1 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY AFRICA (USIU AFRICA) A SHIFT IN THE POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND FRANCE BY: KARINGE JOY NYOKABI ID: 644310 COURSE: IRL4900 LECTURER: JOAN KIMANI 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE 4 INTRODUCTION 4 1.1 Background to the study. 4 1.2 Statement of the research problem 6 1.3 Objective of the study 6 1.4 Research questions 6 1.5 Significance of the study 6 1.6 Literature Review 7 1.6.1 The Ongoing relationship Between France and its Former African Colonies 7 1.6.2 Bleeding Africa: A half a century of the Françafrique 8 1.6.3 How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 9 1.7 Hypotheses 9 1.8 Scope of the study 10 1.9 Research Methodology 10 1.10 Ethical consideration 10 1.11 Chapter outline 10 CHAPTER TWO 11 HISTORY OF FRENCH POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN AFRICA 11 2.1 The Foccart Networks 11 2.2 Election fraud 13 2.3 Economic sabotage 14 3 2.4 Coup d'états 15 2.5 Assassinations 16 2.6 The Biafran war 17 2.7 Military agreements 18 CHAPTER 3 18 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE POWER SHIFT 18 3.1 A new wave in French politics 19 3.2 The Elf Scandal 20 3.3 End of the Cold War 25 3.4 Globalization 25 CHAPTER 4 26 AFRICA BARGAINS FOR POWER 26 4.1 Omar Bongo 27 4.2 Laurent Gbagbo 28 4.3 Mahmoud Tandja 30 CHAPTER FIVE 31 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 31 5.1 Conclusion 31 5.2 Recommendations 32 REFERENCES 33 4 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the study. During the scramble of Africa, France, a hegemony in Europe, amassed 14 of the wealthiest most resource rich countries in the West of Africa. They included countries such as Gabon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Niger and Benin which are rich in oil, uranium, diamonds. With France as a colonial master, these resources were easily available and provided the energy needed for French industrialization During the 1960s, France, although begrudgingly, granted independence to these countries. According to Charbonneau, “Decolonization did not mark an end, but rather a restructuring of the colonial relationship” (Charbonneau, 2008). France's main source of oil Algeria, had declared independence and nationalized its oil. France was forced to look south to Sub-saharan African countries like Gabon, to fulfill its energy needs. This was the beginning of an elaborate system known as Francafrique. Francafrique was used to refer to the covert links between African heads of state and the government in Paris. Through president Charles de Gaulle, Paris created an African cell in the Elysee Palace. Here, laws were passed way beyond any form of popular control. The head of this cell was Jacque Foccart, an influential businessman in Africa who soon became the link between Africa and France. Through a powerful intelligence network, Foccart identified African individuals who would be subservient to French interests and put them in power. Foccart decided who would be in power and who would be overthrown, who would be wealthy and who would not (Al jazeera, 2014). Through Foccart, dictators such as Omar Bongo, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Denis Sassou Nguesso and Felix Houphouët-Boigny were born. These dictators bidded their country's natural resources to 5 France in order for the French to protect their regimes. In exchange, they were paid in billions of dollars by the French national oil company Elf Aquitaine and amassed a lot of wealth, often to the detriment of their people (Koulibaly, 2015). Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo built the largest cathedral in the world in his hometown of Yamoussoukro yet statistically every 100 in 1000 Ivorian children die before they are age one. Moreover, Central African Republic's Jean Bokassa declared himself emperor in an extravagant ceremony funded by the French only to be later overthrown by his cousin. Their positions were backed by the French military who would quell any form of protest or opposition. This was the case when French soldiers opened fire on unarmed protesters in Ivory Coast and when Cameroon's opposition leader, Félix Moumié, mysteriously died in Geneva (Benneyworth, 2011). In the years following Francafrique, France, desperate for energy, utilized extreme measures to safeguard its interests in Africa. These included collapsing the Guinean economy, arming the opposition of an elected President, sponsoring a war in Biafra and imposing fiscal policies that ensured 85% of these countries annual revenues were deposited in the French Central bank (Koulibaly, 2005). However, France was soon to run out of luck. Jacque Foccart was thanked for his services and replaced by the new leftist president, Valery Giscard. The oil company Elf Aquitaine was investigated for embezzlement which led to numerous high profile arrests and the liquidation of the company. Moreover, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990 denounced France's justification of being in Africa to protect African countries from communism. For Africans, these events had numerous implications and they signified a new form of independence. With the French power waning, African dictators begun to be overthrown with a new wave of democracy and summitry spreading across the continent calling for elections and multipartism. With globalization, Africans also realised that France was not the only key player and begun to negotiate their resources with the highest bidder. In 2007 Mahmoud Tandja of Niger threatened to give uranium concessions to China if France did not pay a higher price (Ilisha, 2014). African influence also begun to be felt in Paris, Omar Bongo of Gabon, had the power to select and dismiss French ministers as was the case with Jean-Marie Bockel, a renegade member of the French socialist party. 6 This paper therefore, aims to analyze the French-Africa relationship and its evolution over different forms of leadership and ideologies and determine whether indeed, power is shifting from the hands of the French to those of Africans. 1.2 Statement of the research problem To investigate the nature of France’s political, social and economic activity in Africa and to determine whether these actions have resulted in the economic development of France. 1.3 Objective of the study ● To highlight French influence in post-colonial Africa by demonstrating its political interference acts in several African countries. ● To identify the events that marked the shift in the balance of power between Africa and France ● To validate African influence by examining the policies of various African leaders toward France. ● To recommend measures for France and Africa to adopt to sustain an equal relationship moving forward. 1.4 Research questions ● To what extent has France gone to protect its interests in Africa? ● What were the events that contributed to the decline of French influence in Africa? ● How are African countries asserting their influence over France? ● How can both countries work toward a mutually beneficial relationship? 1.5 Significance of the study This paper is of significance to political leaders, foreign policy makers, economists and scholars who aim to understand the history of the French-African relationship and adopt policies that safeguard their countries from exploitation while still pursuing their national interests. This paper 7 goes on to make recommendations for a mutually beneficial French-African policy that will ensure an equal relationship between the two countries. 1.6 Literature Review 1.6.1 The Ongoing relationship Between France and its Former African Colonies Iwan Benneyworth examines the ongoing relationship between France and its former colonies. Although direct rule ended in the early 1960s, France has employed various measures to maintain a hegemonic foothold in its former possessions. These include political, security, economic and cultural connections. Benneyworth maintains that these relations retain a colonialist character and examines the French ‘mission to civilize’ as well as more existing relationships to justify these claims. Charbonneau explains that the history of continental France is seen as disparate from the history of imperialist France allowing the republic to maintain claims of universalism. (Charbonneau, 2008). However, the cornerstone of the Mission civilisatrice was attempted social engineering through politics and education but often in the promotion of French interests and ideology. Slavery had been abolished yet forced labour was common place in the French colonies. Another contradiction was that France had called for respect of African customs yet did not recognize customary law. Within a twenty year period, France’s African colonies passed from its control yet de Gaulle still maintained that French world power and French power in Africa were inextricably linked and mutually conforming. De Gaulle tried to keep the system intact through the French currency in Africa, the CFA by threatening to server French support, notably in Guinea. Early reactions by France to countries who had declared independence was to enact economic and security agreements, and it could be argued that the breakup of colonial federations into states made them more reliant on France. Decolonization did not mark an end, but rather a restructuring of the colonial relationship (Charbonneau, 2008). 8 Recent geopolitical events have spurred the realignment of French African policy. In the 2009 Gabonese elections, France was accused of instilling Ali Bongo to power, as a favour to his late father who had given them the rights to mine oil in Gabon. In 1993, France, through Elf, sought to influence Congolese presidential elections by denying presidential loans to pay civil servants. These acts could be seen as political interference by France. Given the secrecy of African Elysee Palace cell, it is no wonder that Felix Houphouët-Boigny had entrenched ties with the French elite. In 1990, Mitterrand announced the re-introduction of foreign aid for democracies, but statistics showed that more aid was transferred to authoritarian regimes. Moreover, through defense agreements and permanent military bases, France has been able to safeguard its interests and maintain hegemony. In Rwanda, France facilitates the training and armament of the Hutu against the Tutsi. These actions have made reform of Françafrique difficult. Replacing direct rule with substantial influence may not be colonialism but it is still impactful nonetheless. Africa however, has made strides in curtailing French intervention,. Notably through the creation of the African Peace and Security unit under the African Union, where African countries have the power to intervene in other African countries. Nonetheless, French influence over Africa continues to wane and though it has committed numerous atrocities in Africa, it can also be said that it has improved the socio-economic lives of the African people. 1.6.2 Bleeding Africa: A half a century of the Françafrique Iisha begins by praising Africa for its rich abundant resources. However, decades after attaining independence, Africa is still poor. She continues to quote statements that showcase French dependence on Africa. In 1957, Prime Minister Mitterrand sais “Without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century.” Former President Chirac also said, “Without Africa, France will sink into a third power.” Iisa continues to demonstrate methods in which France has barred the development of Africa. Firstly, when France granted independence to its former colonies, it created a currency known as CFA, to link African economies to the Euro. However, this idea was based on a Nazi premise to manipulate currency that the Germans had used during their occupation of France in the 1940s. To this date, African countries eposit 65% of their national reserves to the French Central bank 9 with an additional 20% in maintenance fees and can only access 15% of this amount, an addition of this would require them to apply for a loan (Koulibaly, 2005). Secondly, French troops have intervened militarily in Africa 35 times in the last 15 years and have numerous military bases within Africa in order to safeguard their resource needs and defend bourgeoise governments. Thirdly, in economic agreements signed between France and her former colonies, France has banned these African countries from giving concessions to its resources to any other countries (Koulibaly, 2005). African countries as thus forced to trade with France even if they are getting a better deal elsewhere. Fourth, France has been at the helm of organizing coups and assassinations in African countries, notably in Guinea, Central African Republic and Benin. Lastly, France has been involved in electoral fraud and selecting presidents within close political cells, notbaly in Gabon and Guinea. 1.6.3 How Europe Underdeveloped Africa Walter Rodney gives a historical analysis of the colonial legacy by the West. He gives the reader an external viewpoint of looking at the depravity in Africa based on the continued exploitation of former colonial masters. He gives a marxist comparison of the developed and developing world citing the developed world as the bourgeoisie and the developing world as the peasants enslaved by the capitalist system. He further explains how colonialism did not in fact bring any development to the African continent but instead halted and reversed the existing civilization. Walter Rodney’s work is well researched and cited. His work is very passionate as he uses exclamations to express his disdain and makes use of some light humour. In my opinion, this style of writing is relevant in the context of his research study as he talks about the oppression, truth and justice. 1.7 Hypotheses Power in the post-colonial French-Africa relationship is slowly shifting from France to Africa. 10 1.8 Scope of the study This research will employ several African countries notably Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Congo in a study on the balance of power relations between Africa and France. It shall analyze the evolution of that relationship from 1958-201 1.9 Research Methodology This study will employ secondary data to conduct a qualitative research on various academic sources and analyze the content in order to make a factual conclusion. 1.10 Ethical consideration This paper is written with observance to other people’s scholarly thoughts and in respect of their intellectual property. All referenced material shall be properly cited and acknowledged and no form of plagiarism shall be undertaken in this paper. This is an original piece of writing. 1.11 Chapter outline This paper is meant to study the evolution of the French-African relationship from the postcolonial era till now. Chapter 1 will cover the research proposal outlining the background to the study, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, literature review, hypothesis, scope, methodology and ethical considerations. Chapter 2 will delve into the French history of political interference in Africa by using countries such as Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Congo to investigate election fraud, economic sabotage, coup d’états, assassinations and military agreements and expose the networks that comprised Françafrique. Chapter 3 will look into the factors that contributed to the power shift between France and Africa including the change in French political ideology, the exposé of the Elf scandal, the end of the cold war as well as globalization. Chapter 4 will then look at how African leaders utilized these events to their advantage. It will analyze how three African leaders; Omar Bongo, Laurent Gbagbo and Mahmoud Tandja shifted their policies toward France and used their resources to bargain for better agreements with 11 France. This chapter will also showcase African influence by demonstrating their ability to select leaders in France, in what has been termed as ‘reverse colonialism’. Finally, chapter 5 will conclude the study and provide recommendations for ascertaining an equal relationship between France and Africa moving forward. CHAPTER TWO HISTORY OF FRENCH POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN AFRICA On January 2013, France sent in 4,000 troops to Mali. Their mission was to combat rebel fighters sweeping through the country. The French president François Hollande, said that the rebels were linked to Al Qaeda and that they posed a global security threat. He said his country’s intervention in Mali was in compliance with International law (Aljazeera, 2014). In the past, France has had a long history of intervention and interference in its former African colonies. These regions are rich in resources such as oil, gas, gold and uranium, much of it untapped. These resources are of vital importance to France’s energy needs and to obtain them, France has employed extreme measures, including supporting a war in Biafra, overthrowing several presidents and collapsing Guinea’s economy. This chapter explores the lengths that France was willing to go to, to quench its thirst for energy. 2.1 The Foccart Networks During General Charles de Gaulle’s second presidency, he appointed Jacques Foccart as his chief advisor on African affairs. Foccart’s role was to head the Élysée Palace African cell, a close political cell and manage the relations with African states. Through this cell, he established close relations with African leaders and their counterparts over the course of 16 years. French African policy passed through secret channels in this cell outside any parliamentary or government control. In a series of interviews documented in a memoir by Clostermann in 1997, Jacque Foccart says: I am a businessman, a paratrooper, secret agent, diplomat and adventurer. I have lead so many lives that I am blurred as an equatorial African pond. I was the most 12 powerful man in Africa. I personally names Presidents. I protected them. I dismissed them. I decided who could live and who could ie. I decided who would become filthy rich. I put together an intelligence network so great and wide that I scoffed at the biggest intelligence agencies in the world: KGB, CIA and MI-5. I sometimes lost, butI often won. Seving France, I sold weapons to South Africa during the apartheid. I put together and used private armies in Biafra, Congo and many other countries. I jealously protected Western and Equatorial Africa from any outside influence. In Afriqua, I was feared by all and owed explanations to no one. My name is Jacque Foccart (Clostermann, 1997). Foccart never accepted money from the French government. He earned a living in import/export business.This financial independence allowed him the freedom to act as a free agent within the state apparatus without an official role (Clostermann, 1997). The relations that Foccart forged with European industrialists and African heads of state formed a network. These business and political networks came to be known as ‘The Foccart networks’. This was the beginning of an elaborate system to maintain Africa’s dependence on France and secure its energy supplies by supporting oppressive regimes and running a covert network of oil companies and secret agencies. The policy, termed Françafrique was decided on by de Gaulle, set up by Foccart, and continued by Presidents Pompidou, Giscard and Mitterand. African presidents dreamt of having close relations with France for it gave them more power. For the Gabonese, decolonization was a myth for they saw their president, Leon M’ba as a puppet of France. On February 19th 1964, scores of the army launched an attack on the Presidential Palace. They arrested President M’ba, dragged him to the television station, and forced him to announce his resignation (Al jazeera, 2014). Gabon however, was of Paramount interest to France, as one of Africa’s largest oil producers, and Paris immediately intervened. Jacques Foccart instructed the then French ambassador to Gabon, Maurice Delaunay, to find M’ba who had retreated to the Equatorial forest and return him back to power, if he was still alive. The operation was a success and M’ba retained his position (Clostermann, 1997). However, President M’ba’s health was of increasing concern to Foccart. He decided to assign some powers to a promising young man, Albert Bernard Bongo, the office manager of the president. He asked M’ba to amend the constitution and elect a vice-president, so the vicepresident could replace M’ba without an election. 13 When Leon M’ba died, Bongo became president without an election and they avoided having a dangerous secession. In an interview with Al Jazeera, former French ambassador Maurice Delauny says, “In those days, everyone thought it was normal for France to prepare the candidate and chose the successor” (Al jazeera, 2014). Omar Bongo’s power increased when oil was discovered by the national French oil company Elf. Elf received a lot of exploration concessions and the company contributed to 70% of the country’s budget (Clostermann, 1997). Furthermore, he amended the constitution to receive 10% of the oil revenues as a personal token of gratitude for his actions. The living conditions for the Gabonese people did not change and they did not feel the impact of the newfound riches in their country. France was accused of actively supported dictators who never hesitated to use brutal forced to stay in power. These leaders were accused of selling of their country’s resources for personal gain while their people remained in absolute poverty. Maurice Delaunay continues to say, “It is obvious that France protected its economic interests by maintaining political stability in countries like Gabon” (Al jazeera, 2014). 2.2 Election fraud In June, 2009 Omar Bongo died of a heart attack. Former French presidents, Jacque Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy were both present at the funeral. The big question was on who to replace Omar Bongo and safeguard French interests. Although Ali Bongo was a good choice, he was unpopular and faced opposition. It was no surprise that after the elections on August 30, 2009 Ali Bongo won the election. Chirac’s former advisor on Africa (2002-2009) Michel de Bonnecorse claimed Aubame got 42%, Ali Bongo 37% and the result was inverted. Maurice Delaunay also claimed the elections were rigged and that they and the French press had the real results (Al jazeera, 2014). Violent protests erupted in Libreville and were quickly quelled. France continued to control its former African colonies by handpicking presidents and making sure they won elections. The policy, called Francafrique was in full swing. Those put in power were subservient to France and French interests. The presidents were called “Black Governors” to show that nothing had changed since colonial times (Ilisha, 2014). 14 In 1960, Cameroon had attained independence and was facing its first election. France had to ensure that the incoming leader was in support of French interests. France’s former ambassador in Gabon, was called into action. He says “When we decided to let the Africans vote, we had to find a suitable candidate. The colonial administration supported Ahidjo, and we were asked to make sure he got elected. And he was” (Al jazeera, 2014). Ahidjo went on to rule Cameroon for 24 years, during which period he was accused of numerous constitutional violations, corruption and assassination of his political opponents. 2.3 Economic sabotage In 1958, Ahmed Sékou Touré declared independence in Guinea, two years before other colonies. He gave a speech in the presence of de Gaulle, saying “There is no dignity without freedom. We prefer poverty in freedom than wealth in slavery” (IIisha, 2014). General de Gaulle was deeply offended and acted with extreme measure, the army and administration left right away and Sékou Touré was not pleased. Abandoned by France, Guinea forged closer links with the communist bloc. The Cuban military trained Sékou Touré’s personal guards and the political structure of the country started to resemble a communist party. It was the beginning of the cold war and United States faced by Soviet expansion, allowed France to police Africa. France was free to carry out its agenda, by any means possible, with the complicit silence of Western nations (Clostermann, 1997). The French Secret Service turned to counterfeiting money, in an attempt to destabilize Guinea. The country had refused to accept the CFA franc, the french currency in Africa an had established its own currency, the Guinean franc. French special services printed counterfeit Guinean Francs and distributed them across Guinea to destabilize their economy. In an interview with the Former French Secret Service chief, Maurice Robert, he explains “The Guinean economy, already in a bad state struggled to recover. It was meant to make Sékou Touré vulnerable and unpopular, so that the opposition government can take over” (Al jazeera, 2014). But France feared this operation would not be enough to defeat Sékou Touré, even if it succeeded in destroying Guinean economy. According to Robert, “We armed and trained the opposition to create a climate of insecurity, and if possible, overthrow Sékou Touré. The 15 operation failed because Sékou Touré found out and stopped it. It was meant to get rid of Sékou Touré as Foccart would want”(Al jazeera, 2014). France ruined the economy of a country and armed the opponents of an elected president, this was a clear indication that it would go to any lengths to secure its interests. 2.4 Coup d'états For more than 50 years following independence, military coups plagued Africa. France opposed them, provoked them or tolerated them, depending on each leader’s willingness to comply with French interests. In late 1972, Benin declared itself a marxist state under President Mathieu Kérékou and nationalized its oil. According to Maurice Delaunay, “ Kérékou was a communist and the French government was in favour of organizing a coup to replace him” (Al jazeera, 2014). Bob Denard was a French mercenary that had fought in the Belgian Congo during the early 60s. He had been called upon to lead yet another operation in Gabon. He was instructed by Maurice Delaunay to assemble a team of about 100 men, who were then trained in Gabon. After the training they were tasked with carrying out a coup in Benin (IIisha, 2014). However, their mission failed. After landing in Benin, Denard and his relatively small force were outnumbered by the Beninian army and forced to make a quick escape. For the French, their mission did not officially exist. Denard was arrested by the French authorities and forced to stand trial for his actions in Benin. France was never officially involved in these significant missions that Denard carried out. Denard had also been on trial previously for four coup attempts in Comoros Islands and the assassination of their former president, Ahmed Abdallah (IIisha, 2014). In May 1974, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing became president of France and soon developed interest in Africa. He had a strange and privileged relationship with Jean-Bédel Bokassa and would regularly travel to the Central African Republic for safaris. Bokassa, had seized power in the Central African Republic through a coup in 1965. It was a key territory for France, being strategically located in the middle of the continent. France had stationed a large military contingent there since it was possible to quickly deploy troops to any region from the Central African Republic. 16 Charles de Gaulle had called Bokassa ‘the daredevil’ (Clostermann, 1997). In 1977, Bokassa decided to declare himself emperor of his country. The coronation ceremony is said to have cost $30 million and to have been subsidized by France (IIisha, 2014). It was however seen as a sham as no heads of state showed up for the ceremony. The French saw Bokassa’s actions as damaging to their image and decided to replace him. French president Valéry d’Estaing pulled back his support for Emperor Bokassa and Bokassa turned to Muammar Gaddafi for help. At the time, France was at loggerheads with the Libyan leader as both countries vied for control of Chad (IIisha, 2014). Paris severed links with Bokassa and identified a suitable candidate, David Dacko. In an operation termed ‘Operation Barracuda’ David Dacko was flown into Bangui while Bokassa was in Libya. Accompanied by the French Secret Service, Dacko was immediately taken to the Presidential palace and the coup was announced (Clostermann, 1997). Bokassa was informed of this while in Libya and did not return to his mother country. 2.5 Assassinations In Cameroon, the French supported the fragile authority of President Ahidjo, and banned the opposition party - Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) due to its marxist agenda. With growing support, UPC leader Félix Moumié was clearly becoming more than an annoyance to France (Mbuyinga, 1982). Moumié had travelled to Geneva, allegedly to buy weapons. There, he met a man calling himself William Bettel who claimed to be a journalist. Bettel was apparently a member of the French Secret Service. After the meeting, Félix Moumié collapsed and died. Swiss authorities determined that he had been poisoned with thallium in his coffee (Mbuyinga, 1982). Maurice Delaunay confirms this by saying “With our approval, president Ahidjo paid somebody. We didn’t like Moumié he was radically anti-French.” He went on to explain, “The general rarely explicitly approved such operations, but he did not say no either. We called this ‘the orange light’ which meant go for it, but we do not know anything about it. This implied if you have problems you will not be covered (Al jazeera, 2014). 17 2.6 The Biafran war In the late 1960s there was an increase in the demand for oil. France began to look elsewhere to secure its energy needs. In 1967, the of oil rich Eastern region of Nigeria seceded and the republic of Biafra was proclaimed. War broke out and there was an influx of refugees. France provided covert support to the Biafrans against the government of Nigeria. According to Maurice Delaunay, the French ambassador in Gabon, “The general de Gaulle favoured the uprising in Biafra. His interest was in oil” (Al jazeera, 2014). Elf Oil had extraction agreements with the recognized authorities of Nigeria, but the revenues from this oil were poured into the war in Biafra. These funds helped supply weapons to the secessionist movement (Bender, 2015). Delaunay was responsible for the weapon supplies for Biafra. He received Chinese, French and South African weapons which were delivered by ships to Libreville and later transported to Biafra. He was also tasked with training the Biafran officers. He set up a military training camp in Libreville where they were trained for four months after which they returned to Biafra (Al jazeera, 2014). However, French intervention only extended Biafran suffering. The supplying of arms and the training of officers did very little to help the country or its people and only prolonged the agony for the Biafrans. Delaunay and his men failed and France, carrying on the ‘orange light’, denied involvement in the conflict. The leader of the Nigerian army, General Benjamin Adekunle (1967-1970 ) nicknamed Black Scorpion, was clear about French intervention. He said “You carried your ambition too far at the expense of so many countries and so many lives”(Al jazeera, 2014). Maurice Robert from the French Secret Service, like Jacques Foccart urged Biafra to continue the war against Nigeria. They decided to mobilize French public opinion so that General de Gaulle was officially involved in the conflict. To achieve this, Robert called the war in Biafra, a genocide committed by the NIgerians against the Biafra people. “We wanted a shocking word to raise public awareness about the problem. We communicated the details of the war to the press and made sure they used the word genocide”(Al jazeera, 2014). Despite French support, the Biafrans were crushed by the firepower of the enemy and were fighting a hopeless battle. Hundreds of thousands had fallen victim to the conflict, many being children who died of starvation. 18 2.7 Military agreements France signed military agreements with most of its former colonies called “Accord de defense” . These agreements secured France’s economic interests and allowed it to protect African nations from external threats. However secret clauses also allowed France to intervene when the presidents were under threat from their own people. These agreements also gave France priority access to raw material like oil, uranium and manganese (Bender, 2015). Currently, France has over 3,000 troops in Africa, spread across Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. This is part of an operation termed ‘Operation Burkhane’ which aims to counter terrorist threats in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the last 15 years, France has intervened militarily 35 times in Africa, notably in 2014 in the Central African Republic and in 2011 in Libya. These interventions are dubbed humanitarian interventions but skeptics claim that France’s efforts are only to safeguard their political interests by ousting rogue leaders or protecting oil zones for their much needed energy supply (Bender, 2015). CHAPTER 3 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE POWER SHIFT This chapter aims to document a series of events that shifted the balance of power from the hands of the French to Africa. Among the reasons is the change in French politics from rightwing Gaullists to left-wing humanists, the Elf scandal that exposed corrupt politicians and the fall of the Berlin wall which allowed for more actors in a globalized world. All these factors led to the end of Françafrique, reduced French influence in Africa and shifted power to African leaders. 19 3.1 A new wave in French politics 1974 saw a power shift in French politics. President George Pompidou was defeated at the polls and the political ideology inspired by General de Gaulle lost to the center right government of Valerie d’Estaing. He was viewed as a right wing man who wanted to modernize society. Some hoped he would restore French-African relations by breaking away from the Foccart networks (Hanley, 1991). As soon as he assumed power, he relieved Jacques Foccart and thanked him for his services. However, African heads did not wish to lose their direct link to Paris and they communicated this to President d’Estaing. Although Jacques Foccart was dismissed, he was replaced by his assistant Rene Journiac, as the head of the African Unit in the Elysee Palace (Hanley, 1991). There was little change in policy and Africa’s puppet Presidents were assured that it was business as usual. When d’Estaing was vying for a second term, a story appeared in a French paper titled “The Diamond Affair.” A document signed by Jean Bokassa, reportedly proved the French president Giscard had accepted a plate of diamonds from Bokassa while on safari in 1973. Giscard was serving as minister of finance at the time. When confronted with the allegations, he refused to comment and vague response was seen by some as an admission of guilt. This led him to lose his election bid to François Mitterrand (IIisha, 2014). In 1981, Mitterrand replaced the head of the French Secret Service, Maurice Robert with Pierre Marion. He immediately discovered Foccart’s networks. The main focus was in Gabon as Omar Bongo had people around him who were being manipulated either by the oil company Elf or by Jacques Foccart. Any ambition he had to clean up the African network was cut short in 1986. That year, Jacques Chirac was appointed as Prime Minister to Mitterand and he immediately put the 72 year old Jacques Foccart back in power as his chief advisor on African affairs (Hanley, 1991). Mitterand on the other hand, nominated his own son Jean-Christophe to be his advisor on African affairs. He had a lot of experience in Africa as a journalist and had stayed in Africa for more than 10 years (Hanley, 1991). African presidents did not mind Francois Mitterand’s nepotism as they had a position to negotiate directly with the president. 20 However, the Chirac-Foccart alliance was too powerful for President Mitterand and his son. Jean-Christophe found it difficult to assert his position. His opponents called him ‘daddy told me’.This stalemate lead to a paralysis in African policy (IIisha, 2014). In 1988, Francois Mitterrand was elected for a second 7 year term. France was still in dire need of African resources, but the fall of the oil company Elf, greatly reduced French influence in Africa and compromised French economy. 3.2 The Elf Scandal In 1967, Charles de Gaulle appointed Pierre Guillaumat, as first CEO of Elf, the national French oil company (Hanley, 1991). It was important to Gaulle that France was oil independent. However, he was soon confronted by a problem, France depended on Algeria for oil which had gained independence in 1962 and nationalized its oil. Elf soon discovered Gabon, and quickly got to work. It would later become the center for oil policy. However, Gabon had already achieved independence in 1960. According to Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, Elf CEO (1989-1993) “Stability is needed when oil is found in a country, since it takes 7 years to extract oil”. General de Gaulle tried to establish some stability in these countries in order to satisfy his country’s need for energy independence (Al jazeera, 2014). To ensure stability, de Gaulle established a system based on the loyalty of two men, Pierre Guillaumat, chief of Elf, who financed French secret operations in its former colonies, and Jacques Foccart who had assisted de Gaulle to come back to power in 1958, and was appointed as chief advisor on African affairs. A few years later, France’s oil giant, Elf, was hit by a scandal of epic proportions. It lead to one of Europe’s biggest fraud enquiries and revealed the extent of corrupt oil money within France. In 1994, a French magistrate begun to investigate Elf’s finances. Buried within the company accounts was a chain of fraud and bribery that lead all the way to the French government. From its early days, Elf had used its oil profits to fund clandestine operations in Africa and finance politics at home (Frindéthié, 2010). Elf CEO Guillaumat says “For de Gaulle it was important to be untarnished by this. The public didn’t know but the president and the finance minister did. People received payments from Elf 21 based on their positions. Many of today’s French politicians benefited from this system” (Al jazeera, 2014). When Loik Le Floch-Prigent was appointed as the new CEO of Elf, he soon discovered the extent of the secret financing system and revealed this to the man he considered his boss, Francois Mitterand. He said to him, “This is strange. People in Africa are financed, and they finance people in France.” Mitterrand said to him, “Continue what was done in the past but don’t forget us”(Al jazeera, 2014). Elf had devoted considerable amounts of money as kickbacks to African leaders, and for years this went on unhindered. Finally in 1994 things came to a halt. A formidable system of corruption was revealed and the repercussions of the scandal hit hard in France, and in Africa the impact was greater (Hanley, 1991). France’s monopoly over the energy market of its former colonies began to crumble. President Mitterrand tried to adapt to this new course in history. In 1990 during the French-African summit Mitterand’s rhetoric was unprecedented. He called for multiparty politics, freedom of the press and judicial independence. This led to a series of pro-democracy campaigns which questioned the military dictatorships, one party systems, forced imprisonment and human rights abuses carried out with French complacency, even support (Frindéthié, 2010). After the loss of Algeria, Gabon had become Elf’s stronghold in sub-saharan Africa. Gabon’s president Omar Bongo, a man who had held power for more than 30 years through French support, now faced opposition. It was the suspicious death of one of Bongo’s rival, Rejambe, that eventually ignited an uprising (Koulibaly, 2015). Elf became the focus of popular anger and a riot broke out in one of its facilities. Libreville was under curfew. Oil wells were shut down because the port was burning and the CEO of Elf decided to close down the company. As power slipped through Bongo’s fingers, Paris considered dropping him in favour of an opponent. Bongo was infuriated. In a press release he said “Demonstrations don’t mean the government has lost control. I will not let that happen. We will restore order at any cost” (Al jazeera, 2014). Bongo fought back by asserting his own influence in Paris. He threatened to open Gabon's resources to the Americans unless Elf opened back its doors (Koulibaly, 2015). This worked in his favour and with the help of the French military, Omar Bongo regained control. Order was restored, Omar Bongo stayed in power, Elf reopened the oil wells and the money flowed once 22 more. His victory was a critical point in the reversal of power between France and its former colony The oil company Elf, was also involved in the Republic of Congo which had substantial oil reserves. From the late 70s, the country had been governed by a regime under President Denis Sassou Nguesso. By the early 90s the wave of national conferences sweeping Africa had hit Congo Brazzaville. The country adopted a new constitution that removed the country's marxist ideology and brought in democratic multiparty politics (Frindéthié, 2010). President Sassou Nguesso, a man from an ethnic minority in the North of Congo had little chance of winning the country's first free democratic election . Nguesso however, had worked closely with Elf for years and for the company directors, deposing him was out of the question. Elf's directors suggested that Pascal Lissouba, a former minister, run as a presidential candidate. Lissouba had been out of politics for years and Elf saw him as easy to control. He came from an ethnic majority in the South of the country and his allegiance to Sassou Nguesso drew votes from the northern ethnic minority. Once Lissouba was elected, Elf's plan was to bring some of Sassou Nguesso's men back to government, keeping the status quo and Sassou Nguesso in de facto rule. Elf thus financed Lissouba's campaign (Mbuyinga, 1982). Lissouba was elected, but he broke the agreement with Sassou Nguesso. He decided to rule on his own and went on to strengthen his party by winning the legislative election months later. However, he needed funds to run his government, pay civil servants and for his campaign. Lissouba decided to approach Elf, offering future oil deliveries in exchange for finance. Elf declined his offer since he hadn't honoured his agreement with Sassou Nguesso (Mbuyinga, 1982). Rejected by Elf, Lissouba approached their rival, the US Company Oxy and reportedly signed a secret agreement giving the Americans a foothold in the Congo. Lissouba was allegedly paid $150 million in return for 10 years of oil production (Mbuyinga, 1982). The money helped him to win the legislative elections. Immediately after his victory, armed conflict broke out between his supporters and those of Sassou Nguesso who had the support of Elf. The two rivals and their militias dragged the country through three periods of civil war from 1993-1997(Frindéthié, 2010). Sassou Nguesso was also backed by a regional ally, José Eduardo de Santos, President of Angola, another client of Elf Oil. 23 Angolans themselves had endured years of civil war and instability. Elf had provided President dos Santos with the necessary finances to remain in office. According to Loïk Prigent, Elf former CEO “It is clear president dos Santos was supported so that he could stay in power. After defeating his enemies at home, dos Santos' army rushed to Congo Brazzaville to the rescue of Sassou Nguesso”(Al jazeera, 2014). With the help of the Angolan army, Sassou Nguesso restored himself in the presidential office of the war ravaged Congolese capital. Congo was stable again, and oil production resumed. However, something had changed in the relation between France and this oil producing company (Frindéthié, 2010). In 1997 the new CEO of Elf at the time, Philippe Jafre, arrived in Congo after the fight ended. President Nguesso had had a change in heart. The oil company had regained its foothold in the country and the President whom they'd helped regain power would no longer take orders from them (Mbuyinga, 1982). Congo was not the only place where Elf's luck begun to run out. Allegations of fraud and bribery that came to light in 1994 had further weakened the country's position. Reports of hidden money and diverted funds had lead to an investigation by France's stock exchange commission. A textile company listed in the French Stock Exchange Market under the name Bidermann Industries would become key to Elf's unravelling. Eva Joly, the examining magistrate of the Elf Affair explained “I discovered Elf was involved with Bidermann. I wondered why an oil conglomerate would invest huge amounts of money in a struggling textile company”(Al jazeera, 2014). In 1992 Elf had invested $120 million in Bidermann, a large part of that money went into its factories in Corréze, an area largely seen as a stronghold of former president Jacques Chirac (Frindéthié, 2010). This money was invested in the months leading up to the legislative elections in 1993 and incidentally, Chirac's party won the elections. Upon Chirac's request, president Mitterrand replaced Elf's CEO, Loïk Le Floc Prigent with Philippe Jaffre. To protect himself from possible repercussions, Philippe Jaffre, Elf's new CEO sued his predecessor in 1993. Jaffre's legal action added fuel to the Elf-Bidermann investigation. Eva Joly continues, “I was completely shocked at what I found. It was inconceivable behaviour from people entrusted to lead the largest national company. I expected that they used their credit cards freely. But to install such a powerful system that provided so many people with public money was beyond expectation”(Al jazeera, 2014). 24 The investigating magistrate traced the company's payments through a chain of fraudulent companies to many of France's leading corporate and political figures. The trial began in 2000 and Eva Joly and her colleagues were protected by bodyguards around the clock. According to Joly, “The enormity of embezzlement in the Elf affair was most striking. This went on for three years from 1989 to 1992. Management embezzled nearly six months of profit. This was equivalent to about 450 million Euros. All of Elf's operations had secret channels to supply funds. It was standard procedure” (Al jazeera, 2014). Elf was floated in the New York Stock Exchange in 1991, by 1996 the French state had sold its stake in the company, but it retained a so called ‘golden share’ which gave the government veto powers (Frindéthié, 2010). Joly's investigation uncovered a network of fund misappropriation from lavish expenses, unwarranted commissions, to outright bribery. Money was also traced directly to African heads of state. Former CEO, Loïk Prigent confirms this, “From the barrels produced there's a small part which goes directly to the head of state which he can use as he likes” (Al jazeera, 2014). Magistrate Joly continues to say, “Elf received hundreds of millions of francs via Switzerland. We found financial streams that went to African leaders; they did what they wanted with this money. And since they had the privilege of being heads of state in office, it is in the current budget of the state. It is impossible to investigate where these funds went once they landed in the pockets of Bongo or the others” (Al jazeera, 2014). Three French magistrates pushed their investigation forward and politicians panicked. To limit the naming and shaming of all those who benefitted from Elf's secret funds in France and Africa, the company was liquidated. In 2000, CEO Philippe Jaffre agreed to a merger with another French oil and gas company, Total Fina. Elf and all its secrets became fully privatized as it was absorbed by its smaller private competitor. The result was Elf disappeared and so did any semblance of justice and accountability. France's biggest corruption scandal led to only a few short prison sentences and fines that many believe will never be payed.Notably, Elf's former CEO, Prigent received a six month prison term. 25 3.3 End of the Cold War The fall of the Berlin wall under the oil giant Elf, had dealt a much more severe blow to the relationship between France and Africa. France would still play a role in its former colonies, but Africa had realized the French were no longer the only players and it was time to show some of its own power (Charbonneau, 2018). The end of the cold war rendered France’s mandate on the continent redundant. They could no longer justify their presence as guardians against the communist threat and just like the wall, France’s monopoly over the energy market of its former colonies began to crumble. The United States, other European powers and particularly China all moved in for their share of Africa’s mineral riches. 3.4 Globalization Following independence, many former French colonies had fallen into civil wars and faced economic strife that battered health and education. But in an increasingly globalized world, the African continent remained precious. The relentless hunger for raw materials and Africa's abundant mineral riches proved this fact. With the waning of French influence, those riches would now go to the highest bidder. Today, the United States and emerging markets such as India, China and Brazil compete fiercely for African resources. Just as in the time of President de Gaulle, France still needs Africa to secure its energy supplies. French presidents today continue to play a power game with their African counterparts by supporting multinational giants such as Bollore, Areva and Total (Iisha, 2014). 26 CHAPTER 4 AFRICA BARGAINS FOR POWER The Elf Scandal investigation led to its privatization and high profile arrests in France. Gabon's presidents Omar Bongo was one of the African leaders who reportedly received Elf's kickbacks, but he remained unscathed. Elf's presence in Gabon, had helped keep President Bongo in power and made him an extremely wealthy man. In turn, Bongo lavished favours on many influential figures in France. The scandal however, had changed the relationship between France and its former colonies. African leaders realized that France wasn't the only one hungry for their riches, and that they no longer had to listen to their former occupiers. A key player in this development was Robert Bourgi. Bourgi's father was a close friend of Jacques Foccart. He says, “My father had known him since 1946. As far as I remember, Foccart considered me family. Foccart was growing old, I travelled for him in Africa when he was brought out of retirement and back into service by Jacques Chirac” (Al jazeera, 2014). Foccart was the mastermind behind the overt and covert networks of influence between France and Africa. When asked whether he thought Jacques Chirac would pursue the same ideology he had with General de Gaulle, he said he was certain that Chirac would follow the same (Al jazeera, 2014). In 1997, two years after returning to his old job, Foccart died. A man notorious for his shadowy dealings with African dictators, was viewed as a French patriot and a servant of the state in death. Robert Bourgi stepped in take the legendary diplomat's position. Described by many as Foccart's spiritual heir, Bourgi was to put his own mark on the influential role. Presidents of Gabon, Ivory Coast and The Republic of Congo all became de facto clients of Bourgi. Unlike Jacques Foccart, Bourgi did not dictate policies to the head of state, he was more like a messenger who moved between the French president and his African clients (Charbonneau, 2018). 27 4.1 Omar Bongo Gabon's Omar Bongo in particular took a central role in French African politics. He was now the chief conductor of Francafrique and knew the parameters better than the African Intelligence cells. He had good knowledge of the French electoral system and gave sound advice to aspiring French politicians. Socialists and democrats alike queued up to see him in his private suit in Paris (Charbonneau, 2018). He was always on the lookout for upcoming politicians so he could establish a rapport with them before they became big names in French politics. These encouragements were often of a financial nature. However, his influence extended far beyond monetary interests to CEO's doing business in Africa and even French domestic politics. In 2002, before the presidential elections in France, President Chirac asked Bourgi to present the future leaders to Omar Bongo. He was accompanied by a few candidates to Bongo's apartment, who asked them questions after which they left. Bongo, then took his letterhead, wrote down a few names, folded it and asked Bourgi to deliver it to Foccart. Among the seven names, five became ministers (Charbonneau, 2018). Pierre Marion , the former director of the French Secret Service says, “I concluded that we were in reverse colonisation. France was being colonized by Gabon and not the other way round” (Al jazeera, 2014). By the turn of the 21st century, Francafrique was a shadow of itself. The fall of communism, the collapse of the oil giant Elf and new emerging markets for African oil had redefined the French African relationship into one where African leaders no longer took orders from their former colonial masters nor did they see the importance of good relations with France (IIisha, 2014). Nicolas Sarkozy was the link between African leaders and French industrialists. In 2007, Sarkozy became the president of France. Robert Bourji left the Prime Minister's party and joined Sarkozy's campaign who maintained him as his chief advisor on African affairs. Bourji worked hard to ensure that Sarkozy was more appreciated by the African heads of state. Sarkozy recognized Bourji's effort during a ceremony and awarded him a legion of honour (Charbonneau, 2018). African influence was thereafter present in the Sarkozy campaign. A number of African leaders were present during the inaugural congress for Sarkozy's candidacy including Gabon's finance minister as well as the daughter of the Gabonese president, Omar Bongo. Sarkozy was quick to 28 appease Bongo and during their first meeting, he reduced Gabon's national debt to the IMF by 20% (Charbonneau, 2018). During Chirac's administration, Bongo submitted a list of people he proposed to be ministers. He went further with Sarkozy and demanded dismissals. One victim was Jean-Marie Bockel, a renegade member of the socialist party who Sarkozy had named Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophonie. His offense was simple, Bockel had voiced his view of the French-African connection in front of the press. He said, “I want to sign the death certificate of Francafrique” (Al jazeera, 2014). Bockel's declaration coincided with a number of legal inquiries into the Gabonese president's luxury assets and bank accounts in France. This didn't fit well with Bongo. Not long after, Bockel was replaced by Allan Joyande. In the de Gaulle era, men like Jacques Foccart had coopted African leaders. Fifty years on, the tables had turned and French ministers now sought legitimacy from African leaders. In February 2010, Sarkozy made an official trip to Gabon. His friend, President Omar Bongo had died a few months earlier. Bongo's son Ali had taken over. The 50 year long French-Gabonese relationship was a symbol of Françafrique. But on this visit, both President's speeches showed that a page had been turned. President Ali Bongo notably said, “The time has come for a win-win partnership”(Al jazeera, 2014). 4.2 Laurent Gbagbo Meanwhile, France's grip over the gulf of Guinea appeared to weaken. In October 2000, Laurent Gbagbo became the president of the Ivory Coast. France did not want to see him in power as he was an opponent of France's long time friend, the first President of Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Following the country's independence in 1960, France had a strong foothold in the Ivory Coast through Houphouët-Boigny. Prior to his 33 year reign, he was quite familiar with the palace of the French republic. He'd served in several ministerial positions of president de Gaulle's government (Charbonneau, 2018). 29 Ivory Coast with its lush cocoa, coffee and banana plantations became a veritable resort where 80,000 French expatriates lived in luxury. It was dubbed ‘The Ivorian miracle’ because in the rest of Africa, Europeans were being pushed out as former colonies declared independence. According to the French embassy, “The country was a shining example to us. It was the model for our relations with Africa. One could rely on President Houphouët-Boigny. He was a respected leader throughout Africa” (Al jazeera, 2014). Robert Bourji, chief advisor on African relations asserted this by saying, “We owe the word Francafrique to President Houphouet” (Al jazeera, 2014). Houphouët-Boigny tried to modernize his country's economy but he was criticized for promoting growth without development and relying too heavily on foreign investment. He had also purportedly amassed a great deal of personal wealth, about $11 billion. In his home town of Yamoussoukro, he built a basilica, the biggest church in the world that costed $300 million (Suret-Canale, 1988). In December 1993, Houphouët-Boigny was buried in the church that he built and he died having left no political heir. Following his death, the head of the Ivorian National Assembly declared himself president. Six years later, he was ousted by the army. After a year of military rule, in 2000, popular protests brought Laurent Gbagbo to power. The new President inherited a bitterly divided country with violent opposition groups. By 2004, Gbagbo was facing open rebellion in the north of the country. He called on France for support but his request was rejected. The President then decided to fight the rebels without French involvement. During the fighting, an Ivorian plane bombed a high school where French soldiers were stationed and nine French nationals were killed. The French saw this as an intentional attack and decided to retaliate. French fighter jets attacked the Ivorian air force base and destroyed their few planes and helicopters (IIisha, 2014). Laurent Gbagbo called young Ivorians out onto the streets of Abidjan in protest. Large crowds gathered outside a hotel where many Europeans had been staying in a tense standoff lasted 48 hours. On November 9 2004, French soldiers guarding the hotel fired on the crowd killing scores and wounding hundreds more (Al jazeera, 2014). Throughout that night, French army helicopters tried to stop young Gbagbo supporters from crossing the bridge that linked the city center with the airport and French military base. Under a deluge of live ammunition, hundreds of Ivorians defied their former colonial master with cries of “Down with France!” and “Long live the 30 independent Ivory Coast!” To new generations of Africa, Laurent Gbagbo became a symbol of resistance, a hero (IIisha, 2014). Just like the presidents of the DRC and Gabon, Laurent Gbagbo begun to dictate his terms to the French. In the Ivorian presidential palaces, the game of power sharing started again away from any kind of popular control. The luxurious lifestyle of French expatriates was no more and their numbers decreased quickly. But big business remained intact as Laurent Gbagbo welcomed French industry. The contract for a bridge in Abidjan initially promised to the Chinese went to Borget,a French company which already managed the Ivory Coast's water and electricity. The company was known as B&B, Borget and Bolloré after its founder Vincent Bolloré, an industrialist who was honored in 2008 by President Gbagbo when he awarded him the National Cross of Merit. He was also granted concession of the port of Abidjan. Bolloré built an empire in Africa controlling the transport infrastructure for goods and raw materials and his company managed most of the port terminals around the gulf of Guinea (Charbonneau, 2018). During the award ceremony, Vincent Bolloré said, “I am proud to show other investors how easy it is to succeed in this country.” Gbagbo replied, “This is a win-win. When you invest you win and Ivory Coast wins as well” (Al jazeera, 2014). No longer taking orders from Paris, African heads of state forged direct and independent links with French industry. But the French companies B&B, Total, Areva and EDF still needed support from French politicians to conduct their business in Africa. The man who would facilitate their case was a close friend of Vincent Bolloré, Nicolas Sarkozy. 4.3 Mahmoud Tandja Since the pre-colonial times, uranium from Niger has fueled France's nuclear power stations. In 2007, Nigerien president, Mahmadou Tandja wanted to raise the price of uranium ore. The uranium mine is under the control of French company Areva. President Tandja wanted to renegotiate the terms. At the time, Areva's director in Niger was Dominique Pin, former leading counsellor at the French embassy at the Ivory Coast.The president of Niger made his position clear and he threatened to give the mining rights to China. The talks came to a stalemate and Dominique Pin was expelled from the country. Fifteen days later, Nicolas Sarkozy arrived to 31 sign a treaty. However by then, the agreed selling price for the uranium had doubled (Charbonneau, 2018). Sarkozy defended French businesses in English speaking countries as well such as South Africa and Nigeria. His aim was to reclaim France's position in Africa but by a fair basis. CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Conclusion Indeed, there is a shift in the power relations between Africa and France. In the period after colonialism, France established a neo-colonial relationship with its former colonies through an elaborate intelligence system run by Jacques Foccart, military defense pacts and supported by African dictators. However, various events such as the change in French political ideology, the fall of the Berlin wall and the investigation of the oil company Elf led to the collapse of Françafrique and the arrest of its perpetrators. African leaders took advantage of the waning influence of France and played to the tune of globalization to find other investors in their natural resources such as oil, uranium and diamonds. However, the question on whether Françafrique still exists a subject of contention as some networks still persist. Characters like Robert Bourji have been visiting the African palaces outside of any public scrutiny, today's African leaders continue to operate in a world where their personal interests come first and France still relies on them for its energy needs. Although globalization has brought other powerful buyers to their doorstep, the competition for Subsaharan Africa's mineral resources is cut-throat and only the highest bidders will gain the favour of its leaders. Its people however, rarely see the benefits of their country's riches. 32 5.2 Recommendations President Macron could be the president to finally shift the power balance between France and Africa. From the start of his presidency, he has been firm on his position to end the decade old Françafrique policy and to establish an equal relationship with African countries. However, the remnants of Françafrique still exist today and justice is needed for equality to be achieved. My recommendation would be for France to be held accountable for the assassination of different political leaders such as Félix Moumié, to compensate countries such as Guinea for collapsing their economy and for investigations to be carried out on electoral offenses in countries such as Guinea. Furthermore, for true equality to take place, France needs to cancel its military agreements with her former colonies. In today’s globalized world African countries need the freedom to trade their resources for competitive prices and award public tenders to the highest bidder. On the other hand, Africa needs to put to trial all dictators that participated in corruption and reclaim all of their stolen assets. African countries also need to effect measures that ensure free, fair and transparent elections in order to democratize the election process. In addition, African countries need to review their constitutions and erase any traces of authoritarianism left behind by autocratic leaders for their own personal gain. President Macron’s ideology is good, however his initiatives need to be more than a symbol of goodwill and translate into concrete actions. 33 REFERENCES Al Jazeera.com (2014). The French African Connection. Al Jazeera English. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.htm l Bender, J. (2015). France's Military Is All Over Africa. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1?IR=T Benneyworth, I. (2011). The Ongoing Relationship Between France and its Former African Colonies. E-International Relations Students. Retrieved from http://www.eir.info/2011/06/11/the-ongoing-relationship-between-franceand-its-former-african-colonies/ Charbonneau, B. (2008). 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