Dimitra PANAGIOTATOU, PhD Candidate
d.panagiotatou@qmul.ac.uk
Queen Mary University of London
School of Business and Management
Supervisors: Professor Martin Laffin, and Senior Lecturer Dr. Stella Ladi
May 2017
Short Paper prepared for the
8 Biennial Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece and Cyprus
European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science
July 1st 2017
th
PhD Thesis Title: Investigating the correlation between the practice of EU Cohesion Policy and
Euroscepticism: An exploratory qualitative analysis of selected EU regions
PhD Thesis/Paper Abstract: The aim of the doctoral project consists in investigating whether and
at which extent the practice of EU Cohesion Policy has inadvertently impacted upon the centrifugal
forces and Eurosceptic dynamics observed in the EU, by focusing in particular on why the policy
has not managed to create lasting positive images about the Union and thus contribute to the
development and diffusion of the EU identity. Drawing from and aspiring to contribute to the
literatures on Europeanization, Euroscepticism and Public Policy, the project explores the
perceptions of supranational, national and sub-national elites about EU Cohesion Policy and the
extent at which different strategies and organizational/operational modalities at national and subnational levels influence the efficient implementation thereof. The methodological framework
consists in exploratory qualitative case-study research of selected EU regions in Greece, the United
Kingdom and Poland, whereas data and findings collated during elite interviews are interpreted
through the lens of discourse analysis. The paper submitted to the Symposium represents a section
of the literature review and some preliminary theoretical considerations relating to Euroscepticism.
1
Exploring Euroscepticism:
Historical roots, conceptual enquiries and current implications for the future of EU
Introduction
Under the current climate of challenge of the conventional political establishment, strict fiscal
discipline leading to economic austerity and ensuing social disruption emerging or prevailing in a
number of European Union (EU) countries, fostering inter alia Euroscepticism and nationalism,
there is increasing academic interest in understanding and framing the limits of Europeanization and
the multi-speed Europe phenomenon in a range of policy sectors. Drawing from and aspiring to
contribute to the literature on EU studies, the paper focuses on the phenomenon of Euroscepticism
and discusses its historical roots, conceptualization and current implications for the future of the
European Union construction.
The Roots of Euroscepticism
Having emerged in the early 1990s and gained increasing ground within the discourse on EU
politics ever since, Euroscepticism figures as an ever-timely and relevant phenomenon nowadays.
The historical roots of the term trace in Britain, where in the course of the 1960s „Eurosceptic‟ was
used as a synonym for „anti-marketeers‟ or opponents to the country‟s adhesion to the Union, and
where it still constitutes “a very different and much more intensive phenomenon than in the rest of
the EU” (Harmsen 2005). Therefore, although indices of Euroscepticism have surfaced in a more or
less concealed manner in certain member states from as early as their accession to the EU, even
before that, the phenomenon as such emerged as an open discourse when the 1992 Danish
referendum rejected the Maastricht Treaty, the latter signaling the end of the “permissive
consensus” era (Harmsen and Spiering 2004).
In more detail, the fast-pacing process of European integration taking place between the 1980s2000s has been generally supported by both European elites and European citizens, the latter being
passive or even condescending to the political decisions of the former. This pattern has also been
congruent with the neo-functionalist approach sustaining that elite decision-making and behavior
was the driving force behind the European integration process. Nonetheless, with supranational
institutions pushing towards further integration, a gap has been created between the European and
national elites and the population regarding the implications and future of the European
construction, and member states‟ citizens started scrutinizing and/or questioning the European
project as a whole or several aspects and policies thereof (Milner 2000; Wessels 2007). The gap
between the two gave birth to Eurosceptic patters, which have been developed around several
arguments grounded on different logics and points of departure. Before moving to the most eminent
factors susceptible to trigger Euroscepticism, a more in-depth elaboration on the term per se, and
the different notions and typologies attached to it seems useful.
Conceptualizing Euroscepticism
With regards to the conceptualization of the term, various definitions and approaches to the study of
Euroscepticism figure in the literature. In a broader context, the notion implies “an attitude of doubt
or a disposition of belief” (Hooghe and Marks 2007) towards deeper European integration or
specific European policies (Flood 2002), or “a fundamental opposition towards the European
Union” (Harmsen 2005). The most widely used definition has been provided by Szczerbiak and
2
Taggart, according to whom Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified
opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European
integration” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003). This definition, mainly applicable to party-based
Euroscepticism distinguishes between soft and hard opposition to the process of European
integration, yet is criticized on grounds of being very broad and all encompassing (Kopecky and
Mudde 2002). It is worth mentioning that some positive connotations have been attributed to
Euroscepticism as well; in particular, that the latter implies the increased critical capacity of the
public to analyze, judge and have a saying on policy directions, and the argument that elites cannot
govern without popular consent. In this vein, Euroscepticism has been quoted as a „healthy‟
phenomenon as it allows for the involvement of citizens in EU policy making processes (Milner
2000). The opposite argument, sustaining that Euroscepticism occurs as a result of the lack of
proper information on what is really happening at EU level and how decisions are taken has also
been developed.
Typologies of Euroscepticism
Drawing from the ideological dimension of policy perceptions, preferences and positions adopted
by both political parties and the public opinion (where applicable), Kopecky and Mudde propose a
rather comprehensive typology of Euroscepticism angles grounded on the concepts of „diffuse
support‟ and „specific support‟ towards general ideas about the European Union and specific EU
practices respectively (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Therefore, they perceive Euroscepticism as a
two-dimensional phenomenon. The first dimension focuses on perceptions about the process of
European integration per se, and distinguishes between Europhiles and Europhobes, whereas the
second dimension looks at perceptions about the European Union as a whole and distinguishes
between EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. Different pairs of „labels‟ found in the two dimensions
lead to a four-fold typology categorizing political parties, or the public, into further categories, such
as Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects (Kopecky and Mudde 2002),
each characterized by distinct approaches and attitudes vis-a vis European matters (Kopecky and
Mudde 2002). Another account, proposed by Flood and Usherwood, distinguishes between six
categories, namely EU-maximalists, who are in favor of further and fast-pacing European
integration; EU-reformists, who despite supporting integration are also constructively skeptic
towards specific parameters thereof; EU-gradualists, who are in favor of a slow and gradual EU
integration process; EU-minimalists, who although having reconciled with the up-to-date state of
EU affairs oppose to further integration; EU-revisionists, who would rather prefer less -than
achieved- integration; and finally, EU-rejectionists, who reject both membership to the Union and
thus, the European Union as a whole (Flood and Usherwood 2005). It becomes obvious that the
different categories presented by both Kopecky and Mudde, and Flood and Usherwood are not
mutually exclusive and that political parties and citizens can identify themselves as belonging to
more than one group depending on the policy juncture at a given time.
Factors triggering Eurosceptcism
With regards to the main factors and rationale behind the manifestation of Eurosceptic attitudes and
perceptions both within national governments, political parties and among citizens, different
approaches and explanatory paths can be found in the literature. To begin with, the utilitarian
approach focuses on the direct and quantifiable benefits or costs resulting from the membership to
the Union, and the European integration process (Gabel 1998; George 2000; Hooghe and Marks
2004). Therefore, drawing from the neofunctionalist approach to the study of EU integration, and
trade theory, support for or opposition to the European project and integration processes are
determined on the basis of utility and profit maximization incentives as well the capacity and
efficiency of the EU executive to achieve its objectives and keep the „promises‟ made to EU
citizens, most notably with regards to economic benefits emanating from adhesion to the Union
(Haas in Jensen 2003).
3
The second dimension, known as the democratic approach, is centered on the argument that the EU
lacks democratic credentials (Follesdal and Hix 2005). In particular, advocates of this approach
argue that the Union faces a broader democratic deficit problem, which can be observed at several
occasions: the insufficiency of directly elected institutions and bodies, the lack of transparency in
the EU decision-making process, the increased power of the EU executive at the detriment of
national governments and parliaments, as well as the perceptions of the public on whether they feel
represented by EU institutions, or whether they are aware of and feel close to the EU decisionmaking process (Mény 2003). Nonetheless, this approach has also been criticized, as some might
suggest that given its sui generis nature and intrinsic characteristics, the Union and its complex
governance setting are as democratic as they can be (Moravcsik 2002).
The third dimension of Euroscepticism, also referred to as the sovereignty approach, focuses on
national sovereignty and identity and the fear or risk for the latter to get „overshadowed‟, weaken or
gradually disappear as a result of increased power transfer at the supranational level, converging
policies and practices within and across member states, and EU integration- and Europeanizationdriven pressures in a broader context (Hooghe and Marks 2004; McLaren 2007). In fact, in many
cases one can observe that “opposition to the European project is less about hostility to the
institutions of the EU or concerns about personal economic/financial losses and more to do with
fears of symbolic threat to the national community” (McLaren 2007). Linking this argument to the
previous section, the rejectionist approach, consisting in what is quoted in the literature as “hard”
Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002) encompasses Eurorejects (Kopecky and Mudde
2002) and EU-rejectionists (Flood and Usherwood 2005), who oppose to or reject the totality of the
European project and all aspects relating to it. Obviously, this approach constitutes the most
extremist dimension of the phenomenon, the latter posing serious threats to the unity and
advancement of the European Union. A final point from which Eurosceptic patterns and ideologies
might depart lies in the absence of economic and social nets {“Social Europe”} within the EU to
countermand the negative implications of neoliberal policies dictated by globalization processes
(Marks and Steenbergen 2002).
Current Manifestations & Implications of Euroscepticism
Notwithstanding the fact that Euroscepticism initially appeared and has figured as a marginal or
peripheral phenomenon, whether „periphery‟ relates to the extreme poles of party systems, the
geographic landscape of the Union –most commonly linked to the study of EU politics within the
UK and/or the Nordic countries- or the margins of domestic societies, in recent years, in particular
since the late 1990s, it has “spread at public opinion and party levels across the EU, contributing
thus to changing academic understandings of the term, from a quasi-pathology to a mainstream and
enduring phenomenon in European domestic societies and democracies” (Leconte 2015). This shift
from a “permissive consensus” (Harmsen and Spiering 2004) to a “constraining dissensus”
(Michailidou 2015) culture and approach to the European integration process has also coincided and
been strongly influenced by the transformation of the European and national EU-related media
landscape (Michailidou 2015). For instance, in Britain, the already fragile and „complicated‟
relationship between successive national governments and citizens on the one hand, and Europe on
the other hand has been further aggravated by the eminent role and influence of the media, most
notably the tabloid press, the latter providing significant insight on “how the debate surrounding
UK membership of the EU has in recent years completed its journey from the margins to the
mainstream of British politics” (Startin 2015).
Euroscepticism has been further triggered by the Eurozone crisis and the negative implications for
European countries‟ social structures. In fact, following economic austerity and other political and
socio-economic developments informed and resulted by the Eurozone crisis, Eurosceptic patterns
4
and manifestations have been mainstreamed within the EU and increasingly affected not only the
public opinion, as reflected in the negative outcomes of national referenda on different European
matters, but also political parties, as manifested in the rise of populism and extreme right- and leftwing parties, civil society groups, media discourses, and even EU institutions themselves (Brack
and Startin 2015). In addition, the crisis has not only „reinforced‟ already existing Eurosceptic
trends, but has also changed the traditional landscape between Europhiles and Europhobes by
triggering novel – and differential according to the context- reactions in member states. For
instance, in the UK, the crisis has been a contributing factor to the deterioration of an already
„troubled‟ relationship with Europe, the latter leading to the decision of the public opinion to
withdraw EU membership. Greece, on the contrary, being traditionally one of the most Europhile
EU members, has experienced a dramatic change in its political scenery and seen the unprecedented
rise of skepticism and/or opposition towards the Union at both party and public opinion levels
(Verney 2015). In a broader context, the crisis has strengthened opposition voices focusing on
power, solidarity and accountability issues emanating from the past and current EU governance
structure, has triggered the de-legitimization of both domestic and EU political institutions in some
cases, e.g. Greece, and has paved the way for a debate on the need for a reformed Europe
(Michailidou 2015).
Euroscepticism and ‘De-Europeanization’
In this context, Leontitsis and Ladi draw from retrenchment as a possible outcome to
Europeanization pressures and make the case for “De-Europeanization” as a distinct form thereof.
In more detail, in light of recent developments in Europe, in particular the Eurozone crisis, the
refugee crisis and the ascent of extreme-right and Eurosceptic dynamics, increased pressure and
coerciveness of Europeanization [as a EU institutions response to the multifaceted crisis] has rather
triggered centrifugal tendencies in Europe, the latter carrying the risk for partial or more generalized
De-Europeanization phenomena to be manifested (Leontitsis and Ladi, forthcoming). Therefore,
two observations can be drawn from. First, that Euroscepticism and the different manifestations
thereof consist in a multi-dimensional phenomenon affecting the EU integration process and the
future of Europe in a broader context, and are differential both within and across member states and
over time. In fact, as the conceptions and attitudes of the public opinion, central governments and
other societal groups are susceptible -to a more or lesser extent- to change, Euroscepticism can also
change over time. Second, that Europeanization outcomes are inextricably linked with
Europeanization mechanisms given that „inappropriate‟ mechanisms can trigger opposite to the
desired results. As revealed by recent developments within the EU, increased Europeanization,
mostly in the form of pressure and imposition, does not necessarily imply more Europe (Leontitsis
and Ladi, forthcoming).
Conclusion
It has become clear that Europeanization, both as a normative and an analytical framework seems to
be a solid and promiscuous starting point for interrogation and analysis on the broader
understanding of EU politics, and in particular on framing the present state of EU affairs and
suggesting a possible way out of the Union‟s current „existential crisis‟. Nonetheless, the
manifestation and escalation of the current economic, political and social developments in Europe
and the implications thereof for the European Union urges one to reflect on the limits of European
integration and the multi-speed Europe phenomenon, and take a closer look at the gaps,
misinterpretations and limits in the Europeanization literature.
5
It is in the light of these developments that the present doctoral project investigates whether and at
which extent the practice of EU Cohesion Policy has inadvertently contributed to the centrifugal
forces and Eurosceptic dynamics observed in the EU, by focusing in particular on why the policy
has not managed to achieve one of its implicit objectives, namely the promotion of the EU identity.
Although there might be other more evident and already documented factors justifying member
states‟ resentment with the European Union, the fact that hardly any attempts have been made in the
literature to associate the practice of EU Cohesion Policy with Euroscepticism makes our question a
valid point for interrogation.
To this end, three working hypotheses are developed. Firstly, drawing from the theoretical
framework on Europeanization, most notably the domestic mediating factors facilitating or
impeding the transposition of EU law into national and sub-national structures and settings, we
assume that there is a correlation between Europhile or Eurosceptic perceptions at national and/or
sub-national level and the practice of EU Cohesion Policy. Secondly, departing from the literature
on Public Policy, we anticipate that different strategies and policy styles employed by national and
sub-national elites, as well as the territorial organization and level of decentralization in member
states impact upon the practice of EU Cohesion Policy. Thirdly, we assume that the element of
regional identity has manifold implications for both the national and European identities and are
therefore interested in the correlation between the practice of EU Cohesion Policy and the pro- or
anti-EU climate in EU regions with strong regional identities and the impact of the former on the
perceptions of the latter about Europe.
It therefore might be that increasing Euroscepticism will prevail against further European
integration in the years to come and that the Union will go back into being an exclusive club of
countries, this time on grounds of different features and criteria than the ones in place when the EU
was founded. But it might also be that the European project has not yet reached the end point and
that EU policies might still be designed in an inclusive and implemented in a flexible manner
respecting the intrinsic characteristics and capacities of its member states and the principle of
subsidiarity. In this respect, accounts on how EU common policies are perceived, used and
presented at the domestic level; whether long-term strategic objectives of these policies exist and
are visible to EU citizens; and whether the feedback mechanisms and learning processes in place
are adequate and suitable seem to be limited or altogether missing from the Europeanization
literature and, thus are worth being explored.
6
Academic Sources
Brack, N., and Startin N. (2015). „Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the margins to the
mainstream‟, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 239-249.
Flood, C. (2002). „The Challenge of Euroscepticism‟, in J. Gower (ed.), The European Handbook.
Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers: Illinois.
Flood, C. and Usherwood S. (2005). „Positions, Disposition, Transitions: A model of Group
Alignment on EU integration‟, Paper presented at the 55th Annual Conference of the Political
Studies Association, University of Leeds, April.
Follesdal, A. and Hix S. (2005). „Why there is a Democratic Deficit: A Response to Majone and
Moravsik‟, European Governance Papers, 5:2.
Gabel, M. (1998). „Public support for European Integration: An Empirical test of five Theories‟,
Journal of Politics, 60.
George, S. (2000). „Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic state‟, Journal of European Integration,
22:1.
Harmsen, R. and Spiering M. (2004). „Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and
European Integration‟. Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam.
Hooghe, L. and Marks G (2007). ‘Sources of Euroscepticism‟, Acta Politica, 42:2-3, 119-127.
Hooghe, L. and Marks G. (2004). ‘Does Identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on
European integration’, Political Science and Politics, 37:3.
Kopecky, P. and Mudde C. (2002). „The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party positions on European
integration in East Central Europe‟, European Union Politics, 3:3, 297–326.
Leconte, C. (2015). „From pathology to mainstream phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism
debate in research and theory‟, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 250-263.
Leontitsis, V. and Ladi S. (2016), unpublished chapter, in E. Ongaro and S. Van Thiel (eds.) Public
Administration and Public Management in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke
(forthcoming).
Marks, G. and Steenberger M. (2002). „Understanding Political Contestation in the European
Union‟, Comparative Political Studies, 35:8, 879-892.
McLaren, L. (2007). „Explaining mass-level Euroscepticism: Identity, interests, and institutional
distrust‟, Acta Politica, 42:2-3, 233-251.
Mény, Y. (2003) „De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges‟, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 41.
Michailidou A. (2015). „The role of the public in shaping EU contestation: Euroscepticism and
online news media‟, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 324-336.
Milner, S. (2000). „Introduction: A healthy scepticism?‟, Journal of European Integration, 22:1.
Moravcsik, A. (2002). „In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing the Legitimacy of the
European Union‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:4.
7
Startin, N. (2015). „Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Eurosccepticism in the
UK‟, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 311-323.
Szcerbiak, A. and Taggart P. (2003). „Theorising party-based euroscepticism: Problems of
definition, measurement and causality‟, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 69.
Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak A. (2002). „The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and
Candidate States‟, SEI Working Papers, 51.
Verney, S. (2015). „Waking the „sleeping giant‟ or expressing domestic dissent? Mainstreaming
Euroscepticism in crisis-stricken Greece‟, International Political Science Review, 36:3, 279-295.
Wessels, B. (2007). „Discontent and European Identity: Three types of Euroscepticism‟, Acta
Politica, 42:2-3, 287-306.
8
Title: The official discourse of Greek extreme right parties in the European
Parliament between March 2015 and September 2016: A content analysis.
Author’s Name: George Kordas
Affiliation: PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science and History, at
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece
Abstract
The relationship between the extreme right and the European integration
seems to define the political agenda during the last years in an important degree, as it
presents a strongly controversial character. This view usually finds fertile ground in
the extreme right’s position concerning the superiority of the member – state against
the transnational institutions (Mudde 2011: 232 – 235). This kind of studies focuses
on the role of the Eurosceptic phenomenon and how this is present at the “Left –
Right” ideological axle. Therefore, studies refer either to a total or to a partial
rejection of the European institutions (Kopecky & Mudde 2002: 300; Taggart &
Szczerbiak 2008: 7 – 8; Vasilopoulou 2009: 4; 2011: 224, 232 - 234). The present
study deals with the content analysis of extreme right discourse inside the European
Parliament, while it simultaneously focuses on answering the following questions:
a) how the appearance and the stabilization of extreme right parties in our country’s
political scene is connected with the growing dissatisfaction against the role of the EU
and b) with which gradations Euroscepticism is presented in the official discourse of
the extreme right parties.
1
Introduction
This article aims to study the political parties of Golden Dawn and
Independent Greeks, which, according to theory are placed further than the
established right in an ideological axle of “Left – Right”. The period on which our
study focuses lasts from the 8th of March 2015, when we have the first official
speeches from parties’ members in the European Parliament after the creation of the
SYRIZA – ANEL coalition government (Rori 2016: 7), until the 15th of September
2016, when two of our study’s four members of the European Parliament take part in
an official discussion for the last time. Our main variables during this study will be
the economic crisis, which has already existed before the period considered, as well as
the gradually ascending refugee crisis. In conclusion, we have to clarify that the
research for the Euroscepticism’s gradations will be conducted through the study of
the official discourse of the parties’ members and resources will be found through the
official page of the European Parliament.
Analysis
1) Notis Marias
The party of Independent Greeks had its worst electoral result during the 2014
European Elections. As a result, only one representative of the party was elected,
Notis Marias (Teperoglou et al. 2015: 12). Nevertheless, he left the party after a
disagreement he had with its president, Panos Kammenos, in November 2014,
although he kept his seat1. Therefore, we are able to study an Independent European
Parliament member who belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists
political party. For his case, we studied 17 texts, which belong as much to the
“Debates” section as to the “Parliamentary Questions” of the parliamentary activities.
After analysing these texts, the following value categories have occurred: “national
interest” (13 times), “solidarity” (7 times), “responsibility” (5 times), “national
sovereignty” (4 times), “democracy” (2 times), “respect” (1 time) and “equality” (1
time). Our analysis has the opportunity to delve deeper, striving to offer us the
discourse’s dimension. The occurring basic dimensions are as follows: the “social”
and the “economic”, followed by the “sovereign” (7 times), the “political” (6 times),
the “migratory” (2 times) and the “humanitarian” and the “institutional” occurring
only once.
According to the above stated, we accept that the values have a “positive”
side, which means that the values’ fitting is linked to the respect of human identity,
human rights, law, democracy, equality and freedom2. In the case of Notis Marias, the
Newspaper of the Editors (Efimerida twn Sintaktwn), ‘To divorce Independent
Greeks – Notis Marias’ (2014), available at http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/prosdiazygio-anexartitoi-ellines-notis-marias, 9 November (accessed 07 May 2017)
2
‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, (2000/C 364/01). available
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (accessed 07 May 2017)
1
2
negative crisis, according to the consequences he cited, is presented 19 times with the
emphasis being put on the “economic” dimension (6 times), a fact that can be
explained from the anti-memorandum position Marias kept. Simultaneously, the
“social dimension” appears 4 times, as the economic crisis has affected immediately
and negatively the society. Although we have the expression of a positive crisis (14
times), this usually has to do more with some kind of an antisystemic political
movement, an indication of an independence movement, than with documented
political views and therefore results in a 4 times expression of both sovereign and
social dimension. Our coding takes the following form:
DATE
TOPIC
SPEAKER
STATUS
PARTY
VALUE
WHO ADOPTS
PURPOSE OF THE
SPEECH
WHAT KIND OF
PROBLEM
RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE PROBLEM
PROBLEM’S
DIMENSION
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
CRISIS OF THE
SYMBOL (ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES)
CRISIS OF WHOM HE
ADOPTS (ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES)
24 / 6 / 2015
REVIEW OF THE
ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK:
STOCKTAKING AND
CHALLENGES
(DEBATE)
NOTIS MARIAS
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
MEMBER
INDEPENDENT
DEMOCRACY
ANTI-MEMORANDUM
CITIZENS - ECR
REVIEW OF THE
ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK
GREEKS’ DECISIONS
NEED TO BE
RESPECTED BY THE
EUROZONE
11 / 5 / 2016
NOTIS MARIAS
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
MEMBER
INDEPENDENT
NATIONAL INTEREST
ANTI-MEMORANDUM
CITIZENS - ECR
E.U.
E.U.
POLITICAL
MIGRATORY
REMOVAL OF TROIKA
FROM GREECE
COUNTRY’S
TRANSFORMATION
INTO A VAST
REFUGEE CAMP
DACHAU
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
RESTORING A FULLY
FUNCTIONING
SCHENGEN SYSTEM
(DEBATE)
DEBATE ABOUT THE
RESTORING OF THE
SCHENGEN SYSTEM
INCOMPLETE
REFUGEE
RELOCATION FROM
GREECE TO THE E.U.
3
ABSTRACT
SUGGESTED
SOLUTIONS
SOLUTION BODY
SHOULD THE
EUROZONE LEARN TO
TO RELOCATE THE
RESPECT THE
THOUSANDS OF
DEMOCRATIC WILL OF
REFUGEES FROM
THE GREEK PEOPLE
GREECE TO THE
WHO ON THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
ELECTIONS OF
EVENTUALLY GREECE
JANUARY 25 DECIDED
TURNS INTO A VAST
TO THROW TROIKA
REFUGEE DACHAU
OUT OF GREECE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE
GREEK PEOPLE
DECISION FROM THE
EUROZONE
E.U.
WAYS OF SOLUTION
CHANGE OF
LEGISLATION AND
TROIKA’S
WITHDRAWAL FROM
GREECE
SOLUTION TIMETABLE
IMMEDIATELY
DIRECT REFUGEES
RELOCATION FROM
GREECE TO THE E.U.
E.U.
MORE EFFECTIVE
POLICIES, ABOLITION
OF THE SCHENGEN
SYSTEM, PENALTIES
TO THOSE COUNTRIES
WHICH DID NOT
ACCEPT REFUGEES
IMMEDIATELY
2) (Chrysi Avgi) - Golden Dawn
Golden Dawn is represented in the European Parliament for first time after
May 2014, when three candidates were elected: Lampros Fountoulis, Eleftherios
Synadinos and Georgios Epitideios. Our research material is consisted of these
official placements, as they were made visible to use, through 17 texts from the
sections of “Debates” and “Parliamentary Question” of the parliamentary activities.
These texts can be analysed in 13 categories depending on the values they
express, twice as many compared to the case of Notis Marias. More specifically, we
can detect the following values: “security” (11 times), “responsibility” (10 times),
“national interest” (8 times), “solidarity” (5 times), “equality” (5 times), “democracy”
(4 times), “human dignity” (4 times), “national pride” (3 times), “national
sovereignty” (2 times), “ identity” (2 times), “economic sovereignty” (2 times),
“European interest” (2 time), and “national purity” (2 time). From this analysis we
find that their discourse in some sections has similarities per pair. “National
sovereignty”, “national interest” and “solidarity” can be met only in the discourse of
Lampros Fountoulis and Georgios Epitideios, while “identity” only in the discourse of
Georgios Epitideios. Except for that, “responsibility” and “national pride” are
expressed in Georgios Epitideios’s and Eleftherios Synadinos’s discourse, while the
“economic sovereignty” only in Eleftherios Synadinos’s discourse. By expanding our
analysis to the significance that the discourse has, we can find the following structure:
“migratory” (16 times), “social” (9 times), “economic” (8 times), “political” (6 times),
“sovereign” (5 times), “security” (4 times), “labor” (4 times), “value” (3 times),
“monetary” (2 times), “institutional” (2 times), “transnational” (2 times),
4
“identitarian” (1 time), “morality” (1 time), “humanitarian” (1 time) and “messianic”
(1 time).
By following the distinction of values we used before, we notice a positive
approach from the 3 members of the European parliament we are studying only 12
times. Most of these times were focused on the “European interest” and
“responsibility” (3 times), where the need of the E.U. to take care of her
responsibilities is highlighted, since the policies she follows do not promote the
longevity of the European structure. Migration remains the main subject of their
official placements, while economy follows, both being issues that the party has
gained “recognition upon thematic competence” (Georgiadou 2014: 191) during the
last years. The negative view of the values mainly focuses on the issue of migration,
but also on the Greek economic crisis and the reasons for its occurrence, which are to
found in the governance model of the E.U. Security is entered on the political agenda
due to migration, whereas the way this issue and the economic crisis are handled, had
given the opportunity to the party’s representatives to comment on the blows the
national interest and the European values have taken from the continuation of these
policies. Our coding takes the following form:
DATE
25 / 10 / 2016
TOPIC
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MIGRATION IN THIRD
COUNTRIES
SPEAKER
GEORGIOS EPITIDEIOS
STATUS
PARTY
VALUE
WHO ADOPTS
MEMBER OF THE
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
GOLDEN DAWN
HUMAN DIGNITY
GOLDEN DAWN
PURPOSE OF THE
SPEECH
DEBATE ABOUT THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MIGRATION IN THIRD
COUNTRIES
WHAT KIND OF THE
PROBLEM
MIGRATION IS
RECOGNIZED AS A
HUMAN RIGHT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE PROBLEM
E.U.
14 / 10 / 2015
DRAFT AMENDING
BUDGET NO 7/2015:
MANAGING THE
REFUGEE CRISIS:
IMMEDIATE
BUDGETARY
MEASURES UNDER
THE EUROPEAN
AGENDA ON
MIGRATION
ELEFTHERIOS
SYNADINOS
MEMBER OF THE
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
GOLDEN DAWN
RESPONSIBILITY
GOLDEN DAWN
EMPHASIZING THE
NEED TO FOCUS ON
THE EUROPEAN
CITIZEN IF WE WANT
TO SOLVE THE
REFUGEE CRISIS
FISCAL MEASURES
FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF
THE REFUGEE CRISIS
E.U. INSTITUTIONS
5
DIMENSION OF THE
PROBLEM
MIGRATORY
SECURITY
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
A DEFECTIVE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
AND THE INABILITY
TO FIND WORK IN THE
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
ABSENCE OF FOCUS
ON THE EUROPEAN
CITIZEN AND HIS
SECURITY
NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
ABSTRACT
IMMIGRATION IS NOT
A HUMAN RIGHT BUT
A SYMPTOM OF A
DEFECTIVE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
AND A FAILURE TO
FIND WORK IN THE
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
SUGGESTED
SOLUTIONS
TRANSFORMATION OF
THE ECONOMIC
SYSTEM AND OF THE
LABOR MARKET
OPERATION
WE THINK IT IS
WRONG TO MANAGE
THE REFUGEE CRISIS
BY THE INSTITUTIONS
BECAUSE THE
EUROPEAN CITIZEN
AND HIS SECURITY IS
NOT A PRIORITY
MANAGEMENT OF
THE REFUGEE CRISIS
IN A NATIONAL
LEVEL, WITH
PRIORITY TO THE
EUROPEAN CITIZEN
SOLUTION BODY
E.U.
WAYS OF SOLUTION
VOTING IN THE
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
SOLUTION TIMETABLE
IMMEDIATELY
CRISIS OF THE
SYMBOL (ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES)
CRISIS OF WHOM HE
ADOPTS (ABOUT THE
CONSEQUENCES)
AUTHORITIES OF THE
COUNTRIES OF ENTRY
AND THE E.U.
STRICTER POLICE
CONTROL, CHANGE OF
THE LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK
IMMEDIATELY
Conclusions
1) Notis Marias
In the case of Notis Marias we studied 17 official placements he made during the
meetings of the European Parliament. The small number of texts is a result of the
“topic fragmentation” that every member of the European Parliament has to come up
against. The fixed pattern in his discourse has to do with Euroscepticism, as he
perceives the memorandum of Greece as a subordinate of the strong Europeans.
Therefore, in his discourse he focused on the “national interest” (13 times), which
arises from the inconsistency between political actions and European values and also
on “solidarity” (7 times) for the same reason.
6
Apart from that, since his intention was to express his objections regarding the
European policies towards Greece, he focused on the economic and social dimension
of the political developments. In agreement with the above and by following
Taggart’s & Szczerbiak’s theory, it seems that Marias’s speech is an example of
“soft” Euroscepticism, because of his objections concerning the European policies
towards our country’s sovereignty, but it does not constitute an example of opposition
against the overall idea of the E.U.(2004: 3).
2) (Chrysi Avgi) – Golden Dawn
In the case of Golden Dawn’s representatives, we also studied 17 texts, which
gave us the ability to outline the positions they took when the refugee crisis was at its
peak and the economic crisis took a dramatic turn for Greece. At the same moment,
the dissatisfaction about the policies of the E.U. dominates the public opinion,
especially due to the refugee crisis. Starting with this – and continuing with the
introduction of more topics – the members of Golden Dawn attempt to deconstruct the
meaning of the E.U., by moving between a “soft” and a “hard” Euroscepticism
(Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004: 3).
More specifically, when the discussion referred to the memorandums and the
negatively affected national sovereignty of Greece, we have a complete rejection of
the idea of European integration (“rejecting Euroscepticism”) (Vasilopoulou 2009: 4;
2011: 224, 232 - 234). But when it was a juxtaposition with external factors (refugees,
Islamists), E.U. was viewed as the last fortress, the defence of which was considered
imperative for the continuation of E.U.’s existence (“conditional Euroscepticism”)
(Vasilopoulou 2009: 4; 2011: 224, 232 - 234). Besides that, the “responsibility” they
tried to express through their speeches is remarkable, as it shows their disposition to
avoid their party’s extremities in the Greek Parliament3, whereas it is also an attempt
to present themselves as critical against Europe and in the same time able to present
some political solutions. A very interesting characteristic of their discourse concerns
the complete abstention from any identifying features, as they were interested in
focusing on the political developments and not on the features that create the image of
the extreme – right Golden Dawn. As a result, there is a huge gap between the way
the organisation works in Greece and on a European Union level.
Approaching the above at the level of our research hypotheses and questions,
the case of Notis Marias is peculiar, as he follows an individual political path,
completely dissociated from the party he was elected. Ideologically, he remains loyal
to what he expresses, while with his political decisions and the creation of the
movement of the “Anti – memorandum Citizens”4 he believes he will have the chance
to play an important role in the next national or European elections in Greece.
What is interesting in the case of Golden Dawn’s representatives is the
rejection of the extreme discourse the party uses in favour of a more responsible
position with an emphasis on security. Without distancing from their basic positions,
Naftemporiki (2016) ‘Serious incident in the Greek Parliament with Golden Dawn’s
parliamentary members’, 6 June, available at
http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1112393/sobaro-epeisodio-sti-bouli-me-bouleutestis-xrusis-augis (accessed 07 May 2017)
4
Press Release (2017) ‘The new political party “Greece – The other road”presented
today in Strasbourg by Notis Marias’, 5 April, available at
http://notismarias.gr/bodytimeline.php?id=20158 (accessed May 2017)
3
7
such as the danger of Islam, they present a more serious image for themselves inside
the European Parliament. This has nothing to do with an alteration to their ideological
identity; it is however an opportunistic feature that can work in their favour, due to the
legal entanglement the party has in Greece. Because of this, the party has lost the
funding from the Greek Parliament, a fact that makes the funding from the E.U. a vital
resource.
In conclusion, if we want to include the four European Parliament members to
a classification of extreme – right theories, we can say that Notis Marias’s case
approaches Mudde’s populist radical right criteria better (2011: 63 – 65). The case of
Golden Dawn, although it seems to be a kind of paradox based on the image the party
has built through the years, we believe that it approaches Betz’s criteria for “radical
right – wing populist parties” better (1994: 4). More specifically, during the current
period of time, extreme right’s representatives, together with communist
representatives and former members of the radical left party SYRIZA are the only
political personalities who have not voted in favour of any memorandum. This could
attract the electorate in the next elections both in the case of Notis Marias and in the
case of Golden Dawn, especially if the later tries to play at the same time with the
value of “responsibility” in its political discourse (Minkenberg 2014: 37 – 38). That
feature goes with the comment it has been made about the organization’s effort to
present a more social face through the strategy of the “executioner and protector”
(Georgiadou 2014: 190). The final result of all the above is a confirmation of our
research hypothesis with regard to the supply side theory (Eatwell 2003: 47 – 53;
Mudde 2011: 277 – 313).
Coding Sources
Notis Marias
1. 12.12. Annual report of the European Central Bank for 2013 available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150310+ITEM-01212+DOC+XML+V0//EL&language=el&query=INTERV&detail=2-319-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
2. 10.16. European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and
social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2015 (A8-0043/2015 - Sergio
Gutiérrez
Prieto)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150311+ITEM-01016+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-378-218
(accessed 7 May 2017)
3. 10.17. Single market governance within the European Semester 2015 (A80018/2015 Ildikó
Gáll-Pelcz)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150311+ITEM-01017+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-378-855
(accessed 7 May 2017)
4. 6. Preparations for the European Council meeting (19-20 March 2015)
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=8
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150311+ITEM006+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-077-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
5. 25.
One-minute
speeches
(Rule
163)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150325+ITEM025+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-381-000
(accessed 7 May2017)
6. 17. Conclusions of the European Council meeting (19-20 March 2015)
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150325+ITEM017+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-102-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
7. 25. One-minute speeches on matters of political importance available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150624+ITEM025+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-334-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
8. 20. Review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and
challenges
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150624+ITEM020+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-219-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
9. 13. 2016 Budget - Mandate for the trilogue (debate) available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150707+ITEM013+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-785-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
10. 3. Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June 2015) and of the Euro
Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece (debate) available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150708+ITEM003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-054-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
11. 3. Conclusions of the informal European Council of 23 September 2015
(debate)
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at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151006+ITEM003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-071-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
12. 8.8. Common provisions on European Structural and Investment Funds:
specific measures for Greece (A8-0260/2015 - Iskra Mihaylova) available at
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(accessed 7 May 2017)
13. 6. Humanitarian situation of refugees within the EU and neighbouring
countries
(continuation
of
debate)
available
at
9
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151006+ITEM006+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-148-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
14. 20. One-minute speeches on matters of political importance available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151014+ITEM020+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-336-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
15. 3. Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary
Union
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151215+ITEM003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-049-000
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16. 15. Restoring a fully functioning Schengen system (debate) available at
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(accessed 7 May 2017)
17. 11. Legal migration package - Action plan on integration of third country
nationals
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160607+ITEM011+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-792-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
Georgios Epitideios
1. 12.12. European Central Bank annual report for 2013 (A8-0011/2015 - Pablo
Zalba
Bidegain)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150310+ITEM-01212+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-324-390
(accessed 7 May 2017)
2. 10.9. Guidelines for the 2016 budget - Section III (A8-0027/2015 - José
Manuel
Fernandes)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150311+ITEM-01009+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-307-773
(accessed 7 May 2017)
3. 26.5. Review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and
challenges
(A8-0190/2015 Pervenche
Berès)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150624+ITEM-02605+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-495-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
4. 6.11. Draft amending budget No 5/2015 - Responding to migratory pressures
(A8-0212/2015 Eider
Gardiazabal
Rubial)
available
at
10
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150707+ITEM-00611+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-480-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
5. 21.4. Draft amending budget No 7/2015: Managing the refugee crisis:
immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration (A80289/2015 Eider
Gardiazabal
Rubial)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151014+ITEM-02104+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-418-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
6. 21.3. Mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for immediate budgetary
measures under the European Agenda on Migration (A8-0290/2015 - Eider
Gardiazabal
Rubial)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151014+ITEM-02103+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-394-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
7. 10.4. 2016 budgetary procedure: joint text (A8-0333/2015 - José Manuel
Fernandes,
Gérard
Deprez)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151125+ITEM-01004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-321-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
8. 10.5. Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union available at (B81347/2015 )
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151217+ITEM-01005+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=4-279-875
(accessed 7 May 2017)
9. 8.8. European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and
social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2016 available at (A8-0031/2016 Sofia Ribeiro) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160225+ITEM-00808+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-438-750
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10. 11. Communication on implementing the European agenda on migration
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160308+ITEM011+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-587-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
11. 7.7. The situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU (A80024/2016 Mary
Honeyball)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160308+ITEM-00707+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-430-375
(accessed 7 May 2017)
12. 11. Legal migration package - Action plan on integration of third country
nationals
(debate)
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=11
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160511+ITEM014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-363-000
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13. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160607+ITEM011+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-795-000
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14. 5.4. Refugees: social inclusion and integration into the labour market (A80204/2016 Brando
Benifei),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160705+ITEM-00504+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-304-750
(accessed 7 May 2017)
15. 15. Travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals
(debate),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160914+ITEM015+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-572-000
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16. 12.4. Asylum: provisional measures in favour of Italy and Greece (A80236/2016 Ska
Keller),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160915+ITEM-01204+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=4-265-562
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17. 8.14. Human rights and migration in third countries (A8-0245/2016 - MarieChristine
Vergiat),
available
at
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18. 8.4. Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with
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at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20161025+ITEM-00804+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-230-500
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Lampros Fountoulis
1. One-minute
speeches
(Rule
163),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150325+ITEM025+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-385-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
2. 21.4. Draft amending budget No 7/2015: Managing the refugee crisis:
immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration (A80289/2015 Eider
Gardiazabal
Rubial),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=12
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151014+ITEM-02104+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=1-420-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
3. 10.4. 2016 budgetary procedure: joint text (A8-0333/2015 - José Manuel
Fernandes,
Gérard
Deprez),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151125+ITEM-01004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-325-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
4. 3. Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary
Union
(debate),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151215+ITEM003+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-057-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
5. 10.5. Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (B8-1347/2015 ),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20151217+ITEM-01005+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=4-281-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
6. 7.7. The situation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU (A80024/2016 Mary
Honeyball),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160308+ITEM-00707+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-433-000
(accessed 7 May 2017)
7. 15. Restoring a fully functioning Schengen system (debate), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160511+ITEM015+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-386-000
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8. 14. Decision adopted on the Common European Asylum System reform
(debate),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160511+ITEM014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-365-000
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9. 5.4. Refugees: social inclusion and integration into the labour market (A80204/2016 Brando
Benifei),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160705+ITEM-00504+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-308-000
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10. 12.4. Asylum: provisional measures in favour of Italy and Greece (A80236/2016 Ska
Keller),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20160915+ITEM-01204+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=4-266-000
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13
Eleftherios Synadinos
1. 12.12. European Central Bank annual report for 2013 (A8-0011/2015 – Pablo
Zalba
Bidegain),
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150310+ITEM-01212+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=2-324-726
(accessed 7 May 2017)
2. 10.9. Guidelines for the 2016 budget - Section III (A8-0027/2015 - José
Manuel
Fernandes),
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11. 16. Asylum: provisional measures in favour of Italy and Greece (debate),
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17. 3. Possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of
the European Union - Improving the functioning of the European Union
15
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17
A Model for Personalized Political Communication
in a Social Media Environment
Maria Boutzeti & Constantinos Mourlas
Faculty of Communication and Media Studies
National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
{mboutzeti,mourlas}@media.uoa.gr
I.
ABSTRACT
Personalization environments using recommendation schemes have been applied to
entertainment or e-commerce, providing to the user information suitable to her/his
personality, interests, goals or buying behavior. This becomes feasible through the use
of a profile, built from known or collected information about the user.
In this paper, our goal is to present a different user profile for the purposes of
personalized political communication in Social Media Networks. This political profile
allows us to define the user’s political attitude on the one hand, and to classify the
content transmitted in a social network according to its political load on the other,
with a view to matching them. This model will be integrated in a Social Media
environment and an adequate set of experiments will take place in order to evaluate its
effectiveness during the personalization process.
[1]
II.
INTRODUCTION
Social Media Networks play an increasingly important role in social and public life
and have reshaped the terms for conducting political communication. In particular:
Social media focus on the individual, as the user is able to choose the social group he
belongs to and interacts with. This radical change in communication, has led to what
Bennett (2012:20-21) calls the "era of personalization", a development that
dramatically changes the conditions for practicing political communication.
At the same time, the numerous messages circulating online cause information
overload, making the political message difficult to reach its audience.
The personalization process is one way of addressing the problem of information
overload. According to Kim (2002:30), “The objective of personalization for the
purpose of delivery of personalized information is fairly straightforward. It is to
deliver information that is relevant to an individual or a group of individuals in the
format and layout specified and in time intervals specified”.
Μany internet personalization systems, in recent years, are based on recommendation
schemes that provide their user with content fit to his personality and interests or
navigational behavior (Amazon, YouTube, etc.). Personalization systems assume that
human population is not homogeneous. Therefore, in order for personalization
systems to operate effectively it is necessary to identify individual users and user
groups consisting of individuals with similar characteristics. Accordingly, the
construction of full and accurate user profiles is a precondition for the development of
personalized applications.
This paper presents an approach for constructing a citizen-user political profile for the
purpose of political communication.
III.
DEFINING A POLITICAL PROFILE: LITERATURE REVIEW
The political profile is a synthesis of various factors believed to affect political
attitudes and electoral choice. Every citizen has his own political profile, consisting of
a different mix of these factors. A political profile corresponds to what we call in
political theory a political position. A position implies a spatial concept on a spectrum
that includes all possible political positions. This concept is known in the literature as
“political spectrum”.
Political spectrum is defined as a classification system of different political positions
on one or more geometric axes that signify independent political dimensions. The
most common approach is the single horizontal “Left - Right” axis, inspired by the
way seats were attributed in French Parliament after the Revolution (Mavrogordatos
G., 2011:1).
Although the “Left - Right” political spectrum has been strongly contested recently as
an outdated concept (Wikipedia, Entry "Political Spectrum"), our bibliography review
suggests that current socio-political issues can still be examined in terms of the “Left Right” spectrum.
[2]
Bobbio (2013:76) suggests that the “Left - Right” distinction retains its meaning and
the ideological load included in positions remains relevant. Giddens argues that
despite the controversial nature of the “Left - Right” distinction, the meanings of
“Left” and “Right” are not static but evolving over time, in line with the need to
explain the characteristics of each era (referred by Pastiadis, 2009 from Giddens “The
third way”). Accordingly, the concepts of “Left” and “Right” adapt, thus preserving
their value as tools to describe politics. Venizelos (2006:23) highlights, that the “Left
- Right” distinction was “obvious and paramount” during the entire 20th century. An
older research of Castles & Mair (1984:73-75) also points out that international
research has maintained, more or less, the classification of ideological attitudes of the
parties in terms of “Left-Right” spectrum. Finally, Marcel et Witkoski in their article
“The distinction Left/Right” (2005:196) point out that in January 2002, 91% of
French citizens could place themselves in the “Left - Right” axis, while only 9%
refused, rejecting this distinction.
In conclusion, even today, in an era when people have adopted a critical view towards
politics, the “Left” - “Right” horizontal axis can still define differences of political
positions while moving along the axis.
Taking as a basis the confirmed value of the “Left - Right” axis, our next step is to
identify the factors that determine the placement of a user on a particular position
along the axis and compose a political profile. These factors are the issues that a
citizen is expected to have an opinion on.
McDonald, Mendes & Kim (2007:64) identify as central axes of political
differentiation the following: 1) Economy Perception, such as government
intervention in the economy and means of production control. 2) Main
Services Distribution, such as health and education.
They also refer to the concept of privilege and its relation to social hierarchy,
as a factor that over time affects politics. Privilege is a factor, which Bobbio
also highlights in his book “Right & Left” (2013:177), underlining that
privilege issues significantly affect the main services distribution. Therefore,
we consider Main Services Distribution and the concept of privilege definitive
aspects of the social perception.
G. Michelat (1993:75-76) in his article “In search of Left & Right” proposes
the categorization of the important factors related to political position into two
main thematic categories: a) Economic-Social attitudes, and b) NationalCultural attitudes. In these two large thematic categories, Michelat places a
number of sub-issues: Economic liberalism, Market economy, Social
attainments, Protest action, (1st category) / Antiauthoritarianism,
Ethnocentrism, Traditionalism, Sexual permissiveness (2nd category). Michelat
suggests that beliefs related to the above sub-issues reveal the political
position of a person.
Norberto Bobbio (2007), trying to describe the dimensions of the ideological
difference between Left and Right, mentions some important social issues
such as: equality expectation, openness of the society, migration issue, use of
violence, relationship with tradition and the concept of emancipation, the
relationship between freedom and power, the relationship between freedom
and equality.
[3]
A public opinion study (referred by Pastiadis, 2009:4/19), conducted in 2007
by VPRC - a public opinion research company in Greece - identifies the
following issues as determinants for a person to self-locate his position on the
political spectrum axis:
o social security feeling,
o satisfaction by political information provided by media,
o satisfaction with democracy in Greece,
o trust in political parties,
o trust in labour unions,
o difference between Left & Right governance,
o citizen’s withdrawal from public life,
o freedom of the economy,
o state or non-state universities,
o Europe and national identity,
o migrants’ contribution to the economy,
o the link between foreigners and criminality
Venizelos (2006:65-68) in his book “Two words: Left & Right today?”,
presents 10 main points of ideological difference between Left and Right,
adding to the previous factors the notions of “Sustainability and environmental
protection”, “Peace and global democratic governance” and “International
terrorism”. These factors, together with “Europe and national identity” of
VPRC, represent concerns about global issues.
Table 1: 10 points of Left-Right difference
(Venizelos, 2006:65-68)
(+ indicates additional elements by Right, while accepting in the first degree the position of
Left)
Left attitude
Right attitude
Pluralist democracy
+ "rationalized" democracy, strong state
Human rights and freedoms
+ respect and protection of individual and
collective security
+ "ethical" unity of society and cultural
homogeneity
+ free market operation, development of free
competition
+ macroeconomic and financial stability
Social liberalism and pluralism,
multiculturalism
Social solidarity and cohesion
Redistributive role of the state, financing
the European welfare state (social security,
education, health care)
Full employment
Social development, diffusion of
entrepreneurship everywhere (state itself,
small businesses, agricultural sector, selfemployed)
Sustainability, environmental protection
Peace, global democratic governance
Human dignity and acceptance of cultural
diversity
Flexible labor relations
Business profitability, private investment,
identification of entrepreneurship with largescale capitals.
+ environment as an economic asset and
resource (for example in tourism)
+ defense against asymmetric threats and
international terrorism
+ emphasis on economic opportunities of
globalization, superiority of the Western
development model
[4]
IV.
DEFINING A POLITICAL PROFILE: LITERATURE EVALUATION
From the literature reviewed, we adopt for our research purposes the following
elements:
1. Thematic categories, consist of closely related issues. In particular:
From McDonald, Mendes & Kim’s approach on a) Economy
Perception and Main Services Distribution taking into
consideration Bobbio’s notion of privilege, two main thematic
categories are adopted:
o Financial Issues, and
o Social Issues
We choose not to follow Michelat’s view, believing that placing
economic and social issues in a single category leads to a general
category, where it is difficult to distinguish the real influence of
each issue. In addition, we found that the issues Michelat placed in
his second category of National-Cultural attitudes are closely
related to Social Issues.
However, Michelat gives us some useful elements about the subissues included in the two main thematic categories.
Taking into account the special issues mentioned above by
Venizelos, we decided to form a third main category, resulting in a
model with three main categories:
o Financial Issues
o Social Issues
o Global Issues
2. In order to organize the three main categories into more detailed sections
and issues, we took into account all the elements identified above (Mc
Donald, Mendes & Kim, Michelat, Bobbio, Venizelos, VPRC). In addition
to this, we also used Wikipedia entries on political positions.
V.
DEFINING A POLITICAL PROFILE: PROPOSED PARAMETERS
Accordingly, we propose to use the following model parameters - organized in
categories, sections and issues - for the purposes of our research:
A) Financial Issues
Economy:
o State intervention in the economy
o Ownership of means of production
o Economic globalization
o Model of wealth distribution
[5]
Labour:
o Full/flexible employment
o Labour protection
o Labour unions
Taxation:
o Tax model
B) Social Issues
Social services/Welfare:
o State participation in social services distribution
o The concept of privilege
Equality - Social Hierarchy:
o Social hierarchy perception
o Equality perception
Citizen participation in public life
o Collectivism vs. Individualism
Balance between equality and freedom:
o Equality vs. Freedom
Human Rights, Immigration, Openness of the society:
o Openness of society - Multiculturalism - Immigration.
o Human Rights and diversity
Relationship with tradition:
o Emancipation vs. Tradition
o Perception of Religion & National Heritage
Perception of use of violence
o Acceptance/refusal of violence
Perception of power. Protest vs. Repression.
o View on power and repression forces
o Relationship between freedom and power
C) Global Issues
Environment:
o Environmental protection and the environment as a commodity
Foreign policy - International relations:
o Non-intervention vs. Fight against terrorism
o Attitude towards U.S.A., NATO, EU
[6]
VI.
DEFINING A POLITICAL PROFILE: PROPOSED MODEL
Our model seeks to define a method for placing a political profile spatially along the
Left - Right axis of the political spectrum. For this purpose, we organize the above
parameters in a table that attributes to them values for each political position along the
axis. In particular, we choose - like Marcel & Witkowski (2005:2) - to follow the
SOFRES scale of seven positions, as follows: 1. Extreme Left, 2. Left, 3. Centre-Left,
4. Centre, 5. Centre-Right, 6. Right, 7. Extreme Right. Then, we assign specific
political statements to each political position, derived from our literature review.
It is important to note that clearly formulated positions do not always exist in the
current bibliography for all the political positions of the scale 1 to 7. However, having
defined the Left or Right position, we can attribute values to missing intermediate
positions using as examples the work of VPRC and Michelat who present the
acceptance levels of various issues in different positions across the spectrum (see
tables below).
[7]
Table 2: Percentage of Acceptability
(VPRC - entire table presented by Pastiadis, 2009:9/19)
Trust in
labour
unions
Left
CentreLeft
Centre
RightLeft
Right
Average
45,21
60,00
39,02
37,34
31,82
39,24
Table 3: Percentage of Acceptability
(Michelat, 1993:77 )
*Percentage points difference between highest and lowest percentages
**
N/A
Economic liberalism (2-4)
Social attainments (3-4)
Protest action (2-5)
Market economy (3-4)
Antiauthoritarianism (2-4)
Ethnocentrism (2-4)
Traditionalism (4)
Sexual permissiveness (2-4)
25
26
33
11
33
58
57
35
Left
14
69
75
17
61
40
44
63
Centr
e-Left
Centr
e
22
55
64
25
58
41
56
55
44
28
43
29
43
53
69
43
Cent
reRigh
t
66
20
31
40
32
59
31
35
Righ
t
d*
74
15
30
37
23
74
83
38
60
54
45
20
38
34
34
25
In the table bellow, we present one example of our model for each of the three thematic categories we adopted:
[8]
POLITICAL POSITIONS TABLE
Extreme Left
Left
Centre-Left
Centre
Centre-Right
Right
Extreme Right
1. Financial Issues
Economy
State controls the
economy
Strong government
intervention in the
economy
Mixed market economy
while sustaining the welfare
state
In favor of the
free market
(with state
rules that
safeguard
public
interest).
In economic
issues, Centre
tends to adopt
the right
positions.
[9]
Market economy
support and
acceptance of
government
regulation to control
monopolies.
The complete lack of
interventionism, with
laissez-faire,
considered harmful to
society.
Today Right advocates
a cautious
intervention of state,
where distortions
occur in the market.
There is also the
extreme neoliberalism,
which advocates the
minimization of state
intervention in the
economy.
State as an observer Free market as a
regulator.
Perception of the
economy is not
decisive for the
determination of an
extreme-Right party
2. Social Issues
Social Services/Welfare
State participation
in the distribution
of services to all
without exception.
Recognition of
greater need for
government
involvement in the
distribution of goods
and services.
Government participation in
expanded categories (e.g.
providing health care to the
financially vulnerable). To
ensure public funding of
education, health care and
related social services to all
citizens.
It seeks a limited
welfare state.
On social
issues, the
centrist lean
towards the
left.
Government
involvement only in
very specific
categories
(e.g. Care for the
elderly )
Identifying small need
for government
involvement in the
distribution of goods
and services.
Access to social goods
and services (e.g. care)
only for those who can
afford it.
Social security system
3. Global Issues
Environment
Capitalism in its
efforts to develop
further, destroys
and contaminates
the environment.
Sustainability Environmental
Protection.
Balanced view
Ecology movement
[10]
Environmental quality
as an economic
resource, for example
in tourism
All rights and
privileges attributed
according to blood
lineage.
Using this table we can position along the political spectrum a political statement.
For example, Marine Le Pen, head of The National Front party in France, in an
interview to Newsweek (Westcott: 2015) stated:
“There’s a big difference between France and the U.S. In the U.S., immigrants must
work to live. In France, they’re taken care of by public finances. In France, there are
millions of unemployed people already. We cannot house them, give them health care,
education... finance people who keep coming and coming. The weight is very, very
heavy now”.
According to the theory on state participation in social services distribution, the view
expressed above is placed at the Right position of the spectrum (small need for
government involvement in the distribution of goods).
VII.
FURTHER RESEARCH
This model should be transferred to a social media network in order to fulfill its
purpose and work effectively within a recommendation scheme. This scheme will
work in two dimensions, trying to achieve a match between user political attitude and
social media content.
1. First step to this process is the identification of the political position of:
a) Individual User. This will become feasible through collecting
information about the user, either explicitly by addressing a direct
questionnaire or implicitly through intelligent methods (studying
user actions, posts, navigational behavior, etc.), or both.
b) Political Texts. For the identification of political texts (parties’ texts,
press releases, comments or press articles) through the overabundance of texts circulating in social media networks, we will use
text analysis techniques, such as a lexicon-based approach or a
machine-learning approach. In a lexicon-based approach we extract
words from political theory that can convey in a condensed manner
the ideological load. For example, the word “progressive” is a word
often found in the centre-left political language. For a machinelearning approach, we will study the use of existing algorithms like
“naïve bayes” or decision trees.
In order to verify this process, we will conduct tests using official
texts found in the websites of the Greek political parties from 2012
onwards. We chose 2012 because this was a milestone year for the
Greek political system, since during the elections of that year a
radically different political landscape emerged.
2. For the matching process, we will define a distance function and will use it
in order to calculate proximity between users and texts, texts and texts, users
and users in order to make relevant recommendations.
[11]
This model will be integrated in a Social Media Network environment and an
adequate set of experiments will take place in order to evaluate its effectiveness
during the personalization process, i.e. delivering useful information to the user and
gaining a the same time feedback from his behavior.
Adopting such an approach, results in:
a) Focusing the content of the message of political actors on the specific interests
of the citizens, thus reaching them more effectively.
b) Making public discussion more relevant by concentrating on the interests of
the citizens.
c) Ultimately, result in better-informed citizens, thus upgrading the functioning
of public life.
[12]
REFERENCES
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