POLICING AND SOCIETY https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2020.1761806 Effectiveness and efficiency: Oslo police officers’ perspectives of the necessity and utility of temporarily routinely arming in response to a terrorist threat Ross Hendy School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Clayton, Australia ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Officers from the Norwegian police were routinely armed with firearms from July 2014 to February 2016 in response to a terror threat. This paper explores the experiences of a sample of officers (N = 16) who were routinely armed during this period. The research took a mixed-methods approach using semi-structured interviews one month before the policy was rescinded. Two key themes emerged. First, officers believed that being routinely armed was advantageous for routine police activities. Officers described that tactical planning had improved as it was no longer necessary to wait for permission to respond with a firearm. The associated tactical freedom triggered an increase in self-belief in their effectiveness and efficiency. Second, officers believed that although officers had observed some behavioural changes when interacting with citizens, over time, citizens became acclimatised to the presence of firearms. These findings provide new empirical evidence relevant to the debate surrounding the implications of permanently arming a routinely unarmed police force. Received 26 November 2019 Accepted 23 April 2020 KEYWORDS Norwegian police; firearms; militarisation; weaponisation Introduction Ordinarily, the Norwegian police are not routinely armed with firearms. In July 2014, the Norwegian police routinely armed all police officers with firearms in Oslo in response to a specific terror threat. Officers remained routinely armed for 14 months until the reversal of the policy in February 2016 (Bergersen 2018). Debate after the reversal attracted significant media attention (e.g. Aftenposten 2017), with some politicians and senior police in favour of permanent armament (Letvik 2017, NTB 2017, Rognstrand 2017) and some against (Holm 2017). While polls indicated that 63% members of the public (Robstad 2017) and 80% of officers in support of permanent arming (Trædal 2017), the governmental inquiry into circumstances surrounding the terror threat and the police response ultimately recommended against permanent arming (Bevæpningsutvalget 2017). The debate in Norway mirrors the discourse surrounding the permanent routine arming the New Zealand Police; opinions are divided among politicians (Locke 2008, Radio New Zealand 2019b), civil libertarians (e.g. Bott 2010), community-based advocates (Buttle 2010), media (e.g. Manawatu Standard 2015, Otago Daily Times 2019), and police representative bodies. Indeed, like Norway, the New Zealand Police have also deployed temporarily routinely armed officers in response to a terror event (Mcculloch 2019). While only five agencies within the OECD operate routinely unarmed police (Hendy 2014), consideration of the issue is not without merit (Waddington 1991). Indeed, contemplation of temporary CONTACT Ross Hendy ross.hendy@monash.edu © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group rosshendy @Ross_Hendy 2 R. HENDY routine armament in the context of the increased scrutiny of the use of firearms by police officers in North America (e.g. see Nix et al. 2017, Sekhon 2017), and police militarisation (e.g. Kraska 1999) make uneasy bedfellows. Further understanding of the cultural and operational differences between routinely armed policing and routinely unarmed policing may provide opportunities to shape police operational practices across all jurisdictions. As Waddington and Wright (2008) remind us, Peel replaced the existing armed police bodies with his ‘new police’ to engender widespread support and acceptance from the citizenry. The consequences of routinely arming an unarmed police have the potential to impact public opinion and legitimacy in police (Waddington 1999, Buttle 2010, Yesberg and Bradford 2019). Furthermore, the issue of temporary routine arming is not isolated to Norway. Police in New Zealand were routinely armed regionally for a short period in response to specific threats (Radio New Zealand 2019a) and nationally for 34 days in response to the Christchurch terror event (Mcculloch 2019). As Police in New Zealand had not been routinely armed since the Armed Constabulary was replaced by the civilian police force in 1886 (Hill 1986), the routine armament response to threats signals a new era in tactical and strategic policing. The literature considering routinely unarmed policing is limited, as is the literature regarding the routine arming of a police agency. Consequently, the discourse incorporates opinions in an attempt to forecast the consequences of such a change. While many ‘hypotheses’ are put forward, there is little evidence of the consequences of such a change. With this in mind, the extended temporary routine arming of Norwegian police officers may be instructive. While some data has arisen from the Norwegian government’s public inquiry into the matter (Bevæpningsutvalget 2017), the present research takes a qualitative approach to describe the experiences of the officers involved in their ‘natural experiment’. The present research considers (1) officer opinions of the necessity to be armed, (2) reflections surrounding officer practice to illuminate whether their behaviour changed in the way that they interacted with citizens or how citizens interacted with them, and, to some degree, (3) proffers insight into the police workplace and hazardous police work. Routinely armed and routinely unarmed police The idea to establish routinely unarmed police may be traced to Peel when establishing the Metropolitan Police in 1829. At that time policing agencies were disarmed to encourage acceptance of the police ‘idea’ and distancing the police from military forces (Waddington and Wright 2008). Some British colonies followed, such as the disestablishment of New Zealand’s armed constabulary in 1886 in favour of a civilian-based police force (Hill 1986), but routine arming became commonplace in most jurisdictions. In North America, police commenced routine arming from 1854, under mayoral direction in Philadelphia, shortly followed by New York in 1857 (Friedman 1993). Finland was the first Nordic country to routinely arm in response to the civil war in 1918, followed by agencies in Denmark and Sweden (Knutsson and Norée 2010). In the case of Sweden, arming occurred when regional forces were consolidated into the national force (Knutsson 2010). South Australia police were the last Australian agency to be routinely armed in 1982 (Slee 1988) and to openly carry firearms in 1992 (Sarre 1996). The Norwegian situation The Norwegian police are an armed police force where officers are trained and equipped to respond, if necessary, to an incident armed with firearms. Ordinarily, officers patrol and respond to incidents without carrying a firearm on their person (but carry other weapons include handcuffs, OC spray, and expandable batons); firearms are kept in a locked security box inside patrol vehicles. Permission must be given by a local commander if officers believe it is necessary to respond to an incident armed with a firearm (Knutsson and Strype 2003). This policy changed in response to intelligence received that a terrorist threat was imminent when the Norwegian Police Directorate directed all officers to temporarily carry a firearm at all times when on duty. POLICING AND SOCIETY 3 The Norwegian approach differs from other routinely unarmed jurisdictions. In New Zealand, for example, firearms are secured in police vehicles, but unlike Norway, officers are not constrained to seek permission to arm themselves (Hendy 2018). In practice, deployable New Zealand/Norway officers operate with and without firearms; they transfer from one state to the other during the succession of different events during a duty shift (Hendy 2018). This model differs to British police officers as routine British officers are not trained nor expected to respond with firearms. In the British Home Office forces, only specialist authorised firearms officers (AFOs) are trained to carry firearms on duty. Most AFOs are deployed in armed response vehicles waiting to respond to incidents that require an armed response (Waddington and Wright 2008). Routinely arming a routinely unarmed police force The routine armament discourse centres on binary constructs that are estranged from the complexities of contemporary police policy and practice (Hendy 2014). For instance, while Greenwood advocated that routine armament would lead to fewer mistakes and injuries to citizens (cited in Waddington 1991), Punch (2011) argues the opposite: that unarmed police will make fewer mistakes, and thus less injurious to the citizenry, but pose a greater risk to officer safety. Equally, routinely arming a police agency is likely to be injurious from police ‘friendly fire’ or needless death of citizens (including suspects). Punch’s conundrum is laid out: the price paid for an unarmed police is some officers will die who might have lived if they had been armed, and in the latter the price paid for an armed police is that some people will needlessly die because of accidents and mistakes. (Punch 2011, p. 72) Others have shown the weakness of casting a binary argument (Squires and Kennison 2010, Hendy 2014). For example, Hendy (2014) identified variances among firearm use by Scandinavian police forces, indicating that policies restricting how firearms were to be used were more influential than whether a force was routinely armed or not. While there is a significant body of literature that explores the police use of force, including the fatal use of force by police, there is insufficient scope in this article to comprehensively address the issues here (for a foundation see Geller and Toch 1996, Alpert and Dunham 2004). Consideration of police firearms use is dominated by case studies of police shootings (Waddington 1991, Squires and Kennison 2010, Punch 2011), particularly on racial disparities of those shot (e.g. Kennison and Loumansky 2007, Osse and Cano 2017, Sekhon 2017), and increasing nature of police militarisation, rather than taking a systematic approach. The history, utility, equipment and tactics of police militarisation of police are explored in the British (Waddington and Wright 2008, Squires and Kennison 2010, Waddington and Wright 2010, Punch 2011), American (e.g. see Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Kraska 2001) and Canadian (Roziere and Walby 2019) contexts. Indeed, debate amongst scholars as to conceptual, ideological and definitional foundations of militarisation and para-militarisation persists (Kraska 1999, Sheptycki 1999, Waddington 1999, Kappeler and Kraska 2013, den Heyer 2014, Roziere and Walby 2019). While the routine armament of a police force would ipso facto result in an increased visibility of firearms in public, other militaristic characteristics observed in American paramilitary unit subculture by Kraska et al. (Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Kraska 1999, Kraska 2001, Kappeler and Kraska 2013) are of tangential interest to the present research. Indeed, a consideration of the impact of routinely arming an entire unarmed police force as it relates to ‘routine policing’ is quite a different question to an increase in the rate of discrete militaristic or para-militaristic deployments which are oftcited topics in the militarisation literature. Given the absence of directly relevant empirical evidence, other research may be helpful to forecast relevant issues. Banton’s (1964) study of policing in North America and Scotland illustrates how officers face issues that are culturally- or jurisdictionally-specific. Likewise, Waddington et al. (2008) found that authorised firearms officers were more risk-averse than routinely unarmed officers. A more recent cross-national study of routinely armed and routinely unarmed policing styles revealed a higher frequency and duration of the use of control behaviours by routinely armed South Australian 4 R. HENDY patrol officers than the routinely unarmed New Zealand patrol officers; albeit there was no evidence linking the differences to the armed status (Hendy 2018). However, several comparative studies of the Scandinavian jurisdictions shed light on operational and outcome differences. The comparison between Norwegian and Swedish firearms events 1985–1998 revealed that on average more officers were present at a Norwegian event than a Swedish event (7.3 compared with 3.9 respectively), Norwegian officers were positioned farther from the person shot than Swedish officers (10.4 m compared with 5.9 m) and revealed that Norwegian officers were shooting in more controlled settings than their Swedish counterparts (Knutsson and Strype 2003). However, a broader comparison of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are complicated due to different rules of engagement and shooting regulations (Knutsson and Norée 2010). Several notable pieces of research originating from Norway reveal relevant insights into the practice, characteristics and personalities of Norwegian officers. Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) found that a sample of Norwegian officers displayed a ‘police personality’ that was distinct from the wider population and that although there was a link between personality and conflict resolution tactics, it was only weakly related. Attitudes of a 2013 cohort of Norwegian police recruits revealed that opinions for routine arming and carriage were roughly equally divided among being in favour, against, or undecided. Those who identified as male were more likely to be in favour of routine armament than female, however, this preference was linked to prospective career plans and the constructions of police function. Recruits who favoured a patrol-based role and had a non-legalistic perception of police function were more likely to prefer routine armament (Fekjær and Strype 2015). Method This article draws on data collected as part of a wider study that sought to compare routinely armed and routinely unarmed police officers when attempting to resolve interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters (see Hendy 2018). This research took a mixed-methods approach, where systematic social observation, participant observation, psychometrics and cognitive interviewing were employed to collect data in New Zealand and South Australia. Due to legal constraints, the research in Norway was limited to psychometric testing and cognitive interviewing. The temporary routine armament in Norway occurred after the fieldwork, methods and data collection protocols had been established and access finalised. Reflective practice Two additional questions were added to the interview schedule for Norwegian officers to encourage participants to engage in a critically reflective process to consider how the policy change had impacted their practice and their perception of citizen interaction. Christopher (2015) argues that police agencies and practitioners benefit from taking a critically reflective process to explore the complexities of police practice. In particular, on-action reflection provides a ‘mechanism for converting an experience into a learning experience’ (Christopher 2015, p. 331). Sample Research access was facilitated through staff at the Norwegian Police University College and the Oslo Chief of Police. Sampling followed both purposive and convivence rationales. Eligibility criteria included the ability to converse in English, experience working as a patrol officer in the wider Oslo jurisdiction, and availability to be present at an interview during a two-week window. The Oslo police department advertised for research participants. Twenty volunteers were put forward to the researcher and were provided with the participant information and informed consent POLICING AND SOCIETY 5 documentation. Sixteen agreed to participate in the research (males = 15; female = 1). Participants’ police length of service ranged from 3 to 25 years. Data collection and analysis Officers were interviewed at the Norwegian Police University College in Oslo. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, were conducted in English and were recorded electronically. The interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber. For clarity, the verbatim quotations have been silently corrected where interviewees stumbled or were uncertain of nomenclature. Two interviews were unable to be transcribed due to technical problems. The interview transcripts were assembled into the MAXQDA application to facilitate an inductive qualitative analysis. Coding followed an inductive process that led to an iterative grouping of themes. Findings The necessity to be routinely armed A core aim of the present research was to explore whether officers agreed with the rationale to become temporarily routinely armed with firearms in light of the terror threat (the ’policy change’). Perspectives of necessity were mixed. For the majority of the interviewees, the risks associated with ‘routine’ policing necessitated the need to be routinely armed and was more pressing than in response to the terror threat. As such, the change in circumstances was convenient, although some officers were frustrated that the terrorist rationale had trumped their ordinary operational concerns: But the one thing I don’t like about it is that the discussion about arming police officers because of our job, not the terrorist threat, gets lost because of it. And that’s kind of annoying, because in all the situations I have been in where I have had a use for the gun, never been about religion or terrorism or anything like that. It’s just been people who are wanting to take the police or maybe getting shot themself, suicide by cop or that type of thing. (Officer A) These views were not universal. Two of the interviewees considered that the routine armament was unnecessary for routine policing, as explained here by Officer B: I’ve never shot anybody, but I armed myself several times. And we were training on it and it took only a few seconds to get on the pistol. So, I have never experienced the old way in doing this as a problem. And at [station A] and [station B], most of the officers, because that has been measured, a very big majority, they want to be armed. I am one of the few that don’t want to be armed. I don’t see that it is necessary, because I trust my pepper spray and my baton and my fists and, and my [experience]. (Officer B) Officers who believed that routine armament was necessary valued its utility. Carrying a firearm without the need for permission from a commander encouraged officers to believe that they could operate with increased efficiency and effectiveness. Justifications revealed officers’ missionfocused (and service-orientated) motivation. For example, Officer C explains how immediate access intertwines with efficiency: … we get calls that could be 30 seconds away. We had one call, we came out of the station and there was a call where they said there’s a guy with a knife [one] block away. We had the gun on us and we didn’t need to stop, take the gun out and talk to each other what we were going to do when we got there. We just drove straight away and got control of him in under a minute. (Officer C) And you’re going to a domestic disturbance and somebody suddenly pull a knife on you, and if you’re in the seventh floor it’s a long way down to get to weapons in the car, a very long way. I’ve done that run, and it feels a very long way to run. (Officer D) Similarly, officer D’s explanation is indicative of officers’ desire to be effective. 6 R. HENDY In the mind of the officers, routine armament enables an effective response to critical events. Officers reinforced their utility argument by classifying their firearm as another ‘tool on the belt’. Like other tactical equipment, such as handcuffs or OC spray, a firearm is a ‘tool’ that extends their capability to respond to incidents that might warrant a firearm. For me it’s much more important that I’m carrying the right tools and mentally I am all the time in the situation and I don’t think about retreating, to back up all the time. (Officer E) Moreover, Officer E’s account illustrates the differences among the various models of routinely unarmed policing. Unlike the British ‘ARV model’, the Norwegian model relies on generalist first response officers, who are trained and equipped with the use of firearms, to respond in the first instance. Further levels of specialist response units are available including emergency response units (IP3 units working in a similar vein to SWAT or British ARV units) for critical incidents or IP1 units for counterterrorist or national emergency response (Bevæpningsutvalget 2017). The critical difference between the Norwegian and British models is that the generalist first responders of the former are deployable to lead critical ‘firearms/weapons’ incidents whereas the latter is not. Norwegian officers discussed that before the policy change, they would ordinarily evaluate the circumstances of all incidents as part of their tactical and response planning. If deemed necessary, officers sought permission to deploy with firearms. This was different while temporally routinely armed as the decision to use a firearm was no longer restricted by command. As such, Norwegian officers were familiar with responses involving firearms, in the same manner as routinely armed officers. Hence, the firearm was ‘another’ tool that officers had the option to use. Necessity was illustrated with mission-focused vignettes. That is, routinely armed policing was necessary to complete their day-to-day work because when temporarily routinely armed they believed they operated more effectively and efficiently than when routinely unarmed. Necessity was mostly discussed at a tactical level rather than at a strategic level. Officers were focused on how best they could respond to a call for service: to complete a ‘mission’. Some were aware, though, of the difficulty in striking a balance between the tactical requirement of an incident in the field and broader organisational strategic objectives. Officer D identifies the conflict associated with command and control structure mechanisms: … what tended to be a problem then that we had bad communications with the policemen out doing patrol and with the policemen inside on dispatch, because many of them probably did want us to have weapons, but they were, according to rules, obliged to go to the senior officer and some of the senior officers didn’t want to give us weapons, so they turned it down because they were more afraid of what the police were going to do with the weapons than the criminals were going to use with their weapons. So they turned the applications for the guns down. So there was a bit of a struggle between the policemen working out and on the dispatch and on the senior officers sitting in offices and making all this, making all these rules. (Officer D) Although this echoes ‘street cop’ and ‘management cop’ paradigms (Reuss-Ianni 1983), it also reflects the conflict between the tactical goals of operational officers (who strive to engage in a mission effectively and efficiently) with the strategic goals of police management. Officers commented on how their opinions of the necessity of routinely armed policing changed during their operational experience, contextualised in response to their exposure in the field. Factors such as the increasing availability and presence of weapons ‘on the street’, an increase in the tendency to use violence, and the increased trend of terrorists targeting police officers informed some officers to believe that routinely armed policing was now necessary. Officer F explains that their opinion changed from when they attended their initial police training to when taking up duties in Oslo: But at the same time if you look at statistics, the crime and violence is going down, but still that’s not the feeling among the officers who work on the streets. But when I started at the police university college I was against routinely arming, and I also was that during my three first years in the police where I worked as an investigator and a patrolling officer in a small city. But after I started working in Oslo I started feeling that we were getting incidents POLICING AND SOCIETY 7 quite often where we had to arm ourselves by locking out the box inside the car, and I felt that that is affecting how we are resolving the incident. (Officer F) Officer F represents the prevailing view that necessity positively correlates the increased volume of events that ‘require’ an initial armed response. In summary, those who perceived the value of the policy change did so as they believed that it enhanced their capability to respond to critical calls for service (those which were non-terror related), more effectively and efficiently. In other words, officers valued the utility of permanent armament as it benefitted their ability to respond to core policing events rather than the necessity to respond to the terror threat. Relief of cognitive strain As identified above, officers posited that routinely armed policing was advantageous as it improved their tactical responses to ‘critical armed incidents’. Officers who favoured the change in policy believed that it was beneficial for tactical responses and personal safety as it eliminated the cognitive strain associated with the command decision-making procedure. Before the policy change, officers needed permission from a senior officer (not in the field) to access their firearms for an incident (except in emergencies). Officers discussed that the procedure, especially the length of time, negatively affected their mental preparedness for the event. Of their most significant concern was that waiting and evaluating whether command would provide permission interfered with their ability to formulate an adequate tactical plan. Officer D explains how the authorisation procedure is frustrating as at times, it causes distress. … when we didn’t have the routinely armed situation, we had it locked down in the cars. And I found that very distressing, because we had to ask for to get our weapons out, and it always took some time because we had to take it on the radio [to request authorisation from command], say that we want to have pistols on this assignment. And it was an ongoing assignment. And sometimes we were just a block away. And they said, ‘Okay, we’re going to talk to the superior officer or the police chief and we’ll get back to you’. And the mental process for the assignment, what we should have been thinking about is, ‘You are going to get the breaching equipment. You’re getting the ballistic shield. You go and get the medic kit. We’re going to position ourselves and we’re going to walk to the building. And then we’re going to enter the building and the flat is on the third storey’. You haven’t time for that, because all your mental behaviour was getting your guns ready. (Officer D) Officers B and G discuss how the process to retrieve the firearm from the locker, fit and load the firearm distracts officers from tactical planning. In other words, officers are focusing their attention to ‘kitting up’ rather than planning how they will approach the situation. Such distractions, of course, were not present when they were temporarily routinely armed. When you are listening [to] the police radio, when you are watching you have to think what shall we do, how shall we solve this? And if you’re also going to the weapon [locker] to get the holster, to load the weapon, load up you are busy just doing that, so you are not able to hear what’s said on the radio or watch when you are driving to the place. So it saves [what] I call it capacity. (Officer B) You respond faster and you don’t have to – because when the firearm is locked in a car then you have to lock it out, you have to load it, then you have to put on this extra holster and everything. So, it takes capacity from you, and especially here in Oslo when we are often close to where it’s happening and you spend a lot of that time when you’re driving just to find the firearm, right, and you don’t get to read and to take messages, and you don’t really update yourself on the actual situation, where you need to go and everything. (Officer G) Officers who previously worked in suburban and rural areas commented that comparatively, there were shorter distances to travel and less time to prepare for a critical event when working in Oslo, than in other parts of the country. [Outside of Oslo] there is sometimes a long road to drive to a place. [But] here in Oslo we could get in a situation straight away with the need of a gun. You don’t get the time to mentally prepare yourself with the driving time or anything. You need to listen to the situation you get in your ear from the [radio]. And you need to put on your 8 R. HENDY holster. You need to, to load your gun, all while you think about what you are going to do when you get to the place in maybe two or three minutes. (Officer C) These officers believed that routine armament improves their safety as it eliminates the strain associated with seeking authorisation and provides time to concentrate on tactical planning. Officers also discussed the risks equipping while en route to an event: But when we got in missions where, assignments where we were able to have weapons, they said, ‘You may arm yourself’, and it was an ongoing situation, then you either had to stop the car, unlock the weapons, do this, put the holsters on, and time is going. Many cases you had very little time and you know that lives may get lost there if you don’t get on the scene very rapidly. So you had to arm yourself while driving with blue lights and sirens – very dangerous situation – and you had to arm the officer driving and try to get his gun on and his belt on. (Officer D) But I’ve had some incidents where when you have to take your eyes off the road, for instance, or the radio, you get a call and you’re the passenger in the patrol car, and you get told to arm yourself, and when you start arming yourself you might miss something on the radio, some important information. Maybe the driver doesn’t know where he has to drive, so you should be looking on the map, telling him where to drive. And you might be very close to where the incident is so that you, you don’t have the time to get the weapon out and your eyes up before you’re already at the scene. (Officer F) Officer D’s remark signals the dilemma faced by officers dispatched to critical events. Present in their mind is that ‘critical events’ are indeed classed as critical as they relate to the preservation of life. Officers are cognizant of the risks when balancing the need to respond and arrive at the scene quickly (efficiently) with the need to arrive safely (effectiveness) when officers believe that the lives at the scene are at risk. The insights of the officers reflecting on their experiences operating under routinely unarmed and armed conditions have identified that under the latter state, officers reported a lesser degree of cognitive strain during the dispatch and mobilisation to a critical event. Officers did not have to ‘wait’ for permission to arm themselves nor have to equip themselves while en route. As a consequence, officers believed that their focus on the critical event was enhanced, which resulted in a superior tactical plan. Public perception While officers were inclined to discuss tactical implications (which were predominantly seen as improvements) of routine armament, they appeared less cognizant of any possible strategic consequences of the policy change. Indeed, this may have been the case as the policy change was officially a temporary measure (albeit that it had been in place for over a year at the time of the interviews). Nonetheless, some themes did emerge that could have implications for the strategic relationship between police and the citizenry. Officer opinions were divided whether the Norwegian public supported the policy change. Some officers relayed anecdotes describing encounters with citizens that demonstrated support for or against the policy, others displayed an awareness that the policy change was contentious in some parts of society. They say in Norway that it’s a big cultural thing, that it’s valuable at a cultural level that we are not armed. I don’t get that point whatsoever, because why is that cultural part more important than being able to save a life if the situation arises? (Officer H) Indeed, Officer H’s sentiments signify the transactional thinking predominant amongst the cohort: that routine armament enables more efficient and effective service. Officers were critical of the media coverage as they believed that it was ill-informed and one-sided. For instance, officers discussed a much-cited criticism that routinely armed policing would prompt an increase in firearm usage by ‘criminals’. An officer rebuked this perspective, believing that ‘criminals’ were already armed, referring to recent robbery involving an AK47 assault rifle. Similarly, officers were aware of arguments relating to weapon ‘threshold creep’. Indeed, this is one of the concerns often cited by POLICING AND SOCIETY 9 opponents to increased weaponisation of police. Officers were divided if ‘threshold creep’ or an increase in the use of firearms since the policy change. Officer G comments: And there’s been a huge debate in the media the last year about this, and there’s a lot of emotions going on – when people are emotional, they’re not rational, so there is very little rationality to what the people are writing. And I just really don’t see the problem, because the gun is just there. I just have it with me. It doesn’t mean I’m going to shoot you. The law for shooting is still the same. I can’t shoot you any more now than I could shoot you before, right? And people think, well, now they’re going to shoot and it’s going to be like Texas … And I just don’t see that, because during [these] 13 months I never touched my weapon, I never grabbed it, I never considered touching it. It was just out of my thinking, I just communicate the same way as I used to. I resolve situations the same way as I used to. The only difference is that my gun is closer to me. It’s not in my car. It’s on my hip. (Officer G) Officer D, however, contradicts Officer G’s perspective. Officer D describes how the change of policy has provided new tactical usage in situations where risk is ambiguous (and arguably not permitted under ‘normal’ conditions) as there is no explicit threat: But now we’re used to it, we know it’s there and we feel confident if something occurs which makes me need to pull out the weapon, I can do it very quickly. […] Sometimes we have to have the guns out when we enter a building, an apartment. Sometimes we just knock on the door, but we have the gun there. If we see something disturbing or he makes some kind of threat which needs us to pull out the weapon, we can do it very quickly. (Officer D) Perceptions of the impact of the policy change on police-citizen relations were informed by officers’ understanding of day-to-day encounters with the public. Except for the occasional adverse comment, most officers discussed that they had not experienced any changes in citizen behaviour. For instance, Officer A recalled that one person approached them and said ‘It’s horrible that you’re wearing guns. It reminds me of the Second World War’ but this was followed by another person stating ‘I’m so glad that you’re wearing arms now. I feel so much safer’ (Officer A). Others disclosed similar positive conversations, such as ‘Good for you, you got your gun, that’s good’ (Officer D). And, surprisingly, some citizens had not noticed that an officer was armed: But usually people don’t notice the gun actually. Because I remember the first period after we got armed, people coming up to me and asking, ‘Do you have a gun?’ And it was right on my side, they could see it, but they didn’t know what to see or look [for]. (Officer A) Comments made by the public were more frequent when the policy change first took effect but reduced as time progressed. Officer E discussed how the comments at the beginning reinforced to them that they were routinely armed, but now believes that the absence of comments indicates familiarity and acceptance of the change. … in the beginning we also saw a difference from how the public responded to us, because they were very focused on that they saw that now you’re armed, why are you armed? That was very important for the public. So they commented on it every time. That always was the subject, no matter what we were talking about. They all always mentioned that during the conversation. So that gave us a constant reminder that we actually were carrying the gun. And, that is also what we’re seeing now and it’s been like over a year when we’ve been routinely armed, that people are mentioning it less and less. It’s not that important anymore, because they are getting used to seeing us with guns. (Officer E) And I guess that people were thinking that we are now more scared of police or police will be more scary and we won’t have the social profile that we like to have. But my experience is that people don’t notice it, because if you’re not interested in police and we put it in our belt, then human perception is so bad in a way that you might not even notice it. (Officer G) Some officers believed that young people were less wary of the policy change than older adults. Officer J recalls how young children appeared more curious than frightened by temporarily routinely armed officers: But when you just meet the kid it doesn’t care about the gun. I still say hello to kids and talk to the kindergarten kids and everything. And before we had the gun even the kids in the middle school, like young teenagers were always asking, ‘Can I see your gun? Can I see?’ because they see these American and English TV series where the police are 10 R. HENDY armed. And for them it’s not a subject really. They don’t feel afraid and they won’t keep to themselves. I still walk around in the city, talk to people, and I don’t feel any different about it. That’s just a tool in my belt. (Officer J) It was evident that officers believed that the notoriety associated with the policy change had diminished over time. Assessments of citizen acceptability of the policy changed were mostly constructed from citizen behaviour explicit during police-citizen encounters, although some officers were aware of the broader cultural disposition to routine armament. Judgements that citizens had become acclimatised to routinely armed officers were reached based on reduction of adverse comments received. Changes in officer behaviour Officers were asked to reflect if their behaviour had changed after the policy change. All interviewees recalled that when the policy change was implemented, they were mindful that they were now routinely armed while on duty and that they now carried a firearm when at situations where a firearm was not necessarily needed. Interviewees were not able to recall the time elapsed before acclimating to the change, although one remarked that at the time of the interview (some 14 months since the change) they felt that it had ‘become very normal [to carry a firearm]. Now I don’t think about it in that way’ (Officer E). Another officer who was reluctant to operate in a routinely-armed capacity before the policy change remarked that they too had become accustomed to carrying firearms. There was a belief, held by some, that the policy change enhanced operational capability. Specifically, officers felt that in addition to acclimating to carrying a firearm, they were better equipped to respond to an emergency requiring a firearm response, should the circumstances arise. Before the policy change, officers described how they were concerned that they would be ill-equipped to deal with emergency critical incidents instantly. Below, Officer K describes how being temporarily routinely armed eases his stress when contemplating unknown risks: When I’m standing in the situation, I’m much comfortable than I was even if I didn’t have the gun and I was preparing and then I got into the situation. I would be much more stressed, I think. So for me now it’s much more relaxed. The last thing for me to do is using my gun, and I have it on me, I’m much more [comfortable] with me as a police officer and what kind of situation will happen there. If somebody runs into me with a knife I can deal with it. That’s a good mentally thing for me as an officer, so I don’t have to be scared all the time, because we officers, we don’t like to tell others that sometimes we are scared. But if you don’t get scared in these kinds of situations then you think your mind is not set, because you have to think all the time, you’re not a super-cop or something. You’re just a human being like everybody else. (Officer K) Moreover, Officer K attributed that being temporarily routinely armed directly reduced their stress; wellbeing is bounded with the self-belief that they were equipped to respond and the belief that they were able to respond. Curiously, Officer F goes on to explain that he was less likely to take the firearm out of the holster since the policy change. Officer F believed that before the change, officers would have ‘forecast’ the need to equip themselves with a firearm, and if approved by command, the firearm would be in hand, not holstered. In other words, Officer F believed that their colleagues were more likely to have had a firearm unholstered when armed under the routinely unarmed policy than now when temporarily routinely armed: I feel when I have the weapon on me I have it there, but I don’t need to touch it or anything, but when you get over the radio that your unit is going to arm yourself and you go to this address and resolve the situation, then you immediately start to, your heart rates goes up and you’re thinking this, this is the real deal. So I would say that two years ago when we were not routinely armed, whenever we got a call where we armed ourselves we would have our hand on the gun, maybe have it outside the holster, but now it’s much more rare that we take it out of the holster. (Officer F) Somewhat related is Officer F’s observation that the policy change has resulted with officers arriving at an event better prepared as they are calmer than they would be before the policy change. No, my feeling is that [officers] are much more calm when they arrive at the scene, when they meet other units as well. People are used to, they resolve the situation like they do on a not-armed incident. But under the old rules when, when you armed yourself, that was the first sign of this is some heavy incident. (Officer F) POLICING AND SOCIETY 11 While the observations from Officer F were not disclosed by other interviewees, they do nonetheless illuminate a possible intersection of practice and wellbeing. In that ‘feeling equipped’ to do ‘one’s job’ reduces tactical stress that might impede the cognitive process of information ingestion during tactical decision-making. Interviewees considered if their practice altered when interacting with the public after the policy change. They were mindful that they were now carrying a firearm routinely, as mentioned above, and this resulted in adjustments in behaviour at the commencement of the policy change. Awareness was heightened when in proximity with citizens and manifested in changes of stance, particularly when officers were operating in crowded situations. Here Officer E outlines that some adjustment was observed, even when talking to ‘ordinary’ people (i.e. when not confronted suspects or offenders): So you might have been a little bit more careful also when you’re talking to people, for example, when it comes to distance, when people are standing behind you, maybe on the side, or if you’re at a place where it’s very crowded you can manage that you might just put a hand there, not because you’re afraid of something happening. It’s just that you don’t want people to be able to grab your gun for example. So you might have your hand there, so people might feel that why is he standing like that, is he afraid of me going like to attack him or is it … ? They might not see the way that we see it. So I believe that it can affect it a little bit, but at the same time I’m trying to just keep the same relaxed, calm situation and don’t get too much focus on the gun. (Officer E) Officer E’s commentary highlights the misconception of officer mindfulness: the protective (or reassuring) action perceived as threatening action. Such behaviours play into the ‘Texan’ and ‘wild west’ narratives espoused by mainstream media as discussed above by Officer G. The need for weapon retention was a concern among officers. The fear that citizens might attempt to take their firearm was apparent, evident in one example disclosed where a citizen attempted to take the sidearm as a ‘practical joke’, but not exclusively: … I’ve had some people come up to me and say, ‘I really support you in this having the gun’. He was this old guy and he was also touching my gun, ‘Yeah, yeah’, like shaking it, so he wasn’t scared at all, like, ‘Yeah, it looks, looks good’. And that situation was sort of I didn’t feel it was a threat or anything, because he was this 80-year-old man like … (Officer G) As a consequence of this risk, one officer posited that the policy change was advantageous as officers were more inclined to request backup if the encounter is likely to involve physical force: So it could be that – I’m not saying it is – but it could be that people are more likely to ask for backup if something, if they see that this is going somewhere where you have to use physical force. So maybe – I’m not saying it is – but I know people are aware of the danger of the firearm being taken away from you. (Officer L) In summary, officers reflected that their behaviour had changed as a result of being temporarily routinely armed. Most significantly, officers observed, even for the most steadfast opponent of the policy in the group, that the routine carriage became normalised. As a consequence, officers modified their behaviour to aid weapon retention: deliberate modification of their body stance when in the proximity of citizens and an increase in the incidence of requesting backup from other officers if they anticipated the need to use physical force against a citizen. One officer observed a reduction of the unholstering of sidearms at incidents that would have previously prompted officers to have their firearms in hand. Although it was not explicitly expressed, officers were somewhat vexed that any gains achieved through the reduction of stress or strain experienced by the officer were complicated by their mindfulness of weapon retention. Discussion This research provides some direct evidence surrounding the impact of routinely arming a routinely unarmed police agency. It also provides two important insights into police practice. First, these findings illustrate how practitioners reconcile the efficacy of changes to street-level operational policy. Chief among these is the observation that despite the scepticism of its justification, 12 R. HENDY practitioners implemented a policy change as they believed that it ultimately benefited their work practice. This is helpful when contemplating instances of other trials that lacked practitioner buyin (e.g. Sherman and Weisburd 1995, Macqueen and Bradford 2017). For instance, the advantage perceived by officers in the present research was not apparent in Sherman and Weisburd’s (1995) early hot-spot policing experiment: officers appeared to favour mobile patrols (which would lead to the exercise of police powers) rather than maintaining static positions at a hot-spot for a prescribed duration. This, then, poses an important lesson for future police research: despite any assumption that police’s hierarchical quasi-military structure may ease implementation (i.e. that officers will follow directions), research design should not assume officer compliance with the implementation protocols as officers are afforded a high degree discretional decision-making and operational independence (Lipsky 1980). Second, the present research gives a platform for a practitioner voice (albeit one from street-level, first response patrol officers) which will surely invigorate arguments of utility, tactics, and police-held beliefs of effectiveness of routinely arming a routinely unarmed agency within a wider discourse of consent, restraint and symbolism (Jefferson 1990, Waddington 1991, Waddington 1993, Bevæpningsutvalget 2017). Interviewees believed that they were more effective and efficient in response to critical police events when routinely armed. The prominence of equipment-based and temporal factors to support their utility argument is perhaps somewhat explained by the ‘operative disposition’ as a consequence of their role (Glomseth and Gottschalk 2009). Indeed, Stotland and Pendleton (1989) observed that professional identities of highly productive officers valued the ‘real police work of catching crooks’ (p.15): responding to critical police events is arguably as close to ‘real police work’ as one could imagine (e.g. Sherman and Weisburd 1995, Van Hulst 2013) and having the best tools available allows for effective and efficient policework. The discussion of the cognitive strain associated with seeking permission (before the policy change) and its implication for effective and efficient policework is notable. Inhibited decisionmaking in operational situations is worth further investigation in light of recent research (see Broomé 2014, Hine et al. 2018). General strain theory (GST) may provide one framework to apply to examine those experiences of those who felt constrained by the ‘Norwegian model’. Agnew (2006) observes that GST is not exclusive to criminal offending; indeed in the present case, the inability to achieve goals (to respond with a firearm) and the possibility to lose something valued (safety) is consistent with GST’s central propositions (see 2006). In the present research, the removal of the permission requirement alleviated strain and eased the reception of new information and tactical decision-making. How, then, does the present research evidence the impact of routinely arming a routinely unarmed agency? First, Punch’s (2011) forecast that routinely arming a routinely armed police agency would lead to needless deaths due to police ‘mistakes’ or ‘accidents’ is not supported here. While there has been an increase in unintentional discharges (2011 N = 4; 2012 N = 2; 2013 N = 6; 2014 N = 10; 2015 N = 24 (Bevæpningsutvalget 2017)), there has not been a similar increase in accidental or deliberate deaths. This may be in part due to the level of familiarisation with firearms that Norwegian officers typically have; all Norwegian officers have annual firearms training (Bevæpningsutvalget 2017) and some interviewees disclosed additional familiarity with firearms due to prior military training. This is similar to New Zealand, but not is the case in other routinely unarmed jurisdictions, such as in England and Wales. Punch’s prediction, therefore, may well have been influenced by the British context (where almost all officers would not have previous experience and familiarisation with firearms). We must be mindful that only one interviewee discussed a reduction in unholstering at critical events, and while it provides some support for Greenwood’s prediction that a transitioned routinely armed agency would see fewer firearm-related mistakes (cited in Waddington 1991) further research could test this hypothesis. Squires and Kennison (2010) theorised that routinely armed officers develop a ‘presumption of capacity’ that causes an ‘illusion of safety’, which ultimately leads to complacency. This may well explain the reported reduction in unholstering. POLICING AND SOCIETY 13 Second, while the extent and diminishing nature of public comments recounted by interviewees should not be taken as representative of public sentiment, they do represent the experiences that the interviewees have chosen to portray. Given the open support expressed for permanent routine arming, one must be cautious to accept interviewees’ assessment without corroboration. Finstad (cited in Høigård 2011) noted that patrol officers are not necessarily concerned with the long-term consequences of their actions which may explain that interviewee reflection might be oblivious to more nuanced community sentiment or indeed simply misinterpretation of citizen sentiment (Rojek et al. 2012). While it is reasonable that officers concluded that their routinely armed presence was accepted by citizens, Yesberg and Bradford (2019) found that public acceptance of increased armed response in London positively related to trust and affective response. Indeed, positivity or acceptance reported in the present research may have been associated with the impending terror threat, rather than the risks associated with routine day-to-day policing. Equally, it may be the case that the interviewees have accurately measured public sentiment. Limitations The present research does not claim to the generalisability or wider transferability of the findings. Indeed, the findings should be considered in the context of the limited availability of patrol officers available and willing to contribute to the research. The research participants believed that the temporary routine arming had not affected police-citizen relations. While there was some report of adverse comments, and some notoriety at the beginning of the policy change, officers reflected that they had not detected changes in citizen behaviour that indicated an increased fear of or caution towards officers. Such insights should be carefully considered as the research has only captured officer perceptions. Conclusion This present study contributes insight into routinely unarmed and armed policing practice. In particular, it evidences experiences of first response officers who had been temporarily routinely armed. Interviewees agreed that routinely carrying firearms had utility; most argued that utility lay in improving efficiency and effectiveness when responding to routine police events, rather than as a preventative measure in response to the perceived terror threat that prompted the policy change. Officers considered the firearm as ‘another tool on the belt’ which aided day-to-day policing. The research was not designed to capture the extent of support for the policy change, but all but one participant reported being in support of routine arming. As a result of the change, interviewees believed that they were more effective and efficient, and this resulted in an improvement for routine ‘day-to-day’ policing. Furthermore, officers reported that they were not necessary ‘using’ their firearms more often, and in some cases, less often. The increased visibility of firearms could be considered to be further undesirable militarisation of the police – as it dilutes the civilianised nature of routine policing (Kraska et al., op cit) – or an inevitable response to a changing operational environment (den Heyer 2014). The interviewees’ explanations for their preference for routine armament adds further nuance to the police militarisation discourse. This paper contributes evidence for police, policy-makers and the community to consider when debating the tactical and strategic issues of utility, visibility and symbolism of the police firearm policies. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Johannes Knutsson for his assistance arranging research access for this research and Jon Strype for his assistance reviewing the manuscript. 14 R. HENDY Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Funding statement This work was supported by the Norwegian Centre for Cooperation in Education [grant number UDSS-2014/10106]; the University of Cambridge’s Department of Anglo-Saxon, Norse and Celtic Scandinavian Studies and Tennant Fund [grant number SSF 2014]; and in-kind support from the Norwegian University Police College. ORCID Ross Hendy http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4027-7015 References Abrahamsen, S., and Strype, J., 2009. Are they all the same? Norwegian police officers’ personality characteristics and tactics of conflict resolution. Policing and society, 20, 99–123. Aftenposten. 2017. Aftenposten mener: Ubevæpnet politi bør være det normale. Aftenposten. Agnew, R., 2006. Pressured into crime; an overview of general strain theory. Portland: Ringgold Inc. Alpert, G.P., and Dunham, R.G., 2004. Understanding police use of force: officers, suspects, and reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Banton, M., 1964. The policeman in the community. New York: Basic Books. 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