government’s major enemy. The group’s main objective is to restore the status quo that existed before the US intervention in 2001. This means that they desire to remove all foreign troops from the country and oust the central government in Kabul to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They claim to have no interest in conducting attacks against Western countries. Their insurgency is based mainly on the use of IEDs, small-arms ambushes and suicide attacks—the latter often in urban areas. Taliban’s traditional area of influence is the predominantly Pasthun regions in East and South Afghanistan, particularly the Kandahar province. In 2015, however, conquering the north of the country became the top priority in the group’s strategy, seizing strategically important districts. The group began to use non-Pashtun fighters in order to better adapt to local ethnic and political dynamics of the North, which probably aided significantly their advances. Holding bigger portions of the country has been a clear objective of the group in the last two years, in order to increase its influence in case any peace process is ever to succeed in the country. If it is true that they virtually control half of the Afghan territory, it will be imUFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 628 UFRGS Model United Nations possible to ignore the demands of the group when the time for seeking political solutions finally comes. It is also important to add that, after the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, the group leaders reorganized from Pakistan, therefore the border region between the two countries still has a high presence of Taliban fighters (IHS 2016d, IISS 2016a). The Taliban also maintain relations with other non-state actors. One of the most important of them is their autonomous eastern wing, the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamic revolutionary group formed by a majority of Pashtun fighters loyal to mujahedeen leader Jalahuddin Haqqani and his son, Sijaruddin. The network operates mainly in the region known as Loya Paktia or Greater Paktia, and is currently an ally of Taliban in the fight for the reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—in fact, the Taliban claims responsibility for many of the attacks conducted by the Network. Their primary base, however, is located in North Waziristan, in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), and in 2011, US officials accused ISI of assisting the group—speculations that were denied by Pakistani authorities (IHS 2016d, IHS 2014a). Al-Qaeda is a further serious threat posed against Kabul. The group has a small core of militants operating in the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan that is a strong ally of the Taliban since 1997, when Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden forged personal close links. In 2015, shortly after Taliban announced Mullah Mansour as their new leader, Al-Qaeda welcomed the decision and pledged allegiance to the new emir. Yet, even though the groups share similar views regarding religious issues, Al-Qaeda’s agenda is not limited to Afghan borders as the Taliban’s is (IHS 2016d). Historically strained relations between the Taliban and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) appeared to have improved since 2014, when commanders from both groups affirmed they have reached an agreement regarding joint operations in Afghanistan. The TTP, however, is still primarily focused on overthrowing the Pakistani regime and enforcing its own authority in Pakistan’s tribal areas, with the final objective of establishing a fundamentalist state in the territory (IHS 2016d). The Taliban also maintains relations with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a Sunni militant group created in Tajikistan that currently operates from South Waziristan in FATA, where established close ties with Pakistani Taliban militants; the Hibz-i-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG)14, with which the group maintains only a pragmatic alliance due to historical strains; and very distant relations with the originally Uzbek Islamic Jihad 629 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Union (IJU), that is actually a very close ally to the Haqqani Network, but it has operated alongside Taliban in some operations throughout the decades in order to fight the then existing Northern Alliance. Nevertheless, these groups are extremely degraded and their presence do not pose real urgent risks to the country’s stability (IHS 2014c, IHS 2014b, IHS 2016d). Finally, it is impossible to summarize the most important groups acting today in Afghanistan without recognizing the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Khorasan Province. The creation of Wilayat Khorasan (a branch of ISIL supposed to cover Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia) was announced in January 2015, and shortly after the group rivaled against Taliban by conducting attacks against their militants. In mid-April, the two groups announced jihad against each other. ISIL in Khorasan benefited from the concealment of Mullah Omar’s death, as many Taliban fighters loyal to him felt disappointed and betrayed and consequently became more susceptible to adhering to the Islamic State (IISS 2016a, IHS 2016c). It is still not clear whether the Islamic State will have resources to expand in Afghan territory or not, but the fact that it is raising its flags to combat Taliban and Kabul’s administration at the same time creates a new source of instability that needs to be paid serious and careful attention. 3 PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS This section aims at presenting, with more details than the previous one, the most important international efforts towards Afghanistan since 2001. Firstly, the Bonn Conference and the constitution of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will be addressed, in order to evaluate the main questions on debate right in the aftermath of Taliban’s defeat in 2001. The second part will bring up the main aspects and objectives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), created in 2002, as it is the framework that guides most international assistance to the country. At last, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM)—which is ISAF’s successor as the NATO intervention in Afghanistan—will be assessed. 3.1 THE BONN CONFERENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 14 Some militants of the Hezb-e-Islami did not join the insurgency and created the political party Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA). This internal division did not exist before 2001. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 630 UFRGS Model United Nations As Taliban power faded away, the international community initiated efforts to restructure the government. In late November 2001, a meeting took place in Bonn, Germany, in order to define the future of Afghanistan, as UN initial efforts did not show significant outcomes (Jones 2010). The final result was presented on December 5th and was named “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending and the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions”, which was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1383, submitted in the very next day (Maley 2009). The Taliban members were not invited to join the debates (Visentini 2013). As stated by Maley (2009, 224–229), the conference aimed to find an “agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan”; besides, “[the final document] was not a peace agreement, […] but rather a road map for the reestablishment of rudimentary state structures”. Thus, there would be created an interim administration (over an interim government) which would be led by a chairman and a circle of members. This interim administration would have the power delivered by the end of December and would be the formal representation to the United Nations. Thereafter, a Loya Jirga (an emergency basis commission formed by several Afghan political representatives) would be opened by former king Muhammed Zahir, by mid-2002. This council would be “entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state” and therefore, it would define the steps to guarantee democratic elections. After warm debates, Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pashtun, was chosen as the chairman. A Constitutional Loya Jirga would be created in order to submit an Afghan Constitution and a commission would redefine the judiciary system in the country. The participants also requested “the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces”. The interim administration headed by Karzai took office, as scheduled, at a dignified ceremony on December 22th in Kabul. Two days before, however, the United Nations would respond to the participants of Bonn Conference claims by approving in the Security Council the Resolution 1386, which authorized the implementation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under a “chapter VII” enforcement mandate of six months. ISAF was created aiming “to secure Kabul and assist the process of developing a unified national army”. Having United Kingdom Major-General John McColl as the first ISAF Force Commander, it was clear that the expenses as well as the forces would be essentially NATO’s: mainly 631 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL constituted by Americans, but with large European participation (Maley 2009). ISAF’s mandate was subsequently extended by UN Security Council, as well as the expansion of its geographical limits of operation, which made the Assistance Force deeply involved in Afghani security issues (Jones 2010). 3.2 THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (2002-PRESENT) The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political mission directed by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Its two main fields of activities regard political affairs and development and humanitarian issues (UNAMA 2016). The Mission was established by UNSC Resolution 1401, of March 28, 2002, following a request of the country’s interim government after the fall of the Taliban. The resolution defined an initial period of twelve months for the Mission, but its mandate was renewed every year since then (UNAMA 2016, United Nations 2002) . According to UNAMA’s official website (2016), the political mission: “[…] provides good offices15 in Afghanistan; works with and supports the government; supports the process of peace and reconciliation; monitors and promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation.” (UNAMA 2016, online) In addition, according to Resolution 1401, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should work closely with the United Nations while working in Afghanistan, and, consequently, work in cooperation with UNAMA (United Nations 2002). The Assistance Mission currently has field offices in twelve provinces across the country: Bamyan, Faizabad, Farah, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Maimana, Mazar-e-Sharif, Pul-e-Khumri, and Kunduz. The main reason for the Mission to act in several provinces is to enhance regional cooperation, which the UN perceive as the most effective way to 15 Working with the provision of “good offices” involves mediation, which means “preventive diplomacy” or “conflict prevention”, in order to help the Afghan government to assume its full leadership regarding security, government and development (UNAMA 2016, online). UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 632 UFRGS Model United Nations increase the country’s security, stability and socio-economic development. It maintains offices in the neighboring regions as well: one in Iran and one in Pakistan. This represents an attempt to engage regional partners to contribute to Afghanistan, since that could provide a more stable ground for the region as a whole. According to official data, in 2016, the Mission counted with 376 international staff members, 1,163 national and 79 UN Volunteers, and a budget of US$ 183 million (UNAMA 2016). The observance of human rights is also a priority for the Mission. Dialoguing constantly with the government, the armed forces, the international and civil society, the human rights engagement focus in five main areas: “Protection of civilians in the armed conflict; monitoring and reporting on grave child rights violations in the armed conflict; elimination of violence against women and promotion of gender equality; human rights aspects of peace and reconciliation; prevention of torture in detention and arbitrary detention”. (UNAMA 2016, online) UNAMA also works at promoting coherent development support to Afghanistan by the international community, supporting development planning, resource mobilization, and coordination of international donors or organizations. Currently, there are more than twenty United Nations agencies, funds, and programs in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2016). UNSC Resolution 2274 (2016), adopted on 15 March 2016, renewed the mandate of UNAMA in Afghanistan until March 17, 2017, and reinforced that the Mission shall continue “leading and coordinating international civilian efforts in assisting Afghanistan, guided by the principle of reinforcing Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership” (United Nations 2016, UNAMA 2016). The Mission, however, faces several difficulties in fully exercising its mandate. Some of them include accusations of corruption within the organization of UNAMA, lack of coordination among agencies and NGOs and low efficiency regarding the allocation of aid. In addition, though the main discourse stresses the role of the Afghan government in the stabilization of the country, international involvement continues highly extensive when it comes to both development issues and the combat of insurgency. UNAMA has also a great role in the reconstruction efforts, but this area has been developing very slow, especially when it comes to further advancing into rural 633 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL zones (Margesson 2010). Tackling these difficulties is key, for UNAMA’s success is vital for the decrease of reconstruction activities that are currently held unilaterally by foreign actors such as the United States. 3.3 THE RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION (2015-PRESENT) Between late 2014 and early 2015, with the formal ending of its operations, ISAF was substituted as the official international intervention in Afghanistan by NATO’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM). As security responsibilities for the country had already been transferred from NATO to the ANSF, both parts agreed on this new framework for the intervention. Both the US and NATO had already concluded bilateral security agreements with Afghanistan; thus, a deep Western involvement even after the end of ISAF was not a surprise. The new mission, whose mandate was unanimously approved by the UNSC with Resolution 2189, was meant to be restricted to “non-combat, training, advisory and assistance” (United Nations 2014, online). According to NATO (2016, online), the mission’s key functions would be: a) “supporting planning, programming and budgeting”; b) “assuring transparency, accountability and oversight”; c) “supporting the adherence to the principles of rule of law and good governance” and; d) “supporting the establishment and sustainment of such processes as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and development of personnel”. The RSM operates divided into five zones, each one of which commanded by a NATO country, as follows: Kabul/Bagram (the mission’s central hub, led by Turkey), Mazar-e Sharif (Germany), Herat (Italy), Kandahar and Laghman (USA). Currently, 39 countries contribute to the mission (whether with personnel or in different ways), and its total strength is of more than 12,000 soldiers, of which almost 7,000 are Americans. In May 2016, NATO and Afghanistan agreed to extend the RSM beyond the present year—without defining a deadline, though (NATO 2016). Recently, European countries—namely Italy and Germany—have been showing a greater involvement in the RSM, mainly aiming at controlling their inflow of refugees, as Afghanistan is second only to Syria as a source of refugees (Felbab-Brown 2016). Parallel to the substitution of ISAF by RSM, the United States ended its Operation Enduring Freedom (launched in 2001) and started to refer to its operations in Afghanistan as “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel”. The new operation, besides working closely with RSM, focus on counter-terrorism (United States 2014). In June 2016, nonetheless, the 9,800 US troops still in UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 634 UFRGS Model United Nations Afghanistan were entitled to a larger role in the fight against Taliban, receiving more authority regarding the use of airstrikes in cooperation with the ANSF—as the latter’s aerial capabilities are still very weak (Fox News 2016). Under the new leadership of General John Nicholson, US forces now have the prerogative to engage in offensive actions against Taliban, as before they were only allowed to act alongside Afghan special operations forces—somewhat exceeding its original mandate and in part resembling ISAF (Copp 2016, Felbab-Brown 2016). Facing the recent advance of Taliban in northern and southern provinces, American and British air support is currently seen as essential by Afghan officials to avoid further territorial losses. Last June, the US government officially announced that would keep 8,4000 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016 instead of the 5,500 initially planned— just a modest decrease from the current 9,800 (Panda 2016). 4 BLOC POSITIONS As the sponsor and leader of the international intervention in Afghanistan, the United States of America is the main extra-regional force discussing the issue. Even though Obama promised to end the war in Afghanistan before the end of his mandate, this is currently not in sight. Last June—as written in the previous section—the US forces in Afghanistan received a larger mandate, which widened the possibility for North-American participation in offensive actions against Taliban and for the usage of US airstrikes (Ryan and Gibbons-Neff 2016). The US delegation in the UNSC recently called for all the actors to support Afghanistan in every way, helping its government to achieve its reform agenda (United Nations 2016). Even though it had never participated directly in ISAF (being a NATO partner country), Japan has been a very important international actor in Afghan nation-building. Japan is second only to the United States when it comes to financial and humanitarian aid to the country, having spent almost US$ 6 billion since 2001, as of April 2015 (Japan 2015). Tokyo also hosted eight international conferences to discuss solutions to the Afghan conflict and provided technical assistance in several areas, notably in infrastructure and in the security sector (NATO 2011). Japan supports the role played by UNAMA in Afghanistan and hopes for bilateral talks between Taliban and the Afghan government, which could improve the security situation (United Nations 2016). 635 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL New Zealand, also a NATO partner country, integrated the NATO coalition in Afghanistan since its beginning, first deploying troops in December 2001. Between 2003 and 2013, the country played an important role as responsible for the Provincial Reconstruction Team of Bamyan (The New Zealand Herald 2012). Currently, it has a small amount of personnel integrating RSM (New Zealand 2016). The country calls for neighboring countries to actively act to restrain the inflow of “arms, fighters and narcotics” and praised the sanction regime on Taliban as a means to bring the militants to dialogue (United Nations 2016). Malaysia’s participation in ISAF came with a medical team, which worked alongside New Zealander troops in Bamyan (Malaysia 2016, NNN 2016). The country notes the especially fragile situation of women and children in the conflict, pointing to the latter’s recruitment by insurgent groups. In this sense, Malaysia calls for a decisive role played by the UN in Afghanistan transformation decade (2015–2025) (United Nations 2016). An US major non-NATO ally and a Mediterranean Dialogue NATO partner, Egypt had only a limited participation in ISAF. The country operates a field hospital in the Bagram airfield, north of Kabul. Egyptian presence was praised for being one of the few Muslim countries engaged in the intervention—alongside with the UAE, Jordan and Azerbaijan—, which helped integration with the locals (Dickson 2010). The country recently stressed the importance of counter-terrorist actions in Afghanistan to also fight drug trafficking in the country—a problem that much undermines statebuilding efforts. Egypt, moreover, sharing worries with the rise of ISIS, offered specialized training in counter-terrorism for the ANSF—for which it would require the help of international donors, nonetheless (United Nations 2016). In the 2016 UNSC session that expanded UNAMA’s mandate for another year, the delegation of France reiterated the country’s support for the Afghan government to continue the efforts initiated in 2014, with the beginning of the transition period. France stands a supportive and positive position regarding the 2016 initiatives that could lead to peace talks. However, it stresses the enormous challenges the Afghan government still has to face: the continuity of the conflict with high levels of violence and terrorist activities victimizing mainly civilians; the maintenance of the country’s unity under the government; the need for an electoral reform; the fight against corruption; the economic crisis and illicit economic activities; and the worrying situation of women and children. The French delegation claims that the participation of the United Nations is essential for safeUFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 636 UFRGS Model United Nations guarding the political and security transition in Afghanistan (Lamek 2016). Even though France was one of the contributors for ISAF, it currently does not contribute with any troops in Resolute Support (NATO 2016). The United Kingdom stresses that economic growth is key to bring stability for Afghanistan, and congratulates the country for recently accessing the World Trade Organization. For the United Kingdom, the international community must keep condemning Taliban’s attacks on civilians and the continuity of violence until the suffering of Afghan people stops (United Nations 2016). At present, the Deputy Commander of Resolute Support Mission in Kabul is from the United Kingdom, and the country contributes with 352 troops (NATO 2016). Spain believes that the United Nations have an even bigger role in Afghanistan since the ISAF’s withdrawal in 2014. The Spanish delegation affirms the importance of the Afghan government continuing efforts towards international reconciliation and regional integration. According to the Spanish deputy the main threats in the country are posed by Taliban, but he expresses hope that upcoming elections may have a positive effect in enhancing local and regional stability (United Nations 2016). Spain contributes with only seven troops in Resolute Support Mission (NATO 2016). The delegation of Ukraine is supportive of the Afghan government’s efforts to solve the problems not only related to the civil war itself, but also its consequences, as fiscal problems, poverty and unemployment. They also believe it is important to consider further military aid and donor assistance to the country, as well as to guarantee that all parties commit to condemn attacks against civilians and do all necessary to minimize the suffering of the Afghan people (United Nations 2016). Ukraine currently contributes with 10 troops in Resolute Support Mission (NATO 2016). One of the main concerns expressed by Senegal is regarding the situation of children in Afghanistan. The Republic of Senegal believes that efforts to combat child recruitment by armed groups and reduce the loss of child lives are extremely important, especially considering the great amount of children that died during the Afghan conflict. The Senegalese delegation also defends the need for electoral reform and welcomes efforts that may lead to peace talks, noting that international cooperation is necessary to Afghan stability (United Nations 2016). The Russian Federation expresses its concern regarding the raising of terrorist acts within Afghanistan borders. In relation to this issue, Moscow states the need to a more inclusive and deeper debate between the government and Taliban high representatives. An effective program that 637 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL might set Afghanistan free of terrorism and drug dealing, as declared by the Russian representative to the Security Council, must arrange the evolution of Afghan security forces capabilities of maintaining stability and peace, which NATO forces have not been able to guarantee. Thereto, Moscow asserts its essay on training and equipping Afghan troops (United Nations 2016). Besides, the rising of Islamic State jihadists in subsequent provinces disquiets President Putin, who fears these terrorist groups might reach Central Asia and Southern Russia. Therefore, Vladimir Putin considers the situation “close to critical” (Frolovskiy 2016). The People’s Republic of China declared uneasiness regarding to the rising of violence that attains civil society. Beijing laments that the progress made in the past could have not maintained the stability in Afghanistan by their own forces. However, China understands that the international community must provide humanitarian and strategic support to the country. Hence, Beijing calls for the implementation of measures in order to consolidate basic Afghani institutions, supporting and congratulating UNAMA’s efforts (United Nations 2016). People’s Republic of China’s interests in Afghanistan, however, are more profound. Recently, Beijing set up an agreement to raise the Afghan military capabilities in order to avoid the contact of the islamic fundamentalist with the chinese Uyghur, who wants to make Xinjiang an autonomous region (Tiezzi 2016). Uruguay and Venezuela praised the efforts of the international community to assist Afghanistan reestablishment of political autonomy, thereunto both countries supported the extension of UNAMA’s mandate. Besides, Montevideo and Caracas understand the lack of security for thousands of civilians is mainly connected to drug traffic. Hence, both countries call for Taliban representatives to participate in cooperation talks to assure that every political group respects civilian protection (United Nations 2016). Angola congratulated UNAMA’s efforts and exposed its understanding that the international community must be present on providing assistance to strengthen Afghanistan. However, Luanda expresses its profound concerns regarding opium seizure and the death of unprotected civilians, which is, as recently declared by the Security Council Angolan delegate, unacceptable (United Nations 2016). 5 QUESTIONS TO PONDER 1.With the ongoing withdrawal of the international military interUFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 638 UFRGS Model United Nations vention from Afghanistan, what must be the role played by the UN in consolidating the Afghan institutions? 2. What has the international intervention accomplished and why has it failed in so many aspects, as it is shown by the growing instability in the country? 3. What are the main foreign interests in Afghanistan? What is the importance of this country for the infrastructure investments in the region, such as the “New Silk Road” project? 4. How to deal with Taliban? How to conciliate this group’s demands—as it has an enormous influence in the country—with the need to tackle its increasingly violent actions? In this sense, what must be the role played by other countries in the region, namely Pakistan, in the stabilization of Afghanistan? 5. How to make the ANSF capable of tackling the growing terrorist threat in Afghanistan? REFERENCES Akbar, Ali. 2016. “Afghan Taliban Reject Peace Talks, Vow To Continue Fighting”. Dawn. http://www.dawn.com/news/1260556. Ali, Imtiaz. 2012. United States-Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture. Report. Washington DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/Imtiaz Ali Report final2.pdf. Almukhtar, Sarah and Karen Yourish. 2016. “More Than 14 Years After U.S. Invasion, The Taliban Control Large Parts Of Afghanistan”. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes. com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-maps.html?_r=3. Amin Ahmadzai, Aziz. 2016. “Hezb-E-Islami’s Opening Is A Major Opportunity For Ashraf Ghani And Afghanistan”. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/hezb-e-islamis-opening-is-a-major-opportunity-for-ashraf-ghani-and-afghanistan/. Asia Foundation. Afghanistan In 2012: A Survey Of The Afghan People. 2012. Kabul: Nancy Hopkins. Azami, Dawood. 2015. “Analysis: The Taliban’s Resurgence In Afghanistan”. Aljazeehttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/analysis-taliban-resurgence-afghanistan-ira. sil-151227065817409.html. BBC News. 2013. “How Taliban Talks Have Become Deadlocked in Doha.” BBC News. July 12, 2013. Accessed May 02, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23274081. Boone, Jon. 2011. “Nato Air Attack On Pakistani Troops Was Self-Defence, Says Senior Western Official”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/26/nato-air-attack-pakistan-soldiers. Campbell, John. 2014. Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Campbell via satellite in the Pentagon Briefing Room. Interview by John Kirby. In person. Pentagon Briefing Room. 639 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/606938. CFR (Council on Foreign Relations). 2014. “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the Afghanistan and the United States.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 02, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/security-defense-cooperation-agreement-between-afghanistan-united-states/p33561. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). 2016. “The World Factbook: Afghanistan”. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. Coll, Steve. 2010. “Kandahar.” The New Yorker. Accessed April 29, 2016. http://www. newyorker.com/news/steve-coll/kandahar. Copp, Tara. 2016. “US Forces In Afghanistan Get Obama OK For Offensive Operations”. Stars And Stripes. http://www.stripes.com/news/us-forces-in-afghanistan-get-obama-ok-for-offensive-operations-1.414137. Cordesman, Anthony. 2014. Afghan Forces In The Edge Of Transition - IV: Progress In Afghan Force Development. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). http://csis.org/burke/reports. Cordesman, Anthony. 2015a. Afghanistan A Year After “Transition”: Losing The War At Every Level. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). http://csis. org/burke/reports. Cordesman, Anthony. 2015b. Afghanistan In Transition: Lessons Of The Longest War. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). http://csis.org/burke/reports. Cordesman, Anthony. 2016. Afghanistan: The Uncertain Impact Of A Year Of Transition. Washington: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). http://csis.org/burke/reports. CTV News. 2014. “Timeline: Canada’s Involvement in Afghanistan.” CTV News. Accessed May 02, 2016. http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/timeline-canada-s-involvement-in-afghanistan-1.1814698. Dale, Catherine. 2014. War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for Congress. Report. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. https://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/natsec/R43196.pdf. Dickson, Patrick. 2010. “Egyptian Hospital Puts Muslim Face On Medical Care In Afghanistan”. Stars And Stripes. http://www.stripes.com/news/egyptian-hospital-puts-muslim-face-on-medical-care-in-afghanistan-1.128099. Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2016. “Blood And Faith In Afghanistan: A June 2016 Update”. The Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/05/ blood-faith-afghanistan-june-2016-update-felbabbrown/2016-felbab-brown-paper-blood-and-faith-vfb.pdf. Forsberg, Carl. 2010. Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign. Report. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan Report 7_15Dec.pdf. Fox, Robert. 2010. “The Dutch Dilemma in Afghanistan” The Guardian. Accessed May 02, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/22/dutch-withdraw-trrops-afghanistan. Fox News. 2016. “Obama Approves Larger Role For US Forces In Afghanistan”. Fox News. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 640 UFRGS Model United Nations http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/10/obama-approves-expanded-afghanistan-airstrikes-by-us-forces.html. Frolovskiy, Dmitriy. 2016. “Russia’s Plan for Afghanistan”. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat. com/2016/04/russias-plan-for-afghanistan/. Graham-Harrison, Emma. 2012. “Afghanistan And US Agree On Strategic Partnership Document”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/22/afghanistan-us-strategic-partnership-document. Harooni, Mirwais. 2016. “Islamic State Claims Responsibility For Kabul Attack, 80 Dead”. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-protests-idUSKCN1030GB. Hodge, Nathan and Marguerita Stancati. 2014. “Afghanistan Signs Security Pact With U.S., NATO”. WSJ. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-afghan-bilateral-security-agreement-signed-1412076436. IHS. 2016a. Armed Forces. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia. IHS. IHS. 2016b. Afghanistan. Jane’s World Armies. IHS. IHS. 2016c. Islamic State. Jane’s World Insurgency And Terrorism. IHS. IHS. 2016d. Taliban. Jane’s World Insurgency And Terrorism. IHS. IHS. 2014a. Haqqani Network. Jane’s World Insurgency And Terrorism. IHS. IHS. 2014b. Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). Jane’s World Insurgency And Terrorism. IHS. IHS. 2014b. Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan (IMU). Jane’s World Insurgency And Terrorism. IHS. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2016a. Armed Conflict Survey. Routledge. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2016b. The Military Balance. IISS. International Crisis Group. 2014. “Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition. “International Crisis Group”. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/ 256-afghanistan-s-insurgency-after-the-transition.pdf. ISW (Institute for the Study of War). 2011. “Analysis: Afghan Assassination Means Taliban Wants War not Peace”. Institute for the Study of War. http://www.understandingwar.org/ news/analysis-afghan-assassination-means-taliban-want-war-not-peace. Japan. 2015. Japan’s Assistance In Afghanistan: Towards Self-Reliance. Ministry Of Foreign Affairs. Tokyo. http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000019264.pdf. Jones, Seth G. 2010. In The Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W. W. Norton. Jones, Seth G. 2011. “Beating Back the Taliban.” Foreign Policy. May 15..http://foreignpolicy. com/2011/03/15/beating-back-the-taliban-2/. Lamek, Alexis. 2016. “Afghanistan Has Entered The Transformation Decade”. France ONU. http://www.franceonu.org/Afghanistan-has-entered-the-transformation-decade. Larsen, Henrik B. 2013. NATO in Afghanistan: Democratization Warfare, National Narratives, and Budgetary Austerity. Report. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School. Accessed April 29, 2016. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/larsen-dp-2013-10.pdf. Libération. 2012. “Les Dernières Troupes Combattantes Françaises Quittent L’afghanistan”. Libération.Fr. http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2012/12/15/les-dernieres-troupes-combattantes-francaises-quittent-l-afghanistan_867855. 641 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Majidyar, Ahmad. 2014. “Negotiating With The Taliban: Lessons From History”. American Enterprise Institute. http://www.aei.org/publication/negotiating-with-the-taliban-lessons-from-history/. Malaysia. 2016. “MALAYSIA - United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - Strengthening The UN Peacekeeping Operations”. Malaysiaunsc.Kln.Gov.My. Accessed June 13. http://malaysiaunsc.kln.gov.my/index.php/malaysia-at-the-unsc/malaysia-s-commitment/strengthening-the-un-peacekeeping-operations. Maley, William. 2009. The Afghanistan Wars. New York: Palgrave and Macmillan. Margesson, Rhoda. 2010. United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan: Background And Policy Issues. CRS Report For Congress. Congressional Research Service. https://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdf. Marsden, Peter. 2009. Afghanistan: Aid, Arms & Empires. New York: IB Tauris. McLeary, Paul and Adam Rawsnley. 2016. “Situation Report”. Foreign Policy. http://link.foreignpolicy.com/view/54d39c35927219fc7f8b56523v7tw.2nk6/2464c3d9. Mashal, Mujib. 2016. “Taliban Chief Targeted By Drone Strike In Pakistan, Signaling A U.S. Shift”. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-leader-mullah-mansour.html?_r=0. Miller, Paul. 2016. “Obama’s Failed Legacy In Afghanistan”. The American Interest. http:// www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/15/obamas-failed-legacy-in-afghanistan/. Mir, Amir. 2016. “Bonn Conference On Afghanistan Fails To Achieve Much”. Rediff. http:// www.rediff.com/news/column/bonn-conference-on-afghanistan-fails-to-achieve-much/20111208.htm. Moniz Bandeira, Luiz Alberto. 2014. A Segunda Guerra Fria: Geopolítica e Dimensão Estratégica dos Estados Unidos. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. NATO. 2010. Lisbon Summit Declaration. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_68828.htm. NATO. 2011. “Japan: A Valued Partner In Afghanistan”. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/news_72931.htm%3FselectedLocale%3Den. NATO. 2012. Chicago Summit Declaration On Afghanistan. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87595.htm. NATO. 2016. “Resolute Support Mission In Afghanistan”. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/topics_113694.htm. NATO. 2016. “Troop Numbers And Contributors”. NATO Afghanistan Resolute Support. http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php. New York Times. 2012. “U.S. Grants Special Ally Status To Afghanistan”. Nytimes.Com. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/asia/us-grants-special-ally-status-to-afghanistan.html?_r=1. New Zealand. 2016. “NZ Army - Current Deployments”. Army.Mil.Nz. http://www.army.mil. nz/about-us/what-we-do/deployments/current-deployments.htm. NNN. 2016. “NAM NEWS NETWORK - Malaysian Flag Flying High In Afghanistan”.Namnewsnetwork.Org. http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/v3/read.php?id=MTM3MTE3. Obama, Barack. 2007. “Renewing American Leadership”. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-07-01/renewing-american-leadership. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 642 UFRGS Model United Nations Obama, Barack. 2008. “Obama’s Remarks On Iraq And Afghanistan”. Nytimes.Com. http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html?_r=1. Obama, Barack. 2009. “Remarks By The President On A New Strategy For Afghanistan And Pakistan”. Whitehouse.Gov. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan. Osman, Borhan. 2015. “Why Capturing Helmand Is Top Of The Taliban’S Strategic Goals”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/26/taliban-helmand-opium. Ottawa Citizen. 2016. “Taliban ran from battle.” Accessed May 3. http://www.canada.com/ ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=505efd02-b2c5-4add-bc19-0. Panda, Ankit. 2016. “It’s Official: 8,400 US Troops Will Remain In Afghanistan Beyond 2016”. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/its-official-8400-us-troops-will-remain-in-afghanistan-beyond-2016/. Putz, Catherine. 2016. “Hezb-E-Islami Moves Closer To A Final Deal With The Afghan Government”. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/hezb-e-islami-moves-closer-to-a-final-deal-with-the-afghan-governmnet/. Rashid, Ahmed. 2009a. Taliban: militant, islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rashid, Ahmed. 2009b. “Prerelease: Ahmed Rashid Takes On The Crisis In Afpak”. Ahmedrashid.Com. http://www.ahmedrashid.com/wp-content/archives/afganistan/articles/pdf/ AhmedRashidTakesOntheCrisis.pdf. Rashid, Ahmed. 2012. “What 2012 Has Meant For Afghanistan?”. Ahmedrashid.Com. http:// www.ahmedrashid.com/wp-content/archives/afganistan/articles/pdf/What2012hasmeantforAfghanistan.pdf. Reuters. 2014a. “Afghanistan’s Abdullah Rejects Election Result As ‘Coup’ Against People”. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-election-idUSKBN0FC0EN20140707. Reuters. 2014b. “Taliban Declare ‘Defeat’ Of U.S., Allies In Afghanistan”. Reuters. http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-war-idUSKBN0K70UC20141229. Rogin, Josh. 2011. “Clinton: Taliban More Likely To Negotiate After Bin Laden Death”. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/04/clinton-taliban-more-likely-to-negotiate-after-bin-laden-death/?wp_login_redirect=0. Rosenberg, Matthew and Michael Shear. 2015. “In Reversal, Obama Says U.S. Soldiers Will Stay In Afghanistan To 2017”. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/ world/asia/obama-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan.html?_r=0. Runion, Meredith L. 2007. The History of Afghanistan. Westport: Greenwood Press. Ryan, Missy and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. 2016. “U.S. Widens War In Afghanistan, Authorizes New Action Against Taliban”. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ checkpoint/wp/2016/06/09/defense-official-u-s-to-begin-striking-taliban-advise-regular-afghan-soldiers-again/. Simpson, Emile. 2015. “The Islamic State Of Afghanistan”. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/22/america-needs-to-make-a-deal-with-the-devil-in-helmand/. Tanner, Stephen. 2002. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander, the Great to the fall of Taliban. Cambridge, MA: DA Capo Press. Tardelli, Luca. 2011. Obama’S Interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya. The United States 643 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL After Unipolarity. London. http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR009/ tardelli.pdf. The Economist. 2014. “Divide And Rule”. The Economist. http://www.economist.com/blogs/ banyan/2014/09/afghanistans-disputed-election. The New Zealand Herald. 2012. “Timeline: NZ In Afghanistan - National - NZ Herald News”. The New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10828196. The Washington Post. 2008. “Obama To Explore New Approach In Afghanistan War”. Washingtonpost.Com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/10/ AR2008111002897_2.html?sid=ST2008111100889. The Washington Post. 2014. “Taliban Escalates Attacks In Kabul”. Washington Post. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-afghanistan-taliban-fighters-attack-foreign-compound-in-capital/2014/11/29/f0aef902-77d4-11e4-a755-e32227229e7b_story.html. Tiezzi, Shannon. 2016. “What’s Behind China’s Offer of Military Aid to Afghanistan”. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/whats-behind-chinas-offer-of-military-aid-to-afghanistan/ Time. 2012. “Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews TIME.Com”. TIME.Com. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2112861,00. html?xid=gonewsedit. Tribune. 2011. “24 Soldiers Killed In NATO Attack On Pakistan Check Post - The Express Tribune”. The Express Tribune. http://tribune.com.pk/story/297979/nato-jets-attack-checkpost-on-pak-afghan-border/. UNAMA. 2015. “Mandate”. UNAMA. https://unama.unmissions.org/mandate. UNAMA. 2016. “Civilian Casualties Hit New High In 2015”. United Nations Assitance Mission In Afghanistan. https://unama.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-hit-new-high-2015. United Nations. 2016. “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2274 (2016), Authorizing One-Year Mandate Extension For United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan | Meetings Coverage And Press Releases”. United Nations Meetings Coverage And Press Releases. http:// www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12283.doc.htm. United Nations. 2014. “UN News - Afghanistan: Security Council Backs Agreement On New Non-Combat NATO Mission”. UN News Service Section. http://www.un.org/apps/news/ story.asp?NewsID=49593#.V120TuYrJsM. United States. 2014. “Obama, Hagel Mark End Of Operation Enduring Freedom”. U.S. Department of Defense. http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603860. United States. 2014. “Report On Progress Toward Security And Stability In Afghanistan”. U.S. Department of Defense. United States. 2015. “Enhancing Security And Stability In Afghanistan”. Department of Defense. Unites States. 2016. “Designations Of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”. U.S. Department Of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/247433.htm. VICE News. 2014. “Why Ashraf Ghani Succeeded On His Rocky Road To The Afghan Presidency | VICE News”. VICE News. https://news.vice.com/article/why-ashraf-ghani-succeeded-on-his-rocky-road-to-the-afghan-presidency. UFRGS Model United Nations | VOL. 4 | 2016 644 UFRGS Model United Nations Vizentini, Paulo Fagundes. 2002. Oriente Médio e Afeganistão: um século de conflitos. Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI. Vizentini, Paulo Fagundes. 2012. A Primavera Árabe: entre a democracia e a geopolítica do petróleo. Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI. Wahab, Shaista, and Barry Youngerman. 2010. A Brief History of Afghanistan. New York: Facts On Files, Inc. Xinhua. 2012. “China, Afghanistan Upgrade Ties To Strategic Partnership”. Xinhua. http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/08/c_131640214.htm. 645