France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? RO LAN D MAR C H AL Is France going to back away from Africa—a continent which no longer wants anything from it? Although phrased in somewhat extreme terms, this question nevertheless reflects a common feeling that French policy makers have been unable to seize upon any new political direction in Africa or to maintain the influence in the continent which was once widely considered unassailable. Since  successive French governments have struggled through crises which had long been anticipated, trying to protect themselves against fierce critics among both African and Western public opinion and accusations of shady deals or aberrant policies. That year,, saw the devaluation of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc and the consequent challenge to one of the privileged instruments of the French hegemony over its backyard (the pré carré), the franc zone. Above all, it was the year of the R wandan genocide. French involvement in its preparation, though certainly refuted at an official level even today, is confirmed by numerous witnesses. Three years later,  saw the end of one of the most baroque dictatorships in the continent and one that was supported, right up to the very end, by Paris. A certain amount of self-denial and shortsightedness are required to dare to say, as the French minister of foreign affairs did in March , that Mobutu Sese Seko was the guarantor of the sovereignty of Zaire. Between these two major crises, which mobilized the international community in such an acute way, other less visible but nonetheless significant events unfolded. France did not have a realistic or innovative approach to these events—or not, at least, one in keeping with its official rhetoric on the absolute necessity of democracy, the rule of law or of good governance. Perhaps even more serious for France’s popularity in the eyes of African public opinion was its support for electoral processes of questionable regularity, as in Chad or Niger. Also important was the increasingly harsh policy over visas,  O livier Vallée, Le prix de l’argent CFA. Heurts et malheur de la zone franc (Paris: Karthala, ).  Le Figaro,  Jan. ; Libération,  Jan. ; Gérard Prunier, T he Rwandan crisis, –: history of a genocide (London: Hurst, ). International Affairs ,  () –  Roland Marchal beginning in , and attitudes towards immigration. All these events contributed towards a growing sense of humiliation and therefore permanent animosity. In spring, , the photograph of police smashing down the doors of a Parisian church where illegal immigrants were on hunger strike circulated round Africa and rekindled a hostility towards French power in a continent that was already filled with resentment over the administrative difficulties in obtaining visas in French consulates. Not only did France lose popularity in countries like the Central African R epublic where it had maintained a strong presence following decolonization; it also showed worrying shortsightedness, and consequently found itself in a clearly inferior position in relation to the extremely enterprising American diplomacy, which was more in tune with the way the continent was changing and which imposed its own visions and policies in the Great Lakes region and southern Africa. Nothing expresses the resulting feeling of hot-tempered impotence on the part of France better than the declarations made by Jacques Godfrain as minister of cooperation about American Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s trip to Africa in autumn . In reality, of course, matters are not so simple;African or Western public opinion does not always prove constant in its judgement. An evaluation of France’s African policy—even its more debatable choices—cannot avoid raising awkward questions for others. Major Western powers, initially the United States and Belgium, followed by several other members of the Security Council at the time, knew about the preparations for the genocide in R wanda several months before it happened. The United States had not acted because of the American death toll in Somalia: around  soldiers lost their lives, compared with the thousands killed in the spring of . Again, one can strongly criticize French backing for the continent’s veteran tyrant; but from the origins of his political career until at least , Mobutu had had the strong support of the United States, where selective amnesia and cynicism are among the most widely shared values. While certain sectors of the French right wing had supported UNITA long after the Lusaka agreement in November , supplying it with a stock of arms and ammunition, the American position is no more commendable.The US support accorded to President Dos Santos cannot cover up the Mafia-like nature of the MPLA in Angola, a state situated a mere , miles away from the virtuous model of ‘good governance’ extolled by Washington. Support given to one of the parties in a conflict is rarely the way to peace. This evident crisis, which some would sum up as France’s marginalization in Africa, to the benefit of the United States (the ‘Francophone versus Anglophone’confrontation) is also related to technical issues, which have more direct political implications. France is criticized for the lack of transparency of its African policies since independence. Despite a few exceptions, these policies  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? have been characterized by several structural dysfunctions. These include the number of different actors involved (including the ministries of foreign affairs, co-operation, defence and finance, the Caisse Française du Développement and the African cell at the presidency). This serves to dilute the political priorities that are officially proclaimed, promoting secret alliances and giving remarkable leeway to African heads of state to pursue their own objectives. O ther structural dysfunctions include the absence of any parliamentary debate on the basics of financial cooperation since, despite its significant size (around  per cent of the funds from public aid to development), the portion of public funding allocated to the ministry of financial and economic affairs was not subject to any parliamentary debate. In addition, there are powerful organized networks surrounding politicians or the directors of big companies which mix public and private interests, the réseaux . This article aims to place these issues within an analytical framework. Some critics of French policies base their assessments on suppositions that are not necessarily shared by a significant proportion of the current French political class. Is, for example, the concept of a French ‘zone of influence’always claimed and can it actually work? Any assessment of French policy towards African countries should take several political and technical issues into account. First, the format which the debate over the issue has taken in France needs to be considered, particularly following the change in the complexion of the parliamentary majority in May .We should then return to some essential aspects of French presence in Africa, including military presence and its attributes, the ‘Fashoda syndrome’ or the perception of American interests on the continent, and finally the tension arising among France’s European allies over France’s willingness to play the European card and their political and financial reticences. The French debate over an African policy The important events outlined above have not been without effect on a section of the political decision-making apparatus. François Mitterrand’s second seven-year term of office (–) had been a period of ‘wait-and-see’ policy or a protective step backwards in perfect keeping with the early stages of the French right of the s. The presidential speech given at La Baule in , which seemed to map out the contours of a doctrine linking development and  Guy Michel, ‘L’aide publique au développement de la France vue par ses pairs de l’O CDE’, Marchés trop- icaux ,  Jan. , pp. –.  Stephen Smith and Antoine Glaser, Ces messieurs Afrique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, ); O bservatoire per- manent de la coopération française, Rapport  and Rapport  (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, , ).  For an analysis of his first term, see Jean-François Bayart, La politique africaine de François Mitterrand (Paris: Karthala, ).  Le Monde,  June .  Roland Marchal democracy, should not be taken at face value. It was no more than a recognition of the changes that had taken place in the continent that French diplomacy had previously wished to avoid taking into consideration. Taking ‘local reality’ into account nevertheless counterbalanced support for the democratization processes, as Mitterrand clearly stated  months later at the Chaillot summit. That message was clearly understood by the African autocrats. Less than a month later President Eyadema of Togo bombed the place where the Prime Minister was taking refuge during the transitional period. In Niger and Congo, demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the military, while in Ivory Coast the main opposition figure, Laurent Gbagbo, was arrested. So much for a democratic process. These new forms of authoritarian regimes, albeit with their formal multi-party and electoral processes, were damaging the fragile course of democracy. During this period France had to modify its terms of aid to African states. This modification took two distinct yet closely related forms: the Abidjan doctrine and the devaluation of the CFA franc. Announced in September  by Edouard Balladur, then Prime Minister, and later revived in Abidjan in July , the Abidjan doctrine set conditions for French budgetary aid for the implementation of adjustment measures advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions. France would no longer pick up the bills of its client states, but would help them adopt stricter control measures. The decision to devalue the CFA franc by  per cent was taken in January , after years of deliberation, in spite of opposition from state leaders with close relations with the president. In both cases, French policy accepted the IMF philosophy the success of which was questionable, therefore not so much constituting a partial alternative as reinforcing a strictly liberal hegemony. In particular, the connection between the treatment of debt and structural adjustment programmes allowed no significant improvement in the debt burden in relation to the resources of the debtor country. An event which brought more hope for a reform of African policy, at an institutional as much as a political level, was Alain Juppé’s appointment as Prime Minister in May , even more so than Jacques Chirac’s election as President. As foreign affairs minister, Alain Juppé had experienced problems with the African networks of Charles Pasqua, then minister of the interior (in Sudan, Algeria and also in the Middle East). He also had trouble with François Léotard, the R epublican Party leader and a traditional supporter of Jonas Savimbi. In his new position, he hoped to set things into order, in so far as those people responsible to the Elysée were diplomats little inclined to sacrifice their professional prerogatives to certain ambiguous middlemen who, while ostensi-  ‘François Mitterrand et l’Afrique’, special issue of the quarterly Politique Africaine, no. , June .  ‘La dévaluation du Franc CFA’, special issue of the quarterly Politique Africaine, no. , June .  R oland Marchal,‘La France en quête d’une politique africaine’, Politique Etrangère, no. , , pp. –.  Eric Fotorino, ‘Charles Pasqua l’Africain’, Le Monde, – March .  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? bly representing France’s interests, in fact were doing little more than acting in private interests or financing their own political structures. The crisis in R wanda that he had to manage also showed Juppé the importance of being extremely prudent in any support for authoritarian regimes and the need for the minister of foreign affairs to take up the instruments for cooperation. However, Juppé’s vague inclinations towards reform relied on two factors that were in fact weakened by the reform process. The first of these was his own political standing at the heart of the French right. His arrogance, giving him the air of an all-knowing civil servant, together with his lack of political feeling for his prime ministerial duties, weakened his position considerably in only a few months, as did his inability to control important social conflicts in anything other than an authoritarian manner. It therefore became difficult to bring about reforms that would only have divided his supporters further and would not win him any significant popularity. The second factor was even more problematic and involved Jacques Chirac himself. R elations between the two men were excellent up to the defeat of spring . But Chirac did not have the same political consistency as Juppé and did not share his visions for African policy.As a radical reformer in the initial days following his election, he nevertheless appointed a second African Cell run by the most faithful supporters of Jacques Foccart, the man of the réseaux par excellence. The tone was quickly set; the reforms would be possible only with the consent of the French President’s African interlocutors—that is to say, never. In this way the President explicitly repudiated the foreign affairs minister when the latter announced a reform of the ministry of cooperation in December  which would prevent it being a ministry of French-speaking Africa beyond its official and broader mandate. Two events had a beneficial effect on the debate that had been evolving for several years but which had not yet managed to emerge as a legitimate problem among the core of the political class or, perhaps and possibly more importantly, among public opinion. The first was the crisis in Zaire; the second was the rebellions in the Central African R epublic, of which there were three in the space of eight months in . These underlined the inability of French troops to prevent a political crisis in a country where they were omnipresent. The sordid events surrounding the recruitment of Serbian mercenaries (war criminals, no less) in which the second African Cell at the Elysée was proved to be involved, showed the absolute necessity of regulating the problem of networks and of rethinking French policy towards its African partners from a sounder base. The victory of the Socialist Party in the legislative elections in May  further fuelled the argument for an aggiornamento.The party leader, Lionel Jospin, had very early on noted his differences with Mitterrand’s practices, a divergence  See Jean-François Bayart, Béatrice Hibou and Stephen Ellis,T he criminalisation of the state in Africa (O xford: James Currey, ; published in French by Editions Complexe, ).  The newsletter La Lettre du Continent was the first to provide evidence on this linkage.  Roland Marchal of which even his political opponents were aware. The Socialist Party victory was not just a personal victory against Mitterrand’s old guard; it was also a victory over the very strong ‘personalization’ of French political life which had transformed the Socialist Party into an electoral machine. Jospin’s willingness to break away from the type of African policy in which Mitterrand had been heavily involved was attributable to several factors.These included recommendations from the international section of the Socialist Party, frequently rebuffed during the Mitterrand years, which now called for radical revisions to be made to the instruments and the content of cooperation. Also significant was the desire among the public to make up for the mistakes of the previous years. Certain changes, such as the reform of the French military presence in Africa, had been started under Juppé’s government and had been maintained for the sake of continuity. Finally, budgetary constraints necessitated greater restraint and moderation. Nonetheless, there were many problems and barriers to overcome and several factors should be noted here. Politics and events at home were important, with unemployment high. In addition, Africa was no longer seen as a highpriority international concern, particularly at a time when the Maastricht treaty was being worked on and focus lay on the Balkan crisis, on Thermidorian political developments in Iran, on tension in the Gulf, on the discussion of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and, last but not least, on the Asian crisis.The first eight months of the new government’s term of office had concentrated on essential domestic reforms including the law on the -hour working week as well as legislation covering the professionalization of the army and immigration. Indeed, it is through the latter issue that the question of a new African policy was touched upon. Africa no longer represents a primary economic concern for France. Africa now accounts for less than  per cent of France’s foreign trade and receive less than  per cent of France’s direct investment, far behind eastern Europe and Asia. Of course, France still has a firm hold on the lucrative sectors of the economy: mining, agribusiness, building and public works, telecoms, insurance, banking and electricity—but international competition has been evident for a long time. French companies hold an average of  per cent of parts of markets on the continent. France’s balance of trade with the African continent is always in the black to the tune of FFr  billion—that is, the same as its balance of trade with EU countries, which is eleven times more important in terms of volume (in  it was FFr . billion). Nevertheless, these figures should be regarded with some caution; North Africa and Egypt consume  per cent of French exports destined for Africa, followed by Nigeria, Ivory Coast and South Africa. The Asian crisis and the prospect for growth in Africa could weaken Afro Guy Labertit, Pour une redéfinition de la politique africaine de la France (Paris: Parti Socialiste, ).  Jacques Alibert, ‘Le commerce extérieur de la France en  et la part de l’Afrique’, Marchés tropicaux ,  March .  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? pessimism and encourage people to believe that Africa will be much more important than figures have shown in the recent past. O n a political level, in the international arena, it is true that France’s position in relation to this ‘backyard’ has always attracted automatic support from many countries. However, this situation is complicated by several important factors. This international support has always varied in strength and is no longer simply automatic. For evidence of this we have only to look at the debate generated at the time of the attempt to re-elect Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary General to the United Nations in autumn , or at the French efforts to gain the support of the reluctant African states to appoint the same man SecretaryGeneral of the Francophone zone against a Congolese challenger who wasVice General Manager of UNESCO. Moreover, there is a dimension of French policy towards Africa that is often overlooked by the public.The ability of certain African heads of state to influence French decision-makers is remarkable. For example, it is easy to forget that the networks that corrupt the decision-making process in France were first developed by Jacques Foccart as much as by Felix Houphouet-Boigny. The influence of O mar Bongo, President of Gabon, on certain figures of both the right and the left is clear. The same goes for the current President of Burkina Faso; Eyadema has always been a close confidant of Jacques Chirac. The death of Jacques Foccart on  May  did not mean the end of these networks. A new generation is ready for action, among it most notably Pierre Pasqua (the son of Charles), Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (son of François) and Jacques Toubon (former minister for justice in the Juppé government, President of Club  and today a counsellor at the Elysée), not to mention others who have not yet retired. The main elements of the new French policy towards its African partners have not yet provoked any real public debate. The most important issues concern the reform of French military presence in Africa, immigration and the methods of cooperation. These issues are even more difficult to assess in the current coexistence (‘cohabitation’) between a right-wing President and a leftwing Prime Minister who have to work together because French public opinion would take an institutional guerrilla war between the two men especially badly at a time when there are more than  million unemployed.This coexistence automatically creates several ambiguities, and it is not always easy to tell if these are attributable to the cohabitation itself or have come about because the Socialists are moving towards the centre-right. Two recent examples can be cited.Throughout the Congo-Brazzaville crisis, Jacques Chirac supported the Gabonese mediation, even though O mar Bongo is actually the son-in-law of the Congolese politician Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The Socialists favoured a position of complete neutrality and non-involvement since they had little sympathy for either of the two contenders. The former President was regarded as too putsch-minded and the ruling President, Pascal Lissouba, cared little about the constitution of the state he was running. The  Roland Marchal countries that Lionel Jospin visited during his African trip in December  and the content of his talks with their respective governments were the object of long consultations with the presidency.This trip eventually became an exercise in realpolitik. When Hassan II wanted to address the French parliament during an official visit to Paris in spring , Socialist and Communist MPs left. Two and a half years later when their leader met the Moroccan king, he made extremely sympathetic statements about the democratic situation in Morocco—and signed important financial protocols. It could be said that the only original aspect of Lionel Jospin’s trip, which was otherwise completely dominated by French domestic policy issues, primarily immigration, was the speech he gave to the Malian parliament: a symbolic recognition of democratic values. A policy can be partially evaluated by looking at the people behind its implementation. Enthusiasm among the reformers was not great when the cabinet was established in June . The new minister of foreign affairs had held a leading position at the presidency during the Mitterrand period, but his memoirs of this period give a very conformist outline of French policy towards Africa. His remarks are characterized by the air of superiority and paternalism that is so common among the top French civil servants who deal with African affairs. Clearly he could not be seen as a committed reformist. The minister of state for cooperation, Charles Josselin, is a freemason (a useful attribute for such a job) but was not well known, though he had a good understanding of the decentralized (non-state) cooperation between French and African regions. No firm statements were issued, during the initial eight months of power, on new ambitions, either on the direction of international relations or on policy towards Africa. Nevertheless, the stances taken on the main problems during that period (the Great Lakes and Congo-Brazzaville) were not unreasonable. Both ministers were keen to prove that the Africa they were talking about was not limited to just Senegal, Ivory Coast and Gabon. What we are witnessing might therefore appear to be the standardization of an existing policy rather than the affirmation of a new one. In fact any originality over policy on the part of the new cabinet has involved two rather sensitive issues: the role of French troops in Africa and the debate on spheres of influence. The end of French policing in Africa? The Socialist cabinet has, very cleverly, used a reform that had been set up by the former majority and has built on it, making it more radical. The professionalization of the French army and the end of national service had been under discussion since the spring of  and a law was passed by the parlia-  Hubert Vedrine, Les Mondes de François Mitterrand (Paris: Fayard, ).  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? ment in November . It was obvious that one of the consequences would be a change in the French military presence in Africa. This decision was also necessary because public deficits had to be reduced in order to meet the conditions stipulated for European monetary union. The total cost of the French military presence was estimated to be about FFr  billion, of which reform would save FFr  million. Moreover, this military presence was no longer linked to any clear geopolitical decisions, as attested by the numerous French contingents in Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African R epublic, Chad and Gabon).These were the result of decisions taken during a time of crisis which nobody, including the ministry of defence, the military cooperation mission and the African leaders, would contest at a later stage since they gave access to higher budgets, indirect resources or political insurance in case of internal strife. Prior to this reform, France officially had , soldiers stationed in Africa. O ver the next five years, this number is to be reduced to ,, concentrated in four locations: Dakar on the Atlantic (a vital base for reaching French Guyana or the West Indies), Djibouti on the R ed Sea (more important for military cooperation with the United Arab Emirates than East Africa) and Libreville and N’Djamena for Central and Equatorial Africa.The closure of the two bases of Bangui and Bouar surprised many observers and was intended to show that French presence is not unconditional. Most of the remaining troops will not be based there for long periods, which means that their families will not stay with them and that the African states will not benefit as they have in the past from the economic impact of a French community with high salaries. The withdrawal of  soldiers from Djibouti automatically means a reduction in GNP of between  and  per cent. Important though it is, this reform will not solve all the problems relating to the French military presence in the continent. Most of the countries in which troops will remain have deep political problems.The December  elections in Djibouti have done nothing to resolve the Afar question, and economic recovery would require the removal of several powerful and highly corrupt figures who are very close to the leaders. In Chad, Idriss Deby cannot be seen as a leader who is working for the rehabilitation of his country. He remains in power mainly because the opposition is deeply divided, not because of any commitment to good governance. Elections due to take place in Gabon in spring  may spark off incidents in the region. O mar Bongo cannot be sure that he will be guaranteed the same support and freedom accorded him by his friends in Paris in the elections of  and . The conflict between the Senegalese state and the Casamance nationalists has already had some impact on French policy; indeed, Abdu Diouf’s request for military support to crush the rebels was unsuccessful. Jospin’s cabinet made one point clear when it strengthened the draft reform and thus indicated that French interventionism in Africa was over. All defence agreements are to be reviewed in order to cancel articles which request French troops to intervene in cases of internal strife (France has defence treaties with  Roland Marchal eight African countries and military cooperation agreements with  others). Practical demonstration of this new political tone came during the Congolese crisis, when the French troops rescued only foreigners in Brazzaville without getting involved in the fighting among the various militias.The French petroleum company Elf-Aquitaine may have had more room for manoeuvre during the crisis than formerly: some journalists alleged that the firm paid both sides to protect its interests. The Central African R epublic could also be cited as a good example of the new approach. A third significant change involved military cooperation. The ministry of cooperation has a budget of roughly FFr  million, mainly for the Francophone African states, though some other countries like Ethiopia are now involved. By contrast, the ministry of foreign affairs has a ninth of this sum to cover the rest of the world. Some institutional changes will take place soon: the mission of military cooperation is to be relocated under the ministry of defence. O ther less important aspects are also under reform. More advanced military training is to take place in Africa and more attention to be paid to the actual content of the military cooperation. The R wandan case is still high on the agenda of discussion among experts and interested politicians. These decisions do not mean that France is disengaging from Africa.The new French cabinet is much more committed than its predecessor to helping African states build security on their continent. Since , France and Britain have been working on various projects involving conflict prevention and an African peacekeeping force. In  the United States produced a draft paper covering the same topics, which was strongly criticised by the French government as it was very unclear on the selection process, for the countries participating in an African Crisis R esponse Force as well as on the decision-making process where an American hegemony was all too obvious. This bitter argument was ended by an agreement on  May  and a common project is currently in implementation: at least seven African countries are to be involved and modern military equipment is to be kept ready on the continent. The French government decided to make some equipment available in its bases in Senegal and to open a training centre in Ivory Coast. O f course, substantial differences between the United States, France and the United Kingdom remain, especially in view of the indirect economic and political impact. Neither France nor Britain wants a repeat of the Gulf War situation where Americans got most of the contracts following the war. A further aspect of US–French relations is equally crucial for the future of the continent. Sectors of the Clinton administration seem to sympathize with the involvement of some private security companies in peace enforcement: for example, Military Professional R esources Incorporated is already active in Bosnia and Angola. This approach is strongly opposed by the new French cabinet. The approach outlined above has been endorsed by international consensus and looks to be a positive and normal solution for Africa.The European Union is discussing a common security and cooperation policy, so why don’t the Africans? Some questions should, however, be addressed. First, the cases in  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? which preventative diplomacy has been attempted within a regional framework have not been very successful. Initiatives by the Intergovernmental Authority of Drought and Development to stop the war in southern Sudan have failed. Ethiopia masterminded a peace agreement among the Somali factions in January  but had to send them huge quantities of weapons, despite the embargo on all kinds of military equipment laid down by the UN Security Council in February . Mediations in the Great Lakes region have been numerous but have borne little fruit. What conclusion should be drawn from these experiences? The events in R wanda, the former Zaire, Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville, not to mention the current situation in eastern Sudan, show that the neighbouring states are currently more deeply involved in armed conflict at all levels than during the Cold War. Easier access to modern military equipment will certainly create mixed feelings among local armies which have become increasingly involved in the informal weapons trade as well as in fighting beyond their borders. How can such problems be dealt with in a way that ensures that such equipment is used only under international control for peacekeeping operations? Finally, many African intellectuals do not feel very happy about this African Crisis R esponse Force. In the past they have emphasized two dimensions of the project. First, the cost of this force would be much less than if it were organized under UN auspices; and second, why should only African soldiers take risks? Are their widows more easily soothed than widows in the West? And is public opinion more easily controlled in Africa? The Somali syndrome isn’t over yet. An end to the era of the ‘backyard’? Anglophobia is very much a part of French political culture. It developed among the left-wing parties as a reaction to American hegemony and among the conservative parties because the conservatives gave vital support to the Gaullist cause and to national values. However, it would be wrong to assume that this feeling is as strong as it used to be. Despite claims made by certain French ministers of culture, French society does not endorse the decisions taken by the Académie Française or any law regulating vocabulary. Moreover, this Anglophobia is no longer directed at Britain, la perfide Albion, but rather at the United States. It is strongly linked to the Fashoda syndrome: the competition with the United States may remind some people that France is not the great power it used to be…a very long time ago. O f course, the Fashoda syndrome has been very evident on the African continent, where French diplomats and businesspeople fear that competition could deeply affect their power. This description is partly true, as illustrated by the way Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front leader John Fru Ndi has been treated by these actors up to  Vincent Hugeux,‘Afrique Centrale: l’épouvantail américain’, Politique Internationale, no. , Autumn .  Roland Marchal September , when he received a much warmer reception. Nevertheless, the perceptions of American interests and French capabilities are now quite divided among both the political parties and the business class. American interest in Africa is widely perceived as being very new. It began in , with a few exceptional areas of concern such as oil and mineral markets, or involvement in some conflicts that had been important in the context of the East/ West confrontation, e.g. Angola, or in what is today perceived as Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in Sudan and Libya. Various high-ranking political figures visited the continent to attest to this new interest, beginning in February  with R on Brown, who played a crucial role in the mobilization of the diplomatic apparatus in support of the private sector beyond the traditional markets. He was followed by the then Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, in O ctober , by Hillary Clinton in March , by VicePresident Al Gore in South Africa and by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in December , with a trip by President Clinton planned for spring . However, while the growth rates of some African countries impress the American political class, investors remain cautious: US investment in Africa was around US$  billion in  while European investment reached about US$  billion. This interest is, in fact, mainly commercial. US exports to Africa reached US$ . billion in , a  per cent increase compared to .The project presented by Bill Clinton on  June  under the title ‘Partnership for Economic Growth and O pportunity in Africa’ ostensibly aims to provide a political framework for this new attention to the continent; but it looks like a very good operation to advertise the Clinton administration without investing any additional funds. The free access of African goods to the US market has been announced as one of the most radical forms of progress, but in fact a similar agreement has been in operation since  between the signatories of the Lomé Convention, now subsumed within the European Union. Moreover, American interest in the continent is very selective and opportunist: some countries are courted, other are completely neglected. In  USAID had offices in  African countries; the number had dropped to  in mid- and may fall to  in a couple of years. ‘Trade not aid’ is the motto. The United States has been very keen to exploit the many important weaknesses of its economic rivals in Africa. As France was closing its doors on intellectuals and businesspeople with its new visa policy, starting in , America welcomed this economic and political elite, offering opportunities that the French could not. French diplomats and mediators were unable to bypass the  ‘Madeleine’s mission’, Africa Confidential : ,  Dec. ; Howard W. French, ‘After the embrace: Albright stirs African doubts’, N ew York T imes,  Dec. .  According to the World Bank, the highest growth rates were in : Ethiopia (%), Uganda (.%), Malawi (.%), Zimbabwe (.%) and Mozambique (.%). In West Africa, the best is Ivory Coast (.%), followed by Togo (%).  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? strict criteria laid down by the African and French officials who assumed that ‘La Francophonie’ was an absolute necessity. Nor should US efforts to foster democracy in Africa be taken seriously, because they vary according to the mineral wealth or the geopolitical situation of the country. O ut of the seven countries visited by Madeleine Albright in , only South Africa can be regarded as a democratic country with relevant institutions, electoral processes and freedom of speech and association.The US efforts to save Laurent Kabila from being ousted as President of Zaire appear pathetic. Bill R ichardson, US ambassador to the UN, dismissed the UN delegate for human rights because of his independence.Yet he cannot ignore the mass killings which occurred in the former Zaire; nor can he justify the prohibition of any political activity in the country or the large-scale corruption and the numerous violent contradictions among the regional friends of this president who sees China as a role model. O f all African countries, Ethiopia has the highest number of journalists in jail. Eritrea is curing the nostalgia of the supporters of the one-party state of the s. Uganda is the country of the noparty democracy, which was criticized by the State Department up to mid. Zimbabwe is far from being a model of democratic freedom and good government. So, while the United States has turned the many ludicrous French policies very cleverly to its own benefit, its own political credibility is far from established. Many observers believe that there is no current US policy towards Africa.The attitude towards Sudan is a good example of the way Washington tries to juggle contradictory interests. As soon as oil became a real issue, any rhetoric on terrorism and fundamentalism was cut short to make way for US oil companies to compete. The many interest groups lobbying both the Clinton administration and Congress, as well as the priority put on pure commercial interests, may explain an overly opportunistic attitude. This has deeply disappointed the counter-elite in Africa, which is fed up with French conservatism. The most thoughtful sectors of the French political class are not worried by this US activity on the African continent.They are well aware that the behaviour of economic actors is no more determined by emollient statements from the White House than it is by France. South Africa is a very good example of the disparity between a strong political interest and the somewhat cautious attitude of the private sector. O nce the ideological debate over the French pré carré is put aside, the vision of political and economic competition in the continent becomes more complex and no longer fits into the tidy model of confrontation between US and French interests.Whether Mr Clinton likes it or not, the competition for major markets in Africa started long before his re-election as President, and the United States is only one of several contenders, including  La Lettre du continent, no. ,  Jan. . It would be interesting to analyse the position of many former senior figures in the State Department or the National Security Council who are paid very high fees to keep detailed records on certain Francophone autocrats like the Togolese president or Mobutu.  Roland Marchal Canada, Germany, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan, the United Kingdom— and France. Economic rivalry between Paris and Washington is mostly over oil, telecommunications and raw materials. It would be very naïve to oppose an old static French capitalism bound by its colonial past and US companies bringing modernity and liberal democracy as outcomes of their contracts. The balance of forces between oil companies in Angola and Nigeria proves quite clearly that the United States is not always as successful as France in the non-French-speaking countries. Behind these headline crises, the US–French competition has existed for a very long time. African rulers, especially French ones, have been eager to enhance it as a way to increase their political influence in Western capitals. Hissene Habre, former opposition leader in Chad, was one of the most efficient at this, but even so did not gain the support he needed when Idriss Deby came from Sudan in December  to overthrow him. O n a political level the United States, being less involved in routine African policy, was quick to notice some changes, especially the emergence of a new generation of African leaders. France lost out badly because of its inability to address these changes. The conservative nature of French politics and its understanding of African policy, where personal ties and traditional networks were predominant, are also to blame.While this traditional framework is in crisis today, it would be wrong to assume that France will disengage from Africa: France may redefine its relationships with the continent by developing new priorities. The challenges of a new French policy towards African states Lionel Jospin, as the new French prime minister, has repeatedly promised a radical reappraisal of French policy towards Africa emphasizing codevelopment and partnership. Such statements are hardly new to French debate; time will pronounce on the accuracy of this rhetoric and it remains to be seen what concrete policies evolve. However, certain questions remain at the core of this heated debate between the various decision-makers. The first is, of course, the reform of the cooperation structures which are numerous and belong to various ministries. Bureaucratic rivalry among them has hindered good political understanding.A reform is due to be announced in February  which will incorporate the ministry of cooperation into the ministry of foreign affairs, giving it a similar status to the ministry for European affairs. The reality may be more ambiguous; such a reform has been on the agenda since . President Jacques Chirac is opposed to radical change, as are some socialist leaders. Moreover, the various bureaucracies involved in the reform will not remain passive since they have a history of dispute. Polemics and political uproar are very likely. The real issue concerns power-sharing agreements between the economic and finance ministry and the ministry of foreign affairs; each wants the other to endorse its decision. Bureaucratic bickering is by no means over; government ministers may become involved. Any  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? reforms need time to be assessed, so it would be presumptuous to take an early stance in a process that cannot be simple. A second issue, very much linked to the first, is the actual content of cooperation programmes. The  countries that signed the Lomé Convention are potentially interested because the ministry of cooperation is formally covering all Lomé countries, but issues of finance and aid programmes are different in reality. Bilateral aid directed to states still represents  per cent of France’s total aid budget (around FFr  billion out of FFr  billion attributed for ), the major part of which goes to sub-Saharan Africa. The most privileged states make up part of the French pré carré: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Mali, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Public aid for development of the French pré carré is still higher than what is given to others. Ivory Coast received FFr . billion and Senegal FFr  million, while Kenya received FFr  million, South Africa FFr  million, Ethiopia FFr  million and Nigeria FFr  million. It is likely that a genuine reform will challenge this distribution of aid, since public aid for development should go to the less developed countries and no longer to those which are better off than others. In addition, this new funding allocation should no longer distinguish between Francophone and Anglophone countries.The role of this aid needs to be clarified: is it a way of doing business (an intrinsic characteristic of bilateral aid) or should it address the development problems? Sugar-coated statements may not be entirely convincing. The third question concerns the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions. French policy is tied by the Abidjan doctrine and can only endorse the decisions of the IMF or the World Bank.There is no more room for debate or suggestion of alternatives. This is true not only on the debt issue but also in respect of programmes dealing with good governance.The emphasis put on the state apparatus can damage civil society because it is framed in a way that does not take into account the processes of the African states to be integrated. The future of the franc zone is another crucial issue. The devaluation of the CFA franc by  per cent can be regarded as successful in West Africa. The policies drawn up by the IMF and France to ease the transition have effectively reduced some serious problems, including the automatic  per cent debt increase. Central Africa has not enjoyed the same level of success. Experts are deeply concerned by the performances of Gabon, Cameroon, and the Central African R epublic. A split between the two African regions followed by a second devaluation in Central Africa is likely.This problem will be taken very seriously, as the African councillor in the ministry of foreign affairs was deeply involved in the devaluation in  and was in charge of economic issues in  Beatrice Hibou, L’Afrique est-elle protectionniste? (Paris: Karthala, ); Jean-François Bayart et al. , T he crim- inalisation of the state in Africa.  Jean-François Bayart, ‘L’embrasement de l’Afrique Centrale’, Politique Internationale, no. , Autumn .  Roland Marchal the President’s African Cell. There is a further need to clarify this before any major European monetary changes. Some European countries are questioning the role of the franc zone in the Ecu system.As early as September , French officials explained that conversion of the CFA franc is taken care of by the French Treasury, a department in the ministry of finance and not by the French central bank, the Banque de France. France retains all responsibility over the CFA franc in relation to its European partners, according to the various Lomé Conventions. Moreover, the officials stated, the CFA franc represents only –. per cent of the whole franc fiduciary circulation and does not influence the monetary issues of the Banque de France. The Bundesbank is contesting this analysis which, as it understands, would weaken the power of the future European Monetary Institute, and supports the view that exchange parity between the CFA franc and the Ecu should be determined by a unanimous decision by the European Council. The French position will be accepted as provisional up to  January , but what will happen after that date? The various statements made by the Socialist Party stressed the necessity of a European dimension to French policy towards Africa. If there is to be a better understanding and more cooperation in the long run, its European partners must quell their inherent mistrust about certain aspects of French policy towards the African continent. France was alone when it called for humanitarian intervention in Zaire in autumn .This mistrust is not only founded on political differences, it is also linked to economic discrepancies. Paris has always been a strong supporter of the European Development Fund and is currently its main contributor, putting in . per cent compared with Germany’s . per cent and the United Kingdom’s . per cent. But this French commitment has paid off because most of the money goes to countries where French companies have dominance. Under sections VI and VII of the EDF, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Senegal were the three main beneficiaries. The most important issue over the coming years will be the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention, as the current one expires at the end of the year . The new treaty should contain a political dimension encompassing conflict prevention, promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and good governance. Some countries (the Scandinavian states, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) would like to integrate the poorest countries but the southern European countries do not support this view. They do, however, agree to differentiate more among the signatories, taking into account issues such as poverty. At the same time, there is a highly technical, though political, debate over the various tools of the new convention and the rules established by the  Jacques Adda, ‘Q uelques remarques sur la parité du Franc CFA et l’avenir de la zone franc après Maastricht’, La revue de l’Office français du Commerce éxterieur— Observations et diagnostics économiques, no. , Sept. .  Good updated statistical data on French cooperation in Africa are available in ‘France–Afrique’, Marchés tropicaux ,  Dec. .  France and Africa: the emergence of essential reforms? World Trade O rganization following the defeat of the European Commission over the banana issue. The traditional instruments of the Lomé Convention (Stabex and Sysmin, systems of stabilization of export earnings from agricultural and from mining products) have already been condemned in their current form but there are not as yet any new ideas on what could come next. Conclusion When public opinion in the West and Africa had swung against France because of its support for the dictator Mobutu, some journalists predicted that France would quickly be marginalized from affairs in the continent.They thought that Paris was losing its authority and could no longer compete with the United States, which proposed a package of policies to foster the free-market economy and liberal democracy. However, a year later, Mr Clinton is having to justify American support of the new autocrat ruling the Democratic R epublic of Congo, Laurent Kabila, who together with his R wandan sponsors is held responsible for killing dozens of thousands of refugees. Mr Kabila, who had initially wanted to leave the Francophone club, has since changed his mind. He now wants to maintain his relationship with Paris and to benefit at a later stage from a likely concurrence between Washington and Paris. Those who proclaimed the end of French involvement in the continent were doubly wrong: first, because what they predicted has not happened and seems unlikely to do so; and secondly, because their modes of analysis are increasingly irrelevant to understanding the ways in which France, not to mention other Western countries, is trying to gain influence on the continent.They forget that Africa has its own understanding and needs for diplomatic support in the international arena. There is clearly a deep crisis in French policy towards Africa, one which started years before the R wandan genocide. A clear sign of this is the number of reports on French cooperation requested by prime ministers since . The tragic events in R wanda and the Zaireian conflict have brought this crisis to the awareness of the French political class in a particularly acute fashion. However, it is too soon to anticipate a complete defeat.There is room both for a change in French policy and for African states to retain some involvement with France. Indeed, few, if any, African states would accept the prospect of dealing only with the US administration and the Bretton Woods institutions. French policy towards Africa has divided the main political parties in France for a long time. Both the Socialist and the neo-Gaullist parties contain members who are pro-reform and those who are more conservative.The change of political generation that came about after the death of François Mitterrand is a positive shift but not yet a determinant: political ambition and vision are also needed. Jospin’s cabinet has not yet demonstrated these qualities. This may be due to the necessary coexistence with Jacques Chirac, who comes from the old school of thought on Africa; or it may be because there is no strong commitment to reform.  Roland Marchal O ne conclusion that can be drawn from events over the past months is that relationships with the continent are likely to be normalized. French troops will not intervene as they have formerly done; the networks will become more homogeneous, with less confusion between private and public interests. If fully applied, the more open visa policy will have an immediate impact on the perception of France among the African elite. R ivalry between France and the United States may still provoke some strong and colourful statements; but it is necessary to keep the actual state of affairs in mind. First, France and America are allies and they will not fight one another over ambitions in Africa that are pointless at the international level. Second, economic rivalry is already acute but is not shown in any spectacular way. Third, the political dimensions of US policy are not entirely credible. Its greatest allies in Africa are somewhat lacking on the democratic front. South Africa is more independent than generally thought, as was clearly shown by the controversy over Nelson Mandela’s trip to Libya, not to mention the bitter competition in the former Zaire. Moreover, a reduction of public aid for development is not the best way to convince African figures of US interest in the continent.  Smith and Glaser, Ces messieurs Afrique, vol. . 