A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
1
A More
Coherent and Effective
European Foreign Policy?
ANDREW BLICK
A Federal Trust Report
February 2009
The Federal Trust
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A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
THE FEDERAL TRUST
for education & research
A More
Coherent and Effective
European Foreign Policy?
A Federal Trust Report
Enlightening the Debate on Good Governance
3
4
This report is based on the discussions of a Federal Trust Work
The Federal
which
met onTrust
a number of occasions in the second half of 2008 t
the new opportunities and challenges presented to the formula
European Union’s external policies by the Lisbon Treaty.
This report arises from the Working Group’s discussions, but the
rapporteur are alone responsible for its analysis and conclusion
Working Group Members
Chairman: Professor Richard Whitman - University of Bath
Rapporteur: Ana E. Juncos - University of Bristol
Professor David Allen - University of Loughborough
David Clark - Senior Research Fellow, The Federal Trust
Brendan Donnelly - The Federal Trust
Dr. Geoffrey Edwards - University of Cambridge
Maurice Fraser - London School of Economics
Lord Hannay - House of Lords
Professor Stephen Haseler - London Metropolitan University
Sir Emyr Jones Parry - Former UK Ambassador to the UN
Nicolas Maclean - MWM Consulting
John Palmer - European Policy Centre and Federal Trust
Professor Jacques Reland - London Metropolitan University
Anthony Teasdale - Head of Policy Strategy, EPP-ED Group, Eu
Parliament
© Federal Trust for Education and Research 2009
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to examine
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A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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Table of Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................6
Setting the Context: Challenges and Opportunities......................................7
The Lisbon Treaty and European Foreign Policy
Leadership and co-ordination in European Foreign Policy..................9
Representation....................................................................................10
Agenda-setting........................................................................................12
Implementation ......................................................................................13
Co-ordination ..........................................................................................15
The European External Action Service.................................................17
Institutional affiliation..............................................................................18
Tasks of the Service................................................................................19
Internal co-ordination within the Union.................................................20
External representation..........................................................................22
Composition of the Service....................................................................23
Conditions of Service and Budget........................................................26
Common Security and Defence Policy.................................................29
Decision-making and implementation...................................................30
Flexibility and solidarity .........................................................................31
After the Irish Referendum......................................................................34
Life without Lisbon...................................................................................35
Leadership and co-ordination: practical measures..............................36
The European External Action Service.................................................36
European Security and Defence Policy................................................37
Conclusions.......................................................................................................40
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6
Introduction
The aim of this report is to examine the challenges and the potentially
new opportunities bearing on the development of European foreign
and security policy against the background of the debate surrounding
the Lisbon Treaty. In the context of globalisation, financial turmoil and
new security threats, collective action at the European Union (EU) level
constitutes by far the best way for the European states to make an effective
impact on the shaping of global politics. At the same time, the Obama
Presidency offers new opportunities for a renewed partnership between
the EU and the US to tackle global issues. Against this background, the
question must be put as to how far the EU is endowed with the necessary
capabilities to deal with the challenges and opportunities ahead.
Even if appropriate institutions do not guarantee a common foreign
policy – the intergovernmental nature of CFSP means that consensus
among the member states is essential before any decision can be adopted
– given a specific quantum of political will, institutions can make it easier
to achieve a united foreign policy. This report argues that the Lisbon Treaty
holds considerable potential in this regard. In particular, the Lisbon Treaty
should solve some of the problems of lack of leadership and co-ordination
in foreign affairs by establishing a new High Representative who will also
be the Vice-President of the Commission. The External Action Service,
which will assist the High Representative in his/her job, will also facilitate
consensus-building, information sharing and common analysis and will
enhance the EU’s external representation. The Lisbon Treaty will essentially
institutionalise existing cooperation in the area of security and defence
and make its functioning more legitimate and transparent. More
problematic is the creation of a President of the European Council. In its
current form, it is unclear what added value this institutional figure will
bring to the CFSP. This report argues that only a careful delimitation of
spheres of competence could prevent duplication and overlaps between
the President of the European Council, the High Representative, the
President of the Commission and the EU Presidency.
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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The report begins with a brief overview of the main challenges to a
coherent and effective European foreign policy and how these relate to
institutional reform. The following section will offer a detailed examination
of the provisions set out in the Lisbon Treaty, looking in particular at
issues of leadership and co-ordination in European Foreign Policy, at
the European External Action Service and at the Common Security and
Defence Policy. It will also examine those questions that are left open
by the Treaty and will need to be tackled by the member states after the
ratification of the Treaty. The final part of the report will discuss the
current state of the ratification process and will consider whether any of
the measures discussed can be implemented in the case of non-ratification
of the Lisbon Treaty.
Setting the Context: Challenges and Opportunities
The 21st century has brought with it new challenges and opportunities
for European external policy. Drafted under the responsibility of Javier
Solana and approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
the European Security Strategy (ESS) provides a comprehensive
overview of the contemporary security challenges, strategic objectives
and policy implications facing the EU. As far as security challenges are
concerned, this document identifies five ‘key threats’: (1) terrorism, with
Europe considered not only as a target but also as a base for terrorist
groups linked to religious extremism; (2) proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction; (3) regional conflicts, particularly in terms of the
opportunities this context of insecurity offers for the development of the
other four threats; (4) state failure; and (5) organised crime, including
cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons,
with possible links to terrorism. The ESS further argues that, in a context
of global interdependence, the EU is also vulnerable to the problems
arising from poverty, disease, competition for scarce resources, and
migratory movements. A recent report on the implementation of the ESS
entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, presented to the
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European Council on 11 December 2008, identified new threats such
as climate change, energy security, cybercrime and piracy.
To these security challenges, one can add the relative decline of
Europe and America vis-à-vis new emerging economic and political
powers such as China, India or Brazil. The recent financial crisis has
also highlighted the vulnerability of European economies. In this
context, no EU member state, however large, has the resources or
capabilities to deal with these challenges alone. Collective action within
the EU (and other international organisations) appears to be the only
way effectively to confront these contemporary dangers and
opportunities.
Despite the challenges, there are also many opportunities for the EU
to play a stronger role in world affairs. First, in a multipolar world, there
are more opportunities for new global and regional coalitions to be
established. The greater flux that characterises the current international
scene also leaves more room for the EU for manoeuvre and contributes
to the realisation of the need of common action by the member states.
2008 has also been a turbulent year which has reminded member states
of the need for unity in times of global uncertainty. When the conflict
over South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia broke out in the summer
of 2008, although there were different positions among the member
states, the EU successfully mandated the Presidency to mediate among
the conflict parties and all the member states accepted the outcome of
the mediation efforts. Similarly, the EU was able to adopt a resolution
approving the launch of an ESDP mission in Kosovo in December 2007,
despite different national positions over Kosovan independence.
Secondly, after the unilateralist policies of President George Bush
and the rift over the Iraq war in 2003, the victory of the democratic
candidate Barack Obama in November 2008 also provides for
opportunities for a stronger EU-US partnership. In the wake of the new
Obama administration, the EU needs to re-evaluate its relationship with
the US. The challenge for Europe is now to produce a common policy
meeting the interests of the EU and which can influence American foreign
policy, not conflict with it. The EU and the US need a joint approach to
the Middle East, Russia, Iran and other issues. Reassurances from France
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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about EU-NATO cooperation, and in particular, Sarkozy’s declared
intention to rejoin NATO’s integrated military structures have also eased
transatlantic relations, as well as relations with other EU allies – although
the UK continues to argue against the creation of an EU military
headquarters in Brussels, principally citing arguments of resource
allocation. Even though one can expect that the Obama Administration
will not actively seek to create divisions among its European allies, EUUS relations will still be challenging on a number of policy areas (NATO,
missile defence, military action in Afghanistan or possibly increased US
protectionism).
Public support for a common European foreign policy continues to
be high. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, 64% of European
citizens are in favour of decisions on defence and foreign affairs being
made at the EU level.1 This links with a further issue, that of expectations.
The European Union will have to respond to the growing demands for a
more significant involvement of the EU in world affairs. These expectations
will emerge both inside and outside the Union, coming from its own
citizens, but also from candidate countries and other international
partners. The aim of this report is to examine which institutional
arrangements and procedures the EU needs in the face of the global
challenges and opportunities ahead, as well as increasing internal and
external expectations. Will the Lisbon Treaty provide the institutions to
deal more effectively with current and future foreign policy problems?
The Lisbon Treaty and European Foreign Policy
Leadership and co-ordination in European Foreign
Policy
The Lisbon Treaty recognizes the crucial role of effective leadership within
the sphere of the Union’s external action. It seeks in particular to eliminate
the rotating Presidency in the CFSP and establish a new semi-permanent
President of the European Council and a new High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will also be a Vice-President of
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the Commission. According to the Treaty, the full time President of the
European Council will be elected by the European Council by qualified
majority voting for a period of two and a half years, renewable once.
The High Representative, on the other hand, will be appointed by the
European Council, with the agreement of the President of the Commission
and the consent of the European Parliament. This position will combine
the responsibilities of the High Representative for CFSP and Vice-President
of the Commission. The High Representative will be supported in his or
her tasks by a newly created External Action Service. Finally, the rotating
EU Presidency will disappear in the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
but will remain active in other policy areas.
Together with the President of the Commission, the President of the
European Council and the High Representative will be the new ‘face’ of
the EU in the world. Although personalities will certainly matter, the
performance of these three top jobs will also depend on the institutional
competences and resources allocated to them. The Treaty sets out the
main responsibilities of these three positions, but there are many issues
that are left only vaguely defined by the document. Thus the possibility
of institutional competition remains open. In particular, ambiguity
surrounds issues of representation, agenda-setting, implementation and
co-ordination.
Representation
Traditionally the function of representing the EU externally fell under the
responsibility of the country holding the Presidency of the Council,
assisted by the High Representative, but this arrangement was judged
by many as unsatisfactory, with the Presidency changing hands every
six months. The new Treaty does not provide a definitive answer to the
question of who represents the EU abroad at the political level. It is true
that it has abolished the role of the Presidency in external representation,
but the Lisbon Treaty does not seem overall to have significantly reduced
the number of actors claiming to speak for Europe. On the one hand,
the Treaty states that the President of the European Council will have
responsibility for the ‘external representation of the Union’ on issues
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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concerning the CFSP. On the other hand, the High Representative also
‘represents the Union’ and ‘shall conduct political dialogue with third
parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in
international organisations and at international conferences’, including
the right to represent the Union’s position on a specific topic to the United
Nations.
It can be argued that the Treaty points towards an implicit division of
labour between the President of the European Council and the High
Representative, as the former will have to ensure the external
representation of the Union ‘at his level and in that capacity’ and ‘without
prejudice to the powers’ of the latter. One could expect that the President
of the European Council will focus on representation at the level of heads
of state, while the High Representative will conduct political dialogue at
the ministerial level. Coherent external representation will therefore
require intensive co-ordination and liaison between their respective staffs
in order to prepare Council meetings and summits with third parties. The
ability to defuse conflict will also crucially rest on the willingness of the
President of the European Council and the High Representative to
cooperate. Moreover, the actual influence that both institutional figures
will be able to exercise will at least in part depend on the resources at
their disposal. It is, however, unclear how much staffing will be allocated
to the President of the European Council. Will his or her administrative
support be drawn from existing Council Secretariat resources, or will
they be new recruits? Will they be EU officials or seconded national
officials? In the case of the High Representative, the Lisbon Treaty foresees
the creation of a new External Action Service to support this post, but as
will be discussed below, the institutional location, size, staff and
competences of this service are still to be agreed. How these logistical
issues are resolved will greatly affect the role that the Presidents of the
European Council and the Commission and the High Representative
will be able to play.
The picture becomes more complicated if other aspects of the EU’s
external action are considered. The Treaty affirms that ‘[w]ith the
exception of the common foreign and security policy… [the Commission]
shall ensure the Union’s external representation’. The President of the
Commission will thus have a significant role in external representation
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when it comes to such important issues as trade or development aid.
Channels of co-ordination will need to be established between the
President of the Council, the High Representative and the President of
the Commission in areas other than the CFSP. The logic of the Lisbon
Treaty would suggest that the High Representative should be the normal
first port of call for interested third parties. However, EU partners will
still have to keep at least three phone numbers if they want to deal with
the EU: those of the President of the Commission, the President of the
European Council and the High Representative. Who to contact will
depend on which policy areas and at which level discussions are taking
place.
Agenda-setting2
In the crucial area of agenda-setting and the establishment of priorities
of EU external action, the provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty also
reveal some possible overlaps between these three jobs. The European
Council will continue to ‘identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine
the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign
and security policy, including matters with defence implications’. The
President of the European Council, as its chair, will thus have a crucial
role ‘driv[ing] forward its work’ and facilitating consensus among the
member states. To what extent, he or she will be able to steer the agenda
of the European Council is not yet clear, and much will depend on the
resources at his/her disposal. The President of the European Council
will also have to ensure co-ordination with the President of the
Commission in ‘the preparation and continuity of the work of the
European Council’ as both incumbents share this responsibility.
On the other hand, for the first time, the High Representative will
under the Lisbon Treaty have the right of initiative and the resources and
expertise to make foreign policy proposals. This provision constitutes a
major innovation of the Treaty – particularly since the High Representative
will also be the Vice-President of the Commission – and it may well over
a period of time substantially strengthen this position. He or she will
inevitably play an important role shaping the policy agenda and setting
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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the priorities in European foreign policy and will also put forward a
‘European perspective’ different from the national and intergovernmental
perspective currently provided by the EU Presidency. However, the High
Representative will not have the sole right of initiative, sharing this right
with the member states. The High Representative will chair the Foreign
Affairs Council meetings and will also nominate representatives to chair
other CFSP bodies such as the Political and Security Committee and the
Council working groups in the area of CFSP/ESDP. In his/her role as a
chair he or she will have to facilitate consensus-building among the
member states and be seen as a primus inter pares . The
intergovernmental nature of CFSP and the unanimity requirement means
that consensus among the member states will still be essential before
any decision can be agreed upon. The room for manoeuvre and the
influence of the High Representative will therefore greatly depend upon
the willingness of the member states to support common positions,
something that cannot be taken for granted.
For its part, under the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission can only submit
joint CFSP initiatives with the High Representative, although it has the
right of initiative in other areas of external action. This provision is
intended to ensure a single voice coming from the Commission on CFSP
issues, but one could argue that the role of the Commission has been
weakened by the Treaty in favour of the High Representative. However,
it is also true that it might result in the contrary, especially if one considers
that the Commission has thus far been very reluctant to resort to the
right of initiative in the second pillar. A High Representative with strong
links with the Commission can bring this important actor back to the
CFSP. In sum, much will depend on whether the High Representative
identifies himself or herself with the group of Commissioners or with his/
her colleagues in the Foreign Affairs Council, with both equally, or with
neither.
Implementation
From the letter of the new Treaty, it is clear that the monitoring of the
implementation of the CFSP/ESDP is the responsibility of the High
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Representative: he or she ‘shall ensure the implementation of the decisions
adopted by the European Council and the Council’. How he or she will
ensure implementation, and in particular, compliance by the member
states, is however a different matter. The High Representative may not
bring a matter of non-compliance by a member state before the European
Court of Justice, but rather can only ‘name and shame’ those member
states who do not comply with their commitments within the CFSP. The
High Representative will also need to co-ordinate his/her activities with
those of the President of the European Council who, as the chair of the
European Council, might also want to monitor the implementation of the
European Council Conclusions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine
how the President of the European Council will be able effectively to
perform this duty, especially if this post has limited staff and resources
available.
On the other hand, when it comes to the implementation of the CFSP,
and in particular, crisis management operations, some duplication of
tasks might occur, in this case with the Political and Security Committee,
which is to ‘monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without
prejudice to the powers of the High Representative’. This Committee
also enjoys responsibility to ‘exercise, under the responsibility of the
Council and the High Representative, the political control and strategic
direction of the crisis management operations’. Tensions between these
two institutions are not however inevitable as, according to the Treaty, it
is expected that the High Representative will appoint a representative
as chairperson of the Political and Security Committee.
In his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, the High
Representative will also shoulder the ‘responsibilities incumbent on it in
external relations and for co-ordinating other aspects of the Union’s
external action’. It is not clear however which precise areas will be under
direct responsibility of the High Representative: will it be only those
covered by the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex)
or perhas also other areas such as Development, Humanitarian Aid,
Enlargement and Trade? This uncertainty raises in turn further questions
as to how the High Representative will interpret his/her remit. He or she
can adopt a narrow approach and focus on the administrative
management of EU external action or conversely, he or she may
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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concentrate on the diplomatic and political aspects of this job. In the
latter case, the High Representative will then need to appoint deputies
to deal with different policy areas, e.g. Foreign Policy, Common Security
and Defence Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy and Parliamentary
Affairs. But even a narrow interpretation of this job will involve a vast
range of duties such as chairing the Foreign and Affairs Council,
attending the Commission’s meetings, conducting the political dialogue
with third parties and running the External Action Service.
Co-ordination
Finally, the High Representative will also play an important role in the
co-ordination of the EU’s external action, although here too he or she
may end up working in competition with other actors. It is explicitly
stated in the Treaty that ‘[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between
the different areas of its external action and between these and its other
policies’. While in the past, the Council and the Commission shared the
responsibility of ensuring such consistency, now the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will assist the Council
and the Commission in this task. In the CFSP area, this task falls under
the responsibility of the ‘Council and the High Representative’ who ’shall
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’.
Despite the strong rhetoric contained in these clauses, it is unclear how
the High Representative will be able to prevent inconsistencies among
different policy areas or enforce compliance by the member states with
common positions since he does not have any specific enforcement
powers to implement these provisions.
Within the Commission, the High Representative will ‘co-ordinate’
the whole range of the Union’s external action, such as trade, cooperation and humanitarian aid, or the external aspects of internal
policies such as agriculture or environment. From the letter of the Treaty,
it would appear that the High Representative enjoys some authority over
other colleagues dealing with external policies. Meanwhile, the President
of the Commission will retain responsibility for ensuring that the
Commission ‘acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body’.
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Hence, one pressing question is what would happen in case of
disagreement between other Commissioners and the High
Representative; would the President of the Commission have the last
say? Currently, the President of the Commission chairs the Group of
Commissioners on External Relations consisting of the Commissioners
for External Relations, Trade, Development and Humanitarian Assistance,
and Economic and Monetary Affairs. The Commissioner for External
Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is the Vice-chair of this group. Thus,
the question is whether this group will retain its current format or the
High Representative will take over its chair from the President of the
Commission.
The High Representative has a further responsibility, that of coordinating member states’ activities in international organisations and
at international conferences. A new provision of the Lisbon Treaty
envisages that the member states that are members of the UN Security
Council ‘will concert and keep the other Member States as well as the
High Representative fully informed’. The Treaty also foresees that when
a ‘Union position’ being discussed by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), the permanent and temporary EU member states sitting at the
UNSC ‘shall request’ that the High Representative present the Union’s
position in open public debates in the way the EU Presidency now does.
However, the ability of the High Representative to present a common
EU position will still be dependent upon prior unanimous agreement
among the member states on the topic in question.
A final potential source of inconsistency in the Union’s external action
might be the Presidency of the Council. As mentioned above, the
Presidency will still chair other Council formations in policy areas other
than the CFSP. Thus, the President of the European Council will have to
ensure co-ordinated action not only with the High Representative in the
CFSP field, but with the Presidency of the Council in other policy areas.
Co-ordination will also be required between the activities of the Foreign
Affairs Council, chaired by the High Representative, and the General
Affairs Council chaired by the Presidency (as is also the case with the
committees and working groups under the responsibility of these two
Council formations). It is also not clear if the Commission will have a
(non-voting) representative in the Foreign Affairs Council, or if it will be
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
17
represented by the High Representative, although it would be reasonable
to assume the former.
The Lisbon Treaty will thus introduce significant changes at the
highest administrative level of EU foreign policy. In contrast to the sixmonth rotating EU Presidency, the new President of the European
Council could bring more continuity and, if held by a strong personality,
more visibility to the EU. However, in its current form, it is unclear what
added value this new institutional figure will bring specifically to the
CFSP, where the High Representative’s leading role has been
maintained by the Lisbon Treaty. In areas other than the CFSP, the
President of the Council will also have to co-ordinate his/her activities
with the President of the Commission and the Presidency of the EU. In
sum, the institutional innovation of the Presidency of the European
Council will do little to increase coherence in EU external action as it
will not put to an end to questions about who speaks for Europe. Only
a careful delimitation of spheres of competence could prevent
duplication and overlaps between the President of the European
Council, the High Representative, the President of the Commission and
the EU Presidency.
The European External Action Service3
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is to be
assisted in his/her work of co-ordinating European foreign policy by the
newly-founded European External Action Service. While the High
Representative will also have the task of representing and advocating
to third parties the consensual European policies and attitudes which he
or she has helped to bring into being, it is worth stressing at the outset
the logical priority of the High Representative’s work of consensusbuilding within and between the European institutions. Without such
consensus within the European Union, there will be little indeed in the
way of robust and effective European policies which the High
Representative can seek to advocate to the wider world. This analysis is
also valid for the work of the External Action Service, which will have
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the twin roles of facilitating consensus between the decision-makers of
the Union and presenting the results of this consensus to the wider world,
particularly through the Union’s external delegations. The unresolved
administrative questions relating to the new Service need to be
considered above all in the light of these related, but not identical tasks
for the new Service.
Institutional affiliation
Analyses of the appropriate institutional affiliation of the Action Service
have been predictably varied since its creation was first mooted by the
European Constitutional Convention. The controversy about whether the
Service should be more closely associated with the Council of Ministers,
with the European Commission or with neither, faithfully reflects the
composite status of the High Representative as both a servant of the
Council and simultaneously a Vice President of the European
Commission. The controversy also reflects differing views as to whether
in future the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union should
indefinitely continue to be conducted primarily by intergovernmental
agreement, or whether in the long term it should become more similar in
its operation to the rest of the Union’s workings, with greater roles for
the Union’s central institutions, namely the Commission, Parliament and
Court of Justice. Those favouring the latter approach will naturally see
the European Commission as the appropriate institutional home of the
new Service. They will rightly point out that of all the European institutions,
the Commission has the greatest experience as broker and reconciler
of differing national and institutional negotiating positions. Depending
upon the precise membership of the Service, the Commission might also
be expected to provide the largest single contribution to the personnel
of the new body.
Persuasive although these arguments may appear, there is a
significant risk associated with them. The new Service may well be less
able to facilitate consensus if it is seen as simply a representative of one
interested party within the sought-for consensus, namely the European
Commission. The need to co-ordinate better the external policies of the
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
19
Commission, the Council and the member states was the main motivating
force behind the European Convention’s recommendations in this area
and in the Treaties which followed these recommendations. Many
national governments moreover, including some which can be expected
to play a substantial part in the reinforcement of the Union’s external
role, insisted in the Convention and have continued to insist since, that
substantial elements of intergovernmentalism should remain for the
foreseeable future as component parts of the Union’s decision-making
in external affairs. To entrust so potentially powerful a tool of the Union’s
external policy to the Commission as the External Service could well be
seen by these governments as an attempt to modify the terms of the
painful compromise contained in the Lisbon Treaty, whereby the High
Representative is institutionally bound both to the Council and the
Commission.
It is no doubt an awareness of these dangers that has led a number
of commentators to call for the new Service to be given a sui generis
status, or to become an agency of the Union. The role of the High
Representative corresponds to nothing in the traditional institutional
architecture of the EU, a fact well illustrated by the Treaty change
necessary to allow the High Representative, as a member of the
Commission, also to work for the Council while remaining a member of
the College of Commissioners. The most logical institutional affiliation
of the Service would appear to be the High Representative himself or
herself, as a sui generis element of the Union, mirroring the sui generis
nature of the Representative. If at some time in the coming years the
institutional character of the High Representative changes, then the
institutional character of the Service can evolve correspondingly.
Tasks of the Service
Some confusion has been caused in public discussion of the tasks of the
Action Service by the conflation of two related but separate tasks of the
Service, namely its contribution to the formation of robust, consistent
and well-constructed external policies for the Union and its role as
representing these policies outside the EU, whether providing individual
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envoys of the High Representative or as providing personnel for Union
delegations in third countries. These tasks can and should be considered
separately.
Internal co-ordination within the Union
The Treaty of Lisbon imposes upon the High Representative at least three
different co-ordinating roles within the Union’s external policies. The
Representative will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and seek to promote
among its members, not least by use of the Representative’s right of
initiative, the unanimity of view which is the precondition of that Council’s
action. The Representative will be a Vice-President of the European
Commission, responsible as executor or co-ordinator for the different
aspects of the Commission’s activities which bear on the Union’s external
relations. The Representative will finally by his or her double affiliation
in the Council and the Commission always be vigilant to ensure that the
views of these two institutions do not damagingly diverge from each
other. This is a challenging spectrum of activity. The Action Service is
one of the few instruments of support for the Representative in these
tasks.
From its very inception, the structure of the Service must therefore
reflect above all the co-ordinating roles of the Representative. At least
as important as geographic or thematic expertise is a steady stream of
information to the Representative of the development of opinion on central
questions of external relations within the member states, within the Council
of Ministers and within the Commission. The High Representative will
not have the time to follow all such issues in detail, nor without advice
and guidance be able to recognize at an early stage the possibility of
harmful divergence in emerging analyses and policies. This advice and
guidance could be provided initially by a relatively small cadre of
officials, whose primary task it would be to monitor and promote on the
High Representative’s behalf consensual policy formation within the
Council, the Commission and the member states. These officials would
draw to the Representative’s attention those areas where failing efforts
of mediation and consensus-building, within or between the institutions,
call for an intervention from the Representative.
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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It may well be that in due course greater thematic and geographic
responsibilities can more directly be located in the new External
Service, but such is not the immediate underlying rationale of the Lisbon
Treaty, and of the uneasy compromise that it represents between
differing views of the Treaty’s signatories on the subject of the Union’s
external policies. According to this uneasy compromise, those tasks
which until now have been carried out by the member states
individually, by the member states in the Council and by the College
of Commissioners will continue under the Lisbon Treaty to be carried
out as before by essentially the same institutional actors. The High
Representative, supported by the External Service, has the new and
complex responsibility under the Treaty of weaving these various
elements of policy and decision-making into a more coherent whole.
But he or she does not have exclusive responsibility for producing
these various elements of policy and decision-making.
It would be surprising indeed if it were possible to gain consensus
within the Council, necessary as a precondition for the setting up of the
External Service, on an initial model for that Service which widely
diverged from the (perhaps unsatisfactory) political compromise on
external policy enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. This consideration points
strongly to a relatively limited initial set of officials to comprise the staff
of the Service working to the High Representative in Brussels.
In connection with the task of internal coordination, one should also
add the role played by the External Action Service supporting the new
role of initiative of the High Representative. The External Action Service
will support the High Representative’s agenda-setting by providing
thematic and geographical expertise, policy assessment, and drafting
for policy proposals. The High Representative supported by the External
Action Service will thus be in a position to provide a European assessment
of European policies and act as an animating force in EU foreign policy.
The Service’s role as a drafter for the initiatives of the High Representative
may well reinforce the Representative’s role in steering towards consensus
among the member states.
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External representation
Different arguments apply to the contribution which the new Service
can make to the external representation of the Union. A specific provision
of the Lisbon Treaty envisages the setting up of ‘Union delegations’,
which would most naturally be based in the buildings of the current
Commission representations throughout the world. The obvious major
source of staff for these Union delegations would be the new Service,
reporting from third countries to and acting on the instructions of the
High Representative. No doubt, as in many national diplomatic services,
some individuals from outside the Service could find a place within
specific delegations, with appropriate arrangements being made on
ad hoc basis for the individuals involved. At least potentially, the
organizational structure of Union delegations could well in the medium
term come significantly to resemble that of most national embassies in
foreign capitals. The question of how far the Union delegations staffed
by the External Service could take over the tasks of national embassies
is a different and more complicated one. An attraction for some national
governments of the new External Service is the possibility that in the
medium to long term it may be able to take over some or all of the
responsibilities exercised currently by national representations abroad
– especially if one considers that the economics of national
representation have become more and more costly. This prospect is an
entirely feasible one for consular matters. There is no reason at all why
in ten years time the Union representations in third countries, particularly
small third countries geographically remote from Europe, should not
carry out consular duties for all EU citizens in the countries to which
they are accredited and in particular provide Schengen visas to citizens
of these countries wishing to visit the EU. The emergence of a specialized
corps of consular officials within the External Service would be an entirely
logical development, demonstrable proof of the Union’s ability to save
the money of European tax-payers by common action.
Much less clear cut is the extent to which Union delegations could
replace in the foreseeable future the work of political reporting and
representation of national interests which are today core tasks of national
embassies. It may well be that no definite answer can yet be given to
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
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this question. Size, economic development and historical ties to specific
countries or regions all make for a very varied calculus of interests
between different member states. It will be many years before any
member state would be prepared to give up its national embassy in
Washington. Shared political reporting and even representation of
specifically national interests is altogether easier to envisage in less
economically and politically significant capitals geographically remote
from Europe. Any agreements made now for the future development of
the Service in this direction can only be preliminary, tentative and
facilitatory.
Although we have considered the tasks of internal coordination and
representation separately, one can expect that they will not remain so in
practice. First, in due course, the Union Delegations might develop into
a sophisticated form of political reporting for the High Representative
and the Commission. Second, some rotation can also be expected
among the officials involved in the co-ordination of EU foreign policy
and those representing the EU abroad, as it is usually the case in national
diplomatic services. The ability of these returning officials to use in Brussels
the experience they have acquired in national capitals will be an
important element of this embryonic ‘European diplomatic service’.
Composition of the Service
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the External Service shall ‘comprise
officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the
Council and of the Commission, as well as staff seconded from national
diplomatic services of the Member States.’ Further details of its functioning
will be established by a Decision of the Council, on a proposal of the
High Representative, after consulting the European Parliament and with
the assent of the Commission. Some preliminary discussions between
the interested parties took place on this matter in 2005, although many
questions remained predictably unresolved. One interesting feature did,
however, emerge from the discussions, namely the acceptance that the
Directorate General of the Commission responsible for External Trade
should not be incorporated into the new Service. Limited although this
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point of agreement appears, it can be taken as implying a more general
model for the setting up of the Service, a model which corresponds to
the broader political and institutional analysis of the Lisbon Treaty
developed earlier in this paper.
The main unresolved question as to how the future External Service
should be structured is essentially that of what proportion of the existing
Commission organization should be incorporated within it. The
significance of this issue can hardly be overstated. A wide-ranging
transfer of existing Commission personnel to the Service would reinforce
the personal standing of the Representative, not least at the expense
of the President of the Commission. Simultaneously and perhaps
paradoxically, it would reinforce the impression that the new Service
is simply the European Commission in another manifestation. On any
hypothesis, Commission officials will predominate numerically in the
new Service. This predominance will be reinforced the greater the
number of Commission officials allocated in the first instance to the
new Service.
The Treaty of Lisbon does not provide guidance as to what may be
the ‘relevant departments’ as recruiting-grounds for the External Service.
Implicitly, however, the non-incorporation of the Directorate-General for
External Trade does answer that question, because it respects the
fundamental philosophy of the Lisbon Treaty that existing competences
over the spectrum of external policy will continue to be exercised by
those who have exercised them until now. There is no aspect of the
Commission’s responsibilities which more directly impinges upon the
external relations of the European Union than trade policy and the
negotiations in the World Trade Organization which are at its heart.
There are good administrative reasons why the High Representative
should not take on, in addition to his or her many other tasks, the direct
responsibility for this complex field. But that the day to day responsibility
for this vital external policy area should be in the hands of another
colleague in the Commission clearly reflects an institutional philosophy
which emphasizes the co-ordinating and representative role of the High
Representative rather than the executive and implementing aspects of
that post.
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
25
This philosophy can be more broadly applied to the structure of the
new Service. The philosophy implies that a wide range of expertise and
advice should be available to the High Representative, but that this
expertise should not normally derive from the wholesale incorporation
into the Service of existing Commission structures such as DG
Enlargement and Development. Nor should substantial parallel structures
be built up in the Service to reduplicate the work already being carried
out by those Directorates General of the Commission, the work of which
has an impact on the external policies and relations of the Union. It
might be that at some stage in the future these Directorates will be
transferred to the External Service. Until that happens, it would be an
expensive source of institutional friction for the External Service to
reduplicate the work of these Directorates or to do more than monitor
and co-ordinate their activities. The High Representative will need
advisers with recent and current knowledge of the work of many of the
Commission’s Directorates General. A clear distinction should be
observed, however, between the substantive work of those Directorates
and the co-ordinating role of the High Representative, supported by the
External Service.
There is only one major aspect of the Commission’s present structure
that obviously will gravitate towards the new Service. According to the
Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative will, in addition to ‘co-ordinating
other aspects of the Union’s external action, be the Vice President of the
Commission charged personally with ‘responsibilities incumbent on it
(the Commission) in external relations.’ Within the present Commission,
the Commissioner responsible for external relations is supported by the
large External Relations Directorate, a Directorate which would logically
work after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty for the High Representative. It
would be strange indeed if this Directorate did not provide a substantial
contribution to the new External Service, together with the corresponding
(less numerous) officials from the General Secretariat of the Council
responsible for external and those responsible for military affairs. The
presence of these latter officials, many of whom are seconded from
national administrations, will reflect the important role of the High
Representative in the Common Security and Defence Policy, a function
the exercise of which will demand appropriate technical support. Beyond
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these mentioned officials, however, there is at present no compelling
rationale for wholesale incorporation into the External Service of existing
clusters of officials from either the Council Secretariat or the Commission.
The final main building-block of the External Service will be, as the
Treaty stipulates, the national civil servants recruited directly to its ranks.
The High Representative will in any case need experts on national
external policies and national civil servants are those most likely to be
able to provide the necessary insights. More generally, the Service will
be dependent upon national administrations for a supply of national
administrators who can ensure that the ethos of the new organization
adequately reflects the contribution to and competences in European
external affairs of national governments. It will be difficult to achieve
this without the willing collaboration of national governments, probably
operating initially on at least a loose quota system. The assurance that
senior positions will be available to suitably qualified candidates from
national administrations will be one precondition of attracting candidates
of appropriate quality from the civil services of the member states.
National Foreign Ministries will also need to be prepared, in terms of
training, and think carefully about the implications of the eventual
establishment of this Service.
Finally, consideration should be given here to whether the External
Action Service should also support the President of the Council in his/
her foreign policy responsibilities. In order to minimise the risk of
duplication and clashes between the President of the Council and the
High Representative, it would seem logical that the Service would provide
at least some support to the President of the Council too. How the Service
will report to the Commission President (who also has responsibilities in
global affairs) remains however an open question.
Conditions of Service and Budget
If the External Service is to perform effectively its co-ordinating function,
it must be seen as an honest broker between the interested parties,
particularly when conflicting views and interests fall for resolution. The
internal culture of the Service must not merely be non-partisan, but must
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
27
be understood to be such by outsiders. A number of administrative
arrangements for the new Service would be helpful in facilitating this
culture and its external perception.
Reference has already been made to the need to reassure national
civil servants joining the Service that senior posts will be open to
them. More generally, a strong mix of officials from different
backgrounds at every level of the Service will reinforce the nonpartisan credentials of the new organization. It should be a conscious
policy of the personnel department of the Service to ensure in every
working unit adequate representation of all three main streams of
recruitment, Council, Commission and national civil services. It should
also be the responsibility of the officials themselves and their
managers to ensure that this mixture of backgrounds leads to the
constructive integration of different strands of interest and argument,
rather than a simple reproduction within the Service of institutional
rivalries that have been traditional outside the Service. Long standard
periods of employment within the Service, a code of professional
conduct for the Service, regular and repeated training for new
entrants and the rapid establishment of a career pattern exclusively
within the Service would all be helpful in this regard. A natural
guarantee for the independence of the Service would be the
recognition that that all personnel questions are the exclusive
responsibility of the High Representative.
Since many of those who will comprise the first members of the
External Service are already employed by the Union, the extra cost to
the Union of setting up the Service will be correspondingly mitigated.
An unresolved issue is that of the salaries and other expenses associated
with the national civil servants who are to join the Service. Since the
member states are the signatories of the Lisbon Treaty and all of them
are beneficiaries of the more coherent external policies for the Union
which the Service will be promoting, it would be entirely reasonable for
them to bear the costs of the civil servants they contribute to the Service.
The interests of the Service however probably point in the opposite
direction, to the entire cost of the organization’s being borne by the
Union’s budget. For the member states to remain the paymasters of
‘their’ civil servants working for the Service would be a barrier to
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integration within the organization and might well lead to undesirable
differences of working conditions between colleagues in the Service.
Irrespective of the precise arrangements adopted for national civil
servants, it is anyway clear that the European Parliament, as joint
budgetary authority, will have great influence over the financial affairs
of the new Service. It will be a matter for political decision within the
Parliament how and how far it wishes to make use of this influence. The
understandable and proper desire of the Parliament to hold the Service
and indeed the High Representative to democratic account may conflict,
particularly in the early years of the Service, with another goal of the
Parliament, namely to demonstrate the Union’s enhanced capacity for
external action after the Lisbon Treaty, of which the rapid establishment
and effective functioning of the External Service will be a major element.
The discussions concerning the External Service which were
suspended after the French and Dutch referendums in 2005 made clear
that widely differing views existed between the participants about the
future role and composition of the Service. If an overall agreement on
the establishment of the Service cannot in the short term be attained,
there might be merit in setting up those elements of the Service which
are least contentious and which can most easily be implemented. It is in
any case highly likely that the Service will have to be set up gradually,
rather than in a single act of creation. From the very first day of the High
Representative’s activity, however, there will be a need for advice and
analysis to support the Representative’s co-ordinating and representative
roles. There is no reason why plans should not already be prepared for
member states, the Council Secretariat and the Commission to set up a
skeleton staff for the High Representative, which could function as a
nucleus around which later development of the External Service could
take place. Parallel preparations could be made for the remodelling of
the Commission’s external offices into Union delegations. The change
of name of all these offices can occur simultaneously, on a designated
day. There would however be powerful symbolism in ensuring that, as
soon as possible after this change of name, members of the External
Service, particularly those who previously had been in the Council
Secretariat and national civil services, were sent to join the staff of these
renamed delegations.
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
29
These first tangible activities of the Service in supporting the work of
the High Representative and in providing personnel for external
representation might well act as a spur to further agreement in the Council
of Ministers and elsewhere on a more precise blueprint for the future
structure of the Service. Despite the vagueness of the Lisbon Treaty about
the details of the Service’s administrative configuration, the Service is
conceived by the Treaty as exercising relatively clear functions. The
exercise of those functions may give added substance and urgency to
the otherwise potentially self-absorbed debate on the best theoretical
model for the Service.
Common Security and Defence Policy
Cooperation in the area of defence has been one of the latest, but
fastest developing additions to the European Union’s array of policies.
After the St. Malo summit, new bodies were created to give form to the
ESDP. These included the Political and Security Committee, the EU
Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff. The institutionalisation of
the ESDP has continued with the creation of a European Defence Agency
and the setting up of a Civ/Mil Cell that could serve as a basis for an
EU autonomous Headquarters. At the Helsinki Council (December
1999), the member states decided on the creation of a Rapid Reaction
Force4 and military capability targets (the so-called Helsinki Headline
Goal) and they also agreed to have a specific number of military and
civilian personnel, including police officers, civilian experts, and judges
at the EU’s disposal.5 The Helsinki Headline Goal was wrongly declared
to have been achieved in 2004. The new Headline Goal 2010, agreed
in 2004, aimed at further enhancing the EU’s military capacities by
identifying military capability targets, namely an EU strategic lift
command, EU battlegroups and the availability of an EU aircraft carrier.
A Battlegroup Concept has been developed with the establishment of
thirteen national and multinational battlegroups. Since 1 January 2007,
the EU has two battlegroups on standby for six months at a time, following
a rotating schedule.
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The institutional development of the ESDP has allowed for the
implementation of EU crisis management operations and, since 2003,
the EU has deployed twenty three civilian and military operations. These
developments have increased the EU’s international visibility and impact.
The Union has increasingly taken over NATO operations in the Balkans,
and it has also deployed missions in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia,
including civilian and military operations to deal with recent security
crises in the South Caucasus and Africa, together with the deployment
of an EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and an EU naval operation
(Atalanta) against piracy off the Somali coast. Against this backdrop,
how will the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty affect cooperation in this
field?
Decision-making and implementation
The Lisbon Treaty, which retains most of the provisions of the Constitutional
Treaty in this area, institutionalizes the European Security and Defence
Policy. A new section on ‘Provisions on the Common Security and
Defence Policy’ incorporates into the Lisbon Treaty all the informal
developments that have taken place since the launching of the ESDP at
the Cologne European Council in 1999. The Treaty also maintains the
distinct intergovernmental nature of this policy. While the use of qualified
majority voting is possible in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) in some cases, such as the appointment of the High Representative
and Special Representatives, implementation of actions, and provisions
on financing – its use is excluded when it comes to decisions that have
military or defence implications. The member states do not wish to lose
control in this sensitive policy area and, as the Treaty reminds us, ‘national
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State’. Moreover,
provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have to
respect the specific character of the national defence policies of certain
member states (e.g. neutrality) and the obligations of those member
states ‘which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO)’ (Art. 42.2). This provision has acquired
even more significance in the context of the Irish referendum since one
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
31
of the main concerns of the Irish voters referred to Ireland’s traditional
policy of neutrality.
Within these parameters, the Lisbon Treaty introduces several
provisions regarding the functioning and implementation of CSDP. First,
the Lisbon Treaty increases the scope of the so-called Petersberg tasks.
In addition to humanitarian missions, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis
management, including peacemaking operations, the Treaty adds ‘joint
disarmament operations’, ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, ‘postconflict stabilisation’ and ‘the fight against terrorism, including by
supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories’. The
Treaty also institutionalizes the European Defence Agency, established
in July 2004. In terms of financial arrangements, in addition to existing
procedures, the Treaty envisages the possibility of guaranteeing rapid
access to the Union budget for new CSDP missions. The member states
can also agree to establish a ‘start-up fund’ to be financed by member
state contributions.
Flexibility and solidarity
The Lisbon Treaty also allows for more flexibility in CSDP in the form of
different procedures for cooperation, namely, enhanced cooperation,
permanent structured cooperation and ‘coalitions of the willing’. The
Nice Treaty had already introduced the possibility of enhanced
cooperation for the implementation of CFSP joint actions and common
positions that did not have military or defence implications. The Lisbon
Treaty allows for a group of states to establish enhanced cooperation in
order to deepen their cooperation in a given policy area, including in
defence matters (Art. 20). Enhanced cooperation is considered by the
Lisbon Treaty as a ‘last resort’ mechanism, to be used only when ‘the
objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable
period by the Union as a whole’ (Art. 20.2). A proposal on enhanced
cooperation requires the support of at least nine member states and it
has to be adopted by the Council by unanimity. The High Representative
and the Commission would also give their opinion and the European
Parliament would be informed. Although the Treaty increases flexibility
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in CSDP by allowing enhanced cooperation in this area, the requirement
of unanimity in the Council is much more demanding than the current
qualified majority voting foreseen in the Nice Treaty. Furthermore, the
fact that other member states may attend deliberations relating to these
issues might increase reluctance to resort to this formal mechanism, to
the advantage of other informal ‘like-minded groups’. In sum, as in past
practice, provisions on enhanced cooperation within ESDP may well
represent a theoretical possibility, without ever becoming a realized
option.
Permanent Structured Cooperation on the other hand holds more
potential to assist cooperation between the member states. The Treaty
provides for ‘cooperation between member states whose military
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding
commitments to one another in this area’. The participating member
states are expected to ‘bring their defence apparatus into line with each
other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of
their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising
their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation
in the fields of training and logistics’ (Art. 2(b)), Protocol 10). Although
it is not envisaged as a procedure for the deployment of EU missions,
this mechanism should facilitate capability development and the pooling
of assets, in turn increasing CSDP operational capabilities. Membership
is voluntary: there is no obligation for the member states to join a
Permanent Structured Cooperation. The decision for the establishment
of a Permanent Structured Cooperation is to be adopted by the Council
on the basis of qualified majority voting. There is also a procedure to
admit new member states that wish to join the Permanent Structured
Cooperation in later moments and also to suspend those member states
that no longer meet the requirements.
The ‘Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation’ contains the
provisions about how to proceed with this form of cooperation, although
there are still many open questions as to how it is going to be
operationalised.6 For example, it is still not clear which member states
will be able to participate in the Permanent Structured Cooperation.
Unlike enhanced cooperation, Permanent Structured Cooperation does
not require a minimum of member states to be launched. Rather
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
33
membership will depend on the criteria used to assess the eligibility of
the participants. It is still unclear what the ‘higher criteria’ for joining a
Permanent Structured Cooperation will be as those mentioned in the
Treaty, Protocol 10, are still rather vague. Yet, it is likely that if the criteria
are too strict or related only to capability this could lead to a two-speed
or multi-speed Europe in the area of defence. For example, a criterion
that sets a defence budget of 2% of GDP as threshold for participation
will have such consequences since most of the current member states
face financial constraints to reach that level of expenditure. The member
states will also need to determine what the role of the European Defence
Agency would be and how it would contribute to the development and
implementation of assessment criteria.
The Treaty also foresees the possibility of entrusting CSDP operations
to a group of member states ‘which are willing and have the necessary
capability for such a task’. The procedure to establish a ‘coalition of the
willing and able’ is much less convoluted than in the case of Permanent
Structured Cooperation. The Council authorizes the decision and, thus,
the mission is launched in the name of the EU, but run by the ‘coalition of
the willing’. The coalition will agree on the details of the implementation
of the task, in association with the High Representative. The rest of the
member states have the right to be kept regularly informed of its progress.
Only if there are major problems or if the decision requires an amendment
will the Council adopt new decisions. While this has been common practice
in the past within the ESDP framework and outside – as seen during the
crisis in Albania in 1997 – introducing the possibility to establish ‘coalitions
of the willing’ in the Treaty might render this practice more legitimate and
transparent, avoiding some of the controversies of the past.
Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty introduces solidarity and mutual
defence clauses. The former calls on the member states to assist other
member states in the event of a terrorist attack or a major natural or
man-made disaster. Assistance, which remains voluntary, will be provided
at the request of the political authorities of the member state affected.
Any decision to implement this clause will be adopted by the Council
on the basis of a joint proposal submitted by the Commission and the
High Representative. The Political and Security Committee will assist the
Council.
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The mutual defence commitment (Art. 42) states that in the case of
an armed aggression, other member states have the obligation to assist
the member state victim of aggression ‘by all the means in their power’.
This obligation, which echoes Art. V of the Brussels Treaty, was very
controversial during the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty. On
the one hand, it was criticized by non-aligned countries because of its
similarities with military alliances. On the other hand, some NATO
members and the WEU Assembly were critical of the mutual defence
clause because it fell short of the commitments contained in the modified
Brussels Treaty, which calls on NATO to execute this commitment.
Agreement among the member states was only achieved in the
Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties by adding substantial qualifications
to the mutual defence commitment. Thus, this obligation is now limited
by reference to ‘the specific character of the security and defence policy
of certain Member States’ and should be consistent with member states’
commitments under NATO, which is described in the same article as the
foundation of the collective defence for its members. Finally, despite
references to commitments to the Atlantic Alliance, the Treaty remains
silent on the issue EU-NATO cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty will not of
itself help reduce strains in the relationship between the two organisations
at the political level (for instance concerning ESDP deployments in
Afghanistan and Kosovo).
After the Irish Referendum
The Irish referendum of June 2008 has thrown the future of the Lisbon
Treaty into inevitable and considerable doubt. It now seems likely that
the Irish government will hold a second referendum on the issue in the
autumn of 2009. A second referendum is however not a guarantee
that the Irish people will say ‘yes’ at this second consultation. If the
Lisbon Treaty were to be rejected in a second referendum, the EU’s
external policies would have to continue to function on the basis of the
Treaty of Nice. However, and given the consensus on the need for these
reforms, EU leaders might also want to adopt some provisions of the
Lisbon Treaty without a formal Treaty reform, i.e. ‘cherry picking’ from
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
35
the text of the Treaty. One can envisage two different alternatives. A first
option might be to adopt pragmatic steps aimed at better co-ordination
among the European institutions and with the member states’ diplomatic
services, but without altering the current institutional structure. A similar
attempt by the European Commission followed the negative outcomes
of the referendums held in 2005 in France and The Netherlands on the
Constitutional Treaty.7
A second alternative would be to adopt some institutional reforms in
the external field by a Joint Action or a decision of the European Council.
For instance, the External Action Service could be established following
a decision by the Council of the EU (with the consent of the Commission
and prior consultation of the European Parliament). As will be discussed
below, the option of piecemeal institutional change would be limited in
terms of what can be adopted. Some of the provisions envisaged by the
Lisbon Treaty, such as the creation of a new President of the European
Council, would anyway require amendments to the current Treaties and
therefore could not be implemented without Treaty ratification. A further
option under current consideration would be to incorporate certain
reforms into a protocol which would be adopted at the same time as the
Croatian accession treaty.
Life without Lisbon
The aim of this section is to examine the ways in which the innovations
contained in the Lisbon Treaty in the area of foreign policy could be
implemented in the event of non-ratification of the Treaty. There is a near
consensus among policy-makers and scholars that changes in the area
of the EU’s foreign policy along the general lines of those envisaged in
the Lisbon Treaty are a precondition of the Union playing a stronger
role in world politics. However, the implementation of these arrangements
without Lisbon will still be extremely difficult, as it will require a renewed
consensus on the part of the member states and the incumbent institutional
actors, something that cannot at all be taken for granted at this stage.
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Leadership and co-ordination: practical measures
As regards the President of the European Council and the new High
Representative the options in the event of non-ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty are rather limited. In this context, the Treaty on European Union
plainly states that the European Council ‘shall meet [...] under the
chairmanship of the Head of State or Government of the Member State
which holds the Presidency of the Council’ and that ‘the Presidency
who shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common
foreign and security policy’.
Under the existing Treaties, it would however be possible to reinforce
the powers of the High Representative, allowing him/her to chair the
External Relations Council. He or she could also be permitted to
participate informally in the meetings of the College of Commissioners
in order to increase co-ordination between the Council and the
Commission in the area of foreign policy. From a legal point of view,
however, the High Representative could not assume the responsibilities
of the Presidency of the Council or be appointed as Vice-President of
the Commission. According to the current Treaties, it is not possible for
the High Representative to be a Commissioner as the members of the
Commission should be ‘completely independent’ from the member states.
The European External Action Service
Arguably, the External Action Service could be established by the Council
of the EU on the basis of a Joint Action if the Lisbon Treaty is finally
abandoned. Other inter-institutional services and agencies have been
established without the need for Treaty change (e.g. the European
Defence Agency). Yet, the fate of this service is directly linked to that of
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. What
would the purpose of this service be if there is no High Representative/
Vice-President of the Commission to be assisted? Simultaneously, other
pragmatic solutions for an enhanced foreign policy capacity could be
implemented, such as closer co-ordination between the Commission
Directorates General dealing with external relations, increased
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
37
cooperation between the Commission and the Council Secretariat
services and joint policy papers drafted by the Commission and the
Council Secretariat. Enhanced coherence in foreign policy can also be
achieved through a structured dialogue between the High Representative,
remaining a representative of the member states, and the Commission
(in particular with its President) or having the High Representative
attending Commission meetings.
If the Lisbon Treaty is not ratified, the Commission Delegations will
not be renamed ‘Union Delegations.’ Some ad hoc measures might
however be put in place in order to improve their role. For instance,
more exchanges and cooperation between the Commission Delegations
and the national diplomatic services could be promoted, in particular
regarding consular assistance. Furthermore, the possibility of doublehatting the Head of the Commission Delegation and the EU Special
Representatives in some countries (as was the case in Macedonia) could
lead to a more unified approach. As far as external representation is
concerned, the member states could well agree on some informal
measures to increase cooperation and ensure a unified policy within
international organisations and towards non-member states. They could
also agree to increase the current role of the High Representative in
international organisations.
European Security and Defence Policy
The ESDP is perhaps the policy area which would suffer least in
institutional terms from the demise of the Lisbon Treaty. There are plenty
of precedents of institutional innovations in ESDP that were established
informally and only later institutionalised in the Treaties (such as the
establishment of the Political and Security Committee). In fact, many of
the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of defence only
institutionalize existing and evolving practices. Thus, the creation of the
European Defence Agency before the ratification of the Treaty shows
not only the willingness of the member states to deepen their cooperation
in defence procurement, but also the potential for informal developments
in this area.
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Another area where the Treaty has been pre-empted regards the
Petersberg tasks. The EU has already been involved in several of the
new Petersberg tasks incorporated in the Treaty. The EU Monitoring
Mission in Aceh was for instance responsible for the decommissioning
of the Free Aceh Movement’s armaments. ‘Post-conflict stabilisation’ has
also been one of the main tasks of the civilian and military operations
deployed in the Western Balkans. By providing advice and training to
police forces, the EU police missions in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and
Palestine (EUPOL COPPS) have contributed to the strengthening of the
rule of law and improving security in these territories.
As far as flexible forms of cooperation are concerned, the ESDP has
been flexible enough in the past to allow for a group of member states,
or a coalition of the willing, to co-ordinate their military forces under the
umbrella of the EU. This was the case, for example, with operation Artemis
in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, when a number of
member states, including Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and the
UK, led by France, pooled their resources to launch and implement this
military operation. The majority of EU operations have been led by one
or several countries, supported by a variable number of member states
and with contribution from other non-EU member states like the US,
Turkey, Morocco, Canada or Chile. For instance, 22 member states
have contributed to EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the same number of
countries participates in the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the
EU military naval operation deployed off the Somali coast is led by the
British warship, HMS Northumberland, and comprises British, French,
German, Italian and Spanish ships.
In matters of common procurement and capability development, the
member states have pursued ‘permanent structured cooperation’ outside
the EC/EU Treaties in the past through the WEU – e.g. Eurocorps and
Euromarfor – and also bilaterally. Bilateral agreements between EU
member states have focused on cooperation in the field of training, joint
procurement and joint command and control. For instance, France and
Belgium have a joint programme to train pilots; for its part, Admiral
Benelux constitutes an example of joint command between Dutch and
Belgium navies.8 In the EU context, the creation of battlegroups so far
constitutes the best example of the philosophy of Permanent Structured
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
39
Cooperation. More recently, the member states have agreed on several
measures to improve European military capabilities. Programmes on a
European Air Transport Fleet, maritime mine counter-measures,
helicopters, a future unmanned aerial system, and a space-based
imaging surveillance system were discussed at a meeting of EU Defence
Ministers on 10-11 November 2008. Interestingly, not all the 27 member
states will participate on each of these programmes (e.g. Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria will not participate in the multinational airlift fleet
based on the A400M) and a non-EU member state, Norway, will
participate in the development of maritime mine counter-measures
capabilities. Thus, existing cooperation does not significantly differ from
Permanent Structured Cooperation as foreseen in the Treaty, although
one could expect that the latter would take place according to certain
criteria agreed beforehand by the member states, rather than on an ad
hoc basis.
The non-ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will mean the abandonment
of the solidarity clause and the mutual defence commitment. In practical
terms, this might not have a significant impact. In the past, member states
have provided assistance to other member states in case of natural
disasters (e.g. forest fires or flooding) and DG Environment is already
co-ordinating programmes in the field of civil protection. One could
also imagine that if requested, in the case of a terrorist attack or armed
aggression, other member states would assist the victim of that attack.
However, in this event, NATO would be the primary organisation
expected to carry out the operation. For its part, the WEU Treaty also
contains a mutual defence clause which obliges its ten member states to
assist each other in case of armed attack.9
The civilian side of ESDP might suffer more from the nonimplementation of the Lisbon Treaty as it would mean that the foreseen
‘start-up fund’ financed by the Union budget will not be created. This
would ential that for urgent needs (e.g. fact-finding missions, start-up of
an operation), police, rule of law and monitoring missions will not have
rapid access to the Union budget, but will have to follow standard
procedures, which have in the past delayed the deployment of the
mission. The member states could decide even without the Lisbon Treaty
to establish a ‘start-up fund’ for civilian crisis management operations to
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The Federal Trust
be financed by member state contributions, similar to the mechanism
that has been established for the financing of EU military operations –
the so-called ATHENA mechanism. It might well be, however, that some
member states would prefer to remain with existing financial
arrangements, even if this means delaying the EU’s response to
international crises.
In sum, there could well be some, if limited life in CFSP/ESDP without
the Lisbon Treaty. In security and defence matters, in particular, there
are plenty of examples of past cooperation between the member states
and it is likely that cooperation will carry on in the future in any event.
Conclusions
The European Union needs a strong foreign policy machinery if it wants
to meet the current global challenges of financial turmoil, international
conflicts and climate change, among others. To date, EU foreign policy
has been characterised by overlapping structures, a lack of leadership
and weak capabilities. The Lisbon Treaty has the potential to improve
the management of EU external action, especially with the creation of a
new double-hatted High Representative supported by a strong European
Action Service. Being at the top of the EU’s diplomacy and EU external
policies (and managing the EU’s external relations budget), he or she
could bring more consistency to these two dimensions of EU external
action.
However, whether the High Representative can bring about such
result will depend on how he or she manages inter and intra-institutional
competition on the one hand, and relationships with the member states
on the other. The High Representative will be under close scrutiny by the
President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and
the member states, who are each likely to try to steer his or her actions.
Given the ambiguity of the Treaty, the person holding this position could
interpret the role of the High Representative as a mere administrator of
EU external action at the service of the member states and a primus
inter pares within the Commission or as a key political figure and the
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
41
main ‘face’ of the EU in the world. Although the latter would solve
problems of continuity and visibility of EU external action, it might lead
to tensions with the President of the European Council and the President
of the Commission, not to mention some member states which jealously
guard their independence in foreign policy. In sum, while the Lisbon
Treaty might improve the effectiveness of EU foreign policy by merging
the positions of the High Representative and Vice-President of the
Commission, and establishing a new External Action Service, it has not
fully rationalised the EU foreign policy system and might even lead to
new problems of inter and intra institutional competition.
Above all, the member states will still retain the power to veto initiatives
that do not conform with their perceived national interests. The institutional
reforms foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty can palliate some of the problems
of coherence experienced by the Union in the past (the rift over the Iraq
war being only one example) and create the conditions in which an
effective foreign policy is implemented, but it cannot provide for the
necessary political will.
As regards the ESDP, the Lisbon Treaty does not change its
fundamental character, which remains the preserve of the member states
acting co-operatively. The sensitivity carried by defence matters means
that progress in this area, more than in any other policy area, will still
depend on the willingness of the member states to act together. Even in
the event of the demise of the Lisbon Treaty, it is likely that existing
cooperation projects and operations would carry on. Cooperation
among the member states in security and defence matters has been
characterized by its flexibility, voluntary character and ad hoc nature,
and it is likely that it will continue to be so.
The fate of the Lisbon Treaty rests on the second Irish referendum this
autumn. If the Irish voters reject the Treaty for a second time, the document
itself will be irreparably damaged. In the face of current global
challenges, as well as increasing expectations of a stronger role for the
Union in world affairs, one could well expect that the member states
will certainly look for other ways to improve the EU’s foreign policy
machinery, especially as it is generally recognized that there is a gap in
the co-ordination and representation of the Union’s external policies.
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42
One way forward could be the implementation of those provisions
foreshadowed by the Lisbon Treaty; which do not strictly need change
in the treaties for their implementation. However, there is no guarantee
that these attempts will succeed. In particular, one should not
underestimate the difficulties that will be encountered in the attempt to
achieve a new consensus amongst 27 in the event of non-ratification.
There is no guarantee or even probability that the member states will
find it easier to achieve on a piecemeal basis the overall package of
often painful compromises which they finally accepted in the Lisbon
Treaty.
Notes:
1
European Commission, Eurobarometer 70, Public Opinion in the European Union, First
Results, Autumn 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/
eb70_first_en.pdf.
2
Although it is true that in foreign policy much of the issues on the agenda constitute a
reaction to external events and crises, one can still talk of agenda setting in terms of prioritising
some issues over others.
3
This section draws on Brendan Donnelly, ‘The European External Action Service’, European
Policy Brief (The Federal Trust, September 2008).
4
The RRF consists of a militarily self-sustaining force of 15 brigades (50,000-60,000
persons), capable of full deployment within 60 days, sustainable for at least one year and
with appropriate air and naval support.
5
At the Feira Council in June 2000, the member states agreed to commit up to 5000 civilian
police officers for civilian crisis management operations, as well as to create a Rapid Reaction
Mechanism to enable emergency civilian aid to be available to help stabilise crises. The
objective was to be able to deploy up to 1000 police officers within 30 days for crisis
situations.
6
For a detailed examination of this issue, see S. Biscop, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation
and the Future of the ESDP’, 20 Egmont Paper (Egmont, Brussels, 2008).
7
European Commission (2006) Communication from the Commission to the European
Council of June 2006. Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater
Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, COM (2006) 278 Final, Brussels, p. 2.
8
9
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
The member states still need to take a decision about the future of the WEU Treaty and its
possible termination.
A More Coherent and Effective European Foreign Policy?
43
The Federal Trust is a think tank that studies the interactions between regional, national,
European and global levels of government. Founded in 1945 on the initiative of Sir
William Beveridge, it has long made a powerful contribution to the study of federalism
and federal systems. It has always had a particular interest in the European Union and
Britain's place in it. The Trust works to achieve its aims through conferences, study
groups and publications.
The Federal Trust has no allegiance to any political party. It is registered as a charity
for the purposes of education and research.
Recent publications include:
Federalism and the British
British, edited by S. Henig, ISBN 978-1-903403-88-4
Altiero Spinelli’s European Federal Odyssey (European Essay No. 43), by J. Pinder
Fog in Westminster, Europe Cut Off (European Essay No. 41), by P. Sutherland
The European External Action Service (Policy Brief), by B. Donnelly
Publications, and details of how to order them, as well as information about
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© Federal Trust for Education and Research 2009
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