France and Africa: A 1996 Update

Number 191 December 1996 France and Africa: A 1996 Update by Bruce Whitehouse Events in late 1996 have brought into relief a rivalry between the two most significant external players in African affairs. France and the United States, allies in every major conflict for over 200 years, are today by many accounts battling each other for influence on the continent. No longer eclipsed by cold war strategy, this rivalry has gently simmered throughout the 1990s. It bubbled to the surface, however, during U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's October 1996 visit to Africa, when he traded rhetorical potshots with French officials over France's domineering role in its former African colonies. One month later, France took the lead in resisting U.S. attempts to deny a second term to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and each government was accusing the other of delaying an international response to the crisis in eastern Zaire. It appeared that the erstwhile allies could not agree on anything. Are these public confrontations mere anomalies in the normally healthy FrenchU.S. relationship, or are they a sign of further trouble ahead? With few major outside challenges to its interests in Africa, France is watching U.S. moves on the continent closely. But as it seeks to defend the "pre carre" (backyard) from outsiders, the French government is also struggling to define its own future role in a region where it has long exercised tremendous influence. Will France continue unfailingly to cultivate its exclusive political and economic ties with former colonies, or will it alter its strategy? The policy course that President Jacques Chirac charts in this regard over the coming years will have farreaching effects, not only for African governments but for the future of the U.S. presence in Africa as well. The Legacy of de Gaulle French involvement with Africa dates back more than three centuries. France's first trading mission on the continent was established on the Senegalese coast in the mid-1600s, and French colonial occupation of Africa's northern, western, and central regions began in the 1800s. But the mold for the intimate bond that endures today between France and its former possessions on the continent was cast in the years following World War II. During the immediate postwar period, the projected model for the future of that relationship was always one of confederation, of a greater republic unified by French language and law, with France as its heart. The transformation of that model from dependence to independence occurred only gradually; indeed, vestiges of the old plans for association linger today, both in French policy and in French thought. The process leading toward the selfdetermination of France's African colonies was set in motion at a january 1944 meeting of colonial officials in Brazzaville, the capital of what was then known as French Equatorial Africa (an administrative grouping that included present-day Congo, Chad , the Central African Republic, and Gabon). This territory served as a headquarters for General Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces opposing the Nazi-collaborationist puppet government in Vichy, France. Responding to the needs of an empire fractured by the war, the Brazzaville Conference mapped out reforms, such as the creation of locally elected assemblies and the inclusion of colonial representatives in French legislative bodies, that would transform the relationship between France and its African territories. Few questioned the need for a federation linking France with its colonies; the only heated discussion was over how centralized that federation would be. The constitution of France's Fourth Republic, founded in 1946, established an association that included most French possessions in Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, along with France itself. Members of the Union Franc;:aise, as the association was called, elected their own representatives to the 2 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES French parliament and were subject to French law. Only Tunisia , Morocco, and Indochina were exempted from the union and classified as "Associated States" given full control over their own domestic affairs but requi red to defer matters of foreign policy to Paris. Under France's Fourth Republic, Africans organized political parties for the first time. The initial crack in this association came wi t h France's crushing 1954 military defeat in Indochina; Moroccan and Tunisian independence followed two years later. In 1956 the French National Assembly passed a set of laws modifying the associational arrangement. These laws strengthened local governments and established universal suffrage in French African territories , weakening t he hand of colonial governors. France retained control of "state services" such as defense, external relations, police and courts , and the t reasu ry; "territorial services" such as education, health, and agriculture were handed over to local legislative assemblies. When the Fourth Republic collapsed in May 1958, Charles de Gaulle was called out of retirement to form a stable government. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, prom ulgated three months later, called for the creation of a "Community" (Communaute) of member states to replace the Union Fran<;aise and contained an unprecedented provision allowing for the independence of African territories. States decided by referendum in September 1958 whether to ratify the new constitution and stay in the Community with their own constitutions and powers similar to those they had under the Fourth Republic Of France's 12 colonies in sub-Saharan Africa , only Guinea, in fluenced by the radical president-to-be Ahmed Sekou Toure , voted against the constitution (96.7 percent of Guineans disapproved of the document). Paris subsequently severed all its ties to Guinea, pulled out its officials, and even dismantled the country's telephone system before leaving. At the same time , France refused to recognize Guinea's declaration of independence, sending a message to its other dependencies that any break with Paris would be total In the remaining II colonies , the presence of French administrators, technicians , and businesses was undiminished. When France assented to the independence of the rema ining members of t he Community in 1960, it did so out of a belief that this was the best means of ensuring the continuity of its influence in the region. In terms of administrative, military, and economic resources, all of the new countries were ill equipped to survive on their own . Thus, between 1959 and 1963, President de Gaulle's government negot iated "cooperation agreements" wi th its ex-colonies (excluding Guinea) and ex- UN Trust Territories (Cameroon and Togo ). These agreements , the precise details of which remain secret to this day, cover such issues as monetary matters, development assistance, education , telecommunications , and defense. They formed t he cornerstone of France's relations with francophone Africa. In short, a nominal "flag independence" was granted so that French commercial. m ilitary, and political influence could be preserved. Unlike other colonial powers such as Britain and later Portugal. France had no intention of making a clean break with its colonies . De Gaulle's administration established a pattern for the conduct of French diplomacy in Africa. De Gaulle felt a strong affinity for the continent, having received vital support from French colonies there during the war, and he counted many postindependence African heads of state among his close friends. For these reasons, relations with former colonies were managed not from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but directly from the president's office, where t he title of jacques Foccart, a businessman and loyal Gaullist with years of experience in francophone Africa, was changed from secretary general of the Community to adviser on African affairs. Foccart came to personify the system of intimate personal ties that France maintained with African leaders. His recently published memoirs reveal that he had sweeping authority not only in setting French policy but also in influencing the interna l affairs of former French colonies and locking out potential political or commercial challengers to French interests in the region. The pattern of active engagement established during de Gaulle's presidency ( 1959- 1969) would endure long after de Gaulle departed the political scene. In its self-assigned role as the continent's policeman, France seldom hesitated to come to the aid of its most valued African friends mi litarily In the two decades following independence, the French armed forces intervened in Mauritania, Senegal, Chad (twice). and Gabon to shore up regimes threatened by unrest. France also helped depose Central African Republic leader Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1979 when his autocratic rule became an embarrassment. De Gaulle's successors, Georges Pompidou ( 1969-1974) and Valery Giscard d'Estaing ( 19741981 ), were content to hold tightly to the "pre carre," albeit with more subtlety than de Gaulle had displayed. Giscard took a firm stance against the apartheid government in South Africa, something his predecessors were reluctant to do, and in 1978 reestablished relations with Guinea after two decades of alienation. While maintaining France's core relationship with its ex-colonies, both Pompidou and Giscard also expanded the French sphere of influence to CSIS AFRICA NOTES is a briefing paper series designed to serve the special needs of decision makers and analysts with Africa-related responsibilities in governments, corporations, the media, research institutions, universiti es, and other arenas. It is a publication of the African Studies Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington , D.C. CSIS is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit policy research institute founded in 1962. Editor: Chairman of African Studies Helen Kitchen Deputy Editor: J . Coleman Kitchen ISSN 0736-9506 CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 3 include formerly Belgian-administered (but French-speaking) Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi; these countries established links with the Franco-African community through participation in annual summits as well as economic and military cooperation with France. French paratroopers were deployed to Zaire in 1978 to help repel a rebel incursion in Shaba province and bolster the rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who had become one of France's strongest allies in the Central African region. The Mitterrand Years When Socialist candidate Fran<;:ois Mitterrand was elected president in 1981, many expected that the new administration would dramatically change the way France dealt with African countries. But despite his party's progressive ideology, Mitterrand proved to be old-fashioned when it came to African affairs. The new president had extensive experience with Africa beginning in the I940s and, like his predecessors, was a good friend of several African leaders. He did nothing to dismantle the system of direct presidential control over Africa policy and stood by while some of his cabinet members' attempts to roll back the network of privileged relationships were stymied. Reinforcing the role of personal networks in policy-making, Mitterrand named his son )ean-Christophe as deputy director of the presidency's Africa section. It soon became clear that France would continue to treat Africa differently from the rest of the world. During President Mitterrand's I4 years in office, the French military intervened IO times in sub-Saharan Africa, protecting friendly governments from rebellions and sometimes evacuating expatriates from strife-torn countries. Officers of the French intelligence services acted as the trusted but unobtrusive deputies of presidents in Chad and the Central African Republic. And it was in I990, during Mitterrand's second term, that French troops came to the aid of Rwandan President )uvenal Habyarimana when his regime was threatened by invasion. The French military presence in Rwanda lasted until Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash and his government forces routed from the country four years later. In the wake of Rwanda's I994 genocide, Mitterrand's steadfast support for Habyarimana's regime would severely undermine French influence in Central Africa. Although Mitterrand ensured overall continuity in the relationship with Africa, he made a few alterations. France began investing heavily in Nigeria's oil boom and allowed the former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea to join the Franc Zone in I985. But the core of the relationship-links with former French colonies and with fran cop hone Africawas not seriously disturbed until I990, when Mitterrand declared at a Franco-African summit that future French aid would be conditioned upon democratic reforms in recipient countries (see "The I990 Franco-African Summit" by J Coleman Kitchen and jean-Paul Paddack, CSJS Africa Notes no. II5 , August 1990). 'We must give a certain bonus to countries that adopt political pluralism," he told the gathered heads of state. "Aid will be more lukewarm toward regimes which conduct themselves in an authoritarian manner without accepting evolution toward democracy; it will be enthusiastic for those which take the step with courage." This was the first time that such a notion of "conditionality" (albeit in a moderate form) had received the public endorsement of a French president and, coinciding with the end of the cold war, it marked the beginning of the end of the era of one-party states that had predominated in Africa since independence. With the electoral victory of the conservatives in April I993, the stage was set for France's next round of policy reforms. The I993 election inaugurated a period of "cohabitation," during which the Socialist president was forced to work with a conservative prime minister and cabinet Balladur Rocks the Boat The cohabitation of I993 to I995 was the second of Mitterrand's rule; the first (from I986 to I988) had seen Jacques Chirac, then mayor of Paris, take over as prime minister. In I993, Chirac's former chief of staff. Edouard Balladur, was appointed to head the government Although a Gaullist, Balladur possessed few of the sentimental African connections held by previous prime ministers (not to mention presidents). and (in collaboration with Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain )uppe) he quickly initiated a reevaluation of French methods. He took steps to curtail the long-standing French practice of meeting recipient countries' "end ofthe month" expenses (usually civil service salaries) when governments were short of cash and announced that French development funds would in the future be channeled to projects rather than directly to African governments. His decision to link French aid to recipients' adoption of sound economic policy (as determined by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and fiscal discipline became known as the "Balladur Doctrine." The centerpiece of Balladur's reforms was the devaluation of the currency of most former French colonies in Africa, the CFA franc. The Franc Zone was essentially a continuation of the colonial monetary system; the CFA franc was supported by the French Treasury and had a fixed rate of parity with the French franc. This arrangement favored commerce between France and the countries of the Franc Zone because no foreign exchange mechanisms were needed to convert between the CFA franc and the French franc. The conversion rate had remained at 50 CFA francs per French franc since I948, and by the early I990s most analysts believed that the CFA franc had become highly overvalued. With the member countries of the Franc Zone enjoying an abnormally strong currency, the French Treasury was in effect subsidizing their imports of foreign consumer goods. In light of France's chronic budget deficits, this arrangement was unsustainable. In January I994 the exchange rate was changed to I 00-to-I . To ease the pain of the devaluation, Paris canceled the outstanding debt of the I 0 poorest Franc Zone countries with the French Treasury. Despite the belief of francophone African elites that they 4 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES had been "betrayed" by their erstwhile guardians, the rationale behind the devaluation was compelling. The move gave a much-needed boost to economic growth in the Franc Zone and especially to exports. The Bank of France estimated that the Zone as a whole recovered quickly from the initial shock and in 1995 posted the first real per capita GDP growth in years. Economic expansion in the West African member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) was measured at nearly 6 percent for I995, and is expected to remain at a similar level for I996. In the Central African member states (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon) it increased from 3 percent in I995 to nearly 5 percent in 1996. The benefits to France were equally important. "One of the biggest tragedies of the overvalued exchange rate was the number of local business that were going under because !African 1 governments couldn't pay them," says former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen. "The French were only thinking of stopping the budgetary hemorrhage from Paris, which was amounting to hundreds of millions per year, and saving the businesses that were going under, many of which were French." Mitterrand's second cohabitation was seen by many as a harbinger of more change in Franco-African relations. Minister of Foreign Affairs )uppe's "modernizers" had carried the day, directing French policy into uncharted waters. As Mitterrand's term came to an end, France was again poised for a redefin ition of its African role. Back to the Future: Chirac' s Africa Policy When jacques Chirac emerged as the victor in France's May 1995 presidential election, Africa watchers already had some idea of what to expect from him. As prime minister ( 1974I976 and I986-1988) and mayor of Paris ( I977-I995). Chirac had been active in African affairs and had shown his Gaull ist leanings by naming Jacques Foccart as his personal Africa adviser. During the following years, Chirac maintained his friendly association with Foccart and with many African heads of state. On the eve of his win in 1995, he vis ited de Gaulle's tomb at Foccart's suggestion Chirac's ideological differences with Mitterrand in matters of Africa policy were well known. True to his Gaullist roots, he opposed the direct linkage of cooperation to democratic and economic reforms and spoke derisively of the merit of multiparty systems in African politics, declaring them a "luxury." But he could not ignore the changes that had taken place in Africa since the end of the cold war. Shortly after Chirac's victory, Hugo Sada predicted in Jeune Afrique that "Jacques Chirac, even if he has often seemed skeptical as to the effectiveness of multiparty democracy, will not dispute the progress of democratization or the adaptations that it requires for French aid policy. But. at least as much as Franc;ois Mitterrand, he will know how to manage that evolution with subtlety-while refusing all forms of restrictive political conditionality" The old-fashioned tendencies Chirac displayed were tempered by the reformists within his own Rassemblement pour Ia Republique party, especially )uppe, whom he named his new prime minister. The policy team assembled in the first weeks of Chirac's administration reflected the dual character of conservative thinking on Africa . For every staunch advocate of "special treatment" for Africa, such as Minister-Delegate for Cooperation jacques Godfrain (a Foccart protege), there was a modernizer and )uppe ally such as jean-David Levitte, the head diplomatic adviser to the president. Even Godfrain's own chief of staff was a modernizer appointed at the request of the prime minister's office. These reformers' top priority was putting French public finances in order and slashing France's budget deficit in preparation for the expected January I, I999 advent of the common European currency (known as the euro). But if Chirac initially appeared wary of close association with members of the old guard, the balance tilted in favor of tradition when he made Foccart an "unofficial adviser" and gave him an office in the Elysee (the presidential palace) In July I995, Chirac undertook his first presidential visit to Africa, meeting with Franc Zone heads of state in three different "assembly points" (Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, and Senegal). He paid special attention to old friends such as Gabon's President Omar Bongo and spoke only vaguely of the "universal values of democracy" and the necessity of economic reform; he did not bring up any contentious topics such as respect for human rights. And he showed true Gaullist colors whi le in Gabon by railing against "the AngloSaxons JwhoJ dream of pushing France out of its position in Africa without paying the price " Chirac has managed fairly successfully to pursue a sort of "cohabitation" of old and new policies He blocked Prime Minister )uppe's attempt to merge the Ministry of Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but allowed Cooperation to be administratively "attached" to Foreign Affai rs. He sent troops to put down an embarrassing 1995 coup led by French mercenary Bob Denard in the Comoros and to protect a threatened President Ange-Felix Patasse in the Central African Republic in 1996. But he also launched a plan to end conscription, downsize the French military, and scale back some of its overseas commitments. He supported seriously flawed elections in Chad and Niger that allowed military leaders to remain in power, but endorsed democratic reforms for those countries at the parliamentary level He kept up the highly visible French presence in Africa, through personal vis its and active diplomacy, while allowing the permanent closure of some French embassies on the continent (in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Malawi) as a cost-cutting measure. And he lobbied effectively for the preservation of existing levels of aid to Africa from the European Union. At the nineteenth Franco-African summit, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in December 1996, Chirac reassured the governments of the Franc Zone that their currency would survive even after the French franc is replaced by the planned single European currency. He promised that the French treasury wou ld continue to back CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 5 The French Africa Policy Apparatus [Each entity's name in English is followed by its informal French name in parentheses.) The Presidency ("Elysee"). Since the end of the colonial era, the office of the president of the Republic has taken the lead in managing relations with France's former African possessions. Its international affairs specialists perform a role similar to that of the National Security Council at the White House. Dominique de Villepin, the secretary general of the presidency, directs policy on all issues foreign and domestic; he formerly worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Africa section. Jean-David Levitte, another diplomat with African experience, coordinates foreign policy as diplomatic adviser. The Cellule Africaine--the small group of Africa advisers based in the Elysee (the presidential palace)-maintains close personal friendships with African leaders and determines most major policy decisions regarding African countries. jacques Foccart headed the Cellule Africaine under successive presidents from 1960 to 1981. President Mitterrand's son Jean-Christophe held the position during part of Mitterrand's administration. After Chirac's election in 1995, Michel Dupuch (France's ambassador to Cote d'lvoire from 1979 to 1993) was named to lead the Cellule Africaine; Foccart, then 82 years old, was brought back as an unofficial adviser with an office in the Elysee The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Quai d'Orsay"). Under the leadership of Herve de Charette, the Quai d'Orsay is responsible for conducting French diplomacy abroad and overseeing French development assistance. The Direction des Affaires Africaines et Malgaches (Department of African and Malagasy Affairs) is currently headed by )ean-Didier Roizin. Other departments within the Quai d'Orsay with responsibility for Africa and foreign aid policy include the United Nations affairs office and the European affairs office, which coordinates with other donors in the region. The Ministry of Cooperation ("Rue Monsieur"). This ministry was created in 1961 specifically to oversee the CFA franc at its present level of parity. His pledge was greeted somewhat skeptically by the heads of state (Congolese President Pascal Lissouba, remembering past promises that the CFA franc would never be devalued, asked Chirac to put his prom ise in writing) When it comes to giving advice, Chirac has sought to promote pro-reform incentives rather than deliver lectures. In his opening speech at the Ouagadougou summit, he repeatedly stressed the importance of "good governance" as a prerequisite of peace and stability, while also issuing a mild warning that donors, with ever-decreasing aid budgets, would have less and less tolerance for governments that do not undertake meaningful reform. "Good governance has become the very condition of development," he said , "an absolute imperative that imposes itself as much on donors development, military, and cultural assistance programs promised under the cooperation accords between France and its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Its status as an exclusive interlocutor with Francophone Africa was diminished somewhat in 1995, when President Chirac placed the ministry under the supervision of the Quai d'Orsay (to which it had previously been attached from 1962 to 1974) and widened its responsibilities to include all 70 countries of the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) grouping, from Antigua to Zimbabwe. It nonetheless continues to play an important role in Africa, helping to fund a wide range of projects, from modernization of police forces to hospitals and education programs. Jacques Godfrain heads the ministry as ministerdelegate for cooperation. The Ministry of Economy and Finance ("Bercy"). As the primary economic-policy ministry, Finance has control over about 80 percent of French overseas development assistance and takes the lead in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. One of its components, the Treasury, is entrusted with the crucial tasks of shaping monetary policy toward the Franc Zone, canceling debt, and making contributions to international financial institutions. The Treasury is among the most powerful players in FrancoAfrican relations; its decisions can only be reversed by the president of the Republic. The French Development Fund ("CFD"). The Caisse Franc;:aise de Developpernent administers development aid projects overseas. Its work is monitored by no less than three cabinet ministries: Foreign Affairs, Cooperation , and Economy and Finance. Attempts during Mitterrand's first term to spin off the CFD as a semiautonomous organization met with stiff opposition and were shelved. The Fund's current director general is Antoine Pouillieute. as on recipient countries." Such a statement is probably as close to conditionality as Chirac is willing to go. Modifying the Policy Machine Chirac has done little to alter the structure of the policy mechanism (see "The French Africa Policy Apparatus") formed in de Gaulle's era. Despite its continuity, however, it has sometimes operated less than smoothly, revealing dissonances among its component parts. For example, the January 1996 coup d'etat in Niger was firmly condemned by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and resulted in the cessation of French aid to Niger. However, these ministries were soon forced to reevaluate their positions at the behest of the presidency; France later 6 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES resumed aid and endorsed a highl y questionable July election that kept the coup leader in power. Such inconsistencies in the system are not uncommon and have led to frequent calls for reform As Fran<;:ois Soudan wrote in Jeune Afrique (August 7, 1996), "It is not the indivi du al worth of those !offices ! that 'make' Africa policy that is in question, but their multiplicity and the sometimes Never has th e contradictory nature of the ir interventions. Africa n topography of Paris seemed so complicated. As seasoned an d ski ll ed users, Africans have quickly learned to exploit the rivalries among these centers of decision to get what they want." It is un likely, however, that the policy-making process wi ll be strea mlined. Each of the relevant institutions has an entrenched constituency, in Pari s and in Africa n cap ital s, that ardently res ists any move that wou ld diminish the institution's power. The governm ent is attempting t o coord in ate its poli cies through interage ncy meetings and has established an "i ntermini sterial com mittee on development aid" (ClAD ) to determine guidelines for French bi lateral and multilatera l assistance. The CIAO is chaired by the prime minister and assembles representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, Economy and Finance, and External Trade, as well as the French Development Fund and other institutions. Aid funding is a point of pride for France, which in 1996 contributed more "public aid for development" than any other donor in proportion to its GDP (0 55 percent ). Its 1996 aid budget amou nted to 45.5 billion francs, or approxim ately $9 bil lion . 60 percent of th is ass istance went to Afri ca. However, French aid has not been immune to pressures for retrenchments. Ai~ fundin g was 1.6 percent lower in 1996 than in t he previous year. Pri me Min ister Juppe comm issioned a report , issued in September 1995, that recommended a thorough overhaul of Fren ch overseas development assistance. Cha nge is taking pl ace, albeit slowly, in fou r main areas: • Sin ce the Balladur era, French ai d po licy has been evolvi ng away from "macro-cooperation" (treasury-totreasury transfers of fu nds) toward "m icrocooperation" (developm ent pro jects). This process , referred to as "Ia decentralisation," sti ll has a long way to go. Funding for grassroots pro jects, supervised by the French Development Fu nd, currently represents only 2 percent of French aid, whil e 80 percent is dispensed in large sums by the Mini st ry of Economy and Finance. • Growing emphasis sho uld be expected on privatesector involvement in development, whi ch is needed to fill the void left by diminishing state resources. In t he future, t he French Development Fund and other government institutions will have more responsibilities in the realm of sma ll busi ness development and the promotion of "favorabl e business environments" in Afri ca n countries. • France is working with the governments of Cameroon , Congo, Cote d'lvoire, and Gabon (the only Franc Zone countries whose debts to France were not cance led foll owing t he 1994 deval uation) to convert their debt into funding for economi c development and environmental projects. • The aid distribution mechan ism itself is expected to be stream lin ed. In t he past , the French bureaus that disburse aid fun ding have frequently battled for control over projects. Compli cations in the process have made it prone to mismanagement and abuse. "France is t he last great country to defend developm ent aid relentless ly, but it doesn't know how to make the most of what it's doing in the field ," one Fren ch official told Le Monde (November 7, 1995). By 1997, th e overseas development contri butions of all government agencies are to be brought together into a single bu dget, rendering the ent ire aid operation more transparent and smoothly ad min istered. Still in the di scussion stage is t he future of the practice kn own as "a ide liee," whi ch li nks delivery of French aid to th e purchase of French goods. This type of aid constitutes 50 percent of bi lateral aid to former colon ies. A controversia l report by parliamentarian Yves Marchand has ca lled for the scrapping of this practice, saying that it limits competition and hinders econom ic developm ent. Policy Hot Spots Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region . Fra nce's involvement with Rwa nda dat es back more than a quarter century. The tiny ( I 0, 169-square-mile) Central African country was included in the Franco-African sum mit "family" in 1970 and signed a tech ni ca l military ass istance agreement with France in 1975. Pres ident Habyarimana , a Hutu military offi cer who took power in 1973, enjoyed strong support from France throughout his in cum bency. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel army of exiles mostly drawn from Rwanda's Tutsi min ority, attacked from Ugan da in 1990, about 300 French sold iers were dispatched to Rwanda to secure key points and evacuate expatri ates. More rein forcements were sent in 1993 as the fighting intensified. Fre nch t roops were not directly involved in combat duri ng Rwanda's four-year civil war, but they occu pied strategic pos itions around the cap ital of Kiga li and provided advisers and arti ll ery support for the Forces Armees Rwanda ises (FAR), the governm ent arm y. Some human rights groups also al lege that French offi cers were involved in the training of ci vilian mi litia called "interahamwe." When the plane carrying President Habyarimana, along with his Burundian cou nterpart, crashed nea r the Ki gali airport on April 6, 1994, a fragile peace accord between the RPF and the FAR was shattered. Withi n hou rs of the cras h, killings had risen to un precedented levels and it became clear that a prepared campaign of extermi nation target ing all opponents of the Rwandan govern ment was under way. Th e FAR and t he interahamwe carried out mass executi ons of civilians, mostly Tutsi, and th e RPF began a new thrust to overthrow the regime in Kiga li. CSIS AFRICA NOTES I 7 Throughout the early days of what would later be termed a genocide, French officials continued to receive Rwandan government emissaries. In late june, as the disorganized and demoralized FAR troops were on the verge of being completely expelled from the country by the RPF, France intervened. It launched a military mission, dubbed "Operation Turquoise," ostensibly to provide safe havens for the thousands of refugees fleeing the fighting in western Rwanda. About 2,500 troops , based in eastern Zaire, participated in the mission. The RPF accused France of extricating its former clients responsible for genocide, and reports filtered back of French officers helping their Rwandan counterparts reach safety in Zaire. When the scope of the killings in Rwanda became known (some 500,000 were believed to have perished, out of a prewar population of 7 million), the French government advanced the theory of a "double genocide," in which the interahamwe and the RPF were equally responsible for the massacres of innocents. It also attempted to block aid from the European Union to the newly installed RPF regime in Kigali In june I 995, a report by Human Rights Watch accused France of continuing to arm the extremists of the interahamwe and ex-FAR in their Zairian refugee camps, with the complicity of Zaire's government. The lasting effect of the Turquoise misadventure is that France is increasingly sensitive to criticism of its role in the region and is unlikely to go it alone, not just in Central Africa but elsewhere. The cost of Operation Turquoise , estimated at $200 million, heightened opposition to such missions among French military planners and in the French public "Henceforth, the era of unilateral interventions in Africa is over," President Chirac told a council of ministers in November I 996, "and this type of intervention is no longer accepted by African states." As of late I 996, the Great Lakes region is experiencing a renewed crisis involving escalating tension in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. This time, France is attempting to exercise its influence in a more subtle fashion. Paris is participating through the UN in discussions over possible humanitarian missions to assist refugees in Zaire. One of the anchors of French influence in the region appears to be giving way, however. Chirac, like his predecessors, staked his Central Africa policy on the seemingly interminable rule of Zaire's President Mobutu. Now, Mobutu is suffering from prostate cancer and his health has deteriorated dramatically in I 996. This turn of events has prompted a search for other options. Chirac is still lobbying for the establishment of a UN-sponsored conference on peace in the Great Lakes region, which he considers a prerequisite for any lasting solution. Immigration. Immigration has become a hot-button issue in France. Public opinion increasingly faults illegal immigrants as contributing to a I 2 percent rate of unemployment. Statistics are unreliable, but France is believed to be home to at least 3 million immigrants, many of whom have entered illegally. Most of these people come from North Africa; there are also sizable numbers from sub- Saharan countries. President Chirac came to office promising firm action against illegal immigration, and under his administration a campaign of immigrant repatriation has been carried out. Using chartered aircraft, officials organized several "mass expulsions" of illegals to their home countries. Border controls were also tightened; 70,000 would-be immigrants were denied entry in I 995. The French government is aware that turning immigrants back at the border, or sending them home after they arrive, is a costly and ineffective policy, and generates bad press. The August I 996 "St. Bernard affair," in which hundreds of immigrants were forcibly expelled from a Paris church in which they had taken refuge, was especially embarrassing to French officials. Therefore programs have been established aimed at discouraging the flow of emigrants from poorer (particularly African) countries. Minister-Delegate for Cooperation Godfrain recently visited Mali, whose impoverished western region has generated thousands of "economic refugees," in an effort to set up long-term programs that would entice Malians to stay home. The French government already has programs in place in Mali to provide incentives (including grants to establish small businesses) for immigrants in France to return home voluntarily. At the same time, Godfrain and other officials recognize that although immigration is a worry for the French, it is a vital support for impoverished African economies. One of Mali's largest sources of revenue , for example, is the money sent from its expatriates in France to their families back home, which amounts to as much as $60 million each year (by comparison, official French bilateral aid to Mali is about $90 million annually). For this reason, the Chirac administration, respecting the development role played by those immigrants who are in France legally, will not go too far in its anti-immigration crackdown. Military Presence. As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the French armed forces, the number of troops stationed abroad (apart from those in the former Yugoslavia) will be scaled back from 56,000 to 39,000 by the year 2002. Of French bases in Africa, only the one in Djibouti-the largest-is to be spared from the wave of cuts; those in the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal will be "reorganized" Although the extent of the force reduction in Africa has not been made public, overall troop strength on the continent is believed to have dropped from I 2,000 to 8,000 since I 994, and may decline even more. As important as the numbers will be the change in the structure of French forces. Troops will be increasingly concentrated in remote rural bases so as to reduce the risk of their becoming embroiled in civil unrest, as happened three times in Bangui (the capital of the Central African Republic) in I 996. They will also stay for shorter periods of time; the two-year tours that many French soldiers currently serve in Africa will be phased out in favor of four-month training deployments. Such changes have aroused strong resistance from 8 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES Francophone African leaders, who have relied heavily on the security guarantees provided by France. "The development of our countries, especially Cote d'lvoire, has only been possible because we were rid of the worry of facing conflicts or exterior aggression," lvorian President Henri Konan Bedie told Le Monde (December 16, 1995). But such objections, as in the case of the CFA franc devaluation , have thus far been politely ignored in Paris. As it scales back in former dependencies, the French military is increasing its ties with nontraditional military partners such as the South African Nationa l Defense Force. In late 1996, French paratroopers joined in "Operation Southern Cross," South Africa's largest ann ual military exercise, marking the first-ever participation by foreign troops. Analysts believe that France's armed forces , thanks to a light force structure and years of operational experience in former colonies , are better suited than any other Western military to share expertise with African armies. France and the United States When U.S. Secretary of State Christopher began an October 1996 tour of Africa in the former French West African colony of Mali , French Minister-Delegate for Cooperation Godfrain could not contain his sarcasm: "Since Bill Clinton hasn't been to Africa once, since he didn't mention Africa in his speech before the UN General Assembly, and since U.S. foreign development aid has diminished by 15 percent. I'm delighted to see the president showing interest in Africa and making it a priority three weeks before the presidential elections " A Department of State spokesma n promptly condemned Godfrain's remarks, and Secretary of State Christopher responded a few days later by inserting a veil ed reference to France into one of his speeches in South Africa: "The time has passed when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers cou ld view whole groups of states as their private domain ." Such a diplomatic spat, rare between allies, drew wide attention. But is the riva lry over Africa as great as is often suggested in both the French and U.S. media? A review of the major categories of U.S. and French interests in the continent indicates that there is more smoke than fire to the supposed contention. Political Goals. U.S. and French strategies in Africa are certainly marked by ideological differences. Chief among these is the approach toward democratization. Where their African allies are concerned, the French are often suspected of being at best less than committed to democratic principles, and at worst of supporting the status quo ante. But even some policymakers in Washington believe that the low standards set by France for its Afri can partners (and notably Chad and Niger) are probably more pragmatic in many cases than the absolute U.S. insistence on rapid progress. One senior U S. official describes the U S approach as "democracy at any price" and the French approach as "democracy where it makes sense." The French, for their part, resent the slashing of the U S. government's foreign aid budget and question the extent of U.S. com mitment. "Americans' concern for Africa ceases as soon as it's necessary t o get out their wallets," Le Monde opined in October 1996. The French also worry about consistent U.S. support for regimes born from resistance movements or "rebel elites" (e.g. , Uganda, Rwanda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and even South Africa). This tendency in many cases seems risky and potentially destabilizing to the French , who prefer a more conservative approach. Differences such as these have built up such a reserve of mistrust that many U.S. officials carry an innate suspicion of French motives. "The automatic assumption is, 'Oh God, if the French have said X, then Y must be true,"' one says. On a majority of issues, however, there is harmony between the two countri es, a fact sometimes obscured by heated political rhetoric. For example, the recent U.S. proposa l for an African crisis response force, which evoked such a hostile response in Paris, was in form and intent nearly identical to an earlier French plan to establish an indigenous African peacekeeping capacity. "!The French! saw more of a UN role, we saw more of an OAU role, but it was a question of emphasis as opposed to real black-andwhite kinds of differences," says a senior U S official who worked on the proposal. "We were both going the same way, but the way we were talking to each other, we weren't hearing that. " Most important, both sides realize that they can rely on mutual cooperation when critical situations arise in Africa. When unrest gripped the Central African Republic in 1996, French soldiers helped evacuate U.S. nationals along with their own expatriates. No one on either side ever wondered whether they would do otherwise, and the United States would certainly return the favor under similar circumstances . As I. William Zartman of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies puts it, "Where it really matters, we can't do it alone." Economic Goals. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 12 1 French industrial companies and 68 French banks or insurance companies were operating in sub-Saharan Africa in 1993. By compa rison, only 48 manufacturers and 12 banks or insurers from North America were present in that year French banks have about S12 billion of investments in the region, versus S2 billion invested there by U.S. banks. French goods also account for one-ha lf of all exports from industrialized countries to the countries of the Franc Zone. But the French have, perhaps inadvertently, undercut their own dominance in Francophone Africa by encouraging their African partners to rely on support from international financial institutions. Thanks to World Bank insistence on full transparency in government. there is less latitude for backroom business deals between African officials and "preferred" French clients The Bank's monitors ensure that no specia l preference is given as African countries sell off their state-owned companies . The Bank is also fostering competition through involvement with African infrastructure projects. It is certa inly more evenhanded in awarding CSIS AFRICA NOTES /9 contracts than many African governments had been, and as a result non-French firms stand a better chance than ever before of winning contracts in francophone Africa. Meanwhile, the predicted 1999 linkage of the CFA franc to a common European currency would strip away one of the greatest advantages enjoyed by French companies in the Franc Zone, further weakening the French commercial hold on many African countries' economies. Even with a more level business "playing field," however, will the Americans show sufficient interest to challenge the French? At least in the near term, the likelihood is not great. According to former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Cohen, the French "see the United States as a rival, but they don't really understand that Africa is not ready for the United States. . . The United States is interested in extractive industry sti ll , and telecommunications, but when it comes to manufacturing of various kinds, as Africa opens up to foreign trade, the countries that will really be competing with France are South Africa, Malaysia, and places like Hong Kong. America is not really competitive, and the problem with France is that it's not really competitive Jeither], against this other kind of competition." The French daily newspaper Liberation (November 22, 1996) agrees: "American engagement in Africa remains minimal: trade rather than aid, ad hoc support rather than Except in a few lucrative slots, such as formal al liances. oil and telecommunications, their goal is not to supplant the ex-colonial power, for fear of having to assume its obligations." France must branch out to new African markets if it is to maintain its commercial lead. There is no room for expansion in the francophone countries. Indeed, the French business presence there is declining; the number of employees of French firms in sub-Saharan Africa dropped nearly 12 percent from 1991 to 1994. The story in South Africa, however, is entirely different. The number of French employees shot up by 70 percent in 1994 alone. French banks are flourishing in Johannesburg. French trade has been growing at 5 to 10 percent annually; today South Africa is the largest sub-Saharan market for French exports. It stands to reason that whatever commercial competition may arise between France and the United States in Africa will be in markets such as southern Africa , wel l outside the "pre carre" and the traditional zone of French interest. Cultural Goals. Cultural issues in international affairs are often overlooked by Americans, who are not given to worrying over the survival of their culture, or even whether they have one at all. On the other hand, culture is extremely important to the French. They value the role of their language, media, and art in uniting France with other countries around the world. In his book France in Black Africa (Washington, D.C. National Defense University, 1989), Francis Terry McNamara argues that "lt Jhe resources and energy that the French continue to put into reinforcing and spreading their culture may be the most potent long-term investment in maintaining the close ties between France and her ex-colonies." French "cultural assistance" is a big-ticket item , amounting to some 5 billion francs annua lly This includes outreach through French-language print and broadcast media, university scholarsh ips, and film. (Interestingly, the French government has even proposed a financial assistance program for the South African fi lm industry) Another major French endeavor is support for "la francophonie," a summit of French-speaking countries convened every two years. The 1995 francophone summit in Benin added a political dimension to the group by creating for itself a permanent secretary general position; this post would be filled at the 1997 summit in Vietnam, and embattled UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is rumored to be a top candidate. Even the modernizers in the French government feel strongly about the need to protect their national identity. "Never has the French language been so threatened by what appears to be the irresistible ascent of English, or rather that impoverished Anglo-American !dialect]," declared thenMinister of Foreign Affairs )uppe in 1994. And the worst was yet to come. In January 1996, under the influence of its Ugandan-educated returned exiles, Rwanda became the first francophone African country to adopt English as an officia l language alongside French. In September, the Algerian government announced that English wou ld replace French as the main foreign language taught in Algerian schools. Even in those countries firmly in the francophone camp, actual French speakers make up a small minority. According to French government figures, only 15 percent of inhabitants of the former French colonies in Africa are considered fully functional in French (the country with the highest proportion of francophones is Congo, with 30 percent; the lowest is Chad, with 5 percent) Nonetheless, the French language remains a vita l part of the culture for the educated elites that constitute the political classes in these countries. Through the defense and propagation of their culture in Africa and around the world, the French seek to preserve their prominence in international affairs. They do not want to be just another European country Although officials of the Chirac adm inistration insist that France has warm relations with Washington, they also advocate a "multi polarity" in which France offers an alternative to U S. hegemony. Most countries "are keen on a multipolar world, " says Minister of Foreign Affairs Herve de Charette. "They wou ld not wish to live in a unipolar world with a single big power setting the standards of right and wrong and laying down the line for everybody else. In this context, people very often turn toward France." If their country is viewed as complementary to-not a rival with-U .S. power, the French could maintain what they see as their rightful place on the world stage. This desire, more than any specific disagreement over concrete political or economic policy issues, would appear to be the most likely source of future friction between the United States and France. For the diplomatic gulf separating the two countries to be narrowed, the current exchange of mutual misperceptions that constitutes French-U.S. dialogue must be replaced by 10 I CSIS AFRICA NOTES genuine discussion of issues and goals. Policy initiatives such as the U.S proposal for an African crisis response force must be planned with greater sensitivity to the concerns of allies and marketed internationally with greater finesse. And both sides must understand that Africa continues to matter a great deal more to France tha n it does to the United States. Had he known the extent of U.S public indifference to African issues, for example, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation Godfrain would never have characterized Secretary of State Christopher's trip to Africa as a preelection ploy Looking Ahead: Can France Let Go? Despite many changes in policy, it is clear that t he old thinking about Africa persists in many circles of French government. and that French officials often have trouble seeing t heir former colonies as fully sovereign states. As Godfrain said proudly in a Jeune Afrique interview (September 21, 1995). "For our African friends , Paris is a second capital. We ourselves have a way of getting along with ]African leaders ] that's not normal between foreigners ." Although spokesmen such as Godfrain prefer to cast the relationship in terms of friendship rather than dependency, many Africans do not share their views. Parts of Francophone Africa have grown restive over France's heavyhanded role in the continent. President Alpha Oumar Konan§ of Mali expressed his pique by staying away from President Chirac's 1995 West African minisummit. Mali has also been expanding its ties with the United States and China. In 1996 Konan§ became the only leader of a former French colony to receive both U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and Chinese President Jiang Zemin. In the Central African Republic, anti-French sentiment is at an alltime high; mutinous troops have battled French soldiers three times in 1996, and in May angry mobs burned down the French cultural center in Bangui. Rising assertiveness in Africa and the public outcry over French involvement in Rwanda have eroded support for the t raditiona l privileged Franco-African bond. 'The future for France is to let Africa live, not to kill it off by stirring up wars," says Jean-Christophe Rufin, a former official in the French M in istry of Defense. Indeed, many believe that the old Africa relationsh ip will not outlast the current French administration. "I thin k once Chirac goes, it will all collapse ," says Cohen . "It's even starting to go while he's still there. " Others believe that the various lobbies seeking to reta in the traditional approach to Franco-African relations are too extensive and influential to be shunted aside easily. These lobbies include a sizable portion of the French business class (which believes that long-term French commercial interests are at stake) as well as powerful African heads of state (e.g., Gabon 's Omar Bongo, Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema , and Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore) who would suffer from any French disengagement. Many observers therefore argue that a simultaneous generational change of leadership in France and in Francophone Africa would be necessary to alter the relationship fundamentally. Whatever happens in Paris and in African capitals , the French connection will endure, at least in some form, as long as other developed countries remain reluctant to get involved in Africa. "You can't imagine how suffocated we feel. " an unnamed African official told the New York Times (October 17, 1996) "All over, people realize that we will never go forward by just depending on the French to manage our affairs. But until there are some other players on the field, no one can afford to fiddle with their ties with Paris. " And when players capable of challenging the French on that field do arrive, they will be more likely to come from Johannesburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Beijing than from Washington or New York. Bruce Whitehouse joined the CSIS African Studies Program staff in 1992 after a period of study in francophone Africa. His previous contributions to CS/S Africa Notes are "Zaire at the Crossroads" (with Shawn McCormick), issue no. 166 (November 1994), and "Who 's Who, and Where: A Guide to Key Personalities in U.S.-African Relations" (with M . Herman Yam) , issue no. 176 (September 1995). He is departing CSIS in December 1996 to work on an environmental resource management project in Mali. The author wishes to thank Ambassador Herman Cohen of the Global Coalition for Africa, Frangois-Xavier Verschave of Survie in Paris, I. William Zartman of the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the French Embassy in Washington, D.C., and all others who contributed to his research for this article.