Parallelism a la Mode

“PARALLELISM À LA MODE by Tammy Nyden The North American Spinoza Society, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, New York, December 2005. Commentators agree that Spinoza's parallelism, the doctrine that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, is central to his overall philosophical system.1 We might therefore expect to find parallelism throughout Spinoza's writings, but, surprisingly, this is not the case. In the following, I argue that the Short Treatise, often considered an early version of the Ethics, does not contain the parallelism doctrine, explicitly or implicitly, nor does it have the requisite ontology to do so. 2 The Ethics contains two innovations that allow Spinoza to consistently deny mindbody interaction: mind-body identity and parallelism. I show that both of these innovations require the introduction of a new type of mode: one that is both infinite and particular. By studying this development in Spinoza's thought, we can come to a better understanding of his mature philosophical system. According to both the Short Treatise and the Ethics, we can understand substance, which Spinoza interchangeably calls God or Nature3, in one of two different ways: as Natura naturans and as Natura naturata.4 By Natura naturans Spinoza understands “a 1 For example, Jonathan Bennett takes parallelism to be one of the three central doctrines of Spinoza's philosophy (Bennett 1981, 573-4); Edwin Curley lists parallelism as one of the Ethics' five main theses concerning the mind-body relation (Curley Le Corps et L'esprit, 5); and Lee Rice notes that the parallelism doctrine has an "extensive progeny of consequences—psychological, epistemological, and moral— throughout the balance of the Ethica" (Rice 1999, 37). 2 The innovative nature of parallelism in the Ethics has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature. One scholar, Edwin Curley, does address parallelism, among others topics, in a brief comparative study of the Short Treatise and the Ethics. He includes the affirmation of parallelism as one of three main theses about the relation between mind and body that are found in both works. But he recognizes that what he is calling "parallelism" in the Short Treatise does not involve a correspondence between the causal relations of ideas and the causal relations of their objects. ("Le Corps et L'Esprit: du Court Traité à l'Éthique" page 11). 3 For example, KV I/22/9-12 and E II/206/24. All quotations from the Metaphysical Appendix, Short Treatise and the Ethics are from Curley's translation in the Collected Works. Citations refer to the standard pagination of the Gebhardt edition: volume / page number/ line. CM refers to the Metaphysical Appendix (Cogitata Metaphysica), KV refers to the Short Treatise (Korte Verhandeling), and E to the Ethics (Ethica). 4 KV I/47/28 and E II/71/5 1 being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than itself.”5 Natura naturata consists in all the modes, or modifications of substance, that depend on God as a cause.6 Both works distinguish between different types of modes in terms of their relation to God as a cause, but they differ as to how many types of modes exist. The Short Treatise says there are two types of modes, the Ethics says there are three. The Two Types of Modes of the Short Treatise The Short Treatise distinguishes two types of modes: universal and particular. "The universal consists in all those modes which depend on God immediately" and "The particular consists in all those singular things which are produced by the universal modes."7 Spinoza says that we know of only two universal modes: motion in matter and intellect in the thinking thing.8 On the other hand, there are unlimited particular modes in each attribute. Motion in matter is the universal mode of extension. The Short Treatise does not say much concerning motion because Spinoza sees such a discussion as properly belonging to a work on natural philosophy. However, Spinoza does say that motion is infinite in its own kind and that it cannot exist nor be understood through itself. Rather, it must exist and be understood through extension.9 The particular modes of extension are singular bodies, which Spinoza takes to be certain proportions of motion and rest.10 Because the attribute of thought is infinitely perfect in its own kind, there must be a mode of thought for everything that exists, both for substances and for modes.11 The mode of thought for substance is the universal mode— intellect in the thinking thing— for it is nothing but God's infinite activity of thinking, without limit or duration. 5 KV I/47/21 and E II/71/8 KV I/48/3 and E II/71/13 7 KV I/47/31 8 KV I/48/5 9 KV I/48/14-15 10 KV I/120/13 6 2 Particular modes of thought, on the other hand, are the ideas of particular things (both of particular bodies and of the particular modes of the other12 attributes). An example of a particular mode of thought is a soul, which is the idea of a particular thing that exists.13 A soul is not, properly speaking, the idea of a thing's essence (which is eternal), but of its existence. I take this to be an important distinction in the Short Treatise. The human soul is an idea of an existing body that will perish. When it does, its soul will perish as well. But the knowledge of the essence of that particular body (an idea within the thinking thing14) is eternal.15 Part I, chapter 3 of the Short Treatise, sheds light on Spinoza's understanding of universal and particular modes. This passage explains how God is the efficient cause of all things by employing a division of causality customary in the seventeenth century. Logic textbooks of Spinoza's day divided causality into the four Aristotelian species (material, formal, efficient, and final) and for each species offered a classification system of its various modes or ways of causing. By employing the classification system found in Burgersdijk's popular logic textbook, Spinoza makes use of terminology and distinctions very familiar to a seventeenth-century reader.16 According to Burgersdijk, an efficient cause can be17: 1. Either Active or Emanative, 2. Either Immanent or Transitive, 3. Either Free or Necessary, 4. Either Essential or Accidental, 11 KV I/51/24 There are an infinite number of attributes, but as humans we only know of two: extension and thought. KV I/27/7-14 13 KV I/51/32 14 From as early as The Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza speaks of the human mind as being part of a greater thinking being or thing. The Emendation of the Intellect II/28/11. As I will discuss later, I take this to refer to "God's idea". 15 KV I/101/23 - I/102/4 16 This division is found in Franco Burgersdijk's Institutionum logicarum Libro Duo, a standard logic textbook used throughout 17th century Europe. It is also found, with minor variation, in other logic textbooks of the time, including two we know Spinoza owned: Clauberg's Logica Vetus et Nova and Keckermann's Systema Logicae (Wolf 194). 17 Burgersdijk 282. Wolf provides an explanation of these distinctions in his commentary on the Short Treatise. The following explanation of Burgersdijk's distinctions is taken from that work. Wolf 190-195. 12 3 5. Either Principal or Subsidiary, 6. Either Primary or Secondary, 7. Either Universal or Particular, and 8. Either Proximate or Remote. Spinoza describes God's causality in terms of each of these distinctions in this order. Let us take each one in turn: 1. An emanative cause produces its effect through its sheer existence, whereas an active cause brings about its effect through the medium of some activity that it exercises. Spinoza says that God is an emanative cause with respect to his actions and an active cause with respect of his actions occurring.18 This means that God's actions depend immediately on God and are therefore the universal modes (motion and intellect). Some might argue that it is odd to think of actions as modes, whether universal or particular. However, there is additional textual support that Spinoza gave actions ontological status. For example, in part I, chapter 10 Spinoza says, "All things which exist in Nature are either [certain and determinate] things or actions."19 I take the first section of chapter 3 to say that God's existence, expressed under the attribute of extension, immediately yields motion (i.e., the activity of matter moving) and God's existence, expressed under the attribute of thought, immediately yields intellect (i.e., the activity of thinking things having ideas). On the other hand, God produces particular occurrences of motion and intellect (i.e., particular ratios of motion and rest or particular ideas) through the medium of God's universal action. An important point is that the motion involved in a particular ratio of motion and rest is none other than God's action. It differs only in that it is a particular expression of God's action (and hence a particular mode) rather than the universal, or omnipresent action. The same holds of the attribute of thought. 18 KV I/35/15-18 Alle dingen, die in de NATUUR zÿn, die zÿn of zaaken of werkingen." Mignini points out additional passages where Spinoza speaks of actions in this way "…different things and actions existing in nature…" (TIE II/24//28) and "I should here like to explain briefly in what way I maintain the fatalistic necessity of all things and actions." (Letter 75 IV/311/16-17). See Mignini's note on page 413 of Spinoza: Korte geschrhiften, Wereldbibliotheek: Amsterdam, 1982. 19 4 2. An immanent cause is an internal one, as opposed to a transitive cause, which creates or changes something external to it. Spinoza's God is an immanent cause since there is nothing external to God.20 However, Spinoza does specify that God is only properly called an internal cause with respect to universal modes and that these, being immediately caused by God, cannot perish as long as their cause endures. On the other hand, he does: …not call God an internal cause of those effects whose existence does not depend immediately on him, but which have come to be from some other thing (except insofar as their causes neither do nor can act without God or outside him); and these, then, can perish, since they have not been produced by God immediately.21 So God is the immanent cause of all things in the general sense that all things are in God, but, properly speaking, God is only the immanent cause of his universal action (universal modes), not of particular expressions or instances of that action (particular modes). 3. Burgersdijk understands a free cause as acting from a deliberate choice and a natural one as acting from necessity. Spinoza does not accept this distinction because he denies that there are any contingent things in nature.22 Spinoza uses the term "free" differently.23 For Spinoza, a free cause is necessitated, but by something internal, rather than external, to the agent. Spinoza's God is free in this sense, for there is nothing external to God. 4. Further, God is an essential, not accidental cause. That is to say, God is a cause through himself, by virtue of his nature and not any accidental properties or circumstances.24 5. The fifth sub-classification, like the first two, refers to the difference between universal and particular modes: God is a principal cause of the effects he has created immediately, such as motion in matter, etc., where there can be no place for the subsidiary cause, which is 20 KV I/35/20 KV I/33/15-19 22 KV I/41/2-9 23 Wolf 193 24 KV I/35/27 21 5 confined to particular things (as when God makes the sea dry by a strong wind, and similarly in all particular things in Nature.25 According to Burgersdijk, a principal cause produces an effect without the help of anything else. A subsidiary cause is merely a necessary but insufficient condition to produce a certain effect. This passage alludes to Spinoza's view that while universal modes are produced immediately by God alone, the production of particular modes has two components. Universal modes cause the essences of particular modes. That is to say, essences of particular things follow from God's activity (and therefore are eternal), however, the existence of particular modes is caused by other particular modes in an indefinite causal chain. 6. Spinoza's God is a first or primary cause, meaning that God is not the effect of any other cause. 7. God is a universal or general cause in that he produces different things. God is not a particular cause, which is restricted to one kind of effect. However, God is not a universal cause in the sense that Burgersdijk uses it, which is a cause that produces many effects by cooperating with other causes. Again, there is nothing external to God with which it could cooperate. 8. A proximate cause produces its effect immediately, without any intervention, whereas a remote cause produces its effect through an intervening proximate cause or a chain of proximate causes. According to Spinoza, God is the proximate cause of universal modes and the remote cause of particular modes: God is the proximate cause of those things that are infinite and immutable, and which we say that he has created immediately, but he is, in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things.26 Since particular modes have external proximate causes of their existence, and those causes are not immediately produced by God, particular modes perish. They, as existing singular things, are not eternal. 25 KV I/35/29 - I/36/5 6 The Body-Soul Union of the Short Treatise The Short Treatise characterizes the relationship between a body and its soul as a union. We know from what has already been said that this is a union between an idea and its object, however the Short Treatise is inconsistent as to the precise nature of this union. For example, it says that there can be no causal interaction between modes of different attributes. Particularly, no mode of thinking can produce motion in a body27 and bodies and their effects cannot act on souls other than to make themselves known as objects. That is to say, bodies do not effect the soul as bodies, but only insofar as they are objects.28 And yet Spinoza gives a specific example of mind-body interaction: For if the body receives one mode, such as, for example, Peter’s body, and again another, such as Paul’s body, the result of this is that there are two different ideas in the thinking thing: One Idea of Peter’s body, which makes the soul of Peter, and another of Paul[‘s body], which makes Paul’s soul. So then, the thinking thing can indeed move Peter’s body, through the Idea of Peter’s body, but not through the Idea of Paul’s body. So Paul’s soul can indeed move his own body, but not that of someone else, such as Peter.29 Further, he tells us that a change in the body will always involve a similar change in the mind to which it is united: The Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the existence of a thing which is in Nature. From this it follows that as the duration and change of a thing are, so also the duration and change of the Soul must be.30 At first sight, this passage may seem to be an assertion of parallelism, the doctrine found in the Ethics.31 But closer inspection shows that the Short Treatise only speaks about the issue in one direction, from body to mind: So this existing proportion’s objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion or rest) changes, either by increasing or decreasing, the Idea also changes correspondingly. For example, if the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we 26 KV I/36/16-18 KV I/29/20-21 28 KV I/93/4 29 KV I/98/3-15 30 KV I/103/1-5 31 E II/89/20 (E II P7). 27 7 call cold is thereby produced. On the other hand, if this [increase] occurs in the motion, then the pain we call heat is thereby produced.32 Further, Spinoza sometimes uses language that implies a causal relation: Now since the Idea proceeds from the existence of the object, then if the object changes or is destroyed, the idea itself also changes or is destroyed in the same degree; this being so, it is what is united with the object.33 [my emphasis]. We know that the Short Treatise was never prepared for publication and for this and other reasons, it contains textual problems, including contradictions. But given the central importance of the mind-body relationship in the system of the Ethics, it seems that studying Spinoza's struggles and sometimes failed attempts to come up with that system may be valuable in order to better understand it. And so I ask what key features are in the Ethics, but not the Short Treatise, which allow the former to consistently deny mind-body interaction? In the remainder of the paper, I offer that these key features are the doctrines of mind-body identity and parallelism and these doctrines require the introduction of a new kind of mode: one that is both infinite and particular. The Three Types of Modes of the Ethics The Ethics divides Natura naturata into three types of modes: Immediate Infinite Modes – Modes that follow immediately from the absolute nature of some attribute of God. They exist necessarily and are infinite.34 Mediate Infinite Modes – Modes that also exist necessarily and are infinite, but they follow immediately from the infinite immediate modes, and only mediately from the absolute nature of God.35 Finite Modes - Singular things. They are finite and have determinate existence. Further, a finite mode cannot exist or produce an effect unless it is determined to exist or produce an effect by another finite mode, and so on to infinity.36 In other words, they are contingent. There is nothing in their essence that posits or excludes their existence.37 32 KV I/120/21-29 KV I/118/23-26 34 E II/65/12-14, II/66/21-22 35 E II/66/18-20, II/66/21-22 36 E II/69/1-9 37 E II/209/18-20 33 8 This division seems to be quite similar to that in the Short Treatise. The immediate infinite modes of the Ethics, like the universal modes of the Short Treatise, depend on God immediately.38 Further, God is a remote cause of the finite modes of the Ethics as he is of the particular modes of the Short Treatise. What is new to the Ethics' ontology is the addition of infinite mediate modes, which occupy a middle ground between the universal and particular modes of the Short Treatise. Infinite mediate modes are, in short, infinite particulars. The Ethics does not give examples of each type of mode. It is clear that the finite modes of extension are singular bodies and their interactions with other singular bodies and finite modes of thought are singular ideas and their interaction with other ideas. However, there has always been quite a bit of controversy in Spinoza scholarship as to how infinite modes are to be understood.39 Even Spinoza's contemporaries wanted clarification. G.H. Schuller wrote to Spinoza in 1675 asking him to provide “…examples of those things immediately produced by God and of those things produced by the mediation of some infinite modification.”40 Spinoza responded: The examples you ask for of the first kind are: in the case of thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in the case of extension, motion and rest. An example of the second kind is the face of the whole universe, which, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always the same. See Scholium to Lemma 7 preceding Prop. 14, II.41 Here we find evidence that Spinoza has the same thing in mind when discussing the universal modes of the Short Treatise and the immediate infinite modes of the Ethics. In both cases the mode of thought is intellect and the mode of extension is motion (and now rest). This is God's infinite action (expressed under the attributes of thought and extension). God's action is universal in the sense that all particulars and their actions 38 KV I/47/30 There are two main points of controversy. First, what is the nature of infinite modes? For instance, Edwin Curley interprets the immediate infinite modes as laws (Curley 1969, 56-63), Friedman interprets them as essences (Friedman 1986, 398). Second, what are the infinite modes of thought? Gueroult takes God's idea to be an immediate infinite mode (Gueroult 1968 314ff), Pollock takes it to be mediate infinite modes (Pollock 176). (On my interpretation, immediate infinite modes are actions and God's idea a mediate infinite mode.) 40 Letter 63, 296-297. Quotations from Spinoza's correspondence are from Shirley's The Letters. 39 9 participate in it. That is to say, it is omnipresent. Specifically, the actions of all particular bodies are particular motions (or particular comings to rest) and the actions of all particular minds are particular intellections. What is new to the Ethics is the introduction of infinite mediate modes, which occupy a middle ground between the universal and immediate infinite modes and the finite, particular modes. Unfortunately, Spinoza only gave Schuller an example of the infinite mediate mode for the attribute of extension: "the face of the whole universe". What does this mean? Well, letter 64 gives us an important clue. The passage refers us to Lemma 7. Lemma 7 does not use the term "the face of the whole universe," but rather "the whole of nature." Further, it defines "the whole of nature" as "one Individual whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole Individual.42 However, there is good reason to believe that Spinoza means the same thing by "the face of the whole universe" and "the whole of nature". First, both descriptions are of something that varies in infinite ways without itself changing. Second, Spinoza himself references his description of the whole of nature in the Ethics when describing the face of the whole universe to Schuller. Therefore, I take Spinoza's terms "the face of the whole universe" and "the whole of nature" to refer to the same thing. The Short Treatise does not discuss the ontological status of the whole of nature and given its two-mode system, lacks the structure to do so. According to the Short Treatise, the whole of nature is one unique being.43 So one would think that it would be a particular mode, not a universal mode. However, the whole of nature is also an infinite being.44 And so it can not be a particular mode as defined in the Short Treatise.45 Remember that other particular things in an infinite causal chain cause the existence of a particular thing, therefore particular things have finite existence. But the efficient cause 41 Letter 64, 299 E II/101/19 - II/102/18 43 KV I/101/22 44 KV I/101/21 45 KV I/48/6-8 42 10 of the existence of the whole of nature cannot be a particular thing because finite beings cannot produce infinite beings. And so we see the Ethics solve a problem with the Short Treatise's ontological structure.46 A new category of infinite mediate modes (infinite particulars) is needed to account for the whole of nature. One objection that might be raised against Spinoza on this interpretation is that by saying the whole of nature is an infinite individual47, Spinoza is contradicting his definition of singular things as those that are finite and have determinate existence.48 However, this objection is based on a failure to realize that Spinoza uses the terms "singular thing" and "individual" in importantly different ways. Spinoza uses "individual" when he wants to stress the unity of the parts making up a composite body. Such a unity can undergo changes to its parts while the composite body itself retains the same nature and form.49 For the form of an individual consists only in the union of the simpler bodies making it up and its nature is the ratio of motion and rest among those simpler bodies. On the other hand, Spinoza uses the term “singular thing” when he is distinguishing a finite thing from other finite things external to it, that is, when he is distinguishing a component part of the whole of nature from other component parts of the whole of nature. The whole of nature is an individual because it is a composite body made up of an infinity of simpler bodies. However, it is incorrect to refer to the whole of nature as a singular thing because there is nothing outside of it. There is nothing that the whole of nature can be distinguished from. It is easy to become confused and think that the terms “individual” and “singular thing” are interchangeable in Spinoza’s philosophy because all finite modes are both. For Spinoza, all finite bodies are unions of simpler bodies and for this reason they are individuals. The whole of nature is the only individual body that is not a singular thing because it is the only infinite individual. 46 To my knowledge, the fact that the introduction of the infinite mediate mode is a solution to a problem with the ontological structure of the Short Treatise has not received comment in the secondary literature. 47 E II/102/13 48 E II/69/69-70 49 E II/100/16-29 11 To summarize, so far we have seen an example of each type of mode for the attribute of extension. Motion and rest make up the immediate infinite mode, which follows immediately from God's absolute nature expressed as extension. Motion (and rest) is God's action (or lack thereof), not a particular (a certain and determinate thing). Rather, motion and rest are universal in the sense that the activities of all particular bodies consist in movement and rest. In this sense, the essence of all bodies as bodies is that they consist of motion and rest. The infinite mediate modes—the whole of nature— follow immediately from the immediate infinite modes. It is a particular thing that it is composed of an infinite number of finite modes: “The whole of nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole Individual.”50 While its component parts undergo changes, the whole of nature, as an infinite individual, does not. It couldn’t, for there is nothing outside of the whole of nature to act on it. As for the attribute of thought, Spinoza tells us that the immediate infinite mode is absolutely infinite intellect and that finite modes are ideas, but there is a glaring absence—the infinite mediate mode. I think we can ascertain what this mode should be by looking for something within the attribute of thought that plays the same role as the whole of nature does within the attribute of extension— an infinite individual. I believe, as I will argue later, that God's idea (idea Dei) fills this role. The legitimacy of this approach, which assumes a parallel structure among modes of extension and modes of thought, must first be explained. It is based on the Ethics' innovative approach to the mind-body union. 50 E II/102/13 12 The Mind-Body Union of the Ethics Spinoza's understanding of the mind-body relationship is much more rigorous and consistent in the Ethics than in the Short Treatise. The Ethics makes it clear that there is no causal interaction between attributes: The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute.51 This makes sense since things cannot be caused by something with which they have nothing in common,52 and the attributes of extension and thought have no properties in common. We saw this notion in the Short Treatise. However, Spinoza inconsistently allowed some interaction between human minds and bodies in that work. In particular, he said that a mind can move the body with which it is united53 and that a body is the cause of what the mind affirms of it. The Ethics is clear and consistent that such mind-body interactions cannot happen. In speaking about human bodies and minds he says: The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).54 Further, the Ethics explains why minds and bodies cannot interact. At the center of this development is Spinoza's doctrines of mind-body identity. 55 The Ethics, like the Short Treatise, refers to the mind-body relationship as a union and defines the mind as an idea of body.56 However, the Ethics clarifies the nature of this union. It is a special type of identity that ideas have with their objects:57 51 E II/89/4-6 E II/47/15-16 53 KV I/98/4-15 54 E II/141/5-7 55 The Ethics uses the term "mind" rather than "soul" to refer to an idea of an existing body 56 E II/94/14-15, E II/96/1, and E II/96/23-31 57 It seems odd that Spinoza would continue to refer to the mind-body relationship as a “union” after he says that they are one and the same thing, expressed in two different ways. For the word “union” usually implies that there are two separate things that are brought together in some way, now forming one thing. However, Spinoza uses the term union to refer to a special type of identity that ideas have with their objects. For example, intellectual love is a unification of the mind with its object through the third type of knowledge. It is when the mind contains the idea of the object so that that idea represents the object as it is represented in God’s mind. In other words, the union of love is the identity of an idea in a singular mind 52 13 …the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways.58 The Short Treatise does say that God and Nature are one and the same thing (the same substance expressed under two different attributes: thought and extension) but the Ethics takes this identity to the level of the finite mode. A finite body and its mind are expressions of the same thing. They are not two different things that can interact. Since bodies and their causal interactions with other bodies express the same thing as minds and their causal interactions with other minds, the structure of these interactions will be the same: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." 59 This parallelism doctrine is not explicitly stated until Part II of the Ethics, although seeds of this notion are found in the Short Treatise. For instance, there is a certain balance to the notion that as human souls are modes of the attribute of thought, human bodies are modes of the attribute of extension. However, this in and of itself does not constitute parallelism. Neither does the fact the Short Treatise claims that the nature of this union is such that the duration of, as well as any changes that occur to, a body will also occur in the soul. For, as we have seen, this work does not assert the reverse (that any changes of the soul will take place in the body), nor is the Short Treatise consistent in its denial of mind-body interaction, which if allowed, would disrupt any parallelism. While the Short Treatise does not clearly show a parallelism between finite bodies and minds, it does introduce something like parallelism at a different level: since Nature or God is one being, of which infinite attributes are said, and which contains in itself all essences of created things, it is necessary that of all this there is produced in thought an infinite Idea, which contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, as it is in itself.60 [emphasis mine] with an idea in God’s mind. Similarly, the term “union” when applied to the mind-body relationship refers to the identity of two expressions of the same mode. 58 E II/90/5-9 59 E II/90/20-21 14 In other words, there is a unique idea (which I take to be the thinking thing) that has the whole of nature as its object. Recall what we have already said about the thinking thing…. We said then that although Nature has different attributes, it is nevertheless only one unique Being, of which all these attributes are predicated. We added that the thinking thing is also unique in Nature and that it is expressed in infinite Ideas, according to the infinite things that are in Nature.61 We know from Part II, Chapter XXII that the whole of nature is one unique infinite being.62 Further, we know from Part II, Chapter XVIII that man is part of this unique infinite being.63 There is a parallelism of sorts between the idea that man('s body) is part of the whole of nature and that man’s mind is part of the thinking thing. Further, there is a parallelism between a whole of nature that contains the essences of all created things and a unique thinking thing that contains infinite ideas, according to the infinite things that are in Nature. The Short Treatise does not say whether the thinking thing is the same thing as the idea of the whole of nature. Further, he does not assert an identity between the whole of nature and the thinking thing of which we are part. And so we do not know if the thinking thing of which we are part is a mind united to the whole of nature in the same way that a human mind is united to its body (i.e., as an idea of that object). If it is, the thinking thing of which we are part would seem to be a particular mind, as it has a unique, particular object (the whole of nature) and therefore could not be a universal mode.64 However, other passages suggest that it would be a universal mode. Spinoza does say that the infinite idea of the whole of nature is “a creature created immediately by God.”65 Therefore, the Idea of the whole of nature must be a universal mode. For Spinoza defines universal modes as those things that depend on God 60 KV I/117/25-29 KV I/97/9 - I/98/4 62 KV I/101/22 63 KV I/86/30-35 64 Spinoza's use of the term "dekende zaak" ("thinking thing") confirms this reading. 65 KV I/117/30-31 61 15 immediately.66 Further, he seems to equate the Idea of the whole of nature with intellect in the thinking thing.67 The problem is that the Short Treatise simply does not give the ontological status of the whole of nature or the thinking thing of which we are part and they do not appear to fit neatly into his division of modes into universal and particular. As we have seen, the Ethics does provide the ontological status of the whole of nature. Further, since the Ethics holds that the order and connections of ideas must be the same as the order and connection of things68, there should be a mode of thought parallel to every mode of extension, including the immediate infinite mode—the whole of nature. That is to say, there must be an infinite mediate mode of thought, and like the whole of nature, it must be an infinite individual. God's idea (idea Dei) seems to fill this role. Spinoza says that: whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection.69 In other words, the object of God’s Idea is the whole of nature. We might say that the whole of nature is the infinite body and its corresponding "infinite mind" (the idea of that body) is God’s idea. Further, E II P8 corollary and scholium imply that God’s idea is an infinite whole composed of the finite modes of thought.70 This would parallel the whole of nature in being an infinite whole composed of the finite modes of extension. This reading is consistent with E II P4, which says that God's idea is unique.71 In other words, God's idea is certain and determinate. It is a mediate, not an immediate, infinite mode. To summarize, immediate infinite modes, then, are simply the expression of God's essence under a specific attribute, for God is essentially active. God's very existence immediately gives rise to such action and the action of a certain attribute is 66 KV I/47/30 “That is why I have also called this Idea (in I, ix) a creature created immediately by God, since it has in itself objectively the formal essence of all things, without omission or addition” (KV I/117/30-32). This quote references Part I, Chapter IX, which calls intellect in the thinking thing “a Son, product, or effect, created immediately by God" KV I/48/19-20. 68 Translated as "dingen" by Nico van Suchtelen in his Dutch translation. Page 69. 69 E II/89/27-30 70 E II/91/5-28 67 16 what unifies all modes of that attribute. For it is the action (i.e., motion or intellect) which gives modes of that attribute their essence as modes of that attribute. From God's action immediately arises the infinite mediate mode— a particular infinite individual that contains all the finite particular modes. This infinite individual (the whole of nature or God's idea) is what gives rise to the individuation of singular essences.72 However, the existence and/or duration of individual finite modes (existing finite bodies or ideas) is caused by other finite modes, in an infinite causal chain. Parallelism and the Need for a Third Kind of Mode The parallelism doctrine plays a central role in the metaphysical system of the Ethics. As we have seen, this parallelism does not only exist within the human mind-body union, but is found throughout nature, from the infinite modes to the finite modes. This notion has its roots in the Metaphysical Appendix. For instance, in that work Spinoza says: If we attend to the proportion of the whole of nature, we can consider it as one being, and consequently there will only be one idea of God, or decree concerning Natura naturata.73 This passage suggests that Spinoza saw a parallel between what makes the whole of nature one being and what makes God's idea one being. However, his early theory of mind does not carry this parallelism through to the level of finite modes. We must keep in mind that he doesn’t state the Parallelism Principle until the Ethics. While there are seeds of parallelism in the Short Treatise, we do not find parallelism itself. First, even if we take the Short Treatise at its word that there is no causal interaction between minds and bodies, we still do not have a one-to-one relation between bodies and souls. For Spinoza defines a soul as an idea of an object that exists. He explicitly tells us that he uses the term "object" rather than "body" so as to include the 71 72 E II/88/8-10 E II/91/5-8. 17 modes of all the attributes, not just extension.74 And so, without recourse to soul-body identity, it appears that Short Treatise has to maintain that there are more souls than bodies. Even if the Short Treatise could support a one-to-one relation of minds and bodies, its discussion of parallelism within mind-body unions would not be enough to support the parallelism principle of E II P7. For P7 says something much stronger: the structure of the whole causal nexus of bodies is the same as the structure of the whole causal nexus of minds. That is to say, the correspondence is not just one within the particular mind-body union, but a correspondence between the position of a particular mind within the thinking thing and the position of a particular body within the whole of nature. That is to say, the parallelism is not just between particular ideas and particular bodies. The parallelism is also between the order and connection of ideas and bodies. The Short Treatise does not make this claim, nor can it, as it does not have the ontological status of the thinking thing or the whole of nature worked out. The Ethics contains two arguments for parallelism, and both depend on ontological features not present in the Short Treatise. Before discussing these arguments, let me pause to say that it is not my purpose to criticize or defend these arguments, fill in their gaps, or even to make explicit their various implicit premises.75 Rather, my goal is to show that Spinoza's reasoning presupposes the existence of an infinite mediate mode. If I can do so I will have defended my thesis that the parallelism doctrine of the second part of the Ethics can not be supported by the two-tier ontology of the Short Treatise. If there is any agreement in the literature regarding parallelism it is that Spinoza's defense of it is frustratingly brief. All the demonstration of EII P7 tells us is that it clearly follows from Axiom 4 from Part I: "The knowledge of an effect depends on, and 73 CM I chap. VII, 329 "The essence of the soul consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say of an object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of extension do." I/119/6-14 74 18 involves, the knowledge of its cause." As Curley and Bennett both argue I A4 is not enough to support this conclusion. As it stands, IA4 can only support the claim that if there is an idea of an effect, then it depends on idea(s) of its cause(s). II P3 is needed as well.76 II P3 states: In God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence.77 From II P3 it follows that not only must there be an idea of an effect, there must be an idea of every effect in God. Therefore, the causal relations of all ideas will mirror the causal relations of their objects. Further, God's idea is an infinite complex idea containing the following: 1. An idea of God's essence, which is expressed as the immediate infinite mode of an attribute78 2. An idea of God's idea itself (the infinite mediate mode)79 3. Ideas of all that necessarily follows (every finite mode).80 This is significant, because parallelism must obtain among all modes and their causal relations, finite and infinite modes alike. This argument for parallelism depends on the notion of God's idea as infinite, particular81, and as containing all ideas. In other words, this argument for parallelism depends on the existence of the infinite mediate mode of thought. Therefore the Short Treatise could not support this line of reasoning. Spinoza provides a second argument in support of the parallelism doctrine, one based on mind-body identity. The scholium of P7 says that just as the thinking substance 75 Such treatments of Spinoza's arguments for parallelism can be found in, for example, Della Rocca, chapter 2; Curley Behind the Geometrical Method II.6; and Bennett § 31-32. 76 Curley Behind the Geometrical Method 64, Bennett 130-131. 77 E II/87/5 78 E II/87/9-10 79 E II/87/23 80 E II/87/24 81 It is significant that the very next proposition states "God's idea, from which infinitely many things follow in infinitely many modes, must be unique." E II/88/6 19 and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended under two different attributes: …also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways…..Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another.82 As we have seen, the Short Treatise does not contain the doctrine of mind-body identity and therefore could not support this second argument for the parallelism doctrine either. Conclusion There is no question that the Parallelism Principle does a lot of work in the Ethics, not least of which is, in conjunction with the doctrine of mind-body identity, to give a consistent story regarding the mind-body relation. 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"Paradoxes of Parallelism in Spinoza." Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 48, 37-54. Spinoza, Baruch. (1985). The Collected Works of Spinoza. Translated and edited by Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ________. (1979). Ethica. Translated (into Dutch) by Nico van Suchtelen. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek. ________. (1995). The Letters. Translated by Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. ________. (1982). Spinoza: Korte geschriften. Edited by F. Akkerman, H.G. Hubbeling, F. Mignini, M.J. Petry, and N.EN G. van Suchtelen. Amsterdam: Wereldbiblotheek. Wolf, A. (1963). Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being: New York: Russell & Russell Inc. 21